For example, the Assam Tribune recently that Bangladesh is involved in a conspiracy to send “illegal immigrants” to West Bengal ahead of the province’s Legislative Assembly elections. On February 26, Indian law enforcement agencies a major crackdown on alleged Bangladeshi “illegal immigrants” in Bengaluru. This demonstrates that the Indo–Bangladeshi relations remain in flux after the recent parliamentary elections in Bangladesh.

Compartmentalization in foreign policy

In foreign policy, the concept of compartmentalization refers to a situation in which states compartmentalize the issues in their relations, leading to cooperation on some issues and disputes in others, while avoiding complete rupture.

In the 21st century, the relationship between Russia and Turkey best the notion of compartmentalization in foreign policy. Since the 2010s, Russia and Turkey have engaged in competition for influence and in some instances, proxy wars in several theaters, including Syria, Libya and Transcaucasia. Simultaneously, Russia served as the principal source of natural gas for Turkey, built a nuclear power plant in Turkey and sold advanced air defense systems to it, while millions of Russian tourists continued to visit Turkey every year.

Even now, Turkey supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity, supplies it with weapons and seeks to undermine Russian influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, yet it continues to act as a mediator between Russia and Ukraine, buys large quantities of oil and gas from Russia, and acts as a hub of key EU-origin military goods for Russia. This is a classic example of compartmentalization of bilateral relations, in which Moscow and Ankara cooperate on several issues and compete in others, while avoiding outright conflict.

Partial compartmentalization: Indo–Bangladeshi relations after the July uprising

After the overthrow of the Bangladesh Awami League-led government, which was closely aligned with India, on August 5, 2024, an interim government took power in Bangladesh, and bilateral ties between Dhaka and New Delhi went downhill. Between August 5, 2024, and February 12, 2026, India undertook several hostile actions against Bangladesh. New Delhi suspended most visa services for Bangladeshi citizens, withdrew nonessential staff and their families from Indian diplomatic missions in Bangladesh, canceled transhipment facilities for Bangladesh, started forcibly pushing migrants over the border and refused to normalize ties with Dhaka pending additional elections.

Moreover, Indian media outlets a sustainable information warfare campaign against Bangladesh. Indian politicians accused Bangladesh of conducting a “genocide” against Hindus. The Bangladeshi High Commission in New Delhi and the Assistant High Commission in Agartala were attacked, and some Indian politicians and analysts indirectly called for and of Bangladeshis.

In response, Bangladesh undertook some reciprocal actions against India, including the suspension of bus services to India, the of a $21 million defense deal and a to sign an energy deal with India’s H-Energy. Moreover, Indian commentators viewed Bangladesh’s rapprochement with Pakistan, recalibration of ties with China and defense procurement negotiations with Turkey negatively.

Yet Dhaka sought to avoid a complete rupture in bilateral relations, leading to continued cooperation between the two countries in some sectors. For instance, Bangladesh a joint naval exercise with India in the Bay of Bengal in March 2025, to import diesel from India and prisoners with its neighbor in January 2026. Also, Bangladesh from formally joining any anti-Indian bloc or alliance.

Thus, under the interim government, Indo–Bangladeshi relations underwent a process of partial compartmentalization. This means that bilateral issues were dealt with separately instead of collectively, leading to disputes on some issues and cooperation in others.

Towards full compartmentalization?

After the formation of a government led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), both Indian and Bangladeshi officials have expressed optimism about the normalization of bilateral ties and some steps. These steps include the sent to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the inauguration of the BNP-led government and the resumption of the India–Bangladesh bus service and visa services for Indians, which have already been taken in this regard.

Yet, the BNP’s political legitimacy is largely based on a narrative of “protecting Bangladesh’s sovereignty” vis-à-vis external actors, particularly India. It has repeatedly strong stances on issues such as border killings and water-sharing. While the new government in Dhaka has extended an olive branch to New Delhi, Pakistan is likely to Prime Minister Tarique Rahman as the chief guest to the Pakistan Day parade next month, indicating continued rapprochement between Dhaka and Islamabad.

Moreover, if the BNP-led government is viewed as “too soft” on India by opposition parties, such as the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party (NCP), it is likely to face significant domestic political backlash. Similarly, the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party-led (BJP) government would be hard-pressed to make any concessions to Bangladesh, especially as the BJP’s domestic political narrative a lot of anti-Bangladeshi rhetoric.

Hence, it is highly unlikely that the Indo–Bangladeshi partnership is going to reach the level it achieved under the Awami League government. Nonetheless, it would be in the interests of both Dhaka and New Delhi to cooperate on a range of issues, including water-sharing, transnational crime, migration, trade and connectivity. Such cooperation could prevent the outbreak of conflict.

The Ganges Water-Sharing is set to expire on December 12, 2026, and the two parties would need to negotiate to avert another crisis about the sharing of the waters of the transboundary Ganges River. On the other hand, issues such as Bangladesh’s growing strategic ties with China, Pakistan and Turkey, border killings, the potential denationalization of millions of Bengalis in Assam and the use of xenophobic rhetoric in domestic politics would continue to complicate bilateral ties and preclude full concord. Thus, under the BNP-led government, Indo–Bangladeshi relationship is likely to slide towards full compartmentalization.

[ edited this piece]

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Given these constraints, the of approximately 55% in participating constituencies is relatively high for a country affected by widespread displacement, armed violence and political polarization. The military authorities presented the elections as a step toward restoring political order and ending open hostilities, though critics remain skeptical about their inclusiveness and intent.

The political process was also closely watched by neighboring countries, including India, as the situation in Myanmar is increasingly shaping not only border security and refugee flows, but the geoeconomic ambitions of regional players, as well.

Consolidation of power

The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), closely associated with Min Aung Hlaing’s military regime, won the majority of the contested seats. The USDP now has a majority in both chambers of Parliament. They secured 232 of the 263 seats in the lower Pyithu Hluttaw and 109 of the 157 seats announced so far in the upper Amyotha Hluttaw. Combined with the constitutionally mandated allocation of 25% of parliamentary seats to unelected military appointees, this outcome gives the military junta effective control of the legislature and forecloses meaningful parliamentary opposition. In practical terms, the election has reinforced existing power structures, lending formal political cover to continued military authority rather than altering the balance of power.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to certify or endorse the election, stating that conditions for a credible and inclusive process were absent and confirming that no ASEAN observer mission would be deployed. Meanwhile, neighboring states that have direct security and economic interests in Myanmar took a more pragmatic position.

China publicly welcomed the completion of the election and reiterated its support for stability and continued bilateral cooperation, framing the vote as part of a domestic political process. India had previously support for Myanmar’s plan to hold elections in a “fair and inclusive” manner and sent monitoring teams. These actions and rhetoric reflect New Delhi’s priority for stability and sustained engagement over diplomatic isolation. Vietnam and Cambodia also sent observers, signaling a willingness among some regional actors to maintain channels of contact with Naypyidaw despite broader international skepticism. This position reflected longstanding divisions within the bloc regarding engagement with Myanmar’s post-coup authorities.

Myanmar’s instability and India’s security

For New Delhi, developments in Naypyidaw are directly related to domestic security concerns. The Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram share a 1,643-kilometer border with Myanmar. The conflict in Myanmar has intensified since 2021, creating instability in weakly controlled border regions, such as Mizoram and Manipur.

Indian law enforcement agencies have reported an increase in cross-border crimes, including weapons and drug smuggling, militia infiltration and the establishment of insurgent training camps. In Mizoram’s Champhai, Saiha and Lawngtlai districts, operations have led to the seizure of explosives, weapons and narcotics. Between September 2025 and January 2026, the value of confiscated illegal substances $15.5 million. Further north, Manipur authorities 22 drug smuggling cases and 12 arms trafficking cases in the first quarter of 2025 alone.

The instability in Myanmar, caused by conflict between the junta and the NUG as well as deep internal divisions between local national insurgents fighting on the side of opposition forces, creates conditions for a growing number of refugees and causes civil and ethnic unrest.

In mid-2025, clashes between the Myanmar militia groups Chin National Front (CNF) and Chin Defense Force (CDF) up to 4,400 people to flee to the Indian state of Mizoram. By March 2026, the number of officially registered Myanmar nationals in Mizoram had 28,355. Of these, 27,574 had passed biometric registration. The total of Myanmar asylum seekers in India is more than 86,000. Despite the deep ethnic kinship between the majority Mizo people in Mizoram and the Chin people in Myanmar, this prompted the deployment of additional police and Assam Rifles units.

The influx of Myanmar refugees has led to growing tension amongst the locals due to the increase in competition for limited job opportunities as the state grapples with rising youth unemployment, which is to be around 12%. Furthermore, the situation is worsening due to the rising crime rate. In June 2025, Mizoram Home Minister K. Sapdanga that more than 50% of criminal cases in the state were linked to individuals who had entered the country illegally or as refugees.

The rising cost of internal strain

While Mizoram is more tolerant of refugees from Myanmar, neighboring Manipur is notorious for ethnic violence. On May 3, 2023, a dispute between the Meitei majority in Manipur and the Chin communities over Scheduled Tribe status escalated into a . Rooted in territory and identity, the situation was significantly exacerbated by the influx of approximately 10,000 refugees from Myanmar, resulting in at least 260 deaths and the displacement of over 60,000 people. Meitei groups also the growth of new settlements and a 30% increase in poppy cultivation as evidence of a “narcoterrorist” threat from Myanmar. This the Indian government to scrap the Free Movement Regime, which allowed local tribes to travel freely without visas, and to start construction of a border fence in February 2024.

This situation poses a significant threat to India’s domestic security and challenges its geoeconomic ambitions. Regions affected by conflict, such as Manipur in India, which borders Chin state, one of the three regions bordering India, are of particular concern as they are along the India–Myanmar–Thailand . This route is a flagship connectivity project under India’s Act East policy. New Delhi has invested over $250 million in the project directly and has extended more than $1 billion in credit lines for broader ASEAN connectivity initiatives.��

Studies on ASEAN-India cooperation that extending these corridors to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam could generate up to $70 billion in additional regional GDP and create around 20 million jobs by the middle of the decade. India is to benefit from this expansion through increased trade and development in its northeast region. However, persistent insecurity in Myanmar and its derivatives continues to construction, raise costs and cast uncertainty over the project’s long-term viability.

Elections in the border regions

Ahead of and during the electoral process, the junta pursued local negotiations with ethnic armed organizations to secure ceasefires or tacit noninterference, thereby enabling limited polling, particularly in border areas. These efforts yielded mixed results. Chin State was almost entirely excluded from the electoral process because resistance forces linked to the NUG and local People’s Defense Force units retained significant territorial control there. These armed groups rejected the vote outright, preventing the establishment of conditions for polling.

In Sagaing and Kachin, the situation was similarly fragmented. Armed actors repeatedly attempted to disrupt the election by targeting logistics and security deployments. In Sagaing, 11 of the 34 townships were from voting due to security concerns, and clashes were reported in seven others during the election. In Kachin State, elections could not be held in four townships and additional incidents were recorded in two more.

While areas immediately adjacent to the Indian border remained relatively calm during the initial phase, security conditions deteriorated further inland as the process continued. Myanmar Witness over 150 conflict-related incidents in townships that were officially designated as “active” or “stable” for voting. Insurgent groups sought to derail the process by threatening officials and voters, attacking supply routes and otherwise intimidating people.

An unsettled outcome

Although the junta held elections in most accessible areas and established institutional control, stability remains elusive because the NUG and affiliated insurgent groups have invested significant resources in preventing ceasefires and disrupting electoral activity rather than facilitating political de-escalation.

The elections showed that the war in Myanmar won’t stop in the short term and that political dialogue is the only way forward. All foreign actors should assist in this dialogue, and the idea of “isolation” should not be supported. The election was a reminder to all critics of Min Aung Hlaing’s military regime that the USDP has its supporters, even if their number is less than the official electoral statistics indicate. It’s impossible to ignore this part of the population and their interests. Otherwise, the situation will be mirrored, and the NUG will become another totalitarian regime.

The stance of key international actors, such as India and China, has reinforced the rationale behind taking a calibrated and pragmatic approach to Myanmar. India’s strategy prioritizes stability, dialogue and reducing violence over ideological positioning, aiming to achieve tangible results. New Delhi continues to engage with the authorities in Naypyidaw, not to endorse military rule, but to preserve border security, sustain humanitarian access and maintain channels for political de-escalation.

This stance contrasts with that of several ASEAN members, whose refusal to engage with the junta has enabled opposition forces to reject ceasefires and disrupt the electoral process through armed conflict. Only a change in approach among ASEAN countries and mediation could bring peace closer. Without offering feasible political solutions, isolating the Naypyidaw authorities could prolong the conflict and have regional consequences, including human casualties and destroy Myanmar’s economic potential for years. Moreover, it will affect neighboring countries with escalating refugee crises and ethnic tensions, as well as undermine projects that would promote social and economic growth in Myanmar and throughout Southeast Asia.

[ first published a version of this piece on February 6, 2026.]

[ edited this piece.]

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In his post-election statements, Tarique Rahman espoused a “” approach, asserting that the country’s foreign policy would henceforth be guided by national interest and the welfare of the people. However, uncertainty clouds the next administration. Will the incoming BNP government’s foreign policy mark a sharp departure from its predecessor, or will structural and regional constraints limit it to pragmatic adjustments?

India–Bangladesh relations at a crossroads

Bangladesh and India maintained a particularly strong bilateral relationship during the tenure of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, which was largely shaped by New Delhi’s objective of maintaining political stability in Dhaka. Given Bangladesh’s strategic geographic location, India has consistently sought to ensure stable access to its northeastern provinces via the Siliguri Corridor through transit agreements with Bangladesh. At the same time, India was concerned about China’s growing presence in the Bay of Bengal, which influenced these ties. However, following the of Sheikh Hasina’s government in a mass uprising in 2024, relations between New Delhi and Dhaka worsened significantly.

The diplomatic fallout was marked by Indian accusations of religious minority repression in Bangladesh, misinformation campaigns and trade restrictions. Most significantly, India’s to extradite Hasina, who fled to the country following her ousting, despite Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal having sentenced her to death for her role in the 2024 protests, exacerbated the diplomatic tensions further.��

Under the interim government led by , anti-Indian narratives gained increased prominence among opposition groups and segments of the broader public in Bangladesh. Moreover, India’s continued for the Awami League in recent elections contributed to rising public dissatisfaction in Bangladesh and heightened perceptions of Indian interference in the country’s internal politics. These developments have complicated bilateral relations and ignited domestic debates over issues of sovereignty and foreign policy autonomy in Bangladesh.��

Nevertheless, India has started to adapt to the new political reality in post-Hasina Bangladesh. In February 2026, Indian Foreign Minister attended the funeral of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, whose son Rahman is poised to assume leadership. In addition, following the BNP’s victory, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi congratulated Rahman and reaffirmed his country’s support for a democratic and inclusive Bangladesh.

Informed observers predict that the BNP will adopt a pragmatic approach toward India, grounded in mutual benefit and strategic necessity. Given India’s status as Bangladesh’s closest neighbor, the new government has significant incentives to restore a productive working relationship with New Delhi, irrespective of whether the relationship reverts to the level of political intimacy seen during the Hasina administration. Therefore, Dhaka must adopt a cautious middle ground in its relationship with India.

For the BNP government, redefining relations with India will require recalibrating the country’s strategic cooperation with New Delhi while maintaining Bangladesh’s political autonomy and decision-making authority. Maintaining such a delicate diplomatic balance amid prevailing anti-India and anti-Bangladesh sentiments among certain groups in both countries will be challenging, especially given that such vitriol is often amplified by rumors, misinformation and political propaganda.

In this context, the BNP government may face domestic pressure to adopt a firmer rhetorical stance toward New Delhi, even though strategic interdependence and regional stability require continued engagement and cooperation with India.

A recalibrated engagement with China? 

Relations with are likely to pose the most consequential strategic challenge for the incoming BNP government. Under former Prime Minister Sheikh, Beijing expanded its influence in Bangladesh through infrastructure projects linked to its Belt and Road Initiative and closer defense cooperation with Dhaka. This trend continued after the political transition, with the interim government reportedly receiving over USD 2.1 billion in Chinese loans and grants, as well as diplomatic recognition, through high-level talks with Beijing.��

In 2026, China is expected to remain Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and a core part of the country’s defense plans. This growing defense relationship is evident in the , under which China agreed to build a drone manufacturing plant in Bangladesh, as well as ongoing talks to acquire . China has successfully institutionalised its close relationship with Bangladesh, thereby narrowing the strategic choices for the next government. The BNP is therefore likely to continue economic engagement with Beijing, as protecting Chinese investments in the country aligns with Bangladesh’s national interests.��

Although historically perceived as aligned with Beijing, the BNP’s diplomatic record reflects a pragmatic foreign policy strategy of alliance diversification. Under ’s administration (1977–1981), Bangladesh strengthened diplomatic and military ties with China to broaden external partnerships beyond India and the Soviet bloc. This hedging approach continued under , when military cooperation and economic engagement with China expanded through several agreements, including infrastructure, trade, and technical assistance.��

However, Dhaka’s hedging strategy toward China will likely come under intense scrutiny from great-power players, pressuring the incoming government to navigate mounting hostility from India and the United States to China’s expanding regional influence. Questions about the sustainability of large-scale infrastructure financing and accusations of Chinese debt entrapment will further shape Dhaka’s approach toward Beijing. Consequently, BNP is likely to strike a balance between strategic prudence and economic collaboration in its engagement with China. It would be wise for the BNP to avoid placing Bangladesh at the center of the intensifying strategic competition between China, the United States and India.

Pakistan’s bid for re-engagement

During the Awami League government, remained relatively distant from Bangladesh, largely due to Dhaka’s long-standing strategic alignment with New Delhi. Furthermore, unresolved historical grievances over Pakistan’s atrocities during the Bangladesh Liberation War continued to shape Dhaka’s diplomatic posture and constrained the prospect of closer bilateral engagements. However, this dynamic changed during Muhammad Yunus’ interim government, when Bangladesh and Pakistan took steps to restore ties. In an effort to rebuild mutual trust, the two countries resumed direct air links, increased civilian and military exchanges, and relaxed visa policies. Moreover, Islamabad explored renewed defence cooperation with Dhaka, including discussions on the potential sale of fighter aircraft.

Beyond official diplomatic channels, Pakistan has pursued soft-power outreach by engaging Bangladeshi cultural figures and media platforms, including the participation of Bangladeshi artists in . Amid persistent anti-India sentiment among segments of Bangladeshi youth, Pakistan appears to be leveraging cultural diplomacy and public engagement to shape public opinion in its favour and encourage closer ties with the new government in Dhaka.

Looking ahead: Bangladesh’s foreign policy choices

For Dhaka, diversifying external partnerships is an ideal strategy to reduce overdependence on any single regional actor. This approach involves balancing relations with both Islamabad and New Delhi and engaging with partners in the Middle East. Bangladesh will also need to maintain a transactional approach toward both India and Pakistan, ensuring that its engagement with both regional players remains transparent, structured and guided by clearly defined national interests rather than ideological alignment. 

For the incoming administration to be successful, the BNP’s “Bangladesh First” policy must prioritize the country’s national interests, diversify external partnerships and address regional challenges, such as the Rohingya crisis. The incoming BNP government, therefore, should avoid entanglement in great-power rivalries between the US, India and China. Instead, the new administration’s diplomacy should be grounded in pragmatism and strategic calculation rather than rhetorical posturing.

[ edited this piece.]

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and union campaigns for living wages also echo living wage concerns beyond statutory minima. This debate, however, is unfolding at a time when a large share of India’s micro, small and medium enterprises — employing the bulk of the workforce — continue to struggle with compliance even with existing minimum wage requirements.

Unlike minimum wages, which are explicitly linked to the nature of work, skill levels and hours performed, living wage frameworks are typically anchored in household consumption needs and do not explicitly account for the quantity or productivity of work.

As a result, they may generate wage benchmarks that appear arbitrary from the perspective of firms’ productivity and economic capacity, particularly for small enterprises operating with low productivity and thin margins. Yet in India’s labor market, an increasing focus on living wages risks diverting attention from a more immediate and consequential task of the wage laws India already has.

Living wages and developed vs developing economies

Living wage frameworks have largely emerged in developed economies, where per capita incomes are often more than ten to 20 times that of India, informality is limited and most employment is in high-productivity sectors. In such contexts, governments and employers have the fiscal and economic capacity to absorb consumption-based wage benchmarks.

India, however, remains a developing economy with low average productivity, widespread informality and nearly 90% of enterprises classified as micro or small units. Policy instruments suited to rich economies cannot be mechanically transplanted into a labor market with fundamentally different structural realities.

At its core, the living wage approach shifts wage determination away from work performed towards household consumption. Wages are benchmarked against food baskets, housing costs, education choices and lifestyle expectations.

This departs from a principle long embedded in Indian labor law and trade union practice — and more broadly in India’s civilizational ethos — where work itself is accorded dignity, the belief that labor, skill and effort (karma) deserve fair reward. By tying pay to household needs rather than work, the living wage framework disconnects remuneration from productivity, effort and skill acquisition.

This shift raises practical contradictions. Should two workers performing the same job earn different wages because one has a larger family? In a country as diverse as India, with sharp regional price differences and household structures ranging from single migrants to joint families, a consumption-based wage formula quickly becomes arbitrary, inequitable and administratively complex.

More importantly, such an approach weakens incentives for skill formation and productivity enhancement — the levers India must strengthen if it is to realize its ambition of becoming a by 2047. For an economy still climbing the income ladder, linking wages explicitly to the quantity and quality of work performed remains important for aligning remuneration with productivity.

Since productivity is shaped not only by effort but also by workers’ skills and working conditions, wage-setting mechanisms that recognize these factors can promote efficiency as well as fairness. When embedded within a framework of statutory minimum wages, skill-linked wage systems are therefore not merely pro-employer; they can also be pro-employee, as they encourage skill acquisition by linking wage rates directly to employees’ skill sets.

Laws on the book: a failure to enforce

India’s real wage crisis lies elsewhere. It is not the absence of a living wage benchmark, but the failure to enforce minimum wages already notified . Across agriculture, construction, domestic work and small manufacturing, many workers continue to be statutory minimum wages. Revisions are often delayed, inspection capacity is limited and compliance remains weak. For many workers, minimum wages remain a legal entitlement rather than a lived reality.

It was precisely to address these shortcomings that Parliament enacted the , 2019. By consolidating four earlier laws covering minimum wages, wage payments, bonuses and equal remuneration, the Code seeks to simplify compliance while strengthening worker protection. Its most significant reform is universal coverage.

Although its predecessor, the , 1948, existed for decades, its application was limited to “” notified by governments, leaving large segments of India’s informal and service sector workforce (like housemaids, cooks, caregivers, workers in small eateries like dhabas and roadside restaurants) outside its legal ambit.

The Code on Wages, 2019, removes this occupational filter, making minimum wages protected for the first time. Now, minimum wages have become a statutory right for all workers across organized and unorganized sectors.

The Code also introduces a statutory floor wage to be fixed by the central government, based on minimum living standards, with scope for regional variation. States cannot set minimum wages below this floor. This creates a national baseline of wage protection without abandoning the principle that wages remain linked to work and skill. Minimum wages are to be fixed using transparent criteria, including skill categories, geographic conditions and the nature of work, such as exposure to heat or hazardous environments.

Beyond wage levels, the Code strengthens core labor protections. It prohibits gender-based discrimination in recruitment and wages for similar work. It extends provisions on timely wage payment and restrictions on unauthorized deductions to all employees by removing earlier wage ceilings. Overtime wages at twice the normal rate are mandated, and responsibility for wage payment is clearly assigned to employers.

Equally important is the rethinking of enforcement. Inspectors are now designated as “”, combining oversight with guidance to improve compliance. First-time, nonserious offenses can be compounded through monetary penalties, while repeat violations attract stricter sanctions. This compliance-oriented framework recognizes India’s enforcement constraints while retaining legal accountability.

Searching for a just marketplace

Taken together, the Code on Wages, 2019 already incorporates many objectives advanced by living wage advocates: universality, adequacy, equity and enforceability. What it deliberately avoids is anchoring wages to individual household consumption patterns. Introducing a parallel living wage framework alongside the Code would blur legal clarity, complicate enforcement and weaken the incentive structure needed in a developing economy.

The economic risks of such a shift are significant. Most Indian enterprises operate on thin margins and have to capital. They can plan for and comply with clearly defined, work-linked minimum wages. But wages are tied to evolving consumption baskets, often devised without adequate sensitivity to the capacity to pay unpredictable labor costs. The likely outcomes are reduced hiring, greater informality and weaker compliance.

India’s labor market faces structural challenges: informality, low productivity and limited enforcement capacity. The Code on Wages, 2019, offers a pragmatic, Indian response aligned with the country’s development stage and long-term aspirations. The priority now is implementation through regular revision of minimum wages, stronger enforcement and universal compliance.

The debate, ultimately, is not between compassion and growth. It is between a wage system anchored in work, skills and productivity and one anchored in consumption. If India is serious about becoming a by 2047, the task is clear: make the Wage Code work, and ensure that the minimum wage promised by law is paid in practice.

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Aadhaar was created in 2009 to provide all residents of India with a single, unique and verifiable identity number that can be used by government and private sector agencies to identify individual residents of India. The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), a statutory authority of the Government of India, administers the Aadhaar program and issues a 12-digit unique Aadhaar number to Indian residents.

With almost 80 million now occurring daily, UIDAI has strengthened India’s position as a global leader in digital public infrastructure (DPI). 

On January 28, 2009, the UIDAI launched the Aadhaar program under the leadership of Nandan Nilekani, and the Aadhaar number was issued on September 29, 2010. Within ten years of its launch, Aadhaar enrolled 90% of India’s population in a digital ID system, considered the world’s most extensive biometric identity system, serving as the primary infrastructure for digital payments in India.

Today, government schemes and programs use Aadhaar as the basis for offering welfare schemes, including Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) and the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY), to facilitate service delivery. Through electronic Know Your Customer (e-KYC) and Aadhaar-enabled payment options, Aadhaar facilitated a continuous flow of benefits and subsidies directly to beneficiaries, by reducing the need for intermediaries and preventing fund leakages.

Over have adopted Aadhaar for user verification purposes in the banking, insurance and telecom sectors. UIDAI enabled over two billion Aadhaar transactions by August 2025, and its AI solution is utilized by 150 government and private entities. 

India’s digital economy has experienced rapid growth due to Aadhaar’s role as an enabler, particularly in assisting with the fast and safe onboarding of clients for use within India’s — 26 companies worth more than $90 billion combined — through online verification of customers’ identity and ease of completing transactions digitally. 

The rapid rise of Aadhaar has also made it an easy target for cybercriminals. Aadhaar has become a key pillar for delivering public services, as well as many aspects of India’s digital economy. Due to its critical role, Aadhaar poses a significant risk from fraudsters. 

Challenges and risks in the Aadhaar ecosystem

Aadhaar’s centralized database, the Central Identity Data Repository (), has so far remained uncompromised; yet risks and vulnerabilities arise through the third-party systems it connects to, such as banking, telecom and university applications, enrollment apps, authentication devices and other API-based services.

In 2018, approximately 200 inadvertently disclosed personal Aadhaar data. This was an insider attack with Aadhaar data being accessed by unauthorized personnel working for the government.

In 2024, one state government’s portal was found to be exposing Aadhaar-linked , and the other challenge is application programming interface () misuse and weak integration. Some organizations unintentionally expose Aadhaar numbers, dates of birth or addresses through fragile APIs, despite the UIDAI enforcing strict compliance requirements. Aadhaar numbers, casually shared, became tools for exploitation, as cyber criminals have used the Aadhaar numbers to loot their money. 

Aadhaar-enabled SIM Fraud leading to cyber crimes

A majority of financial cybercrimes in India begin with access to fraudulent subscriber identity module cards, commonly known as . Cybercriminals gain access to fraudulent SIM cards by providing fake Aadhaar card documents, photocopies of unsuspecting individuals, using morphed Aadhaar cards and exploiting the SIM card issuance process.

A recent study from the Indian School of Business found that many SIM cards issued are linked to Aadhaar verification as the primary source of identity and/or residence authentication. SIMs validated in this way serve as a backbone for various cybercrime activities, including KYC fraud, phishing scams and others.

Cybercriminals use Aadhaar data to gain access to genuine customers’ bank accounts by using fake , phishing links that mimic verification portals and exploiting Aadhaar demographic data to reset mobile banking credentials. Cybercriminals also use fake Aadhaar cards to open , which are then used for financial transactions and crypto transactions. 

Aadhaar for social engineering

Criminals increasingly use Aadhaar to execute social engineering attacks, such as online scams involving impersonation and fraudulent calls/emails to obtain Aadhaar data, which have resulted in millions of financial losses. A retired professor in Hyderabad was defrauded of ₹1,500,000 ($16,705) by who claimed that Aadhaar was being misused and that fake Aadhaar cards were being used in land fraud or to create counterfeit identities and avail benefits. 

The 2013 ruling made Aadhaar voluntary; yet, subsequent mandates — such as to Permanent Account Number (PAN) cards — raise serious concerns about the freedom, autonomy and dignity of citizens. The (2016) amended rules to promote ease of living and livelihood, and introduced the for Good Governance Amendment Rules, 2025, which permit both public and private entities to utilize the Aadhaar Authentication service. However, the amendment raises about privacy and the misuse of personal data.

AI, deepfakes and synthetic ID frauds

AI is an emerging technology that may pose a threat to Aadhaar data due to the rapid progress of these technologies and the inadequate control measures or regulations in place to prevent issues from arising. Increasingly, these technologies can enable cybercriminals to create fake , simulate a complete identity similar to an existing person and create that closely match the original voice, making it easier to compromise security measures. 

Additionally, using AI-generated information allowed fraudsters to build identities appearing to be legitimate by altering demographic information and photographs/biometric information to create a profile that can pass as “real.” The increased use of AI technology for Aadhaar Authentication provides an opportunity for the use of deepfake videos, including deepfake technology that can circumvent and allow unauthorized access to accounts.

Without additional protective measures and regulations in place, preventing fraudulent activities related to Aadhaar in the era of AI will become increasingly complex, and even a minor leak could result in identity theft or cyber fraud.

Aadhaar and the quantum risks

The Aadhaar architecture utilizes public-key cryptography methods for the secure storage of encrypted data. However, with the rapid growth of quantum technology, the reliance on �龱�������–S�󲹳�����–A����𳾲��� (), Elliptic Curve Cryptography () and Advanced Encryption Standard () for encryption makes Aadhaar vulnerable.

Consequently, there is an urgent requirement for a migration strategy for Aadhaar to the Post-Quantum Cryptography () model. Addressing these risks requires robust governance, strong technical safeguards and privacy-by-design frameworks to secure Aadhaar as critical national infrastructure.

Recent initiatives

The UIDAI has recently launched a redesigned , featuring enhanced security measures and making it easier for users to manage their digital identity. This improved app functions offline, providing users with easier access to their Aadhaar information, offers a higher level of data protection and gives users multiple secure ways to share their information with others. 

UIDAI established the Aadhaar Data Vault () to enhance the security of individuals’ sensitive information. The ADV is a secure digital repository that allows individuals to store information related to their Aadhaar account (Aadhaar number, name, phone number, etc) with stringent encryption and controlled access.

The recently released framework called “” serves as the roadmap for constructing and defining the digital identity of Indian citizens over the next decade. Furthermore, the recent by UIDAI of 20 million Aadhaar numbers of deceased individuals is a prime example that demonstrates the regular update of the Aadhaar database to weed out nonexistent ID card holders and prevent/reduce the misuse of the digital ID card.

Finally, UIDAI has made for all entities using Aadhaar-based verification to boost accountability and prevent its misuse. UIDAI is considering a rule that would stop private organizations from storing as it shifts to a more secure digital verification system.

The way forward

Aadhaar has become a vital component in India’s digital infrastructure development, facilitating the delivery of services to its citizens. To develop an improved Aadhaar-based digital service ecosystem, the UIDAI must create a Multi-Layer Authentication Framework for Aadhaar users that utilizes PQC to ensure continuity of service, even if a user has lost access or compromised any one method of verification (biometric data, one-time passwords, personal identification number).

As cybercriminals increasingly utilize , the UIDAI must begin to prepare for AI-enabled fraudulent activity. UIDAI needs to invest in even more advanced forms of technological security that protect against the actions of these types of cyber criminals, including the continued development of liveliness detection technology.

Another way to enhance identity security while preserving user privacy is by utilizing behavioral biometrics (i.e., typing speed, touch pressure, device movement or voice cadence). These biometric methods are inherently much more difficult for a fraudster to replicate than traditional biometric methods.

Aadhaar’s efficiency depends on its ability to address various risks associated with challenges, such as advanced cyber-attacks, post-quantum cyber-attacks, large-scale data breaches, AI-based identity theft, escalating privacy legislation and data misuse. The possibility of being unable to authenticate ourselves when needed, along with inconsistent governance levels throughout the entire Aadhaar ecosystem, is another concern.

The Aadhaar infrastructure must be built upon, strengthened and expanded to face the newer challenges. The Aadhaar system will need to be continually updated to protect against the risks posed by rapidly evolving technologies, which will require an investment in developing a sophisticated and secure cybersecurity framework.

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Yet five years on, with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that none of the worst-case predictions have materialized. There have been no mass detention camps, no sweeping disenfranchisement and no deportations on anything near the scale seen in the United States or even in Western Europe.

Implications of the CAA

India has no codified law and is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. , which offers a path to citizenship for non-Muslim minorities from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, is ethically troubling for its explicit exclusion of Muslims, including persecuted sects like Ahmadis, Shias and Hazaras.

India also fails to recognize atheists, queer people and political dissidents, all of whom may face real persecution in the region. Additionally, the CAA excludes asylum seekers from other jurisdictions, such as the Uyghurs from Xinjiang and persecuted Christian communities in Myanmar. There is a clear case for reforming the CAA to include these groups and make it consistent with India’s constitutional commitment to nondiscrimination and equal protection.

The CAA was not a diabolical master plan nor “fascist” ideological blueprint, but rather a kind of ad hoc triage — an attempt, however flawed, to deal with the overwhelming demographic and administrative pressures of undocumented migration, particularly from Bangladesh. Like much of India’s immigration policy, it was reactive and shaped more by logistical and political considerations than by any coherent doctrinal vision.

India’s role in immigration

India has a unique role as a receiving state in South Asia. During the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, India took in an estimated refugees, overwhelmingly Bangladeshi Hindus fleeing communal violence. Between 1971 and 2011, it was estimated that over 11 million Bangladeshi Hindus entered India. Today, at least still reside in the country.

Since the early 1970s, for which we have good data, there has been no counterbalancing of Indian Muslim asylum claims in the nearby Muslim-majority nations Bangladesh, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Oman or the Maldives. The number of Indian Muslims seeking asylum in the US, UK, Canada, Australia and the EU has also been statistically insignificant. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) records and national statistics for all these countries this.

Au contraire, India continues to host significant refugee populations: over 100,000 Tibetans, including the Dalai Lama, approximately 95,000 Sri Lankan Tamils, Afghan and Myanmar minorities, and individuals such as the Bangladeshi feminist author , as well as the Pakistan-born singer , the latter granted full citizenship. Unlike its neighbors, India has extended sanctuary for decades, often without international financial or logistical support.

Migration around the globe

Despite this record, India is often singled out. In July 2025, The Washington Post ran the headline: “In India’s deportation drive, Muslim men recount being tossed into the sea.” To make matters worse, the article was reprinted subsequently by Genocide Watch! The article referred to boat repatriations of Rohingya that involved no deaths or injuries to anyone involved.

On the contrary, of migrants — mostly from Muslim-majority states — have drowned since 2015 in the Mediterranean due to Frontex-supported border practices. The US deports mostly Hispanics from Central America. Australia continues to detain asylum seekers offshore, many of them Muslim. Yet we do not see headlines accusing these countries of “deporting Catholics” or “tossing Muslims into the sea.”

Pakistan has embarked on the deportation of undocumented Afghans, unprecedented in postwar history. The Washington Post’s headline would appear grotesque if applied to the United States, the EU or any comparable democracy, or even to Pakistan. Yet, such language is reserved for India, where humanitarian inconsistencies are interpreted not as flaws of governance, but as actions of a “genocidal state.”

To be fair, India deported approximately Rohingya in May 2025. Its of undocumented Bangladeshis are far more numerous, amounting to tens of thousands annually, according to the Border Security Force. These frequently occur without formal legal proceedings, raising genuine due process concerns and sometimes imperiling Indian Bengali-speaking Muslims.

Recent evidence demonstrates that Rohingya camps in Bangladesh are being used by groups like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) to recruit, smuggle meth and train fighters. The 2025 Crisis Group links these groups to Myanmar’s ongoing civil war. India, bordering the narcotics-trafficking Golden Triangle in Myanmar, fears militant and narcotics spillover — reframing the Rohingya issue as both a humanitarian crisis and a regional security threat.

Still, the scale of deportations from India pales in comparison to other democracies, operating with vastly greater capacity and international legitimacy — and with less scrutiny. The US deported over people last year. Frontex, the ����’s border agency, carried out more than forced or voluntary returns in 2022. Australia has kept over asylum seekers in offshore facilities since 2013.

Reframing the refugee framework in India

Without a doubt, India needs a more coherent refugee framework. One viable is adopting a differentiated risk framework, akin to what Germany has implemented, which prioritizes vulnerable groups for protection while retaining case-by-case scrutiny. Another is establishing an independent asylum determination body, much like Immigration and Refugee Board, which separates executive discretion from legal adjudication and increases transparency.

India’s refugee policy is flawed — at times exclusionary and often inconsistent. Like many democracies, India struggles with migration, state capacity and identity. Islamophobic rhetoric and anti-immigrant hysteria do exist in India, and in some cases, mirror the nativist panic and punitive enforcement patterns seen in the US under the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), or the securitized asylum discourse in Europe and Australia.

