The German traffic light coalition government of the Social Democrats, Free Democrats and Greens (respectively red, yellow and green) has fallen. So has the French minority government led by Michel Barnier of Les Republicains. Now, neither France nor Germany has a government or a budget. Note this has not happened before.

Social divisions and political polarization

Germany and France are the two beating hearts of the EU. They created the EU and still drive it. With both in political limbo, the EU is lost.

Internally, both these countries are no longer homogenous or cohesive anymore. They have experienced unprecedented levels of immigration. This has created problems of assimilation since, unlike the US, Europe does not have a tradition of mass immigration. In Germany and France, immigrants form a greater percentage of the population in the US. Furthermore, Muslim immigrants in these countries tend to be more conservative than the local population or even their relatives back home. For example, German Turks voted for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in much higher percentages than in Turkey. Many Muslim women also tend to wear headscarves in societies where sunbathing nude or topless is no longer a big deal.

Most people find change uncomfortable. Europeans are no exception. People do not like the way their communities are changing so rapidly. They may not be racist, but they want to retain their character. The French want to remain French and the Germans want to preserve their Germanness. Yet the political correctness that blights expression in the US also censors conversations in Europe. If someone is uncomfortable with headscarves or Turks voting for Erdoğan, she or he is denounced as a racist and an Islamophobe. People find such denunciation deeply alienating and often turn to the far right in revolt.

European economies are in big trouble

Economically, European countries are in trouble. They have huge debts, high deficits, slow productivity growth and low birth rates. There is no way Greece or Italy can pay back all their debts. Furthermore, the Russia–Ukraine War has increased energy prices, weakened industry and unleashed inflation in the economy. People are hurting. Naturally, they do not want to keep paying for a war with no end in sight.

In contrast, European elites have committed themselves to Ukraine’s defense. So, they want to keep spending on the war even as they seek budget cuts elsewhere. Naturally, legislators are unable to agree upon the cuts and governments are falling. At the moment, no resolution to the budget crisis in either Berlin and Paris is in sight.

The euro is not the world’s reserve currency. That privilege belongs to the dollar; so, unlike the US, Europe cannot print money to finance its deficits and prosecute endless war. So, Germany, France and the EU find themselves in a bind; their monetary and fiscal options are limited.

Europe has other problems too. Europe needs to increase the flexibility of its labor markets. Given an aging population, this can only happen with immigration and less rigid labor laws. The oppressive regulatory state is throttling growth and needs urgent reform. None other than German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has called for a war on red tape despite his socialist roots. European countries also have to reform and even shrink the welfare state. Only British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ever really achieved that in the last 50 years in Europe.

European economies have also suffered from external shocks. Chinese demand has declined and the US has taken a protectionist turn under both Republican and Democratic administrations. This protectionism will only increase once Donald Trump takes charge of the White House in January.

At a time of such upheaval, European political culture is in total flux. The traditional left and right are dead in France. They have been replaced by a constellation of pro-business centrists, the far right and a hodgepodge combination of leftist groups. German politics is also fragmenting, and the rise of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) shows the degree of disaffection with the status quo in a country still haunted by Adolf Hitler. Something was not right in the state of Denmark and some things are certainly not hunky dory in Europe today. A full-blown crisis is now underway.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: Why is the EU in Crisis? What Lies Ahead? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Republics have suffered total collapses throughout history. There’s no reason why the US should be immune. The fear of that often prompts a superficial reference to the final fall of the Roman Republic or the end of Greek democracy. But there’s a deeper history: Republics came into being far earlier in Middle Eastern and Mediterranean civilizations. And we can draw from a much wider range of examples to learn from as we try to understand the challenges and the opportunities.

A true republic is a political system without monarchy or concentrated political power in any office, branch or individual. Elected officials represent citizens to make decisions on their behalf, with separate branches of government providing checks and balances. While many associate republics with direct democracy in our times, there’s a much wider array of power structures that developed in the formative era of republics.

The 20th century established republics as the global standard. Monarchies declined after World War I and most former European colonies declared independence as republics following World War II. Fascist and communist countries, which centralized power in individuals or ruling parties, also reduced in number.

Despite their concentration of power, however, many fascist and communist states claimed the title of republics. While countries out of 193 identify as republics today, far less uphold republican principles and blend them effectively with democracy. Examining the historical evolution of republics highlights those best positioned to serve as the most resilient modern examples.

Republics require regular gatherings and assemblies, making them difficult to establish in sparsely populated agrarian societies, while empires generally concentrate power too heavily for self-rule to gain traction. It was in smaller city-states, particularly trade-focused ones, where citizens could form factions, exchange ideas and influence government decisions and rules for commerce.

The invention of republican ideals

Some of the earliest experiments with republican governance appeared in ancient Sumerian city-states (4500–2000 BC), centered in modern-day Iraq. Kings acted more as neutral rather than rulers, sharing power with aristocratic families and groups, as well as common citizens. In Kish, citizens could a new king during crises. In Uruk, assemblies of townsmen and elders had to ratify major military decisions.

The Sumerian city-states fell to the Akkadian and Babylonian Empires by 1750 BC. Phoenician city-states, emerging about 250 years later in what is now Lebanon, revived republican ideals. Here, monarchical power was often with a merchant class and citizen council. Egyptian records dating to the mid-14th century BC describe Phoenician cities sending delegates to represent citizens rather than monarchs, with mentions of and aid requests by the “men of Arwad” and “elders of Irqata.”

By the 6th century BC, the Phoenician city of Tyre had functioned for seven years without a monarch, governed instead under suffetes, or judges, elected for short terms. In Chios, a “people’s council” allowed citizens to debate laws and hold officials accountable. However, beginning in the 9th century BC and continuing over the next few centuries, Phoenician city-states were successively conquered or subjugated by the Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian and Macedonian Empires.

Like other civilizations, Phoenicians established colonies and trading posts. Carthage, founded by Tyre in 814 BC in modern Tunisia, grew into a powerful city-state with its own . By the early 7th century BC, two elected suffetes from aristocratic families replaced the monarchy. They governed alongside an aristocratic Senate, while newer merchants could gain influence and a popular assembly allowed citizens’ input on major decisions. Military and religious leaders also held considerable power.

Republican ideals weren’t confined to Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. Buddhist texts like the Maha Parinibbana Sutta mention Indian republics called in the 6th century BC. Some adopted republican styles of government, while others formed republican confederations, like Sumerian and Phoenician city-states, to make decisions collectively and protect against larger threats. The Indian republics were gradually absorbed by the Maurya Empire (321–185 BC) and other entities.

Greece and Rome evolved republics

Ancient Greek city-states also developed republican ideals. Sparta was governed by a constitution and popular assembly as early as 600 BC, though it remained largely monarchical. Athens established a direct democracy in 507 BC, known as demokratia, meaning “people” and “rule.” Greece’s slave-based economy allowed some citizens time to participate in politics, though this limited political fairness. In 431 BC, Attica, the region surrounding Athens, had an estimated population of 315,000, of which only 172,000 were citizens, and just 40,000 male citizens could vote.

Still, Athens’s allowed these citizens to frequently debate, deliberate and vote. They were overseen by the Council of Five Hundred, which was chosen annually by lot to draft laws and manage administration. However, following Athens’s Golden Age, 4th century BC Greek like Plato and Aristotle, and later 2nd century BC historians like Polybius, criticized the system for inefficiency and vulnerability to charismatic leaders to sway public opinion, leading to volatile policy shifts.

They emphasized balancing public, aristocracy, and monarchical roles to avoid the typical of chaos and order: First, a strong leader unites a restive society under a monarchy, which evolves into tyranny. It is overthrown and replaced by an aristocracy, which reduces into oligarchy. Democracy eventually replaces it but deteriorates into mob rule, restarting the cycle.

Invasions further weakened Greece’s republican and democratic systems. In 338 BC, Greece fell under the control of the Macedonian Empire, ending the independence of many city-states. Despite this, Greek states formed republican confederations to protect against threats, including the neighboring Roman Republic. The term republic derives from the Roman res publica, meaning “public affairs” — this emphasizes shared governance, civic participation and checks and balances. Since its founding in 509 BC, the Roman Republic’s political structure had evolved considerably. Polybius expressed for Rome’s system; two tribunes were elected annually to represent the common citizens, while two consuls were elected and held executive power, checked by an aristocratic senate.

Romans were skeptical of Greek democracy, especially in Athens, due to its instability, infighting and mob rule. Carthage’s republic seemed overly commercial and lacked the civic loyalty the Romans valued. This loyalty was central to Rome’s military, staffed by a citizen army motivated by . In contrast, Carthage’s strong, citizen-led navy protected trade routes, but its reliance on mercenaries for land campaigns made them costly and unpredictable.

These factors reduced the ability to push back against Roman rule. By 146 BC, Rome defeated both Greece and Carthage, cementing its dominance and expanding political system. Polybius suggests that Rome’s success over Carthage was partially due to its powerful, aristocratic Senate, while Carthage’s policies were increasingly shaped by popular influence. He believed that Rome’s decisions were made by elites versus the influence of the masses in Carthage.

Yet by this time, Rome was approaching its Late Republic phase. Scholar Harriet Flower’s argues that the Roman Republic wasn’t a single entity but a series of six republics, each with unique political characteristics. Others have also challenged the notion of a single Roman Republic, placing Republican Rome into three main periods characterized by changing centers of power.

The Early Republic (509–367 BC) was marked by tensions between patricians (aristocratic elites) and plebeians (common citizens). The struggle for plebeian rights led to significant reforms, including the establishment of tribunes, elected by the to represent common interests and often from the plebeian class.

During the Middle Republic (367–133 BC), the Licinian-Sextian laws of 367 BC were passed to again alleviate tensions between patricians and plebeians, limiting patrician land ownership, providing debt relief for plebeians and ensuring that at least one of the two consuls was a plebeian. However, political power increasingly concentrated in the Senate, undermining these reforms.

During the Late Republic (133–31 BC), Rome’s military success over rivals coincided with the growing influence of ordinary citizens in the judicial system, especially as jurors. Yet the republic was plagued by social conflict, corruption and civil unrest. Sulla’s march on Rome in 88 BC and his curtailing of the tribunes’ power exemplified rising instability. Afterwards, figures like in the ’70s BC and Julius Caesar in 59 BC began consolidating power, further undermining republican values. In 27 BC, Augustus formally transitioned Rome into an empire, while maintaining the of republican traditions.

Roman orator Cicero, a prominent defender of the Republic, inadvertently its demise through his support for Augustus, endorsement of dictatorial powers and willingness to suspend legal norms during crises, showing the dangers of sacrificing republican ideals to manage turmoil. For the next few centuries, republican ideals were largely sidelined.

The rise of modern republics

The collapse of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD saw and monarchies spread across its former territories and peripheral regions. This instability nonetheless allowed new republics to emerge, such as Venice, founded in 697 AD. It maintained a 1,100-year run as a through a political system that encouraged merchant participation and representation, shrewd diplomacy, social mobility, community cohesion and an extensive trade network. France eventually conquered it in 1797.

During the Italian Renaissance (14th to 17th centuries), urbanization, advancements in communication and Enlightenment ideals enabled the rise of new city-states. Merchant classes and other groups established republican systems as alternatives to European monarchies elsewhere as well. However, they were ultimately absorbed by empires, partly due to their inability to exploit the expanding Atlantic trade routes that reduced the importance of the Mediterranean.

Republics were not confined to Europe. The in modern-day Malaysia, particularly the Lanfang Republic declared in 1777, arose when Chinese settlers recruited by local sultans for mining formed companies to safeguard their interests. Over time, they evolved into self-governing territories with elected leaders and various levels of democratic governance. The Lanfang Republic was eventually defeated by Dutch colonial forces in 1884, with the rest absorbed through treaty or militarily defeated by the century’s end.

The establishment of the US marked the reemergence of the large-scale republican state. In 1787, after the American Revolution, the nation formally became a constitutional republic, aiming to eliminate monarchy while avoiding a chaotic direct democracy. The Founding Fathers created a , balancing public participation with safeguards against aristocracy and emphasizing consent of the governed (though limited to white male landowners). The debates over constitutional amendments and expanding democracy for decades, paralleling similar discussions in post-Revolutionary France after 1789.

Today, many republics exist, but their authenticity and stability can be compromised. Being conquered imposes outside authority, while others pursue foreign expansion themselves, centralizing control and subjugating other territories. Republics such as those in 16th century Netherlands, 17th century England and 18th century US and France grew into empires or reverted to monarchies, adapting in ways whose lessons are still relevant today. These expansionist policies, often justified as essential for wealth and security, led to the abandonment of certain republican and democratic principles.

Risks of devolution

Republics can shift toward authoritarianism, with modern policymakers perceiving more open democratic systems as unstable and vulnerable to manipulation. In recent years, China and Russia have seen reductions in public accountability, civil liberties, meaningful political participation and concentrations of power behind Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, respectively. In North Korea, power has been concentrated in the leader’s office since its founding, with leadership passed within the Kim family. Similarly, a dynasty has developed under the Aliyev family in since the 1990s, with concerns that may follow.

Countries with strong presidential systems, common in the Americas, risk in the executive branch. Fixed terms limit the removal of unpopular leaders, since, unlike in parliamentary democracies, no “confidence vote” mechanism exists for crisis situations. can also weaken checks and balances; coups can be common.

Alliances and federations of Greek city-states like the and , as well as the Native American , formed assemblies and councils for representation and collective decision-making, influencing models like the and European Union (EU). The statement that the US is “a republic, not a democracy” reflects the original aim to keep political power within the states rather than the federal government. However, authority has increasingly centralized in Washington, DC, reducing state sovereignty, tensions in the EU between individual states and Brussels.

Political apathy and extremism can also stem from the influence of billionaires and corporations over the political process, government corruption and the erosion of social mobility. Social media platforms offer the chance for heightened political participation, but are increasingly vulnerable to disinformation spread by big tech and political actors. This reveals new ways in which democracies can veer toward .

The diversity of republics today reflects their historical variety, with countries still navigating the governance structures in their own contexts. Kazakhstan, initially authoritarian, has seen some toward a more balanced system with a more powerful parliament following popular protests in 2022, though it remains less democratic. Similarly, Singapore, often described as authoritarian, is still considered a republic due to some , maintaining a blend of controlled leadership and political structure.

The future of republic governance

An informed and engaged citizenry, supported by a strong economic base, is essential for a successful republic. Citizens must feel the benefits of their system, and these must endure through fair elections, the rule of law and due process. Effective foreign policy also relies on wide-ranging trade networks and adaptable alliances, while maintaining a strong military and avoiding military overreach or falling into the trap of foreign conquest.

Historically, empire and monarchy have been more common than republics, shaping world order through hierarchical and anarchic systems. Within the global United Nations framework, which is designed to support the sovereignty and equality of nations — a principle rooted in republican ideals — republics can govern more democratically by collaborating in a way similar to ancient confederations. The Achaean League and Lycian League consisted of states with varying political systems cooperating within a loose, republican-style confederation. Modern blocs like the EU, Association of Southeast Asian Nations and African Union allow countries to work together under common principles and boost their voice in the international system.

Changes in domestic politics have seen the growth of in the 2010s, as more referendums and popular votes of legislative and constitutional issues emerged globally, but especially in Europe. While larger republics like the US, Germany and India still avoid national-level votes on major issues, direct democracy is increasingly apparent at regional and local levels. Challenges remain in terms of deliberation and integration, as states like California and Arizona have seen ballot initiatives rushed, leaving limited time for meaningful debate.

Modern , based on those originating thousands of years ago, have also elevated these referendums in recent years and provided an alternative to traditional political processes. They have influenced major policy changes, from climate policies in France to abortion laws in Ireland, with assemblies, typically convened by legislative bodies in partnership with nonprofits, designed to reflect demographics. While they have led to concrete policy shifts, some recommendations have not been adopted as lawmakers cite the importance of expert-led decision-making.

With the US election behind us, reassessing republican ideals, both domestically and globally, is crucial. As the Grand Old Party potentially gains control over all three branches of government in a divided nation, how it implements policies will either ease concerns or amplify them. The future of republicanism depends on the US shaping its domestic agenda for the common good and using its influence on the global stage in line with democratic principles.

[, a project of the Independent Media Institute, produced this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post What Are Republics, Exactly? It’s a Good Time to Learn appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The budget battle that broke the camel’s back

Scholz is scrambling to save face amid approval ratings that have plunged to an unprecedented low of 14%. The SPD’s own approval ratings are similarly abysmal.

Polls of voting intentions show the party now tied with the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) at around 16% — a dramatic drop from the SDP’s 26% support in the last election. The FDP faces even bleaker prospects, polling around 3–4%, just below the 5% threshold needed to enter parliament.

While tensions within the coalition were no secret, the breaking point came when a proposal by Lindner leaked. The 18-page “Turnaround Germany – A Concept for Growth and Generational Justice” suggested cutting financial aid to low-income families and refugees, which panicked the SPD and Greens.

The election of Donald Trump as the next US president has raised fears the US will soon cut its support for Ukraine, forcing Germany to pick up the tab or risk the defeat of Ukrainian forces. Lindner claims he was pressured to agree to another suspension of the debt brake. He refused, afraid of embarrassment by the constitutional court. Scholz floated the possibility of new elections, which Lindner leaked to Bild while parties were still deliberating. This was the final straw for Scholz, who asked for Lindner’s dismissal. 

The economic headwinds Germany has been facing only add to the drama. Budgets crafted on the assumption of GDP growth that never materialized have left government departments strapped. Austerity measures have strained even the nation’s soft power as cultural icons like the Goethe Institute have been forced to close German schools abroad.

Related Reading

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The crux of the budgetary deadlock is Germany’s “debt brake,” a constitutional limit capping new debt for structural deficits at 0.35% of GDP. While this debt brake was suspended temporarily during the pandemic and the Ukraine invasion, it has since snapped back into force, severely restricting the government’s freedom of action.

Who stands to gain?

With elections likely in early spring, Germany’s political map could shift drastically. The center-right Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), currently polling at 33%, are poised to regain power, though their numbers fall short of a parliamentary majority. A coalition with the Greens remains unlikely due to ideological divides, and the SPD’s recent failure makes it a dubious ally. That leaves the CDU/CSU with only a handful of feasible partners — including an intriguing, if controversial, one in the newly-formed Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW).

BSW, led by former leftist Sahra Wagenknecht, has captivated voters disillusioned with mainstream parties but unwilling to embrace the far-right AfD. Known for her anti-immigration stance and advocacy for a negotiated settlement with Russia, Wagenknecht is a questionable candidate to offer the CDU/CSU a politically stable alliance. 

It should be noted that AfD came out as the party with the most votes during recent state elections in Thuringia (34.3%, slightly ahead of CDU 33.5%). It missed to reach that goal in Saxony, but only by a hair (34.0% compared to 34.4% for CDU).

Voter discontent in Germany, especially in the former East German states, has led to a surge in support for right-wing AfD. Due to Germany’s history, politicians are very aware of the danger of fascism, but they seem rather helpless in addressing the root causes (increased unemployment in rural areas, social anxiety, xenophobia, feelings of being second-class citizens).

Financial and global implications

The collapse of the German government sends shivers through markets already sensitive to geopolitical risk. Shares of Germany’s iconic automakers — BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Porsche and Volkswagen — have fallen sharply, anticipating the return of Trump-era import tariffs on European goods. With Germany’s political attention diverted inward, “budget sinners” like Italy, France and Spain may find relief, as former members of the hard-currency block, such as Germany, have historically pressured them to meet strict fiscal criteria under the Maastricht Treaty.

So far, little or no spread widening between German and other Euro-area government debt has been observed in reaction to the earthquake in Berlin. While the German 10-year government bond yield stands at 2.4%, France and Spain pay a clear premium at 3.2%, followed by Greece at 3.3% and Italy at 3.7%. Still, Italy (135% debt-to-GDP ratio) and Greece (162%) pay lower interest rates than the UK (98%) and the US (123%). Those yields only make sense if the political will to keep the Euro area together would galvanize politicians into further bailouts of countries should the need arise.

If no stable coalition emerges, Germany faces the prospect of another election, potentially plunging Europe’s largest economy into a period of prolonged instability. A caretaker government may limp along in the interim, but effective governance and ambitious legislative agendas will be on hold.

Internationally, the political crisis could have wide-reaching effects. As Germany becomes preoccupied with its own domestic woes, European allies such as Italy and France may gain breathing room in their own budgetary struggles, potentially facing less scrutiny from Berlin on debt under the Maastricht Treaty. However, any withdrawal from a Trump-led US could leave Europe drifting in the high seas without clear leadership, missing out on a potentially generational opportunity to determine the geopolitical direction of a future Europe unshackled from US dominance.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Madrid’s political focus on Catalonia has intensified since 2017. After holding what was deemed by Spanish authorities an illegal independence referendum, Catalonia’s President Carles Puigdemont and other officials fled to Belgium, a diplomatic crisis. Spain then imposed direct rule over the region, with the EU backing its decision and citing the need for constitutional approval of referendums. In the aftermath, local support for Catalonia’s independence , offering Madrid a way in.

