However, economists are now scrutinizing this longstanding system. Over the past decade, Hong Kong has accelerated its with mainland China. The Greater Bay Area initiative has deepened cross-border financial links, while the Chinese yuan (CNY) — especially the offshore Hong Kong variant — has gained ground in global settlements. Simultaneously, US–China tensions have elevated systemic risks in dollar-reliant jurisdictions. These dynamics prompt a fundamental question: Should Hong Kong realign its currency anchor from the USD to the CNY?

That question is no longer purely academic. In early May 2025, the HKMA injected over HKD into the market to defend the — the nation’s currency tied to the exchange rate of another nation — as the HKD again approached the weak-side limit of 7.85. Over the course of a single week, Bloomberg that the HKMA injected approximately $59 billion HKD (around $7.5 billion) through three separate to stabilize the Hong Kong dollar.

This piece assesses the merits and hazards of shifting to a yuan peg through the lenses of macroeconomic theory, financial market modeling and political economy.

What derivatives markets reveal about peg fragility

One of the clearest ways to gauge investor sentiment about Hong Kong’s currency regime is by looking at how financial markets are pricing risk — especially through derivatives such as currency forwards and options. These instruments give us real-time insight into whether investors believe the HKD peg to the USD will hold, or whether they expect it to break.

When investors believe that a pegged currency might soon move to a or shift to a new anchor — like the CNY — this uncertainty shows up in option prices. Specifically, options that protect against large swings in the HKD become more expensive. By analyzing these prices, economists and central banks can estimate what probability the market is assigning to a potential regime change.

Recent data suggest that this probability is rising. As of mid-2025, markets are increasingly pricing in the possibility that the HKD–USD peg may not be indefinitely. One metric used by FX desks is the — the difference in price between buying an option to hedge a stronger HKD and one to hedge a weaker HKD. This measure has become more skewed to the downside, signaling growing concern about depreciation risks or a future realignment of the peg.

Another red flag is the cost of non-deliverable forwards () — contracts used to speculate on or hedge future exchange rates where capital controls or uncertainty exist. NDF pricing on the HKD is showing compared to past norms, suggesting markets are hedging against more volatility than usual. These changes closely track rising global interest rate differentials, declining liquidity in Hong Kong’s banking system and heightened political uncertainty.

In short, while the peg remains intact, market-based indicators are flashing caution. They reflect growing skepticism about how long the HKMA can defend the current system without introducing new policy tools or considering structural adjustments.

To help interpret these signals, economists sometimes use simplified models that estimate what investors think might happen under different scenarios, such as the peg continuing versus a re-pegging to the yuan. Based on this approach, one estimate suggests that markets now see a nearly of peg discontinuity in the medium term — levels last seen during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.

Moreover, if the peg were abandoned, market pricing suggests that the HKD would likely move closer in value to the yuan rather than float freely. This is a striking development: It signals that in the event of a change; investors are already anticipating closer with China.

This doesn’t mean a shift is inevitable. But it does highlight the value of these market-based signals in providing early warnings to central bankers and FX officials. Peg regimes are as much about credibility and perception as they are about reserves and policy rules. If markets start to doubt the HKMA’s ability or willingness to maintain the peg, it can create a self-fulfilling pressure, even if the fundamentals remain strong.

The takeaway is clear: The HKD–USD peg is still holding, but the risk premium for holding HKD is rising. This should prompt careful monitoring and timely communication by the HKMA to reinforce market confidence.

Strategic realignment or premature gamble?

Proponents of a yuan peg cite three major rationales:

1. Economic integration: of Hong Kong’s trade in 2024 was conducted with mainland China. Financial linkages through Stock Connect, Bond Connect and Wealth Management Connect have cemented bilateral capital flows. Pegging to the yuan would reduce transaction costs and FX hedging complexity for firms operating across the border.
2. Renminbi internationalization: As China scales up its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System () and pilots, Hong Kong could serve as a premier offshore settlement hub. A yuan peg would position Hong Kong as an institutional anchor in the global trend, particularly in Belt and Road economies.
3. Geopolitical hedging: Amid intensifying US–China strategic rivalry, Hong Kong faces increasing risks of secondary sanctions, export restrictions and financial surveillance. A yuan peg might shield its financial system from such external shocks by reducing direct reliance on dollar-based clearing and custody systems.