But this is precisely why nuance is important. India belongs squarely within the global democratic conversation on asylum, borders and belonging, not outside it. Vilification as a genocidal anti-Muslim ethnocracy — instead of well-deserved criticism of its legal and structural limitations — is neither factually grounded nor helpful in light of genuine border control imperatives around terrorism and narcotics.

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When Indian Member of Parliament (MP) recently lamented “the silence of the diaspora” on issues such as immigration or civic engagement, he touched a nerve that goes beyond politics. He was describing a deeper instinct, one of self-preservation disguised as prudence. It is a habit many Indians recognize: to stay safe, polite and disengaged even when their experience could enrich public debate.

Restraint can look rational. But when silence hardens into avoidance, it weakens the very democracy that made such success possible. The Indian diaspora’s story has been one of aspiration and excellence. Its next chapter should be about contribution, using its global voice to strengthen the democratic ideals that empowered it.

Why this matters beyond identity

For decades, Washington and New Delhi have spoken of shared democratic values, assuming that cultural similarity would naturally translate into political alignment. That assumption no longer holds. Across the world, democracies are losing hold of institutions, truth and one another.

In this moment of drift, the Indian diaspora stands at a rare intersection. It lives within one democracy while carrying the memory of another, giving it the vantage point to interpret both. Yet when debates sharpen, from immigration to technology policy, its instinct is to stay silent, to watch and wait for the storm to pass rather than weigh in and act.

Caution can be wise when politics changes color, but silence in moments of churn is not prudence; it is absence when engagement matters most. The diaspora’s distance, often mistaken for neutrality, risks shrinking its influence just when its experience could help restore balance.

Of course, silence may not be only cultural; it is also structural. Many in the diaspora live within systems that reward stability over dissent. Visa uncertainty, professional dependence on sponsorships and the fear of jeopardizing immigration status make civic participation feel risky. Others face subtler barriers, such as underrepresentation in politics or the absence of collective institutions that promote policy engagement. Indian community organizations in the United States often focus on cultural preservation rather than political advocacy or coalition building. In that ecosystem, discretion becomes a habit, and risk aversion turns into an identity.

This silence has cultural roots. From early schooling, Indians are trained to compete, not collaborate. Marks, promotions and awards all reward the individual. Working together is rarely taught as a skill, except perhaps on the sports field.

We are taught that “Unity is Strength” and “Knowledge is Power.” Yet somewhere along the way, we learned to practice only the second. Our education system produces skilled professionals, not civic thinkers. It teaches us how to win, not how to belong. The result is a quiet contradiction: We celebrate both proverbs yet live by only one.

While studying in Singapore, I noticed how cultural habits shaped learning. My Chinese classmates, guided perhaps by Confucian notions of harmony, collaborated freely and celebrated collective achievement. Many Indian students, though equally talented, tended to work more independently. It wasn’t a lack of goodwill, but a reflection of how deeply competition is wired into our idea of success.

This is not about blame; it’s about inheritance. Centuries of hierarchy and colonialism taught us that survival depends on personal advancement. Even today, diversity, one of India’s strengths, can make unity fragile. We coexist but visibly fail to act together.

Sociologists call this a culture, rich in talent but short on cooperation. The diaspora reflects it too. We gather easily for festivals or emergencies but rarely for the slower, harder work of civic life.

The pattern is visible across what were once called the BIMARU states (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh), regions that have produced some of India’s brightest global achievers yet still struggle with underdevelopment. Individual success has not translated into collective renewal. It is a mirror of the diaspora’s dilemma: brilliance without solidarity, achievement without influence.

Democracy’s unfinished lesson

This habit extends into Indian politics. Opposition and ruling parties alike often invest more in criticism than in ideas. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s call for “” and his vision of , a developed India by 2047, rest on the same truth Tharoor hinted at: democracies thrive on participation, not performance alone.

The diaspora faces the same challenge. Members are not guests in their adopted democracies; they are an integral part of them. Their voice can help both India and the United States reimagine liberty, equality and civic duty in a divided world.

To participate is not to take sides. It is to take responsibility. The diaspora’s unique position, between two experiments in democracy, gives it moral leverage few others have.

Finding balance

Former Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Kishore Mahbubani, recently CNN-News18 that India must become an independent third pole in a multipolar world, close to both Washington and Beijing yet dependent on neither. He compared the two powers to elephants on a seesaw, saying India’s strength lies in balance.

The same could be said of the diaspora. Living between cultures gives the diaspora a rare chance to balance ideas, not just loyalties. Its role need not be political; it can be moral, cultural and intellectual. Silence, in that context, is not elegance but evasion. True independence, whether for nations or communities, grows from engagement and from the courage to speak when the way forward is unclear.

Toward a shared voice

India’s story has always balanced individual brilliance with collective purpose. The freedom movement, the cooperatives of the early republic, and the shared traditions of Bhakti and Sufism all remind us that progress is social, not solitary.

Today’s global Indians, whether in Delhi or Dallas, have more influence than any generation before them. What remains is the courage to act together, to see unity not as sameness but as shared purpose.

It is not to argue that the diaspora should fight back or turn political; rather, it is to suggest something quieter and more powerful: that it must develop an assimilated voice, one that speaks from within the societies it belongs to, shaping conversations rather than echoing them.

History shows how perception can shape destiny. During the Second World War, Kyoto was removed from the US list of atomic-bomb targets, and Nagasaki became one of the alternatives. Historians note that the decision reflected not sentiment alone but Kyoto’s cultural prestige, its diplomatic importance and the personal intervention of Secretary of War Henry . Influence, as that episode reminds us, does not always stem from power; sometimes it flows from how a place, or a people, are perceived.

That is the kind of soft power India and its diaspora must rediscover, not through symbolism but through credibility, empathy and engagement. When a community speaks not from anger but from alignment, it earns trust. And trust, in today’s fractured world, is the rarest currency of all.

The challenge for the Indian diaspora is not to find a louder voice but a wiser one, capable of helping build a fairer world and keeping alive the moral promise of collective democracy.

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In this situation, a successful voluntary carbon market for agriculture can play a crucial role not only in mitigating GHG emissions and enabling adaptation to climate change, but also in raising the incomes of farmers. In view of this, there is an urgent need to strategize the requisite measures to address the challenges and promote the development of an efficient voluntary carbon market for agriculture. 

The global voluntary carbon market (VCM) is valued at around and is expected to grow at a 25% compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in the next decade. , about 2.45 billion were issued, and 1.04 billion remain across 10,701 projects as of August 31, 2025. Of the total, agriculture accounted for only 1.5%, while forest & land use and renewable energy accounted for about 37% and 30%, respectively, of carbon credits issued.

India accounted for about 17% of total projects and 15.7% of total carbon credits, as estimated as of August 2025. However, the agriculture and forest & land use sectors accounted for only about 0.2% and 0.8%, respectively, while the renewable energy sector accounted for about 87% of the country’s carbon credits.

Further, within agriculture, the focus of project registries has been very narrow and largely confined to a few areas. According to the database, only the project registries of improved irrigation management and manure methane digester were successful and received most of the carbon credits, but not the registries of feed additives, rice emission reductions and sustainable agriculture. These trends also suggest that Indian agriculture project registries have been declining steadily over the past five years or so.

Challenges in implementation

Despite the tremendous potential with multiple benefits, the progress of carbon farming in India is very limited, constrained by a number of challenges. These challenges plague not only India but the rest of the globe as well, making agricultural projects highly prone to rejection.

The extent of VCM project rejection in agriculture, forest and land use categories is as 81%. Further, the registration period of these projects in India is much longer, at 1689 days, compared to 623 days for the rest of Asia.

One of the major challenges is the lack of affordability for dominant smallholder farmers for the initial investments to take up carbon farming projects, especially long-term projects. Another major challenge is the constant monitoring, evaluation and verification by third parties. While engaging such third-party services may be expensive and add to the costs, the reliability and accuracy of such expert services are other major challenges. 

The lengthy period of registration is another hindering factor, especially for small farmers in carbon farming projects. Lack of expertise in estimating complex processes of carbon accounting, such as measurement of soil carbon, change in emissions, etc., is another important challenge. 

In addition, increasingly volatile global carbon markets are also discouraging stakeholders due to uncertain returns on investment in the projects. Falling carbon prices in recent years are one of the reasons for the slowdown in VCM project registrations globally. Such uncertainty in carbon pricing is a cause for concern as it may drive away investments.

Further, research studies identified challenges such as regulatory hurdles, manipulation, a lack of expertise in ensuring compliance with standards and social exclusion of local communities, among others. Studies also found instances of nonreceipt of the monetary benefits by the intended farmers, leading to abandonment or noncompletion of projects.

Finally, the growing number of extreme weather events from climate change is adversely impacting carbon farming projects, which require a stable ecosystem to measure their success. 

The way forward

In view of the rising volatilities in global carbon markets, there is a need to develop a domestic carbon market and trading system so that farmers are not adversely impacted by such price volatilities. Further, in view of the past experiences in terms of the long periods of registration, suspension and rejection of projects, there is a need to strengthen the domestic carbon farming ecosystem with comprehensive measures addressing the challenges of all stakeholders, including farmers, investors, third-party verification agencies, auditors, end-using industry and more.

Towards this, it is essential to simplify and customize processes suitable for Indian conditions wherever feasible, while taking into account global standards. There is also a need to bring out guidelines for authenticating and designating third-party monitoring, verification and auditing agencies. 

In this regard, the can be a starting point with a simplified version of processes and standards with small-scale, shorter-duration projects. This will help farmers and other stakeholders to get familiarized with the carbon farming processes, standards and regulations.

A public–private partnership judiciously combining government and industry incentives may be an effective way of funding such green credit programs. Towards this, agro-based and agri-input industries may be encouraged to contribute actively. For instance, the fertilizer industry, being a large contributor of GHG emissions, may be encouraged to participate in green credit programs, providing incentives to farmers.

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Beneath this optimism, there is a greater doubt. If machines displace humans on a large scale, who will fuel the demand side of the economy? Could world growth be stable when the very basis of participation starts to falter?

In the Asia-Pacific region, countries like China, India and Japan are racing to advanced AI into manufacturing, logistics and services. The rapid adoption of these countries illustrates both the potential for economic transformation and the social challenges that come with accelerated automation.

The mirage of limitless productivity

Artificial intelligence has already transformed manufacturing, logistics and design in ways previously unimaginable. Computers now catch mistakes before they occur, study market changes in real time and manage assembly lines with little human intervention. The productive potential of the world has increased, yet the social price of this acceleration is not yet well grasped.

According to PwC’s Global Artificial Intelligence (2023), AI could contribute up to 15.7 trillion dollars to the global economy by 2030, raising GDP by as much as 26% in some regions. China and North America are expected to capture nearly 70% of these gains due to early adoption of AI in manufacturing and logistics. The World Bank also that countries that adopted automation between 2015 and 2023 experienced GDP growth 1.4 percentage points greater than those that did not.

But economic growth does not always indicate human progress. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), employment elasticity has also fallen sharply as a result of AI. For each 1% increase in productivity fueled by AI, traditional jobs declined by about %. Output grows, but participation shrinks. The gains from growth increasingly go to owners of capital, not of labor.

Manufacturing productivity in India continues to year over year, while the industry’s share of employment continues to. Similar patterns are visible across the Asia-Pacific, where nations like China, South Korea and Vietnam are seeing output soar while traditional employment opportunities lag, highlighting the regional dimension of the automation challenge.

The hidden cost of displacement

History has cautioned us for a long time against such paradoxes. When Britain mechanized its textile manufacturing in the eighteenth century, production boomed, but so did inequality and discontent. Each new wave of industrialization created fresh wealth while supplanting traditional ways of life. What distinguishes the current shift from previous ones is the pace and magnitude of disruption.

The McKinsey Global Institute that 300 to 800 million jobs might be lost worldwide through automation by 2030. New jobs will become available, but the transition will not be smooth and will not be distributed evenly. Skilled professionals will adapt to new roles, while millions of low-skill and mid-skill workers will lose their jobs. The danger in this is the creation of hyperspecialization and concentration of wealth at a global level.

The World Economic Forum (2024) advises that skills will severely disrupt of the global workforce within the next five years. If the purchasing power of the masses refuses to keep up with technological advances, the world’s economy may ultimately slow down.��

The social consequences of excessive automation

Behind these statistics is mounting human insecurity. The French sociologist Émile Durkheim wrote of “” as a state of normlessness in which people no longer feel they belong to society. It is creeping silently across economies that are hurtling towards automation with weak social protections in place.

The 2024 Edelman Trust Barometer found more than of respondents in 28 nations worried about losing their jobs to automation. The psychological cost of job loss cannot be discounted. Escalating social distrust, intolerance and mental anguish are not accidents; they are collateral damage of an economic system that is concerned with output growth but not emotional security. When human work is boiled down to obsolescence, dignity itself is at risk.

If the AI ascension happens without ethical consideration, then the gap between technological progress and human well-being will grow. Development should not be at the cost of humanity’s cohesiveness and sense of purpose.

A need for conscious care, not just conscious machines

The aspiration for conscious AI is, at its core, a reflection of our own wish to know ourselves. Consciousness, however, is not computation. It is awareness, empathy and moral consideration. The issue is not whether machines might develop consciousness, but whether humans can continue to do so in the face of the pursuit of boundless efficiency.

Real progress will have to go hand in hand with technological and moral advancement. Governments and corporations also have a mutual responsibility to see that AI gains are shared. Profits from automation can be invested back in humans via education, reskilling and public benefit. A few nations are automation taxes, AI dividends and universal reskilling schemes to counteract the gap between innovation and inclusion. Such concepts, ambitious though they may be, are crucial to avoid economic polarization.

Lessons from the past

With every industrial change, humanity learned the same thing in a different way. The first industrial revolution made people more productive, but it also grew inequality. The second created national wealth at the expense of workers. The digital revolution connected billions but made social bonds more fragile.

The age of AI is different in scale and speed, yet it must learn from these earlier chapters. Artificial intelligence has the potential to alleviate poverty, improve healthcare and address climate challenges. However, if it continues without ethical restraint, it may also intensify inequality and erode human meaning. As nations compete for technological dominance, a global framework rooted in fairness and responsibility becomes indispensable.

The way forward

The future of AI will require us to reconcile speed and sensitivity. Progress is not to be judged by quantity, by how much machines can do, but by quality, by how much they will enrich human life. Development is only valuable when it heightens dignity, equality and purpose.

If we move toward conscious AI without cultivating human consciousness, we risk building a world in which intelligence blooms but wisdom perishes. Machines will soon be able to reflect, reason and adapt, but they cannot care. That is a uniquely human advantage, and we should not let it slip away.

The promise of conscious AI is radiant, but concern for consciousness must develop in tandem. If one leaves the other behind, even the most brilliant technology will cast a shadow over humanity’s future.

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On October 22, India’s Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology () released to the Information Technology Rules (2021) that propose regulating synthetic media, including deepfakes and AI-generated content. The draft, open for public consultation until November 6, introduces a legal definition of “synthetically generated information” and mandates clear labeling of any content created or modified by algorithms.

If adopted, it would make India one of the first major democracies to legislate the blurred boundary between fact and fabrication. The proposal, according to media reports, would require platforms that enable or host synthetic content to display disclaimers covering at least 10% of an image or the first 10% of an audio clip. Large platforms, i.e., those with over five million users, would need to deploy automated detection tools and collect user declarations identifying AI-generated media.

Those who comply retain safe-harbor protection under India’s IT law; those who don’t could lose immunity for user content. The government’s intent is clear: stem AI-driven misinformation, impersonation, and national security risks before they destabilize institutions or elections. Yet this ambition exposes a fundamental tension: how can a democracy encourage innovation while protecting reality itself?

A fourth path emerges

The world’s three main AI governance models have already diverged. The is rights-driven, emphasizing privacy and watermarking. The United States relies on self-regulation and voluntary industry pledges. enforces state control through sweeping “deep synthesis” rules.

India is charting a fourth path: governance built on trust. By regulating synthetic media before it triggers a national crisis, New Delhi is attempting something rare: preemptive, proportionate regulation at scale in a democracy.

With over 900 million internet users and some of the world’s fastest-growing AI startups, India’s regulatory design will inevitably shape how emerging markets approach digital truth. In this sense, the draft is less about compliance and more about geopolitical signaling. It tells Washington, Brussels and Beijing alike that the Global South will not remain a passive consumer of tech rules set elsewhere.

From data sovereignty to truth sovereignty

India’s digital policy evolution — from data localization to AI regulation — reveals a larger pattern: the assertion of digital sovereignty. What began as a debate over where data should reside has become a question of who decides what is real.

In practice, “truth sovereignty” means protecting the informational integrity of a billion citizens in an open, multilingual and highly polarized media ecosystem.

It’s also a matter of soft power. If India can demonstrate that democracies can regulate AI media without resorting to censorship, it could export a new “Bangalore Consensus”: an innovation-friendly, rights-respecting and transparency-rooted approach.

The global stakes

AI-generated misinformation is already a transnational problem. A in the US used AI voice clones to suppress voters. in Southeast Asia have stemmed from manipulated videos. In an era where influence can travel at the speed of an upload, governance must catch up with the generation.

Against this backdrop, India’s experiment is a test case for the world: can regulation steer the digital future without strangling it? Failure would reinforce the view that only authoritarian systems can effectively police AI. Success would show that open societies can adapt fast enough to remain resilient. Either way, what India builds or breaks will resonate far beyond its borders.

The new arms race: trust

As the US and China compete over chips, India is competing over credibility. India’s true export won’t be semiconductors; it will be standards: frameworks for watermarking, provenance and responsible AI disclosure.

This is where India’s deepfake regulation transforms from policy to diplomacy. A coalition of democracies around shared principles of digital integrity — an Indo-Pacific Charter on AI Authenticity — could be as influential as the was for climate change.

Because in this century, trust is the new strategic resource.

If India gets it right

If done right, these regulations could do for information integrity what did for digital identity: provide the infrastructure for authenticity at scale. If done wrong, they could entangle innovators in red tape and push creativity underground. Either way, the rest of the world should pay attention.

India is not just regulating technology. It is redesigning the contract between democracy and truth. And if it succeeds, the next export from the world’s largest democracy won’t be software or services; it will be trust.

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Malik’s death also points to the shrinking operational space for terrorist groups within Pakistan. While the killing happened in the backdrop of infighting between militants, it also communicates a larger reality. ISKP is increasingly being put on the back foot. The killing of Malik highlights the growing on ISKP’s governance. The group has undergone losses at the leadership level, coupled with sustained counterterrorism pressure, all of which indicate dilution in its operational capabilities, specifically when it comes to carrying out mass influence and operations.

A decreasing safe haven for terrorists

Over the last two decades, Pakistan has waged several counterterrorism operations aimed at gradually disintegrating organized militant networks so that extremist groups are denied safe havens. This first began with (2007–2009), mainly in the Swat region and in the tribal belt, followed by (2009), which pushed back Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) strongholds in South Waziristan.

April 2014 created a turning point for Pakistan with the onset of the phase of , which systematically targeted militant infrastructure, command and cross-border networks in North Waziristan. Capacity-building efforts were further reinforced through (2017), focusing on intelligence-based operations, urban counter-terrorism and the removal of residual extremists. These protracted campaigns attempted to disrupt terrorist sanctuaries and fracture the cohesion of pseudo-legitimate groups like the ISKP.

However, it is that militant infighting in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has weakened ISKP’s command structure and limited its maneuverability more than the operations led by the Pakistani government. Far from projecting strength, the group’s internal conflicts highlight its desperation and decline in Pakistan’s increasingly inhospitable security environment.

The role of other countries 

Pakistan has India of aiding militant groups such as ISKP and TTP with funds and strategic guidance. Thus, allowing them to function as proxies made to destabilize Pakistan’s security environment. In December , Pakistan presented a detailed dossier containing evidence of Indian financing of the groups, their training and their safe havens linked to Indian Intelligence.

These concerns were in the reports of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the United Nations Security Council in , which charted ISKP-TTP linkages and mentioned external facilitation.

Despite this apparent foreign patronage, every important terrorist that has been killed represents a major blow to the terrorist movement, and the death of Malik falls in line with this trend. His killing highlights the fact that ISKP leadership cannot withstand Pakistan’s counterterrorism onslaught that continues to shrink the operational capacity of terrorist groups. 

From the United Nations’ of Pakistan’s frontline sacrifices to senior US generals Islamabad as a “phenomenal partner in counterterrorism,” global voices have kept affirming the role of Pakistan in dismantling ISKP and other similar networks. The trajectory is increasingly evident: the ISKP is on the run. A series of Pakistani operations has reduced the footprint of this group to scattered remnants, disrupted its organizational capacity, and laid bare the external support systems that have tried to sustain it.��

Uprooting terrorism in the region 

In spite of scattered operatives, ISKP’s true sanctuary has never been in Pakistan. The UN Sanctions and Monitoring Committee Report issued in confirms that the group’s organizational hubs and training grounds are located in Afghanistan, where they receive protection and logistical support.��

Pakistan has time and time again warned against the permissive environment Afghanistan maintains and that such an environment emboldens ISKP, TTP and allied groups. From Kunar to Nangarhar, the states for terrorists become a launching pad for cross-border attacks against Pakistan. Thus, the issue of terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan continues to be a central point of tension between the two countries.

In a nutshell, Pakistan cannot eliminate the roots of terrorism on its own; it requires a collective effort by Afghanistan and other neighboring states. After facing more than four decades of war, the responsibility now lies with the Afghan authorities to dismantle terrorist sanctuaries and cut off support networks operating from their soil.

Peace and stability in Pakistan are directly tied to Afghanistan’s security, and by extension, the stability of the wider region and the international community also hinges on Afghanistan’s ability to address this challenge. A unified regional approach, led by Afghanistan and supported by neighbors, is critical to finally uprooting terrorism in South Asia.

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Economic cold war?

Khattar Singh begins by asking whether Trump’s tariffs mark the start of an economic cold war. Moran doubts this, pointing out that the policy is riddled with uncertainty. Some tariffs face legal challenges, and Trump himself has a history of walking back duties when they risk fueling inflation. While Trump sometimes frames tariffs as inherently good, Moran insists he is pragmatic enough to avoid market chaos or consumer backlash.

Moran highlights three questions to watch: which countries will get exemptions, which will strike free trade agreements and how courts will ultimately rule. For now, no one, including Trump, can say exactly where tariff policy is headed. This unpredictability makes life difficult for businesses, as seen with the failed 500% tariffs on Chinese imports that raised costs but produced no concessions from Beijing.

Does Trump want a deal?

On tariffs as a negotiating tool, Moran stresses the volatility of Trump’s approach. Duties could fall if parties reach agreements or rise if talks collapse. But Trump’s frequent public reversals mean even his advisors lack clarity. Moran recalls that the extreme tariffs on China hurt the US economy and consumers more than they pressured Beijing, underscoring the limits of this strategy.

Is Trump uniting BRICS?

Khattar Singh presses Moran on whether tariffs could backfire by pushing BRICS nations closer together. Moran concedes there is some risk: Resentment could bring members “slightly closer.” However, he doubts a 10% tariff would overcome deep divisions. India and China remain at odds, while Iran and the United Arab Emirates also clash. He predicts that as BRICS grows in influence, its geopolitical fractures will become more apparent.

The BRICS plan to set up their own payment system outside the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication has become especially controversial. Initially framed as a sovereignty tool, it now allows Russia to dodge sanctions. Moran warns that without guardrails, the system could facilitate dangerous activity. Washington, he argues, will grow increasingly alarmed, and Trump may try to use tariffs to block its expansion.

Trump and India

Moran singles out India as a vital partner. He sees potential for a bilateral trade deal with New Delhi and hopes for a deeper US–India alliance, especially given shared concerns about China. Defense is central here. Moran criticizes India’s reliance on Russian systems, citing Iran’s failure to stop Israeli attacks with its S-300 missile systems. He argues this is a “wake-up call” for India and urges the country to purchase US-designed systems instead.

Khattar Singh counters that US MIM-104 Patriot systems have struggled in Ukraine and that India’s Russian-made S-400s performed effectively against Pakistan. Still, he notes India’s growing trust in the United States, pointing to its purchase of Boeing AH-64 Apache helicopters.

A US–India trade deal

Turning to economics, Moran distinguishes between what a Trump–India deal might look like and what it should. Trump’s fixation on the Harley-Davidson motorcycle company complicates negotiations, while issues such as manufacturing and IT services remain sensitive. Yet Moran insists that bilateral engagement with India is far more practical than attempting to juggle hundreds of simultaneous agreements.

He allows that multilateralism with BRICS could serve US interests in some cases, but stresses that internal divisions make bilateral deals the safer path. For India, alignment with Washington on trade and defense could strengthen both nations’ positions in the global order.

The future of AI

Khattar Singh and Moran agree that AI will define the next economic era. Moran points to the UAE’s aggressive push to become an AI hub and warns against leaving the field to China, whose advances he identifies as potentially disastrous. He argues the US should not try to handle AI challenges alone.

Khattar Singh notes India’s vibrant AI ecosystem, from widespread use of ChatGPT to national investment in research. Together with the US and the UAE, India could anchor an AI partnership. By contrast, the European Union’s regulatory environment discourages innovation. As Moran bluntly notes, “None of these AI companies are European. Zero.”

Are Americans paying for tariffs?

In closing, Khattar Singh asks whether tariffs ultimately hurt Americans. Moran’s answer is a resounding yes. Economists are right, he says, that tariffs raise domestic costs. The effect depends on scale — targeted tariffs like those on Chinese aluminum in 2018 were manageable, but sweeping 500% tariffs would devastate consumers and industry.

Trump himself is inconsistent, sometimes framing tariffs as leverage, other times as revenue. That inconsistency suggests tariffs will not disappear quickly. Moran ends by stressing that the US needs competitive partners. While not excluding Europe, he doubts the old transatlantic alliance can deliver innovation. For him, the future lies in closer ties with India — on defense, trade and especially AI.

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The was considered highly important as it brought together several states involved in conflicts: Russia’s war in Ukraine for the past three years, Iran’s 12-day conflict with Israel and the 2025 standoff between Pakistan and India. However, this gathering offered an important opportunity for these countries to engage diplomatically, explore new alliances and address regional and global adversaries.

Modi after a seven-year gap, setting the stage for high-level engagement with Xi. His trip was significant as it reflected ongoing efforts to reset bilateral relations following the deadly border clashes in 2020, which had represented the worst period of hostility between the two countries in over four decades. In the past, PM Modi held meetings with Xi and Putin during the in Kazan. At the time, Western leaders had distanced themselves from Putin over the war in Ukraine.��

During the summit, the world watched the involving Russia, India and China. Analysts suggested the Chinese president effectively used the summit to showcase a post-American-led international order, highlighting that the efforts by the White House since January to counter China, Iran, Russia and India had not achieved their intended effect. In this context, India also had the opportunity to pursue alternative partnerships, strengthen ties with China and Russia, and expand its strategic space following past sanctions under the Trump administration.

History of the SCO 

Leaders from Asia, Europe and Africa convened in the northern Chinese port city of Tianjin for the largest-ever SCO summit, setting the stage for the bloc’s development over the next decade. Originally established to address regional security concerns, the SCO has, over its 24-year evolution, grown into a comprehensive organization representing nearly half of the , a quarter of the global landmass and a quarter of global GDP.��

The SCO traces its roots to the “Shanghai Five” mechanism in 1996, when China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan came together to manage border security after the Cold War. On June 15, 2001, the SCO was formally established with Uzbekistan joining as the sixth member. What began as a grouping has expanded with the accession of India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus, now comprising ten member states, along with two observer states and 14 dialogue partners.

Sharif traveled to China to attend the SCO Heads of State Summit in Tianjin. During the summit, PM Sharif met with key , including Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He was also scheduled to attend the military parade in Beijing on September 3, 2025. Meanwhile, Modi visited Japan and China from August 28 to September 1, 2025, to attend the 15th Summit and the 25th SCO meeting.��

Notably, Japan’s top trade negotiator canceled a planned visit to the United States before Modi’s trip, signaling the emergence of new alliances aimed at countering the ongoing trade tensions. Modi’s visit aimed to strengthen ���Ի徱��–J���貹�� relations, discuss global peace and hold sideline meetings at the SCO Summit with other leaders.

SCO failures 

Unfortunately, the SCO summit failed to provide a platform for dialogue between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, India and Pakistan. However, the strongly condemned terrorism in member states, such as the terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, as well as the terrorist attacks on Jaffer Express on March 11, 2025, and in Khuzdar on May 21, 2025. In addition, the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral was in the spotlight, particularly after US President Donald Trump trade tariffs affecting multiple countries, with India being among the most impacted.

In response, India sought out alternatives by deepening strategic and economic ties with Russia and China. Moreover, the Tianjin Declaration also announced the creation of the SCO , a joint security center and support for peace in Afghanistan. It also called for UN reforms to reflect modern realities and condemned the violence in Gaza.

In a nutshell, the 2025 SCO Summit in Tianjin highlighted the organization’s increasing influence in shaping a multipolar world. By bringing together regional powers engaged in conflicts, facilitating trilateral and strategic partnerships, and advancing initiatives like the SCO Development Bank and joint security measures, the summit highlighted the bloc’s potential to offer alternative frameworks for global cooperation. While dialogue between India and Pakistan remained limited, the summit reinforced the SCO’s role as a platform for diplomacy, regional stability and strategic realignments beyond the traditional Western-led order.

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This dichotomy is not just a policy-level contradiction; it is India’s lived energy reality. The world’s most populous country faces the herculean task of reconciling its development ambitions with its 2070 pledge, all while addressing the energy needs of people.

Solar surges, but coal persists

India’s renewable push is undeniable. With over 119.02 gigawatts of installed in mid-2025, the country ranks among the top five globally. The government’s target of of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030 has driven the of Ultra Mega in Rajasthan, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh, transforming barren lands into grids of gleaming photovoltaic panels.

These investments are not just about climate goals. They also make economic sense. India’s solar power tariffs fell to a record low of ₹2 ($0.02) in 2020 and stood at around ₹2.56–₹2.57 ($0.03) in late 2024, as approved by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission—keeping renewables an attractive alternative for distribution companies facing higher coal costs.

Yet coal continues to power of India’s electricity generation. In June 2025, the Power Ministry greenlit the reopening of 32 abandoned , citing soaring demand amid a . Electricity consumption hit as air conditioning use spiked across urban centers.

The decision underscores a core challenge: while solar shines at midday, coal provides the steady, dispatchable power required around the clock. With large-scale battery storage still in its infancy and hydro capacity limited, coal remains the country’s energy backbone for now.

Just Transition or just talk?

COP30 places at the heart of its agenda. For India, this raises hard questions. What does a just transition look like in the coal districts of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha, where entire communities rely on mining for jobs, livelihoods and local economies?

In towns like , the net-zero narrative feels distant. Generations have worked in coalfields. Informal workers, many of them women and , depend on coal scavenging and truck loading for subsistence. If the mines closed, where will they go? Despite central government assurances, local voices worry that economic alternatives remain vague or absent.

Programs like the fund, proposed in India’s draft National Electricity Plan, are promising on paper but lack clear pathways for re-skilling or regional development. Unlike Germany, which has invested billions to coal while protecting workers, India’s fiscal room has limits. Without concrete investment in healthcare, education and alternative employment in coal districts, the transition may be more abrupt than just.

Solar corridors and shifting rural economies

Conversely, in the sunny plains of Rajasthan and Gujarat, the rise of solar power is reshaping local economies, though not always smoothly.

In , once a dusty village, the world’s largest solar park sprawls across 14,000 acres. Thousands of temporary construction jobs emerged during the installation phases. Some farmers now to solar developers, generating passive income. However, others express concern over land alienation, water stress and the uneven distribution of benefits. Critics warn that top-down land acquisition for energy projects often marginalizes those without legal titles, exacerbating inequality.

The central government’s Pradhan Mantri Kisan Urja Suraksha evam Utthaan Mahabhiyaan (PM-KUSUM) , which subsidizes solar-powered pumps for farmers, offers a more inclusive model. By enabling decentralized solar production and usage, it allows smallholders to cut input costs and sell surplus power to the grid. Still, its uptake has been uneven across states, often stalling due to bureaucratic delays and lack of awareness.

Between global south leadership and domestic trade-offs

India seeks to position itself as a climate leader of the Global South, amplifying voices from low and middle-income countries demanding climate justice, technology transfer and fair finance. At the Group of 20 () forum (an intergovernmental forum comprising 19 sovereign countries, the EU and the African Union [AU]) and other forums, New Delhi has “common but differentiated responsibilities” and called out the unmet $100 billion climate finance pledge from developed nations.

At COP30, India will likely repeat its call for equity: rich nations must not only cut their emissions but also support others in transitioning away from fossil fuels. It will advocate for climate finance mechanisms that are accessible, predictable and responsive to national contexts.

Yet India’s domestic trade-offs may raise eyebrows. How does one credibly push for global equity while reviving coal? The answer may lie in India’s developmental compulsions. While per capita emissions remain far below Western levels, India faces intense pressure to deliver jobs, industrial growth and energy access.

Over Indians still lack regular electricity access — millions more face load shedding. Until renewables become fully reliable and scalable, the state’s social contract may demand that coal continue, at least in the short term.

Straddling the transition: pragmatism or drift?

India’s energy trajectory does not fit neatly into binaries. It is not a simple story of green vs. black, progress vs. pollution. Rather, it is a balancing act shaped by geography, demography and development needs.

Some analysts call this pragmatism — an incremental approach that prevents energy shocks. Others see it as inertia — a reluctance to make tough decisions, such as setting a clear coal phase-out date or investing adequately in energy storage.

What’s clear is that India’s actions are being watched closely. As the world barrels toward the , every country’s pathway matters. India’s scale means that its transition choices will shape global climate outcomes. But its challenges are structural and social; it demands empathy and nuanced understanding.

COP30 and the road ahead

As COP30 unfolds in the Amazon, the symbolism is powerful. A summit held in the heart of the planet’s largest rainforest asks the world to act on the urgency of climate change. For India, this means owning its dual identity: a clean energy frontrunner and a coal-dependent economy in transition.

The success of India’s net-zero mission will depend not only on solar installations and EV rollouts but also on how it treats its most vulnerable — mine workers, marginal farmers and those left behind by energy transitions.

If India can bridge its energy divide while pushing for global climate justice, it may yet emerge not just as a negotiator but as a model. Not because its transition is perfect, but because it is honest, human and ongoing.

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Breaking from negotiations, Trump’s tariff salvo was an attempt to address simmering tensions in the Indo-US relationship by leaning on Pakistan through an oil deal and tariff concessions. Was this sudden shift a product of Trump’s ambitious economic agenda, or a mask for strategic signaling and transactional politics in this trade affair?

The latter seems likely, given America’s history of using deliberately exhaustive trade talks as a strategic tool to exert pressure on other nations, extract concessions or advance broader strategic objectives.

The deal

India was negotiating a Bilateral Trade Agreement () with the US, which began in February. By April, an had been drawn, reflecting US priorities of reducing India’s trade barriers and addressing its $45.7 billion goods trade deficit. From February to July, negotiations grew tense as India refused to liberalize or open up its agricultural and dairy sectors to US markets. India also pressed for , including lower US duties on steel (50%) and aluminum (25%), and preferential access for labor-intensive exports such as textiles, gems, jewelry and IT services. In return, India signaled willingness to provide the US greater market access.

However, apart from these two sticking points, India also US demands for reduced tariffs on auto components and acceptance of US Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, prioritizing its domestic industry and the campaign. Similarly, regarding non-tariff barriers, the US India’s Quality Control Orders (QCOs) and import regulations, which it viewed as barriers to market access for US goods. However, India defended them on the grounds of consumer and domestic industry safety.�� 

Trump’s negotiation style

The negotiations thus offered potential gains for both sides, but the costs and contentions were high. It made them intense and rigorous, conditions ill-suited to Trump’s negotiating style. The US’s negotiating approach under Trump, specific to trade and tariff issues, has been unconventional and rushed. 

A recent deal with Vietnam was concluded hastily under pressure. The US exploited Vietnam’s trade surplus and export dependence, using tariff threats and prolonged talks to secure concessions. Despite months of negotiation and goodwill gestures, such as liquified natural gas (LNG) deals, Vietnam ended up facing a and transshipment penalties — far less favorable than its proposed 0% reciprocal tariff.��

Similar tactics were seen with countries like Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and many more. These examples illustrate Washington’s tactics of achieving win-win trade deals, even with allies and partners, demonstrating how transactional diplomacy now colors their trade relations. 

However, a closer look suggests that economic or trade calculations do not solely drive these deals. The US is using these trade deals as geopolitical tools — deliberately exhaustive negotiations to push countries toward aligning with its strategic objectives.

Economic attrition diplomacy

Economic attrition diplomacy involves leveraging prolonged trade negotiations to pressure a counterpart into aligning with geopolitical goals, often by creating economic uncertainty or exploiting asymmetric dependencies.

Vietnam’s case illustrates this. The US Hanoi to cut reliance on Chinese industrial goods and curb transshipments, directly serving its anti-China agenda. The negotiations were lengthy, with multiple rounds reflecting prolonged and exhaustive talks to force Vietnam to concur with the deal, leaving it little room to maneuver.

The cases of Indonesia and Japan are also noteworthy. The US pressured Indonesia to align its anti-China goals, primarily due to Indonesia’s attempt to diversify trade with members, and a investment deal with China made in November 2024.��

In the case of Japan, Trump their bilateral relations by escalating dramatically: threatening 25% tariffs, then actually imposing them on Japanese goods, including automobiles, effective August 1. This was an unprecedented move against a US ally. Japan, burdened by its trade surplus and alliance status, yielded partial concessions under tariff threats and geopolitical pressure.��

South Korea, too, faced a tariff of 25% in July, and ended up with a 15% “reciprocal” tariff, effective August 1. The US sought geopolitical advantages from Korea, pressuring it to increase dependency on US purchases, specifically F-35 fighter jets. Although no deal was finalized, South Korea greater market access for US goods, as well as defense commitments to avoid higher tariffs.��

These tactics reveal that US trade negotiations often serve a larger purpose: pushing countries to align with its under the guise of economic bargaining. These echo Washington’s action from five years ago, when it used diplomacy against China. The US attempted to curb China’s technological rise by targeting firms like Huawei, pressured China on issues like intellectual property theft and signaled strength to its own allies.��

During trade negotiations, the US repeatedly escalated tariffs and introduced complex demands, including structural changes to China’s economy, prolonging the uncertainty and pressuring China. Subsequently, China yielded partial concessions, providing the US with some limited success.