���貹����’s and autonomous movements are among Europe’s most well-known, and its management of them is watched closely across the continent. Many other European nations, particularly in larger countries, have autonomy seeking devolution, self-government or outright independence. The perceived of European-level efforts to resolve these issues has led countries to maintain their own policies. Although few movements are considered serious threats, attempts to assert themselves often provoke direct interventions by national governments — when these governments have the capacity to do so.

The struggle between nationalism and separatism

Many of Europe’s once-distinct regional identities have only waned in recent times. The rise of in Europe in the 1800s led to unitary states that integrated peripheral regions with the capitals, a trend known as “capital magnetism.” Additionally, increasing in other large cities weakened to local communities and support systems.

Integration and assimilation pressure was also exerted on regional identities to create more national identities. At the time of Italy’s unification in 1861, for example, of Italians spoke the Tuscan dialect which began to be promoted as . Steadily, its use in public and administrative life, mass media and other methods led to a decline in the use of other regional dialects and languages. Similarly, French policies promoted the Parisian dialect as standard French, and the German Empire promoted High German.

Modern EU states face greater limitations on language suppression. The framework provided by the EU’s “post-sovereign” system implores member states to minority language protections and other rights. Nonetheless, national governments have modernized their approaches to establishing national uniformity. Proficiency in majority languages is often a prerequisite for education, media and employment opportunities, while immigration favors majority-language learners. As a result, dozens of minority European languages are on the of extinction.

Nonetheless, autonomous movements in Europe do wield political power. Political networks like the , a group of pro-independence political parties, operate in the EU parliament and serve as political outlets for separatist movements, using democratic processes.

Italy is constantly attempting to more effectively tie to itself its autonomous regions: the islands of Sicily and Sardinia as well as three northern regions. The 2018 of the regional political party Lega Nord into a national one, Lega, demonstrated some success. The autonomy movements, however, were similarly adaptive. Other northern Italian parties recently to vote to approve legislation approving them greater autonomy in June 2024. South Tyrol, Italy’s German-speaking region, brings the added challenge of receiving support from Austria. Austrian leaders have repeatedly proposed granting Austrian to German speakers, and, in January 2024, voiced support for , drawing a reflexive rebuke from Rome.

Hungary’s disputes with its neighbors are even more notable. The 1920 breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire left significant Hungarian communities across , and . Today, the Hungarian government supports these communities by funding cultural institutions, providing financial aid and fostering solidarity, which has sparked tensions with these countries. However, as a smaller nation, Hungary struggles to exert significant influence, especially in EU member states like Romania and Slovakia, and it has also found limited success in Ukraine.

Western European states remain resilient

Aside from cases like these, EU countries generally tend to avoid interfering in each others’ separatist movements. This has helped France to consolidate its rule over its mainland territory. However, it hasn’t yet done so over the Mediterranean island of Corsica, purchased by the French in . The rollback of the French Empire after World War II reignited historical tensions, further inflamed by the arrival of many French people and Europeans from to Corsica in the 1960s. Though violence largely subsided in Corsica after the 1970s, a ceasefire was not reached , and pro-separatist riots in 2022 show the situation .

the unrest, French President Macron raised the possibility of granting Corsica greater autonomy. Previously, , as tensions were building in neighboring Spain over Basque separatism, France raised the administrative autonomy of its own Basque territory by granting it single community status, unifying several local councils under one regional authority. Contrastingly, the merger of the region of in 2016 with two other French areas reduced its autonomy and integrated it more into the national apparatus. The different approaches demonstrate the diverse policies used by national governments to manage their regions.

Germany, the most populous country in the EU, administers several regions with aspirations for greater autonomy. However, its , which grants states greater authority over areas such as education and language, has helped temper separatist sentiment and reduced the need for management from Berlin.

A federal system has not resolved the challenges faced by Belgium. The country’s and French-speaking regions have sought greater autonomy, with some advocating for unification with a greater Dutch or French-speaking state. While increasing regional autonomy has been part of the solution, the regions remain interconnected through the capital, Brussels, and its wider role as the capital of the EU.

That has not deterred breakup advocates from proposing a similar “” between Belgium’s regions, like the peaceful split between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992. a victory in June 2024 for Vlaams Belang, a party whose leader ran on reaching an agreement to dissolve the country or declaring Flanders’s independence. But their shock defeat ensured Belgium’s continuity and thus the stability of the EU.

Outside the EU, Europe’s autonomy issues are also in flux. In the late , the UK granted greater autonomy to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Scottish independence efforts were then disrupted after a failed 2014 referendum and the UK’s subsequent departure from the EU two years later. The Scottish National Party established a Brussels office to maintain EU connections, the European Friends of Scotland Group, founded in 2020. The Scottish Independence Convention plans to hold a in Edinburgh in October 2024 featuring more than a dozen European groups to coordinate their independence initiatives, though the participation of separatist movements within EU countries may limit the extent of EU involvement.

Brexit also reignited secessionist sentiment across the UK, particularly in , but also in Wales. Even within England, regional parties like CumbriaFirst, the East Devon Alliance and Mebyon Kernow for their own regions’ autonomy, and devolution within England has been increasingly in recent years. London has struggled to counter these movements since Brexit, but it has succeeded in preventing a resurgence in paramilitary activity since it ended it in Northern Ireland in the 1990s.

In Eastern Europe, separatism is a persistent threat

Western Europe’s relative success in reducing armed conflicts over the last few decades contrasts with its resurgence in Eastern Europe. The region’s fragile borders and the emergence of weak states in the wake of the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have seen separatist movements gain increasing power.

The EU and NATO played a pivotal role in the collapse of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new states, often at the expense of Serbia. In response, ethnic Serbian separatism has surged across and , with supporters citing the EU’s and NATO’s support for separatist movements in the 1990s as justification for their actions.

Russia has also inflamed separatism in parts of the former and the former Soviet Union to counter EU and NATO expansion or to incorporate these regions into it. Beyond supporting Serbian interests in the Balkans, Russia has utilized, to varying degrees, separatist movements in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Russia has long performed to separatist movements in the West, including inviting representatives to like the Anti-Globalization Movement of Russia, though largely consisting of fringe groups. Russia itself has its own separatist and autonomy movements, however, including in Chechnya, Tatarstan and elsewhere. These have found support from Western actors, including through the launch of the . has also supported Russian separatist movements, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan meanwhile the 50-year anniversary of the Turkish invasion of EU member state Cyprus in 1974 in support of local Turkish separatists.

Most separatist movements in Europe lack the infrastructure to become independent states without external support but persist in their pursuit of independence nonetheless. And European countries with territories outside of Europe, such as France with or Denmark with , must manage their burgeoning independence movements. Access to the EU may be influential in convincing them to remain, but , such as Azerbaijan’s recent support for New Caledonia’s independence, could potentially play a stronger role.

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A new concern for national governments may emerge closer to home. In the , the tension between Russian minorities and national governments remains evident, and the situation faces uncertainty amid the war in Ukraine. The rise of the Alternative für Deutschland political party in the former East Germany has in turn highlighted the enduring divides within the country less than 40 years after reunification, and how new political entities can emerge to exploit such sentiments.

Islamic separatism is a live issue in Western Europe

Yet the most pressing issue appears to be emerging in Western Europe’s major cities. French President Emmanuel Macron, aiming to address concerns over what French authorities describe as “parallel societies” of Muslim immigrants and their descendants, proposed a law in 2023 to the education, finances, and propaganda networks of radical Islam, often from foreign countries. Macron labeled this phenomenon as “separatism.” He was referring to marginalized communities on the outskirts of major French cities in the famed banlieues, which are increasingly beyond state control and driven by domestic grievances and dissatisfaction with French foreign policy. While France’s situation appears the most severe, such sentiment is common across Western Europe.

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FO° Exclusive: Make Sense of the Hellish Rioting in France

The EU’s handling of autonomous and separatist movements has frequently faced criticism from nationalist governments, and balancing separatism with nationalism remains a sensitive challenge. However, major countries like Germany and smaller ones like Denmark demonstrate it is possible to manage these issues within national frameworks. Switzerland, a non-EU state, shows similar success in keeping itself together. Clearly, despite nationalist policies, centuries-old communities are resilient and difficult to absorb and erase, even without outside support. Managing these long-standing issues, as well as emerging movements, will require continual adaptation.

[, a project of the Independent Media Institute, produced this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Meloni’s choice of Mattei was no accident. Many Italians, including Meloni, view North Africa as the natural place for Italy to extend its influence on the African continent. Meloni, however, is seeking to shun the legacy of colonialism in Africa. She has been of France, in particular, for pursuing policies in the continent that she characterizes as “neocolonial.”

The prime minister is attempting to open a new chapter for cross-Mediterranean relations, rejecting predatory impulses towards Africa and instead emulating Mattei, who built an alternative model based on cooperation between North Africa and Southern Europe. During the Cold War, Mattei helped to promote peace and stability between Algeria and Europe; Meloni hopes to repeat the feat.

Italians remember that in those decades, after their own experience of devastating war, it was the stability of energy supplies made the rebuilding of Italian industry possible. At the same time, they remember that the influx of Italian cash likewise helped North African countries win their own struggle for independence and establish stability afterwards.

Now, like then, Italy needs energy. Without Russia fueling its heavily gas-dependant grid, Italy must look for alternative solutions. North Africa is an obvious choice; in the first half of 2022, Algeria became Italy’s gas supplier, ousting Russia. Meloni’s visit was one of the first steps to establishing a more solid Italy–Algeria relationship.

Consequently, Meloni has launched the “,” which enlists Italian companies such as Eni, Enel, Snam and Terna to do the work of integrating with Algerian partners. Meloni hopes to transform Italy into an oil and gas hub, completely abandon Russian gas and replace it with both natural gas from Africa as well as liquefied natural gas (LNG) from sources like the United States..

How is Italy managing this era of scarcity?

Italy to phase 80% of Russian gas out by 2023 and 100% by 2024 or 2025, at the latest.

in his luminary Nuclear Commerce, Anis H. Bajrektarevic noted that “in an ever evolving and expanding world, there is a constant quest for both more energy and less external energy dependency. With the fossil fuels bound industry setting an alarming trend of negative ecological footprint, there is a clear and urgent must to predict and instruct on alternatives.”&�Բ�����;

And indeed, after the Russian intervention in Ukraine, Europe and Italy had to change strategies. They imports of LNG by over 60% in 2022. Because of this, demand for LNG has reached colossal proportions, and prices are projected to remain steadily elevated in the coming years.

LNG needs to be processed back into a gaseous state in order to be used. Italy, which has not traditionally used a large amount of LNG, needs to build the infrastructure to make this possible. in In addition to the few preexisting regasification facilities Panigaglia, Livorno and Rovigo, new plants are being constructed. Snam has built one in with a total processing capacity of 5 billion cubic meters per year, equal to 7% of Italy’s requirements. It plans to open another in Ravenna in the third quarter of 2024. The Italian strategy is undoubtedly on track. These two LNG terminals will increase the country’s energetic flexibility.

After the cut in Russian natural gas supplies, Italy can count on supplies from Azerbaijan via Turkey thanks to the Trans-Adriatic pipeline. Azerbaijan currently supplies about 10% of Italy’s needs and could supply up to . And Italy can rely on Transmed, better known as the “Mattei pipeline,” too, which already connects Algeria to Italy and has a capacity of around cubic meters of gas.

Eni and Enel in Africa

Eni and Enel are both formerly public companies. After privatization, they continue to work closely with the Italian state. They have always guaranteed strategic continuity in relations with African countries and are the key to giving substance to the Mattei Plan.”

Eni has been present in since the mid-1950s and has projects in as many as 14 countries. It is a key player in the diversification of gas supplies, first and foremost thanks to its long-time relationship with Algeria’s Sonatrach.

But it’s not just Algeria. Another country Eni has an established relationship with is , where Eni has been present since 1954 through its subsidiary, Ieoc. In 2022, Eni produced almost of the gas produced in Egypt. From its plant in Damietta, it exports much of that gas — in the form of LNG — to Europe. Eni and Egypt are working together to exploit deposits in new areas such as the Nile Delta. Eni has also promoted new investments and projects intending to diversify gas source countries. A significant case in point is , a floating natural gas liquefaction plant off the coast of Mozambique. The plant has a capacity of 3.4 million tonnes of LNG.

Enel has been developing projects in Africa, too. It already operates , both wind and solar, from Morocco to Zambia and South Africa. It is building new green energy capacities in other countries, too, such as Ethiopia, where Enel has planned a photovoltaic plant in Metehara.

After the great chaos

The balance of the Mediterranean was disrupted in 2011, the year of the “Arab Spring” that upset many ruling classes. The movements took inspiration from Arab nationalism, the same tendency with which Mattei had worked in Algeria. After more than ten years, things have settled down, and a new phase can start. The relaunch of Italian action in the region is a positive step, but we must consider some pitfalls.

There are new players: China, Russia and Turkey all have footholds in the Arab Mediterranean as well. China, especially, has been money into the region. France too, of course, still holds substantial sway in Africa. In spite of this competition, Italy can still draw upon its tradition of friendly cooperation and move forward with its North African partners.

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Acknowledging this solemn responsibility doesn’t mean that the news must always be about dramatic events and civilizational crises. News is also entertainment. A lot of what we want to read about may be little more than social gossip. The media thus provides a very useful purpose: sharing with us a diversity of matter that may feed our chatter among family and friends.  

Still, any responsible media should help its public to distinguish between the different types of stories it reports and the degree of urgency each one merits. Alas, not all media respect that discipline. There is a comprehensible reason for that. Media outlets expect every item their journalists produce will be optimally designed to attract their readership’s interest or curiosity. Unfortunately, this intent can lead to exaggerating the significance or even the nature of a reported event or fact.

An ABC News with a decidedly dramatic title, “Italy’s government convenes talks amid skyrocketing pasta prices” offers an example of how such journalistic practices can get out of hand. We live in an age of high drama that has accustomed us to hear regularly about the risk of climate catastrophe, the next pandemic, a new Cold War and the impending threat of nuclear war. In such a context, the idea of an issue that requires “convening talks” at the highest level of government and that addresses an out-of-control (“skyrocketing”) trend will quite naturally justify the kind headline guaranteed to attract serious readers.

The first sentence in the article makes it clear that the issue merits the highest level of urgency. “Italy’s government is on full alert following a national problem: skyrocketing Pasta prices.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Full alert:

The appropriate reaction of any government to an event that the worst practitioners in the media believe will attract the public’s attention.

Contextual note

Concerned that some readers may underestimate the gravity of a crisis affecting what everyone understands to be an inexpensive food commodity, ABC’s reporter, Emma Ogao, offers some startling figures that define the amplitude of the crisis. “The price of pasta rose for two consecutive months, by 17.5% in March followed by a 16.5% rise in April – when compared to the same periods a year earlier, according to the Italian National Institute of Statistics.”

The average reader will be forgiven for thinking that over a two-month period the price of pasta rose by a whopping 34% (17.5 + 16.5). The historically-minded might be tempted to relate this price explosion to the inflation crisis of Weimar Germany or 20^th century Argentina that devastated the capacity to govern those countries. But the figures Ogao mentions, impressive as they are, cannot and should not be added up. They are comparisons with the monthly figures from the previous year. What these two figures really mean, when broken down, is that the average annual rate of inflation during those two months was 17%, twice the general rate of inflation in Italy, a point she did make earlier in the article. This rise in prices is unusual, especially compared to the falling price of durum wheat, from which pasta is made. But in itself the rise is not alarming, not even for Italians who are supposedly addicted to pasta.

Ogao provides no other figures to clarify the price rise, but she does provide a figure for the average annual consumption of pasta per citizen: 23 kilos. To understand the facts, a curious reader will have to consult a much more informative and less sensationalist article from CBS News that nevertheless bears the somewhat alarming title, “Italy calls a crisis meeting after pasta prices jump 20%.” We can only suppose that the editors rather than the journalist, Elizabeth Napolitano, composed the headline, because in the second paragraph we learn that the precise figure is 17.5%. The 20% in the title is probably rationalized by the editor by the need for rounding complex figures.

To cover what is, despite its exaggerated alarmism, an interesting story, if only because of the strong association Americans have between Italy and pasta, CBS News confided its reporting to a journalist focused on monetary questions, Elizabeth Napolitano. And if her surname is any indication, she has all the required qualifications to be thought of as an expert on pasta. Napoli (Naples) may be more closely associated with pizza, but pasta plays an important role in Neapolitan gastronomy.  

Napolitano’s analysis appears in CBS’s rubric, “Moneywatch.” The statistics she provides are much more interesting than Agao’s, though her rhetoric is also occasionally over the top, as when she refers to Italy as “the pasta-crazed country.” We usefully learn, for example, that “roughly 60% of people eat pasta daily” allowing us to draw the conclusion that 40% of Italy’s population is not “crazed,” or at worst is only semi-crazed, because they eat pasta only two or three times a week.

But, contrary to the ABC article, Napolitano supplies us with some real statistical “food for thought” concerning the question of inflation. We learn, for example, that the current “cost of the staple has exceeded $2.20 per kilo.” This figure enables us to calculate the financial burden pasta inflation imposes annually on the average Italian. Multiplying $2.20 by 23 means that we are talking of a total annual expense of just over $50. The additional cost per person per year caused by 17.5% inflation thus comes to just under $9. That works out to nearly 2.5 cents per day. For a family of (the average household size in Italy), that means the cost – if inflation continues at the same rate – will be a little more than a Jefferson nickel (5 cents) a day. Median household income (PPP) was $35,189 in 2021. The impact on cost of living is literally 0 % (0.000142 %). The kind of thing, in other words, that can easily justify a government’s going onto full alert.

Historical note

Governments traditionally combated inflation by raising interest rates to reduce the pressure on the money supply, but that simple trick no longer works. Reacting to the global financial crisis in 2007-8, the US government allowed several major financial institutions, wildly over-exposed in speculative assets, to collapse. Others that should have followed the same logic survived thanks to government bailouts or through private initiatives, such as Warren Buffett’s injection of $5 billion into Goldman Sachs in September, 2008.

This began an extended period in which governments systematically kicked the can down the road with the practice of quantitative easing (QE). They brought interest rates to near 0% to maintain an economy that had become structurally unstable. But QE skewed the fundamentals of the global economy. Investors who had easy access to essentially interest-free cash tended to allocate capital based on distorted signals from inflated asset prices rather than aligning with the underlying fundamentals of productive investments. National economies became dependent on free cash. Any disturbance, for example to supply chains as happened with the Ukraine war, creates an insoluble crisis.

But monetary inflation is not the only problem societies are facing. As the ABC News article demonstrates, journalistic inflation has distorted the fundamental utility of news services just as QE has distorted the fundamentals of the economy. Any cultural meme – such as the popular association of Italy with pasta – can now justify writing irresponsible copy containing misleading statistics. This is news as entertainment.

The CBS News article provides some sanity by mentioning the impact of the Ukraine war on the supply of wheat and the cost of energy. But it still fails to avoid the temptation of applying the rhetoric associated with political and economic crises to a minor and temporary disturbance in a single economy.

Both articles fail to signal the real significance of the Italian “crisis.” Just as the “yellow vests” in France began their protests over a modest rise in the price of gas, their discontent covered a much larger range of issues. Could the pasta inflation crisis –  if indeed it can be called a crisis —  be similar? Serious journalism should be expected to dig deeper when using the rhetoric of political drama.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.

Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

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Chiara Castro interviews Raffaella Saso, vice-director of . She explains that Italians fear immigrants who they see as unemployed. They could be a drain on society. Furthermore, Italy does not promote integration. Therefore, illegal activities too often become survival strategies.

Italian media have also promoted negative perceptions and highlighted conflicts over the past ten years, almost never putting forward positive stories. This adds to the negative perception of immigrants.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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These biases could worsen now that , the far-right leader of the Fratelli d’Italia party, was elected Prime Minister of Italy in October 2022. Already, Meloni has tightened immigration policies, and her discourse is undeniably protectionist. It is unclear how Meloni’s policies will influence Italians’ perceptions of immigrants, but many fear the worst. 

We sought the insights of Roberto Beneduce on this topic. He has extensively studied the reception and assimilation of migrants. Beneduce also has a clinical practice at the Frantz Fanon Centre where he and his team welcome migrants from many provenances. 

Interview

Roberta Campani: We are interested in Italians’ perceptions of foreigners on their territory. Since you have great experience in reception and accompaniment of immigrants, we would love to have a presentation from you on the current situation.

Roberto Beneduce: The perception of the Italians is certainly oriented by many events and many variables. Italy’s current economic and labor situation has had an impact. Political speeches and media biases have equally decisive weight. It is difficult to imagine a perception that is independent of all this. We have to conceive a model of hybrid, multiple causations to understand this perception…

There are three primary axes influencing Italian perception of immigration.