However, the counterarguments are formidable:

1. Capital account constraints: The yuan remains only partially convertible. Although China has liberalized under the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor () and RMB Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (RQDII) schemes, the People’s Bank of China () retains discretionary capital controls. Pegging to a undermines the viability of any credible board-like regime.
2. Policy opacity: The PBOC’s exchange rate regime is a managed float with daily midpoint settings and periodic direct intervention. This contrasts sharply with the HKMA’s rule-bound and transparent operations. Importing such opacity would erode investor confidence in Hong Kong’s financial governance.
3. Legal and institutional risks: The HKD–USD peg is embedded in legal contracts, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) — the global standard for derivatives contracts — and derivative clearing systems. Transitioning the anchor currency would require massive contractual rewrites and could trigger systemic counterparty risk.
4. Geopolitical blowback: A yuan peg would likely be interpreted as a de facto political realignment with Beijing. This could US sanctions or trigger the removal of Hong Kong’s special trading status under US and EU law, with substantial ramifications for multinational financial institutions.

Navigating the trilemma with gradualist alternatives

The Hong Kong case vividly illustrates the “” or monetary trilemma: A jurisdiction cannot simultaneously maintain free capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate and monetary policy autonomy. By design, Hong Kong sacrifices monetary independence in favor of a credible peg and open capital account.

Switching to a yuan peg would not resolve this trilemma, but merely substitute one constraint for another. It would replace imported Federal Reserve policy with alignment to PBOC settings, which lack transparency and could respond to non-market criteria. Furthermore, given China’s reactive capital control framework, Hong Kong would likely face episodic arbitrage pressures from exchange rate misalignments, settlement delays or inefficiencies in cross-border transactions, and liquidity challenges due to capital flow restrictions.

Instead of abrupt realignment, a suite of gradualist alternatives offers a path forward:

1. Dual anchor framework: Hong Kong could maintain its dollar peg while simultaneously promoting CNY usage in trade finance and settlement. By gradually building a parallel renminbi ecosystem, Hong Kong could prepare for deeper future integration without destabilizing the existing regime.
2. Currency basket peg: Pegging the HKD to a weighted basket (e.g., 60% USD, 30% CNY, 10% EUR) would enhance resilience and reflect actual trade patterns. However, such a system would reduce transparency, complicate intervention mechanics and risk speculative attack during transitions.
3. Monetary buffering and market signaling: Enhancing FX reserves, publishing real-time intervention data and tightening the peg band during crisis periods could restore market confidence in the existing system. The implied and skew — the latter being the difference in implied volatility between a currency pair’s call and put options — of FX option market monitoring can provide the HKMA with forward-looking risk indicators. If the implied volatility on USD calls (due to a weakening HKD) rises sharply compared to puts, it signals market fears of a potential peg break or devaluation.
4. Digital currency integration: Participation in digital yuan pilots without formally shifting the peg could allow Hong Kong to shape regional fintech architecture while preserving its dollar-based monetary firewall.

Stability, optionality and trust

Currency regimes do not operate in a vacuum. They rest on institutional credibility, strategic foresight and geopolitical alignment. While markets increasingly price the potential for a peg shift, the underlying architecture of the LERS remains sound. Hong Kong holds over in reserves — more than twice its monetary base — and its legal and policy frameworks continue to command global investor trust.

The deeper question is whether Hong Kong can continue to serve as a bridge between two incompatible monetary systems — liberal, rule-based dollar finance and state-centric, capital-managed yuan finance — without compromising either. For now, the answer lies in preserving optionality.

The HKD–USD peg has delivered nearly 42 years of macroeconomic stability, low inflation and international integration. The of abandoning this legacy — especially in the absence of full yuan convertibility — far outweigh the speculative benefits. Indeed, a premature shift could backfire, accelerating capital flight, destabilizing asset prices and reducing Hong Kong’s appeal as a financial platform.

Instead, the pragmatic path is strategic patience. Rather than adopting the yuan as anchor, Hong Kong should deepen its role as a multipolar financial node — supporting dollar, yuan and digital rails alike. Over time, if and when the yuan becomes fully convertible, independently priced and broadly accepted as a global reserve asset, the peg debate can be revisited with a more balanced risk-reward profile.

Until then, the US dollar remains the bedrock not just of Hong Kong’s exchange rate, but of its institutional trust and global stature.