Aggressive attrition driven by frustration

Unlike other countries that faced standard coercion from the US with only tariff threats, India was hit with multiple salvos — tariffs, penalties and an embrace of Pakistan. The reasons were clear: the Russia factor, trade with Iran and India’s non-compromising posture during trade negotiations.

This aggressive attrition behavior is motivated by geopolitical frustration, something the US is familiar with acting on. In the 1930s and 1940s, US economic attrition against Japan, driven by frustration, culminated in the of 1941, contributing to the escalation of World War II. Negotiations were prolonged. The US demanded Japan withdraw from China and Indo-China, while Japan sought recognition of its territorial gains, creating a deadlock with no progress.��

A similar situation is unfolding between the US and India today, where the former harbours geopolitical suspicion over India’s relationships with Iran and Russia, alongside deadlocked trade demands. These factors have likely fueled frustration and driven the US to send a strong strategic message by escalating risks and attrition, perhaps setting an example on the global stage.

Unconventional transactionalism: India must reassess its strategy

India must read the negotiating table more carefully and patiently, adopting measured and mixed negotiating styles instead of a confrontational approach, which at times frustrates the US. 

As India looks toward the prospect of a mini-deal by September-October, it should aim for strategic prolongation — progress with limited concessions — rather than dragging talks with no real progress. This will create more room for negotiations and reduce US frustration to some extent. 

India must also leverage its geopolitical value and diversify its trade relationships with Europe and other countries. This will strengthen India’s bargaining position, soften US demands and deter extreme measures. 

A similar approach saved South Korea from higher tariffs despite having no deal with the US, as South Korea adopted strategic prolongation, used measured negotiation tactics offering room via concessions and resisted hasty or pressured deals. 

India must remember that Trump is a master at playing unconventional transactional cards, where deals are more important than relations. India should demonstrate that an agreement is in progress and that there is something on the table, rather than leaving it empty.

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Following this, the Monitoring Team of the UN Security Council (UNSC) Sanctions Committee explicitly TRF in its reports for the first time — a move that India has been advocating for since the 2019 Pulwama Attacks. A member state in regards to the 2025 Pahalgam terror attack that it “Could not have happened without Lashkar-e-Taiba support, and there’s a relationship between LeT and TRF.” A second member state noted that “the attack was carried out by TRF, which was synonymous with LeT.”

While these are major diplomatic wins for India and help corner Pakistan when it comes to denying its terror-sponsoring activities, it will essentially be business as usual for the latter. 

For India, a real win lies in on-ground efforts. As the pattern indicates, a terror designation does little to deter Pakistan-funded terror in Jammu and Kashmir (a northern state in India that shares a contested border with Pakistan). But intelligence-based counterterror operations have proven successful in eliminating groups like the Indian Mujahideen (IM) in the past.

Terror designations offer little immediate security 

US designations of Pakistan-backed terrorist outfits have long been viewed as a diplomatic tool India can leverage in international forums, particularly in influencing outcomes such as listings on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is a global money laundering and terror financing watchdog. 

However, as takes center stage in the global order, these diplomatic maneuvers now hold little deterrent value. The case of the IM — a group formed through the reorganization of the declining Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) cadre — illustrates this trend.

The group was a nightmare for the Indian security landscape as IM’s operational behaviour was of maximum terror with minimum identification. The IM’s designation as an FTO by the US came in September 2011, two months after the July 13 Mumbai serial . Yet this did little to deter IM from striking Indian cities: three cases of limited intensity bombing were conducted by IM in eight months in 2013, from the Hyderabad to the Patna , resulting in and around 190 injuries.

The LeT was designated as an FTO in December 2001, but carried out the Akshardham Temple within nine months, followed by the 2003 Mumbai — demonstrating continued operational capacity.��

The US itself has faced serious threats and attacks after terror designations. Take the case of Al-Qaeda, which was designated an FTO by the US in October 1999, but less than two years later carried out one of the deadliest terror attacks of the decade: the September 11 (9/11). It was followed by continued strikes, including the USS Cole in 2000 and the Riyadh compound in 2003. Similarly, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the precursor to the Islamic State (ISIS), executed a series of hotel targeting Westerners in 2005, shortly after its own FTO designation in 2004.

In the long term, it can be seen that IM faced a strong impact from sanctions. However, despite being a weaker group, they still managed to survive (though in degraded strength) till 2017. With this in mind, it is easy to see how the impact of FTO designations on stronger and well-resourced terror groups like the LeT or Jaish-e-Mohammed remains limited.

Designations disrupt but don’t dismantle

These examples point to a fundamental limitation: the FTO mechanism aims primarily at disruption, not dismantlement. It is most effective against groups with limited resilience and financial dependency on formal networks, and can thus collapse due to disruption. Robust terror organizations tend to endure due to three key structural advantages:

1. Safe Havens and Porous Borders: Territories with weak governance, such as parts of Africa or , provide physical bases for training, recruitment, and planning. Designation efforts have little effect without the of local and national host governments. After 9/11, Al-Qaeda shifted its base to Pakistan’s tribal areas to remain off the radar of US military operations. LeT similarly went underground with the of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) after the November 26, 2008, (26/11) in India.
2. Decentralized Operations: Decentralized and tight, cell-based networks help terror groups build multiple offshoots and use them as front organizations. This allows these groups to operate even if their leadership gets targeted by arrests or FTO sanctions. The LeT used IM and TRF, while Al-Qaeda used its regional branches such as AQI and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to bypass sanctions.��
3. Alternative Funding Sources: Some non-traditional funding sources are immune to the US’s banking sanctions, allowing terror organizations to procure arms and explosives and send them to safe havens for training through various cross-border networks. The , charitable fronts, and non-traditional funding from sympathetic donors allow groups to circumvent asset freezes and FTO-sanctioned disruptions. After their designations, Al-Qaeda used hawala networks and Gulf-based donors to finance 9/11, while LeT sustained itself through the “charitable activities” of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), a front with ISI backing, leading to 26/11.

The benefits of network-centric counterterror strategies 

Where designations fell short, coordinated multi-dimensional and intelligence-led strategies focused on dismantlement have yielded better results. This involves a : combining targeted strikes with intelligence-led efforts to degrade networks.

Targeted strikes help in eliminating leadership, and strong intelligence works to identify financial pathways, front organizations, and decentralized cells. This has driven major successes in India’s counterterror landscape, starting with the collapse of the IM. 

Beginning in 2012, Indian intelligence worked in close with the US and other countries like Nepal, highlighting a multi-specter counter strategy. They conducted sustained operations that dismantled IM’s operational and financial networks.��

in the Gulf were identified and sanctioned under the FTO, leading to a collapse of its funding streams. Some serious intelligence work led to the of key operatives, including IM’s leader Yasin Bhatkal, as well as Abdul Wahid Siddibapa, who was associated with their financial funding. With the of other key operatives in 2014, IM’s Azamgarh and Pune modules were also brought down. By 2017, the Indian Mujahideen had been effectively dismantled.

TRF and IM: Learning the right lessons

The key operational similarity between LeT’s IM and LeT’s TRF is the use of maximum terror with minimal identification, with a slight difference in operational advancement and method of engagement, which is direct but sophisticated in �ո��’s case. The IM overtly and aggressively executes attacks through bombings, but TRF relies more on covert work and sets a limited target with high symbolic value and psychological impact. 

The approach is also quite the same — they young muslims by exploiting local grievances, communal coloring and political approaches. TRF has intensified this through via limited tech capabilities, focusing on Kashmiri youth.��

Despite being a smaller organization, TRF’s efforts to develop and modernize its operational behavior make it harder to influence through designations and sanctions. Moreover, an additional difficulty with TRF lies in developing a strong and grounded counterterror strategy — not at the operational level, but at the tactical level. Several key factors explain the limited progress so far:

First, network-centric operations have not been able to penetrate �ո��’s tight, decentralized cells, likely due to in human intelligence and limited visibility into ground-level dynamics in Jammu and Kashmir.

Second, the group’s operational pattern relies heavily on and recently radicalized individuals who are not on law enforcement watchlists. This makes early detection and preemption difficult.

Third, TRF has demonstrated quick tactical adaptability. The satellite data, secure encrypted communication, coordinated hit-and-run strikes to exhaust and distract government forces, as well as the use of body-cameras and high-end weaponry, show that the outfit focuses not only on sustenance but on advancement — and is actively evolving its methods.

These challenges, while significant, are not insurmountable. Addressing them requires a shift toward more advanced network-centric operations — anchored in the integration of intelligence across domains. This means building intelligence fusion models that combine human intelligence (HUMINT) and open-source intelligence (OSINT) with technical assets such as drone surveillance, cyber forensics, and satellite imaging. Such capabilities must be embedded within a broader multi-spectrum counterterrorism strategy: one that combines targeted operations, search-and-destroy missions, and financial disruption. 

�ո��’s — particularly its financing through hawala networks and front organizations — can still be targeted in the same manner as the IM was in the early 2010s, ideally in coordination with international partners such as the US.

The dismantling of TRF will depend not on designations or sanctions, but on sustained operational and intelligence recalibration. That will require clear strategic direction — and political will — from the highest echelon in New Delhi and Jammu and Kashmir.

Perhaps the recent , which resulted in the elimination of the Pahalgam terror mastermind, is one indication of a gradual movement towards a multi-specter counterterror strategy.

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The Indian Government, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in , underlined the necessity of foreign social media enterprises adhering to national laws if they intended to operate within the country. It emphasized that requiring them to comply with such laws on combating destructive online content should not be equated with “unfortunate and condemnable” words such as “censorship”. The case has been filed in the Karnataka High Court, a provincial judicial authority in Southern India, and is awaiting a court ruling.��

Social platforms operate in murky waters

This development has again brought to light the contestations regarding what qualifies as censorship: whether it is appropriate at all, and who sets the criteria for determining online content as harmful and thus censorship-worthy? At the same time, including, of course, the general discourse surrounding national sovereignty and the fundamental right to free speech. 

While it’s clear the Indian government is seeking to regulate and streamline online content, it doesn’t automatically follow that every state-led move to manage public information is unethical or repressive. Nor should every tech company’s claim of standing up to a rudimentary idea of democratic freedom of speech be taken at face value. 

State-led regulations imposed on social media giants should not predispose them to rational sympathy simply because they seem to initiate transparent information-sharing and a more-informed public discourse or speak the “truth” of state power and hold it accountable.

These platforms’ real-world operations often enjoy unearned moral high ground, positioned as champions of transparency and accountability. But no matter how hard such corporations bend over backwards to present free-speech absolutism as their sole guiding principle, in reality, their own operations are steeped in political motivations and interests, geopolitical alliances, ideological leanings and overall lack of internal checks or self-reflexivity. 

Take Musk’s own jaunts and wrangles with Grok, an Artificial Intelligence chatbot he designed to, as he claims, “maximize truth and objectivity” on X. However, when Grok’s seemingly factual imperative pointed out the in his own statements and the right-leaning ideological rhetoric he sympathized with, he claimed it had been “parroting legacy media” and is “working on it”. Earlier in July, he then on X that “We have improved @Grok significantly.” The new Grok has since made anti-semitic statements and �ᾱ�ٱ����.��

The Indian government’s regulation isn’t just a reactive policy

The dialectics over content regulation hinges on two opposing claims. The first is whether the state is making a legally and ethically legitimate decision by blocking and controlling content that its democratic institutions constitutionally deem harmful. The second is that these (officially) politically neutral social media companies have the right to resist such oversight when their internal mechanisms to moderate and combat harmful online content already exist and are operational.

Scrutinizing both positions reveals that the reality is far murkier than these tech platforms belie. And in that murk, the Indian government’s regulations begin to look less like repression, and more like a necessary reckoning — one that goes beyond the rhetoric and recognizes the actual political and economic inclinations behind their operations.

The government seeks to establish the necessity of such a regulation because tech giants have operated for years with little to no real scrutiny. There has been almost no accountability for whether their internal systems actually succeed in curbing harmful content, or whether they even try to guard against their own ideological leanings’ ability to skew moderation decisions. 

These platforms, be it X or , have blocked users with viewpoints ideologically opposed to theirs or their management’s, throttled reach, flagged users as politically affiliated in the absence of official declaration from the users themselves and in some cases, erased profiles entirely — all while claiming neutrality.��

The 2018 Cambridge Analytica has already shown how IT companies work with social platforms — in this case, Meta (formerly Facebook) — to improperly harvest data from millions of users without consent, and then use it to target voters with political ads during elections. Meta faced global backlash and investigations for failing to prevent the misuse of its platform, and the exact concerns we face here: data privacy, electoral manipulation and platform accountability.

In the case of X, particularly, evidence demonstrates the brazen and unilateral abuse of power, as the of progressive, American Democrat politicians and representatives were imposed with a limited reach, whereas accounts of far-right American politicians were heavily circulated and amplified. Similar cases were observed in India, where Grok has, on repeated occasions, published opinionated content in favor of Congress, an Indian political party currently in the opposition, showing little regard for non-partisan objectivity.��

And this raises a pertinent question: if the European Union can regulate these social platforms and take actions to curb on platforms like Meta, why can’t India? 

What makes matters much worse, apart from the blatant ideological bias and political engineering, is the unabated mushrooming of user accounts that confidently indulge in hate towards people of colour, having implicit backing from the enterprise’s top brass; those who employ racist staff “normalizing Indian hate” on X in the American federal Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), without any repercussion.��

It is necessary to note that of X’s revenue comes from advertising, and the remaining from the sale of data licenses. This implies that X is heavily reliant on conservative Western political representatives using X as a platform for election campaigning and propaganda. This results in the intensification of discriminatory content against people of colour and minority religions.

Quite understandably, this inclination flows into the moderation of content posted in India by Indian users, and content that exposits ideas contrarian to the strict doctrine of Western conservatism is, in a way, expunged or restricted. There is, however, a rational concern as to whether the Indian government’s regulation of social media intermediaries would result in content critical of the government being removed. 

The scales tilt heavily towards government regulation

At the heart of this concern is the simple question: who legitimately and ethically determines which content is censorship-worthy — and why? When the choice lies between a foreign tech giant and the democratically elected government of the country where it operates, the tilt should be obvious.

An institution vested with the responsibility of safeguarding the country’s sovereignty, and which, however flawed, can be held accountable through courts, elections and and provisions. A private company headquartered abroad, answerable to shareholders and driven by profit, will not be.��

That’s why India’s IT Act matters — it creates a channel to institute some level of accountability in the operations of tech companies within India’s territorial boundaries.

Even when governments or parties misuse their power — say, by silencing criticism — the solution isn’t to hand the reins to Silicon Valley. Its panacea is to strengthen domestic democratic institutions: constitutionally-bound independent entities like the , special non-partisan investigative and grievance redressal commissions such as the and legal provisions such as the Indian ������.��

There are constitutional pathways to address state overreach. But when tech platforms take incidents and spin them into ideological narratives, it doesn’t promote justice. It risks spurring social unrest and antagonism. 

The priority of the elected legislature should be to democratically empower domestic institutions to create a more informed Indian electorate — instead of allowing Western tech corporations to shape public discourse, misrepresent real-time developments and impose their often carefully fabricated, biased and geopolitically motivated viewpoints that masquerade as objective information onto the Indian public.

As foreign media companies deepen their footprint in India, it is high time for the Indian government to draw clear legal boundaries. The unchecked influence of these occasionally deleterious, unchecked platforms cannot be allowed to compromise the country’s legal preeminence or democratic institutions. 

Foreign tech firms operating here must be held to the same constitutional standards as any domestic entity. And most importantly, adherence to the constitutionally mandated laws of the land by foreign companies should continue to be rightfully emphasized — it forms a cornerstone of the nation’s right to self-determination and sovereignty.  

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Missed opportunities on the global stage

Modi has failed to establish meaningful and assertive interactions with external powers such as the US, UK, France, Canada, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Turkey. He also struggles to address issues with troublesome neighbors like Pakistan and China, who have deliberately intruded into India’s territory. Although he traveled around the globe to promote India’s foreign policy and diplomacy, he to convince foreign powers, including America, that India has been a victim of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism for decades and not the other way around.��

Perhaps due to this, Pakistan — despite being an epicentre of Global Terrorism, including cross-border terror against India for the past many decades — has been adorned as Vice Chair of the Anti-terrorism Committee by the UN Security Council (UNSC), which is an unparalleled paradox.

Additionally, he has not secured a for India in the UN Security Council or membership in other prominent forums like (a trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK and the US), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (), the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty () and (an intergovernmental political forum consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US).��

The recent security crisis and the India–Pakistan war have exposed flaws in India’s national security and foreign policy. The terror attack in on April 22, 2025, killed 26 innocent tourists in Baisaran valley of India-administered Jammu and Kashmir, revealing serious lapses in security management and civilian safety. In retaliation, India launched on May 7, 2025, which demonstrated the capabilities of its forces across all three wings. However, the announced on May 10 showed that Modi succumbed to US President Donald Trump’s pressure. The ceasefire benefited Pakistan because India had gained the upper hand in the ongoing India-Pakistan conflict. This event significantly India’s diplomatic landscape.��

In 2014, Modi his tenure with enthusiasm to transform India into a haven for foreign investments by streamlining rules and regulations to make investment easier. However, bureaucratic disputes and a rising middleman culture discouraged his well-planned efforts. An excessive concentration of power within the Prime Minister’s office and among a small group of Indian Administrative Service () officers led to the formation of a confidant coterie. His reliance on this small circle marginalized democratic governance, frustrating senior ministers, party leaders and top officers.�� 

Governance crisis and administrative decay

The Bharatiya Janata Party () government at the center, along with its own party governments in many states, has failed to control rising prices, poverty, unemployment, law and order, ever-mounting , undue interference by party workers and officials in daily administration and declining morals and increasing promiscuity among party cadres. This indicates a weakening of the top leaders’ control over party members and office bearers.��

The high-profile of a sitting BJP Member of Parliament (MP), Brij Bhushan Sharan Singh, accused of molestation and sexual offenses under the POCSO Act by women wrestlers Vinesh Phogat, Sakshi Singh and other minor girls, has garnered attention. Unfortunately, the First Information Reports (FIRs) lodged against this MP have been . Similar cases against BJP leader (who has now obtained bail) and , “Bum-Bum,” a BJP district president, are particularly concerning.��

Crimes committed by party workers have severely tarnished the party’s reputation, which claims to establish a new culture in the country. Modi has also for the BJP through Electoral Bonds and granted extraordinary favors to billionaires such as Gautam Adani, Mukesh Ambani and others.��

The central government has waived large loans for wealthy businessman, Gautam Adani, while thousands of have gone bankrupt and suffered due to natural calamities. India’s wealthiest industrialist, Mukesh Ambani, enjoys Z+ security by the Indian state along with other VIPs and politicians. Taxes paid by ordinary citizens fund the cost of this security. Ironically, while elites enjoy top security, common citizens often fall victim to crime due to a shortage of police personnel and ineffective law enforcement.

Furthermore, the BJP is the powers of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Election Commission, Enforcement Directorate and Income Tax Department to intimidate politicians with non-BJP affiliations who are facing various criminal charges. This can be seen in like Ajit Pawar, Chhagan Bhujbal, Ashok Chauhan, Hemanta Biswas Sharma, Subhendu Adhikari, Prafulla Patel and many others. These politicians are pressured to join the BJP and support its interests, leveraging these agencies. An ironic aspect is that once these tarnished politicians join the BJP, the cases against them are often withdrawn.

Another serious concern is the declining health of Indian democracy. In a parliamentary system, opposition parties and their leaders play a crucial role. However, the of opposition members from the House to prevent meaningful debates and discussions on national issues, merely to serve the ruling party’s interests, represents a negation or violation of democracy.

Another troubling development that has caused an internal crisis is the ethnic riots in that started last year. Yet, the Prime Minister has not visited the region to ease the suffering of the affected community or to restore the declining confidence in the police and security forces.��

The Indian Army’s (a recruitment model that allows youth to serve in the armed forces for four years) has sparked controversy. Politicians, who do not retire from active politics even in their seventies, face ridicule as young men in their twenties prepare to leave the army after just four years of service. People express about the scheme’s long-term implications, especially given the rising cross-border terrorism from Pakistan and China’s consistent intrusions into Indian territory. Former Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat reportedly the scheme’s merits, and his mysterious death in a helicopter crash highlights his cautious judgment today.

The overemphasis on the Hindu-Muslim also threatens national unity and social cohesion. The use of slogans like “Jai Shri Ram” (“Hail Lord Rama”) to advance the BJP’s political goals has caused alienation among Muslims and other minorities, actions that conflict with the ideals of Lord Ram and India’s diverse culture. The government must stop communal segregation and actively include Muslim and other minority communities in India’s growth and progress.

India’s economy remains , despite grand claims to become the world’s fourth-largest economy and its ambition to reach third place. In 2025, the national debt has sharply increased to approximately $248 billion due to ill-planned spending, misappropriation of funds and large-scale embezzlement. These issues have fostered a parallel black economy that threatens the country’s economic stability.

media agencies are another worrisome aspect of Mr. Modi’s politics. They undermine the principle of democracy by violating the idea that the media serves as the fourth pillar of democracy. News channels based in Noida are mostly labeled as “”, and many consider them biased and sold. The print media in the country does not dare to challenge or hold the government accountable, drawing parallels to the of 1975.��  

A call for renewal and accountability

The popularity and support for the BJP have declined, with only minor exceptions in some states. As its foremost leader, Modi cannot escape the responsibility that comes with his prominent role in the party and the country. His advancing age, declining mental focus, the rise of vested interests and the absence of a strong opposition have created obstacles in governance. Additionally, giving undue favors to elites and corrupt elements within the BJP has prevented the leadership from ensuring independent, fair and effective decision-making. These issues have shattered the hopes, aspirations and expectations of the people not only within India but also across the international community. The grand vision of making India the (“world guru” or “teacher of the world”) of ancient times again has proven ineffective, as seen after Operation Sindoor, when none of its allies supported it.

As Modi approaches the end of his likely last term, he must carefully assess his personal shortcomings and reemphasize the BJP’s original promises to build a new culture of honest, fair, corruption-free, responsive and responsible democratic governance — completely different from the previous Congress governments in India. 

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Formation of the CDS Position

India began addressing the weaknesses in its defense management following the Kargil War of 1999, when Pakistani soldiers infiltrated Indian positions in Kashmir. The , formed that same year, exposed serious flaws in military coordination. In response, the in 2001 and the in 2012 recommended major reforms, including the establishment of a centralized defense leadership.�� 

Despite repeated calls from military leaders and defense analysts, political leaders hesitated to act. Only in did the Cabinet approve the position of Chief of Defense Staff and create the Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (PC-CISC). This position aimed to improve cooperation among the services and streamline procurement, staffing, and training through the newly established Department of Military Affairs () under the Ministry of Defense.��

General became India’s first CDS. He took on two critical roles: head of the DMA and Permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). The government tasked him with promoting inter-service coordination and overseeing integrated planning across all military branches.

The latest rule

Until now, the CDS has mainly held an advisory role. While the CDS to coordinate procurement and training at the Defense Ministry, operational authority remained divided. Each service handled its own operations, and committees had to reach a consensus before executing joint action. This fractured approach caused delays and undermined the efficiency of joint operations.

The new order gives the CDS the power to issue joint directives without relying on separate approvals from the service chiefs. For example, the CDS can now direct operations across all three branches during joint exercises or national emergencies. This change mirrors the command model at India’s Andaman and Nicobar Command (), the country’s only existing tri-service operational command.

The current Chief of Defense Staff, General Anil Chauhan, that India must separate operational functions from the administrative Raise, Train, Sustain (RTS) functions (recruitment, training and logistics). He argues that Integrated Theatre Commands () offer a clearer structure, allowing commanders to focus on actual threats rather than routine management. At the same time, this reform preserves the administrative authority of each service chief within their own branch.

The next leap

By granting the CDS operational authority, the Indian government has taken a major step toward establishing Integrated Theatre Commands — a reform that military strategists have demanded for decades. Political hesitation stalled this idea for years, but the ruling government revived it in its 2024 election manifesto.

In 2024, General Chauhan delivered the 22nd Major General Samir Sinha Memorial Lecture at the United Service Institution (USI) of India. He for a deeper commitment to inter-service cooperation and described developing a joint culture in the armed forces as “Jointness 2.0,” which he considers the way forward. Chauhan urged the three services to foster a joint culture as they move toward establishing joint operational structures.

The CDS stated, “Jointness 1.0 was about fostering better camaraderie and consensus among the services. Since there were no major differences, we now have an opportunity to advance to the next level — Jointness 2.0.”

Why Integrated Theatre Command (ITC) is the need of the hour 

The concept of Theater Command, or theaterization, by geographic regions to improve coordination. , such as Carl von Clausewitz of Prussia, have advocated for unified military command in their writings. The Indian military has long recognized its value, particularly as the country faces mounting external and internal security threats.

It has been part of the current government’s manifesto to implement it. Previously, asset shortages and political shortsightedness had only cast a shadow over it. Additionally, it has been a long-standing demand of scholar warriors and veterans. 

India’s current strategic environment includes the possibility of a “2.5-front war” — facing simultaneous threats from China and Pakistan, along with internal security challenges such as insurgency, terrorism and hybrid warfare. Although traditionally seen as a friendly neighbor, Bangladesh’s recent behavior — particularly during — revealed growing strategic discomfort. Dhaka’s vocal for Pakistan under the banner of Islamic solidarity and criticism of Indian military actions requires a firm and clear response.

Our version of ITC 

Other countries have already adopted similar structures. The United States adopted Integrated Theatre Command (ITC) structures due to global strategic needs. They maintain an independent military posture, which gives them an advantage against any direct threats to their mainland. After the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, they Unified Combatant Commands across multiple global theaters, such as CENTCOM in 1983. These reforms gave the US military clear authority and a robust command structure across multiple regions.��

China also adopted a similar approach in 2016 by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into five Integrated Theatre Commands. This restructuring aligns with China’s 2049 goal of becoming a global military power. It supports China’s expanding maritime interests, overseas presence and efforts to secure Sea Lines of Communication (). The Chinese reforms rely on centralized decision-making and rapid technological modernization.

Since India’s focuses on inclusive growth — unlike China’s rapid expansion — it should pursue structural reforms, such as Integrated Theatre Commands, cautiously, ensuring they do not undermine existing operational effectiveness. Given its unique geography, threat environment and limited resources, it should make only essential, context-specific changes to enhance jointness.

ITC implementation must be pragmatic, considering India’s terrain and strategic realities. The goal is to manage the integration between jointness and actual integration. The biggest challenge to achieving jointness is changing attitudes by transforming insecurity and doubt into a sense of belonging among the services and within politico-bureaucratic engagements.

Decision myopia to execution

Decision-making for any hierarchy, such as a theatre command structure, involves the following levels:

1. Policy

2. Strategy

3. Tactics

4. Operations

The success of the Integrated Theatre Command depends on how well the forces execute and adapt to it, as it combines military capacity — assets and manpower — with operational capability, including strategic execution and integration. 

This foundation effective military diplomacy, enables quicker decision-making and builds greater credibility in regional and global security engagements. The entire range of military reforms, leading to tri-service regiments or theatre commands, involves three major phases: jointness, integration and theaterization. The first two phases may overlap, but the theaterization phase — establishing theater commands in specific regions — should ideally be implemented after completing the first two phases.

The future architecture of the commands must clearly define who holds responsibility at each level. For example, CDS can primarily focus on policy and strategy. To simplify matters, theater commands should be based on geography, providing clarity to theater commanders. Implement the change in a top-down approach to ensure it takes root and becomes effective.

From day one, India can place common forces and functions under a central theater command. This will be a phased change that does not occur overnight. As it is implemented, further adjustments can be made as needed based on emerging issues and new insights. It is a mistake to believe that once jointness is achieved, no additional changes will be necessary. This is never true for any country. It is an ongoing process that requires continuous establishment, not a perfect structure.

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Part of the slowdown stems from a correction following the post-COVID economic bounce. After the pandemic, pent-up demand surged, and monetary and fiscal stimulus fueled growth. Low interest rates lowered debt payments, and many state governments cut stamp duties. Equity and housing prices rose, making the wealthy feel very rich and boosting their consumption. Now, this demand has declined.

Reasons for the slowdown in growth

The post-COVID bounce rested on a narrow base. Both the informal and rural economies suffered. They were not as financially developed, and the wealth effect from monetary stimulus was weak. Furthermore, the rich did not spend what the poor in these sectors earned. This led to a K-shaped recovery, where different parts of the economy perform divergently, like the arms of the letter “K.” 

Second, the savings glut among the wealthy is insufficient to drive the economy. Indian policymakers need to raise incomes for more people. The poor tend to, and want to, spend more. If they do not see higher incomes, the financial sector transfers money from the rich to the poor through unsecured consumer credit. This mirrors the growth of in the US, which reached $1.17 trillion at the end of the third quarter in 2024, with an average interest rate of 23.37%.��

The RBI has attempted to slow unsecured credit growth, but this alone cannot solve the core issue: how the government addresses the lack of real wage growth among the masses. 

Over the last five years, agricultural job creation in India has been more than 50%, which is concerning because agriculture accounts for just over 15% of the country’s GDP and is a low-productivity sector. The states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Bengal, in India’s hinterland, do not generate enough high-quality jobs. To improve this, the government must boost private investment by opening up the economy, creating demand for more productive labor and generating new jobs. 

On the supply side, policymakers need to invest in education, health and vocational training so Indian workers can meet the increased demand from higher investment. India must shift away from low-quality, low-income jobs in agriculture that produce little demand, toward better opportunities that foster higher income and growth.

What should the Indian government do?

In policy terms, India needs to do two things. First, it must introduce another round of liberalization, which involves reducing protectionist barriers and lowering tariffs. Policy certainty for the next three to five years is crucial because businesses require predictability and confidence. India needs foreign businesses to establish operations in the country, as this facilitates technology transfers. These transfers, in turn, boost efficiency, increase productivity and enhance the economy’s competitiveness.

Today’s situation has improved since 1991, when the public sector was more dominant. Although the public sector remains inefficient, the industry’s concentration in a few hands is a concerning trend. While we are no longer in a pre-1991 world, reducing industry concentration remains a crucial priority.

Second, India should pursue growth that matches its high potential. Given the economy’s current low base, India should aim for higher growth rates.

What about the falling rupee and FIIs leaving the Indian market

The volatility of the rupee has been too low. While the RBI needs to maintain inflation credibility, it must also avoid excessive market interventions. Now, the RBI has loosened the strict management of the rupee’s volatility. As a result, the money that previously flowed in is now flowing out. Additionally, US markets are currently frothy, causing dollars to return to the US and exert downward pressure on both the rupee and Indian stock markets. In any case, Indian markets were also frothy and needed a sanity check.

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Harshan Kumarasingham knows this firsthand. Born to Sri Lankan heritage, raised in New Zealand and now teaching in Scotland, his life reflects the British Empire’s global web. Importantly, this noted scholar’s ideas of “Eastminster” and “vice-regalism” explain how imperial power morphed, not vanished, after the end of the empire.

From Westminster to Eastminster

Great Britain’s Westminster model of democracy evolved over centuries. Once Britain acquired its empire, colonial administrators exported this model to the colonies. Yet they modified the model right at the start. All power was ultimately concentrated in the hands of the viceroy, who was deputizing for the British crown. So, the colonies inherited a vice-regal form of government with the trappings of the Westminster model.

After independence, colonies moved rapidly from the Westminster model to the Eastminster one. After World War II, independence came suddenly. Colonies did not have time to evolve political norms or other institutions. They inherited the apparatus of the state from the colonial government that answered to London, not to the natives. Unlike the UK, the colonies did not experience the slow evolution of democracy over time.

Local elites took over the centralized oppressive structures of colonial governments. Most postcolonial leaders had studied in British institutions such as Oxford or Cambridge. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, went to the same school as Winston Churchill, the British wartime leader. The likes of Nehru adopted the English language and British ideas, even when they were fighting their colonial masters.

After independence, the local elites chose the modified Westminster model that Kumarasingham calls the Eastminster model themselves. Nobody forced India, Sri Lanka or Pakistan to choose this model. The postcolonial elites chose this model willingly, but, over time, adapted it to their own purposes.

Eastminster model has a concentration of power

As mentioned earlier in this write-up, the colonies had experience of vice-regal government. At the end of the day, the viceroy was in charge and the natives did not matter. So, even when democracy came to the colonies, the Eastminster model allowed leaders to concentrate power.

It is the Eastminster model that has allowed Indian leaders like Indira Gandhi in the 1970s and Narendra Modi today to concentrate power. This model allowed Sri Lanka to move from a prime ministerial form of government to a presidential one. In Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah became the governor-general, not the president. The full title of the British viceroy was the viceroy and governor-general of India and Jinnah knew exactly what he was doing when he took that title. It concentrated all power and authority in his hands.

Many Eastminster states now blur the lines between democratic rule and monarchy. They face weak checks and balances. These leaders can silence the opposition. They also enjoy broad symbolic authority, much like the colonial governors who preceded them.

Settler vs subject states

Of course, not all colonies are the same. Settler dominions — Canada, Australia and New Zealand — where the population came from the British Isles, at least in the early days, managed to adopt the Westminster model successfully. The prime ministers of these countries answer to their parliaments. They function in a system of checks and balances and are ultimately answerable to their people.

Unlike settler colonies, the leaders in subject colonies like India or Kenya had little in common with their people. They had become anglicized and were importing alien traditions to their native lands. To their credit, these Eastminster elites often tried to govern fairly. India’s Nehru, Pakistan’s Jinnah, Sri Lanka’s Don Stephen Senanayake and Malaysia’s Tunku Abdul Rahman wanted to include minorities and create modern countries. But all of these leaders ruled top-down, not bottom-up.

Note that this top-down structure was baked into these subject colonies. The British did not create social hierarchies in these colonies. Yes, they certainly reinforced and exacerbated them. After independence, these hierarchies did not go away.

Elected monarchies and the rise of illiberalism

The Eastminster model is increasingly throwing up populist leaders who now act like monarchs. Ironically, many of them have humble beginnings. Modi sold tea outside a train station. Kenyan President William Ruto was a barefoot schoolboy who used to sell chickens at a roadside stall. Yet both of them have concentrated power in their hands and act like kings.

The issue in the Eastminster model is not the background of the leaders. In many countries, plebeians have replaced patricians. The issue in Eastminster democracies today is chronic institutional weakness. Unlike Westminster democracies like the UK or New Zealand, Eastminster parliaments lack real opposition. Unreformed colonial-era bureaucracies hold too much sway. Nehru’s state-led economic model is a classic case in point that handed power to powerful bureaucrats and left little room for rivals. Hence, Eastminster systems often lack the basics of liberal democracy: debate, pluralism and strong courts.

Thanks to weak institutions, many democracies are turning illiberal. Turkish voters have thrown in their lot with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a strongman who has been in power forever. In Eastminster, many leaders rule by fiat. Democracies have often failed to deliver and people prefer food and stability over rights and freedoms. Singapore, an authoritarian democracy, clearly proves this point.

The problems of Eastminster are now infecting Westminster. The UK elected Boris Johnson and is now flirting with Nigel Farage. America has elected Donald Trump again. The West can no longer assume that elections equal liberty. Nor can former colonies. All must rethink what democracy really means — and what they want from it.

[ and edited this piece]

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Under this new policy, the military recruits 17½–21-year-old men as Agniveers — “fire warriors” — who train for six months before reporting for active duty in the army, navy and air force. These Agniveers will serve for four years, after which the military will retain 25% of them. Those retained by the military will serve as “regular cadre,” who currently stay on for 15 years, with possibilities of staying on for longer if they win promotions.

What do proponents of Agnipath hope to achieve?

The Indian and other proponents defend Agnipath on four primary grounds: structural reform, fiscal efficiency, creating a talent funnel, and decreasing the average age of soldiers.

They argue that the earlier recruitment system relied on outdated caste and ethnic divisions. India inherited this structure from the British, who designated certain groups — such as Sikhs, Gurkhas, and Rajputs — as “martial races” and recruited them into region- and caste-specific regiments. These regiments mirrored the British Army’s model, which still includes units like the Royal Irish Regiment or the Scots Guards. In post-independence India, many of these traditions persisted, especially in the Army’s infantry. While the Air Force, Navy, and several arms of the Army now recruit nationally, many regiments still rely on local or ethnic catchments. Supporters claim this approach reflects colonial divide-and-rule tactics, not the needs of a modern nation-state. They believe India should eliminate these legacies and replace them with ethnically neutral, numbered units.

They also highlight the unsustainable cost of the previous model. Previously, long-term soldiers received not just pay, but pensions, healthcare, housing, and rations. Pensions alone consumed nearly a quarter of the defense budget. This heavy financial burden limited the military’s ability to invest in modernization, including critical equipment upgrades and advanced weapon systems. By reducing the number of long-term soldiers, the Agnipath system will reduce pension obligations. In 2025–26, the government allocated ($1.29 billion) for Agnipath — only 3.5% of the total ₹3.12 trillion ($36.6 billion) defense budget. Proponents argue that the policy frees up funds for modernization while trimming bureaucratic bloat.

Supporters also claim that the Agnipath system will allow the best talent to rise. Under the policy, only a quarter of Agniveers will be retained, so competition is intense. Government officials argue that this structure incentivizes performance and ensures that only the most capable and motivated candidates transition into the permanent cadre. In their view, this merit-based filter will create a more effective fighting force in the long run.

In addition to rewarding talent, the policy also aims to make the military younger. The government has stated that one of Agnipath’s goals is to reduce the average age of soldiers from 32 to 26. A younger military, it argues, will possess greater physical endurance, adaptability, and drive. Although the government has not set a specific timeline for achieving this demographic shift, officials maintain that a lower average age will inject josh aur jazba — zeal and passion — into the armed forces, enhancing both their morale and performance on the battlefield.