The first major influencer is misleading political speeches. Many Italian politicians express their desire for a hegemonic culture that representss native Italians. These speeches show a perceptual reality marked by concern for the number of immigrants seeking asylum or arriving on Italian shores through the and crossing the Mediterranean 

The concern is emphasized by right-wing political parties to motivate conservative choices when it comes to border control, humanitarian and international protection policies, and the need to tighten regulations surrounding the reception of foreigners. This conservative perception is often reiterated by the media as they intentionally highlight social conflicts between the native population and foreign nationals, competition for job opportunities or access to different resources (housing, for instance) while simultaneously skipping over more positive stories concerning immigration. This media practice acts as confirmation bias for those who wish to deny the realities of immigration. It could be argued that their way of representing the context of migration is an act of “linguistic terrorism,” to quote the words of Ferruccio Rossi Land, an Italian semiotician. 

The second axis influencing Italian perceptions on immigration consists of groups committed to the “.” These people oppose those who view the flow of immigrants as threatening. They see immigration in relation to the social, economic or war dynamics that are characterizing our present. Italians with this humanitarian perception want to rise up to the demands of asylum seekers and immigrants, and seek to create conditions of encounter rather than conditions of conflict. 

The perception in this second axis doesn’t find immigrants as threatening subjects and adheres to real statistical data instead of inaccurate and inflammatory news stories. People of this perception recognize Italy as a country endowed with resources which, unfortunately, are often not used or are dispersed. 

The bad use of resources concerns the humanitarian sector too. In particular, I am thinking of the chaotic management of contracts entrusted to the nongovernmental organizations that manage immigrants and asylum seekers. These organizations often hire civil servants who have no specific training in humanitarian work, which creates difficulties in communication with new immigrants. There needs to be more careful selection of humanitarian teams based on proven expertise in managing the reception of immigrants, more particularly of those who are affected by specific forms of vulnerability. We also need more forward-looking policies when it comes to welcoming foreign nationals and helping to integrate them into our society. 

Finally, the third axis is the dominant, quieter, more visceral one. Italians with this perception often swing back and forth between humanitarian attitudes and xenophobia. These people often react irrationally to the presence of the Other, the foreigner, perceiving them both as people in need and as threats to native culture.

In this hostile reaction, we recognize two major sociological problems. The first is the systemic racism, the unresolved knot of contemporary democratic societies. We have to recognize that racism permeates not only public opinion, but also institutions, such as schools and healthcare facilities. This institutionalized racism is a huge contributor to the perception of foreigners as a threatening phenomenon. This kind of racism breeds harmful opinions which often manifest as violence, aggression, and acts of humiliation against foreigners. In other words, we cannot forget the structural racism of the nation-state, of the modern State.

That is why I was talking earlier about a real denial of the objective reality when it comes to immigration. We perceive foreigners as threatening and aggressive, but we do not see the violence that is directed at them. We perpetuate narratives where Italians are the victims of conflicts with immigrants. However, it is native citizens who attack, mock, and threaten defenseless or isolated foreigners. 

By an unconscious mechanism of denial, these realities are ignored. When Achille Mbembe speaks of a “,” he touches the raw nerve of Europe’s contemporary social structure. Animosity towards foreigners is nurtured by political and economic processes that have their hidden roots in slavery, colonialism, institutional racism and capitalism.

We should consider at length why people care so little to question the systematic and daily racist violence against foreign nationals.

A portion of this violence has resulted in actual . In Italy, as in other countries (Japan, for instance), foreigners are the object of constant aggression by ordinary citizens as well as police forces: the case of death for health problems or suicide in what we call “administrative detention centers” became more and more common in last decades. Despite the nationwide prevalence of these aggressions and this institutional violence, people still refuse to consider the deeper implications behind such acts of violence, and just consider the immigrants and asylum seekers as a threat!

Too often, the legal aggravation of racism in these crimes is the subject of endless negotiations, interpretations, and disputes. True legislative progress is painstakingly slow when it comes to mitigating racism. This is a further issue that should be discussed when trying to understand the nature and reproduction of hostile, negative perceptions of foreigners. 

A Lebanese-born author, , used the term “reverse colonization” to describe the anxieties that arise in societies facing immigrants. As their presence grows, foreigners are increasingly perceived as those who could threaten the religious, ethnic, and cultural identity of our countries, as those who are colonizing our Europe. They believe foreigners will take employment opportunities from natives. They fear that the high reproductive rates of migrants could upset imaginary demographic profiles. Here, again, we meet the dark side of Nation-State’s, its projective (delusional) representation of the Other: the reproductive anxiety, the concern for the building of an ideal, ‘good citizen’ and an idealized loyalty to its beliefs, the need for frontiers that bar the route to foreigners… I call this whole “pathologies of citizenships”.

The many forms in which violence can be imagined, practiced, and projected. 

According to Hage, denial is an unconscious mechanism. In the past, slaveholders simply ignored the rape and violence inflicted on slaves but simultaneously feared being the object of such hostile attacks. Today, we tend to deny and erase the violence perpetrated in the past centuries -as well as in the present time- on other populations, other bodies, and other territories.

In other cases, violence takes on an invisible, mundane, but no less perverse character. For example, asylum seekers are subjected to endless queues while waiting for a visa, and they never become full citizens, as the cases analyzed by the Iranian anthropologist Shahram Khosravi well epitomizes (his expression, “stolen time”, summarizes these issues). At the same time, even people living in our countries for many years are often subjected to forms of control and scrutiny of their private life (family, house spaces, and so on), which could be defined as a new, miniaturized panopticon. Xavier Jonathan Inda speaks of “anti-technologies of citizenship” to analyze the current politics of citizenship in the US.

Violence and exploitation have not ended with colonization

The modern exploitation of migrants is no different from the project of European imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As some scholars have documented, it is in the literature that sometimes we find the valuable traces of history and “involuntary documents,” as historian would say, of the violence against the Other.

Marc Bloch was a French historian who in his book, The Historian’s Craft, that “involuntary documents” are more credible historical materials than “intentional documents.” Intentional documents, such as official legislative documents, church records, and autobiographies, are often tailored to certain narratives and are limited in the insights they can provide about the past. Bloch believed that involuntary documents, such as letters and drawings, provide more objective and accurate historical insights.

Bringing to light the unconscious dynamics connected to our anxieties and to our reactions to those anxieties is a task as complex as it is urgent: the task of my ethnopsychiatry. Social reform should be made a real field of pedagogical work. We need “social clinics” where experts can help remedy the fears of indigenous communities as they receive more immigrants and asylum seekers.

Unfortunately, widespread racism continues to poison social relations and feed spasms of white supremacy are occurring far too often. All this results in a political class which is not representative of the entire population but however able to impose its hegemonic discourse: the immigrant as a danger. I do not frequently see minorities represented in the Italian political class, nor in that of other European countries.

Roberta Campani: Unfortunately we do not. What you say makes me think of an old reading by Ernesto de Martino, where he says, as early as 1964, that we should introduce Italians to interiority and to everything that is not European or of Judeo-Christian origin. Did this project take place, and has it been developed in one way or another?

Roberto Beneduce: There is a passage that Ernesto de Martino reaffirms in many of his writings. It is what he calls “non-bourgeois ethnology.” De Martino’s interest in anthropology did not arise from a mere attraction to the exotic world. In our writing of history, and in our process of giving meaning to history, a thread was missing. 

Ernesto De Martino used this expression to describe the missing link: the thread of the primitive. He believed that it was necessary to take up this thread again in order to recognize its role in history as it had been written, but also in our modern world and societies. For a scholar of social sciences, the incessant re-emergence of primitive, barbaric, and archaic practices in our societies, laws, and institutions constitutes a decisive theme. We meet here even the strong influence of Gramsci on de Martino’s thought.

It would take little effort to show how our discourses often trivialize the presence of irrational thinking in the societies of Italy, Germany, and France. Not all are protected from this re-emergence of irrational terrors and violence, which often has its target in the “.”&�Բ�����;

De Martino said that not only should this “missing thread” be analyzed historically, but it should also be recognized within our modern societies. An essay from one of De Martino’s most intriguing books, (1962), addresses the threats of witchcraft in 1950s Germany. 

Those pages are valuable, as they depict a German professor knocking on De Martino’s door and bringing him the dossier of a witchcraft trial in Germany, the same Germany that had just come out of another witchcraft, another barbarism. In Italy and around the globe, we have to deal with these shadows, these dark whirlpools of the irrational. From the “” that fueled the 6 January capitol in Washington D.C., to the satanic sects in Italy or in other Western countries, we must recognize that barbarism is something from which we modern humans are not spared.

When we refuse to recognize the presence of the “primitive thread”, and of the barbarism in ourselves, we end up projecting it onto the Other﹣the foreigner﹣ who, for many, continues to embody the negative, the threat, the obscure (bad motherhood, bad families, sexual promiscuity, bad manners…). 

These issues require urgent joint reflection among researchers, intellectuals, and the political class.Unfortunately, this kind of collaboration is largely absent today. In fact, there seemed to be more articulation between the political and intellectual classes in past years. 

Roberta Campani: When did this regression begin? Within the last two decades?

Roberto Beneduce: It began during the late 1980s and the 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, a radical crisis affected both communism and revolutionary theorists. Intellectuals from both spheres were left speechless and without direction. 

The fall of the is a perfect example, as it marked the dissolution of the Soviet Union and a crisis within communism. After the Cold War, many intellectuals failed to find adequate categories to understand the complexities of the advancing times. They ended up overlooking the fact that violence quietly inhabited the core of both the socialist state and the capitalist state.They couldn’t take on the task of re-thinking articulations of power at a sufficient level of complexity. This contributed, at least from the standpoint of intellectuals, to the loss of thrust in the possibility of influencing future political choices. 

Neoliberalism, on the other hand, does not require critical thinking. Neoliberalism needs a subjugated public opinion that believes in an unregulated economy and limitless consumption. A hoard of consumers bends to the image of progress, reaching for the utopian promise of being able to indulge any desire at any moment in time. 

By gently imposing the desire to consume to the point that the current economic model is the only thinkable one, neoliberalism has achieved great success. However, when critical thinking arises, neoliberalism also reacts violently..

Indeed, we see how movements fueled by critical thinking are now often criminalized and repressed (what is happening in France is an exemplary witness of this). The need to decolonize our categories of analysis, and our own desires, the cogent need to invent new models, as Frantz Fanon had already indicated referring to colonial societies, continues to be a priority of our present.

was a Martinican psychiatrist who studied in France. He was active in the liberation front in Algeria and theorized violence as a necessary way out of colonialism. His maintains that “all of us are entitled to moral consideration” and that “no one is dispensable.” Fanon’s assertions about human rights continue to inspire activists and scholars dedicated to social justice today.

Can a population, a country, learn to accept and accommodate this contradiction? How? 

Roberta Campani: Let us return to perceptions of foreigners in Italy. Can we think of something to reconstruct the bond between intellectuals, ordinary citizens, and political figures? Could something similar to South Africa’s be realized?

Roberto Beneduce: Undoubtedly, researchers who do not isolate in laboratories and in their own theoretical models are led to dialogue, listening, and the acceptance of contradiction. This is also what I try to convey to my students. 

Therein also lies the meaning of a discipline such as anthropology. On the one hand, the anthropologist studies these contradictions to bring light to these shadowy areas. On the other hand, a good enough anthropologist does not stop questioning the meaning behind these contradictory trends. Among these issues, the old question arises: Why do disadvantaged groups continue to pursue political projects that often go precisely against their interests and goals for society? 

Many experts theorize that no one is spared from the temptation and the responsibility of violence. Reconciliation is a process, one that cannot be completed in a short time period. It is a process that requires great patience and long-term commitment.

No authentic theoretical reflection could believe that it is possible to complete the complex process of reconciliation in ten years or less. Reconciliation is an infinite process that can facilitate dialogues with even the most beaten-up and belittled groups. Among those who are isolated and marginalized within our social landscape, one finds that the most enlightened figures too often stay silent in the face of such archaic and deeply ingrained social structures. This is what I recorded and understood these past years. 

Contradiction and conflict are part of the reality of every human group of every epoch (this is , which I make my own). When one fails to acknowledge this, the inevitable effect is that the poles of institutional operation, the social, and the intellectual, move further away from one another. This centrifugal dynamic is good for neoliberalism because it allows it to operate with maximum freedom, ignoring the needs of individuals and local communities. 

Consider this example: the dynamic that pits the right to healthcare and nutrition against the need to work to afford basic necessities. Those who want to defend the well-being of the environment in which they live will then often find themselves in conflict with those that just look for work. This fracture, as I observed in my fieldwork, can occur within their own families and communities, because despite their personal beliefs, the need to work and industrialize will always be imperative. 

Neoliberalism plays into this contradiction. We have seen it in Italy in the case of the in Basilicata region of Italy or industry in Taranto. We also see it in Rosignano with the of the Solvay beaches. We saw the same ferocious contradiction in Japan, where Chisso factory gave job opportunities and promoted ‘progress’ while killing and poisoning land, human beings and animals by mercure as the woefully well-known case of Minamata disease demonstrated. There are an infinite number of situations in which the right to health and ecological well-being is dramatically opposed to the demands of work and industrialization.

This contradiction is a metaphor that can be instructive to other fields as well. For example, if I, as an expert in the reception and integration of immigrants, cannot make it clear to natives that foreigners do not create economic competition for social aid or housing, do not introduce new diseases or political threats, then I have mistaken my discourse, my analysis. 

Another example of these conflicts is the of Romani immigrants in 2018. The establishment of immigrant housing in the area caused entire neighborhoods to explode, with some citizens even resorting to violent actions. Eventually, the immigrants were forced to give up their assigned homes. A typical expression of the struggle between the poor…

The fact that the institutions, experts, and social workers did not foresee these conflicts is shameful. Afterwards, they admitted their powerlessness by allowing these expressions of violence and racism to prevail over the law. This event is one of the darkest images of the defeat when it comes to the law and the principle of coexistence. Housing is needed by everyone, including natives. The fact that virtuous complicity cannot be created among even the most marginal sectors is a huge problem. 

If the choice is between work and health, between environment and salary, we have already failed. If one has to choose between providing housing for a foreign family or for a native family, between two kinds of poor, we have already failed. The weighing of rights against one another is a dichotomous logic that is properly lethal. I have even heard health workers say that “first, our citizens should be treated. Then, and only then, should foreigners receive care.”&�Բ�����;

To passively accept these drifts is to allow oneself to drift dangerously. Unfortunately, hegemonic discourses help reproduce negative perceptions of the Other. This is certainly a dramatic problem of our time.
edited this piece.

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Having suffered an egregious and unjust assault from its powerful eastern neighbor, Ukraine is not only standing up to defend its territorial integrity, it has embarked on a process of change that will transform a theater of war into what already resembles a theater of the absurd. Theatrical it will be, just as President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to the US Congress turned out to be an example of choreographed performance art. The Washington Post and US media are doing their damnedest to present the current tragedy as the prelude to a joyous comedy.

The script for what sounds like a double bill goes something like this. As a Ukrainian victory approaches, the reigning oligarchs who have dominated public life in Ukraine for three decades will gracefully leave the stage and return to their dressing rooms. After a quick wardrobe change, they will reappear as modern business executives dedicated — not to greed, as in the previous script — but to the efficient running of a modern European economy functioning inside a shining democracy from which political corruption has been banished and public service enshrined for the benefit of the entire population.

The Washington Post’s writing team, consisting of Kevin Sullivan, David L. Stern and Kostiantyn Khudov, appears to be working on the second script. Earlier this month, they penned an whose subtitle announces the theme of the drama:“Ukraine may have the opportunity to rebuild a post-war society that is more democratic, less corrupt and more economically diversified.”

As creative fiction this reads well. But apparently the writers see themselves not as creative writers but as earnest analysts of future reality. They want us to believe in the likelihood of the scenario they delineate. This is where readers of the news expecting to gain some serious perspective on how the future will play out should remember a simple rule: to be wary of sentences that insert “may” before the verbs they use to define a political or economic future. “May” is a very convenient auxiliary when predicting the future. It’s the perfect tool for hedging one’s bets. Their forecast that there “may” be a democratic, corruption-free future is equally as truthful as saying “Ukraine may not even exist in two years time.” Both are possible. Neither can be classified misinformation.

The news that founds the state of affairs that “may” exist is based on a theme that has been discussed since the adoption last year of a law passed by the Ukrainian government. The law’s title bore the word “de-oliharkhizatsia.” The Washington Post journalists explain: “The word of the moment in Ukrainian politics is ‘de-oliharkhizatsia’ or de-oligarchization: a renewal of the long-held goal — and sometimes only faint hope — to free the country’s political system of domination by the ultrarich.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

De-oligarchization:

1. The voluntary transformation of a regime built on personal greed into one guided by the notion of excellence, efficiency and public service.
2. The title of a contemporary Ukrainian fictional drama written for the theater of neoliberal hyperreality.

Contextual note

In an earlier for The Washington Post, David Stern quoted the assessment of an official who admitted that the system of corruption was ”so strong and well institutionalized that it was quite difficult to break” while promising to “do everything we can to make sure it never recovers.” Stern describes the official, Rostyslav Shurma, as “a close economic aide to Zelensky who previously worked for many years as a top executive in Akhmetov’s steel company, Metinvest.” Who could doubt that the same team that has so successfully resisted Putin’s army will do an equally good job making sure Ukraine’s corrupt oligarchy “never recovers”?

In one of the articles, the authors cite another official, Viktor Andrusiv, who appreciates the difficulty of the task that consists of removing or at least seriously diminishing the power of oligarchs. “They are not disappearing,” he asserts. “The key thing is to end their monopolies, which were produced by their political connections. Now they will have to act more like big businessmen.”

The language here gives the game away. This is the world not of business but of political theater. It’s all about “acting” a role one is not used to. The oligarchs, unlike the proverbial leopard, will change their spots. It may not be as far-fetched as it sounds. After all, Ukraine’s Actor-in-Chief, Volodymyr Zelenskyy —  who also happens to be the nation’s president — learned to act like a president as the star of the TV series, Servant of the People. Following his lead and perhaps thanks to his coaching, the oligarchs, who will neither be exiled nor dismissed, will learn “to act more like big businessmen.”

The two articles in The Washington Post demonstrate the nature of this ambitious project: recasting the old troupe of oligarchs – literally bad guys – in the role of modern executives. In other words, good guys. They are expected to leave behind them the costumes they donned and the manners they cultivated while playing the oligarch. Their histrionics that were more appropriate to tragedy – or rather bad melodrama – will give way to sophisticated comedic banter aimed at promoting the general welfare. That supposes, of course, that yesterday’s oligarchs can equal in performance the part played by their obviously talented president.

Historical note

Readers should note that the authors call the effort at de-oligarchization “a renewal of the long-held goal — and sometimes only faint hope — to free the country’s political system of domination by the ultrarich.” Why has the goal been held for so long with no result? And how long has it been held? Why should we believe this time around that the hope is no longer faint?

Perhaps they want us to believe that the popular uprising in 2014 that resulted in a successful coup – ably assisted by the likes of Victoria Nuland, John Kerry and Joe Biden –entertained the goal of rooting out corruption? Apparently not, if we are to judge by the performance of the new president, Petro Poroshenko. Mike Eckel writing for Radio Free Europe, days before the Russian invasion, that “Poroshenko was seen by critics as being slow to make fundamental changes, or go after powerful officials seen as corrupt.” Most people classify Poroshenko himself as an oligarch.

Eckel recalled that “Zelenskiy won the presidency by a landslide over Poroshenko after campaigning on pledges to end the conflict with Russia and to tackle the corruption and bureaucracy that has hamstrung the economy and hurt living standards.” Like Obama in the US in 2008, for the people, the new president represented hope and change. And as with Obama, hope waned as change faltered. “Results have been mixed at best,” Eckel recounts, “and there is growing suspicion that Zelenskiy administration officials may be undermining those efforts themselves.”

Decades after achieving independence from the Soviet Union, the long-held hope of fighting corruption has gone nowhere. Corruption has become a way of life. Zelenskyy himself was propelled forward in his acting and political career by a prominent oligarch, Ihor Kolomoisky, a man Anthony Blinken’s State Department banned from entry to the US last March. Four months later Zelenskyy stripped his former promoter of Ukrainian nationality. Some have suggested that this might have been designed to shield the oligarch from the wrath of the de-oligarchization law. Kolomoisky is for the moment safe in Israel, whose nationality he holds.

Now that Ukraine is enduring a glorious war that “may” lead to a triumphant outcome for the valorous regime – incidentally supported by its oligarchs – hope appears reborn. When the dust settles, and corruption is definitively uprooted, Ukrainians in the postwar years may have to end up thanking Vladimir Putin for provoking what none of their own presidents was capable of accomplishing.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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This means that its leader Giorgia Meloni is going to become Italy’s first ever woman prime minister. Meloni’s victory hasn’t exactly been welcomed as a progressive achievement though. Many domestic and international players are now wondering about what could happen next. Here’s a quick introduction to help you make sense of Italy’s new prime minister.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The effects of conspiracy theories in Italy were particularly noticeable when a wave of spread across various moderate to large cities last year. A small portion of the Italian population protested all over the country against the government’s mandatory vaccinations and use of the , a document needed until April 1, 2022 to enter public places and given only to those who had been given both vaccine doses. The conspiracies fuelling these protests focused on the government’s handling of the pandemic, the dangers of vaccines, and the basic existence of COVID-19. While most protests were peaceful, conspiratorial belief pushed some individuals to carry out violent attacks.   