The future of the peg

The debate over whether to reanchor the Hong Kong dollar from the US dollar to the yuan is not merely a technical question of exchange rate policy — it is a reflection of deeper global tensions. At stake is more than monetary alignment; it is a test of how to operate between two diverging systems: one grounded in liberal, rules-based transparency, and the other shaped by state-driven capital controls and strategic ambiguity.

Hong Kong stands uniquely at the crossroads of this global transition. It is not just a currency regime under scrutiny, but an institutional model under stress, caught between competing geopolitical narratives and market logics. The HKD–USD peg, in place since 1983, has served not only as a nominal anchor, but as the backbone of Hong Kong’s credibility as an international financial center. As integration with the mainland deepens and global monetary structures fragment, that foundation is increasingly under market-led reassessment.

This is not a moment for premature decisions or symbolic realignment. The core challenge is not choosing between the dollar or the yuan, but maintaining institutional coherence in a world where the political, financial and reputational costs of miscalculation are rising. Strategic patience, not reactive allegiance, must define the path forward.

In a time of fluidity and fractured certainties, stability no longer means inaction — but neither does movement without clarity ensure progress. For now, the peg endures. What ultimately sustains it may not be just reserves or rules, but trust — earned, maintained and constantly tested.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The Last British Governor of Hong Kong

The present troubles are rooted in the snake oil peddled before 1997 by what is now, very largely, an English Conservative Party that was then in office. Like all British governments, they scattered appointments about like golden corn to clucking hens.

Chris Patten, the last governor of Hong Kong before the end of the British administration, was a parochial politician for one of the most parochial constituencies in England: Bath. He was no statesman. But he was good at presenting arguments clearly — and himself as thoughtful, intelligent, intellectual, self-deprecating and wise — irrespective of the truth. Patten ran in a successful general election for the Conservatives in 1992, though he lost his own seat in the UK Parliament. For this, he was rewarded and compensated with Hong Kong.

Once there, his thinking didn’t change. He took the view that the Beijing leadership — responsible for the well-being of 1.16 billion people at the time and for lifting hundreds of millions from poverty — ought to make exceptions for an Englishman who still had his mind on home and what it would think of him after the handover of Hong Kong to Chinese authorities. Patten created the impression that he and the British cared about Hong Kong, and that Hongkongers (just like the good people of Bath) would control their own destiny through local democratic mechanisms that he would introduce. He advertised himself and his reforms shamelessly. It was an exhibition in self-delusion and sentimentality only now matched by Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s desire for Brexit, no ifs, no buts.

True, Patten was dealt a poor hand. Although the colonial administration could be effective when its military-style simplicity and self-imposed limitations were at their best, Hong Kong never had good government, let alone democracy. The majority of people had always lived in cramped accommodation as they do today, struggling to make ends meet through work, work, work and still more work. There was corruption in the administration, in the universities, in the judiciary and in business. The police worked hand in glove with gangsters. Everyone from the poorest immigrant to the highest colonial officer had to pay their way somehow.

Those insulated by money or a passport to another world might have found life in Hong Kong to be an “experience,” exciting and even romantic. For the rest, it was a grubby, dog-eat-dog existence. But Patten made a bad situation worse by foisting on it the democratic pretentions of an English market town.

Consequently, Hong Kong was left with no tradition of good government and no pool of committed and effective public servants. There was just a collection of tycoons and merchants, intellectuals and professionals, only some of whom might conceivably oversee Hong Kong’s gradual integration with China. The field was narrowed further after many of them — hooing and cooing at the world in what D.H. Lawrence called an “Oxford voice” or, worse still, a “would-be Oxford voice” — wrapped themselves in Patten’s democratic cloak. They were the ones upholding democracy and defending the people’s “unique” way of life.

So, don’t blame them if they were incompetent; if they were unable to agree on anything or do anything; if they failed the people through maladministration and petty bickering; if they had no imagination or foresight or just did not care; or if they spent their time grandstanding while others scratched out a living in tiny rooms amongst the skyscrapers.

Blame the outsiders instead. Blame the day-trippers who pack the shops, stuff their wheelies full of Gucci and Yves Saint Laurent, pour through the streets, clog up the trains and buses, fill the parking lots, push up prices and are generally “there” in too great a number. Blame the outsiders who are picking up jobs, buying up apartments, fouling up the bureaucracy and public services and who, in just about every other sense, are behaving rather badly. Just blame the outsiders.