Agnipath will compromise the military’s effectiveness as a fighting force

Opponents of Agnipath raise serious concerns about morale, training, selection, and long-term stability. They argue that the policy reduces incentives, disrupts unit cohesion, and risks producing undertrained, undervalued soldiers.

They emphasize that young Indians often prefer government jobs for their job security. The civil service and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) offer permanent tenures. In contrast, Agniveers receive temporary contracts with no guarantee of retention. Even families with a long military tradition now encourage their children to join the police or other uniformed services instead. This shift undermines the Indian military’s recruitment base and makes it a less attractive career. The risks of combat remain high, but the pay is modest — ($350–$480) per month — and there are no pensions, no long-term healthcare, and no canteen privileges for most Agniveers. (Note that per capita annual income is around , as per the World Bank.) Soldiers know their service will be short, their benefits limited, and their families unsupported if they fall in battle.

This creates broader social concerns. Most recruits come from rural or semi-rural backgrounds, where honor and stability carry significant weight. A young man who returns home after four years without permanent employment may face stigma or struggle to marry. A large cohort of trained, armed, unemployed men could also increase social instability. History shows that unattached young men, especially those with combat training, often pose security risks — either by turning to crime or joining insurgencies.

Critics also challenge the policy’s impact on physical fitness and selection standards. To minimize corruption, Agnipath prioritizes exam scores over physical tests. This has led to the recruitment of candidates who may be academically capable but physically underprepared. Many do not come from traditional military communities and lack the pride and identity that comes with such lineage. Veterans and sergeants report that current Agniveers are less tough and less motivated than earlier cohorts.

The training regime reflects another key shortfall. Six months of training — compared to the 14-month programs of a decade ago — is too short to instill the physical and mental discipline needed for modern combat. Experts argue that recruits need at least three months of proper nutrition before they can even begin strenuous training. Furthermore, modern warfare, especially in the Air Force and Navy, requires highly technical skills. Even infantry soldiers now rely on sophisticated equipment, including night vision goggles, drones, and RPGs. If 75% of Agniveers leave after four years, the military has little incentive to invest in their advanced training. The result is a diluted, underprepared force.

The most serious concern raised by critics of Agnipath is the damage it inflicts on morale across the Indian military. Morale is not a superficial concern — it is the foundation of combat effectiveness, discipline, and sacrifice. A soldier who does not feel respected, valued, or secure in his role will not fight with conviction. The Agnipath policy signals, both symbolically and materially, that society places a lower value on military service than on other government jobs, such as those in the police or civil administration. Agniveers know that their employment is temporary, that their benefits are limited, and that most of them will be discharged after just four years. This awareness undermines their commitment and weakens the very institutions they serve. Over time, this constant churn of personnel erodes institutional memory and hollows out the experience base that any professional military depends on.

Compounding this morale crisis are the structural weaknesses embedded in the policy itself. Low pay, short training periods, and unclear criteria for retention all contribute to a sense of precarity and disposability among Agniveers. Soldiers who are not properly trained, not physically prepared, and not paid or treated on par with their long-term counterparts will naturally feel alienated from the institution they serve. These conditions send a clear message: that their contribution is short-term, replaceable, and ultimately expendable. Instead of fostering loyalty, camaraderie, or pride, the system incentivizes self-preservation. The Agnipath framework, by design, introduces a new class of temporary soldiers who lack a clear path forward — and that uncertainty saps morale at the core.

This shift is already changing the culture within the ranks. Officers and veterans report a steady decline in esprit de corps — the pride and unity that once defined the Indian military. Agniveers, occupying a lower rank than regular soldiers, now constitute a de facto new caste within the armed forces. Four years is simply not enough time to internalize regimental values or develop the kind of trust that makes soldiers willing to risk their lives for each other. In traditional units where soldiers fought for Nam, Namak, Nishan — honor, loyalty, and shared identity — such bonds took years to build. By contrast, Agnipath fosters a dog-eat-dog environment, where individual survival trumps collective mission. Agniveers, knowing they will soon exit the system and may never see their fellow recruits again, have little reason to form deep attachments. The result is a more fragmented, risk-averse, and ultimately less effective fighting force.

Agnipath will not achieve the benefits supporters claim

Given these contrasting sets of pros and cons, it would be easy to argue that its supporters and critics simply value different priorities — stability vs. flexibility, experience vs. youth, or institutional loyalty vs. cost savings. But this is misleading. In reality, Agnipath doesn’t just sacrifice one set of goals for another — it fails even on its own stated terms. Now, I will consider each of the pro arguments in turn and explain why Agnipath will not achieve the results it is meant to achieve.

On the issue of caste and ethnic regiments, critics agree that India should transcend colonial-era divisions. But they also argue that ethnic and regional identities still matter in India today. Regimental pride often draws strength from shared cultural backgrounds. Critics note that Nepal’s legendary Gurkhas — who have served with distinction in the Indian Army since 1815 — no longer find Agnipath attractive. They refuse to risk their lives for a temporary job that lacks honor and career progression. This rejection not only weakens the military but also strains India–Nepal relations. Meanwhile, Britain to recruit Gurkhas, and has begun studying their integration as a model for its own forces. Agnipath has already handed geopolitical advantages to India’s rivals.

Supporters emphasize that the new policy will reduce pension costs. Critics respond that this financial gain comes at too high a price. Pensions exist not just as a benefit but as a symbol of respect for those who serve. Retired soldiers often pass down institutional wisdom and support the military in civilian roles. Removing that link discourages recruitment and erodes long-term military culture. Young Indians may reject the Agnipath route in favor of more secure and stable careers — even if those offer less money. In times of crisis, India may find itself with fewer qualified and willing recruits. The Pahalgam attack of April 2025, which claimed 26 civilian lives, highlights the need for a military that blends the energy of youth with the judgment of experience. Budget cuts that hollow out that balance endanger national security.

Supporters claim that Agnipath rewards merit and competition. Critics disagree. They argue that the selection process now favors test-takers over patriots. Young men who want to serve their country long-term may never get the chance. Worse, those trained in arms for four years may return to society without a clear path. In rare cases, this may lead to radicalization or militancy — where the very training meant to serve the nation turns against it. More broadly, the lack of a reintegration plan will leave many Agniveers adrift, with no guarantee that their service will help them build a future.

Supporters say Agnipath will make the army younger. Critics acknowledge the potential benefits of youth, but they see no plan or timeline to reach the stated goal of reducing the average age to 26. They also question whether constant turnover will help the military. As Agniveers finally become competent in their fourth year, the military discharges most of them. This wastes training investment and drains institutional memory. Critics believe that a strong military needs both youthful vigor and veteran leadership — Agnipath provides neither in sustainable measure.

New Delhi must have the courage to change direction

The Agnipath policy has ignited widespread debate over its impact on the Indian military’s operational effectiveness. While the government introduced it as a step toward modernization, serious concerns have emerged — about the loss of experience, the difficulty of retaining talent, and the mental toll on short-term recruits. These concerns raise a pressing question: does the policy actually strengthen India’s defense, or does it compromise it?

Recognizing that this policy may have been a mistake is not a sign of weakness. It is a mark of responsibility. The government must have the courage to revise a flawed decision. Listening to veterans, defense experts, and those serving in uniform would allow the government to rework the scheme into something more stable, more effective, and more respectful of the armed forces’ mission.

This critique comes not from any lack of respect for the military, but from deep admiration for it. Indians owe an unshakable debt of patriotic gratitude to the men and women who serve, often at great personal risk. Out of that respect, we must insist that the military receive the support, resources, and long-term stability it deserves — not just symbolic praise, but meaningful policy.

The recent Pahalgam attack and continued threats on India’s borders make this need all the more urgent. A strong military cannot rely on youth alone. It must draw strength from the combination of youthful energy and experienced leadership. A recruitment policy that honors both will serve India’s security far better — and reflect the seriousness with which we regard those who defend it.

[ edited this piece.]

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Its origins are truly shrouded in the mists of time. Some believe the Hindu spiritual leader Adi Shankaracharya started the Kumbh Mela in the 8^th century by organizing regular gatherings of ascetics. Others trace its roots even further to the Vedic period. According to Hindu mythology, a great cosmic churning of the ocean produced a pot (kumbha) filled with amrita, the nectar of immortality. A war between the gods and the demons broke out over the possession of the amrita. During this struggle, drops of the nectar spilled onto four earthly locations which now serve as the rotational sites for the Kumbh Mela. Every three years, one of these four sites hosts the festival, but the Maha Kumbh Mela in Prayagraj remains the grandest of them all. 

Sacred texts like the praise the purifying power of these waters, and believers trust that a dip at the sangam washes away all sins, granting the spiritual liberation. Legend tells of a conversation between the river Ganga and Lord Shiva where Ganga expresses concern over accumulating the sins of those who bathed in her waters, saying: “People bathe in me to purify themselves – but then how do I get rid of all these sins?”. Shiva reassures Ganga, “when the saints come and take a bath in you, you will be purified”. True to this belief, on three especially auspicious days (this time on January 14, January 29 and February 3) revered holy people, including the photogenic Naga sadhus—ascetics from the Himalayas who come naked and covered in ash—descend upon the sangam to take their sacred plunge.��

Maha Kumbh Mela 2025

While the Maha Kumbh Mela is held every 12 years, this year’s gathering is particularly special because it happens during a rare alignment of the sun, the moon, Jupiter, and Saturn – a conjunction that takes place only once every . Such a rare occurrence amplifies the spiritual significance of this year’s event. The Bible says: “For where two or three gather together as my followers, I am there among them”; now multiply this a million times and imagine the ‘I am there among them’ feeling at the sangam of these sacred rivers, and that is what you can expect from the festival this year.��

This Maha Kumbh Mela is expected to see nearly 400 million people over six weeks, with up to 30 million present on peak days. It is said to be the only gathering of humans that can be seen from , an awe-inspiring testament to human faith and devotion. Down here on earth, media outlets, photographers and YouTubers eagerly capture the event, sharing of its grandeur with the world.��

Attendees range from sages, saints and sadhus to politicians, celebrities and experience-seekers. Some visit to participate in religious history, while others seek salvation, personal enlightenment or simply the energy of being part of something monumental. Regardless of their motivations, all who attend share in the collective spiritual experience. 

Finally, Moksha

Although I’m fairly irreligious, I’m surprised by how often I feel a surge of emotion upon entering any crowded place of worship – whether a temple, mosque, gurudwara or church. It’s not necessarily the presence of God that moves me, but rather the sheer magnitude of human belief. I can only imagine the surge of emotion while standing on the banks of the waters in Prayagraj, feeling the weight of centuries-old faith and that of the millions surrounding me. 

The Maha Kumbh Mela is not about witnessing a performance, electing a leader or even hearing someone preach the word of God. It is about being present and praying at, what is believed by more than 1.2 billion people, a sacred place and time, absorbing the blessings this holy locus has to offer. The belief is that if you immerse yourself in the waters here at the confluence of these three sacred rivers and now when these celestial bodies are aligned, you will receive Moksha— liberation from the cycle of rebirth and eternal union with God. This goal contrasts sharply with modern technological pursuits that are trying to extend our lifespan and keep us out of the hands of God for as long as possible. 

I find this massive gathering of pilgrims and the grand accumulation of their faith awe-inspiring and hopeful. While I lack the belief, courage or endurance to attend in person, I hope just sitting alone in my study and watching nightly updates on YouTube will be enough to bestow upon me some remote blessings. 

Special thanks to Mr. M.V. Subramoni – retired civil engineer and unretired armchair religious scholar – for his fountain of knowledge on the Kumbh Mela and his enduring faith.

[ edited this piece]

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A decade of growth

India’s remarkable transformation has been reflected in its ascent from being labeled one of the “Fragile Five” economies to becoming one of the top five economies worldwide in less than a decade. , once critical of India’s economic challenges, has now recognized the country’s transformative reforms, which have turned it into a beacon of international investment.��

The country’s rise in innovation has been equally impressive. India climbed from 81st in 2015 to 39th in 2024 in the Global Innovation Index () rankings among 133 countries, showcasing its commitment to fostering a robust innovation ecosystem. By implementing strong policies, increasing investment in research and creating a supportive environment for startups and entrepreneurship, India has positioned itself as a leader in innovation. The success of the Unified Payment Interface () exemplifies this transformation. The UPI recorded a staggering 16.58 billion transactions worth $279.4 billion in October 2024 alone, revolutionizing the financial sector. Additionally, the country’s defense production surged by 174% over the course of the past decade, with exports increasing over 30 times. These achievements make India a strategic ally for global powers.��

India has further demonstrated its regional and global leadership through a series of key policy initiatives. Programs like have driven technological empowerment, while the World Solar Alliance has positioned the country as a leader in global renewable energy cooperation. Initiatives like , which strengthens ties with Southeast Asia, and , which promotes domestic manufacturing, have further cemented India’s status as a critical stakeholder in regional and international affairs.

India’s emergence on the global strategic stage reflects a decade of consistent policies and transformative reforms, underpinned by sustained political stability. This defining feature of the 2024 world affairs has allowed India to assert itself as a key global player. The reelection of Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a term has solidified this political stability, enabling the government to implement impactful development-oriented reforms and policies. These measures have transformed India’s economic, military and diplomatic spheres of influence, strengthening governance across various sectors and reinforcing the nation’s position as a vital force in global affairs.

An expanding global reach

India has pursued its rise on the global stage with a firm “Neighborhood First” policy and a strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific region. The country has expanded its sphere of influence westward by actively engaging with Gulf nations, which now rank among India’s top partners in trade, investment and energy. The India-Middle-East-Europe corridor () has drawn significant interest from regional and global stakeholders. This initiative connects India to Europe through the Arabian Peninsula and offers a promising solution to mitigate risks and reduce reliance on traditional maritime shipping routes.

India has also strengthened ties with Central Asian states to the north and nations in the Indian Ocean Region to the south. Engagements with Africa, particularly along the East African coastline, have reached unprecedented levels. India’s commitment to inclusive governance is evident in its active participation in initiatives such as the International North-South Transport Corridor (), which provides a robust alternative for accessing Eurasia and beyond.

The country’s natural leadership in the Global South has garnered widespread support for initiatives like the Voice of Global South and the African Union’s inclusion as a permanent member of the G20. India’s leadership in vaccine equity during the Covid-19 pandemic earned global admiration. By 2023, India had supplied over 301 million vaccine doses to countries, demonstrating its commitment to global health and solidarity.

India’s emphasis on sustainability is reflected in the International Solar Alliance (ISA), a platform it proposed to promote solar energy adoption. As of August 2024, 119 countries had signed the ISA framework, with 99 countries the agreement. India has also invested nearly $3 billion in infrastructure and development projects tailored to the needs of partner countries, further solidifying its role as a trusted global partner and an advocate for equitable development.��

Between 2008 and August 2024, India extended $951.22 billion in grants and lines of credit to countries, forging strong development worldwide. This unwavering commitment has positioned India as a steadfast ally to the developing world, demonstrating how democracies can effectively deliver socio-economic benefits. These efforts have not only uplifted other nations, but have also bolstered India’s own economic framework, ensuring distribution of resources across society.��

India’s transformative advancements are also evident in its global port rankings. Nine of its major ports are now listed among the world’s top 100 by the World Bank, with ports like the Visakhapatnam port and Mundra port being among the top 30. The efficiency of India’s port operations is best reflected in its dramatically improved median turnaround time, which has been reduced from a sluggish 28 days in the 20th century to an impressive 0.9 days in 2024. This surpasses many global benchmarks, including the United States (1.5 days), Australia (1.7 days) and Singapore (1 day), underscoring India’s enhanced logistical and operational capabilities.

Net security provider

India’s prominence as a maritime power extends beyond efficient port operations to its role as a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific. With its expanded capabilities, operational expertise and proactive engagement, India has become a stabilizing force in the Indian Ocean Region, reinforcing its claim as “India’s Ocean.” This growing stature contextualizes the shifting dynamics of global maritime strategy, often referred to as the “” at sea. The increasing naval presence and partnerships among international players highlights the Indo-Pacific’s rising significance, with India firmly established as a pivotal economic and strategic fulcrum in this vital geography.��

India has decisively advanced its maritime deterrent capabilities in recent years, significantly strengthening its nuclear triad. In 2024, India commissioned , its second Arihant-class Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear Submarine (SSBN). This development reinforced India’s strategic balance and peacekeeping capabilities, which are crucial for national security. INS Arighaat embodies India’s commitment to self-reliance (Atmanirbhar Bharat) in defense, showcasing advanced design, manufacturing expertise, cutting-edge technology and the country’s robust research and developmental framework. Indian scientists, industries and naval personnel collaborated to conceptualize, develop and integrate the Arihant class SSBNs, which are entirely indigenous. Further demonstrating its maritime ambitions, India its fourth SSBN Submarine in Visakhapatnam, underlining its focus on securing maritime interests in a dynamic and often volatile geopolitical environment.��

Expanding its strategic horizons, India has also displayed remarkable interoperability and operational adaptability through large-scale military exercises. One prominent example is , a biennial exercise hosted by the Indian Navy’s Eastern Naval Command from February 19 to 27, 2024, in Visakhapatnam. Milan 2024 attracted unprecedented , bringing together 51 countries from six continents, 35 ships, 50 aircrafts and 11 heads of maritime agencies. This exercise, which began modestly in 1995 in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands with only four participating navies, has grown exponentially in size and complexity. Milan 2024 not only highlighted India’s maritime capabilities but also demonstrated its adaptability and strategic leadership on a global scale.��

Via on X.

Complementing its maritime capabilities the Indian Air Force (IAF) hosted its first multinational , Tarang Shakti 2024, from August 6 to 14, 2024. The exercise, aptly named “waves of power,” aimed to enhance interoperability and operational coordination amongst Friendly Foreign Countries (FFCs). This milestone event marked a significant step toward strengthening India’s defense collaborations on a global scale. Notably, Tejas, India’s indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), played a central role, showcasing the growing importance of domestically developed platforms in modernizing the country’s defense infrastructure.��

Tarang Shakti logo depicting the countries participating. Via on X (cropped).

Tarang Shakti 2024 attracted participation from 51 countries spanning every continent, making it one of the most comprehensive air exercises in recent history. However, Russia and Israel, two of India’s key strategic partners, notably abstained from participating. Despite these absences, the exercise provided a platform for participating nations to synchronize their Concept of Operations (CONOPS), test their ability to mobilize and maintain detachments at distant locations and hone their capabilities in different operational environments. 

The exercise featured cutting edge, technologically advanced including the F/A-18 Super Hornets from the US, the , the European Typhoon, Australian E/A 18G and the F-35 Lightning II, which engaged with IAF’s LCA Tejas, Su-30 MKI, Rafale, Mirage 2000 and Jaguar fighter jets. The IAF also deployed its advanced rotary and fixed-wing platforms, including the LCH Prachand, ALH MK-IV Rudra, C-130 Hercules and the Netra and Phalcon Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) systems, which are normally not deployed abroad for exercises.��

Tarang Shakti 2024 underscored India’s advanced air power and its ability to rapidly respond to and adapt to evolving threats and security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. This landmark event highlighted India’s leadership in fostering global defense cooperation while demonstrating its capability to operate at the forefront of strategic and operational innovation. 

Transforming stable internal security

India’s rapid growth in 2024 has been driven by a stable and secure internal security environment, achieved through the proactive collaboration of all national security stakeholders. This progress is evident in key developments across the nation. Security forces have made significant strides against (LWE), eliminating 287 extremists and arresting 992 individuals, including 14 politburo members. For the first time in four decades, fatalities among civilians and security forces fell below 100, underscoring the government’s commitment to LWE by March 31, 2026. Authorities have reduced LWEs influence by 80%, confining its impact to limited areas in .��

India also revolutionized its criminal justice system in 2024 by replacing outdated British-era laws with transformative legal frameworks. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 replaced the 163-year-old Indian Penal Code of 1860, modernizing the legal foundation of criminal offenses. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 replaced the antiquated Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) of 1898, ensuring more effective procedures for investigations and trials. The Bharatiya Sakshya Bill 2023 replaced the Indian Evidence Act of 1872, introducing reforms to streamline evidence collection and admissibility. Together, these reforms modernized India’s legal framework and strengthened the criminal justice system. Complementing these changes, the government invested significantly in technological advancements, including the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems () and its integration into the Interoperable Criminal Justice System (). CCTNS in hand with ICJS have led the Ministry of Home Affairs towards effective justice delivery and law enforcement by ensuring seamless data sharing across law enforcement, judiciary, prisons, forensics and prosecution.��

The government’s zero-tolerance approach to terrorism yielded substantial results in Jammu and Kashmir. Following the repeal of in August 2019, the region has experienced rapid development, culminating in assembly elections in , which saw a record voter turnout of 63.88%. Massive infrastructure improvements and inward investments have propelled the region’s economic growth, creating opportunities in previously underserved areas.

The Indian government has also intensified its fight against narco-terrorism with a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach. Authorities seized over 10,000 kg of narcotics in 2024, including a record consignment intercepted during a joint operation by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Indian Navy and Gujarat Police off the Gujarat coast. In November 2024, the Indian Coast Guard seized of methamphetamine from a Myanmarese fishing boat in the Andaman Sea. In addition, the Ministry of Home Affairs destroyed of narcotics during the year. Structural, institutional and informational reforms have strengthened the nation’s anti-drug policies, with the central government establishing NCB offices in every state to support this mission.��

These accomplishments demonstrate India’s proactive security policies, transformative legal reforms, technological advancements and unwavering commitment to safeguarding the nation. By addressing internal threats with decisive actions and a visionary approach, India continues to reinforce its position as a resilient and forward-looking global leader. 

A rising global power

Barry Buzan’s highlights the intersection of politics, economics and geographic developments as critical to human security, emphasizing the interplay of five major elements, each uniquely contributing to global stability. The aspect reflects the strategic interplay between the states’ armed capabilities and their perceptions of one another’s intentions, influencing peace and conflict dynamics. The political dimension encompasses the organization of states, governmental systems, ideologies and the legitimacy of their identities. The economic element addresses the availability of resources, financial stability and the mechanisms to sustain welfare and state authority. The social component focuses on the sustainability and evolution of traditional languages, cultures, religious identities and customs. Lastly, the element underscores the maintenance of local and global ecosystems as vital support systems for humanity.��

India’s comprehensive growth across these five elements has positioned it as a favored partner on the global stage, bolstering the multipolar world order. India’s consistent development supports a global environment of freedom, openness, transparency and adherence to rules-based order. Its inclusive and responsible approach has particularly resonated in the developing world. This sense of responsibility has established India as a “” and “Preferred Security Partner” in times of crisis, further solidifying its role as a key player on the global horizon. By addressing local, regional and global security challenges, India has underscored its pivotal role in shaping a balanced and equitable world.��

As India strides into 2025, its trajectory as a rising global power reflects the culmination of decades of transformative reforms, strategic foresight and resilient leadership. The nation’s robust advancements across economic, political, social, military and environmental dimensions continue to bolster its role in shaping a multipolar world order. India’s achievements in innovation, infrastructure, defense and diplomacy underscore its growing stature as a stabilizing force in regional and global affairs. India exemplifies a forward-looking democracy capable of addressing complex challenges. With its leadership in renewable energy, technological innovation and inclusive development, 2025 sees India not just as a global economic powerhouse, but as a trusted ally and advocate for equitable growth. As the nation builds on its successes, it reaffirms its commitment to global peace, stability and sustainable progress, paving the way for an even brighter future.

[ and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In a few short years, a microscopic blob of cells, clinging to the walls of the mother’s womb, transforms into a thinking, feeling, understanding, questioning, acting individual. It will become capable of courage, care, compassion, commitment and conviction; curiosity, creativity and connection; meaning-making, self-regulation, problem-solving, imagination, integrity and leadership; joy, sorrow, hope and fear; empathy, resolve, resourcefulness and resilience.

These are not just words. Those who watch over children as they are growing up know that these big-sounding ideas show up so endearingly in their day-to-day actions, in their random thoughts and in the way they think, act and relate to others. They can be kind and cruel, sharing and grabbing, laughing and crying, self-assured and lost, leading and following, making and dismantling, falling and getting up, failing and succeeding — all the while exhibiting this amazing range of capacities.

And they learn most of it by themselves, propelled, as Khalil Gibran famously said, by “life’s longing for itself”. From latching to the mother’s breast at birth, to crying for milk. From using her body to crawl and stand, to walking and maneuvering past obstacles and climbing trees. From understanding the words cooed to her, to making herself understood by mostly clueless adults. From making up fanciful stories, to making sense of the world around her and her own place in it. The child makes an amazing, explosive and deeply personal journey of survival, discovery and learning in the first few years of her life.

For those of us who have forgotten those days from our own lives and learned now to turn to the nearest mentor, or a reference book, or Google, or Chat GPT, it is not easy to understand how invested the child is in learning, or to remember how extraordinarily existential the learning challenge is for the child. They don’t think about learning, they don’t plan on it, they don’t make timetables — they just learn. 

That is the magic of childhood.

What, then, is the place of us adults at this stage in the child’s life? 

Adults are the foundation of Early Childhood Development (ECD)

Of course, we adults want our children to grow up whole, to succeed in their lives and perhaps to help others succeed. Some adults might imagine that children figure out so much of the growing up on their own that there is little need for them to do much. Others, fearful that the children won’t get all the benefit of their wisdom, might believe that they need to hold them firmly by the hand and direct their every move — so that they grow up into exactly who they wish them to be.

Then to adults, understanding Early Childhood Development (ECD) is a fascinating journey of our own.

That journey involves discovering what children need and don’t need from us, what kind of environments help them thrive and how we can support their learning journey so that they acquire the wisdom, dispositions and skills they will need to be happy with themselves and have a meaningful presence in society. It tells us who we need to be so that our children thrive and flourish.  

ECD is not a set of activities, or even a few programs, strung together to keep children engaged. It is not just helping children read and recognize numerals. It is not merely having them memorize songs and stories and recite them for visitors. It is not only feeding them a mid-day meal that will keep them from stunting. It is not just making sure that they receive the medical attention that will keep them from sickness. It is all that but much more. Much more that we ignore at our peril.

That “much more” calls out to us every day we watch children grow up. Understanding the nature of their world and building a meaningful relationship with it, the value of collaboration among human beings and between humans and nature, a scientific temper, the ability to see, listen and reflect, the ability to think critically and creatively, the ability to build physical and emotional resilience through a focus on well-being: these are all critical to a child finding fulfillment in life. 

Building this cannot be deferred past the “Foundational Stage.” Outlined in India’s 2022 for the Foundational Stage, it refers to the first five years of formal education between the ages of three and eight, when a child’s cognitive, physical and socio-emotional growth is shaped. By ignoring them at this stage, we are doing a great disservice to an entire generation.

And there is something else, even more urgent because it is even more foundational. children at this stage (or at any stage) will learn little unless they feel supported by a network of relationships that spell physical and emotional security and safety. They will learn little unless there are responsive adults around who care about what the children feel and think and who are willing to make space for it in the learning journey. They will learn little unless what they learn connects with their experiences and environments in meaningful ways.��

We also understand that adults who are not currently experiencing the same themselves — belonging, security, validation, support and safety nets — are unable to offer them to others, including to children. The adults, too, need physical strength, emotional resilience, mental fortitude, artistic expression and technical mastery. They, too, need to learn all this in meaningful ways that connect to their world and experiences. They, too, need to experience relationships. And they need to experience all of it in the communities they belong to – the village, the urban sprawl, the organizations they work in, the support networks, the containers of their existence.

The future of ECD depends on all of this.

What does the future of ECD look like? 

There seem to be promising recent developments for the future of ECD in India.

The promotion of the by the World Health Organization, UNICEF and the World Bank Group in 2019 provides an important basis with global credentials for early childhood interventions to be more holistic and responsive to children’s needs than they have been.

The explicit acknowledgment of the Foundational Stage in the (NEP) of India in 2020 was a significant departure from the concerns of the past educational policy. It was a major step forward in giving ECD its rightful place. It brought the attendant hope that commitment of resources and the necessary policy congruence across different public initiatives might become possible.

Since then, there have been more insistent calls and some policy actions in India for more widespread teacher training and curriculum development in early childhood education, and such training seems to be reaching a larger number of front-line workers than was the case earlier.

The easier and increasing availability of technology and internet bandwidth has made the challenge of reaching the vast Indian front line somewhat more tractable.

Unfortunately, these green shoots obscure much that is distressingly missing in our vision of ECD today.

The expansive imagination of the Foundational Stage in NEP has given way to a narrowly defined Foundational Literacy and Numeracy (FLN) construct, so much so that FLN is actually being used in several places as a synonym for early childhood education.

The Nurturing Care Framework is often considered met simply because we have initiatives for mid-day meals and vaccinations in place.

Front-line capacity-building continues to use approaches that have already proven ineffective over decades, fostering neither the necessary skills nor generating the needed motivation and enthusiasm among the participants. 

Alarmingly, among influential sections of policymakers and implementers, the availability of technological solutions has prompted a flood of initiatives that essentially side-step the inconvenient, long-haul but foundationally important challenge of building good teachers. They hope to replace them with screens, apps and canned content, in blatant disregard of a mass of early childhood research and our intuitive understanding of the needs of our children.

And as we rise to safeguard our future and address the challenges that have been outlined here, as we resolve to tend that sacred fire and gather around it, we must remember that there currently exist important tacit, largely unnoticed assumptions about how the world should be ordered. They affect all of society and, therefore, do not seem to engage our attention when we think specifically about ECD, but they affect ECD in foundational ways. 

I call them the four “tions”, four important mechanisms of social organization that we have been taking for granted in education. 

Institutionalization of education

The first of the “tions”. Much of public policy has promoted the idea that the only learning worth our children’s time and our money is the one that is provided in pre-schools, schools, colleges and universities. 

Across most of the world, this has made learning information-centric and uncritical. It has packed children into rows and columns in classrooms and made them unfamiliar with their surroundings. 

It has taken them away from productive use of their hands and bodies and valorized “brain work” which, in turn, has created an artificial crisis of periodic unemployment. It has snapped their connections with their land, their environment, their culture and their communities — replacing them with words in ink on paper. 

It has given rise to a deep sense of disempowerment among most of our communities as far as education is concerned, the feeling that they don’t know enough to be meaningful contributors to their children’s learning. 

While there might be some justification for this where aerospace engineering or robotic surgery is concerned, its extension to ECD is alienating for the children and alarming for society. For ECD to have a future, we must discover how much there is to learn for children in communities, on land, in relationships and in discovery and invention, even outside schools and pre-schools.

Urbanization of communities

The second “tion”. The worshippers of urbanization have led us to believe that the ghettoization of people in cities and towns is inevitable as we “develop.” 

With economic and social policies in most countries oriented towards this shibboleth, we have seen unhygienic and alienated living grow exponentially in the cities, even as rural communities have been devastated by the loss of populations. Mental health challenges in urban communities have become alarming, accentuated simply by the inhuman stresses that accompany urban living. 

For the very young, it has meant few physical spaces for wholesome growth and play, little opportunity for meaningful community engagement, a social landscape tragically barren of nurturing experiences and distressingly few ways of developing a resilient personality. 

For ECD to have a future, we must reconsider how physical communities should be laid out, how large they should be, how they should harmonize with the surrounding landscape and how their cultural, economic and political sinews should function.

Globalization of society

My third “tion” is the globalization of our society. We have also been fed the inevitability of globalization, almost as a primal force. It is true that it promises economic efficiency, but we have, in the process, lost much. 

Diversity is the essence of risk reduction and long-term survival and thriving, whether at the level of an individual, an organization, a community, a nation, or indeed, the evolution of life itself. In a few short decades, blinded by the promise of economic efficiency, we have traded diversity away for massive inequality and loss of local skills, trades, crafts, self-reliance, agency and autonomy. 

Our textbooks, the only source of information promoted by our policies, have consistently failed to ignite an examination of the underlying assumptions and their all-too-visible outcomes among our children. 

The globalizing impulse, being un-moored in authentic experience and unresponsive to local needs, has thus led to the loss of entire education systems including, unfortunately, those that address the very young.

As a result, they have fostered and valorized the creation of an alienating and alienated elite. The reaction to that is a distressing level of anti-intellectualism throughout the world. That, of course, creates the fodder for the assembly line that is perhaps the holy grail of the globalizing philosophy in the first place, but it also creates a dangerous level of instability and irrationality in society that can eventually only tear everything apart. This is not just a possibility. It is happening now, around the world. 

For ECD to have a future, we must acknowledge the primacy of the “local” in the lives of our children, help them celebrate their uniqueness and foster the confidence that will allow them to reject the totalizing impulses of our world today.

Standardization of processes and outcomes

The final “tion” is the standardization of processes and outcomes in education and is, in some sense, the inevitable outcome of the first three. 

While establishing a standardized set for seventeen-year-olds taking a calculus course may make some sense, it is singularly inappropriate for all five-, six- or seven-year-olds to be assessed based on a single set of learning outcomes, or for them to be subjected to one set of learning activities or processes. 

Such standardizing, almost by definition, violates the space that growing up requires at this stage. 

Once launched, these standards can become more and more mindless. This was seen when all the tens of thousands of (government-run childcare centers in India), in a particular system, were expected to be “teaching” the same lesson at, say, 11 AM on Friday, November 20. Elaborately constructed textbooks were thus distributed to ensure that this standardization was implemented. The inertia of the system, thankfully, kept it from actually happening in most places, but the intention of the standardizers was clear. More importantly, significant opportunities for the students’ learning were undoubtedly lost.

Standardization is beguiling because it is easy for someone with little contact with children, and little understanding of their ways of learning, to imagine and decree. Its implementation does not result in any learning simply because that is not how learning happens at this stage. 

But it is not harmless. It does distort adult behavior, both of teachers and parents, toward their children, replacing empathetic, supportive and nurturing adult-child learning interactions with meaningless choral shouting in regimented classrooms and anxious parents demanding performance on utterly meaningless standardized tests. 

For ECD to have a future, we must firmly reject standardizing impulses and seek to provide our children opportunities to explore their world at their own pace, supported and inspired by affectionate adults.

To summarize, education is the primary mechanism that drives long-term change in society. ECD forms the foundations on which all of it is built. For ECD to have a future and for us to have a future, we must hold and cherish ECD in a way that protects and strengthens children today and the society tomorrow.

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Today, more than two million Hindus of Indian origin live and work side by side with their fellow American citizens. Hindu temples, like Jewish synagogues and Muslim mosques before them, have cropped up in cities and suburbs throughout the country. Americans increasingly do business in India. Perhaps most importantly, ever since the 1960s, millions of non-Indian Americans have become deeply engaged in Hindu-related practices such as and , for both spiritual and secular reasons. In this context, what seems like a narrow scholarly debate about a long-dead mystic, in fact, takes on extraordinarily broad significance.

Swami Tyagananda and Pravrajika Vrajaprana’s 2010 , Interpreting Ramakrishna: Kali’s Child Revisited, is a painstaking attempt to refute the central thesis of American scholar Jeffrey Kripal’s earlier , Kali’s Child: The Mystical and the Erotic in the Life and Teachings of Ramakrishna. Published in 1995, Kripal’s book roiled political and cultural waters that academic volumes seldom disturb.

Based on Kripal’s doctoral dissertation, Kali’s Child took as its subject the legendary 19th century mystic, Sri Ramakrishna Paramhansa. Ramakrishna was one of the most colorful, enigmatic and revered holy men in India, where such figures are as much a part of the landscape as the ornate temple towers looming above dusty villages or the unassuming shrines tucked into alcoves in teeming cities.

Intrigued by the man so many consider a modern saint, Kripal set about dissecting the sage’s psyche with the scalpel of psychoanalytic theory. He argued that at the secret heart of Ramakrishna’s life and work was homoeroticism and sexual abuse.

Objections to academic texts are typically voiced by the author’s colleagues in journals, books and conferences. But Kripal’s conclusions were different because Ramakrishna is worshipped by devotees in both India and the West. He is regarded as a spiritual exemplar by seekers of all kinds, thanks to the of mission centers established in his name by his chief disciple, Swami Vivekananda, and the writings of illustrious Western devotees like Christopher Isherwood.��

Hindu controversy and scholarly debate

The reaction of many Hindus to Kripal’s thesis was similar to that of certain Christians to Martin Scorsese’s controversial , The Last Temptation of Christ, or to those who speculate about what Jesus and Mary Magdalene may have been up to when the apostles weren’t looking. To attribute sexual impulses to a figure many consider a divine avatar — or at least an apostle of self-realization who had transcended base desires — was, to some minds, an insult verging on blasphemy.

Some critics treated Kripal to the same facile psychoanalysis that they accused him of applying to Ramakrishna. Attempts to his book went all the way to the Indian Parliament, though they were unsuccessful. He even faced personal threats in the closest thing to a that one can imagine in the land of Mahatma Gandhi.

Kripal’s critics within the academy were less emotional. They either disagreed with his conclusion on intellectual and methodological grounds or dismissed his assertions as mere speculation. But critics were in the minority. Most scholars of religion greeted Kali’s Child with kudos; the book was honored with prestigious , including the American Academy of Religion’s History of Religions Prize for the Best First Book of 1995. Even those who were indifferent to the subject matter rallied around Kripal on the grounds of academic freedom.

For his part, Kripal maintained that he held Ramakrishna in the highest regard and was merely doing what any scholar should: analyzing a phenomenon through a particular theoretical lens and following the inquiry to a well-reasoned conclusion.

To scholars, disagreement and argument are both expected and desirable. But book banning? Personal attacks? Threats of violence? Beyond the pale. In a name-calling standoff, Kripal’s critics were labeled homophobes, Hindu fundamentalists and right-wing Indian nationalists, while his defenders were branded Hinduphobic, sex-obsessed cultural imperialists.

I interviewed both Kripal and the authors of Interpreting Ramakrishna for my own 2010 , American Veda: From Emerson and the Beatles to Yoga and Meditation: How Indian Spirituality Changed the West. As such, I can confidently state that none of those charges apply to any of the three. Over time, cooler heads prevailed, but the debate never died. Kali’s Child became a symbol of the tension between academic critiques of Asian religions and the practitioners of those religions, who claim that Western interpretations seldom reflect their actual beliefs and practices.