Conspiracy Theories and COVID-19

Conspiracy theories can be as “attempts to explain the ultimate causes of significant social and political events… with claims of secret plots by… powerful actors.”&�Բ�����; Scholars find that they tend to arise in correspondence to incomprehensible and unexpected worldwide events that feelings of fear, uncertainty, lack of control, and stress. Individuals who possess these feelings tend to believe in conspiracies because they provide alternative and simplistic answers to events which would otherwise be difficult to understand. 

The COVID-19 pandemic has created the perfect environment for conspiracy theories to flourish. Given its uncertain and inexplicable environment, people have turned to conspiracies to better understand the situation they are living in. In addition, thanks to the stay-at-home orders, people have spent the majority of their time on social media platforms, which are rife with conspiracy theories. 

Myriads of radical right extremists were and continue to be extremely active on social media platforms. They spread numerous conspiracies regarding the origins of COVID-19. While some were new in nature, others were readapted old tropes which came to include the pandemic. Some of the most common conspiracies disseminated by the radical right were: anti-Asian (with many different scenarios speculating as to whether poor food hygiene was to blame or whether Asian governments intentionally created and spread the virus to secure global dominance), anti-Semitic (the Jewish population was blamed for spreading the virus to advance its financial goals), anti-immigrant (with a readaptation of the Great Replacement theory, itself often imbued with implicit anti-Semitism, in addition to anti-black and Islamophobic elements), anti-government (governments were blamed for controlling and suppressing societies by taking away individual freedoms) and anti-vaccine (governments were criticised for using them to monitor people). 

Conspiracy Theories in Italy: Dangerous or Not? 

Last year and early this year, Italy experienced a wave of nationwide protests, with individuals expressing their anger towards imposed by the government. The government imposed vaccinations for workers in almost every sector. Workers who refused to be vaccinated were to have their employment terminated. The Green Pass was mandatory too. Italians utilized their right to protest to express their anger against these policies. Sadly, this anger is often fuelled by nefarious, conspiratoracies. Some of these clearly encourage individuals to carry out violence during or after the protests.  

Between September 2020 and April 2021, during the first wave of nationwide protests , Italian citizens against the government’s mandatory lockdowns, they questioned the existence of the virus, and doubted the COVID-19 vaccine. Their anger was reinforced by a series of conspiracy theories that had spread on social media. Most of these stated that COVID-19 did not really exist, but was actually a falsehood perpetrated by governments to control individuals. They claimed that the Italian media was exaggerating the number of deaths and cases in the country. They also argued that governments had created vaccines to monitor individuals. Furthermore, these vaccines were believed to be dangerous as they were created far too quickly and without enough tests to prove their efficacy.

This more recent wave of protests was also founded on conspiracies ranging from anti-government to anti-vaccine. A portion of the Italian population is convinced that the government is consolidating its power over its citizens by controlling them, taking away their individual rights and freedoms, and controlling the country’s money supply. They also believe that vaccines are still harmful and should not be administered to young children. Protestors have come to define the Italian government as a “health dictatorship or tyranny.” In November 2021, a massive crowd in Milan greeted the well-known vaccine skeptic , praising his words against the Green Pass and mandatory vaccination. 

Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier, not all protests were peaceful. Some resulted in violent attacks. On April 3. 2021, attacked a vaccination hub in Brescia, Lombardy with multiple incendiary devices. Investigators and prosecutors argued that the main of the perpetrators was to damage the hub and interrupt the vaccination campaign in the city. 

The attack was a direct outcome of Pluda’s journey into conspiracy theories. On his Facebook page, Pluda shared a variety of posts, pictures and memes of different conspiracies ranging from anti-government to anti-immigration, from anti-vaccination to anti-COVID. He believed that COVID-19 was a hoax and that the government had created it for its own agenda and that vaccines were created to control the population. Because of his beliefs, Pluda took part in many of the anti-vaccination and anti-COVID protests, which he advertised on his Facebook page with the aim of  gathering as many of his friends and followers as possible.

Other protests at taking down the government and changing the social and political order. These protests turned violent when on , protestors guided by the leaders of Italy’s far-right groups, such as Forza Nuova, broke into the headquarters of the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL — Italy’s most important trade union) in Rome and caused havoc. Protestors managed to overtake police officers at the entrance and gradually make their way through the offices, damaging furniture, destroying objects and breaking windows. 

How to Curb Violence?

After the violent attack in Rome, Italian prosecutors and investigators have been working to arrest any individual with extreme and radical views who was tied to the protests. Many of the individuals arrested were part of a Telegram channel called “” (“Stop the Dictatorship”), which has been taken down because of its hateful comments. The channel boasted several thousand members that talked about taking up arms, committing attacks on Italian institutions and taking down the health dictatorship. 

While this is a step in the right direction, the Italian government can implement more information campaigns — both online and offline — which could be crucial to avoid the spread of conspiracies. By increasing the amount of factually correct information on vaccines and COVID-19 and by taking down posts, videos, and memes that spread conspiracies, the Italian government could mitigate violent attacks in the future. 

Conspiracy theories can be dangerous and can push individuals to commit violence, especially when the environment is stressful, inexplicable, and uncertain. The conspiracies related to the COVID-19 pandemic have pushed individuals worldwide to commit violent attacks. Italy is no exception and, like other nations, must act speedily to curb such violence.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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A total of 1,009 voters, including 58 delegates chosen by regional councils and known as “great electors,” took part in the first stage of voting, which will be repeated every day until a consensus is reached. A clear vote is unlikely to be reached before Thursday as cross-party negotiations are still underway and the majority of lawmakers have decided to cast a blank vote as a delaying action amid intense backroom talks.

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Usually a symbolic formality, Italy’s presidential election is this time a focus of special attention by media and citizens, as the country’s fragile national unity and political balance depend on its outcome. The vote comes at a pivotal time, as the country has recently agreed to an EU-sponsored ($213 billion) program of economic and social reforms aimed at rebooting its national economy.

Among the top contenders is Prime Minister Mario Draghi, a former president of the European Central Bank, who has openly  his willingness to run for the job. For Draghi, a seven-year presidential term is undoubtedly more appealing than ending his mandate with a disorderly, mixed coalition ahead of general elections next year.

But parties are reluctant to vote for Draghi as his eventual election as president and resignation as prime minister could lead to snap general elections. His exit as head of government, a role he was appointed to by Mattarella in February 2021 after the collapse of the so-called Conte II cabinet, in favor of the presidency could bring Italy back to a new phase of instability and political uncertainty. 

Why Does This Election Matter?

In recent decades, Italy’s national politics has undergone profound transformation concerning the structure and ideologies of both parties, and the role of the president has become increasingly important. Beyond exercising moral authority, representing national unity and being the guarantor of the independence and integrity of the nation, as defined by the Italian Constitution, the head of state takes charge during a political crisis.

The president has the authority to select the new prime minister, as Mattarella did last year in  Draghi to lead the country out of a political impasse after the resignation of technocratic Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte. The president also has the authority to approve or deny the appointment of ministers who will form the new cabinet, and they can refuse mandates to weak coalitions and dissolve parliament, setting the country on the path to national elections.

Will the Government Fall Apart?

The situation is particularly delicate as it involves the stability and longevity of the current government and the possibility of early general elections. The outcome of the presidential vote may lead to different scenarios, potentially able to shift allegiances, disrupt existing coalitions and alter the balance of power among Italy’s political parties.

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If parliament fails to agree on a candidate, the vote will undoubtedly become a source of division between the left and the right, inevitably opening the path to a political rupture. 

The government’s collapse would not only damage Italy’s political equilibrium, but also impact the European Union. Brussels has heavily bet on Italy’s ability to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic — which rocked the economy and markets — endorsing prime minister Draghi’s national recovery and resilience plan.

What About Mario Draghi?

The presidential election is also important because it could represent a turning point in determining the political future of Prime Minister Draghi, who has provided a period of balance and good governance in Italian politics.

According to his supporters, choosing Draghi as the president and having him in office for the next seven years would increase the chances to keep markets stable, which would imply the prospect of long-term economic recovery and, at the same time, give Italy more credibility at a European and international level.

Yet, many lawmakers are pushing for President Mattarella to stay on for another year, arguing that this would be the best solution to guarantee the government’s stability until scheduled general elections in 2023.

Who Are the Other Contenders? 

As the prominent businessman and former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi  his candidacy, saying that Italy could not afford further political division, far-right leaders Matteo Salvini (Northern League) and Giorgia Meloni (Brothers of Italy) are  a list of moderate right-wing figures. This includes former Senator Marcello Pera and ex-mayor of Milan Letizia Moratti as potential candidates, hoping to gain support from the center left.

Other possible contenders include Pier Ferdinando Casini, a long-serving centrist senator and former speaker of the lower house who reportedly has good cross-party relations, Marta Cartabia, a judge and former president of the Italian constitutional court currently serving as minister of justice, and Giuliano Amato, a former politician who served twice as prime minister and thrice as minister during the 1990s.

After the first three ballots, where a two-thirds majority is required (673 out of 1,009 voters), an absolute majority of 505 votes is enough for a candidate to be elected. Yet if the voting process continues past the end of Mattarella’s term, it would be clear that the presidential election has paved the way for another unpredictable political earthquake.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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According to Mattarella, it would have been risky to organize early elections during the pandemic. Indeed, new elections would have delayed the fight against the pandemic. In addition, the prospect of a right-wing populist government would also probably have had a negative impact on the financial markets — a risk that had to be avoided in an already challenging situation.

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Draghi is inheriting a difficult situation. In Italy, the health, economic and social crises triggered by the pandemic have exacerbated the country’s enormous structural problems. Italy’s “seven deadly sins” — as Italian economist Carlo Cottarelli called them — are tax evasion, corruption, excessive bureaucracy, an inefficient judicial system, demographic problems, the north-south divide and difficulty in functioning within the eurozone. As a result of the pandemic, gross domestic product (GDP) fell by almost 9% in 2020, public debt rose to around 160% of GDP and more than 400,000 jobs were lost. The inability of the traditional parties to find solutions for the economic problems keeps support for the right-wing populist coalition (Lega, Fratelli d’Italia, Forza Italia) at almost 50%.

Even though almost all major political forces have declared their intent to cooperate with the Draghi government, the framework of a technocratic government offers the right-wing populists a target. It is quite conceivable that they will accuse Draghi of lacking democratic legitimacy. It will also be a challenge for the new head of government to govern without his own parliamentary majority.

Managing the Health Crisis Without Austerity

The top priority of the new leadership will be to manage the health crisis. This includes speeding up vaccinations and supporting schools and the labor market. This means applying for — and successfully using — funds from the financial assistance plan of the European Union to mitigate the economic and social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The expected €200 billion ($243 billion) or so from this fund could benefit the economic recovery as well as the planned structural reforms in public administration, taxation and the judiciary, which will give the new government more room for maneuver in economic policy.

Unlike the last technocratic government under Mario Monti between 2011 and 2013, the fact that Draghi will not have to enact politically-costly fiscal consolidation with possible negative effects on GDP growth can also be seen as an opportunity. This is mainly due to broad market confidence in Draghi and the fact that his government is operating from the outset under the protective umbrella of the ECB, which will not allow the cost for servicing public debt to rise excessively. The eurozone’s fiscal rules have also been temporarily suspended; this makes it possible to support the economy through fiscal policy measures.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that, despite the structural problems, the Italian economy has many strengths: Italy is one of the most industrialized countries in Europe and the second-largest exporter after Germany. If some obstacles to growth are removed and, for example, credit is released by the Italian banking sector, the pace of recovery could pick up significantly. Draghi’s experience from the finance ministry and in central banking could help him set a decisive course.

Who Will Succeed Mario Draghi?

Nevertheless, given the major challenges facing Draghi’s technocratic government, one should be cautious about expectations. The next general election is less than two and a half years away, and it cannot be ruled out that it will be brought forward. That is very little time to address structural problems that have existed for decades.

To avert a victory for the right-wing populists, the new head of government will do everything he can to prevent early parliamentary elections until the current moderate majority in parliament has elected President Mattarella’s successor. The latter’s term ends in February 2022, and it cannot be ruled out that Draghi himself will succeed Mattarella. He could use his authority and power as president to stabilize politics, as is the traditional role of the Italian president.

In 2012, Draghi saved the eurozone as head of Europe’s most important financial institution. In the current crisis, even if supported by figures from across a broad political spectrum, he will act as head of one of Europe’s most politically-fragile governments — an incomparably less favorable starting position.

Draghi will make the best possible use of his time as head of government. That much is certain. However, given the massive level of support for the populists, the most important question is: After Draghi, will someone take the helm who will continue his reforms or reverse them? Not only Italy’s future but also that of the entire eurozone depends on it.

*[This was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Another of Bannon’s initiatives to remodel Europe in the image of Trump’s America is his stab at changing the governance of the Catholic Church. He would undoubtedly like the Curia to adopt an aggressive “Vatican First” policy. He famously Pope Francis “the enemy.” Bannon has mobilized his network of wealthy conservative Catholics in the US in the hope of deposing the Holy Father on the grounds of heresy. This will buttress the spiritual side of his special view of reality, to ensure its conformity with his political and racial ideology.

Can it be that challenging a sitting pope has provoked divine retribution in the form of the revocation of his lease of the Trisulti Charterhouse? If so, it means that the divinity would have exceptionally appealed to the secular arm, since the revocation came not in the form of a thunderbolt from on high but from the Italian state, still governed by a right-wing coalition that until recently was guided by Bannon’s ally and favorite European strongman, Matteo Salvini.

The pope had nothing to do with the canceling of the lease. It was Italy’s Culture Ministry that. Bannon intended to use the monastery as both a right-wing think tank to disseminate propaganda and an academy that would serve as the launchpad from which he hoped to turn Europe into a province of Breitbart News and Trumplandia.

But the battle isn’t over. In the words of Bannon’s appointed director and associate, Benjamin Harnwell: “The DHI [Dignitatis Humanae Institute] will contest this illegitimate maneuver with every resource at its disposal no matter how many years it takes. And we will win.”

Harnwell may be counting on Bannon’s money (he has already put $1 million into the venture) to achieve his victory, though there’s no indication Bannon himself will cover the legal fees. It’s true that a cabal of rich American Catholics have been raising funds to impeach the current pope or force him to resign. Some of that money could be allocated to the DHI’s legal case.

In June, Bannon summed up the: “The fight for Trisulti is a microcosm of the fight for the Judeo-Christian West.”

Here is today’s 3D definition:

Microcosm:

A tiny, incomplete world that encapsulates all the features of the entire world or universe, which serves to instill the belief in the inexorable existence of a bigger, complete world that contains exactly the same properties as the microcosm but on a scale that renders it absolute and unopposable

Contextual Note

A microcosm is a very small version of the macrocosm, which generally means not just something bigger, but the entire world or universe. Steve Bannon’s vocabulary reveals the extent of his ambition. He might have called it a sample, a blueprint, a template, a foretaste or even a prototype of something that he intends to build into an influential force. Instead, his choice of metaphor suggests that his ideas and their political application are designed ultimately to dominate the universe or at least that part of the universe he calls the Judeo–Christian West. 

Though Bannon purports to be a Roman Catholic — who nevertheless openly seeks to overthrow the current pope — his concept of “Judeo-Christian” appears to be less related to the Catholic “” and more to the Old Testament notion of a chosen people. Not the tribes of Israel, though Bannon would certainly include them (at least for the short term), but “people of the white persuasion.”

Part of his problem lies in the fact that most people of the white persuasion — Italians, for example — are not persuaded by Bannon’s ideas. If he really thinks there is a “fight for Judeo–Christian West,” what does he intend to do with all those Judeo-Christians who are opposed to his nationalist, populist and fundamentally racist policies? Have they failed to appreciate that their whiteness marks them as members of the chosen gladiatorial race?

Historical Note

Though everything Steve Bannon has done publicly smacks of partisan, populist politics, Newsweek the institute’s attempt to establish its legitimacy by bridging theology and at least one science (anthropology). DHI claims to protect and promote “human dignity based on the anthropological truth that man is born in the image and likeness of God.”

Had Bannon sought to understand the literary, scientific and theological tradition of his beloved Western culture, in whose defense he has so boldly risen, he would have discovered that the notion of microcosm dates at least back to Plato. The Greek philosopher saw the human being — body, mind and soul — as a microcosm of the universe, containing all its complexity on a micro scale. As Encyclopaedia, the idea of the microcosm, as understood by thinkers from ancient Greeks to the Christian philosophers of the Renaissance, “postulates a metaphysical relationship between man and the rest of nature.” It says nothing about the fight for dominance by the Judeo–Christian West.

Pope Francis is currently conducting a three-week in Brazil focused on the Amazon rainforest and the issues surrounding its exploitation. The president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, one of Steve Bannon’s political heroes, doesn’t approve. Gregorio Diaz Mirabal, an Amazon native and head of COICA, representing more than 4,500 indigenous communities, has thanked the pope, that the church is “the only institution that is calling for the protection of the planet.”

That isn’t quite true, since the United Nations has also as have a few national governments. Even Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan have begun to and now see the combat against the effects of climate change as a promising sector, though as a Goldman executive expressed it, “We see this as an opportunity to unlock economic growth.” From his point of view, the interest in climate change stems from the fact that there’s money to be made from investing in profit-making companies, though that in no way diminishes the interest Goldman’s clients have in investing in fossil fuels. Bannon, by the way, began his career at Goldman Sachs.

Diaz Mirabal made headlines when he “urged Pope Francis and the Catholic Church as a whole to help [his people] talk with ‘the new gods of the developed countries.’” The “new gods” he named were Google, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. He could have added Goldman Sachs to the list and — why not, if only for comic effect? — Amazon.

A battle is clearly brewing. Is the pope a Christian or a heretic? The teaching at Bannon’s gladiatorial academy would have made it clear that anyone who defends the indigenous and indigent dark-skinned populations of the Amazon rainforest against visionary leaders of Judeo-Christian truth, calling into question their sacred , must be a heretic. Alas, the Italian government has struck a blow at academic freedom and the pursuit of both microcosmic and macrocosmic truth by preventing that teaching to prosper, grow and eventually evangelize Europe.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book,, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Italy’s GDP currently stands at and its growth rate is extremely anemic. In January, the country’s central bank estimated that the economy would grow just this year. Between 1969 and 1998, Italy’s real GDP per capita increased by 104%. During this time, Italy had domestic monetary policy autonomy thanks to the lira, which it devalued frequently.

Since joining the euro, the devaluation option has been off the table. Italy’s monetary policy is set by the European Central Bank. From 1999 to 2016, Italy’s real GDP per capita fell by 0.75%. During the same period, Germany’s real GDP per capita grew by 26.1%. While Italians have lost out, Germans have gained since the launch of the euro.

THE ECONOMY IS A MESS

Even as the Italian economy has shrunk, its debt has grown. It now has the third largest state debt in the world after the US and Japan. The debt mountain of at 132% of GDP is far too high. The rescue of the Italian economy is impossible, as it exceeds the capabilities of European states.

Since 1999, the Italian economy has gone steeply downhill in all aspects. Fiat has ceased to dominate the European car market and the country has lost its leading position as a producer of white household appliances. Many factories shut down and several large businesses have relocated to other countries.

Labor market problems; low public and private investment in research and development; a large and inefficient bureaucracy; a dysfunctional, costly and slow-moving justice system; and high levels of corruption and tax evasion are among some of Italy’s intractable problems. With devaluation no longer an option, Italians have been unable to put their house in order and kickstart their economy.

Unemployment is at about 11%, the fourth highest in the European Union after Greece, Spain and Cyprus. At the same time, unemployment among young people aged between 15 and 24 amounts to an . Poverty has risen to its highest level since 2005. The latest figures reveal 5 million people living in absolute poverty as of 2017. The figure includes 6.9% of Italian households.

As a result, a deep economic and social crisis is sweeping through this Mediterranean country like a hurricane.

Even as debt, unemployment and poverty rise, Italy has the maximum bank branches per inhabitant in Europe. These branches survive mainly by giving interest and corporate loans, a poor and short-sighted business model. Given that interest rates in the eurozone are zero, banks are making losses. Their liabilities are reaching $290 billion, about 15% of Italian GDP. Italian banks are in deep trouble, spelling more trouble for the economy ahead.

The Italian economy is the third largest in eurozone. In this badly designed monetary union, it is like a tired horse, loaded with bad debts, that is finding it difficult to breathe as it marches uphill on the stones and puddles of an incredibly rigid eurozone system.

THE EURO IS ADDING TO THE MESS

The eurozone today is nothing else but a combination of conflicting interests among member states. What is of great interest to Italy is not of interest to Germany. What is of value to France does not matter to Greece. And the reconciliation of interests in the era of the common currency has proved to be impossible. This is because Germany, the dominant economic power of the eurozone, has managed to rule and dominate. It is using the euro for its benefit, while other countries, instead of resisting or objecting, are bowing and obeying.

