Economic toll

Unlike Iran, the other Middle Eastern states, especially the six members of the GCC, have strengthened their economic ties with the West. One major example of such economic ties is the one between the EU and the GCC. The 1989 has resulted in over $170 billion in exports and imports between the two sides in 2023.Ģż

Over the past five decades, these countries have also worked hard to attract foreign investors, entrepreneurs, and even wealthy individuals seeking to invest in luxury real estate and opulent lifestyles. To name a few examples of such steps, Dubai a five-year multiple-entry visa for business trips in 2021, and the UAE began five-year residency and renewable 10-year visas to those who own real estate in the UAE valued at $5 million and $10 million, respectively. To attract foreign capital, both and have introduced Golden Residency programs that grant wealthy foreigners, including their families, long-term residencies of ten years or longer.Ģż

States such as the UAE and Qatar have become reliable hubs for travelers reaching their destinations globally. In 2023, an 18.25% share of the UAEā€™s GDP was through aviation. In practice, this means $92 billion in revenue and 992,000 jobs. It is a similar trajectory for Qatar. In 2025, only Qatar Airways Group reported a 28% over the previous year, surpassing $2 billion. Qatarā€™s tourism revenue surpassed , up 25% from 2023.Ģż

Saudi Arabia is another Middle Eastern power with considerable financial clout. Its economic reform for the post-oil Kingdom, known as , aims to sector to become not only self-sufficient but also an exporter and global hub for biotechnology. Within this project, other strategies include the mining sector with a focus on minerals, and even the gaming and Esports to host international tournaments, as well as attracting foreign companies to Saudi Arabia. The program is reliant on the non-hydrocarbon sector, comprising foundational pillars namely construction, tourism and tech, which are integral to Saudi Arabiaā€™s economic growth, as the World Bank states, ā€œthe non-oil economyā€™s share of GDP grew from 60 percent in 2015 to 68 percent by 2024ā€.Ģż

With the risks of collapsed tourism, damaged energy infrastructure and logistics disruptions growing manifold, the Gulf countries face an imminent crisis. Amid the worsening security crisis in the region, all of these countries face a heavy blow, with the looming threat of economic devastation, as they remain heavily dependent on such critical sectors to attract foreign investment and capital while diversifying away from oil exports. Their economic leverage rests on regional stability, which has been put under immense strain due to the volatile situation. 

More alarming is the emerging scenario in which large companies tend to act quickly to secure their assets and withdraw from a conflict zone; however, their return is a slow, cautious process. Consequently, if the war results in the departure of some foreign companies from the region within a few weeks, their return may take months or years, which would be detrimental to the economies of the GCC in the long term.

Ironically, Iran will not face such a risk, as the Islamic Republic has not been a destination for international firms due to sanctions and an inadequate environment that has not been conducive to foreign investment. 

Damaged reputation

Over the past few decades, the Gulf countries have built a reputation as a safe destination. This feature has attracted not only investors and foreign companies but also pensioners and those fleeing high taxation in their home countries. As their reputation is now tarnished by the escalating conflict, it will take a long time to rebuild it and recover from the damage inflicted. During the early stages of the war, Iran hit back hard. Missiles and drones were fired at numerous targets, including , and industrial complexes.Ģż

One small example is the UAE. It to around 240,000 British expats. The USā€“Israelā€“Iran war has distressed the majority of expats living across the region. It has gone as far as being by some Western news outlets, such as tabloid Daily Mail, as ā€œā€˜Dubai Is Finishedā€™: Expats say they will leave and never come back as tax-free dream is shattered by war and officials begin prosecuting people for posting videos of missiles.ā€Ģż

Worthy US alliance?Ģż

Except for Iran and Yemen, the US is in some sort of alliance with all states in the region. The closest allies are Israel, followed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Jordan and others. Israel, for instance, has $330 billion in aid, both military and civil, from the US since its foundation.Ģż