In light of the controversy, Interpreting Ramakrishna, although it is merely one reaction to one scholar’s take on one Hindu luminary, has a far larger resonance. The book is an exhaustive effort to refute Kali’s Child on its own terms by two monastics in the Ramakrishna order: Swami Tyagananda, an India-born monk who runs the Vedanta Society of Boston in Massachusetts and serves as Hindu chaplain at both MIT and Harvard; and Pravrajika Vrajaprana, an American nun at the Vedanta Convent in Santa Barbara, California.

While neither author occupies an academic position or has earned a doctorate, each is deeply immersed in scholarly pursuits. Fifteen years after the appearance of Kripal’s casus belli — the act that provoked, in this case, a war of words — they released their multi-pronged rebuttal.

Tyagananda and Vrajaprana’s critiques of Kali’s Child

One line of attack in Interpreting Ramakrishna is on Kripal’s translations of the recognized source texts on Ramakrishna. The authors regard the Bengali-to-English rendering in Kali’s Child as significantly flawed. For his part, Kripal contends that his mistakes were few (some were corrected online and in a second printing) and do not affect his salient arguments. Tyagananda and Vrajaprana beg to differ, arguing that Kripal, consciously or unconsciously, made linguistic choices that bolstered his predetermined conclusions.

Words and phrases that the respective authors translate differently are many and varied; they are not inconsequential. Perhaps the best example is the Bengali phrase, ���峾����ī-����ñ�����Բ�. Previous translators have rendered the phrase, “women and gold.”

The authors of Interpreting Ramakrishna say it was often used by Ramakrishna to symbolize lust and greed, or, more generally, the worldly distractions that spiritual aspirants are advised to avoid. Kripal’s translation is “lover-and-gold.” For Tyagananda and Vrajaprana, this is an attempt to reinforce Kripal’s portrait of Ramakrishna as a misogynist who feared sexualized women (as opposed to women as maternal figures). Kripal, in turn, accuses translators who use “women” as merely a symbol for lust of participating in the cover-up of Ramakrishna’s secret homosexuality.

To the lay reader, each side can sound convincing on these issues of textual fidelity. This should not be surprising. Why should Bengali texts be different from Hebrew, Greek, Aramaic, Arabic, Sanskrit or any other source of sacred literature whose meaning is debatable? The larger issue is the ambiguity of translation itself. Try as they may to be objective, translators invariably bring a boatload of cultural and ideological assumptions to their work. That is a matter of no small import in any conversation about religion.

Tyagananda and Vrajaprana also go after Kripal’s reliance on psychoanalytic theory. The question of whether any Western framework is entirely adequate for understanding Hinduism is a matter of considerable debate, but when the theory in question is as as Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud’s, the atmosphere gets even more contentious. Are psychoanalytic concepts valid and universal enough to be applied by anyone to anything? More specifically, can those concepts be applied to a Hindu renunciate who lived over a century ago in a culture vastly different from Freud’s Europe or today’s America?

As with translation arguments, this is a matter for scholars to adjudicate. Non-experts can readily see the appeal of Freudian ideas, but they can also see why psychoanalytic concepts might produce an incomplete portrait of an individual, or even a radical distortion. At issue, among other things, is the relationship between the erotic and the mystical. That the two might be connected is easy to see; that they are inextricably and causally linked, as Kripal would argue, is a leap that many — including the authors of Interpreting Ramakrishna — are unwilling to take. To them, Freudian interpreters of religion are the proverbial hammer carriers, finding nails wherever they look.

Finally, Tyagananda and Vrajaprana accuse Kripal of making bold assertions that are unsupported by the available evidence. In their view, Kali’s Child is more a product of speculative imagination than of rigorous deduction, the inference being that Kripal’s conclusions owe more to his own psyche and his philosophical biases than to the facts at hand. Needless to say, Kripal’s supporters make the same claim about Ramakrishna’s devotees, many of whose descriptions of the master can accurately, and unsurprisingly, be described as hagiographic — representing a revered person as perfect or ideal.

My two cents

I myself do not approach these disputed issues as either an academic or an expert on the life of Ramakrishna. But I have more than a passing interest in how religions, especially Hinduism, are understood by the general public, so I am glad that Tyagananda and Vrajaprana have presented their argument in painstaking detail and readable prose. I hope that academic scholars, for their part, will critique their work honestly and vigorously and let the chips fall where they may, rather than summarily ignoring the book because the authors are devotees and not fellow academics. That would be a shame, as their voices, like Kripal’s, deserve to be heard.

For a long time, something called “The Insider/Outsider ” has raged in the ivory towers of religious studies. To religious practitioners (“insiders”), scholars of religion who rely primarily on textual analysis (“outsiders”) lack the direct experience necessary to comprehend spiritual beliefs and practices. For their part, scholars tend to see insiders as lacking the objectivity necessary to see their own religions without nearsighted distortion.��

Each side makes a strong case, but each is weighted down with preconceived notions. This begs the question: Is there such a thing as objectivity in matters of religion? As Tyagananda and Vrajaprana themselves acknowledge, “objectivity cannot exist where personal interests, agendas, political and religious biases, and personal priorities intersect. Like all holy grails, true objectivity exists only in mythology.” One wishes that statement could be read before every clash over religion begins.

Adherents of Christianity, Judaism and Islam have also been perturbed by scholarly depictions of their faiths, but Hindus are at a particular disadvantage. Very few have been trained in Western schools of religious studies, and their tradition has not been well represented in the academy. In recent decades, the imbalance has been somewhat ameliorated by the advent of Western practitioner-scholars — mainly baby boomers who got involved with during the 1960s and 1970s and went on to graduate school. But there is still a dearth of religious studies scholars who were born into Hinduism. Lay scholars, primarily Hindu Americans of Indian descent, have attempted to pick up the slack, and they have not always been welcome in academia.

It goes without saying that in a global, plural world, it is vitally important that individuals come to understand religions other than their own. That understanding will be derived, in large part, from university-based scholars. But if those scholars ignore the insiders’ viewpoint, what they teach the rest of us is bound to be incomplete.

As someone who stands outside both traditional religion and academia and benefits immensely from both perspectives, I can only hope that diligent insiders, such as Tyagananda and Vrajaprana, can find a place at the table, where their work can be judged on its merits. These researchers appear to have left no stone unturned, and herculean efforts like these should add to the discussion of Ramakrishna studies (yes, there is such a sub-discipline) and to our understanding of modern Hinduism in general.

As for the holy man at the center of the controversy, I suspect he would view it all with amusement and sublime detachment. To generations of seekers, Ramakrishna remains the most versatile of mystics — a saint for all seasons, and a symbol of ecstatic devotion, rational nondualism and elastic, eclectic spirituality. He not only espoused the core Vedic dictum, “Truth is one, the wise call it by many names,” but lived it by diving into a variety of Hindu pathways and practices, as well as, famously, Islam and Christianity. 

For the millions who continue to draw inspiration from Ramakrishna’s life and work, the claims of Kali’s Child and the counterclaims of Interpreting Ramakrishna are sideshows. To them, the sage’s sexuality — whether conscious or unconscious, acted upon or sublimated, homosexual or heterosexual — is about as relevant as Michelangelo’s or Johann Sebastian Bach’s. In the end, what matters is what he did, what he said, what he created, what he became. I suspect the authors of both Interpreting Ramakrishna and Kali’s Child would agree.

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[Naveed Ahsan and edited this piece.]

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The role of imperialism

Colonialism gave rise to the between developed countries (colonizers) and developing countries (colonies). These came with several facets: In , the indigenous populations faced genocide and were replaced by Europeans, bringing the settlements under the aegis of capital. Colonial empires of each colonizing country became sources of minerals and farm produce (obtained via a of surplus) and served as for manufactured commodities produced in the colonizing countries — this led to colonial while Britain import of manufactured commodities between the 18th and 19th centuries. were jointly oppressed by more than one colonizing country. Colonies also provided and to work in colonial mines and plantations.

Investment during the colonial period proceeded differently in the colonizing and colonized countries. In the colonies, investment was principally in mines, plantations and , which in tandem enabled colonies to export crops and minerals while importing manufactured commodities from the colonizing countries. The drain of surplus from the colonies not only 19th century Britain to open its domestic market for consumer goods exports from other colonizing countries (United States, Germany, France etc.), but also export capital to these other colonizing countries (, United States etc.).

The other colonizing countries deployed industrial policy whereby they initially imported capital goods from Britain but gradually ascended the technological ladder. By the 20th century, they had surpassed Britain technologically. The income deflation that British capital enforced on its colonies caused the drain of surplus to diminish. Japanese competition negatively impacted colonies’ ability to be reserve markets for British capital. Consequently, British capital tended to emphasize to the detriment of enterprise (relative to other colonizing countries) that cemented its technological lag.

After , World War I disrupted the world economy. British hegemony declined, and limited industrialization took place in some colonies, such as India. But that was also influenced by British policy designated defense procurement at the lower reaches of the technological ladder. On the other hand, increasing conflict among the colonizing powers allowed some policy space for limited industrialization in some Latin American .

When a wave of decolonization began in the middle of the 20th century, there existed several differences between the developed and the developing countries. First, there was a significant difference in average per capita income between developed and developing countries. Second, economic activities in the developing countries were principally located in the lower reaches of the technological ladder, especially production of minerals and farm produce, while the opposite was the case in the developed countries. Third, there existed a large labor surplus in the developing countries who were either unemployed, underemployed or engaged in petty production.

How has the picture changed since then? It is indisputable that the per capita income gap between developed countries and a few hitherto developing countries has declined. This group includes two types of countries.

The first is countries or territories that have small geography and populations, such as Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong. Thanks to the Soviet Union’s existence, these countries were able to form special political relationships with the US based on industrial policy after 1945. The policies ensured both market access for exports and relevant technology transfer. These countries were able to selectively ascend the technological ladder and achieve per capita income levels comparable to developed countries. Some of these gains after the 1997–1998 Asian Crisis when these US political compulsions declined following the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991.

Second, there are some oil exporting countries who have achieved high levels of per capita income. Like the first group, they have a special political relationship with the US. They have constituted themselves into the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The industrial structure of this second group is even less diversified than countries and territories in the first group.

The development experience of both these types evidently cannot be replicated in other countries. After all, the US is incapable of having a special political relationship with all developing countries.

China, a large developing country both in terms of population and land area, has experienced rapid growth. As a result, it has established a diversified industrial structure that is and an ascent of the technological ladder that is now at least to the US. But China’s per capita income level is well below that of developed countries.

As far as the other developing countries are concerned (which comprise a majority of the world’s population), their per capita income levels are either low or middle income. They still operate at the relatively lower reaches of the technological ladder and are characterized by a large labor surplus.

Therefore, the claim that the world economies are merely different in income levels but their internal functioning involves the same set of principles is empirically untenable. These differences between the developed and developing countries may be due to international (external) factors, domestic (internal) factors or some combination of both. 

In all three cases, development economics remains relevant. Let’s examine some of these themes after addressing some methodological points.

Institutions and economic development

It is being argued that the rise in per capita income levels of some developing countries and the increasing methodological convergence with mainstream economics have blurred the lines between development economics and other branches of economics. It is implied that as some countries have moved from low- to middle-income status, the unique characteristics of development economics — focused on addressing the problems of poor countries — are becoming obsolete.

Economists argue that institutions have played a key role in economic development. Our arguments in the previous section may be seen as positing the role of international institutions (imperialism) in determining the extent of diffusion of economic development.

Other , such as Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, have argued that inclusive political and economic institutions are critical for long-term sustainable development, whereas extractive institutions can stunt growth and create entrenched inequalities. Even countries with rising incomes can face stagnation or regression if their institutions remain or become weak or serve only the interests of existing elites. These views have been critiqued from .

Moreover, rising incomes can mask deeper structural issues such as decline or stagnation in life expectancy trends, inequality and deceleration in innovation. Without addressing these institutional deficiencies, some countries can easily revert to underdevelopment, political instability and systemic economic crises.

Therefore, development economics retains its distinctiveness by offering insights into how historical, social and political structures shape economic outcomes that differ across countries.

Development microeconomics and development macroeconomics

Ravi Kanbur    that “in the realm of theory and conceptualisation, many of the ‘old’ development economics perspectives on departure of individual choice behaviour from textbook rational choice theory, or of market failure, are now seen as very much part of mainstream economics debates.”

Two factors are relevant here. First, this quotation is about microeconomics. It’s true that some mainstream economists recognize that individual behavior departs from neoclassical tenets. This is the case in both developed and developing countries.

Second, the macroeconomic setting within which behavior of individuals unfolds is quite different in developed and developing countries. Eminent economists Utsa and Prabhat Patnaik that imperialism involves a set up where the production pattern of developing countries is decisively influenced by developed countries by constraining them to be open to specific types of international trade and capital flows. Consequently, farm produce and minerals, which are primarily produced in developing countries, are exported to developed countries by squeezing incomes of non-elites in developing countries. As long as this is valid, macroeconomic models of developed countries need not explicitly take into account the sector producing farm produce and minerals. Therefore, of developing countries do take into account the sector producing farm produce and minerals (often denoted as the agricultural sector in such models).

Similarly, in a world where the US dollar is the reserve currency, it does not follow that all other countries face identical external constraints. For instance, the interest rate differential between the US and other developed countries on average significantly falls short of the average interest rate differential between the US and developing countries. Consequently, the contours of trends vary between developed and developing countries.

Neoliberal globalization and inequality

The wave of neoliberal globalization that began in the 1970s involved the following aspects: First, there’s the emergence of international , centered in the US but mobile across countries. This emergence has attenuated the effectiveness of policy interventions contradictory to international finance capital’s interests. Second, there’s limited mobility of enterprise capital (involved largely in economic activities at the relatively lower reaches of the technological ladder) in areas that are principally in and around China, on account of . Third, due to the first and second factors, the share of wages in output in developed and developing countries has declined, leading to a of world demand. The wage gap between the developed and developing countries has not declined to such an extent (taking into account other elements of cost and demand) that labor arbitrage could result in a worldwide transfer of production capacity, at all levels of the technological ladder, from the developed to the developing countries.

More broadly, Amit Bhaduri that globalization has not only widened the gap between rich and poor on a global scale, but has exacerbated inequalities within both developed and developing countries. A.K. Dutt that an export-led growth model tends to confine developing countries to the lower reaches of the technological ladder, unless there is investment that furthers technological change and market access remains intact. It also results in developing countries being dependent on developed countries for commodities that are at the upper reaches of the technological ladder. The model makes developing countries more vulnerable to external shocks even if they are sector-specific, as long as this sector is key to the exports of a particular developing country.

It is worth reiterating that all countries in the world engage in export-led growth since world exports identically equal world imports. Besides, if all developing countries seek to push out exports of commodities that are produced at the lower reaches of the technological ladder then that would only contribute to the of inflation in developed countries. Bhaduri’s commentary illustrates the relevance of development economics by giving rise to a critique of export-led growth in developing countries and making the case for a domestic, demand-driven approach to economic development. Only through an industrial policy that nurtures local industries and domestic living standards can developing countries seek to attain meaningful strategic autonomy.

Since the 1970s, economic policy has been dominated by neoliberalism and has pressed working people the world over. As a result, inequality has risen, as by Pranab Bardhan. The rise in equality has principally involved capital gaining at the expense of labor. Moreover, there has been a further squeeze in the magnitude and composition of public welfare (or social wage including education, healthcare, infrastructure etc.). But this squeeze has been more pronounced in developing countries where besides the unemployed, petty producers and the underemployed a new category of a has emerged. These people are poor in spite of working full time — workers in the are an example.

Using a critical examination of neoliberalism, A.K. Dutt also seeks to a need for development strategies centered on redistribution and active state intervention in developing countries. Dutt argues that the fundamental inadequacies of neoliberal policies, by design, neglect issues of social welfare and equity. Neoliberalism places profits of firms (primarily in the developed countries) over people, failing to address the structural issues that keep developing countries trapped in poverty and inequality.

By emphasizing the importance of non-neoliberal state intervention, Dutt challenges the neoliberal orthodoxy. He goes on to propose that governments in developing countries take an active role in regulating markets, redistributing wealth and investing in public goods such as education, healthcare and infrastructure. These measures promote equitable growth and lay the foundation for more resilient economies in developing countries.

The need for context-specific development strategies

Leading economist, Dani Rodrik’s of mainstream economics underscores the critical role of development economics in making a case for inclusive development. Mainstream economic models often adopt a one-size-fits-all approach, assuming both developed and developing economies are homogeneous. This view overlooks the unique historical, institutional and social contexts of each country. This oversight is particularly harmful in the Global South, where policies grounded in such untenable generalizations have exacerbated inequality and failed to address the needs of marginalized people.

Rodrik points to the failures of neoliberal policies, such as the Structural Adjustment Programs of the 1980s and 1990s, which prioritized austerity and market liberalization without considering local realities and, arguably, their rationale. These programs often deepened poverty and eroded state capacities, demonstrating the limitations of mainstream economics. In contrast, development economics fills this gap by advocating for context-specific economic strategies.

Nobel laureate Amartya Sen the need for an inclusive approach to development. He argues that it should be measured not merely by economic growth, but by improvements in human well-being and freedom. Sen’s Capability Approach aligns with the principles of development economics, which prioritizes the expansion of human freedoms, access to education, healthcare and other social goods as central to development — issues especially relevant in developing countries.

Joseph Stiglitz, also a Nobel laureate  the failures of neoliberal policies in fostering sustainable development. He argues that laissez-faire alone cannot solve deep-rooted issues like inequality and that state intervention is crucial in providing public goods and ensuring less inequitable outcomes. Like Rodrik, Stiglitz asserts that development strategies must be context-specific, acknowledging that different countries face different barriers to growth.

These economists collectively reinforce the centrality of development economics in creating inclusive development strategies that recognize the complexities of each country’s unique difficulties. Their work emphasizes the need for economic policies that go beyond growth and efficiency, focusing instead on equity, human welfare and sustainable, context-sensitive development. By addressing these dimensions, development economics remains essential in designing pathways to more inclusive economic growth.

The case for industrial policy

Influential economist and author known for his critiques of neoliberalism and advocacy of industrial policy, Ha-Joon Chang that developed countries advocate that developing countries must adopt laissez-faire policies. Yet as previously explained, they themselves have used industrial policies to attain the status of developed countries. These trends have been well , though US policy makers have gone to great lengths to their use of industrial policy.

Chang’s critique reveals that industrial policy remains crucial for countries at every stage of economic development. Faced with the strategic challenge from China, developed countries — the US most of all — are resorting to import bans, tariffs, subsidies, export controls etc. Neoliberalism, which denies developing countries these tools, perpetuates the very structural inequalities that imperialism engenders.

Chang’s insights are particularly relevant today as many developing countries still operate in the relatively lower reaches of the technological ladder. If it challenges neoliberalism, development economics could provide a framework for promoting industrial policies that can support the long-term structural transformation these countries need for economic development.

The persistence of underdevelopment and the fallacy of convergence

Kanbur’s argument fails to account for the persistent structural barriers to convergence between rich and poor countries. According to mainstream growth models, developing countries should grow faster than developed countries if they have similar levels of technology and institutional quality. Yet convergence remains elusive for a number of reasons. First, technological levels are never the same between both sets of countries, not least because of technology controls instituted by developed countries. Second, institutional quality does vary among developed and developing countries — weak, non-participative institutions and deficits in infrastructure exist in developing countries. Mancur Olson’s on institutional inefficiencies shows how these barriers prevent convergence.

More generally, convergence between developed and developing countries if four conditions are met. First, there must be full mobility of enterprise capital across countries. Second, there must be full mobility of workers across countries. Third, exports of developing countries to developed countries must be adequately large. Fourth, consumption, especially of elites, in developing countries and composition of capital goods that constitute investment must be sufficiently elastic with respect to the relative price of domestically produced commodities vis-à-vis commodities produced in the developed countries.

Evidently, the second and fourth conditions are not satisfied. The first and third are also not satisfied despite China’s role in the world economy. This is because the share of other developing countries in and greenfield foreign direct isn’t high enough to sufficiently narrow the development gap.

Development economics as a field of resistance

Development economics remains not only relevant but essential, as developed and developing countries are linked but dissimilar. Its focus on industrial policy and context-specific policies offers the tools necessary to resist the status quo and grapple with economic development challenges in a world with no convergence.

By focusing on the structural difficulties that perpetuate poverty and inequality, development economics serves as a field of resistance, pushing back against neoliberal orthodoxy.

Needless to say, development economics is pluralist by definition. We have highlighted several diverse perspectives here, even ones we do not necessarily agree with.

The assertion that development economics has lost its distinctiveness is not just misguided, it’s reductionist. It overlooks that development economics comprises development microeconomics, development macroeconomics and related fields like international economics. Kanbur’s proposition involves the conflation of development microeconomics with the whole of development economics.

It is true that per capita income levels in some developing countries have risen. However, the gap between the average per capita income levels of both sets of countries tends to be large. Moreover, even some mainstream economists have that developing countries face a middle income trap. No matter how this middle income trap is theorized, it is the case that this is a challenge only for developing countries.

This narrow focus solely on per capita income overlooks the pervasive structural inequalities, historically persistent divergences and the adverse impact of neoliberalism that continue to shape the world economy. Far from obsolete, development economics remains indispensable in addressing these multifaceted issues.

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The findings of the provide valuable insights into career aspirations, government support for startups, and suggestions for fostering a more supportive environment for future entrepreneurs. The implications of these findings are significant for policymakers, educators, and investors. By supporting this entrepreneurial movement, India could undergo transformative change and set an example of student-led growth for the global community.

Indian students stand out globally, demonstrating one of the highest levels of entrepreneurial ambition. As India’s startup ecosystem thrives, aided by government initiatives like Startup India and extensive support from academic institutions, the GUESSS report raises essential conversations for policymakers, educators, and stakeholders. Targeted strategies are needed to harness this entrepreneurial potential by closing critical gaps, improving accessibility, and building an environment where every aspiring entrepreneur can succeed.

Immediate career preferences: employment is primary, but entrepreneurship is on the rise

The GUESSS India 2023 report, the in India, reveals that 69.7% of Indian students intend to pursue employment right after graduation, a statistic that mirrors global trends. Many students within this group aspire to join large corporations, public service, or academia, reflecting the value placed on job security and career stability early on. This preference aligns with the traditional education-to-employment path that has historically directed students toward stable jobs post-graduation.

However, a growing segment—about 14%—aims to jump directly into entrepreneurship. This new wave of students sees potential in creating their own businesses and contributing to India’s dynamic startup environment. With entrepreneurship becoming more attractive due to platforms like and the success stories of , students are increasingly inspired to build their ventures.

Five years after graduation, the number of students aiming to launch their businesses more than doubled, reaching 31.4%. Meanwhile, preference for traditional employment falls to 52.2%. This trend suggests an “employee-first, entrepreneur-later” mindset, where students view the corporate experience as valuable preparation for entrepreneurship. For policymakers and educational institutions, this deferred approach signals the need to create pathways that make entrepreneurship a feasible career choice right after graduation.

The role of government initiatives: startup India and incubators

Government initiatives, especially Startup India, have created a vast network of over 500 government-recognized incubators nationwide, fostering a supportive environment for young entrepreneurs. These incubators serve as critical resources, providing funding, mentorship, and hands-on business support to help students overcome early obstacles. In addition, programs like tax exemptions, simplified compliance, and prioritized procurement for government projects have helped student-led ventures thrive. 

Through initiatives like the National Innovation and Startup Policy () and the National Education Policy (), the government encourages universities to include entrepreneurship in their curricula—for example, the funds numerous universities’ innovation labs and incubation centers. The and encourage student entrepreneurship by supporting ventures that foster national self-reliance and showcase Indian ingenuity. Expanding access to incubators, mentorship, and funding focused on young entrepreneurs will empower more students to transform their ambitions into businesses that enhance India’s economic resilience and international stature.

Challenges in achieving the entrepreneurial vision

Despite enthusiasm for entrepreneurship, challenges hinder the transition from intention to action. Currently, only manage active, revenue-generating businesses. This discrepancy suggests barriers to transforming startup ideas into functional businesses, requiring attention from institutions and policymakers. Furthermore, male students display higher entrepreneurial ambition than their female counterparts, highlighting the need for programs encouraging women entrepreneurs. Resource accessibility, especially incubators and funding, also varies across regions, posing additional challenges for students in rural or underserved areas. Addressing these regional disparities is crucial to ensuring equal entrepreneurial opportunities for all students.

Recommendations to unlock India’s entrepreneurial potential

The following actions are essential to maximize the entrepreneurial potential of India’s youth:

1. Expand Incubation Support: While India’s incubator network is growing, making these resources more accessible to students across regions, especially women entrepreneurs, would create a more inclusive ecosystem. Aligning these resources with student needs, particularly in non-urban areas, will foster a diverse and widespread entrepreneurial culture.

2. Enhance Entrepreneurial Education: Integrating entrepreneurship education across disciplines—not just in business schools—can foster a broader understanding of venture creation. Universities can also implement experiential programs that let students work on actual startup projects, bridging the gap between theory and practice.

3. Increase Government-Industry-Academia Collaboration: Collaborative programs among government agencies, private enterprises, and academic institutions can provide funding and mentorship, helping students gain valuable industry insights and connections crucial for entrepreneurial success.

4. Support Women Entrepreneurs: Mentorship programs and scholarships for female entrepreneurs can help close the gender gap in entrepreneurship. Female students can also benefit from connecting with female mentors and role models in business, inspiring more women to pursue entrepreneurial careers.

5. Promote a Startup Culture through Media and Events: Shows like Shark Tank India illustrate media’s impact on career ambitions. More events and initiatives celebrating young entrepreneurs can help create a culture where entrepreneurship is encouraged and celebrated.

India’s path forward: reflections from stakeholders

As India’s student entrepreneurship ecosystem grows, policymakers, educators, and industry leaders have a unique opportunity to shape a future where student-driven innovation fuels economic growth. Supporting the ambitions of young entrepreneurs benefits individuals and contributes to solving more significant economic issues, from job creation to technological advancement.

The GUESSS India 2023 Survey reveals a strong entrepreneurial drive among India’s youth. The challenge ahead is creating a comprehensive support system that removes obstacles and improves accessibility, enabling these entrepreneurial aspirations to become impactful realities. Through effective policies, enhanced educational frameworks, and collaborative initiatives, India can position itself as a global hub for student-led entrepreneurship.

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The West has tried to Russia internationally, defeat it militarily and, through an array of draconian sanctions, cause its economic collapse. It has met none of these objectives.

Russia’s connections with China have deepened strategically. India has preserved its strategic ties with Moscow despite Western pressure. Russian with several African countries also have a new momentum. Moscow is strongly present in the West Asia region and has a close relationship with key Arab countries. Its partnership with some Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries is gaining steam, too.

BRICS’s expansion

The of BRICS in 2023 with Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia had already signaled that major countries in the Global South had a very different perspective on Russia than the West did. It sees Russia as a friendly country, not an adversary. That almost 40 countries have shown interest in joining BRICS, a forum in which Moscow plays a key role, signifies that Russia is an attractive partner to them.

The Global South seeks a reformed international system that would reflect the shifts in power equations away from the West, both economic and political, that have occurred over the years. These countries want more attention to be paid to their concerns and priorities.

The West’s double standards regarding its “values-based” policies, its military interventions, its use of various means to bring about regime changes, its use of sanctions as a policy tool, its weaponization of the United States dollar and the US’s global financial system have increasingly pushed non-Western countries to hedge themselves against Western pressures by joining forums such as BRICS. If Russia earlier looked westwards, the West has turned its back on Russia. Now Russia is much more focused on its Eurasian identity and is looking eastwards.

Non-Western countries cannot opt out of the existing international system or create one of their own. What they hope to do is to change the balance of power within the existing system and reform it to ensure more equality and equity in its functioning. The Global South countries, which also have close relations with the West, are being attracted to join BRICS or associate with it in order to increase their political, economic and security options.

The fact that 24 world leaders attended the Kazan summit, including those of five founding members and the four new permanent members, show that the West’s already failing efforts to isolate Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, have been strongly rebuffed.

More members may bring complications

With so much interest in BRICS in the Global South, the question of expanding its membership and the criteria to do that pose difficulties. BRICS is a consensus-based forum. With the expansion, building a consensus on issues would become more difficult. That would affect the operation and credibility of the forum.

The of the BRICS Foreign Ministers in June 2024 at Nizhny Novgorod in Russia, also attended by the four new members, could not issue a joint communiqué because of differences on certain points.

Putin has himself publicly recognized the downside to any further expansion. He noted that the existing members have worked together for years and know how the forum functions. The process of absorbing the new members into the methods and spirit of the forum will be the immediate focus, not its expansion.

The decision, therefore, has been not to broaden the BRICS membership for the moment but to enlarge its base by accepting new countries as partners. Developing a consensus within BRICS on which countries should be admitted as partners was presumably not an easy exercise; all the BRICS members, old and new, had effective veto rights. It had to be ensured that no member country was particularly advantaged by the choice of partners and that the final list reflected a balance between the preferences of the forum’s members.

A wide spread

The Kazan summit saw the of 13 new BRICS partners: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. It is significant that four members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also among these.

Algeria, much to its disappointment, become a member when BRICS expanded last year. It has now obtained partner status. Two key Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) have become partners, too. Other Central Asian countries could obviously not be included as that would have weighed too much in favor of Russia’s interests. Already, the inclusion of Belarus is a clear Russian preference. The geographical spread of the new partner countries is noteworthy.

Russia’s obvious preference for Turkey was also accommodated given the latter’s for Russia, even though giving partner status to a NATO country might not fit into any normal criteria for deciding BRICS partnerships. Should NATO get a foothold in BRICS? From the Russian point of view, this would be a welcome political development in NATO’s eastern flank. The US, which sees BRICS as an organization created to rival the West in the global system, would be obviously perturbed by Turkey’s decision.

Why Pakistan was kept away

It would seem that China has not exercised its own special geopolitical preferences too visibly. If it were interested in Pakistan’s inclusion, as it could well have been — it had linked India’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) membership with that of Pakistan — it would have run into India’s strong opposition. In September 2024, while visiting Pakistan, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk its inclusion in BRICS but stated that such a decision would have to be based on a consensus. India clearly scotched any move to reach out to Pakistan, to the point that Pakistan seemingly was not invited to the summit.

India had reservations about Turkey becoming a partner because of its on Kashmir in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Ultimately, India did not stand in the way of Turkey becoming a BRICS partner.

The last BRICS summit approved the membership of Saudi Arabia, but it has not its acceptance. It was represented at the Kazan summit by its foreign minister. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Riyadh while the summit was being held in Kazan, which tells its own story.

Do not overestimate BRICS’s pace

The importance of BRICS’s expanded partnerships across Asia, Africa and Latin America should not be underestimated. It shows dissatisfaction with the current international system. Non-western countries want an end to the West’s hegemony. They suffer from the West’s self-centered, arbitrary policies. They see strengthened multilateralism reflected in multipolarity as the key to change.

At the same time, the pace at which BRICS can bring about this change should not be exaggerated. The goals of BRICS in forging alternatives to the dollar-dominated financial system are not easy to achieve. Within the BRICS countries, there are rivalries and divisions. Their political systems differ. Some are deeply anti-West. Others have friendly ties with the West even when they seek more space for themselves in a West-dominated global system. There are large economic disparities within the group. The policies of some both help and hurt the interests of the Global South.

When all is said and done, BRICS’s expansion, with all its challenges, is a vehicle for a much-needed re-balancing within the global system — something India also seeks.

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Stereotypes actively ignore the reality of the Gulf region

The central flaw of the movie lies in its reliance on negative stereotypes. Saudi citizens are depicted in a manner that ignores the core values of hospitality, respect and cultural diversity that define much of Saudi society. This reductive representation not only mischaracterizes the Saudi people but also risks straining the diplomatic and economic ties between Saudi Arabia and India. For decades, Saudi Arabia has been a key partner to India, especially in providing employment opportunities for millions of Indian expatriates. However, Goat Life largely overlooks the positive contributions these expatriates offer Saudi society and the mutually beneficial relationships both countries have enjoyed in the Gulf.

The focus on negative experiences within Saudi Arabia is further complicated by the omission of success stories from the region. Many Indian professionals have built thriving careers in industries such as healthcare, technology and construction. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 initiative, which has specifically invited Indian professionals to contribute to the Kingdom’s ambitious development projects, is completely disregarded in the film. Initiatives like the program, which safeguards the rights of domestic workers, are also ignored, painting an incomplete picture of life for Indian expatriates in the Gulf.

Important social issues continue to be ignored

This misrepresentation in the movie reflects a broader trend in Indian foreign policy in which flaws in allied nations are highlighted while domestic issues are underplayed. Indian cinema, in this case, seems to follow suit. The film’s exaggerated depiction of life in Saudi Arabia diverts attention from pressing societal challenges in India, such as exploitation, gender-based violence and systemic inequality. Notable cases like the Nirbhaya gang rape or the Kathua incident are stark reminders of real, tragic stories that exist within India’s borders — stories that deserve more attention in Indian cinema.

This selective narrative raises further questions when considering recent developments such as the Canadian government’s allegations against the state of India. Canada accused India of being involved in the killing of Canadian nationals on Canadian soil. Such serious accusations, which have significant geopolitical implications, are conspicuously absent from Indian cinema’s focus. Why are these pressing international issues not addressed with the same vigor in Indian films? 

The selective focus on external flaws while overlooking internal issues mirrors a pattern often observed in India’s diplomatic stance. By critiquing its allies through international platforms, India risks eroding the goodwill that has long defined its relationships with key partners like Saudi Arabia. At a time when global interconnectedness is essential, the portrayal of nations in films like Goat Life should aim for greater nuance and fairness. Similarly, Indian cinema has an opportunity to shed light on the real struggles faced within its own borders, amplifying voices that demand justice and reform.

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Republics have suffered total collapses throughout history. There’s no reason why the US should be immune. The fear of that often prompts a superficial reference to the final fall of the Roman Republic or the end of Greek democracy. But there’s a deeper history: Republics came into being far earlier in Middle Eastern and Mediterranean civilizations. And we can draw from a much wider range of examples to learn from as we try to understand the challenges and the opportunities.

A true republic is a political system without monarchy or concentrated political power in any office, branch or individual. Elected officials represent citizens to make decisions on their behalf, with separate branches of government providing checks and balances. While many associate republics with direct democracy in our times, there’s a much wider array of power structures that developed in the formative era of republics.

The 20th century established republics as the global standard. Monarchies declined after World War I and most former European colonies declared independence as republics following World War II. Fascist and communist countries, which centralized power in individuals or ruling parties, also reduced in number.

Despite their concentration of power, however, many fascist and communist states claimed the title of republics. While countries out of 193 identify as republics today, far less uphold republican principles and blend them effectively with democracy. Examining the historical evolution of republics highlights those best positioned to serve as the most resilient modern examples.

Republics require regular gatherings and assemblies, making them difficult to establish in sparsely populated agrarian societies, while empires generally concentrate power too heavily for self-rule to gain traction. It was in smaller city-states, particularly trade-focused ones, where citizens could form factions, exchange ideas and influence government decisions and rules for commerce.

The invention of republican ideals

Some of the earliest experiments with republican governance appeared in ancient Sumerian city-states (4500–2000 BC), centered in modern-day Iraq. Kings acted more as neutral rather than rulers, sharing power with aristocratic families and groups, as well as common citizens. In Kish, citizens could a new king during crises. In Uruk, assemblies of townsmen and elders had to ratify major military decisions.

The Sumerian city-states fell to the Akkadian and Babylonian Empires by 1750 BC. Phoenician city-states, emerging about 250 years later in what is now Lebanon, revived republican ideals. Here, monarchical power was often with a merchant class and citizen council. Egyptian records dating to the mid-14th century BC describe Phoenician cities sending delegates to represent citizens rather than monarchs, with mentions of and aid requests by the “men of Arwad” and “elders of Irqata.”

By the 6th century BC, the Phoenician city of Tyre had functioned for seven years without a monarch, governed instead under suffetes, or judges, elected for short terms. In Chios, a “people’s council” allowed citizens to debate laws and hold officials accountable. However, beginning in the 9th century BC and continuing over the next few centuries, Phoenician city-states were successively conquered or subjugated by the Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian and Macedonian Empires.

Like other civilizations, Phoenicians established colonies and trading posts. Carthage, founded by Tyre in 814 BC in modern Tunisia, grew into a powerful city-state with its own . By the early 7th century BC, two elected suffetes from aristocratic families replaced the monarchy. They governed alongside an aristocratic Senate, while newer merchants could gain influence and a popular assembly allowed citizens’ input on major decisions. Military and religious leaders also held considerable power.

Republican ideals weren’t confined to Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. Buddhist texts like the Maha Parinibbana Sutta mention Indian republics called in the 6th century BC. Some adopted republican styles of government, while others formed republican confederations, like Sumerian and Phoenician city-states, to make decisions collectively and protect against larger threats. The Indian republics were gradually absorbed by the Maurya Empire (321–185 BC) and other entities.

Greece and Rome evolved republics

Ancient Greek city-states also developed republican ideals. Sparta was governed by a constitution and popular assembly as early as 600 BC, though it remained largely monarchical. Athens established a direct democracy in 507 BC, known as demokratia, meaning “people” and “rule.” Greece’s slave-based economy allowed some citizens time to participate in politics, though this limited political fairness. In 431 BC, Attica, the region surrounding Athens, had an estimated population of 315,000, of which only 172,000 were citizens, and just 40,000 male citizens could vote.

Still, Athens’s allowed these citizens to frequently debate, deliberate and vote. They were overseen by the Council of Five Hundred, which was chosen annually by lot to draft laws and manage administration. However, following Athens’s Golden Age, 4th century BC Greek like Plato and Aristotle, and later 2nd century BC historians like Polybius, criticized the system for inefficiency and vulnerability to charismatic leaders to sway public opinion, leading to volatile policy shifts.