The time has come for Italy to leave the eurozone. So far, Italian politicians have feared short-term negative effects of such an exit. Yet the cost of delaying Italy’s exit from the eurozone will ultimately prove to be far greater than the cost of rupture because of an imminent and impending economic crisis.

The first decision by the coalition government of the Five Star Movement and the Lega to submit a 2019 budget with a defying Brussels was clearly in the right direction. Italian policymakers need to reinforce the economy by strengthening domestic demand and safeguarding the prosperity of the people. In a crisis, they cannot follow Brussels’ strict fiscal regulations that have been authored by Germany.

Italy must at last cease to dance to Berlin’s commands and bid adieu to the euro. By returning to the lira, Italy will regain its political, economic and institutional sovereignty. Despite current problems, Italy still has the second largest industrial capability after Germany in the eurozone at 19% of GDP. The country produces aircraft, cars, weapons, electronic systems, perfumes, shoes and clothes. Its export potential still remains high.

There is another reason to leave the euro. Italy needs energy in the form of cheap oil and gas. By leaving the euro, it could get oil from Libya and gas from Gazprom. This would lower its production costs. Combine that with a flexible national currency and the Italian economy would become extremely competitive.

To sum up, Italy is sailing into the turbulent eurozone sea where powerful winds will sink it. However, if its political leadership decides to change course and return to its national coin, Italy could still save itself.

*[An earlier version of this article was published by Daily Egypt News.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Italy has one key partner—the United Arab Emirates (UAE); two economic partners—Kuwait and Qatar; and three third-party partners—Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman. As Italy grapples with an ongoing financial crisis, officials in Rome view the GCC’s interest in diversifying its web of security partnerships as an opportunity to take advantage of a lucrative defense market and to boost national exports.

Military bonds between Italy and the GCC are taking shape within the context of a Gulf-Mediterranean security nexus. Southern European and Arab Gulf states are forging stronger ties to fortress themselves against the security threats posed not only by militant Islamist extremists, but also by the flood of refugees and migrants caused by the raging conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Although Italy is not mainland Europe’s top arms dealer (France holds that title), the escalating geopolitical instability across the MENA region will likely give rise to stronger cooperation in the defense sector between Rome and the Gulf states. Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s government has provided an unprecedented level of support for Italy’s military industry, which has scored significant achievements in three GCC countries this year.

United Arab Emirates

In March, the UAE—the GCC’s longest-standing purchaser of Italian weapons and the Arab Gulf state with closest ties to Rome—agreed to a $355 million deal to buy eight drones from Piaggio Aerospace. Since 2015, Mubadala, a public joint stock company and an investment vehicle of Abu Dhabi’s government, has acquired 100% of Piaggio Aerospace. This is one of the most strategic among GCC-owned Italian assets, particularly due to Piaggio Aerospace’s plans to develop a line of drones. This deal means that, for the first time ever, a technologically advanced combat item would be GCC-owned since its inception.

The UAE is also an important political and strategic ally of Italy. Rome frequently reaches out to Abu Dhabi for support—first and foremost pertaining to the Libya dossier and, to a lesser extent, to Egypt’s. Indeed, the frequency of high-level bilateral political visits has increased significantly over the past few turbulent years. Convergence, however, on specific regional crises, especially Libya, comes with limits. Although the UAE unequivocally supports the Tobruk-based government and General Khalifa Haftar’s anti-Islamist forces in the Libyan National Army (LNA), Italy has been pushing for the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), brokered by the United Nations in December 2015, and views General Haftar as an important security interlocutor, but not a political one.

Qatar and Kuwait

Officials in Rome, however, usually set aside these sensitive dossiers with the other GCC members, although several are important economic and defense partners of Italy. In June, for example, Italy’s state-owned Fincantieri secured a $4.5 billion contract with Qatar to supply Doha with five warships which, according to Il Sole 24 Ore, will come with missiles and radar. This landmark deal followed years of conversation between Rome and Doha. The visit of Emir Tamim Bin Hamad al-Thani to the Italian capital in January laid the groundwork for the contract, which includes the training of Qatari personnel by Italy’s navy.

In April, Kuwait signed a $9.1 billion deal to purchase 28 Eurofighter jets from the EuroRADAR consortium, led by , marking the largest contract ever secured by the Italian defense giant. The deal includes logistical and operational support, as well as the training of both aircrews and ground personnel, to be carried out in cooperation with the Italian Air Force.

Italy, Qatar and Kuwait finalized these two contracts only as a result of government-to-government agreements signed between the defense ministries of Rome, Doha and Kuwait City. They represent a significant upgrade in what were already important economic relations. Whether they will lead to stronger political and strategic cooperation remains questionable.

Saudi Arabia

Finally, there are those relations that are strictly linked to third parties—in this case to Italy’s most important ally, the United States. Italy’s ties with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman, with whom bilateral relations never truly took off, strengthened only after Washington reached out to its European Union (EU) allies to share security responsibilities in the Persian Gulf.

Since the beginning of the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen, Italians in arms, ammunition and spare parts to the Saudis, who fly the Eurofighters jets in their war against the Houthi rebel movement and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Italian-Saudi relations, however, are complicated. On one hand, Prime Minister Renzi’s government has tried to reach out to the Saudis with two high-level visits to Saudi Arabia in two years. (Renzi visited Riyadh in November, and in June Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni visited Jeddah.) Indeed, there are a host of Italian firms with a strong presence in the Saudi market; they collaborate extensively with local companies to build infrastructure and petrochemical factories in cities across the kingdom. For instance, Salini Impregilo, a leading constructor, built Riyadh’s Kingdom Tower and is on Riyadh’s subway project.

Yet the numbers are quite small given the country’s size. This is partly because the level of mutual contacts and familiarity between Italy and Saudi Arabia—just as with Bahrain and Oman—has been historically low, and these countries have been traditionally treated as friends of friends, rather than as full partners. In addition, Italy’s geopolitical alignments have often been at odds with Saudi Arabia’s.

Italy’s historically strong connection to Iran represents the major obstacle in Rome-Riyadh relations. Partners since the 1950s and up until the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Italy is a trusted interlocutor for the Iranians, who for in the P5+1 group negotiating on the nuclear file in 2004. In 2013, former Minister for Foreign Affairs Emma Bonino was the first European foreign minister to visit the Islamic Republic following the end of President Mahmood Khatami’s tenure in 2005. At that time, the Italian diplomat was already pushing to include Iran at the at the Geneva II conference on Syria.

Since the signing of the nuclear agreement, Italy has been quick to arrange an exchange of high-level political visits with Tehran and to ink significant deals in sectors such as petrochemicals, heavy industry, . In September, Iran even negotiated a naval exchange deal with Italy for its warships to be berthed in Italian ports and vice versa. This agreement, in particular, as well as the general political vicinity of the two countries, represents a red flag for the Saudis, especially in an increasingly polarized region.

A grave concern in Riyadh and other GCC capitals is that Iran’s reintegration within the global economy, as well as Tehran’s improved relations with Italy and other Western states, is paving the way for more states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to begin viewing Iran as a useful partner, if not a tacit ally, in the struggle against Sunni Islamist extremism and terrorism.

Indeed, when Iranian President Hassan Rouhani made his watershed visit to Italy in January, Renzi called on Rome and Tehran to in an effort to defeat the “evil” Daesh (Islamic State). In 2015, EU Foreign Policy Chief and Member of the Italian Parliament Federica Mogherini hailed the nuclear deal’s passage. She that the watershed agreement could “open unprecedented possibilities of peace for the region, starting from Syria, Yemen, and Iraq.” These statements were poorly received in Arab Gulf states such as the UAE, where officials, certainly encouraged by Riyadh, accused Mogherini of failing to understand their perception of Tehran’s foreign policy in .

Oman

Yet not all members of the GCC are likely to have a negative attitude toward deeper Italian-Iranian ties. The Sultanate of Oman, which is the council’s most independent state and maintains a cordial relationship with Tehran, shares Italy’s view of Iran as a nation with an important and legitimate role to play in resolving international security crises. Although Oman’s relationship with Italy has been so far unsteady—with limited cooperation in fields such as tourism, oil, gas and construction—Rome is increasingly viewing Muscat as a valuable diplomatic interlocutor. Often dubbed “The Switzerland of the Middle East” and rightfully credited with promoting peaceful solutions to regional conflicts, the Omani perspective can be increasingly valuable at a time when Italian officials grapple with refugee crises stemming from conflicts for which the only solutions are political.

At the same time, there may been reason to expect that Italy and Oman are also exploring a defense partnership. In September, Rome and Muscat’s defense ministers, Omani military officials and the Italian ambassador to the sultanate attended an Omani-Italian joint military exercise in Jebel al-Akhdar. As Oman struggles to achieve its aim of economic diversification, Muscat officials view the sultanate’s ports such as Duqm as crucial trade hubs with great potential for growth in the shipping and logistics sectors. This would, in turn, offer more Italian firms a stable corner of the MENA region for trade and investment. By aiding the Omani military with joint drills, Italy is perhaps suggesting that it is a stakeholder in the long-term security of the country—as well as of the region.

Italy in the Middle East

A final consideration emerges from this analysis. As Italy begins to define its presence in the Gulf region, it must achieve a delicate balance between its relations with Riyadh, Tehran and the other Arab Gulf capitals.

As the GCC nations respond to escalating geopolitical instability and rising sectarian temperatures by asserting a more muscular foreign policy, while becoming less confident in their most important defense partner, the US, they are turning to other NATO members to counterbalance their dependence on Washington for weapons deals. They might be exploring the Italian option not only as the world’s eighth largest international arms exporter, but also, potentially, as a country that perhaps could still be persuaded to align with the GCC states on a host of global security issues, especially in the Mediterranean. Then, perhaps, Italy could sway other European countries to follow.

For these reasons, this Mediterranean country, until now essentially a stranger in the neighborhood, is likely to play an increasingly important role in the Arab Gulf states’ long-term strategic planning.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner institution of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Closer Italy-Africa relations can pave the way for mutually advantageous business deal-making and investments. Engagement on the economic front can proceed along a dual track: On the one hand, involving large Italian corporations, and on the other, small and medium-scale Italian enterprises. If done right, African partners can be involved in both cases.

At first blush, the largest Italian firms, mostly in the banking and insurance sectors, may not appear to have much to gain or offer from entry into African markets. But there are large Italian companies active in a variety of other sectors that��can advance Africa’s developmental agenda. Some of these firms ought to be sought out and enticed to invest.

Many large Italian companies have little or no presence in Africa. Major reasons for the lack of a more significant Italian corporate presence in Africa are the misinformation and biases that continue to color perceptions about the continent. As one , “In recent years, one can observe Italian business’ unawareness of the dynamics of Africa markets; perceptions are still anchored on dated impressions and prejudices of the 1980s of an Africa in decline.”

As a result, persuading major Italian companies to invest in Africa is a concerted effort. African governments frequently rely on what they believe are tried and true methods of attracting investment, like participation in trade fairs or mingling with trade missions. Such efforts may yield some results, but a more “activist” approach is warranted. Governments ought to identify companies whose investments would be synergistic with their country’s development needs, engage in individualized lobbying to attract such investment and lay out specific incentives.

What are examples of prominent large Italian firms that��might be persuaded to invest?

An Obvious Choice

For many African countries that seek to establish an industrial base by developing linkages with their agricultural sector, attracting investment by agro-processing companies is an obvious choice. One such Italian company is Parmalat. One of Europe’s largest dairy processing companies, Parmalat has recovered from a 2003 bankruptcy (the biggest ever in Europe) and is now a subsidiary of French multinational Lactalis.

Parmalat remains a significant firm in its own right, with precious expertise in dairy and food processing, and revenue of €6.4 billion a year. The company is present in Europe, Australia and China. Outside of southern Africa, it has next to no presence on the African continent.

African countries desirous of bolstering their automotive sector could instead consider joint ventures with Fiat Chrysler. Buoyed by its acquisition of Chrysler, Fiat—the world’s seventh largest automaker—is now a truly global player in the automotive industry. In a bid to embrace technological innovation, it modernized its assembly lines according to the Toyota model—the industry gold standard—and recently reached an agreement with Google’s parent company, Alphabet, to build self-driving minivans.

Fiat has manufacturing or assembly plants in Italy, Brazil, Poland and Argentina, and joint ventures in Turkey, India, Serbia and China—but no presence in Africa. Fiat can potentially serve as a joint venture partner in those African countries seeking to boost nascent automobile industries. Moreover, given the still relatively small size of sub-Saharan African markets, factories based on the continent could be used for exports to the Middle East and North��Africa. Peugeot is an example of this, having recently opened an assembly plant in Ethiopia.

Countries intent on developing local defense manufacturing firms may consider pursuing joint ventures with Finmeccanica (renamed Leonardo-Finmeccanica, but still better known by its old name). The 68-year-old,��€13 billion a year revenue-generating aerospace and defense firm manufactures parts for the Eurofighter Typhoon jets and has developed missiles and missile defense systems. The company’s civil and defense electronics business competes against Lockheed Martin and France’s Thales.

Arguably, Finmeccanica is best known for its civil and military helicopter business. The company is currently the world’s largest helicopter maker after Airbus. Among its most recent significant sales are agreements to sell choppers to Pakistan and to build helicopters in Russia under a joint venture agreement. In the United States, Augustawestland—now a Finmeccanica subsidiary—had previously won a contract in partnership with Lockheed Martin for the manufacture of the president’s next fleet of , until the deal was scuppered due to cost overruns.

Finmeccanica’s production facilities and joint ventures are located around the world, including Poland, Turkey, Romania and Malaysia; again, no such facilities exist anywhere in sub-Saharan Africa. The advantage of nurturing government-to-government ties to spur business deal-making is readily apparent: The Italian government holds a 30% stake in Finmeccanica. And it is the Italian government that proposed Finmeccanica’s present chairman, Giovanni De Gennaro—a former police chief and undersecretary in charge of security.

Oil and Gas

Another important and already large investor in Africa is ENI. Unlike other large Italian firms, ENI has not neglected the African continent. In recent years, the company has made oil and gas discoveries in Ghana and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). ENI is “doubling down” on Africa. It recently announced that it intends to invest $20 billion in Africa over the next four years, with more money devoted to power generation and renewables.

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Here too, cordial government-to-government relations can yield concrete benefits. The Italian government is a major shareholder in ENI, and ENI too has long had a revolving door between its business and government. A case in point: ENI’s recruitment in 2015 of Lapo Pistelli, former deputy foreign minister, to be in charge of the Africa portfolio.

Certainly, investment from large multinationals is accompanied by risks—corruption chief among them. Take Finmeccanica, for example. In the last few years, it has been implicated in corruption scandals in Panama and Algeria; and in India where the company pursued a €556 million contract for the sale of helicopters. Delhi eventually blacklisted the company, prohibiting it from engaging in any further business in India.

Perhaps no Italian company better epitomizes opacity in its operations, and intertwinement of state and corporate interests, than ENI. In their book, The Parallel State, authors Andrea Greco and Giuseppe Oddo set forth in detail the scandals and intrigues in which the corporate behemoth has been enmeshed since its creation.

Ranked 65^th in the Global Fortune 500, ENI has been an extension of the state apparatus fulfilling Italian national interests, but at the same time an entity so appropriately connected as to be able to pull the right levers at the right time, often persuading Italian authorities to do its bidding. In an interview with popular Italian television journalist Lili Gruber, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi dispelled the notion that ENI’s “multifarious” connections were the stuff of conspiracy theorists. In a startlingly unguarded moment, Renzi declared on national television that “ENI is a fundamental component of our energy policy, our foreign policy, our intelligence policy. By intelligence, I mean our secret services.”

Monopoly on Corruption

Italian companies investing in Africa certainly do not have a monopoly on corruption. ENI itself, for instance, failed to secure the right to develop oil fields in Uganda. It was outmaneuvered by British firm Tullow Oil, which reportedly bribed the Ugandan leadership.

Tax avoidance is another major issue. According to the Africa Progress Panel—chaired by former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan—Africa loses more money to tax avoidance (especially by large multinationals, and particularly in the extractives sector) than it receives in international aid.

Corporate malfeasance, no matter how widespread, cannot preclude the pursuit of strategic investment. Corruption is par for the course in the extractives sector—or any other sector involving vast sums of money. Its elimination may be impossible, but a drastic reduction should be feasible; for instance, through improved regulatory regimes and enforcement mechanisms to deter tax evasion and prevent corruption. Of course, no regime, no matter how improved, will bear fruit unless the political backing to uphold regulations exists.

Similarly important is investment by African governments in the quality of their negotiators. Governments must not limit recruitment to those who meet some baseline standard of competence, but must also attract civil servants imbued with a sense of mission and patriotism; and having done that, provide them with adequate resources. These investments must include cultivation of knowledge in substantive areas, but also improve negotiation skills. All too often, investment in government officials’ capabilities is viewed as an unnecessary expenditure, without the realization that officials negotiate opposite highly sophisticated counterparts in the private sector with immense resources at their disposal—investment in government negotiators’ capabilities can yield significant (if somewhat unquantifiable) returns.

Thinking Small

Aside from thinking creatively about how to engage large Italian industry, African governments must also think about how best to reap the know-how of Italy’s small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). Italy’s SMEs, concentrated in the northeast, are the locomotive upon which the country has in many ways come to depend.

Indeed, SMEs account for 99.9% of enterprises active in Italy and employ 81% of the workforce. Over 94% of these SMEs have fewer than 10 employees, 4.8% have 10-49 and 0.5% have 50-250. They are active in just about every sector of the Italian economy—from life sciences to chemicals, to communications technology, as well as the fashion industry, for which Italy is well known. SMEs are involved in producing medicinal products. Italy has, for some years now, developed a thriving pharmaceutical sector—one of the largest in the world, and second in Europe after Germany.

Countries worldwide are keen to emulate the dynamism of Italian SMEs located in Lombardia, Veneto and the Emilia Romagna regions. Certainly, some SMEs in expansionist mode might consider Africa as a locus for factories set up under joint venture agreements. Many, for instance, have factory outposts in eastern Europe, where labor is far cheaper.

But perhaps the most valuable form of engagement here will not arise from investments per se, but from the lessons that these Italian companies may impart to African entrepreneurs about business, relevant technologies and adaptability in ever-changing markets. It would make ample sense to try “pair up” small nascent firms in African countries with corresponding SMEs active in the same sectors.

African governments must realize that in order to reap dividends from the Italian-African relationship, they cannot be passive recipients of aid or hope through mere happenstance to attract notice from investors.

For instance, shoemakers in sub-Saharan African countries might have much to learn from observing and adopting some of the technologies and organizational strategies of Italian SMEs. Such pairings would ideally be devised via national and regional chambers of commerce in Africa with regional chambers of commerce in the Italian northeast. In countries where chambers of commerce are anemic, this activity would have to be delegated to their embassies in Rome.

These are just some of the avenues for Italian-African cooperation that exist—geopolitical, economic or otherwise. For the relationship to sustain its current upward trajectory, both sides will have to commit to certain steps.

African governments must realize that in order to reap dividends from the Italian-African relationship, they cannot be passive recipients of aid or hope through mere happenstance to attract notice from investors. They must engage with Italian authorities and businesses with tact and creativity.

Italy, on the other hand, must continue to treat Africa as a region meriting attention, and avoid sliding back to the old ways of treating the continent as a geopolitical backwater. In addition, instead of ignoring the most brutal aspects of its past on the continent, Italy . A new beginning for relations between Italy and Africa should not be interpreted as permission for the collective expiation of unacknowledged previous wrongdoings.

International fora—typified by the Italy-Africa Summit—can be helpful in advancing ties between Rome and the continent. Such conferences��allow officials to meet with one another, and for connections to be established between the public and private sectors, as well as civil society. And, of course, these summits spawn ideas on how to propel the relationship forward. Ultimately, however, these ideas must be implemented through political commitment and continued focus, long after such conferences pass. Only then can relations between Italy and Africa reach their full potential for the common benefit.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Italy’s postcolonial relations with the Horn of Africa can be summed up as undulant: occasionally on the rise, propelled toward a crest by sporadic government officials’ visits or business deals but, just as often, on the low.

Government policies that��belied pride in Italy’s colonial legacy, rather than regret, certainly damaged relations. So did the fact that Rome had other priorities during most of the Cold War: a commitment to building the European Union (EU), preservation of the transatlantic partnership and the cultivation of ties with Latin American countries with large Italian expatriate communities. The relationship with Africa was woefully neglected.

Besides, even if Rome had made Africa a priority, one wonders how much it would have been able to implement any long-term “redirect” in its focus given its frequent changes in government. Of course, poor leadership in the Horn of Africa, coupled with civil wars engulfing most of the region, played a significant role in precluding closer ties as well.

Turning to Africa

Laudable as it is, the Renzi administration’s announcement of an intention to re-engage with Africa is not unprecedented.