The alliance between the Gulf states and the US dates back to the 1940s, when, for instance, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Abdul Aziz Al Saud aboard USS Quincy in 1945. The result was access to Saudi oil for security assurance to the Kingdom. And other Gulf states suit and went into an alliance with the US.Ģż

Fast forward to 2026, although the Gulf countries do not receive US military aid on the same scale as Israel and Egypt, their arms deals with the US are among the largest. Between 1950 and 2024, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE have $182 billion, $40 billion, $35 billion and $34 billion, respectively. These massive purchases have certainly helped these countries defend themselves against Iranian drones and missiles; however, the cost of munitions for them is considerably higher than for Iran, as a Shahed-136 drone costs under $50,000, compared with, say, Patriot interceptor missiles that cost per shot. The ineffectiveness of US military equipment to deter attacks, coupled with USā€™ waning commitment to uphold its alliesā€™ defense under its security umbrella in the region, propels the Gulf countries to recalibrate their security ties with the US.Ģż

After all, it was never their war to begin with, yet they face dire consequences simply for allying with the US (which now appears more to be a grave liability). Since the beginning of the war, Tehran has justified its attacks on Iranā€™s neighbors by claiming that any location in the region hosting a US military presence is a legitimate target. However, most of the missiles and drones thrown at the Gulf states were not precisely aimed at the American bases, either deliberately or due to a lack of precision, as it has been that the Circular Error Probable of Iranian missiles is between 20 and 500 meters. This makes it even harder for states such as the UAE to convince foreigners to stay or even consider returning, once the war is over. Expats, especially those who are attracted by luxury and 0% income tax rate, will hardly be willing to live in a place where even a one percent chance of missile penetration exists, should another round of conflict emerge.Ģż

Post-war scenarios

While efforts were recently made to a peace deal between the US and Iran, with Pakistan acting as a primary mediator, the talks in Islamabad stalled; however, reports are now that the conflicting parties are expected to re-engage in negotiations soon.Ģż

Regardless, for the Gulf countries, there are mainly two outcomes as of now. The first prediction is that the Iranian regime will be toppled and a new Iran will emerge. In this case, the Gulf states can simply claim that the old threat no longer exists. Hence, it will be relatively easier to convince expats and companies that departed in haste to return. And the Gulf states would emerge shaken but ultimately ā€œvictoriousā€, and their alliance with the US would be seen as worthwhile. Their domestic publics would also be less likely to question the rulersā€™ strategies and policies. However, this scenario appears very unlikely, given Iranā€™s position in surviving the war and transitioning to a ceasefire and negotiations, as well as the US stance shifting toward achieving a mere exit strategy.

A second scenario, which is the most likely one to consider, is that the  Iranian regime survives the war, in which case the main losers will be the Gulf countries. Iran, the US and Israel will all claim victory and, to an extent, those claims will be correct. The leaders of these three countries will be able to convince their publics that they have achieved their objectives, at least among those who support their governmentsā€™ policies. The new Supreme Leader, whether it is still Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei or a successor in case he is also killed, will claim that they have defeated the US plan to overthrow the regime, and the IRGC, Basij and regime supporters across all strata will buy it. President Trump will tell his MAGA supporters that he has ā€œobliteratedā€ the threat of a ballistic and nuclear Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu will tell Israelis, mainly his supporters, that Iranā€™s capability to attack Israel is diminished. 

However, for regional countries such as the UAE, there wonā€™t be a victory narrative to pursue. They will not be able to convince their constituencies by claiming victory, as they have, at best, been defending themselves in a war that was not theirs. The public will be anxious about what the alliance with the US (and in the case of the UAE with Israel) will bring next. The Gulf states will face criticism from their people regarding the alliance with the US and any ties to the state of Israel. History bears witness to this, as public perception in Gulf states has often diverged from government narratives, and state decisions have not sat well with the public. 