They emphasized balancing public, aristocracy, and monarchical roles to avoid the typical of chaos and order: First, a strong leader unites a restive society under a monarchy, which evolves into tyranny. It is overthrown and replaced by an aristocracy, which reduces into oligarchy. Democracy eventually replaces it but deteriorates into mob rule, restarting the cycle.

Invasions further weakened Greece’s republican and democratic systems. In 338 BC, Greece fell under the control of the Macedonian Empire, ending the independence of many city-states. Despite this, Greek states formed republican confederations to protect against threats, including the neighboring Roman Republic. The term republic derives from the Roman res publica, meaning “public affairs” — this emphasizes shared governance, civic participation and checks and balances. Since its founding in 509 BC, the Roman Republic’s political structure had evolved considerably. Polybius expressed for Rome’s system; two tribunes were elected annually to represent the common citizens, while two consuls were elected and held executive power, checked by an aristocratic senate.

Romans were skeptical of Greek democracy, especially in Athens, due to its instability, infighting and mob rule. Carthage’s republic seemed overly commercial and lacked the civic loyalty the Romans valued. This loyalty was central to Rome’s military, staffed by a citizen army motivated by . In contrast, Carthage’s strong, citizen-led navy protected trade routes, but its reliance on mercenaries for land campaigns made them costly and unpredictable.

These factors reduced the ability to push back against Roman rule. By 146 BC, Rome defeated both Greece and Carthage, cementing its dominance and expanding political system. Polybius suggests that Rome’s success over Carthage was partially due to its powerful, aristocratic Senate, while Carthage’s policies were increasingly shaped by popular influence. He believed that Rome’s decisions were made by elites versus the influence of the masses in Carthage.

Yet by this time, Rome was approaching its Late Republic phase. Scholar Harriet Flower’s argues that the Roman Republic wasn’t a single entity but a series of six republics, each with unique political characteristics. Others have also challenged the notion of a single Roman Republic, placing Republican Rome into three main periods characterized by changing centers of power.

The Early Republic (509–367 BC) was marked by tensions between patricians (aristocratic elites) and plebeians (common citizens). The struggle for plebeian rights led to significant reforms, including the establishment of tribunes, elected by the to represent common interests and often from the plebeian class.

During the Middle Republic (367–133 BC), the Licinian-Sextian laws of 367 BC were passed to again alleviate tensions between patricians and plebeians, limiting patrician land ownership, providing debt relief for plebeians and ensuring that at least one of the two consuls was a plebeian. However, political power increasingly concentrated in the Senate, undermining these reforms.

During the Late Republic (133–31 BC), Rome’s military success over rivals coincided with the growing influence of ordinary citizens in the judicial system, especially as jurors. Yet the republic was plagued by social conflict, corruption and civil unrest. Sulla’s march on Rome in 88 BC and his curtailing of the tribunes’ power exemplified rising instability. Afterwards, figures like in the ’70s BC and Julius Caesar in 59 BC began consolidating power, further undermining republican values. In 27 BC, Augustus formally transitioned Rome into an empire, while maintaining the of republican traditions.

Roman orator Cicero, a prominent defender of the Republic, inadvertently its demise through his support for Augustus, endorsement of dictatorial powers and willingness to suspend legal norms during crises, showing the dangers of sacrificing republican ideals to manage turmoil. For the next few centuries, republican ideals were largely sidelined.

The rise of modern republics

The collapse of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD saw and monarchies spread across its former territories and peripheral regions. This instability nonetheless allowed new republics to emerge, such as Venice, founded in 697 AD. It maintained a 1,100-year run as a through a political system that encouraged merchant participation and representation, shrewd diplomacy, social mobility, community cohesion and an extensive trade network. France eventually conquered it in 1797.

During the Italian Renaissance (14th to 17th centuries), urbanization, advancements in communication and Enlightenment ideals enabled the rise of new city-states. Merchant classes and other groups established republican systems as alternatives to European monarchies elsewhere as well. However, they were ultimately absorbed by empires, partly due to their inability to exploit the expanding Atlantic trade routes that reduced the importance of the Mediterranean.

Republics were not confined to Europe. The in modern-day Malaysia, particularly the Lanfang Republic declared in 1777, arose when Chinese settlers recruited by local sultans for mining formed companies to safeguard their interests. Over time, they evolved into self-governing territories with elected leaders and various levels of democratic governance. The Lanfang Republic was eventually defeated by Dutch colonial forces in 1884, with the rest absorbed through treaty or militarily defeated by the century’s end.

The establishment of the US marked the reemergence of the large-scale republican state. In 1787, after the American Revolution, the nation formally became a constitutional republic, aiming to eliminate monarchy while avoiding a chaotic direct democracy. The Founding Fathers created a , balancing public participation with safeguards against aristocracy and emphasizing consent of the governed (though limited to white male landowners). The debates over constitutional amendments and expanding democracy for decades, paralleling similar discussions in post-Revolutionary France after 1789.

Today, many republics exist, but their authenticity and stability can be compromised. Being conquered imposes outside authority, while others pursue foreign expansion themselves, centralizing control and subjugating other territories. Republics such as those in 16th century Netherlands, 17th century England and 18th century US and France grew into empires or reverted to monarchies, adapting in ways whose lessons are still relevant today. These expansionist policies, often justified as essential for wealth and security, led to the abandonment of certain republican and democratic principles.

Risks of devolution

Republics can shift toward authoritarianism, with modern policymakers perceiving more open democratic systems as unstable and vulnerable to manipulation. In recent years, China and Russia have seen reductions in public accountability, civil liberties, meaningful political participation and concentrations of power behind Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, respectively. In North Korea, power has been concentrated in the leader’s office since its founding, with leadership passed within the Kim family. Similarly, a dynasty has developed under the Aliyev family in since the 1990s, with concerns that may follow.

Countries with strong presidential systems, common in the Americas, risk in the executive branch. Fixed terms limit the removal of unpopular leaders, since, unlike in parliamentary democracies, no “confidence vote” mechanism exists for crisis situations. can also weaken checks and balances; coups can be common.

Alliances and federations of Greek city-states like the and , as well as the Native American , formed assemblies and councils for representation and collective decision-making, influencing models like the and European Union (EU). The statement that the US is “a republic, not a democracy” reflects the original aim to keep political power within the states rather than the federal government. However, authority has increasingly centralized in Washington, DC, reducing state sovereignty, tensions in the EU between individual states and Brussels.

Political apathy and extremism can also stem from the influence of billionaires and corporations over the political process, government corruption and the erosion of social mobility. Social media platforms offer the chance for heightened political participation, but are increasingly vulnerable to disinformation spread by big tech and political actors. This reveals new ways in which democracies can veer toward .

The diversity of republics today reflects their historical variety, with countries still navigating the governance structures in their own contexts. Kazakhstan, initially authoritarian, has seen some toward a more balanced system with a more powerful parliament following popular protests in 2022, though it remains less democratic. Similarly, Singapore, often described as authoritarian, is still considered a republic due to some , maintaining a blend of controlled leadership and political structure.

The future of republic governance

An informed and engaged citizenry, supported by a strong economic base, is essential for a successful republic. Citizens must feel the benefits of their system, and these must endure through fair elections, the rule of law and due process. Effective foreign policy also relies on wide-ranging trade networks and adaptable alliances, while maintaining a strong military and avoiding military overreach or falling into the trap of foreign conquest.

Historically, empire and monarchy have been more common than republics, shaping world order through hierarchical and anarchic systems. Within the global United Nations framework, which is designed to support the sovereignty and equality of nations — a principle rooted in republican ideals — republics can govern more democratically by collaborating in a way similar to ancient confederations. The Achaean League and Lycian League consisted of states with varying political systems cooperating within a loose, republican-style confederation. Modern blocs like the EU, Association of Southeast Asian Nations and African Union allow countries to work together under common principles and boost their voice in the international system.

Changes in domestic politics have seen the growth of in the 2010s, as more referendums and popular votes of legislative and constitutional issues emerged globally, but especially in Europe. While larger republics like the US, Germany and India still avoid national-level votes on major issues, direct democracy is increasingly apparent at regional and local levels. Challenges remain in terms of deliberation and integration, as states like California and Arizona have seen ballot initiatives rushed, leaving limited time for meaningful debate.

Modern , based on those originating thousands of years ago, have also elevated these referendums in recent years and provided an alternative to traditional political processes. They have influenced major policy changes, from climate policies in France to abortion laws in Ireland, with assemblies, typically convened by legislative bodies in partnership with nonprofits, designed to reflect demographics. While they have led to concrete policy shifts, some recommendations have not been adopted as lawmakers cite the importance of expert-led decision-making.

With the US election behind us, reassessing republican ideals, both domestically and globally, is crucial. As the Grand Old Party potentially gains control over all three branches of government in a divided nation, how it implements policies will either ease concerns or amplify them. The future of republicanism depends on the US shaping its domestic agenda for the common good and using its influence on the global stage in line with democratic principles.

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Singh’s rise to military success

Singh was born in Kusumdesar Village in the Churu region of the Bikaner Kingdom on July 14, 1919, to Brijlal Singh Rathore, a soldier, and his wife Jadao Kanwar. In 1938, after his intermediate exam, Singh was enrolled as a Naik, or corporal, in the Bikaner State Forces. When World War II broke out, he received a commission as a Second Lieutenant from the King. In 1949, he was absorbed into the Indian Army with the Third Gorkha Rifles .��

In 1961, Singh was promoted to the rank of brigadier and was given the command ofIndia’s paratroopers, the . “Operation Vijay,” the plan for the liberation of Goa from the Portuguese, commenced on December 17, 1961. Although the 50th Parachute Brigade was given a secondary role in the original operational plan, their rapid advance and initiative under Singh’s dynamic leadership made them the first to reach Panjim, the capital of Goa. On the morning of December 19,Panjim to the brigade. Portuguese Governor General and Commander-in-Chief Major General Vassalo De’ Silva fled to Marmagao but later surrendered. At 11 AM, Singh’s forces hoisted the Indian tricolor on the Secretariat Building at Panjim.

Refusal to retreat led to one of India’s greatest victories

Singh’s success did not stop there. In 1965,China issued an to India to vacate the border outposts of Nathu La and Jelep La in Sikkim. Above him in the military hierarchy was Lieutenant General Sam Manekshaw, the Eastern Army Commander, and Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, commander of the XXXIII corps, who were responsible for Sikkim. Singh, now a major general, was the General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 17th Mountain Division, which controlled Nathu La. Orders given to the 17th and 27th Divisions required that they vacate the outposts and fall back to the main defenses in the case of hostilities.

The GOC of the 27th (deployed to the east of the 17th) from Jelep La. Thus, Jelep La fell to the Chinese. To this day, the vital pass leading to the is still with China. Singh, however, refused to pull back. From August to September 1967, the Chinese tried their best to make Indians withdraw from Nathu La, but Singh made his forces hold on even though he could have vacated this outpost. During this engagement, both sides suffered casualties, but Nathu La gave a bloody nose to the Chinese under Singh’s audacious leadership. The victory helped the nation and the army overcome some regrets of the military defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Perhaps Singh’s insistence on defending Nathu La led to him being given a non-operational command, the 101st Communications Zone in Shillong. However, this general with “a talent for war” had the uncanny quality of winding up in military operations. By this time, the Mizo separatist , orchestrated by the Mizo National Front, had begun. Since the area was under his responsibility, Singh set counter-insurgency operations into motion in Mizoram. His quick thinking quelled the rebellion for some time. Mizoram became an Indian state much later, in 1986. Mizoram is the rare example of a successful counter-insurgency operation, allthanks to the initial sagacious set by Singh.

The liberation of Bangladesh is Singh’s crowning glory

In December 1970, Singh was promoted to lieutenant general and assigned the command of the IV Corps. The hierarchy above Sagat was the same as it was in Nathu La in 1967: Aurora was now the Eastern Army commander and Manekshaw the army chief. 

Initially, the plans for the liberation of Bangladesh did not involve the capture of Dacca (now Dhaka), the capital of Bangladesh. The plan was to liberate areas up to the major rivers surrounding Dacca and thereafter to declare Bangladesh liberated. The army headquarters’ directive to Eastern Command did not envision Dacca as the final objective of the campaign in the east.

Singh was ordered to advance up to River Meghna from Tripura in the East and up to the river line. He was ordered not to cross the Meghna. However, military genius that he was, Singh clearly identified the two centers of gravity of the campaign: the fall of Dacca and the capitulation of all Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Undaunted by the massive Meghna, Singh launched the first-ever Indian heliborne operation across the river. His IV Corps raced to Dacca in a blitzkrieg. This led to the fall of the city and the capture of 93,000 Pakistani soldiers. It would perhaps have been appropriate for Singh, seeing as it was he who captured Dacca, rather than Aurora to have accepted the of Pakistani forces from Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi.

Singh’s legacy lives on

The Param Vishisht Seva Medal and the Padma Bhushan, awarded to Singh for his services in war, fall short of the magnitude of his contribution to the Indian nation. According to an unverifiable rumor, his victory ride through Dacca and his “son-of-the-soil” image may have ruffled his superiors’ feathers, causing them to deny him the awards he deserved. Whatever the case, it would now be appropriate to award him the , even posthumously.

Singh eventually settled down in Jaipur after retiring from the army in 1979. His house in Jaipur is called “Meghna,” as is his younger granddaughter. He breathed his last on September 26, 2001, at the age of 82.

On July 14, 2019, and the week after that, I had the unique privilege of organizing celebrations for the of the birth of this illustrious general. A prominent road in Jaipur has been adorned with a bust of Singh and named after him. The Jaipur Literary Festival in January 2019 witnessed readings from his biography. A seminar was organized in Jaipur, where generals who fought the war with him, as well as his son Lieutenant Colonel Ran Vijay Singh and his relatives, paid tribute in a very publicized event.

Truly, Singh was a general who never lost a battle.

[ edited this piece.]

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Sexual assault across countries and cultures

Jane’s home country of India is known as one of the most dangerous countries for women. Sexual violence is so pervasive that some consider it the . Many girls grow up to experience sexual harassment or assault at some point in their lives.

In early August, the of a female doctor in training on her college campus in Kolkata added to India’s troubling record of horrific sexual violence against women. The brutal attack sparked massive protests and strikes across the country after she was found dead on the podium of a seminar hall with injuries that suggested torture. Months later, the government is still responding to the crime and its repercussions as women demand justice and legal reform.

The Kolkata incident represents just one of the thousands of cases documented each year, with a rape reported every 15 minutes. Women in rural communities or those in lower castes, particularly the Dalits, are particularly vulnerable to sexual abuse. Dalits are known as impure “” in India, often working as street sweepers and latrine cleaners. They are sometimes manipulated into forced labor or prostitution.

Seen as lesser than others, Dalit women who face abuse are often dismissed, silenced or are subjected to victim-blaming. This is despite overwhelming evidence of abuse — with one study finding that over of Dalit women face sexual harassment or assault in their lifetime.

Upper-caste men often lower-caste women who are less likely to report them. They leverage their social standing and associated privilege to manipulate or cover up the case. This pattern is mirrored in the US, where men in positions of power target women who are lower on the socioeconomic ladder because they believe they will not be caught (i.e., men like Harvey Weinstein).

In India, cultural censorship of women, combined with inefficient government support, discourages them from reporting assaults and seeking help. Outdated practices, such as the , which some doctors still use to verify if a woman was penetrated, are just one of many ways women are humiliated in the aftermath of an assault.

India’s patriarchal culture and gender roles run deep, especially in communities with inadequate access to education and opportunities for development. Even if women stand up to violations of their human rights, they often face shame and ostracization, leading many to avoid coming forward.

Some studies estimate that as many as of rapes go unreported in India. In the US, an estimated of sexual assaults go unreported. The majority of data surrounding sexual abuse in India focuses primarily on rape, with studies on sexual harassment and other types of sexual assault (nonconsensual kissing, groping, touching etc.) receiving far less attention.

Public outrage has led to legislative reforms and increased institutional support for women in recent years. However, sexual assault remains commonplace in India, even for women from more privileged backgrounds, like Jane Doe.

Sexual misconduct in places that are meant to be safe for women, such as work, school or religious institutions, is not unique to countries with a poor track record on these issues. Women also face such threats in American institutions that continuously fail to respond effectively and transparently to cases of sexual misconduct.

Violence towards students in the US

While a family in Kolkata sought justice for their daughter in light of her rape and murder, Jane began her own pursuit of justice in a small college town in Minnesota.

In 2019, Jane left her family behind in Delhi and began her studies at Carleton College in Northfield, Minnesota. She planned to study computer science at the elite institution.

Carleton mandates its academically gifted students to leaven tough coursework with required P.E. classes in their early years on campus. Jane selected a Salsa dance taught by Smith, a Carleton graduate and high-ranking administrator whom the college claimed was an award-winning Salsa dancer. According to a complaint filed with the US District Court in Minnesota (Doe v. Carleton College, 2024), Smith groomed and assaulted Jane over the COVID years in an escalating pattern of abuse. 

The complaint states that Smith hired Jane as his co-instructor, requiring her to rehearse with him on campus and at his home nearby. Jane alleges Smith forcibly massaged her against her will, spanked her, forcibly kissed her, bit her and assaulted her multiple times during rehearsals at his house and on campus. The assaults could be brutal and allegedly included beatings, choking and drugging.

According to the college, Jane told a Carleton dean in early February 2022 that she had been attacked at the home of a faculty member, and that she needed extra time to complete assignments due to the trauma caused by those attacks. The dean refused to assist, however, and essentially told Jane to work harder. Discouraged by Carleton’s inaction and Smith’s claim that his administration ties would protect him against her allegations, Jane endured escalating abuse until she presented Carleton with Smith’s written confession and photos of her injuries. Carleton quietly terminated Smith after some time, and the college’s Title IX coordinator told Jane to keep quiet about the incident. 

Like many victims of campus sexual assault, Jane’s academic performance suffered. Rather than assist Jane, Carleton placed her on academic review and at threat of suspension for missing a COVID test while she was being assaulted by Smith. Jane said she felt “even more trapped” and that “she struggled to cope with the emotional distress caused by the instructor and the institution.” Despite her hardships, she met Carleton’s academic standards but continued to be harassed by the school.

Jane’s complaint alleges that Carleton failed to adequately supervise the instructor’s behavior and that the school was deliberately indifferent to the misconduct. It further states that the Title IX Coordinator failed to investigate the situation, allegedly violating Carleton’s Title IX policies and procedures, as well as federal law.

Jane is now suing Carleton for five counts per the First Amended Complaint: Vicarious Liability for Assault and Battery, Vicarious Liability for Sexual Abuse, Negligent Retention, Negligent Supervision and Vicarious Liability for Negligence.

In response, Carleton has called Smith a “predator” and said it regrets Jane’s experience at Carleton, but that Carleton has no legal liability for the sexual assault committed by its administrator. On August 19, two months after the initial filing, Carleton filed a motion to dismiss the case. The school claims — in direct contradiction to federal law — that it has no responsibility to investigate sexual misconduct. The motion was subsequently withdrawn after Jane amended her complaint. 

Despite cultivating a DEI-friendly institutional facade that includes a full-time dedicated Indigenous Community Liaison on a small campus with a negligible indigenous population, Carleton College has a sordid history of turning a blind eye to campus sexual assault. A group of Carleton alumni, frustrated with the college’s attempts to whitewash its past, started a dedicated to collecting survivor stories starting from the 1960s and documenting the numerous lawsuits Carleton has faced, including a seminal 1991 lawsuit that helped establish national standards for responding to complaints made under Title IX. Carleton has already responded to some of the allegations in Jane’s lawsuit by firing at least one of the administrators involved and appointing their lawyer’s employee as Carleton’s Title IX coordinator.��

A dark history of sexual misconduct

Maxwell Pope graduated from Carleton in 2020 with a major in Dance and Psychology. During his time at the college, a male professor, Jay Levi,  was accused of sexual misconduct. One student alleged the professor her inner thigh multiple times and pressed his body into her while they were in a dark room together. Levi was also Smith’s academic advisor during his time at Carleton.��

According to Carleton’s student paper, The Carletonian, this was just one of at least nine Title IX claims brought against the professor. Title IX, part of the Education Amendments of 1972, prohibits gender-based discrimination in educational programs that receive federal funding.

After students reported the professor’s inappropriate sexual behavior, he took a “sabbatical.” He returned to campus in 2018. In 2019, a piece in the Carletonian claimed the Title IX investigation was “adjudicated with an opaque set of sanctions.” In a subsequent piece, a student writer expressed shock and anger in response to the misconduct and Carlton faculty to “redesign” the sexual misconduct complaint process.

Discussing his time at the college, Pope said, “It was definitely a situation with [Levi] where it felt more like students looking out for students, or students informing students.” He stated, “I don’t remember a time where the college was initiating those conversations — it was definitely a keep-it-quiet situation.”

According to Pope, “transparency would have felt better” in situations of sexual misconduct on campus, a sentiment that is echoed by students across the country in light of cover-ups and institutional censorship.

In recent years, a plethora of elite schools, such as and , have been accused of mishandling sexual misconduct. Inadequate responses from administration officials angered students. Given this poor track record, future students fear what will happen if they are assaulted.

Women are at serious risk of sexual abuse in US institutions of higher education. Many institutions refuse to take accountability for enabling continued abuse. One in five women is sexually assaulted during their time in college. Two-thirds of college students are sexually harassed.

Yet according to the National Sexual Violence Resource Center (NSVRC), in 2014, of US colleges stated they had not investigated a single sexual assault case in the previous five years. Compare this data to the number of reported sexual misconduct cases on college campuses, and the fact that two-thirds of assaults in the US go unreported. The numbers don’t add up.

Justice from India to the US

The frequency and perception of assaults vary from country to country. A closer look at how universities in the US respond to accusations of sexual misconduct shows that women are often hurt by a lack of transparency. Jane left a country where both data and attitudes indicate she would have been exposed to sexual misconduct at home, only to encounter it upon arrival in the US.

In India, women face sexual misconduct in schools, hospitals, workplaces, public transportation and at home. Women are raised to be aware of the high likelihood of harassment, abuse and, in the worst-case scenario, rape.

They intimately understand the hardship of speaking out in a country where bureaucratic processes, cultural shame, the caste system and gender roles often form insurmountable obstacles for women seeking justice.

Despite cover-ups and pay-offs, cases from the Kolkata incident in August to the of 2012 – which led to the creation of the death penalty for rape in India — galvanized the public and advanced the fight for greater accountability, justice and legislative reform.

In the US, there is greater overall gender equality, better access to medical resources and mental health support, and a longer history of both legislative and institutionalized systemic support for survivors.

In recent years, there have been significant but insufficient cultural shifts toward believing in and standing up for women. Many women are now taught not only how to stand up for themselves, but also that they can stand up for themselves.

Yet beneath the sparkling facades of US institutions, industries and college campuses, there are people like Harvey Weinstein, Larry Nassar and Roger Ailes. There are cover-ups, pay-offs and the slow but sure suffocation of victims by bureaucracy. And then, silence, until women like Jane come forward.

Hailing from the “rape capital of the world,” Jane arrived at an illustrious college campus in the prairies of Minnesota to pursue an education. She describes her college years as polluted by grooming, harassment and assault that severely damaged her physical, mental and emotional well-being.

This story, one of many, forces us to face disheartening truths and uncomfortable realities. Many US parents quake at the thought of sending their daughter to India when she is young, vulnerable and alone. Consider a family in Delhi or a rural village in Bihar and their excitement at the opportunity for their daughter to attend an elite US college.

Imagine them finding out she was abused, manipulated, assaulted and coerced by an educator in a position of power at an institution they believed was safe for their daughter.

It is time we address the reality of sexual abuse in the US, especially in the education system. The lack of transparency and accountability is catastrophic. It hinders both current and future students like Jane from making informed decisions about their educational environment and the associated risks of sexual harassment and assault.

Before pointing fingers at countries like India, we should be honest with ourselves, our communities and our students about the reality of sexual misconduct in our own nation. We must make tangible changes and consider victims in both how we prevent abuse and how we obtain justice.

[Joey T. McFadden and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Thirteen among the more than thirty countries that have formally expressed their interest in membership are now associated with BRICS+: four Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam), two Latin American countries (Cuba and Bolivia), three African countries (Algeria, Nigeria, Uganda), two Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) and two European countries (Belarus and NATO member Turkey). They were given the status of “partner states” in Kazan.

To say that the Americans are not enthusiastic about the appeal of this new global club would be an understatement. Should the success of the summit in Kazan be interpreted as a sign of the failure of their strategy to isolate Russia? Worse still, are we witnessing the beginning of the end of the American century?

In addition to the nine member states and thirteen partners, the summit was also attended by some representatives of countries whose presence was rather unexpected, such as the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister, the very Russophilic Alexander Vulin. However, it was the presence of UN Secretary-General Antonio Gutierres that caused outraged reactions, especially in Ukraine. “The UN Secretary-General declined Ukraine’s invitation to the first global peace summit in Switzerland. However, he has accepted the invitation of the war criminal Putin to Kazan,” hammered the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry.

It is true that Gutierres boycotted the Bürgenstock meeting this spring. It is also legitimate to wonder whether a UN Secretary-General should shake hands with a person accused of war crimes, even if he is the president of a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin on March 17, 2023.

This juicy skewer of participants is notable for its heterogeneity. There are dictatorships and democracies, Muslim, Christian and secular countries, economic superpowers and failed nations; some have been characterized as rogue states. Are what we are witnessing merely an updated reiteration of that elastic non-aligned movement launched in the 1960s by Yugoslavia’s Prime Minister Josip Tito and Indian Jawaharlal Nehru, which encompassed two-thirds of the world but never achieved any real global influence? No, something else is happening here. In the space of sixty years, the balance of global power has clearly changed.

A motley but (almost) global group with growing influence

Antonio Gutierres is a realist. He understands how historically significant the bubbling events within the BRICS states are. He was in Kazan because it is important. To underline that point, consider a few figures. The nine countries now called BRICS+ account for more than half of the world’s population. Their combined gross national product is already greater than that of their rivals in the G7, the Western directorate comprising the US, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and the UK. The gap is likely to widen in the coming years, since the BRICS+ growth rate is around 5%, while Western economies are stagnating at 1–2% — and some, like Germany’s, are officially in a recession.

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Despite these new geo-economic realities, the international order established by the West after the World War II has been resistant to change. The UN Security Council will remain secure in the hands of its five permanent members — three Western states plus China and Russia — for a long time to come. However, the BRICS states are not seeking to change the United Nations Charter or create a parallel system to the United Nations. Rather, they are focusing on the economic and financial governance of the world.

Parallel to the founding of the United Nations, the victorious Western powers, at the Bretton Woods conference in 1945, created institutions designed to regulate world finance. The dollar became the world’s reserve currency, making every country vulnerable to US sanctions. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which provide financial assistance to countries in difficulty, are run like shareholder meetings, in which the US holds a decisive vote. Together with the other Western nations, they possess an absolute majority. It is these two pillars of Western power in the world that the BRICS states hope to compete with. But how?

It would be literally impossible to reform the international financial institutions in such a way as to reduce Western influence in them. However, they cannot prevent the creation of parallel systems of payment. The BRICS countries are thus working on three main tasks:

• A mechanism for processing international payments independent of SWIFT — from which Russia was excluded after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
• An intensification of trade that is invoiced in local currencies instead of dollars, in order to accelerate the “de-dollarization of the world.”
• A development bank that competes with the World Bank and finances infrastructure projects. There are currently 96 projects underway with a total volume of $32 billion.

Critics of the BRICS states doubt that they are able to really compete with the dollar. Despite a steady erosion, the greenback still accounts for 55% of the reserves of the national banks. And when it is replaced by other currencies, these tend to be Western currencies, with the notable exception of the Chinese renminbi. Nevertheless, the trend is clear and the potential of BRICS+ is there. The formation of alternative transportation corridors is part of the same strategy to break free from Western, i.e., American dependency.

Land routes vs. sea routes

In a globalized and interdependent world, the transport of goods represents a strategic dimension. From cars to cell phones, hardly any industrial activity exists that does not include and depend on an accumulation of natural resources and semi-finished products from all corners of the world. Over the last hundred years, goods have primarily been transported by sea. Today, sea freight accounts for 70% of world trade. You only have to look at a map of the US naval bases around the world to realize how important the sea lanes are to Washington’s power strategy. From the Sea of Japan to Malacca, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Panama, Rotterdam and New York, Washington’s ambition — sometimes supported by its British ally — to dominate the seas is obvious.

With its “Belt and Road” initiative, China has been trying for several years to develop land routes to, compete or at least complement the existing sea routes. It is therefore very revealing that one of the flagship projects highlighted in Kazan was the North–South Corridor, which will ultimately connect St. Petersburg with India, without passing through any Western-controlled areas. Is it worth remembering that India has become the largest importer of Russian oil products, despite the very audible gnashing of teeth in Washington?

What is Switzerland doing?

Between soft power and economic impact, the BRICS+ are redrawing the geopolitical map. Is Switzerland even aware of this probably irreversible development? Has it sought an invitation to Kazan?

The answer is yes, Swiss companies are well aware of the underlying forces shaping the world of tomorrow. This is why some, for example in the trade sector, are moving to Dubai. Yes, Switzerland’s State Secretariat for Economic Affairs is well aware of this. It wants to update our free trade with China. Switzerland is the only European country apart from Iceland to have concluded such an agreement. That is an advantage.

Unfortunately, the options chosen by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport have not been helpful. By running after the Americans, who have been losing all their wars for twenty years, weFO° Exclusive: Make Sense of BRICS Summit in Russia
have turned Russia against us and made China doubt our reliability. Moreover, for three quarters of the world Gaza has become a symbol of the moral bankruptcy of the West, including Switzerland. Is there still time to restore our credibility? Is this even possible with the current political cast running our affairs? These are the questions that every Swiss citizen must rightly ask themselves.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The BRICS countries argue that the US and its allies have weaponized the global financial system. The dominance of the dollar, and to a lesser extent the euro, in international trade and finance allows the West to impose sanctions that impact countries’ economies deeply. For instance, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the US and its allies froze $282 billion of Russian assets held overseas and cut Russian banks off from SWIFT, a global system for cross-border payments. America also warned other countries’ banks of potential “secondary sanctions” if they supported Russia.

These actions have led several countries to reevaluate their reliance on the US dollar. Central banks around the world, especially in countries at odds with the US, are stockpiling gold and exploring alternatives to dollar-based transactions. BRICS members see this dependency on Western-controlled systems as risky and are eager to reduce it. China, in particular, views reliance on the dollar as a major security vulnerability.

The proposed solution: BRICS Bridge

To reduce dependency on Western financial systems, Russia proposed a new payment system called “BRICS Bridge.” This digital platform would allow BRICS countries to conduct cross-border payments through their central banks without relying on US-controlled networks like SWIFT. The concept borrows elements from a similar system, mBridge, which is partly overseen by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Switzerland, a prominent institution in the Western-led financial order. However, BRICS Bridge aims to challenge that order, offering a financial lifeline to countries facing Western sanctions and creating a more multipolar financial system.

Different visions of global influence

Russia and China are the main drivers behind the push for BRICS reforms, but their motivations differ. Russia seeks to create a sphere of influence that protects its interests and supports its allies through a flexible, transactional approach to international relations. This approach would allow countries to engage with Russia based on mutual benefits without subscribing to Western “normative” values, which Russia sees as biased.

China’s ambitions go further. Rather than just establishing an independent sphere, China wants to rewrite international rules, shaping a world order where multiple centers of power coexist, with China as a central authority. This would give China greater control over global trade, finance, and diplomacy, gradually replacing the US as the primary rulemaker.

Many countries in the Global South support BRICS because they see it as a pathway to a more flexible international environment where they can negotiate deals that directly benefit their economic growth. For example, India has reaped significant benefits from purchasing discounted Russian oil, prioritizing these economic gains despite the moral conflict posed by the ongoing war in Ukraine. In a multipolar world, countries in the Global South could avoid being tied down by Western rules and make independent decisions in their best interests.

However, this freedom comes with risks. Without a dominant Western power like the US to counterbalance rising powers, these smaller countries could find themselves vulnerable to regional giants, such as China, who may impose their will on them by force in the future.

The BRICS alliance reflects a growing dissatisfaction with the current global order. Critics argue that the US-led international system has become ineffective and no longer serves the interests of many countries, leading them to seek alternatives. However, BRICS itself has limitations. Despite its symbolic appeal, it has not achieved substantial progress on key issues like creating a global currency to rival the dollar or liberalizing global trade. The dollar remains dominant, and the influence of Western-led institutions persists.

Even if BRICS doesn’t have the power to immediately reshape the world, its existence signals a significant shift. Countries are increasingly interested in alternatives, showing that faith in the US-led system is waning. The BRICS alliance may lack the cohesion and power to fully realize its vision, but its popularity underscores a global desire for change.

[Anton Schauble wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The war’s impact on Europe has been significant. Heightened energy prices have affected countries heavily reliant on Russian gas, such as Germany. European nations have also diverted resources and attention toward Ukraine and away from other crucial areas like social spending and healthcare. Most fundamentally, the war has shattered the last remnants of trust between the East and West, leading many European nations to up their defense budgets in anticipation of a potential direct conflict with Russia.

Switzerland in the middle of an increasingly anxious Europe

Reflecting this defensive attitude, EU High Representative Josep Borrell that Europe is a garden and the rest of the world is a jungle. Germany has closed its borders, apparently to avoid the jungle taking over the garden. Switzerland takes a more moderate approach. While acknowledging migration and integration challenges, the country emphasizes the need for proactive and inclusive migration policies.

Right-wing leaders are in charge in many parts of Europe, like Robert Fico in Slovakia and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party is on the rise, and in France, the National Rally party made a decent dent in the latest parliamentary elections. Switzerland finds the rise of right-wing, anti-immigrant populist movements across Europe to be a cause for concern. Unlike other European countries, though, Switzerland is a decentralized confederation. This offers a degree of resilience against nationalist trends that would seek to dominate politics at the countrywide level. Yet Switzerland remains uneasy about the deeper political and social crises of which the rise of the far right is a manifestation.

Switzerland the investor

In lighter news, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway a free trade agreement with India in March. Swiss diplomat Ralf Heckner has received the credit for achieving what the EU, the UK and the US failed to do. The secret of Swiss success is the country’s independent position. As a non-member of major trade blocs, Switzerland has greater flexibility in forging agreements with emerging markets. Additionally, India’s status as a rapidly growing economy and Switzerland’s political commitment to strengthening economic ties played crucial roles in the successful negotiations.

Switzerland is looking east for economic growth, with China and India among its top export markets. However, the country has adopted a cautious approach toward China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy, economic slowdown and challenges faced by private actors. 

Switzerland the peacemaker

As a famously neutral territory for peace talks, Switzerland hosted a summit to resolve Sudan’s ongoing civil war. Yet Sudanese General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces, to sit the talks out. Despite his absence from recent negotiations, Switzerland remains committed to facilitating dialogue and humanitarian access.

Switzerland has faced more than one setback in Africa in recent times. The cocoa crop in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana is facing its third tough year in a row. Chocolate-loving and chocolate-producing Switzerland may need to diversify its cocoa supply chain and include more suppliers from Latin America, with which it maintains cordial relations.

Finally, remaining in the Western Hemisphere, Switzerland views the current state of American democracy with concern, particularly regarding the deep political polarization and potential challenges to the peaceful transfer of power. The US is the preeminent global superpower, and uncertainty about its future direction adds to instability everywhere.

To manage these risks, Switzerland has adopted a flexible and open-minded approach, maintaining communication channels with both major political parties in the US. This proactive strategy ensures continued cooperation and stability in its relationship with the global superpower, regardless of the election outcome.

[Peter Choi edited this podcast and wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Recent events illustrate the rising tensions of the new Cold War in the Pacific. From June to September of this year, the Chinese and Russian militaries conducted joint maneuvers that ranged from live-fire in the South China Sea to air patrols circling Japan and even US airspace in . To respond to what Moscow “rising geopolitical tension around the world,” such actions culminated last month in a joint Chinese–Russian that mobilized 400 ships, 120 aircraft and 90,000 troops in a vast arc from the Baltic Sea across the Arctic to the northern Pacific Ocean. While kicking off such monumental maneuvers with China, Russian President Vladimir Putin accused the US of “trying to maintain its global military and political dominance at any cost” by “increasing [its] military presence… in the Asia-Pacific region.”

“China is not a future threat,” US Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall in September. “China is a threat today.” Over the past 15 years, Beijing’s ability to project power in the Western Pacific, he claimed, had risen to alarming levels. He said the likelihood of war was “increasing” and, he predicted, it will only “continue to do so.” An anonymous senior Pentagon official that China “continues to be the only U.S. competitor with the intent and… the capability to overturn the rules-based infrastructure that has kept peace in the Indo-Pacific since the end of the Second World War.”

Indeed, regional tensions in the Pacific have profound global implications. For the past 80 years, an island chain of military bastions running from Japan to Australia has served as a crucial fulcrum for US global power. To ensure that it will be able to continue to anchor its “defense” on that strategic shoal, Washington has recently added new overlapping alliances while encouraging a massive militarization of the Indo–Pacific region. Though bristling with armaments and seemingly strong, this ad hoc Western coalition may yet prove, like NATO in Europe, vulnerable to sudden setbacks from rising partisan pressures, both in the US and among its allies.

Building a Pacific bastion

For well over a century, the US has struggled to secure its vulnerable western frontier from Pacific threats. During the early decades of the 20th century, Washington maneuvered against a rising Japanese presence in the region. These actions produced geopolitical tensions that led to Tokyo’s attack on the US naval bastion at Pearl Harbor that began World War II in the Pacific. After fighting for four years and suffering nearly 300,000 casualties, the US defeated Japan and won unchallenged control of the entire region.

Aware that the advent of the long-range bomber and the future possibility of atomic warfare had rendered the historic concept of coastal defense irrelevant, in the post-war years Washington extended its North American “defenses” deep into the Western Pacific. Starting with the expropriation of 100 Japanese military bases, the US built its initial postwar Pacific naval bastions at Okinawa and, thanks to a 1947 agreement, at Subic Bay in the Philippines. As the Cold War engulfed Asia in 1950 with the beginning of the Korean conflict, the US extended those bases for 5,000 miles along the entire Pacific littoral through mutual-defense agreements with five Asia–Pacific allies: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia.