Previous Italian leaders have, from time to time, spoken of a similar reset. Aldo Moro, a Christian Democrat who served as foreign minister before being kidnapped and murdered by the Red Brigades, defied expectations when, as Italy’s diplomat-in-chief, he sought to revive ties with the countries of the Horn. In doing so, he surprised observers who had reputed him as too lazy and too immersed in domestic politics to be an incisive foreign minister. Indeed, on an official visit to Ethiopia, informed that the umpteenth political crisis in Rome had led to the collapse of the government of which he was a cabinet member, he refrained from interrupting his trip and continued his visit, desirous as he was of avoiding any misunderstanding or causing offense.

Another Italian leader who articulated a pro-Africa policy was Bettino Craxi, Italy’s influential socialist prime minister of the 1980s. While speaking at the Constitutive Congress of the International African Socialist in Tunis, Craxi declared: “In every field, when it comes to Africa, we Italians are seriously behind others. Greeted everywhere with affection and respect, we have been late to organize a more effective policy, a more active and widespread presence.” Those words still ring true today, 35 years after they were spoken.

Previous efforts and appeals to re-engage with Africa were seldom met with any follow-through. What reason, then, to treat Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s pronouncements differently?

In this instance, Italy has followed rhetoric with some visible action. Beyond the convening of the first Italy-Africa Ministerial Conference, Renzi has visited Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and Senegal. None of his predecessors had ever even made a trip south of the Sahara while in office.

It is also during Renzi’s tenure that Italy has participated in international fora dealing with issues of relevance to Africa at the highest level. At the 2015 United Nations Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa, for example, only two donor states were represented at the head of government level: Sweden and Italy. Of course, it was no coincidence that these two states were also campaigning for a non-permanent United Nations Security Council seat.��Whether these initial gestures will be followed by more sustained measures remains an open question.

Political Longevity

However, Renzi, as opposed to his predecessors, has had the political space to redirect some of his government’s focus to Africa. He has taken advantage of this opportunity.

Italy has had 63 governments over the last 70 years, and four already this decade. Recently, however, legislators have refrained from causing any fracas that��would precipitate the collapse of the Renzi government and a call for elections.

The Renzi government has been in power for two and a half years, far above average by the warped standards of postwar Italy. Cynically—but not without reason—Italians typically point out that legislators’ reluctance to bring the government down is due to a revision of the laws governing certain emoluments or pension payments.

Previously, these would have been owed to members of parliament (MP) irrespective of length of service. Theoretically, under the old system, an MP who had taken up his seat after winning an election, served only one day in parliament before elections were called, and then failed to get reelected, would still be owed certain emoluments. In the early 1990s, the laws were changed to require service of 30 months before MPs were eligible for such emoluments. The laws have since been changed making eventual payment of pension-related emoluments conditional upon an MP serving one full term in parliament.

The Renzi government’s longevity is, of course, attributable to other, arguably more important factors, but it is undeniable that more time in office has given him space to leave his imprint on Italy-Africa relations. Future prime ministers will have the same opportunity if their time in office is similarly long-lived.

Convergence of Interests

As important as the longevity and stability of Italian governments to resuscitating Italy-Africa relations is a convergence of interests between the two sides.

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have been dismal for many years now. Workers’ economic productivity has decreased, while labor costs have remained steady. Unemployment stands at 12%, while youth unemployment remains stubbornly high at 35%. Mind-numbing amounts of red tape make Italy one of the most expensive places in the rich world to start a business. Taking stock of Italy’s sub-par economic performance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has forecast that unless policymakers aggressively tackle a slew of systemic issues, the seen before the 2008 financial crisis until the mid-2020s, in effect noting that Italy faces two lost decades.

One among several strategies that the Italian government is pursuing in order to promote economic growth is to encourage Italian companies to expand into emerging markets. The government’s interest in nudging Italian investment toward Africa does not appear to be a passing fancy. It is, in part, consistent with the implementation of recommendations contained in a voluminous report authored by the Italian Institute for the Study of International Politics, which was delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The report urges Italy’s economic crisis.

As the world’s eighth largest economy, Italy can play an even larger role in . Both Italy and the African Union (AU) acknowledge that annual trade amounting to €38 billion is far below potential.

As the home to many large internationally competitive corporations, instantly recognizable high-end brands and many successful small and medium-scale enterprises, Italian companies can provide products that��are in demand in African markets with the growing middle classes. But they can also use African countries as a base for production.

Ulterior Motive

An obvious ulterior motive for Italy’s engagement with Africa is migration. It is impossible for Italy to tackle the challenges posed by migration without cooperating with African governments and civil society. Of course, the challenges posed by migration bedevil Europe as a whole, and not only recently.

In 2010, for instance, word leaked of the fact that the EU was contemplating paying Libya’s Muammar Gadaffi €5 billion a year in order, as , to prevent Europe from becoming “black.”

Italy, as a “frontline” state has been particularly active within the EU and international fora on the migration issue. Under plans jointly drawn up by the Italians and European partners, the EU would seek enhanced security at African borders and the right to repatriate migrants without the right to stay in Europe in higher numbers. In exchange, Europe would allow more legal migration. It would also pledge a larger sum than the €1.8 billion offered at the Valletta Summit on Migration. The funds being discussed amount to €10 billion. Predictably, the sticking point is the financing. The Italians have , but the Germans are resolutely opposed.

For African states, the benefits of enhanced cooperation with Italy are self-evident. Although foreign direct investment (FDI) flows last year were up globally by about 40%, they were down overall in Africa by 7% in 2015 when compared to 2014. West and Central Africa fared poorly (18% and 36% respective drops in FDI), East Africa less so (2% decrease in FDI), while southern and northern Africa (2% and 9% in FDI).

This decline in FDI is taking place in a context in which low commodity prices have adversely affected several African economies, who in the aggregate might be headed toward a 17-year low in gross domestic product (GDP) growth. Though not a panacea, Italy can be a source of increased FDI for the continent.

Jostling for Influence

Africa can also reap other strategic dividends in the near and medium term. Consider the European Union’s current state. The EU remains as divided as it ever was post-Maastricht over a plethora of issues, some existential. To mention just a few well-known examples: dissension over how to galvanize a still-anemic continental economy and how best to confront reduced, but still significant, migratory flows.

EU member states also remain unable to achieve the sort of cohesion necessary to formulate truly common foreign and defense policies. With Brussels failing to muster a common voice on these and many other issues, one is reminded of Henry Kissinger’s apocryphal remark: “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?”

Given Europe’s current discombobulated state, Africa stands to gain from having as many interlocutors as possible with Brussels. Italy can serve as one such partner. By forging a relationship based on mutual interests, Italy can advocate in favor of more Africa-friendly positions in Brussels. This would not be a negligible contribution to Africa’s interests. After all, EU institutions and EU member states are Africa’s most important source of development assistance.

Beyond Brussels, Italy can help facilitate political dialogue with other countries in the wider Mediterranean, including the Balkans. A more stable Italy—with fewer transient governments—will wield greater political influence commensurate with its economic heft. It can exert such influence with its neighbors and within European institutions.

It is one of those ironies of politics that former colonizers continue to exert undue influence in their now independent former colonies in amounts disproportionate to the influence they wield in the world at large.

In many ways, it has already started to do so. For instance, Italy, together with the US, is taking the lead in conflict resolution in Libya. In the EU, where Italy’s “decision-making power is typically regarded as ‘that of a medium-sized power, not of a big country,’” to have Federica Mogherini appointed to the post of EU commissioner for foreign affairs.

Predictably, Italy will seek to leverage greater stability in other geographic areas as well, Africa included. For historical reasons, perhaps, nowhere more so than in the Horn of Africa. In prior years, Italy offered its good offices in order to mediate the Ethiopian-Eritrean border dispute and Egypt and Ethiopia’s altercation over the latter’s construction of a dam on the Blue Nile. Italy’s efforts to secure an important mediatory role in both cases came to naught.

Italy has also constantly sought to position itself as a player of importance in the Somali peace processes. Here, it has attained more success as reflected, for example, in its selection as chair of the the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Partners Forum—a regional organization comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.

Italy’s jostling for influence in the Horn of Africa bears more than just a . It is one of those ironies of politics that former colonizers continue to exert undue influence in their now independent former colonies in amounts disproportionate to the influence they wield in the world at large.

Ultimately, political gestures must almost always be reciprocated with a quid pro quo. If African states see value in Italy interceding on their behalf in Brussels, Rome can reasonably expect to play a larger role in Africa. A more prominent continental role by Italy could be acceptable to African states so long as Rome is neither biased nor overbearing in its mediation efforts.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Earlier this year, Italy hosted the first ever Italy-Africa Ministerial Conference in Rome. Held at the cavernous travertine-laden��Farnesina headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the meeting was attended by high-level delegations from over 40 African countries.

In his closing remarks, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi underscored his intention of broadening political and economic ties with the African continent, by for a “future in which Africa is seen not as the greatest threat—as some demagogues would have it—but as the greatest opportunity.”

The conference, which is intended to be a biennial affair, and Renzi’s visits to sub-Saharan Africa (the first ever by a sitting Italian premier) reflect the Italian government’s commitment to reinvigorating the relationship.

Mutual Benefits

Italy has been late to realize the mutual benefits that��can accrue from a more robust partnership with Africa. Even though it is the world’s eighth largest economy, and Africa’s sixth or seventh most significant trading partner, Italy’s postwar political engagement with the continent has been , and commercial exchanges are below their potential.

Other countries have realized much sooner that regular high-level political dialogue featuring targeted discussions about trade and development could spur investment. China and India, for example, both hold triennial summits with African leaders, whereas the United States holds the biennial US-Africa Business Summit. The French arrange an annual Africa-France Summit, Japan regularly organizes the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, and Turkey has periodically spearheaded summits with continental leaders.

What accounts for Italy’s laggardness to date?

Italy’s insularity and relative economic underdevelopment explains Italian officialdom’s comparatively low level of engagement with Africa post-World War II. Political instability wrought by constant changes in government—63 since 1945—also stunted long-term strategic thinking at la Farnesina.

Moreover, at varying times and to varying degrees, Italy’s former colonial possessions—and their relationship with Rome—were beset with problems, some of their own making, others attributable to Italy. As a result, for most of the postwar period, Italy, unlike Britain or France, could not use its former colonies as a launch pad for strengthening political and business ties elsewhere on the continent.

Understanding the factors impeding closer ties between Italy and the sub-Saharan African countries with which it had historical ties requires understanding the nature of Italy’s postwar exchanges with Eritrea (an Italian colony from 1890 to 1941); Somalia (Italian Somaliland comprising most of modern-day Somalia was a colony from 1889-1941, it continued to be ruled by the Italians under a United Nations trusteeship until 1960 when, at independence, it was conjoined to British Somaliland); and Ethiopia (occupied, but never fully pacified, from 1936 to 1941).

ERITREA

The Italian community in Eritrea was mostly nestled in the picturesque capital, Asmara. Initially a settlement of a mere 150 inhabitants, Asmara was officially founded as a town when the governor of the then Ethiopian Mereb Mellash province, Ras Alula, opted to make it his new capital. When it fell under Italian rule, Asmara blossomed. In a bid to turn it into Africa’s “Little Rome,” the Italians expended significant resources to modernize the city’s infrastructure and to beautify it with Art Deco architecture for which it is renowned to this day.

The colony’s most prominent Italian businessmen made Asmara and its environs their home. These included figures like Barattolo, who got his start in the textile sector, opening a single factory employing a mere 200 workers and eventually growing his business to around 10,000 workers.

Emma Melotti was certainly the region’s most prominent female��entrepreneur. After her husband’s passing, she took over his namesake brewery, and under her sapient stewardship, Melotti came to dominate the Ethiopian market through a network which enveloped even remote villages. Melotti was also available throughout the region, being sold in Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, Yemen and Kenya.

Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation

The first snag in relations between Eritrea and the Italian community—principal propulsor of relations—emerged soon after Eritrea was re-conjoined to Ethiopia under a federal arrangement in 1952, as mandated by United Nations (UN) Resolution 390 (V). Previously Ethiopian, then colonized by the Italians, and after World War II a British protectorate, Eritrea was federated to Ethiopia upon the condition that Eritrean institutions bequeathed by the British—such as the legislature and courts—would continue to function unimpeded.

This resolution of the Eritrean issue via federation—though temporary it later turned out to be—occurred in spite of competing formulas floated by other states at the UN. Among those opposed to the federal arrangement, for instance, was Italy. Though Italy’s post-World War II government may have been post-fascist, it was not postcolonial.

Rome favored a solution where Eritrea remained an Italian colony; and barring that, advocated that Italy continue to administer Eritrea under UN trusteeship. Ultimately resigned to the fact that neither of these proposals would garner sufficient support, Italy called for Eritrean independence. Indeed, during this time, Ethiopia and Italy financially supported rival (and armed) groups—pro-union on the one hand, pro-independence on the other.

Ethiopian diplomats secured a diplomatic coup by obtaining sufficient international support for the Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation, but the same imperial government also helped sow the seeds of the two countries’ eventual separation.

In a pique of royal obstinacy and heavy-handedness, and only 10 years after consummation of the Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation, Emperor Haile Selassie, unwisely going against the counsel of some of his advisers, forcibly dissolved the federal arrangement. His decision subsumed Eritrea into the unitary Ethiopian state and gave further impetus to Eritrean agitation for secession.

The Derg

The beginnings of armed resistance, and the consequent instability in Eritrea, began to hinder Italian (and, indeed, all) commercial activity. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)—a precursor to today’s governing Eritrean People’s Liberation Front—for instance, regularly engaged in extortion by levying “taxes” on agricultural land concessions run by Italians.

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The coming to power in 1974 of Ethiopia’s military government, the Derg, in 1974, made the business environment particularly inhospitable for Italians; most private enterprises were nationalized and expropriated. The Derg’s decision to close all foreign consulates in Eritrea, including the Italian consulates in Asmara and the port town of Massawa, further hastened the Italian exodus.

In one particular act of ruffianism, Derg functionaries went so far as to break into the then vacated Italian consulate in Asmara and temporarily occupied its premises. The final nail in the coffin of a continued Italian presence in Eritrea was the then province’s envelopment by civil war throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

ETHIOPIA

In Ethiopia, much like Eritrea, the “vanguard” of Italo-Ethiopian ties were Italian residents. The Italian community thrived due to its industriousness and ingenuity. Its prosperity, however, was also enabled by Haile Selassie’s injunction prohibiting retribution against Italians who had not committed war crimes.

Among the most successful businessmen entrepreneurs were Mario Buschi, who was involved in public works and ran a company with boats for hire on Lake Tana, source of the Blue Nile; or Mezzedimi, the Italian architect responsible for designing a number of buildings that��came to dominate Addis Ababa’s postwar urban landscape, including the UN Economic Commission for Africa’s sprawling Africa Hall.

Such commercial activity occurred in spite of what were often lukewarm political ties between the two countries. Closer postwar relations between the two governments were inhibited for several reasons.

In the first instance, stalled negotiations over payment of reparations hindered the establishment of closer ties. Italy reneged on its obligation to pay Ethiopia $25 million for war damages and moral harm, as laid out in the 1947 Treaty of Peace. Indeed, at one point, the negotiating positions of both parties seemed irreconcilable. The Italian government maintained that it owed Ethiopia no money, because any moral or physical harm caused by Italy’s five-year occupation of the country was supposedly outweighed by public works the Italians had built. Ethiopia countered that Italy’s egregious war crimes warranted that it pay above and beyond the $25 million stipulated by the peace treaty.

Giuliano Cora, an Italian journalist who at the time commented on the absurdity of this diplomatic impasse, rhetorically asked: “Do we really have to compromise our situation and our future in this region for want of $25 million?” It appears that the Italian government was prepared to do so.

Ultimately, Italy secured the better bargain. Addis Ababa agreed to a lower figure of $16.3 million and the payments occurred under the guise of “technical and financial assistance” for the construction of a dam not far from the capital and a textile mill in the town of Bahir Dar. No mention was ever made of reparations.

Even with this hurdle cleared, another remained: restitution of the 1,700-year-old Axum obelisk, which the Italians had plundered during the occupation. To placate Addis Ababa, Italy offered to build a hospital or an interstate road, in exchange for the uncontested “right” to retain this concrete reminder of its colonial past. Here, too, Italy conveniently forgot that the 1947 treaty mandated the obelisk’s return.

The saga finally ended in 2005 when Italy bore the costs of surgically slicing the obelisk into three parts, so as to have it transported back to Axum in three trips aboard an Antonov plane. Ironically, it was Silvio Berlusconi’s center-right government (whose governing coalition included neo-fascists) that made amends.

Italy still retains other important wartime loot, most importantly a portion of Ethiopia’s prewar Ministry of the Pen archives that appears to be within the custody of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This issue has been forgotten by both sides. The government of Ethiopia ought to try��.

Haile Selassie’s imagination

The most curious stumbling block to closer postwar Italy-Ethiopia relations, however, was the delay by Rome in extending an official invitation to the emperor to visit Italy. The Ethiopian monarch fervently wanted to revisit the country he had last seen in 1924 as regent. His trip had been perennially postponed due to a disagreement over a number of issues, including negotiations over reparations and the Axum obelisk; as well as the impolitic decision by the Italians, at one point, of scheduling Haile Selassie’s visit for shortly after the planned visit of Somalia’s president, at a time when the two countries were at loggerheads over disputed land.

Perhaps no two countries captured Haile Selassie’s imagination as much as Italy and France. The monarch’s fondness for the French is easy to comprehend. Haile Selassie was Francophone, and after an early traditional Ethiopian church education, schooled by a Guadeloupian physician and a Francophone Ethiopian Capuchin monk. But what to make of his affection for Italy on both an emotive and psychological level?

After all, it was Italy that��had unseated him, and it was in Italy that his first daughter, Princess Romanework, and two of her sons had died after having been captured by the Italians.

According to Italian historian Angelo Del Boca, Haile Selassie reputedly confided to Giulio Pascucci-Righi, the Italian ambassador accredited to Addis, in 1970:

“I owe nearly everything to Great Britain. The British gave me a place to live when I chose to go into exile, and they brought me to my homeland. All the same, as it may seem, the Ethiopian people have no love for Great Britain. Only two countries are our friends and understand us. Those countries are France and Italy. I hope that my successors will keep the faith [with regard to] this two-fold constant.”

The likelihood that the emperor’s words reflected the Ethiopian people’s state of mind after a . His pro-Italian gestures soon after the war ended could, in theory, be attributable to a desire to play off the Italians against the British.

British forces had fought together with Ethiopian patriots to dislodge the Italians and had remained behind after Ethiopia’s liberation. It is possible that Haile Selassie wanted to guard against Britain’s accumulation of undue influence in Ethiopia, and the risk that having gained such influence, Britain would wield it to declare Ethiopia a protectorate. But the words spoken to Ambassador Pascucci-Righi were purportedly spoken in 1970, years after the threat of falling under Britain’s sway had passed.

Regardless of whether the words spoken privately to the ambassador were accurately recounted by him, clearly the emperor’s attachment was heartfelt. First, because he persisted in sending signals, at times subtle and on other occasions explicit, to the press and visiting Italian officials that he was eager to receive an invitation to visit Italy.

Enemy Country

A further example of the emperor’s sympathy for Italy occurred in the 1960s when, having dispatched a delegation to Italy, the imperial government secured a loan from a consortium of Italian banks (with the facilitation of the Italian government). The Ethiopian government submitted the loan to the senate for final approval. The Ethiopian senate, whose members included several veterans of the Italian-Ethiopian war, rejected the loan’s terms because they considered the interest rate unduly onerous.

The emperor initially responded to the senate’s recalcitrance by claiming ��è����-����������é and rebuking legislators for still treating Italy as an “enemy country.” Ultimately, in relenting, the emperor resorted to what Cambridge historian Christopher Clapham has termed a familiar imperial stratagem employed by Haile Selassie in the face of insurmountable political opposition to a deal: professing ignorance as to its details. The loan was never disbursed for want of the senate’s approval.

The incident bore an uncanny resemblance to an earlier loan negotiation between Italy and Ethiopia. In 1889, Ras Makonnen (the emperor’s father and duke of Harar), visited Italy to conclude a loan agreement on behalf of his cousin, Emperor Menelik II. Upon his return to Ethiopia, Ras Makonnen was castigated by courtiers for having agreed to a loan with interest rates that were deemed usurious, several courtiers went so far as to impugn his patriotism.

Indeed, of the 235 Italian concessions existing in Somalia at independence, comprising more than 45,300 hectares of land, most were devoted to bananas. During their colonial suzerainty over Somalia, and for several decades following independence, Italy gave preferential treatment to banana imports from Somalia by imposing higher tariffs on those imported from other countries.

When Haile Selassie’s trip to Italy finally occurred, the emperor was received with all the pomp and pageantry reserved for Italy’s most illustrious postwar guests. Perhaps the most evocative scene of the trip was described by the Italian daily, Il Giorno, which wrote of the emperor, with his diminutive figure, standing erect in an open state vehicle side-by-side with Italian President Giuseppe Saragat, accompanied by a phalanx of fully-mounted cuirassiers whose horses’ hooves click-clocked on the Roman cobblestones as the pair majestically made their way to the Quirinale Palace.