For the last two decades, these writhing factions have preferred to engage in whatever shabby tactic is needed to get one up on their opponents. Having grown up in this morass, it is unsurprising that today’s politicians and “influencers,” professional dissenters and career activists (many of whom are still only in their 20s and 30s) are just as uncompromisingly bitter, ambitious and moralistic as their mentors. If things should go badly wrong in Hong Kong, well that will only give these careerists the profile they need and another entry for their résumé. They might even be able to scoop up a stipend as a “scholar” at a prestigious university overseas and write books about the crisis they saw coming.

The Mainland

The most critical problem confronting Hong Kong, and the source of the despondency eating away at its soul, is second-rate political leadership by Hongkongers, for Hongkongers. The solution lies just across the border. If absorbed by Shenzhen, Hongkongers would quickly see an improvement in their living standards. The high-quality government that the city so desperately needs would be forthcoming immediately, the political and physical constraints on the territory would be relieved, living spaces opened up, corruption expunged, businesses controlled and inequalities finally tackled as subventions are pushed toward those who need it most.

Beijing is certain to act positively because its long-term survival, just like that of any other leadership the world over, depends upon how well it looks after those it governs. Moreover, Beijing will want China to look good. And there is the simple fact that the Shenzhen government really does know what it’s doing.

The solution might seem radical, even unthinkable in the present circumstances. Yet full integration by 2047 will take place come what may. I suspect it will be necessary sooner rather than later. At the moment, Hong Kong’s government probably has neither the will to make such a proposal, nor the ability to win enough support for it after 22 years of misrule.

The most likely scenario is that Beijing will increase pressure on Hong Kong’s tycoons to govern properly and look after its own people rather than just administer them. Equally likely, however, is that Hong Kong’s youth, seduced by that Oxford voice breathing gently and languishingly on the back of their necks, will cling to the hope that they can unmix Hong Kong from mainland China. Beijing will then have no choice but to conclude that the slow path to integration is taking Hong Kong over a cliff. Unity will come sooner rather than later but in a different and extremely unhelpful atmosphere — one, it will be said, that all along could have been avoided.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese revolutionary who was responsible for propelling the transformation of China to the power it is today, had a grand dream. His ambition of creating a unified China—where the regions of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan would be “reunited peacefully” with the mainland—was to be fulfilled under his policy of “one country, two systems.”

Formulated fully by 1983, the essential principles of this policy underlined how each region could retain its economic, political and social systems—built on capitalism—once communist China resumed the exercise of its sovereignty over the regions.

In reality, Deng’s policy has encountered many setbacks over the last decade, and none have made peaceful unification more elusive than Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo) elections on September 4. In an election with the highest ever since Hong Kong was handed back to China by the British in 1997, non-establishment/pro-democracy candidates won 30 out of 70 contested seats—with five of those 30 seats won by young, first-time candidates from the post-Occupy movement of 2014.

Many news outlets around the world have been that a new generation of voters has finally made its voice for more autonomy, and eventually independence, heard. But is there really much cause for celebration? What are China’s concerns? And what’s next for Hong Kong?

David and Goliath’s Stand-off

Hong Kong’s sociopolitical battles with Beijing have long been in the making, with resistance against signs of “mainlandization” steadily building up since the 2000s. Language, for example, has become a main point of contention. Under the Basic Law of Hong Kong, Mandarin, or Putonghua, was made an official language along with Cantonese and English. The increased emphasis on Mandarin in institutions and schools as a medium of instruction has led to locals fearing that their cultural identity is being .

Politically, Beijing has maintained a tight control on the city’s institutions, and the latest round of elections has only emphasized the strict boundaries that anti-establishment forces must work within. The LegCo is responsible for passing laws and approving the government budget, but registered voters directly elect only 40 out of the 70 seats—35 through geographical constituencies and five through the District Council, with the remaining 30 elected by 28 traditional functional constituencies—which gives special representation to certain pro-establishment social and economic groups.

Beyond the LegCo, Beijing’s resolve to implement a controlled framework for the first election of the chief executive through universal suffrage in 2017 has also been a spark for political activism since 2014. In August 2014, the decision made by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in China to “” in the selection of the chief executive, “so as to facilitate the building of consensus within the Hong Kong community,” was a sign of Beijing’s outright rejection of democracy. While the chief executive would be elected by popular vote, no open nominations would be accepted, and “two to three candidates” would be eligible to run for office—but only after each candidate has been approved by a majority of a 1,200-member election committee that is likely to be pro-establishment.