The defiance was most noticeable in relation to the alliance between the US and Gulf state leaders, which does not always align with how the Arab public perceives the US and Israel. During the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, a reservations to customers who would like to enjoy their meals while watching Iranian missiles roaring towards Israel. A similar case happened during the Gulf War. On January 18, 1991, Saddam Husseinā€™s Iraq launched missile attacks on Israel. In his book, The Achilles Trap, Steve Coll writes that five Iraqi Scud missiles hit Tel Aviv and Haifa while Saudi officers and American counterparts were in the coordination center, C3IC, observing the attacks. The Americans were shocked when they saw the Saudi officers cheering the Iraqi strike with Allahu Akbar.Ģż

Now, while the times may differ, similar sentiments persist. Gulf states have to tactfully handle public opinion while simultaneously preventing their economies from falling into the doldrums. Henceforth, the path for the Gulf states is certainly fraught with difficulties on multiple fronts. 

In the end, therefore, it is not the US that loses investors and entrepreneurs, nor is it Israel, which is a startup country with the most powerful military in the region. Iran will not suffer from the mistrust of foreign investors either, as the country has few or no foreign investors, especially Western ones, due to sanctions and an unfriendly environment for foreigners. Tehran has little involvement in the international trade community to worry about losing it. What Iran has never had will not be a loss to Tehran in the post-war period. The real costs will be borne by the Gulf states.

[ edited this piece.]

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Yemen and the limits of proxy conflict

Carvajal explains that the roots of todayā€™s tensions lie in Yemen, where Saudi Arabia and the UAE cooperated for nearly a decade after forming a coalition in March 2015. Saudi Arabia managed operations in the north, while the UAE focused on the south, cultivating close ties with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) through financial and political support. This arrangement helped stabilize the southern provinces after Houthi militants were expelled in 2015.

That balance unraveled in December 2025, when a local dispute in Yemenā€™s southern Hadramaut region escalated. A deputy governor seized control of a government oil facility, prompting UAE-aligned STC forces to intervene. Saudi Arabia responded by declaring instability near its border a national security threat and deploying its newly trained National Shield Forces into northern Hadramaut and the eastern governorate of Mahra.

While media narratives framed the episode as a proxy war, Carvajal argues it was ā€œa natural consequenceā€ of rival factions competing for territory and influence. Crucially, the crisis exposed an unspoken rule within the Gulf: Despite rivalry, neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE will directly confront the other militarily. As Carvajal notes, this restraint reflects ā€œbasic tribalismā€ and an enduring awareness that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) remains inseparable and indivisible geographically and historically.

East Africa: Sudan as the new battleground

The rivalry now extends beyond the peninsula, particularly into Sudan. Carvajal points out that in late 2025, the United States delegated peace efforts in Sudan to Saudi Arabia after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salmanā€™s visit to Washington. With US engagement increasingly hands-off, Saudi Arabia moved from mediation to direct involvement.

Over recent weeks, Saudi Arabia announced it would purchase all of Sudanā€™s gold. This effectively underwrote the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and marginalized Iranā€™s role in the process. Carvajal observes that Iran has ā€œtaken a back seatā€ as Saudi Arabia stepped forward financially and politically. At the same time, the SAF signed a major arms deal with Pakistan, a move Carvajal links indirectly to Saudi funding.

These developments, he argues, are not isolated. They reflect Saudi Arabiaā€™s effort to counter Emirati influence in East Africa while filling a vacuum left by the US. Sudan, in this sense, has become a testing ground for a more assertive Saudi regional posture.

Nuclear signaling and strategic optics

A major theme of the discussion is the emergence of new defense alignments involving nuclear powers. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a strategic defense agreement declaring that an attack on one would be treated as an attack on both. Turkey has since expressed interest in joining the pact.