In the run-up to, and after, the emperor’s 1970 visit, official Ethiopian-Italian ties were on an upswing. Following the 1974 revolution, commerce suffered another prolonged denouement; this time caused by the military government’s nationalization of private enterprises and, later, the country’s descent into an all-consuming civil war.

SOMALIA

In post-independence Somalia, as was the case in Ethiopia, some leaders harbored an affinity for Italy, which encouraged continued engagement. Somalia’s one-time minister of planning and international cooperation, Ahmed Habib Ahmed, in words that were somewhat similar in spirit to those reportedly uttered by Haile Selassie, remarked: “[Though] I studied in France, ‘my world’ is Italian; the French are distant to me.”

Several decades post independence, Italian commercial involvement in Somalia centered upon agriculture. The Italians set up cotton, sugar and banana plantations and, after 1929, the year in which worldwide cotton prices collapsed, focused mostly on bananas. Bananas eventually became Somalia’s most significant export.

Indeed, of the 235 Italian concessions existing in Somalia at independence, comprising more than 45,300 hectares of land, most were devoted to bananas. During their colonial suzerainty over Somalia, and for several decades following independence, Italy gave preferential treatment to banana imports from Somalia by imposing higher tariffs on those imported from other countries.

Italy further bolstered its political position in Somalia by tilting in its favor in territorial disputes (this policy may not have been adhered to consistently given the frequent change in governments in Rome).

Almost immediately after independence, in the early 1960s, Somalia pressed territorial claims on Ethiopian-controlled territory inhabited primarily by ethnic Somalis. It did the same with regard to lands inhabited mostly by ethnic Somalis in neighboring Kenya and Djibouti, avowedly announcing pursuit of a Greater Somalia encompassing all ethnic Somalis.

Somalia lent pressure to its irredentist claims by supporting armed militias who made frequent forays into Ethiopia, where they were pursued back into Somali territory by forces led by General Aman Andom—an Eritrean who was an interesting historical figure in his own right; in charge of Ethiopian counteroffensives against Somalia, and later, briefly, head of state after Haile Selassie was toppled, before he too suffered the same unceremonious fate.

All-Out War

In the late 1970s, Somalia and Ethiopia actually fought an all-out war over the ethnically Somali Ethiopian Ogaden province. Italy maintained an outward veneer of neutrality, but leaned toward Mogadishu, surreptitiously allowing it to purchase military helicopters, trucks and light weaponry on the Italian market. The support emanated, in part, from the fact that since Somalia had been Italy’s longest-held colony, it was treated with some affection. Beyond that, it is reasonable to surmise that Italy’s support for Somalia may have emanated, at least in part, from lingering bitterness over the Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation—a solution to the Eritrean question which Italy had strenuously opposed.

Aside from official institutional ties, for many years Somalia also benefited from another sort of linkage with Italy: the sympathy and support of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Promotion of commercial interests and mobilization of investment in postwar Italy were not the sole province of the government, but of political parties too. The PCI, and its competitors, jockeyed for influence at home and abroad, by supporting foreign regimes they deemed to be their ideological brethren.

Following the 1969 Somali revolution, the PCI extended cultural and technical assistance and invested in the country through Italian labor unions and affiliated entities. It provided Mogadishu with expertise and machinery to help bolster the Somali construction and agricultural sectors. Italturist, the PCI’s travel and touring company, was also tasked with arranging facilitation tours for Italian tourists in Somalia.

The Italian community in Somalia thrived as a result of the good political ties between Italy and Somalia. As was the case in Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, the Italians benefited from the protection of Siad Barre, Somalia’s post-revolution strongman. Barre inveighed against any harm befalling the Italians and expressed his sympathy toward Italians on more than one occasion, such as when he declared: “I have said, and have repeated, that for us Somalis, Italians are not considered foreigners; and this is a privilege which we have not extended to any other community.”

At one point, Barre even assured the Italians that he was “no Gadaffi.” In saying so, he was communicating to the Italians that he would refrain from following in the footsteps of the Libyan leader who had nationalized the property of Italian settlers after Libya gained its independence from Italy.

But such sweet-talking aside, as Barre fell under the Soviets’ orbit and he increasingly moved his country to the left, ideology trumped his apparent affection for Italians and a spate of nationalizations followed. The local branches of the Banca di Roma and Banca di Napoli, multiple insurance firms and AGIP—the precursor to today’s oil conglomerate, ENI—were among the Italian firms affected.

Though some firms and small factories were spared, the damage was done. Italian companies and most of their expatriate personnel left the country, never to return. Once Somalia spiraled into civil war, even the small Italian community that had faithfully remained behind returned to Italy.

Italy’s engagement with countries in the Horn of Africa was peripatetic. In Ethiopia, Africa’s second most populous country, relations were frequently rocky. Disputes arose over Eritrea and the implementation of commitments undertaken by Italy at the end of World War II by signing the 1947 Treaty of Peace; more generally, it appears that for several decades Italy struggled to come to terms with the fact that the colonial era had ended.

Italy’s focus on other geopolitical priorities, Ethiopia and Somalia’s adoption of economic policies that were inimical to an Italian presence, and their enmeshment in civil wars also minimized Italy’s engagement with the Horn and, by extension, other African countries.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Now that the United Kingdom has decided to leave, the next big problem facing the European Union (EU) is a constitutional reform referendum in Italy. In April, the . They were designed to improve the efficiency and stability of the Italian state and reduce the ability of the Italian senate to bring down the government.

Although the package passed, it did not get the required 66% majority in both houses to come into��immediate effect. The only way the package can come into effect now is if it is approved by the Italian people in a referendum.

Matteo Renzi, the Italian prime minister, will take place in autumn 2016, and he has gone further to say that unless the people approve the proposals, he will resign. Former British Prime Minister David Cameron’s failed referendum gamble makes this look like a risky decision.

The proposed constitutional reforms include: reducing the size of the senate; reducing the power of the senate—both��to block legislation that has been passed by the chamber of deputies and to bring down the government; and reducing the power of Italian regional governments.

Italian Reforms

Major reforms of the state are urgent because (GDP), and the state has to find resources for an aging population, an influx of refugees and the rescue of banks.��The senate has proved to be an obstacle to some reforms.

Reforms are needed to increase the overall productivity of the Italian economy.��This requires a simplification of the tax code; less taxation of work and more on property; simpler public administration; and a simpler and more efficient court system. State-owned enterprises also need to face��more competition, as do some professions and retailers.

Before it joined the euro, Italy was able to devalue its way out of short-term problems, as the UK is doing now. But devaluation��enabled it to avoid making big and difficult reforms. Since it joined the euro, Italy has reformed its previously unviable public pension system—a task that Ireland and the UK have yet to discuss seriously. So, Italy’s underlying ability to make big reforms should not be underestimated.

The polls on how Italians will vote in the referendum are very volatile. The proportion in the “don’t know” category range from 19% to 42% in the two most recent polls. Furthermore, Prime Minister Renzi’s party lost ground in recent city elections, including Rome.

Prime Minister Renzi’s main opponents are the Five Star Movement, who make their policies and select their candidates by polls over the internet. They reject the idea of career politicians and prefer politicians to be amateurs who do the work on a short-term basis. This sentiment is similar to the rejection of “experts” and “elites” in the Brexit referendum on June 23.

The trouble with amateur politicians is that, while they may have good ideas, they may lack the necessary technical ability and staying power to see their ideas through to full and effective implementation.

Italy is the eighth��largest economy in the world. It has an excellent quality of life and a great reputation. Unfortunately, its state system does not work well and there is not enough political consensus to put things right.

This is not a weakness that Italy can afford. It needs a strong and effective state. A rise in the price of fuel or international interest rates could cause a big crisis for Italy, unless it has a state that is capable of making and fully implementing difficult decisions.

That is why Renzi’s referendum is so important for Italy and for Europe.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Italian banks are in trouble. In the recent market turmoil,��. As per the��Financial Times, Italian banks have more than €350 billion of bad debt. Put simply, this is debt where borrowers are not paying repayments as they originally promised to, and the loan itself may never be repaid. It is little surprise that confidence in Italian financial institutions has evaporated, credit is hard to get and the Italian economy is gasping for air.

This week, Italy announced a deal with the European Commission (EC) that allows it to guarantee its bad debt. Here’s how it is supposed to work. Italian banks will offload their bad debt to private players like hedge funds and alternative asset managers. Some of these institutions are looking to increase returns. They will buy this “” at a deep discount. The government is guaranteeing this debt to ensure that the losses these institutions suffer are capped should things go belly up.

Many governments are keen to create private markets for bad loans, and this is what the Italian government is aiming to do. This broadens the pool of creditors, lowers the cost of debt and spreads risk. Most importantly, banks get rid of bad debts from their books. They become healthier and can resume normal activities such as lending to businesses and individuals. Just as in a patient who has open heart surgery, credit flows again and the economy recovers to good health.

So, what’s the catch with such an eminently sensible proposition?

First, there is no guarantee that the Italian government’s guarantee will work. Markets have reacted skeptically. They have good reason to do so. The details of the deal are sketchy. The Italian government is in charge of a fast-aging country with high unemployment. Apart from pasta, football and��la dolce vita, Italians love tax evasion. When the push comes to shove, the Italian government might not have the money or the political will to fulfill its guarantee.

Why not��, take the hit in the gut, recapitalize banks if need be, and march on to create a healthier system? And whilst doing so, rationalize Italy’s Byzantine regulations that are honored more in the breach than observance? Why not reform a convoluted tax system that no one understands except accountants? What about reforming an education system that churns out a notoriously poorly skilled workforce? Also, how about rewriting labor laws that do not make any sense?

The Italian government finds these questions suitably thorny. Therefore, it has plumped for a deal that promises quick rewards and much less pain.

Second, this week’s deal raises a fundamental question regarding risk and reward in the global financial system. Italy disingenuously claims that its deal with the EC will not cost the taxpayer money. The deal will stimulate the economy and, as a result, generate revenue. Yet it is an incontrovertible fact that Italian taxpayers are taking a risk. If things go wrong, they end up footing the bill to cover the losses of private investors. If things go right, then these private players rake in profits.

This has happened before. As , the 2010 Greek bailout “was about protecting German banks, but especially the French banks, from debt write offs.” He recommended slashing Greek debt by a third, but was ignored by the powers that be. Instead, the troika of the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) threw good money after bad. They replaced private debt with public debt, enriching the rich by robbing the poor for the lofty goal of inspiring confidence in the economy.

Hank Paulson, the former US treasury secretary and head honcho of Goldman Sachs, did the same under President George W. Bush. Financial institutions who took reckless risks were bailed out by taxpayer money. Top managers of these institutions cynically used this money to help themselves to��. They justified their bonuses on narrow legalistic arguments. They were promised bonuses by the banks in their contracts. These contracts were sacred and made them creditors because the bank owed them money. Legally, they had first claims as creditors and bonuses were their sovereign prerogative. The minor point that the banks themselves would not exist if the taxpayers had not bailed them out was mere piffle.

The bailouts during the Great Recession of 2008 shook not only the economic foundations of the current financial system, but also its legitimacy. Financial markets work not because they are necessarily efficient. Markets work because people believe in them. If people are not sure that they will get 800 grams of potatoes when they are promised 1 kilogram, or when they suspect that they will be sold a bad second-hand car when they are promised a good one, then trust evaporates and markets eventually disappear.

Today, markets are suffering a crisis of faith. Economists, its high priests, and bankers, its swashbuckling knights in sharp suits, are seen as charlatans and thugs. They are seen as members of a sordid system where the rich rob the poor to swill champagne and gorge��foie gras.

People suspect that Italy’s deal might end up becoming another bailout. Besides, many remember another deal whose ghost is haunting the eurozone every day. When the ECB launched the euro, Italy had failed to meet the����to join the currency union. In the style of the��Mafia,��Camorra�����Ի��������à�Բ����ٲ�, the Italian government did an “” deal with none other than Paulson’s gang,��the .

The Goldman deal was breathtakingly simple. Even better, it was totally legal. The land of Niccolò Machiavelli and Luca Pacioli, the father of modern accounting who created the system of double-entry bookkeeping, entered into a swap deal with Goldman. It converted a foreign currency debt into a domestic currency obligation. By using a fictitious exchange rate and rigging interest rates, Goldman waved its magic wand and made debt disappear from Italian books. It was creative accounting at its finest. Italy could adopt the euro and the European Union (EU) embarked on its new single currency experiment. In return,��. To paraphrase Robert Browning, God was in heaven and all was right with the world.

Italy was not the only country playing footsie with the rules. In 2010,��Der Spiegel reported that Goldman had��“helped the Greek government to����with the help of a derivatives deal that legally circumvented the EU Maastricht deficit rules.” This deal was based on the Italian one and helped Greece join the eurozone. Goldman was smiling all the way to the bank, and unsuspecting tax payers were unknowingly left with a fat bill. At a time when the Greece debt crisis is still playing out, the Italian government makes protestations that this time things are different. However, this sort of deal-making has gone awry far too many times so far. This system of socialism on the downside and capitalism on the upside has to come to an end.

Third, the Italian deal raises fundamental questions about the future of the EU. Across Europe, skeptics are attacking the EU for its democratic deficit. Incestuous elites in Brussels decide the destiny of Europe without bothering to consult the people. Many believe that the EC and ECB are fixated with austerity. They fear that capital is sacrosanct and people like��, the Italian boss of the ECB who once worked for Goldman Sachs, still puts the interests of his former employers first. Just as markets work when people believe in them, so do institutions. Sadly for Brussels, the EU project itself is experiencing a crisis of faith.

Both the left and the right are increasingly making the same arguments against the diktats that Brussels delights in issuing. Local communities and national governments are chafing against EU institutions like the EC and the ECB. Italy had to bargain very hard to arrive at a deal with the EC. There are numerous EU rules prohibiting state aid to struggling banks. Italy wanted to push through����but had to defer to the EC. The negotiations, whilst tough, papered over an unresolved contradiction. Is the EU an optimal currency union?

As��The Economist��points out, Italy’s experience within the eurozone has been miserable. It has been in recession for five of the last eight years. Its per capita income after adjusting for inflation is lower than in 1999. Italy’s sovereign debt has now crossed 130% of its GDP. Italian productivity has been falling and the economy is ridiculously uncompetitive. The same is largely true of Spain, Portugal and Greece. Currency unions do not necessarily need homogeneity. However, the constituent units need to have enough similarity to function together. This similarity could be political or it could be political or social. In the US, New York and California are willing to subsidize Mississippi and Alaska. However, Germany and Denmark are flinching when it comes to supporting Italy or Greece.

The����sums up the issue in a nutshell. The French were terrified of the rise of Germany after reunification. In 1988, François Mitterrand, then-president of France, described the deutschmark as “Germany’s Atom Bomb.” To defuse it, Jacques Delors, Mitterand’s socialist comrade who was the big boss of the EC, came up with the immaculate conception of the euro. Yet this immaculate conception has turned out to be��.

Lumbering oxen like Greece have been yoked together with fleet-footed workhorses like Germany with no one holding the reins. Oxen employed wizards like Goldman Sachs whose hush-hush deals transformed them into horses, at least on paper. All was supposed to go swimmingly well, but the eurozone cart keeps lurching from crisis to crisis.

How surprising? Might yet another deal set a few things right?

*[You can receive “The World This Week” directly in your inbox by subscribing to our mailing list. Simply visit����and enter your email address in the space provided. Meanwhile, please find below five of our finest articles for the week.]

Education Alone Cannot Eradicate Poverty

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A top-down, one-size fits all approach to achieve Goal 4 of the Sustainable Development Goals will not solve the issue of poverty.

In the developing world, one primary school looks like any other primary school. Although the children and teachers might speak different languages, the desks are always in military rows, the Oxford University Press textbooks are always torn, and the teachers always write in chalk and chant ABCs that the children always parrot. The exception, of course, is when children have��no desks��at all.

It becomes almost routine to visit, wait to be served tea or coffee with biscuits, listen to principals complain in great depth about the lack of funding and government corruption, and nod sympathetically. Colonial heritage is often evident in the out-of-place uniforms and the confusing use of several language mediums.

Population growth in the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa mean that more of these startlingly similar primary schools pop up in different guises: government schools, low fee…

The Miracle of Bernie’s Candidacy: The Holiday Story You Won’t Be Told

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The rise of Bernie Sanders in the US presidential polls feels like a holiday miracle.

Senator��Bernie Sanders��heads into New Hampshire��more than 25 points ahead�����Ի���into Iowa on the up, despite the array of forces aligned against a candidate who highlights the cost of our concentrated wealth. Sanders was virtually blacked out of the media and Democrat debates were severely limited. The Democratic presidential candidate doesn’t even have the foundational work of the “liberal class” to build on: Many “liberal” institutions have shied from effectively advancing progressive ideals that conflict with donor interests.

In a functional democracy, there might not be a “Bern” to feel. Sanders would be an ordinary politician whose consistent positions have been guided by the public interest. “One of 565,” we’d yawn, “and not even blessed with out-of-this-world looks or charisma.” The freshness and resonance of Bernie’s candidacy speaks powerfully to major failures of American democracy.

Hillary Clinton��feels this widespread frustration in America. She has tried to frame herself as…

Brexit is More Complicated Than You Think

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What would happen if the UK left the European Union? Former Irish Prime Minister John Bruton explains the different options.

In June, the people of the United Kingdom may vote to��leave the European Union��(EU). At the moment, a narrow majority favors remaining in the EU, but a large group is undecided. That group could swing toward a “leave” position for a variety of reasons, including what might be temporary EU problems with refugees. However temporary the reasons might be, a decision to leave would be politically irreversible.

It would be wise for��Ireland��to give thought now as to how it might react to a decision by UK voters to leave the EU, and how it would play its hand in the subsequent negotiations. A number of scenarios will arise and Ireland needs to identify its red lines in each one of these.

The negotiation of a UK withdrawal from the EU will be done under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. It will have to…

A Very Russian Murder

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A culture of impunity is endemic at the Kremlin.��

If there was ever a case of cloak and dagger, this was it: Alexander Litvinenko, a former KGB agent working for MI6, an outspoken critic of the Kremlin and President Vladimir Putin with a close connection to a renegade oligarch—Russia’s “Gray Cardinal”��Boris Berezovsky, now also dead under mysterious circumstances—poisoned by a rare nuclear isotope on British soil by his business partner and former FSB colleagues. It was a moment when the Cold War spilled over the edge of its new order container. Richard Howell, the lawyer representing London police,��called it��a “nuclear attack on the streets of London.”

Now, a British judge has ruled in a public inquiry that the two men charged with the murder by the Crown Prosecution Service in 2007—Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitri Kovtun—were responsible for carrying out the assassination.��Sir Robert Owen��concluded that: “Taking full account of all the evidence and analysis available to me, I find that…

Tracing the Genesis of Terrorism in Pakistan

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Ever since a “monster” was unleashed in the 1970s, terrorism and sectarianism have been a regular occurrence in Pakistan.

Growing up in Lahore in the 1960s and 1970s, there were hardly any organized attacks on public institutions as we now see in present-day��Pakistan.��Sure, we heard about the atrocities committed by both sides in the India-Pakistan partition of 1947; we were informed of the occasional political assassinations (Liaquat Ali Khan); we learned about the military crackdown on the anti-Ahmadiyya riots of 1953; we actively participated in student demonstrations against the dictatorial regime of Ayub Khan; and we expressed collective disgust at the flip-flop shenanigans in the era of the senior Bhutto.

By and large, however, Lahore was a lively place embodying religious harmony and rule of law—though the British always denied “access to justice.”��There was a Christian chief justice of the Supreme Court.��Ahmadis held high positions in the bureaucracy.��Atheist poets and thinkers congregated at smoke-filled cafes.��Missionary schools abounded.��And the horse-driven carriages…

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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What happens when you mix terrorists, Rome and pizza together? Well, you get Twitter-savvy Italians who are ready to laugh off the latest threat from the Islamic State (IS).

Drawing on an Islamic end of day prophecy, IS militants have threatened to conquer Rome, created a hashtag for their medieval plan and even mistaken the Leaning Tower of Pisa for pizza — yes, you read that right. Good luck finding that one, Caliph Ibrahim!

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a or you could choose to be a .

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The (EU) is a group of sovereign states, who are sovereign in that they are entirely free to leave the EU. This freedom to leave means the EU is not a “super state.” There is no coercive force — and no EU army — to make Britain or any other country remain in the union. enjoys a freedom, within the EU, that colonies did not enjoy within the or other European empires. Britain is, therefore, entirely within its rights in considering the option of leaving the EU, although that does not mean such a course would be wise.

The EU does not exist on the basis of coercion. It exists on the basis of common rules or treaties that EU members have so far freely abided by, even when particular decisions were not to their liking. If countries started systematically ignoring EU decisions, the union would�� soon disappear.

One particularly important set of EU rules are the ones that apply to budget deficits and debts of EU countries within the eurozone. These rules have been incorporated in EU treaties and in treaties between euro area states. One provision is that if a country has an excessive deficit, it must reduce that by an amount equivalent to 0.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) each year until it reaches a deficit below 3%.

and , big states that were founding members of the EU, have both produced budgets for 2015 that do not comply with the rules. Initially, the objected, so both countries adjusted their budgets a little. But even after these revisions, the budgets are still in breach of EU rules. Some will argue it’s the rules that are at fault, not France and Italy. Inflation is negative, so debts increase in value while prices fall.