While this decision triggered the 79-day Umbrella Movement and brought Hong Kong’s political , it did not lead to any immediate changes.

“The Umbrella Movement successfully aroused the political enthusiasm of the usually politically apathetic citizen, says Elizabeth Kit-Wai, a local commentator and journalist. “At the same time, however, the people [were] very disappointed that the movement failed to bring genuine political reforms to the city.” She adds that the events of 2014 resulted in “a small group of people” becoming drawn to the idea of independence, while many others preferred to remain on a more moderate path of demanding China to accommodate more mechanisms for democratization.

But accommodation was not a message that Beijing has conveyed, and recent events since the end of 2015 have only fueled anti-Beijing sentiments. The disappearance of five Hong Kong booksellers—with one being within Hong Kong—and the short-lived  in February 2016 struck deep blows to the policy of “one country, two systems,” making the elections in September an opportune moment for localist parties to come together.

Serious Fragmentation

Unity, however, was not the name of the game for the pro-democracy camp, and to several people that 51�Թ� spoke to, it is something that might not materialize for some time.

To Kit-Wai, the pro-democracy camp looks “seriously fragmented,” and this was reflected in the long list of candidates who contested in each district, especially in the New Territories East and West.

It is also likely that a consensus on just how much autonomy should be fought for will not be reached amongst pro-democracy parties in the near future. While the LegCo results showed that pro-democracy voters largely preferred candidates from parties with moderate political agendas, the victory of pro-independence candidates—such as , who campaigned with more extreme agendas—has made localist messages of pro-independence more mainstream, and the polarization of liberal stances might heighten in the lead up to the chief executive elections in March 2017.

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“I think people who were silently supporting the localist movement would be galvanized,” says Dylan Loh, a graduate research fellow at the University of Cambridge and a faculty member at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University. For next year’s chief executive elections, all eyes will be on whom the nominating committee puts forth as candidates for elections. Loh adds that the election result “quells any chance of having a more reformist-minded or independent candidate being put up for the CE [chief executive] elections.”

The current chief executive, C.Y. Leung, is highly unpopular, and whether or not he will successfully serve the second term is a critical point of the development of local politics.

Same Old Band

While China’s efforts in censoring news about the LegCo elections —the University of Hong Kong’s China Media Project  and found only one Chinese-language article about it in mainland papers—it is unlikely to alter its current paternalistic approach toward post-2014 Hong Kong. Unsurprisingly, in the lead-up to voting day on September 4, several pro-independence candidates were , while others faced threats and were even  for being too critical of Beijing.

The Politburo also  via the Xinhua news agency, stating that it “would not tolerate any talk of independence ‘inside or outside’ the legislature.”

The elections may, therefore, have allowed several anti-Beijing activists to get their foot through the door, but the general composition of LegCo has essentially not changed much, with the pro-Beijing camp retaining a majority. As such, China is likely to adopt a “wait-and-see” approach.

“The issuance of warnings coupled with the increased influence in academia, media, grassroots and elite levels are sure to continue,” says Loh, and such boundaries and limitations are likely to frustrate localists and create a vicious action-reaction cycle of protests.

Hong Kong does not have to look far to see how China’s tolerance of resistance has dipped and become more violent in tone since 2014. China  in June 2016 after Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen failed to acknowledge the concept of “one China.” Within the mainland, the government’s , a village in southern China that used to pride itself for running its own government, has heightened the climate of fear and .

If China hoped that the crackdown on Wukan would create fear in Hong Kong, it has created an opposite effect. Localist leaders have shown a stronger commitment of standing firm to their cause, with close to 100 Hong Kongers  in solidarity with the villagers in Wukan on September 19.

Power to the People?

With just months to go till the chief executive elections, there are clearly mixed feelings amongst the electorate on the future of Hong Kong’s politics.

“The new LegCo has given me hope—in that positive changes might actually happen, though I’m not sure where it will lead and how far localism will succeed,” says Stephanie Chiang, 24, a recent graduate. “I voted, half-thinking that my vote wouldn’t make a difference but, to my surprise, it did.”