Carvajal is blunt about the military realities. It is, he says, ā€œhighly unlikelyā€ that Saudi, Turkish or Pakistani soldiers would fight and die for one another. Instead, these agreements function as geopolitical signaling. They give Saudi Arabia what Carvajal calls ā€œthe optic of going nuclear,ā€ without crossing that threshold itself.

This signaling is aimed squarely at Iran and shaped by frustration with Washington. Saudi Arabia, Carvajal says, has been ā€œbeggingā€ the US for a formal defense pact since the administration of US President Joe Biden, unsuccessfully. In parallel, the UAE has pursued its own balancing strategy, announcing negotiations with India over defense cooperation and nuclear sharing. Carvajal frames the UAEā€™s outreach as ā€œshowing the flagā€ rather than a literal expectation of Indian military protection.

China waits in the wings

Underlying all of these shifts is the perceived retreat of the US. Carvajal argues that Washington is gradually pulling away from the region under US President Donald Trump, creating uncertainty for Gulf monarchies accustomed to US security guarantees. Trumpā€™s unpredictability, combined with looming US midterm elections, makes long-term planning difficult.

Carvajal sees Chinese caution rather than commitment. Gulf states are in a wait-and-see mode until the political direction of the US becomes clearer. Still, a shift toward Chinese weapons systems would be easy, especially as cheap, effective drones reduce reliance on expensive Western aircraft in conflicts like Yemen.

Rivalry without rupture

Despite escalating competition, Carvajal remains confident that Saudi Arabia and the UAE will reconcile. Yemen places such a heavy burden on Saudi Arabia that Saudi leaders will eventually ask the UAE to reengage under a new framework. The UAE has already signaled it is handing full responsibility for Yemen back to Saudi Arabia.

In the longer term, Carvajal envisions the two states acting as co-hegemons within the GCC, potentially positioning themselves as mediators beyond the peninsula, including in South Asia. The rivalry is real but temporary, a phase shaped by uncertainty rather than a permanent fracture.

[ edited this piece.]

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In the West, political change is a regular feature. Except for Bahrain, the GCC has had its taste of political change too. New monarchs have taken charge and they do not subscribe to the same views of international relations as their predecessors. Today, the GCC has an increasingly negative perception of the West in general and the US in particular.

The convergence of Brexit, the disintegration of European unity, the effects of the Donald Trump administration, a rising China and COVID-19 has put further stress on the dominant US-led postwar order. The GCC now sees its future pointing to the East. Anwar Gargash, the UAEā€™s senior diplomatic advisor to the president, highlighted this when the US pressured its Gulf ally to halt the construction of a Chinese military facility in Abu Dhabi. As per Gargash, the UAE and the GCC are worried about another cold war, claiming that it ā€œis bad news for all of us because the idea of choosing is problematic in the international system, and I think this is not going to be an easy ride.ā€

While the UAE did indeed stop Chinese construction, the decision to allow it in the first place might have been a misstep by the Emiratis. They should have realized that the West would view the base as a threat. There is little room for another military competitor within the GCC. Therefore, Abu Dhabi faced a simple choice: choose China as a security guarantor or maintain ties to the West.

Saudi-led GCC ignores the West’s requests

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War, the West has sought support from its partners to isolate President Vladimir Putin. Lower energy prices are critical to the success of the West and Washington has pressured the GCC to increase oil production.

Therefore, the Saudi-led decision in the recent in Vienna to cut production has upset Washington greatly. In fact, the White House was enraged by the OPEC+ decision. President Joe Biden has been trying to rein in prices at the pump before the November midterms but prices will now go up thanks to the Saudis and their friends. The decision to cut production hurts Biden domestically and helps Putin in prosecuting his war against Ukraine. As an oil producer, Russian revenues have just received a shot in the arm.

Thanks to the OPEC+ decision, inflation will go up. So will interest rates and the risk of a global recession. It is now clear that both and , the former British prime minister, failed in their efforts to convince the GCC to increase oil production. Although cutting oil production was a Saudi-led initiative, no other GCC power expressed any objection. This suggests that the GCC has a collective political intent to raise oil prices.