Countries are caught in a debt deflation trap of a kind that was not envisaged when the rules were drawn up. But that is an argument for changing the rules, not an argument for ignoring them or pretending they have been complied with, when they haven’t.

There is no coercive force — and no EU army — to make Britain or any other country remain in the union.��Britain��enjoys a freedom, within the EU, that colonies did not enjoy within the��British��or other European empires. Britain is, therefore, entirely within its rights in considering the option of leaving the EU.

But changing the rules would require EU treaty change, and nobody wants to change the treaties, because such a move would have to be unanimously agreed upon by all 28 EU states. Other EU members fear that would be an opportunity for Britain to use the lever of blocking a treaty change to revise the fiscal rules — with which it might otherwise agree — simply as a means of getting a concession of British demands for: a restriction of free movement of people within the EU; vetoes for a minority of national parliaments on EU legislation; and the scrapping of the “ever closer union” within the EU.

This is a form of blackmail, but it has happened before in EU affairs. But if the EU is unable to change its treaties — because of blockages like this — the union will eventually die. Necessary EU treaty changes cannot be dodged indefinitely. The EU will atrophy if it cannot change its treaties, in the same way that states would wither if they couldn’t change their constitutions from time to time.

In a recent commentary, Daniel Gros, of the Centre for European Policy Studies, criticized the European Commission of Jean Claude Juncker for failing to either insist that France and Italy stick by the existing fiscal rules or, if not, call for a revision of the rules to take account of the exceptional deflationary conditions that exist.

He is right.

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Bond markets are notoriously fickle. They often seem to be driven by sentiment rather than deep analysis. The experience of 2006-08 shows they are not infallible. They are not a good guide to long-term economic prospects. Rating agencies seem to follow sentiment rather than lead it. They are like a bus driver who is looking out the back window rather than at the road in front.

This is the context in which and should be assessing the wisdom of submitting draft budgets this month to the Commission, in accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact, which go back on commitments they had previously given to reduce their budget deficits to below 3% of gross domestic product (GDP).

The low rate of interest at which most European governments can borrow at present can be explained by two factors, which are not necessarily permanent.

1) Sovereign bonds — that is bonds issued to allow governments to borrow — are treated as entirely risk-free assets in the balance sheets of banks, under the rules the (EU) has set for calculating the solvency and adequacy of capital of banks. This is a somewhat artificial assumption, in that it implies there is a zero risk a European government will ever default on its bonds — in other words, fail to pay all the interest due and repay the bond in full and on time. The scale of debt relative to income of some European countries might lead some to question this assumption, unless, of course, there is a big surge in either inflation or economic growth.

2) Prevailing interest rates are now so low, the amount of money seeking a home is so great and high-yielding investments are so scarce, that it is not surprising investors are turning to government bonds, and thus driving down their interest rate. But if the flow of funds slowed, or if the availability alternative better yielding investments were to increase, the demand for government bonds would immediately slow. Then the interest on government bonds would have to increase, if governments were to sustain their borrowing levels.

It is against this background that the budget plans to be submitted by member governments of the on October 15 will have to be assessed. The European Commission, in assessing the draft budgets of member states, would be unwise to assume that present low interest rates on government bonds are a permanent condition.

Ironically, while governments may defy the European Commission, they would not be able to defy the bond markets if, for any reason, bond markets were to change their minds about sovereign bonds and look for a higher interest rate. Bond markets can be less forgiving and less attentive to rhetoric or political argument than the European Commission or ministerial colleagues in the European Council of Ministers. That could happen quickly, leaving little time for adjustment.

It is less likely to happen if the EU’s system for coordinating the budget policies of the 18 euro area states are seen to be respected, especially by big countries such as France and Italy. This is backed up in a very specific way by Article 126 of the European Treaties.

If the system is defied, or reinterpreted in a way that removes its meaning, the fickle bond markets could get nervous again. Ireland knows, better than most, how difficult that can be for a state that needs to borrow to fund services or repay maturing debts.

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My next destination was determined. I arrived in Milan in January 2013, right after Catholic Christmas and the New Year. Since Apostolic Armenians around the world celebrate Christmas on January 6, I joined the community for the festive holiday.

After carefully following directions, I arrived where Armenians of Milan and the surrounding cities gathered to celebrate together. The altar was carefully decorated and people in the church were beautifully dressed, ready for the holiday just like in other Armenian communities. I had the chance to exchange a few words with community members and the priest, who warmly welcomed me.

These Italian-Armenians seemed very friendly and curious. They even adopted the lively mode of Italian hand-speaking gestures. The fact of being in a charming country like , the beautiful atmosphere of the church, and the familiar religious paintings and writings made me feel at home. I was convinced the Armenian Church in Milan would become one of my favorite places in the city.

Travel Through Time

During the 6^th and 8^th centuries, many Armenians migrated to Italy. But the first Armenian communities were officially established much later, in the 12^th and 13^th centuries, when active trade was developed between the Armenian Cilician Kingdom and the big city republics of the Italian peninsula such as Genoa, Venice and Pisa. Since trade was a lucrative industry, Italian and Armenian merchants played a key role in sustaining Italian-Armenian ties. Armenian merchants in Florence would gather and tell stories about Armenia, the first nation in the world that adopted as a state religion in 301 AD.

Among the attentive and curious listeners was Leonardo da Vinci who, upon being impressed by stories of Armenian merchants, decided to visit Cilicia and recorded his impressions about Armenia and its people in his notebook. Although several Italian art historians argue that da Vinci’s vision was the result of his imagination, Josef Strzygowski states that da Vinci visited Armenia. Da Vinci’s geographic and historical descriptions of Armenia in his Codex Atlanticus were precise, meaning it is likely he traveled there.

The fact of living in a Christian country has its positive and negative impacts on a community that strives to maintain its identity. Interestingly, keeping the Armenian identity, which is mainly associated with Christianity, is easier in the Middle East where the major religion is Islam. The religious differences in the region help preserve Armenian identity.��

Throughout this time, Armenians felt welcome in Italy. In the early 18^th century, the Armenian monastic congregation of the Mechitarists was founded in Venice, on St Lazarus Island. When Napoleon conquered Venice, and eventually closed all of its religious institutions and the lagoon, he made an exception for this monastery, as he valued the cultural heritage of the island so much that the congregation was declared an academic institution. St Lazarus Island was not subjected to any kind of confiscation. The famous monastery, with its rich library, manuscripts depository and publishing house, and where Lord Byron studied Armenian, is considered to be the most relevant center of Armenian cultural heritage in Europe.

Another significant monastery is St Gregory of Armenia, which is located in the historical center of Naples. The 16^th century Baroque-style monastery is one of the main city attractions along with its Via San Gregorio Street, which is famous for Christmas shops.

Years down the line, the number of Armenians in Italy slowly increased, with survivors of the Armenian genocide seeking refuge in the country. Over time, Armenians built over 40 churches across Italy. It is unsurprising that the first Armenian-printed books were published in Venice in 1512. Additionally, the Armenian college, which was named after Moorat Raphael, was founded in Venice in 1836, where many generations of the cultural and political elite were educated over the last two centuries. Currently, the college is still standing, but it is inactive.

Community Life in Milan

Today, Armenians in Italy are concentrated mainly in Venice, Rome and Milan, where the central Armenian Apostolic Church is located. The community is not purely Italian-Armenian; many people come from the and directly from Armenia. The new and old communities in Italy are noticeable when you meet more Armenians from around the world than traditional Italian-Armenians. In total, Italy is home to around 3,000 Armenians. There are many entrepreneurs, traders, intellectuals, artists and craftsmen among them.

The fact of living in a Christian country has its positive and negative impacts on a community that strives to maintain its identity. Interestingly, keeping the Armenian identity, which is mainly associated with Christianity, is easier in the where the major religion is . The religious differences in the region help preserve Armenian identity. While in this case of Italy, the identical religious belief and the fact of not having Armenian schools lead to deep assimilation into Italian society, at the expense of Armenian culture. As a result, most Italian-Armenians have gradually lost their language.

The aforementioned churches built by Armenians in Italy remain intact, but only few of them officially belong to the community. The rest of them are under the control of the Holy See, which occasionally rents them out to foreign communities for holding their religious ceremonies.

It is challenging for the well-integrated Armenian community to preserve its identity in Italy, since the country is a large Christian nation and there are only few Armenians. Therefore, assimilation is a given, especially for younger generations that usually do not speak the Armenian language. On the other hand, many of them learn Armenian and are keen to discover more about their culture and feel proud to keep their identity, as argued by Father Tovma Khachatryan of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Italy. He also added that it is critical to remain Armenian and the first step toward that is to speak the language.

Despite not having an Armenian school in Italy, the community finds ways to maintain and transmit its heritage. Some community members voluntarily teach Armenian at churches and the cultural center in Milan. Several youth programs are organized from time to time by the Ministry of Diaspora in Armenia. The church takes pride in educating and interpreting the importance of being Armenian and keeping the nation’s identity.

The community enthusiastically marks Armenian holidays and important dates as these are the best gateway to bring all community members together. Armenians from all walks of life gather to celebrate festivals such as Christmas, St Sarkis and Lent. After the holy mass and spiritual enrichment, lavish food and heartwarming conversations conclude the holidays.

One may notice the significant importance that is given to Armenian youth in Milan. Here, young people actively join the Armenian mass every Sunday, participate and help in organizing special events and holidays, and assist in managing the community’s online journal. These young Armenians are mostly students who study in Milan. They are quite busy with their jobs and everyday lives, yet they always try to find time to dedicate to their culture and keep Armenian affairs running in a foreign country.

Some young Armenians I spoke to are very dynamic and creative art students, who constantly participate in exhibitions and events where they proudly present a piece of their country. They love living and studying in Italy and always try to combine their Italian experience with their own identity. The outcome is positive and promising in their own words. Armenian youth also appreciate all they have learned and experienced in Italy through its culture.

On April 24, the Armenian Genocide Remembrance Day, Italian senators discussed the need for international recognition of the genocide, and argued that Italians should be more aware of the historical tragedy. For this purpose, a special education program will be introduced in Italian schools.

Today, Italian-Armenian ties are as strong as ever. The bond between these two nations is growing and each of them have their own particular contribution to a centuries-old friendship, be it cultural, economic or political.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Western governments have watched with increasing perplexity as, over the course of the past year, militias stopped the bulk of Libya’s oil production, several regions were engulfed in bitter conflicts, and the political transition in Tripoli ground to a halt. Now the international community prepares for a March 6 conference in Rome to discuss how to stabilize Libya.

The picture is bleak. The government of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan has made no progress on reestablishing the security sector. Instead, local militias have strengthened their position. This allows organized crime and extremist groups to flourish.

In Benghazi, members of the army and the former security apparatus are being assassinated on a daily basis, without anyone having been held to account. The risk of insecurity in Libya spilling over into neighboring countries, or into southern Europe, is likely to grow in the coming years.

In Tripoli, the political climate is increasingly poisoned. Violence has become a routine instrument for exerting political influence, through kidnappings, attacks on media, or blockades of oilfields. While rival camps in the General National Congress (GNC) engage in endless turf wars, the political process has entered a deep crisis of legitimacy. The government has been on edge for months. Only a third of eligible voters had registered for the February 20 elections to the constituent committee, while less than half of those registered turned up. Ethnic minorities boycotted the vote.

The disinterest in the elections betrays a wider loss of confidence in the political process. Evidently, the key power struggles are not being fought in conference halls, but instead in the rivalries over the control of the security sector, borders, and oilfields. The post-revolutionary balance of power is far from settled.

The government is not an actor, but rather a stage for these power struggles. Representatives of individual cities, tribes, business networks, and different Islamist currents each control their respective ministries and public bodies. Many have ties to armed groups. The security sector is a patchwork of units representing particular political interests, and clashes are common. The boundaries between officially sanctioned militias and the army have blurred.

The Dilemma of Western Governments

Western powers had withdrawn after successfully toppling the Muammar Qadhafi regime, hoping that a Libyan-led transition would enjoy broader legitimacy and, therefore, have better prospects for success.

As Libya’s crisis deepened, calls mounted in Western capitals for stronger support to the country. But how do you support a government that isn’t one? How do you assist in rebuilding an army when it has not been decided who will control it?

The international community has no coherent answer to these questions. But that does not stop it from engaging. The US, UK and Italy have embarked on a large-scale training program. All in all, 15,000 recruits are to become soldiers. But nobody knows under whose orders they will be after having undergone training. Prime Minister Zeidan and his defense minister are wrangling with the GNC president and chief of staff over the authority to decide on force deployment.

Until now, the forces that have intervened in conflicts, upon the government’s demand or with its approval, are units that emerged out of the revolutionary armed groups of individual cities. These units can intervene because they have a political basis and clear objectives — contrary to the government.

The government does not lack trained soldiers, but the ability to take decisions and the necessary political backing to impose order. The training program will not change this.

The big topic at the upcoming conference will be initiatives for disarmament and the control of weapons and ammunition stockpiles. There is no doubt that weapons proliferation needs to be addressed urgently. However, will Western governments adopt measures that fit the realities on the ground?

No militia will hand over its arsenal to the government as long as it is not clear whose interests that government represents. A temporary solution would be to hold militias responsible for stockpiles under their control, and entice them to cooperate with the authorities. But such an approach does not lend itself to big announcements at international conferences.

Given widespread desperation over Libya, there are increasing calls for unilateral steps by Western governments. In January, the French Army’s chief of staff thought out loud about the possibility of international intervention in southern Libya. The region’s role as a jihadist sanctuary has been blown out of proportion in the French media for several months now.

But any form of external intervention would trigger broad rejection in Libya, and cause more problems than it would solve. Last October, already, the US-led abduction of al-Qaeda suspect Abu Anas al-Libi from Tripoli nearly brought down the Zeidan government.

In Libya itself, attitudes toward the role of foreign governments are often schizophrenic. Insistent pleas for greater external support to the transition alternate with the deep-rooted conviction that foreign powers are meddling in the country’s many conflicts. Discreet support in the form of advice and expertise is and remains the right approach.

The impression that foreign support is biased toward individual players or camps must be avoided. There are no quick solutions to the chaos in Libya — just some limited opportunities to support a political process that is protracted, unstable and open-ended.

*[This article was originally published by .]

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By mid-1920s, an Italian anarchist group, Gli Arditi d’Italia (Italy’s Daring Ones), counted some 50,000 members and sympathisers, and its most prominent member was called Errico Malatesta. Fascism ranted and raved across the country and the Pope manifested his understood support for the rising dux, in the face of personal sympathy and powerlessness. Revolution for this ardent group of resistance was an act of will, a leap forward beyond the socio-economic calculus, and the rationalities of the professions of politics. But the will did not suffice and Italy’s Daring Ones were progressively outnumbered by the grassroots ranks and files of the Fascist militias, The Blackskirts. What happened next lies in the untold and told of history books.

“Italy Cannot be Governed”?

After ninety years, the country is without its dux economicus (Mr Monti) following the stepping down of its dux mediaticus (Mr Berlusconi) and, most unusually, pontifex maximum (Mr Ratzinger). The popular saying,  “Italy cannot be governed”, is a self-fulfilling prophecy. For most commentators Italy’s political chaos, its peoples and institutions’ ungovernability, and the popular disinterest for rules and regulations is the cause of its current malaise. Regardless of the value of these common places, which are often used by Italians as a ground for debates and sarcasm, without a taint of self-defense, anarchy is a spectre, among other phantoms, which wanders in Italy’s streets, where Europe is only coterminous.

The last elections decreed the rejection of austerity measures in toto and sanctioned the return to electoral anomaly. The centre-left Democratic Party (PD) did not reach 30% while Mr Berlusconi’s party did not win and did not lose. The Milanese politician succeeded in mobilising its silent minority of voters, made of private interests, non-wage earners, propertied classes and the enchanted strata with his media, with a campaign made of common promises and the unsaid hope of not enforcing rules on tax evasion. Furthermore, unsurprisingly, the EU-imposed Prime Minister Mario Monti was given a cold addio, with little more than 10% votes. Matter of surprise is not Berlusconi’s resilience in the political scene, despite innumerable gaffes, trials and failure to deliver his dreams of prosperity. Indeed while the leader of the centre-right party achieved 30% of the vote (including the quasi-separatist North League), in reality 70% of the votes went to overtly anti-Berlusconi parties. After all, every country has its own political idiosyncrasies and Italy is no exception.

Yet, the state of exception is Italy’s anti-political movement, the5-Star Movement (M5S) headed by the comedian Beppe Grillo. The scope of Grillo’s victory signed the end of the old political context in diametrical lines and brought the debate towards systemic analysis of Italy’s institutions and polity. Under the veneer of populism and vaffanculism, (translatable as ‘f**k-off-ism’) which were also traits of Mussolini’s “anti-party” Fascist movement in the 1920s (as described in the ), the M5S emblemised many of the contradictions of Italian politics and society. Italy’s taste for populism is not new, but the success of the M5S invites an alternative justification.

When European leaders pledged unconditional support for the English-speaking and internationally-travelled Mario Monti, Italians were simultaneously realising that unelected EU institutions were embezzling their already limited representative governance. When the country’s unemployment soared in face of the economic crisis, the political leadership first ignored the materiality of the crisis under Berlusconi and then justified draconian moves of austerity, through an informally illegitimate government supported by the centre-left PD and the exiting ruling party, with little regard to popular dissent. Thus, when Italians casted their ballots with a vote of protest, they did not chose to be traditional in their support for left-leaning parties; nor did they vote for nationalist or neo-fascist groups such as La Destra, Casa Pound, Forza Nuova, which saw their share of votes falling to disappearance. All these and other votes from the undecided electorate seemed to have conveyed into Grillo’s movement, which achieved an astonishing 25%, only three years after its creation in 2009. With the prospect of a hung parliament and the mobilisational capacity of his party, Grillo displayed contempt for offers by other political parties, inviting them to dig their graves with a self-defeating governissimo, a left-right coalition.

“Break-through on the Left”

A great deal of words has been spent on this election, yet to capture the essence of Grillo’s movement, one should emphasise his political syncretism, his outrage beyond “left and right”, which has been capable of attracting sympathies across the social, generational and political spectrum of Italian politics, in tandem with the movement’s campaign in favour of largely popular ad hoc policies, such as electoral reform, cuts in the politicians’ wages, etc. On this platform the movement attracted those undecided that could understand a language of clear, unrhetorical ideas, and had enough of the old refrains of slander and accusation between the two camps of Italian politics: Berlusconi’s opponents and the 76-year old billionaire. It was a vote of protest, but rooted in decades of unrelenting political opprobrium, widening gap between people and authorities and the disenchantment with the matter of politics as traditionally conceived. As this happened, the M5S, regardless of its real political leanings which seem sympathetic to “third way” politics (in the past exemplified in the UK, by the or neo-fascist parties in Italy), expressed the sentiments of a large section of disillusioned people, for whom change needed to be carried by new faces and the language of the ordinary, or the too ordinary. Therefore, the M5S operated the “break-through on the left” and attracted leftist voters, beyond its anti-EU positions. The movement played the game with the language of new media (e.g. blogs), but also established itself locally, similarly to what the North League had done in the late 1990s.

If there is something positive in these elections is the “positive danger” it represents for Italy’s political class as a whole.  The “tsunami”, as said by Grillo himself, will probably leave few traces of the old political guard. Yet, this huge mass of discontent and indignation against the institutional stasis could lend itself to future xenophobic waves, as disclosed in some of Grillo’s statements about citizenship rights and his violent anti-EU language. The 5-Star Movement is diverse and syncretic; almost surely, those elected in parliament are not able to formulate a coherent approach to political government, beyond the agreement on ad hoc policies. They bear the legacy of their previous affiliations, which often is marked by right-wing movements.

The negative danger lies in the issue of leadership, which in many instances has brought Italy to a rightist drift, with Mussolini, Berlusconi…With the cataclysmic resignation of the Pope, which left a spiritless religious country without its conservative façade, and where President of the Republic Giorgio Napolitano will soon step down, neutralising the last bulwark of the status quo, people may be worried of a new anarchist moment, engendered by the lack of traditional institutional breaks. Yet, this is indeed the best opportunity for them to exercise influence on wanderer politicians, who in the absence of systemic forces are more likely to listen than to perform the daily corruptions of Italian politics. When in the 1920s Benito Mussolini started its anti-communist campaign, Italy’s Socialist Party reached an appeasement with him and the Communist Party opted for a pragmatic, failed, approach of containment. Italy’s Daring Ones, supported also by Antonio Gramsci, remained among the few forces to actively oppose fascist populist encroaching, with persistence and engagement. If today, Italian progressive elements opt for a strategy of appeasement with populism or lean towards those who oppose the M5S by the means of European austerity and pragmatism, the M5S will be able to gather even more momentum and could eventually follow a path of xenophobic anti-politics, transforming the political debate not to the language of bread and fight, but degrading it to an empty vaffanculo!

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