Views held by young voters like Chiang could very well propel the pro-democracy camp to get their act together and form a more cohesive front over the next few months.

A lot hinges on how the new localist lawmakers will behave. Many anti-establishment legislators within the LegCo are , and the political scene stands to become more chaotic if anti-establishment legislators like Edward Leung and Baggio Leung (both Leungs are not related) take on more militant and extreme pro-independence stances during council meetings.

Militancy is an approach that could be adopted by localists over the next few years, with a recent commentary by a that localists could create “a scenario in which China is so sick of Hong Kong that it thinks the best thing to do is to expel Hong Kong” from the mainland.

This, however, is highly unlikely to happen. Hong Kong remains a strategically important entity to China. The superpower’s rigid claims on Hong Kong mean expulsion would only be a wound to its dignity and reputation. It is also worthwhile to note that it would not be possible for Hong Kong to rely on other nations after expulsion. Unlike Taiwan’s strong ties with the United States, Hong Kong as an entity has never been outwardly supported diplomatically by Washington, and Beijing is likely to make sure it stays that way.

With China and Hong Kong entering uncharted political territory, it remains to be seen how Deng Xiaoping’s grand ambition of having a united China can be fulfilled, given that both sides are likely to fight fire with fire to assert their own positions of power. It is, however, worth noting that compared to the Umbrella Movement, the LegCo election results are a more solid start to Hong Kong’s journey of figuring out a sustainable, cohesive approach toward Beijing’s goal of creating “one China.”

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Gary Chang, a Chinese architect, has lived in a 344-square-foot apartment in Hong Kong for almost his entire life. His parents and three sisters occupied the tiny space, then divided into three rooms, and even managed to sublet one room to a tenant. This is not unusual for a crowded city of more than 7 million people where rents are high and space scarce.

When his family moved out to a bigger place, Chang decided to stay on and invest in a project of incredible spatial efficiency. In the years since, he has turned the space into a beautiful, highly-automated home with 24 interchangeable rooms. There is a fully equipped kitchen, laundry room, a walk-in closet, a home cinema—there is even a spa. When all the moveable walls are drawn back, what is left is a luxurious space of 180 square feet, light and airy.

It is a true feat of architectural genius and creativity. “My trouble is I have too much storage,” jokes its creator.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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This month, the United Nations hosted its annual jamboree in New York. The focus was on the 2014 Climate Summit and 100 Heads of State and Government attended it. More than 800 leaders from business and civil society also turned up. Furthermore, on September 21, over 400,000 people marched through the streets of this bustling city to raise awareness about global warming. US President Barack Obama addressed the summit, but promised no concrete action. Leaders of China and India stayed away. The summit was high on rhetoric and low on action. It seems humanity is too addicted to old sources of energy to make any sacrifices to curb the human impact on the environment.

Speaking of the environment, it turns out that the loss of species is greater than estimated. While populations of mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish have declined by an average of 52%, the number of freshwater species have declined by a catastrophic 76%. In Ghana, the lion population is down by 90% in 40 years. There are two questions we are failing to address. First, can we continue to sustain 7 billion people on the planet without destroying the environment? Second, can we continue to follow the Industrial Revolution economic model with unfettered growth, unbridled consumption and unlimited thirst for natural resources?

The environment is a one-day headline for much of the media. What has been hogging the headlines is Obama’s decision to strike the Islamic State. Regional allies terrified of the group’s rise have published photos of a female pilot and a royal prince in a cockpit flying out to battle the terrorist organization. The alliances in the Middle East are changing like its shifting sands. So far, the US has been reactive instead of imaginative, and its flip-flop foreign policy will continue because it does not know what it wants to achieve except for preserving a status quo that is clearly untenable.

As the time of publishing, pro-democracy protests are raging in Hong Kong. Life in the city has come to a standstill. Over the past weekend, the police used tear gas and pepper spray but riot police have since been withdrawn. Crowds are continuing to swell and are peaceful, with a lot of singing and chanting going on. The Chinese Communist Party is in a dilemma because it worries about calls for democracy spreading to the mainland, challenging the stranglehold it has on power. A Tiananmen-style crackdown would chip away at the legitimacy of the party. Conceding the demands of the protesters would cause communist leaders to lose face, an anathema in Chinese culture. The issue has taken on such significance that any decision will be taken right at the top. President Xi Jinping now faces a dilemma that could define his destiny.