After this decision, the White House has announced that it is re-evaluating its with Saudi Arabia. Members of the US Congress have called for a freeze on future cooperation including stopping arms sales. For them, given the context of Putinā€™s war on Ukraine, the GCCā€™s decision to cut oil production effectively aligns it with Russia.

As far as the GCC sees it, Ukraine is not in the same geographical sphere and, therefore, it does not see the war as a security concern. For the GCC, Iran is the big security concern. It is also irked that the White House rubbished concerns over the Houthis and ended support for the Saudis in the war in . The decision to cut oil production is not a product of petulance but the culmination of a decade of mistrust.

Ever closer relations with Russia

The UAEā€™s rapid growth in international standing has won many plaudits. It has been able to expertly manage strategic narratives to align with foreign partners on issues such as countering violent . Under the leadership of Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) the UAE has grown assertive in its foreign policy, engaging in conflicts in Mali, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen.  His diplomatic initiatives include building a strong relationship with Putinā€™s Russia. On his part, Putin sees the UAE as an extremely useful partner in his long standing goal to build an economic and transportation to markets in Asia.

After the OPEC+ decision to cut production, MBZ traveled to for a state visit. The UAE has claimed the visit was intended to help support peace talks. But its timing and intention are clear. If Abu Dhabi wanted to signal neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine War, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed would have made the trip. Alternatively, MBZ could have made a phone call instead. The in-person meeting was to broadcast the strength of Emirati-Russian ties.

Russia is giving the UAE military support and conducting joint operations across . Defense platforms manufactured in the UAE have been seen in the hands of Russian and Chechyen in Ukraine. The UAE has also emerged as a for Russian trade in oil and chemicals with Asia.  Even so, it is the Saudis who have drawn the ire of Washington while the UAEā€™s close engagements with Moscow have flown under the radar.

Ukraine is more than aware of the strong relationship between the UAE and Russia. Kyiv does not see MBZ as a neutral actor. The UAE initially refrained from condemning Russiaā€™s invasion. Thereafter, senior Emirati have routinely visited Moscow. On the other hand, dialogue with Kyiv is sparse.

Many will attempt to reshape the of recent events within the GCC. However, the deterioration of trust and confidence between the GCC and the West is out in the open now and will lead to further strains. Neither MBS nor MBZ have traveled to the US in recent years. MBSā€™s involvement in the murder of and the MBZā€™s in Russian in the 2016 US election that brought Trump to power have clouded potential visits. By aligning so closely with Russia and raising oil prices, the two rulers have wrought a sea change in GCC policy that will inevitably have seismic consequences.

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Water World: Is Climate Change Driving Our Future Out to Sea?

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Burning fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that trap heat in the atmosphere, making them major contributors to climate change. On the other hand, high industrial activities, alongside rapidly increasing populations, put growing pressure on energy demand.

The Example of Qatar

Qatar has made remarkable economic achievements over the past few decades. Yet Qatar is facing a trade-off between boosting its economic growth and lowering its carbon dioxide emissions. Its strategic mandate to boost economic development, along with other areas related to sustainability, makes Qatar an interesting country to analyze.

The World Bank defines Qatar as one of the richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita. Its economy is highly dependent on oil and gas production, which for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of export earnings and 70% of government revenues. The country is also a major player in liquefied natural gas. Nonetheless, Qatarā€™s high dependence on fossil fuels has resulted in an in the CO2 emissions level when compared to global averages.

To combat the rising carbon emission percentages and lower environmental pressures, Qatar is introducing strict policy measures to achieve sustainable development through four central pillars: economic, social, human and environmental development. While many disruptions have occurred over the past few years, including fluctuations in oil and gas prices, economic downturns and a deadly pandemic, nobody expected an economic blockade.