For the next 40 years to the very end of the Cold War, the Pacific littoral remained the geopolitical fulcrum of US global power, allowing it to defend North America and dominate Eurasia. In many ways, the US geopolitical position astride the axial ends of Eurasia would prove the key to its ultimate victory in the Cold War.

After the Cold War

Once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the Cold War ended, Washington cashed in its peace dividend, weakening that once-strong island chain. Between 1998 and 2014, the US Navy from 333 ships to 271. That 20% reduction, combined with a shift to long-term deployments in the Middle East, degraded the Navy’s position in the Pacific. Even so, for the 20 years following the Cold War, the US would enjoy what the Pentagon “uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, operate how we wanted.”

After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US, Washington turned from heavy-metal strategic forces to mobile infantry readily deployed for counterterror operations against lightly armed guerrillas. After a decade of fighting misbegotten wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington was stunned when a rising China began to turn its economic gains into a serious bid for global power. As its opening gambit, Beijing started in the South China Sea, where oil and natural gas deposits are . It also began expanding its navy, an unexpected challenge that the once-all-powerful US Pacific command was remarkably ill-prepared to meet.

In response, in 2011, President Barack Obama a strategic “pivot to Asia” before the Australian parliament and began rebuilding the US military position on the Pacific littoral. After withdrawing some forces from Iraq in 2012 and refusing to commit significant numbers of troops for regime change in Syria, the Obama White House a battalion of Marines to Darwin in northern Australia in 2014. In quick succession, Washington gained access to five near the South China Sea and a new South Korean naval base at on the Yellow Sea. According to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, to operate those installations, the Pentagon to “forward base 60 percent of our naval assets in the Pacific by 2020.” Nonetheless, the unending insurgency in Iraq continued to slow the pace of that strategic pivot to the Pacific.

Despite such setbacks, senior diplomatic and military officials, working under three different administrations, launched a long-term effort to slowly rebuild the US military posture in the Asia–Pacific region. After “a return to great power competition” in 2016, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson that China’s “growing and modernized fleet” was “shrinking” the traditional US advantage in the region. “The competition is on,” the admiral warned, adding, “We must shake off any vestiges of comfort or complacency.”

Responding to such pressure, the administration of President Donald Trump added the construction of 46 new ships to the Pentagon , which was to raise the total fleet to 326 vessels by 2023. Support ships aside, when it came to an actual “fighting force,” by 2024 China had the world’s with 234 “warships.” The US deployed only 219, with Chinese combat capacity, according to US Naval Intelligence, “increasingly of comparable quality to U.S. ships.”

Paralleling the military build-up, the State Department reinforced the US position on the Pacific littoral by negotiating three relatively new diplomatic agreements with Asia–Pacific allies Australia, Britain, India and the Philippines. Though those ententes added some depth and resilience to the US posture, the truth is that this Pacific network may ultimately prove more susceptible to political rupture than a formal multilateral alliance like NATO.

Military cooperation with the Philippines

After nearly a century as close allies through decades of colonial rule, two world wars and the Cold War, US relations with the Philippines suffered a severe setback in 1991. That country’s senate refused to renew a long-term military bases agreement, forcing the US 7th Fleet out of its massive naval base at Subic Bay.

After just three years, however, China occupied some shoals also claimed by the Philippines in the South China Sea during a raging typhoon. Within a decade, the Chinese had started transforming them into a network of military bases, while pressing their claims to most of the rest of the South China Sea. Manila’s only response was to a rusting World War II naval vessel on Ayungin shoal in the Spratly Islands, where Filipino soldiers had to fish for their supper. With its external defense in tatters, in April 2014 the Philippines an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with Washington. This allowed the US military quasi-permanent facilities at five Filipino bases, including two on the shores of the South China Sea.

Although Manila won a from the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague that Beijing’s claims to the South China Sea were “,” China dismissed that decision and continued to build its bases there. And when Rodrigo Duterte became president of the Philippines in 2016, he revealed a new policy that included a “separation” from the US and a toward China. That country rewarded the policy with promises of massive developmental aid. By 2018, however, China’s army was anti-aircraft missiles, mobile missile launchers and military radar on five artificial “islands” in the Spratly archipelago that it had built from sand its dredgers sucked from the seabed.

Once Duterte left office, as China’s Coast Guard harassed Filipino fishermen and blasted Philippine naval vessels with water cannons in their own territory, Manila once again started calling on Washington for help. Soon, US Navy vessels were conducting “freedom of navigation” patrols in Philippine waters and the two nations had staged their biggest ever. In the April 2024 edition of that exercise, the US deployed its mobile Typhon Mid-Range capable of hitting China’s coast, sparking a bitter from Beijing that such weaponry “intensifies geopolitical confrontation.”

Manila has matched its new commitment to the US alliance with an unprecedented rearmament program of its own. Just last spring, it signed a $400 million deal with Tokyo to five new Coast Guard cutters, started receiving Brahmos from India under a $375 million contract and continued a billion-dollar deal with South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries that will produce ten new naval vessels. After the government a $35 billion military modernization plan, Manila has been negotiating with Korean to procure modern jet fighters. This is a far cry from a decade earlier when it had no operational .

Showing the scope of the country’s reintegration into the Western alliance, just last month Manila hosted joint freedom of navigation in the South China Sea with ships from five allied nations: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines and the US.

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the AUKUS alliance

While the Philippine Defense Agreement renewed US relations with an old Pacific ally, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue involving Australia, India, Japan and the US, first launched in 2007, has now extended US military power into the Indian Ocean. At the 2017 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Manila, four conservative national leaders led by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump decided to the “Quad” entente (after a decade-long hiatus while Australia’s Labour Party governments cozied up to China).

Just last month, President Joe Biden hosted a “” where the four leaders agreed to expand joint air operations. In a hot-mike moment, Biden bluntly : “China continues to behave aggressively, testing us all across the region. It is true in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, South Asia, and the Taiwan Straits.” China’s Foreign Ministry : “The U.S. is lying through its teeth” and needs to “get rid of its obsession with perpetuating its supremacy and containing China.”

Since 2020, however, the Quad has made the annual Malabar in India into an elaborate four-power drill in which aircraft carrier battle groups maneuver in waters ranging from the Arabian Sea to the East China Sea. To contest “China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region,” India that the latest exercise this October would feature live-fire maneuvers in the Bay of Bengal, led by its flagship aircraft carrier and a complement of MiG-29K all-weather jet fighters. Clearly, as Modi it, the Quad is “here to stay.”

While the Trump administration revived the Quad, the Biden White House has promoted a complementary and controversial AUKUS defense compact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US (part of what Michael Klare has called the “” of US foreign and military policy). After months of secret negotiations, their leaders that agreement in September 2021 as a way to fulfill “a shared ambition to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy.”

Such a goal sparked howls of diplomatic protests. Angry over the sudden loss of a $90 billion contract to supply 12 French submarines to Australia, France the decision “a stab in the back” and immediately its ambassadors from both Canberra and Washington. With equal speed, China’s Foreign Ministry the new alliance for “severely damaging regional peace… and intensifying the arms race.” In a pointed remark, Beijing’s official Global Times newspaper said Australia had now “turned itself into an adversary of China.”

To achieve extraordinary prosperity, thanks in significant part to its iron ore and other exports to China, Australia had exited the Quad entente for nearly a decade. Through this single defense decision, Australia has allied itself firmly with the US. It will to British submarine designs and top-secret US nuclear propulsion, joining the elite ranks of just six powers with such complex technology.

Australia will spend a monumental to build eight nuclear submarines at its Adelaide shipyards over a decade. Additionally, it will host four US Virginia-class nuclear subs at a naval base in Western Australia and buy as many as five of those stealthy submarines from the US in the early 2030s. Under the tripartite alliance with the US and Britain, Canberra will also face additional costs for the joint development of undersea drones, hypersonic missiles and quantum sensing. Through that stealthy arms deal, Washington has seemingly won a major geopolitical and military ally in any future conflict with China.

Stand-off along the Pacific littoral

Just as Russia’s aggression in Ukraine strengthened the NATO alliance, so China’s challenge in the fossil-fuel-rich South China Sea and elsewhere has helped the US rebuild its island bastions along the Pacific littoral. Through a sedulous courtship under three successive administrations, Washington has won back two wayward allies: Australia and the Philippines. They are once again anchors for an island chain that remains the geopolitical fulcrum for US global power in the Pacific.

Still, with more than 200 times the ship-building capacity of the US, China’s in warships will almost certainly continue to grow. In compensating for such a future deficit, the US’s four active allies along the Pacific littoral will likely play a critical role. (Japan’s navy has more than 50 warships and South Korea’s 30 more.)

Despite such renewed strength in what is distinctly becoming a new cold war, the US’s Asia–Pacific alliances face both immediate challenges and a fraught future. Beijing is already putting relentless pressure on Taiwan’s sovereignty, breaching that island’s airspace and crossing the median line in the Taiwan Straits monthly. If Beijing turns those breaches into a crippling embargo of Taiwan, the US Navy will face a hard choice between losing a carrier or two in a confrontation with China or backing off. Either way, the loss of Taiwan would sever the US’s island chain in the Pacific littoral, pushing it back to a “second island chain” in the mid-Pacific.

As for that fraught future, the maintenance of such alliances requires a kind of national political will that is by no means assured in an age of populist nationalism. In the Philippines, the anti-US nationalism that Duterte personified retains its appeal and may well be adopted by some future leader. More immediately in Australia, the current has already faced strong dissent from members blasting the AUKUS entente as a dangerous transgression of their country’s sovereignty. And in the US, Republican populism, whether Trump’s or that of a future leader like J.D. Vance could curtail cooperation with such Asia–Pacific allies, simply walk away from a costly conflict over Taiwan or deal directly with China in a way that would undercut that web of hard-won alliances.

And that, of course, might be the good news given the possibility that growing Chinese aggressiveness in the region and a US urge to strengthen a military alliance ominously encircling that country could threaten to turn the latest Cold War ever hotter. This would transform the Pacific into a genuine powder keg and could lead to a war that would, in our present world, be almost unimaginably destructive.

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Overview of the criminal law reforms

In July, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi India’s three most important pillars of criminal law — the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Code of Criminal Procedure and Indian Evidence Act — with the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita. According to Home Minister Amit Shah, around have been proposed, which include stricter punishments for rapes of minors, an increase in the sentence for rape from seven to ten years, mandatory digital recording of statements from victims of sexual assault and placing a 30-day time limit on delivering judgments — with the goal of achieving a conviction rate of 90%.��

The Kolkata case

Sexual assault conviction rates are abysmally low in India, standing at between between 2018 and 2022 — to say nothing of reporting rates, which are unmeasurably low. Public outrage on India’s rape crisis was reignited on August 9, 2024, and thousands more have taken to the streets around the country in solidarity.

The case is set to be heard on October 1 and will be tried under the BNS, which Chief Justice of India (CJI) Chandrachud has made “much needed improvements…to protect victim interests and carry out the investigation and prosecution of offences efficiently.” Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s proposed legislation challenges the BNS rape punishments, as capital punishment is at present, given to under the age of 12 or gang-rape of minors under the age of 18. In the Indian state of Bengal, the death penalty was carried out in 2022. This number is much lower than the incidences of either offense.

Critiques of the new criminal code

“You can’t tinker with the law anymore, be it the BNS or other reforms. The question is implementation. These are all gimmicks — they don’t identify the problem of rape at the root,” said Rebecca John, Supreme Court advocate and leading criminal lawyer (also defending the Booker-prize winning author Arundhati Roy). 

“We have retained every ugly colonial aspect of the old criminal code — particularly marital rape,” she continued. Home Minister Shah had presented the BNS as a , stating that “about 77 years after independence, our criminal justice system…will function on Indian ethos.”

I also interviewed Senior Supreme Court Advocate and leading human rights lawyer Colin Gonsalves, who expressed skepticism of the mandated digital documentation of rape victim testimonies and criminal complaints (First Information Reports), praised as a “” by CJI Chandrachud. “Videography is a tricky business,” Gonsalves said. “Take the case of Afzal Guru [terrorist charged with the 2001 Indian parliament ]. His hands and feet were tied to the chair, and he had a policeman on the left and right. But they only filmed his face. Videography doesn’t guarantee police transparency.” 

Challenges of collecting evidence

Furthermore, most states do not have the forensic infrastructure to implement the kind of documentation of sexual assault claims laid out in the BNS. Forensic teams are to visit a crime scene if rape is suspected (and for all crimes carrying a sentence of seven years or more.) However, at present, only 10%–12% of cases are referred to forensic labs, of which there are only seven in the country. Half of all forensic cases are .

Implications for the accused

Interestingly, the BNS poses a threat to those accused of sexual assault and other offenses — who are also supposed to be innocent until proven guilty. Gonsalves stated that “the biggest concern is the laws surrounding police custody.” The police were previously able to hold suspects for up to 15 days for non-terror offenses without filing charges or bail, and can now hold them for up to 180 days. Other checks and balances on police custody, such as regular medical examinations to prevent torture or registering the arresting and supervising officers, have been struck. 

Previous guidelines per 1997’s ruling to protect and compensate victims of police abuse are no longer being incorporated. “Torture happens in police custody, we know that,” Gonsalves said. “This contravenes Article 21 of the , the right to life, and Article 14, equality before the law, by promoting manifest arbitrariness.”  

What to do about the judicial backlog?

The laws have been accused of worsening the judicial backlog. Lawyer and activist Indira Jaising estimated in an that the new criminal code would increase the pendency of criminal cases by 30%, which may obstruct the BNS’s mandate to deliver justice within three years. As of January 2024, the backlog is estimated to take around to clear. This is particularly problematic for sexual assault victims, who often do not report in fear of or are retraumatized by cases that stretch on for years.

However, some reforms are certainly a step in the right direction. These include online filing of judgments, mandatory police status update on rape cases within 90 days, expansion of underage human trafficking provisions to boys and girls and a 30-day time limit on delivering judgments after trial.

As for the Kolkata case, it remains to be seen how the courts handle it. “We are outraged by the amount of violence perpetrated on the victim in near-pornographic detail, but not the violence of the crime itself,” John said. “Until that changes, this will keep happening.”

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Why the public fight?

Ottawa sees itself admirably as a champion of the global downtrodden. While this is true to a large extent, there are two caveats. First, it is a selective champion. It has repeatedly scolded China over its treatment of its Uyghur population, located largely in the Xinjiang region. It scolded India over its handling of the farmer protests in the Indian state of Punjab in 2020. It was so outraged by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that it responded by committing over $13 billion in funding, largely for military assistance. However, over the decades, it has consistently supported Israel’s occupation of Palestine, voting against Palestine at the UN and arming Israel. And it to do so in the face of over Palestinian deaths and many more injured in Gaza: in essence, aiding a genocide.

Second, it forgets its past crimes against its own indigenous population. And the neglect continues, with the indigenous facing disproportionately high rates of incarceration, difficulty in accessing healthcare and clean drinking water and violence against women. Such selective championing of causes and preaching to others while ignoring its own sins leads the world to question whether �䲹�Բ��岹’s concern is politically motivated and therefore weakens its moral standing on the global stage.

Ottawa feels that New Delhi has intruded on its sovereignty, which is foreign interference. However, other countries have also interfered with Canada with harmful or specific intent. For example, China has been accused of interfering in Canadian elections, in Arctic waters and Chinese Canadians to spy for them. Russia too has been of interfering in Canada by trying to influence elections and diminish support for Ukraine. By the way, �䲹�Բ��岹’s closest ally, the US, has also in foreign election interference in a long list of countries — including Brazil, Bolivia, Italy, Iran, Japan and Russia. And long before China meddled in �䲹�Բ��岹’s elections, the US had in Canadian elections during the Kennedy years (helping Lester B. Pearson defeat Diefenbaker) — and yet, there’s no record of Ottawa publicly upbraiding Washington.

The assassination of a Canadian citizen on Canadian soil by a foreign element is inarguably egregious. Has such a thing — one country coming into a second country to kill a citizen of the second country — ever happened before? The list of countries and their assassinations (state-sponsored killings) is long. The number of — or “targeted killings” — attributed to the US numbers over 60, some conducted outside of the country of the victim’s nationality and some conducted within. Israeli number over 300. Interestingly, in 1990, the Israeli secret service Mossad killed a Canadian engineer in Belgium. And in 1997, two Mossad agents holding Canadian passports tried to poison a Hamas political leader in Jordan. The swamp of international assassinations is thickly populated and morally murky. Pointing a finger at one country can be risky because, to paraphrase that old joke, four fingers will be pointing back at your allies.

The breaking of the “rules-based international order”

Double standards are at work. Israel considers Hamas as a terrorist organization and India considers the Khalistan Tiger Force as a terrorist organization. Israel Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Iran this past July. Israel had announced their intent beforehand, and afterwards they did not bother to deny it. All this is quietly accepted by Canada, the US and other Western countries. However, India’s possible (denied by India) killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada last year is considered a shameful and punishable offense by Canada and the West and has led to a diplomatic row.

It’s not surprising that the Global South views the glass house of “” cynically. The repeated hypocritical behaviors of powerful countries have caused it to become opaque, weaken, crack and finally break, leaving just one rule standing: Might is right.

Many rules of international conduct have been formulated, but a global order based on them can only work if they apply equally to all.

Foreign policy based on Khalistan

The significant political clout of Khalistan-supporting Sikhs in Canada has pushed the Nijjar issue to the forefront of �䲹�Բ��岹’s foreign affairs agenda. Of the roughly 5% people of Indian origin living in Canada, less than half are Sikh and fewer still are Khalistani (desirous of an independent Sikh homeland — Khalistan — carved out of the Indian state of Punjab). And yet, they seem to have a disproportionate influence on Trudeau. In the 2015 election, 20 Sikh MPs were elected and Trudeau called four of them to his cabinet. One of them, Harjit Sajjan, holder of several ministerial posts over the Trudeau years, is to be a Khalistan sympathizer. In 2018, Trudeau went on an official to India, focused largely on Punjab, Sikhs and Khalistanis — which concerned and angered the Indian government. The leader of one of �䲹�Բ��岹’s major political parties and currently Trudeau’s coalition partner is Jagmeet Singh, a Sikh who is said to  Khalistan. However, just because there are a large number of Sikh politicians should not mean that Sikh-specific issues should get higher priority; after all, these politicians should be working for the well-being of all Canadians.

Putting oneself in the shoes of Khalistanis, it is understandable that they — with their singular focus on attaining Khalistan — would want to embarrass and discredit India as well as spoil relations between Canada and India. But why should Trudeau, as the leader of the entire country, want the same thing? Why would he want to ruin relations with India — the fifth largest economy in the world, a working (albeit chaotic) democracy of 1.4 billion people, with 1.8 million people of Indian origin having chosen Canada as their new home? Why would he want to adopt a simplistic “me good, you bad” school of foreign policy? Why would he not want to address in good faith the repeatedly-stated security concerns of a long-standing ally?

Perplexed at the unusually on-stage nature of a usually off-stage dispute, Indian analysts wonder if Ottawa has a hidden agenda. Some wonder if this public fight is a deliberate attempt by Trudeau to project an external enemy and thereby gather internal support and cohesiveness. Others if the aim is to move the mantle of “master of threat” from China (a stronger foe but indispensable) to India (a weaker foe and possibly more dispensable). Yet others wonder if this is a ploy to shift the spotlight away from �䲹�Բ��岹’s stagnant economy. They theorize that this may all be done with next year’s election in mind.

One explanation for this public fight is that both sides are now deeply frustrated and not listening to the other. Canada feels that India is not accepting or explaining the evidence it has on Nijjar’s killing. India feels that Canada never properly the 1985 bombing of Air India Flight 182 (“the worst terrorist attack in �䲹�Բ��岹’s history”) which killed over 300 people (most of them Canadians) and was to Sikh extremists — and that Canada is still not addressing its concerns about Khalistani terrorists residing in Canada. It would not be surprising if, when a country is repeatedly stifled in diplomatic channels, it resorts to non-diplomatic means.

Foreign policy as if the whole country matters

Going forward, much depends on the role Canada wants to play in this drama. Does Canada want to break up India? If it continues to protect and enable Sikh separatists living within its borders, it will be aiding that process. This would be a surprising and ironic role for Canada, given its own long efforts to maintain a united English-French nation. And if so, does Canada want to play a similar role for of refugees and empower them against their country of origin — such as Afghans, Columbians, Iranians, Mexicans and Turks who have fled their country to make their home in Canada? And then, what of French Canadian nationalists? Or, alternatively, does Canada want to play a role it could aspire to — that of peacemaker? Canada may be ideally situated to do this — having the largest Sikh population outside India, having a large number of non-Sikh Indians residing in Canada and having a historically friendly relationship with India.

Over the centuries, Canada has provided a welcoming and safe new home to various groups of immigrants who — for the most part — have left their old animosities and grievances at the door and entered with just their hopes for a new life and good intentions in hand. For the cohesiveness of all Canadians, for the well-being of the entire country and for its peaceful place within the community of nations, Canada cannot allow its foreign policy to be monopolized by the concerns of a small section of its population or the political machinations of one party or the impulses of one person. Ideally, Ottawa needs to have practical and sustainable long-term foreign policy goals that reflect national values and serve the country’s interests as a whole. And with those firmly in mind, it must decide what kind of relations Canada should have with not just India, but all the countries of the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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India is at a unique juncture in its history. No less can be said of a country with 1.4 billion citizens, the fifth-largest economy and the second-largest startup ecosystem. India is a leader of the Global South and enjoys a great deal of goodwill from other developing nations. Further, it has become a rival to its neighbor China, an aspiring global power. Thus, India is a desirable ally to other foreign powers.

India’s desirability as an ally can be measured in the liberty it claims from all its international partners. The US courts India as a potential ally, but India 36% of its oil and defense technology from Russia. Conversely, Indian mortar shells have made their way to the Ukrainian arsenal without substantial indignation from Moscow. India recently a Western call for a collective ban on the Russian media outlet RT with the words “does not pertain [to us].” Simultaneously, it RT for “misleading” information about US diplomats in New Delhi.

The liberty on both ends has spilled over to the Russia–Ukraine conflict. Although India denied any formal neutrality, it righteously “the side of peace”. Many nations, including the warring parties, have used this opportunity to for its participation in the peace process. However, India’s complex web of transactions with the opposing sides hinders this request.

Undeniably, India seems to be the best mediator between the two sides. However, it would not be the making an attempt at peace. More than seven different talks have been held under mediation by countries like China, Brazil, Mexico and others, adding more pressure on India to perform well.��

India greatly benefits from dealing with all sides. However, in exchange, it needs to fulfill its partners’ expectations while being under the spotlight. Mediating a peace process in these conditions may not be the best bet.

Why won’t India work as the mediator?

India has little to gain and a lot more to risk by taking on the role of peacemaker. A ceasefire in the Russia–Ukraine conflict is imminent. However, it does not guarantee a successful peace process. Russia and Ukraine have provisionally achieved their goals on the battlefield. The conflict is now a war of attrition with both sides making unprecedented and unconditional for a of fighting. Russians have met their target of the Donbas and other territories up to Crimea. They claim to be capable of ensuring Ukrainian neutrality. Although a ceasefire appears to be imminent, the horizon of peace is far from visible in this conflict. Once a ceasefire is achieved, the status quo will only reduce the motivation to find common ground. Russia is also known for frozen conflicts as an influence expansion method.

The Russia–Ukraine war is a complex conflict with ideological, territorial and secessionist elements. Russia has historically the existence of Ukraine and its border and claimed the territory around the Sea of Azov. Arguably, 27% of people in this region, the Donbas Oblast, also secession to it. Self-determination, guarantee of collective security and compromise on territorial integrity will be the basis for any peace plan. It may also include exonerating President Putin and retracting his International Criminal Court warrant for war crimes in Bucha. Most of these issues are often touted as beyond the mandate of interventions by the international community.

India’s likelihood of disappointing either side is high with its limited experience and dependencies on all stakeholders. A position of comparative advantage and the ability to offer inducements is necessary for mediating and enforcing peace. However, India is far too dependent on both sides for their support elsewhere to remain unbiased. It has a $57 billion trade with Russia. This constitutes approximately 36% of its defense technology and cheap crude oil. At the peak of the conflict, Russian oil to India was $12/barrel cheaper than benchmark prices. The discount continues to be nearly $6-7/barrel. The arrows in its quiver of strategic autonomy will be fewer.

Apart from recent financial gains, partnership with Russia is a longstanding neutralizer for India’s issues with China. The benefits predate the recent interest that the West has shown in this problem. India cannot afford to estrange a regional partner in Russia, especially with the Sino-Russian cooperation being at a record high. 

Ironically, all India can expect out of Russia, vis-a-vis China, is for it to not aid Beijing against New Delhi. Active support on this matter can only come from the West. Cooperation with the Western partners, particularly the US, has increased multifold with China’s rising influence in the Indo-Pacific. The US is also India’s largest export destination and a close collaborator in defense production. Approximately $186 billion worth of Indian out of $433.09 billion in 2023-24 were destined for the US and Europe. Co-operation from these trading partners helps India derive maximum benefit out of the China Plus One strategy of global manufacturing diversification.��

Most importantly, India needs Russia and the West to prevent being cornered by either on a regular basis. Thus, it would be important and equally tough for it to meet the expectations of special treatment from both ends. India must also not believe that the current leeways from the partners will continue once its actions are seen to be tipping the war in another direction.

Attaching itself to the outcomes of an already failed process could curtail India’s strategic autonomy. Uninhibited exchange with both sides over the past two years has garnered a lot of benefits and goodwill for it. Mediating the peace process will only burden it with the responsibility of being seen as unbiased. This could prevent India from achieving two of its supposedly short-term goals: obtaining a permanent seat at the UN Security Council and settlement of the Kashmir issue. 

Its actions in the course of the peace process could polarize the international community, thereby jeopardizing the more or less universal for its UNSC permanent membership. As a mediator, India will also be expected to practice in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) what it preaches in Donbas.

Instead, only being seen as the peacemaker could keep its goodwill intact. India can achieve this label and much more, by advocating for humanitarian cooperation at the BRICS summit. 

Maintaining the image of peacemaker

India presenting itself as a peacemaker is more beneficial for it compared to actually mediating peace. It can do so by diverting efforts towards mitigating the impacts of the conflict. This strategy has worked well in the case of the Israel–Hamas conflict where India has demanded a “humanitarian corridor”. A similar move also reaped goodwill at the G20 Summit that India chaired in 2023. It the cause of energy and food security in the Global South and the conflict affected zones. The result was a rare declaration agreeable to the West, Russia and China.��

BRICS appears to be a fitting forum to deploy this strategy. The group has a trans-polar appeal, evident in the it has attracted in the past five years. 30 nations have expressed their willingness to join the group. Memberships of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have already begun in January 2024.��

Over the years, BRICS has moved past its identity of being a purely economic union and posited itself as a platform for the Global South. Particularly for those that have been historically excluded from the world’s “G” order. India’s foreign minister S Jaishankar recently said the BRICS exists “because you [the members] would not let us into the G7”. 

A lot can be achieved with 40% of the global population, a quarter of the economy and a numerical majority of developing countries. President Putin has also a similar hope in his statement claiming confidence and close coordination with BRICS partners regarding the war.��

India’s National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval recently visited Russia for the BRICS NSAs meet. Doval also called-on President Putin along the sidelines of this event. There was much of a peace plan from the meeting that turned out to be “a briefing on Modi’s Ukraine visit”. Simultaneously, Modi to President Biden “briefing him about his visit to Russia”. India certainly appears to be getting its balancing .��

For the BRICS summit this week, India must target achieving substantial humanitarian relief through joint efforts by Russia and Ukraine. These could include ensuring free navigation for commercial vessels, developing humanitarian corridors, mitigating environmental impact or safeguarding nuclear infrastructure. 

Safe navigation for commercial vessels and a “bilateral” humanitarian corridor are the lowest hanging fruits on the cooperation tree. Ukrainian grain ships continue to be in transit, while the Russian dark fleet sails heavily under-insured. There already exists a humanitarian corridor agreement between the two parties, put in place with Turkey’s help in 2022. India can advocate for its reinstatement. This will particularly aid global food and energy security and relieve supply chain stress as global shipping freight tariffs are at an all time high.��

The international community has also expressed fear for the safety of nuclear infrastructure in the conflict zone. Missile attacks and power outages in to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant in Ukraine have risked radiation fallout and failure of containment systems. Similar concerns have been raised regarding the war’s ecological impact. For instance, destruction of essential infrastructure such as the Kakhonka has caused heavy flooding and displacement in the areas downstream. India can propose that both parties collectively ensure prevention of such damages and mitigation of their spillovers, a move made easier by the fact that the aforementioned points are part of President Zelenskyy’s peace formula. These measures can also get Russia some international goodwill with minimal strategic bearing.

A breakthrough in impact mitigation could prove to be BRICS’s rite of passage into global security and conflict management. By playing a key role, India will reaffirm that it cares about the developing world and not just its rising influence. Most importantly, it would be doing so in the presence of its regional competitor, China. Success at the summit can open many doors for India to steer BRICS and lead the Global South in the future.

[ edited this piece]

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Politics of terror

For decades, Pakistan has used state-sponsored terror as an instrument to buy geopolitical rent from the United States via Afghanistan. In the past, Pakistan gave operational control to terror proxies to cultivate ground for against India.

However, the strategy of using terror did not last long. On May 2, 2011, the US al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. This incident sowed seeds of distrust between the two nations.

Similarly, Iran Pakistan in the 1971 war against India. However, ideological confrontations have led to distrust and hostility between the parties. Iran also believes that Pakistan is Baloch jihadists to please the West and Saudi Arabia.

Evidently, politics of terror have cost Pakistan heavily, without much reward. The state is clearly weakening, as several signs indicate. The Afghan Taliban’s is being more assertive than it otherwise would be. Pakistan is targeting Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamist nationalist network opposing the Pakistani military. Pakistan’s approach against Afghanistan’s Supreme Council is also telling.

Middle Eastern terror conflicts have increased following Israel’s 2023 invasion of Gaza. Pakistan seems to be negotiating with a few proxies, and allegedly with . These actions may be in order to de-escalate terror attacks in Pakistan and deter the TTP.

The nation may also be seeking openings for security and strategic cooperation with the West. In December 2023, Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir and former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Nadeem Anjum, Washington, DC. The US didn’t show any interest in engaging with Pakistan; it is already locked in multiple fronts from Ukraine to Israel. The nation also believes that TTP is already weakening the ISIS threat.

However, the ISIS in Iran in January paint a worrisome picture of regional security.��The on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall in March stoked fear of revival of ISIS regional branches, especially in Central Asia.

Islamization and flashpoints

Pakistan’s politics of terror typically end poorly, which complicates its negotiation of geopolitical rent. It suffers from the usual dilemma that comes with terror politics; proxies can be useful for some time, but eventually, their radicalism becomes too extreme.

One can argue that the US, too, had relations with terror proxies. In December 1979, the CIA’s provided arms and logistics to jihadist groups in Afghanistan to drive out the Soviet Union. Unlike Pakistan’s relationship with proxies, however, this was a limited relationship.

Pakistan’s continued engagement with proxies may come from former president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s regime in the 1970s and 1980s. He Sharia Benches in the High Court to align the nation’s legal statutes with Islamic doctrine. His policies brought in officers who wanted to pursue an active Islamic agenda in military matters. A new breed of military thinkers and strategists also emerged. They pushed for a merger of social jihadism with military plans.

Islamization had far-reaching consequences. It led non-state actors, directed by Pakistan’s ISI, to quell opposition to Zia’s pro-Sunni Islamization measures. This in turn the extremist Jaish-e-Mohammad and Soviet jihad groups.

Zia’s radical Islamization continues to permeate the Pakistani Army, which has prevented action against Islamic terror groups such as TTP. The virus of Islamization has removed Pakistan’s ability to think like a rational nation, putting it in a state of poly-crises.

In January, Pakistan witnessed new flashpoints, including Iranian against the Baluch terror group Jaish al-Adl. This attack on the Pakistani province of Balochistan further deteriorated Iran–Pakistan relations.

Pakistan’s response was limited to diplomatic protests and the of Iran’s ambassador. However, Pakistan likewise carried out retaliatory precision strikes against Baluch camps on Iranian territory. This indicates a strategy of deterrence similar to the it used against India in 2019.��

Pakistan does have the option to use force against Iran; it did so in a limited manner on January 17, when it launched a series of air and artillery inside Iran’s Sistan and Balochistan province. The limited strike demonstrated Pakistan’s deterrence capabilities, but terror groups inside Pakistan continue to complicate its situation.

Attacks on Chinese workers

On October 7, Baloch terrorists in the Pakistani city of Karachi conducted a that killed two Chinese nationals. Before that, on March 26, Baloch insurgents conducted a that killed five Chinese workers in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. These are merely the most recent instances of deadly attacks on Chinese nationals. In 2022, a in Karachi killed three Chinese instructors. In 2021, yet another killed two Chinese nationals in the Gwadar region.

These incidents have raised serious questions over Pakistan’s credentials of being a safe investment for China. In defense, China shut its firms and launched a sound into these incidents.

Pakistan is attempting to revive its economic situation and its relations with China, but such incidents might jeopardize long-term Pakistan–China economic relations. The issue of terror attacks paints Pakistan as an unsafe investment, to China and the rest of the world. Regardless, for the time being, China intends to with Pakistan to protect its personnel.

For Pakistan, going full throttle against insurgents raises the concern of a mass insurgency. However, Pakistan has gradually begun cross-border operations in relation to Afghanistan. The consequences may put Pakistan into a severe security headache as the capital of Islamabad is now caught in a twin terror trap with the TTP and Baloch militants. If flared, this situation could heavily impede Pakistan’s strategic and economic interests.

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India and China are major regional powers in Asia and among the of the 21st century. Despite being neighbors, a stark contrast exists between their domestic policies, political systems, foreign policies, market economies, ideologies etc. Before acknowledging their present disputes, it is necessary to consider their initial relationship and ambitions.

India was under British colonial rule for nearly two centuries, declaring independence on August 15, 1947. It constructed a democratic political structure influenced by the Western states. Conversely, China faced a two-decade-long between Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 1927 to 1949. The CCP gained complete control of mainland China and proclaimed the resulting People’s Republic of China would be based on Marxist ideology.

India was among the first non-communist countries to recognize the legitimacy of the new Chinese state. These two new states set in motion a favorable bilateral relationship. This era of brotherhood was publicly by the slogan, “Hindi Chini bhai bhai” (“Indians and Chinese are brothers”). However, this positive relationship would not last long.

India and China’s rising tensions

As early as the 1950s, suspicion and distrust grew between the nations surrounding China’s interest in Tibet, a buffer land between India and China. In 1951, China Tibet. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai attempted to ease tensions by signing the Panchsheel Pact in 1954. Then in 1959, the Chinese government the McMahon line, the border between India and Tibet (China). China started claiming the Indian territory of the Aksai Chin Plateau, and the India–China relationship further deteriorated when India discovered a Chinese road in the region.��

Border disputes arose between the nations, leading to the 1962 . The conflict ended with India’s defeat and China capturing areas of the Assam plains in northeast Aksai Chin and Demchok in northwest India. Relations worsened still when India gave to the Dalai Lama, a spiritual and temporal head of Tibet, and China Pakistan’s war efforts against India. Historians can trace periods of skirmish and negotiation alike to the 1960s.

In 2017, a major took place in Doklam, Bhutan. This area is claimed by both China and Bhutan and is an important juncture for all three nations, including India. While India accused China of building an illegal road in Bhutan’s territory, which caused security concerns for both India and Bhutan, China accused India of intrusion in its territory.

What started as a border dispute soon spilled over into foreign policy, dictating bilateral and multilateral relations as well as forming alliances. Asia, specifically South Asia and Eastern Asia, has become a testbed for both India and China to flex their power and influence. The pro-Chinese governments of India’s neighbors — Pakistan, the Maldives and now even Bangladesh — pressure India to change its 1984-esque “” attitude. Similarly, China is surrounded by pro-Indian governments — Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines — which cooperate with India militarily.

China has undertaken its Belt and Road and invested extensively in building sea routes to foster infrastructure development in other nations. The goal is to increase trade and trade relations with Asia. Meanwhile, India collaborates with the United States, Australia and Japan in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or ) to counter China’s presence in the Indian Ocean. The Quad’s goal is to unify a multilateral coalition to resist Chinese influence, which could embolden other nations to join and counterbalance China’s dominance.

China has made many such advances to keep India under check. With this rise of Chinese dominance in market and international politics, India has become a major element to balance Chinese regional power.

International relations in the 20th century evolved with the start of new alliances and multilateral engagements. To make these intertwined relations more prominent, globalization connected national economies, forcing even the socialist nations to open their markets for trade. In the 21st century, any action taken by states unilaterally impacts other international players as well. As major regional powers, the fastest-developing economies and two of the most populous countries in the world, India and China have undeniably become crucial international forces.

The rift between India and China that started with border disputes and ideological differences is now a matter of international concern, with both equilibrating one another. Border issues are in themselves complicated problems faced by majority nations, solutions to which are never secure for both parties. Given the current international arena, ambitions and geopolitical nature of the power struggle, even if the border crisis were solved, a permanent settlement between India and China is infeasible for the foreseeable future.

Cooperation is still possible

Rup Narayan Das, author of the , India-China Defence Cooperation and Military Engagement, describes India and China’s defence cooperation as a “complex mix of conflict and cooperation.” Having no mutually delineated Line of Actual Control (LAC) and differences in perceptions of the LAC, alternative periods of skirmishes and negotiations are common. But to bring stability in the border regions and foster understanding, India and China a Border Defence Cooperation on October 23, 2013. Under this agreement, neither side can use military strength to attack the other, and both sides must share information about their weapons and combat operations, among other things.