Brazil’s presidential election is causing much turmoil. The country’s currency and stock market fell when opinion polls showed an increasing lead for President Dilma Rousseff. Markets favor her challenger, Marina Silva, who has surrounded herself with reform-minded advisers. 

In Russia, the State Duma has revived plans to ban long-distance Skype calls, in an attempt to increase revenues and curb the “threat of terrorism” and “illegal drug trade.” It seems foreign ownership of Russian media brings similar dangers: It will soon be restricted to 20% instead of the existing 50%. President Vladimir Putin’s iron grip on the media is stronger than ever, with his partner and rumored new wife recently appointed chair of the National Media Group. Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to fester even as it has disappeared from the headlines. Fighting has broken out again in Donetsk, bringing the recent ceasefire agreement into question.

Three other developments deserve attention. First, Brazil’s presidential election is causing much turmoil. The country’s currency and stock market fell when opinion polls showed an increasing lead for President Dilma Rousseff. Markets favor her challenger, Marina Silva, who has surrounded herself with reform-minded advisers. The election is a defining one for Brazil and will be close.

Second, the rise of China’s private sector and the intertwined nature of Sino-US economies were on display when Alibaba’s initial public offering on the New York Stock Exchange created waves. Alibaba is an Internet monster that is redefining ecommerce with sales of $248 billion in 2013, exceeding those of eBay and Amazon combined.

Third, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi received a rapturous reception reserved for rock stars in the US. In a display of oratory in Madison Square Garden, he announced a major outreach to non-resident Indians, welcomed American companies to “Make in India” and simplified visa procurement for American citizens, who will soon be able to get visas when they show up on Indian shores.

As autumn begins in the northern hemisphere, we invite you to send us blog posts, articles, videos, infographics, cartoons and more. Click to become a contributor. Meanwhile, please find below our finest articles for September.

[seperator style=”style1″]1: A Cheat Sheet for Obama on Modi’s US Visit[/seperator]

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Obama needs to disregard Washington’s India experts and woo Modi, who will achieve success with Indian Diaspora and US business.

The authors of this article have read with amusement the garbage being churned out by pundits in Washington DC. They tend to be ignorant, monolingual, whiter than white so-called India experts. An odd coconut, the term used for anglicized Indians who barely speak any Indian language, is thrown …

[seperator]2: Britain Betrays Hong Kong… Again[/seperator]

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The British government has failed to condemn China for breaking its promise of greater democracy in Hong Kong.

If you were told the Chinese government — an unelected, one-party state — will decide who you can vote for, what would your response be? Not only would you likely object, you would expect others, especially democracies, to loudly condemn the idea. But Britain has done just the opposite to the people of Hong Kong, when it failed to call China out for breaking its promise of greater …

[seperator]3: How Safe is Thailand for Tourists?[/seperator]

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To restore confidence, the Prayuth government must find the culprits of the British tourists’ murder.

On September 17, Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, the self-appointed Thai prime minister, suggested during a speech to senior bureaucrats that female tourists in Thailand are not safe if they wear bikinis. “They think our country is beautiful and is safe so they can do whatever they want, they can wear bikinis and walk everywhere,” Prayuth said, before adding, “[But] can they … 

[seperator]4: Iman Bibars: Youth Employment in North Africa (Part 1/2)[/seperator]

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With the second youngest population in the world, what confronts youth in North Africa’s job market?

The dire economic situation in North Africa moved into the spotlight when Mohammed Bouazizi, a young Tunisian fruit vendor, set himself alight on December 17, 2010, sparking revolts that shook dictators from Algeria to Yemen. While causes behind the uprisings were complex, encompassing decades of authoritarianism, corruption and human rights abuses, economic …

[seperator]5: Chinatown Gang War[/seperator]

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The migration of China’s secret societies to America led to the most violent Asian gang war in US history.

Secret societies in China, also referred to as Hock Sair Woey (Black Society), whose origins date back to the first century A.D., were formed as tongs (“clubs” or “meeting halls” in Cantonese) in America beginning in the mid-19th century. Their illegal activities included running gambling halls, loan sharking, collecting debts, extorting businesses, smuggling of …

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If you were told the Chinese government — an unelected, one-party state — will decide who you can vote for, what would your response be? Not only would you likely object, you would expect others, especially democracies, to loudly condemn the idea. But Britain has done just the opposite to the people of Hong Kong, when it failed to call China out for breaking its promise of greater democracy for the island territory.