The 2020 Galwan Valley , which killed 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese soldiers, revealed the persisting atmosphere of distrust between the armies. Fortunately, communications through diplomatic and military channels have made steady progress to solve the Western border issue, said Senior Colonel Wu Qian. In light of the recent exchanges, External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said that about 75% of the “disengagement problems” with China have been sorted out. Likewise, Qian that the troops have “ on the ground at multiple locations in Eastern Ladakh,” including the Galwan Valley.

India and China are also part of different international groups that quintessentially demand collaboration: BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), G21 and the United Nations. As BRICS continues to grow and challenge Western economic dominance, especially the hegemonic position of the US dollar, a faltering of India–China cooperation would be detrimental to BRICS’s development. India initially contributed to the SCO and helped it increase its international reputation; but as it sees the organization being China-dominated, India has been its participation.

With increasing globalization and the common concerns of mankind, India and China have emphasized the need to from traditional technologies to green technologies, electric vehicles, low-carbon urbanization and adaptation. Many regard the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol agreement as most appropriate for international cooperation. While these organizations provide a forum for dialogue and cooperation, they also lead to discontent and competition. One long-standing is the matter of getting India a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, as well as China’s objections to this goal. China has caused delays and indecisiveness in the UN by skipping summits, opposing proposals and disagreeing.

Expanding trade can bring economic prosperity

Economic cooperation is one of the most important areas for India and China to agree upon. After all, the is expanding; it amounted to $113.83 billion in bilateral trade in the 2023 fiscal year.

“We feel that the economic relationship with China has been very unfair and very unbalanced. We don’t have the same market access there, while they have much better market access in India,” Jaishankar at the Global Centre for Security Policy in Geneva.

Notwithstanding the colored balance of payment (BOP), India and China’s economic relationship complements the other nation. Where China excels in cost-effective manufacturing, India specializes in cost-effective design and development. India offers China a populous market for its many products, and China has emerged as India’s largest in recent years. Although both countries have become investment destinations, bilateral investment has yet to grow.

In May 2014, China invited India to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As of August 14, 2024, 48 projects (25 sovereign and 11 non-sovereign) have been for $10.45 billion financing. The New Development Bank (NDB), which established its office in Shanghai, its India Regional Office in Gujarat International Finance Tec-City in June 2022. India is the biggest borrower in NDB, with 19 projects approved with a commitment of $6.92 billion as of August 31, 2022. With an increasingly integrated economy and a symmetrical BOP, India and China’s relations can prosper and negotiations can be more effective.

In contemporary international relations, cooperation and fallouts are an inevitable phenomenon. India and China are no exceptions. The commendable aspect of the India–China relationship is their mutual respect for communications and negotiations. Despite the antithesis between their prevalent ideologies and their role in the balance of power, the two have mostly maintained stable bilateral relations with short periods of squabble. They must now maintain the status quo in international politics. While alliance or friendship are not possible options in the international arena, stability and collaboration are expected and attainable.

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Blinken these media outlets of spreading “Russian government propaganda and disinformation,” of engaging in “covert influence activities aimed at undermining American elections and democracies” and of functioning as a “de facto arm of Russia’s intelligence apparatus.” To dispel the impression that these new bans are motivated by domestic political calculations, he tried to project Russian media as a global problem. He alleged that the outlets meddle in the sovereign affairs of nations in coordination with Russian intelligence services — that their goal is to manipulate elections not only in the US, but worldwide.

It is difficult for outsiders to believe that “Russian disinformation” can so easily influence US elections. US democracy has strong roots and cannot be destabilized by foreign propaganda; surely it is not so fragile.

In democracies, elections are won or lost on a multitude of issues: national and local issues, the electorate’s understanding of the contending parties and individuals’ positions, the media’s influence, the electorate’s political awareness, the voters’ perception regarding how the candidates’ platforms could affect their own well-being and so on. The final results often are not known until the actual voting takes place.

So the idea that foreign actors could manipulate elections in India, the world’s oldest democracy, seems far-fetched.

Blinken’s alliance and goals

Blinken asserts that RT “possess[es] cyber capabilities” for “covert” operations around the world. He says that the network uses oblivious US citizens to spread “Kremlin-produced content” and attitudes to the public. He elaborated, stating that Russia utilizes similar strategies “around the world.” One example is how the Russian capital of Moscow allegedly runs the online platform African Stream across social media. Blinken says that this platform claims to give a voice to Africans everywhere, but “in reality, the only voice it gives is to Kremlin propagandists.”

As a counter, Blinken states that the US is building a “more resilient global information system, where objective facts are elevated and deceptive messages gain less traction.” He adds that the US is going to promote campaigns that protect the freedom of the press — ones that strengthen the populace’s media literacy, to help people “better distinguish fact from fiction.” The US is coordinating with other governments via the State Department Global Engagement Center in an effort to quash information manipulation.

Blinken announced that the US is partnering with the United Kingdom and Canada to combat “Russian weaponization of disinformation.” In his words, the three nations are beginning a “joint diplomatic campaign to rally allies and partners around the world” to join them in addressing this Russian threat. Further, he instructed US diplomats everywhere to share their acquired evidence of RT’s capabilities and targeting strategies. While each government will decide how it responds to this, the US advises its allies to treat “RT’s activities as they do other intelligence activities by Russia within their borders.”

Blinken claims that the US “respects and champions freedom of expression, even when it comes to media outlets that wittingly spread government propaganda.” He says the nation will keep protecting media freedom around the globe. However, the US will not watch idly while actors like RT conduct hidden operations to support Russia’s diabolical schemes. The US, he adds, will aggressively combat subversive Russian ploys, namely those of “invading sovereign nations, fomenting coups, weaponizing corruption, carrying out assassinations, meddling in elections, and unjustly detaining foreign nationals.”

US hypocrisy and Western narrative control

To put it lightly, many of Blinken’s claims are highly debatable. Worse, they contradict the US’s own policies and actions on the global level.

The US treats freedom of expression as a core value and considers dissent to be an intrinsic part of democracy. In this case, however, the nation is sanctioning Russian media and placing legal curbs against its own citizens who appear on RT to criticize US policy on the respective Ukraine and Gaza conflicts. So the Biden administration is violating its own declared values. As a further blow to freedom of speech, the social media company Meta, undoubtedly pressured, has also Russian media on its platforms, including the outlet Sputnik and the aforementioned RT.��

This US double standard is not surprising. When non-Western nations place curbs on their own media or suppress dissent, the US quickly condemns it as a breach of democracy — even when their goal is to thwart rioting and violence. Yet the US does not seem to recognize the contradiction between its sanctions against RT, which violate the principle of freedom of expression, and limited restrictions that foreign countries implement to domestically curb social unrest, which it routinely condemns.

The West largely controls the flow of information globally. It can create and control narratives at the international level. Its power to disseminate distorted narratives about foreign nations makes those nations feel vulnerable. In fact, as far back as the 1970s, the developing world tried and failed to promote a new international information order — the New World Information and Communication Order () — to fix this vulnerability.

Today, some major non-Western countries are trying to break into this quasi-monopoly on global information flows, but are handicapped. The West has several advantages: Its native language, English, is the of international trade and business. Its print media and news agencies have long exercised global domination. The US also controls the social media space with its audiences worldwide. Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a 2024 with American journalist Tucker Carlson that Russia could try to promote its own narratives, but this would require an enormous, risky investment. Since this space is dominated by the West, Putin is uncertain that such an effort would yield success.

People widely believe that the CIA is connected to the US mainstream, social media and . Allegedly, it gets work from journalists abroad. The capacity of the National Security Agency to intercept communications worldwide, including illegal tapping of communications of enemies and allies alike, is well-established.

It is widely accepted that the US media, its democracy promotion organizations and its intelligence agencies promote regime change in foreign countries. A recent in the Financial Times by Bill Burns and Richard Moore — the heads of the US’s CIA and the UK’s MI6, respectively — publicly displayed their role in policy-making in the Ukraine conflict, for instance.

Largest democracy vs dominant democracy

India knows all about the US’s hypocrisy when it comes to suppressing free speech. The nation has protested the nation’s interference in its internal affairs.

In India’s case, Russian media has not interfered in the functioning of our democracy or our elections. We have not been victims of Russian propaganda or disinformation. Russian media has limited access to the Indian media space, while the Western media, especially that of the US and UK, dominates the dissemination of international news in it.

Even if some European countries also allege that Moscow interferes in their elections, there is no evidence that Russian media linked to Russian intelligence seeks to manipulate the outcome of elections “worldwide.” It is certainly not the case with India, whose colossal democracy would surely be affected if Russian meddling were as prominent as other nations say.

The US and the rest of the West continue to dominate the global information system, which India has experienced at its own cost. Western journals and broadcasting networks like The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, The Economist, Le Monde, Foreign Affairs, BBC, France 24 and DW are politically oriented the Indian government. They, alongside human rights organizations and groups that promote democracy and religious freedoms, spread about Indian developments. Even official US State Department reports do this.

India would therefore have questions about the US’s efforts to build “a more resilient global information system, where objective facts are elevated and deceptive messages gain less traction.” The US missions in India are tutoring local journalists on “fact-checking” — this fact-checking presumably comes with a bias for the US’s claims about India.

It would be ironic if the UK and Canada raised issues about Russian media with India. These two nations harbor people whom India considers ; those who question India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, attack our missions and threaten to kill our leaders and diplomats, among other things. India has no such problem with Russia.

It is not likely that the US would raise the issue of RT’s operations in India directly with the Ministry of External Affairs. They would already know what India’s response would be. This is not a bilateral issue between the US and India and should not be treated as such. The Global South will almost certainly be largely unresponsive as well.

[ edited this piece.]

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Less than a decade ago, British Viceroy Lord Elgin had said, “India was conquered by the sword and by the sword it shall be held!” Now, in an ironical turn of events, the youth of Bengal seemed to be returning Elgin’s comment. Many genuinely felt that violence was the only language the foreigners understood. Armed terrorism thus became closely intertwined with the fight for swaraj. In 1907, Aurobindo’s brother Barindra Ghose, began using his family home in Maniktola (then a suburb of Calcutta) as an arsenal-cum-school for revolutionaries. His compatriot, Hem Chandra Das from Midnapore, went to Paris to learn bomb making and understand revolutionary politics. As Bipin Chandra Pal, Ashwini Kumar Dutta, Aurobindo Ghose and others took control of the militant movement, the police files of the British became thicker and thicker with the names of young ‘suspects’ and ‘preventive detainees’. The same files now also had a name for this movement—’Bengal Terrorism’!

‘Bengal Terrorism’ was at its peak between 1908 and 1910. It was an organised movement that did not approve of individually motivated acts and secret murders. The objective was to stage a popular uprising and revolution that could bring down the edifice of British imperialism. This they hoped to do by forming secret societies that could enthuse the youth with higher values of bold action and sacrifice for the country, train them in the manufacture of bombs and explosive devices and the use of arms and also arm them for the fight.

Through the assassination of British officials they hoped to demoralise the British, paralyse the administration and uproot all enemies of India’s freedom—Indians or foreigners! Guerrilla warfare, inciting the army to revolt, arranging arms supplies from nations hostile to Britain—these revolutionaries were open to following many paths.

An official report of the time mentions about 210 revolutionary outrages and 101 attempts involving hundreds of revolutionaries in the decade between 1906 and 1917 in Bengal. This includes several failed and aborted attempts on the lives of high officials between the announcement of partition in 1905 and the Muzaffarpur bombing carried out by the Jugantar revolutionaries Khudiram Bose and Prafulla Chaki in April 1908.

These were times when the Criminal Intelligence Department (CID) could hardly afford to lean back and take a moment’s rest. Swamped with work, all its attention was now focused on tracing the web-like threads of revolutionary activity to their points of origin. All attempts to force a breakthrough had proved futile. On a more specific note, the CID was also aware of an assassination plot building up against the former Calcutta Presidency Chief Magistrate, Douglas Kingsford (now posted as District Judge in Muzaffarpur), but had not been able to unearth it. And then suddenly, the Muzaffarpur bombing happened!

A turning point in India’s revolutionary history, the incident created a sensation in British India. The blast was followed by deafening silence in stunned British circles. Young, impassioned, 18-year-old Khudiram Bose was arrested for the bombing. Through the incident and the investigations that followed, the British were able to unravel the functioning of a wellspread network of secret societies and the people associated with it. The Muzaffarpur bombing became the starting point of the famous trial known as the Alipore Bomb Case or the Alipore Bomb Conspiracy. The Muzaffarpur incident was the first real eruption of a volcano that had made many attempts to surface in the recent past. Before the bombing, several unsuccessful attempts had been made on the lives of high-profile British officials. In 1906, Bampfylde Fuller, the Lieutenant Governor of the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, was trailed from Guwahati to Rangpur, but no attempt was made. On the night of 6 December 1907 an attempt was made near Narayangarh in the Midnapur district to blow up the train in which Andrew Fraser, the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, was travelling. Another attempt was planned on the Lieutenant Governer’s train near Chandernagore in which Barindra Ghose was accompanied by his close associate Ullaskar Dutt and Prafulla Chaki. The attempt failed because the special train did not come that way on the appointed night. December 1907 also saw a group led by Narendranath Bhattacharya carry out a dacoity in Chingripota (24 Parganas) and the shooting of B.C. Allen (District Magistrate, Dhaka) by members of the Dhaka Anushilan Samiti. On the night of 11 April 1908 an attempt had been made on the life of the Mayor of Chandernagore who had incurred the wrath of the revolutionaries for stopping a swadeshi meeting from taking place. The police, therefore, had enough reasons to keep a close watch on the activities of some people in Calcutta, whom they suspected of having links with the revolutionaries.

Events had been in motion for a while, but deep in their hearts the revolutionaries were getting impatient for that one big bang that could shake the British to their foundations. It is in this context that the Muzaffarpur bombing assumes great historical importance. When Khudiram Bose and Prafulla Chaki threw a bomb at what they presumed to be the carriage carrying Douglas Kingsford on 30 April 1908 in Muzaffarpur in Bihar, they brought matters to a head. Instead of assassinating Kingsford, the bomb, however, killed his bridge partners Mrs. Kennedy and Miss Grace Kennedy, the wife and daughter of Mr. Pringle Kennedy, Advocate-at-Bar at Muzaffarpur. But even though it missed the desired target, the bomb that was hurled that fateful evening blasted the myth of British invincibility and shook the empire at its roots. Indeed, even a century later, the modest bomb remains one of the loudest explosions in Indian history.

[ has given 51�Թ� permission to publish this excerpt from The Alipore Bomb Case: A Historic Pre-Independence Trial, Noorul Hoda, Niyogi Books, 2008.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Alipore Bomb Case: A Historic Pre-Independence Trial appeared first on 51�Թ�.

— Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks.

On September 22, 2024, a from CNN reverberated across Sri Lanka: “Sri Lankans elect Marxist-leaning Dissanayake as president to fix the economy.” The deceptively simple headline conceals the hope, frustration and the persistent change that characterize today’s Sri Lanka. National People’s Power (NPP) party leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake now stands at the helm. Yet questions echo in the collective consciousness: Is this the dawn of genuine transformation, or merely another chapter in Sri Lanka’s lengthy political saga? This time, the air feels charged with an unsettling potential.

What does the new president represent?

The Sri Lankan people’s yearning to disrupt the status quo has eclipsed their fear of the unknown — the nebulous movement embodied by AKD, a leader emerging from the rural hinterlands to topple the established order represented by the seasoned Ranil Wickremesinghe, a six-time president.

From his inaugural moment, AKD’s presidency marks an audacious experiment for the country. His NPP is a heterogeneous ranging from radical leftists rooted in the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) to progressive elements. Here, we witness a -esque experiment in adapting Marxist movements to the ever-shifting landscape of social conditions.

Gramsci, a thinker who grappled with the nuances of ideological purity, argued for the necessity of pragmatism to forge a broader appeal. AKD’s own pragmatic turn has inspired a tentative optimism not only within Sri Lanka but also in the cautious hearts of its neighbors, especially India. The pivotal question persists: Can AKD balance reform with pragmatism during his presidency, or will he become ensnared in the very contradictions he seeks to transcend?

The NPP positions itself as a reformist entity distinct from its traditional Marxist roots, seeking to redefine its identity within the broader historical panoply of leftist movements. Yet — as with all revolutions — the shadow of past dogmas hovers, threatening to undermine the delicate foundations of reform.

AKD’s election symbolizes a profound shift in Sri Lankan politics and Sri Lankan socialism. In the 1970s, the JVP’s rigid adherence to Marxist orthodoxy privileged revolutionary fervor over pragmatic reform. Today, while the NPP acknowledges its origins, it has redefined itself as prioritizing governance and systemic reform over ideological purity. This evolution, however, is fraught with uncertainty and internal conflict, for the pull of old-guard sentiments within the JVP may clash with the drive for pragmatic governance.

How are Sri Lanka’s neighbors reacting?

As he navigates these turbulent waters, AKD faces formidable geopolitical challenges in the competing interests of India and China. Scholars  Harsh Pant and Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy , “Given the economic and geopolitical scenario, pragmatism is likely to take precedence — Sri Lanka will continue to balance between India and China.” Their insights reveal a landscape shaped by competing aspirations, where AKD’s focus on governance could forge a path toward stability — though whether this is a hopeful vision or an illusory one remains an open question.

However, India’s apprehension looms large as AKD’s presidency unfolds. The strength of the NPP, particularly in its connections to Beijing, raises alarms in New Delhi, which views the burgeoning partnership as a potential threat to its own regional influence. This fear is not unfounded, since India faces the possibility that Sri Lanka under AKD might continue the economic tango with China — trading closer alignment for survival. India fears that AKD might inadvertently lean toward China. The previous Rajapaksa regime did so, which cultivated ties with Beijing, allowing increased Chinese influence through infrastructure projects like the Hambantota Port. India’s security apparatus remains vigilant; some warn that AKD’s presidency could herald a recalibration of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy that may favor China at India’s expense.

As New Delhi grapples with these fears, it remains intent on countering any perceived drift of Kotte towards Beijing. Indian officials are likely to engage with AKD’s administration to promote stability and cooperation while subtly exerting pressure to ensure Sri Lanka does not slip further into China’s orbit.

This geopolitical backdrop complicates AKD’s administration, as he must navigate the intricate balance between fostering relationships with both powers while maintaining domestic support. At the heart of this precarious experiment lies a pressing challenge: addressing the that shadows AKD’s ascent.

AKD’s ability to navigate the labyrinthine reforms required by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the intricate dance of debt restructuring will define the early chapters of his presidency. To secure the fourth tranche of the $3 billion IMF program, Sri Lanka must demonstrate measurable progress in fiscal reforms and debt sustainability. The urgency of these reforms is palpable, for the threat of further financial deterioration looms large, threatening the very fabric of the nation.

Debt restructuring is a particularly thorny issue, fraught with the weight of a massive external debt burden and exacerbated by years of mismanagement. AKD inherits a complex negotiation landscape, where cooperation from key creditors — China, India and private bondholders — will be critical. In the days preceding the election, Wickremesinghe that “any move to alter the basics of the agreement could delay a fourth tranche of nearly $3 billion from the IMF package, which is crucial for economic stability.” Such warnings echo in the corridors of power, reminding us of the fragile balancing act AKD must perform.

While China has already in the form of debt rollovers, the way toward more comprehensive restructuring deals still needs to be discovered. Beijing’s strategic interests, particularly regarding infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), complicate the process. India, eager to witness stability in Sri Lanka, stands ready to support AKD’s reformist agenda, yet the shadows of previous projects, like the initiative, loom large, casting a shadow of uncertainty on future collaboration.

How will AKD move forward?

AKD’s administration must navigate the treacherous waters of fiscal consolidation, implementing IMF-mandated measures that include tax reforms, public revenue generation and enhanced governance in public enterprises. While these reforms are crucial for economic stabilization, they are not without risks. Public discontent could rise as the specter of austerity measures threatens to exacerbate inflation and unemployment.

The balancing act between India and China constitutes one of AKD’s most formidable challenges. On the one hand, India anticipates that his rise could distance Sri Lanka from the Rajapaksa-era ties to Beijing, marred by allegations of corruption. Conversely, AKD’s historical ties to China and the NPP’s pragmatic stance suggest that Beijing may still see him as a favorable partner. As a Chinese journalist candidly expressed, BRI projects could gain momentum under AKD’s presidency, perhaps even surpassing the ambitions of his predecessors.

This intricate balancing act will inevitably dominate AKD’s foreign policy. His early promise to cancel the controversial , while unlikely to fracture relations with India immediately, signals a willingness to make bold decisions that challenge external powers. Yet, whether such actions will tilt the balance in Sri Lanka’s favor or further entangle it in diplomatic complexities remains shrouded in uncertainty — much like his earlier campaign against the US , which revealed a readiness to confront foreign influence when politically expedient.

Amidst these challenges, AKD’s presidency offers a flicker of hope. The ravaged economy, scarred by years of mismanagement, yearns for bold reform. AKD’s election embodies the public’s longing for something new, a desire to transcend the failures of the past. His presidency will be defined by how he navigates internal reforms and his capacity to traverse a complex geopolitical landscape deftly. The stakes are high, and the potential for failure looms large, yet the possibility of transformation lies within this uncertainty.

Sri Lanka has seen political experiments before; many leaders have succumbed to the very establishment they once vowed to dismantle. But AKD’s presidency symbolizes a nascent possibility — a collective aspiration for a better future. Success will not merely depend on policy but on forging unity in a nation long fractured by political and economic strife.

As AKD prepares for parliamentary elections in November — an event that could define his capacity to enact reforms — the lingering questions remain: Will the Sri Lankan people, civil society and international partners rally behind arduous yet necessary changes? And can AKD maintain the delicate equilibrium between ideology and pragmatism while steering Sri Lanka through the turbulence of geopolitical rivalries? Only time will unveil the true nature of this bold new experiment, a venture into the unknown where hope and despair coexist in a fragile embrace. The future, like Gramsci’s modernity, hangs between hope and uncertainty, awaiting its verdict in a world without illusions.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Nao Jr was seemingly always busy, either ‘on duty’ in the only medical unit that Strait Island had, distributing medicines in case there was a need for anyone on the island, or fishing in the early morning or late evening, or just sleeping, which was his favourite pass-time. He agreed to help me record the folk tale only after 9 at night and I agreed to his terms, as I was excited to find at least one person in the entire habitat of eight households who claimed to remember a tale. He promised to visit me in the guesthouse. I was very anxious to receive him at the stipulated time.

I remember distinctly that it was 21 January 2006. Nao came to the guesthouse, thinking that he would finish the job in one evening. Little did he know that linguists have the bad habit of checking each and every word and phrase that is uttered. In the first sitting, he tried to narrate the story in Andamanese Hindi. He would halt in between, groping for the right words or phrases. When he was not satisfied with the Hindi version, he would suddenly revert to the appropriate Andamanese word. This was rather exciting and educational for me. The long-lost language was getting revived gradually in an ancient tale. I never expected this!

The loud choruses of the crickets and frogs had begun in the tsunami-created marshes and swamps behind our guesthouse; the power had been switched off and we were all sitting in the dark. We knew it was past 11 pm. We used to get electricity only for two hours. Nao wanted to retire. I extracted a promise from him to visit us the next day, at his convenience, but with the Andamanese version and not the Hindi one. He said he had forgotten it all. When I insisted that he could attempt to remember it at night while going to bed, he agreed to try but was sure that his memory would fail him. ‘Chaaliis saal se sunaa nahiin, kaun bolega? (It has been 40 years since I have heard it; who can narrate it?)’ He was sure he would disappoint me.

Then came the next day. I was making some grammar notes sitting on the wooden bed in the afternoon. I saw Nao standing at my door with an expectant look on his face. The moment I looked up, he said in Hindi, ‘Kuch kuch yaad aataa hai (I can remember a little).’ I invited him in and then we sat around the bed, turning it into a makeshift table. He started narrating the same story in short Great Andamanese phrases, not very fluently, but mixed with Hindi. Narayan, my student, assisted me in recording and transcribing the story. This is how our long journey of the Great Andamanese narration started, a journey into the past. I would interrupt him to get Hindi equivalents and he could, with a 90 percent success rate, render them. It took us several days, to get the full version of the narration of ‘Phertajido’ and the subsequent word-for-word translation. Sometimes, we would have our sessions in the afternoon and sometimes after 9 pm, as he was always busy fishing by the Strait Island jetty after sunset. This was a great story and I could see he loved narrating it.

The translated version of this story had some gaps, which I realized only after coming back to Delhi. I decided to go through the entire process again during the next trip. I was lucky enough as Nao obliged me during my next trip to Port Blair in December 2006, almost 11 months after our previous visit.

On reaching Port Blair in December 2006, I discovered that Nao was in Strait Island and not in Port Blair as I was informed by a tribal friend on the phone before I left Delhi. The AAJVS officials not only failed to honour my already sanctioned permit to visit Strait Island but were also on the lookout to catch and arrest me if I pursued my research. No one in the mainland would believe that a researcher could be arrested for hearing a story from the Great Andamanese tribes for work. Under the pretext of safeguarding the protected tribes, the concerned official would disregard the sanction given to us by the Home Ministry and would expect us to grease his palms. I neither had the means nor the inclinations to oblige him.

There was no way of informing Nao of my arrival in Port Blair. Unfortunately, Strait Island had no phone connections. The only wireless communication that the island had, was in the hands of the government officials. I had no option but to visit the Port Blair jetty and take a chance and see if I could run into any of my tribal friends on the ship. Ships for Strait Island leave very early in the morning at about 5:45 am. It was 19 December 2006; I reached the jetty much before the stipulated time. A crew member from one of the ships recognized me. By then, many local officials, especially those who worked on ships and boats, had started recognizing me as a friend of the Great Andamanese tribes. As soon as this man, a ticket checker at the departure gate saw me, he indicated towards the next ship moored in the distance and said, ‘Go and see Reya. She is going to Strait Island.’ This was a girl from the Great Andamanese tribe, whom I knew very well and who had married a Bengali man. I ran towards her, lest I lose her. She immediately recognized me and greeted me with a namaste. She introduced me to her husband. She asked me in Hindi, ‘Kab aayaa (when did you come)?’ Reya is one of those Great Andamanese tribal girls, who loves to amalgamate herself into our society and is happy to forget her heritage language. I told her that I desperately wanted to see Nili (the pet name of Nao). She informed me that Nao was on Strait Island and had no plans of visiting Port Blair. My world was falling to pieces.

I knew requesting the administration to transport Nao Jr to Port Blair would not help. I knew that getting permission to travel to Strait Island will be equally difficult, as some officers-in-charge were against any research on these tribes. It is a shame that the members of these tribes are kept as captives in their own land and are restricted from meeting other Indian citizens. Had it not been for the initiative of the Great Andamanese themselves, they would have never befriended locals and visitors like us. I immediately fished out a piece of paper from my purse, wrote a note in Hindi in bold letters, and gave it to Reya to pass it on to Nao. I told her to ask him to have it read out to him by one of the school-going children. I also told her that the sole purpose of my trip to the Andamans was to meet Nao and my other tribal friends, but Nao in particular. She promised to deliver the message.

[Listen to a song included in the book: .]

[ has given 51�Թ� permission to publish this excerpt from Voices from the Lost Horizon: Stories and Songs of the Great Andamanese, Anvita Abbi, Niyogi Books, 2021.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In 2014, commenting on the Bharatiya Janata Party’s landslide victory under Narendra Modi, The Guardian published an editorial that : “Today … may well go down in history as the day when Britain finally left India.” The author read the writing on the wall accurately. The process began in 2014, but Modi outlined it eight years later in his 2022 Independence Day speech, Modi introduced the concept of (Five Resolutions), outlining India’s vision over the next 25 years. One of the key resolutions is to rid the country of any remaining “colonial mindset.”

This renaming is not merely a symbolic act but represents a fundamental rethinking of policy-making and the nation’s role on the global stage. The decision reflects a significant shift in mindset, moving away from colonial-era thinking towards a renewed emphasis on India’s historical and cultural identity.

In keeping with this goal, the Home Ministry has recently several locations in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to honor Indian heroes and freedom fighters. One notable change is the of a hill previously named after a British army officer’s wife to Mount Manipur, commemorating the resistance of Indian fighters exiled by the British.

The politics of symbolism

Renaming places is not a new phenomenon; throughout history, conquerors have imposed their names on cities, often erasing indigenous identities. Similar efforts are evident in other countries as well. For instance, in the United States, historic sites have been renamed to reflect their original cultural significance, such as Fort San Marcos, renamed Castillo de San Marcos to acknowledge its Spanish heritage. Likewise, in China, streets and areas have been renamed to reinforce a national narrative.

For a former colony like India, renaming places is a form of symbolic decolonization. It serves as a means of reinforcing a collective memory that honors resistance to oppression and celebrates autonomy. Yes, the decision to rename Port Blair to Sri Vijaya Puram is a symbolic gesture, but symbolism is not just words without effect. In politics, psychology and history matter.

This name change is part of India’s effort to reconnect with its maritime history. The Andaman Islands command a key choke point between the Bay of Bengal to the west and the Andaman Sea to the east. This places it close to the vital , the second busiest oil chokepoint in the world after the Strait of Hormuz.

Well before the oil trade, the islands were significant in maritime trade. They once as a base for the Great Chola Empire, which extended its influence across Southeast Asia. In his book The Ocean of Churn, Sanjeev Sanyal how the islands were connected to the broader history of maritime trade and power projection in the Indian Ocean. The islands’ geographical location made them pivotal for controlling sea routes, and they were home to thriving port cities, interacting with traders from across the Bay of Bengal and beyond. The renaming reflects a recognition of the islands’ historic and strategic role..

Moreover, Sri Vijaya Puram holds a crucial place in India’s struggle for independence. In the latter years of the colonial period, the city housed the notorious Cellular Jail where numerous freedom fighters were imprisoned. This site not only represented British oppression but also the indomitable spirit of those striving for freedom. One such figure, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, foresaw that the islands would be critical to India’s defense.

India develops the islands’ strategic potential

The 2004 tsunami brought international attention to the vulnerabilities of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands but also showcased India’s capacity for disaster response and regional cooperation. In the aftermath, India led rescue efforts and a tsunami early warning system, solidifying its role in maritime security.

In recent years, the government has launched substantial infrastructural projects aimed at transforming the islands into economic and strategic hubs. The of undersea fiber-optic cables has improved connectivity, while the of the local airport is expected to enhance tourism. Initiatives in eco-tourism and the development of deep-sea ports further underline the islands’ growing significance.

Sri Vijaya Puram is not yet the fully-fledged maritime stronghold that Savarkar envisioned, although India took an important first step in this direction in 2001, when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee the first tri-service theater command in the region. However, the renaming is a statement of purpose. It signals a commitment to India’s maritime heritage while also highlighting ongoing efforts to enhance the Andaman and Nicobar Islands economically. This transformation under current leadership aims to position the islands as pivotal assets for India’s future.

[ edited this piece.]

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Nepali Proverb

(Those who live in a place from where the Himalayas cannot be seen may not be trusted.) 

At the time of writing, the monkey menace is a lightning rod for a great deal of public anger in the hills. Everyone seems to be perpetually persecuted by them. At the old Charleville, guards armed with airguns stalk the campus to scare off the simians, especially after one of the aggressive rhesus monkeys lunged at one of the Deputy Directors, completely disregarding his seniority, forcing him to take immediate evasive action. He jumped over the railing straight into the defile down below. Result? A broken arm!

Or you could say that Mr Obtuse, a college professor was to a certain extent responsible for the sudden explosion in the rhesus population. Don’t jump the gun and get me wrong. It all goes back to the winter vacation when our dear teacher went off to his home in the plains.

On meeting an old friend, he jokingly complained of a flagging libido. ‘I’ll fix that!’ promised the friend. Later, he gave him some specially concocted sweetmeats put together by a renowned herbalist, who’d made a minor fortune peddling cures for all kinds of sexual ailments, near the Clock Tower in Moradabad. Fortified with a box brimming with aphrodisiacs, our professor came home to his flat in the narrow lanes of our bazaar. On the very first day, he ate one, leaving the box near the window. The rest, as they say, is history— not his, theirs! A pesky monkey grabbed the box, spilling the contents on the ledge below. In the ensuing free for all, the sweets were gobbled up by a troupe of monkeys. Now don’t ask me if it worked. Honestly! I don’t know. But you have my word for it—there was an immediate jump in the population of simians. I hear there were rumours that one of these red-bottomed rhesus’ had a big grin on his face whenever he peeped through the barred windows of the learned professor’s abode looking for fresh supplies!

And grinning were the langurs too at one of the town’s best walkers, a certain Miss Crabbit who, having retired from a girl’s school settled here and has not stopped walking since. Given to the belief that those who walk sixteen kilometres a day are blessed with an eternal life, she sets off on her walk after a frugal breakfast, returns home for lunch, and takes off again to stagger home at dusk.

Things went well for years, that is until one of her nieces brought her a silvery fur coat to keep her warm through the cold winter. Hardly had she stepped out of her flat, when she noticed that she was being trailed by a troupe of amorous black-faced langurs marching in step behind her!

Now! That’s real monkey business.

Up until the 1960s, we had a tradition of doctors who made their way to the mountains from the sultry Ganges delta of Bengal. Foremost among these was a Dr Mitra, who ran a private clinic near the Old Theatre. On retiring, he passed on his practice to Dr Bagchi who, for some weird reason, always wore a monkey-cap. You could tell that summer had come when the good doctor removed his cap and little kids on the road went around yelling: ‘Papu ki topi uttar gayey!’ (Old man’s taken off his cap!)

Dr Bhaduri though had no cap fetish, he specialized in sex problems. Right next to the Electric Picture Palace cinema, he had a garish hoarding that showed an exhausted lion lying flat on its face before imbibing his magical aphrodisiac, while on the other side there was that magnificent pride of Africa, roaring at the tourists much in the manner of the MGM lion. Things were going well for the good doctor, up until the day police came knocking at his door.

What could he have done? He wondered. His medicines were not that bad!

The warrant stated he had certified as dead a man who was alive and kicking, and mad and angry too, because meanwhile his estranged wife had run off with the proceeds of his insurance policy. Off to the police station they marched and into the lock up he went for the night. The barred metal door clanged shut only to be opened the next morning when he was produced before a magistrate.

Lo and behold! As luck would have it, the doctor recognised Mr Tormented, the duty magistrate, as the errant youth whom he had a long time ago treated for venereal disease. Now, seated on his august chair, memories of another day came flooding back, he could still remember the burning sensation every time he had to visit the loo. Bashfully, he now remembered approaching the doctor, and managed to mutter: ‘Doctor Sa’ab, I think my thing has a cold.’

Dr Bhaduri had taken one look, smiled and said: ‘Till it sneezes, may be I’ll treat you with penicillin.’

On this fated day, their eyes met again. Time’s relentless sand papering had weathered them both as the clock rewound to twenty years ago. What mattered was that at the decisive moment, they were partners in crime again.

‘Doctor Sa’ab! What are you doing here?’ asked the judge.

‘Police say I’ve certified the living as dead! And his wife has taken off with his insurance!’

‘How did that happen?’

‘These men dragged me out of my bed at night and into a hotel room,’ he recalled, almost as in a dream. ‘Yes! There was a body. I wrote the name they gave me. Can you ask a dead man his name?’

‘True! Very possible!’ nodded Tormented, saying: ‘A case of mistaken identity. Bail granted.’

For the rest of his days, I am told Dr Bhaduri stopped taking house calls. The word was out that he would break out in hives if you so much as phoned him to take a house call.

[ has given 51�Թ� permission to publish this excerpt from Gupp and Gossip from the Hills, Ganesh Saili, Niyogi Books, 2012.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The essential tenets of education as propounded by Gandhi can be summed up as follows:

1) Education must serve the nation’s needs consistent with the philosophy of freedom, truth and non-violence.

2) Equality of all religions and all men.

3) Equal importance to intellectual training and manual work, which should be socially useful and productive.

4) Mother tongue as the medium of instruction at all levels along with the compulsory teaching of Hindi.

5) The curricula and other arrangements should aim at serving the needs of villagers.

It was a basic principle of all Gandhian institutions that teachers should regard untouchability as a blot on Hindu society and should strive for its removal and should never exclude a boy or girl for reasons of his being an untouchable, nor treat him or her differently after admission.

Manual work was an integral part of Gandhian education. There is no point, he used to say, in developing the brain only. One has to develop one’s brain through one’s hands.

Gandhi had been engaged in the work of rural reconstruction, harijan uplift and political regeneration and therefore, his fingers were constantly on the pulse of the common people. He realised that unless education was given a new orientation, it would not be possible to build the social order that he cherished. He placed before the nation a scheme which he had been evolving for 40 years—a scheme popularly known as the Wardha Scheme of Education, which he called ‘Nayee Talim’ or New Education. He defined it as education for life and through life.

Gandhi’s educational ideas grew out of his experiments in education with his family and in his ashrams in South Africa and India before they were formulated and publicly announced. By education he meant an all-round drawing out of the best in the child and man—body, mind and spirit.

‘That education alone is of value,’ he said, ‘which draws out the faculties of a student so as to enable him or her to solve correctly the problems of life in every department.’

‘Nayee Talim means teaching through craft. That basic craft has to be selected in the light of the conditions and produce of the region.’

According to him, self-reliance was the most important characteristic of Nayee Talim. The knowledge that this system imparted could not be had from books. It was from nature that this knowledge had to be obtained. ‘Knowledge directly derived from anything was much better than knowledge derived through a written lesson or through symbols. That was the essential basis of Nayee Talim.’

Basic education discarded bookish learning and aimed at an all-round development of the child so that he could become a useful and productive member of the society. In his last talk on Nayee Talim on 14 December 1947, Gandhi said, ‘Basic education is generally interpreted as education through craft. This is true to a certain extent, but this is not the whole truth. The roots of Nayee Talim go deeper. It is based on truth and non-violence in individual and collective life.

The Wardha scheme left out teaching of religion because Gandhi held that religions as they were taught and practised led to conflict rather than unity. Truths common to all religions could be taught. No denominationalism or factionalism was to be encouraged specially between Hindus and Muslims.

[ has given 51�Թ� permission to publish this excerpt from Gandhi’s Vision: Freedom And Beyond, Aparna Basu, Niyogi Books, 2018.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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