In a September 4 , Britain “welcome[d]” China’s commitment to universal suffrage, and merely noted that the restrictions imposed by Beijing on candidate nominations in Hong Kong — which profoundly undermine whether elections are democratic — will “disappoint” some. If, as the United Kingdom claimed, “the important thing is that the people of Hong Kong have a genuine choice,” it ought to have unequivocally condemned Beijing’s strategy.

On August 31, China’s legislature laid down a strict process for Hong Kong’s top office, ruling out open nominations. Under this system, only those favored by Beijing can be chosen as candidates for Hong Kong’s top office. The move shatters the dream of democracy for most people in Hong Kong, who have long shown their strong desire for the right to choose their own leader. These views have been made abundantly clear in public opinion polls and annual pro-democracy demonstrations; this year, half a million people took to the streets.

The British government appears to have forgotten about the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, an international treaty. Under that binding agreement between the UK and China that set out the terms of Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty, the territory is promised a “high degree of autonomy,” and that the Hong Kong government can decide all policies on its own except foreign affairs and defense. Yet the September 4 British statement made no reference at all to Beijing’s violations of that agreement. Nor did the UK raise concerns in June when Beijing issued a “white paper” asserting that China has “overall jurisdiction” over the territory, and that Hong Kong’s level of autonomy is dependent on Beijing’s wishes.

Both developments created an immediate uproar from people in Hong Kong. But although Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited the UK shortly after the “white paper” was released, British Prime Minister David Cameron did not publicly raise the issue of Hong Kong with Li, nor did he protest in any visible way the flagrant breach of a bilateral treaty.

… “welcoming” Beijing’s decision is a bridge too far, and one that no self-respecting citizen of a democracy should cross. In a March 2013 interview, Chancellor George Osborne said he wanted China to “look to the UK as a home you can base some of your activities in.” Does that mean he would welcome the Chinese Communist Party to dictate who he can vote for?

This most recent betrayal of Hong Kong is not an isolated incident. Despite the initial assertion of Cameron’s coalition government in 2010 that it would “stand … firm on human rights in all our bilateral relationships” with China while seeking closer ties, the UK seems to have opted to raise issues only behind closed doors — if at all. The British government, unlike others, chose not to visibly commemorate the 25^th anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre. The UK has been inconsistent in its position toward meeting the Dalai Lama since Gordon Brown’s tenure. And it wasn’t until the waning years of British rule of Hong Kong that limited voting rights were granted.

Such appeasement of China over Hong Kong’s rights is implicitly and sometimes explicitly presented by British officials as necessary for better trade relations. Cameron said, during his visit to China in 2013, that the two countries should deepen “mutual respect and understanding” in order to “remove barriers to trade and investment and partnership between our two countries.”

There is nothing wrong about deepening mutual respect, trade and investment. But a shocking failure to defend basic rights for Hong Kong’s 7 million people has been interpreted by the Chinese government as weakness. One wonders what diktats Beijing issues to London on trade, security or major international issues, or whether London recognizes how its diplomatic, economic and strategic interests are threatened by Beijing’s disdain for human rights.

An immediate concern for the UK ought to be its ability to advocate for fair trials for its citizens detained in China’s Kafkaesque judicial system. In 2009, British citizen Akmal Shaikh was executed after being convicted on drug smuggling charges, despite more than two dozen interventions by the British government arguing that his bipolar disorder warranted a forensic examination that might have exempted him from criminal responsibility under Chinese law. In August 2014, British national Peter Humphrey, who ran a well-known due diligence consultancy, was sentenced to more than two years in prison for “illegally obtaining private personal information.” Humphrey had been forced to confess on national television, and was initially denied the right to have family members and consular officials attend his trial.

Prior to Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty, many warned about the slow erosion of Hong Kong’s civil liberties, although Britain often failed to sound the alarm.

But “welcoming” Beijing’s decision is a bridge too far, and one that no self-respecting citizen of a democracy should cross. In a March 2013 interview, Chancellor George Osborne said he wanted China to “look to the UK as a home you can base some of your activities in.” Does that mean he would welcome the Chinese Communist Party to dictate who he can vote for? Most probably not.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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