The Diplomatic Rift

In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt cut diplomatic relations with Qatar. They prohibited Qatar-registered planes and ships from utilizing their airspace and sea routes, and the Saudis also blocked Qatar’s only land border.

This point is of particular importance as the deterioration in relations among the Gulf neighbors urged Qatar to rethink its sustainable development goals while meeting local demand. At the beginning of the blockade, the country relied heavily on importing several commodities, especially food items. Later, it accelerated initiatives and programs to diversify the economy and reduce reliance on imports.

Achieving carbon neutrality is also factored into all Qatarā€™s initiatives. For example, by the end of 2022, Qatar aims to deliver the first carbon-neutral FIFA World Cup in the history of the event. All stadiums and infrastructure are subjected to rigorous sustainability standards. Several air quality monitoring stations and extensive recycling programs are being introduced, along with the construction of the eight stadiums that will be used during the football tournament.

Qatar has since become much more independent across several sectors, including food production and transport, making it a case study on how to transform challenges into opportunities for growth.

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This was also evident with total carbon emissions. According to my own analysis, carbon emission per capita fell by 13% as of 2018 from a historical record in 2000. Since then, total carbon emissions have increased as the economy has grown but at a slower rate, meaning that Qatar is undergoing expanding relative decoupling. In the 2008 to 2018 period, a 1% change in GDP resulted in a fall of CO2 emissions, from 0.65% to 0.44%. This drop is very relevant to Qatar as several measures have been applied, particularly over the last 10 years, to reduce emissions.

A Reduction in Emissions

While Qatarā€™s total emissions have declined over recent years, policies to increase energy efficiency, diversify the energy mix by introducing more renewables, support technological development to improve energy efficiency in a desert climate, and implement energy demand management programs to maintain the same trend of decline and achieve climate change objectives have been increasingly crucial.  

The heightened pressure caused by the blockade on Qatar is now over, but what is needed are more synergies and collective efforts across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to stimulate economic diversification and minimize carbon emissions. Member states of the GCC are sharing multiple environmental, social and economic factors that should incentivize them to cooperate to meet their climate change objectives and economic development goals.

*[Saad Shannak is a scientist at Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute, part of Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU) in Qatar. The views expressed are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect the universityā€™s official stance.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Yet as restrictions ease and economies pick up pace, the sense of normality that many hope for is one of the few luxuries energy producers cannot afford. In the race to comply with mounting political pressure to reduce carbon emissions while simultaneously securing their energy futures, the Sino-Gulf alliance may become the new center of gravity for global energy markets.

Young People Are the Key to Reconciling China and Hong Kong

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The pandemic has undoubtedly cast a dark shadow on energy. The International Energy Agency (IEA) recently that energy demand will not return to pre-pandemic levels until 2023 in its most optimistic outlook or 2025 in the case of a delayed economic recovery. However, a return to pre-COVID demand does not necessitate a return to pre-crisis growth. Predicted growth in demand between 2019 and 2030 is estimated at 4% in the delayed recovery case, compared to 12% in a COVID-free world.

Nevertheless, the pandemic has also highlighted the importance of a reliable and accessible electricity supply. The IEA that the electricity sector, whose demand outpaces other fuels, will support economic recovery and account for 21% of global final energy consumption by 2030. This push for electricity is widely driven by the various global emission reduction targets, increased use of electric vehicles and heat sources in advanced economies, and greater consumption from emerging markets.

Leader of the Pack

Of the countries driving this growth, China is leading the pack and is predicted to be the main driver of energy demand over the next decade. Following his for an ā€œenergy °ł±š±¹“Ē±ō³Ü³Ł¾±“Ē²Ō,ā€ President Xi Jinping has sought to reposition China as a key player in global energy markets. While the Chinese are currently the worldā€™s consumers and producers of coal-fired electricity, Xiā€™s to make China carbon neutral by 2060 means that energy demands are increasingly being met via renewables.

China is predicted to account for of global renewable expansion, leading in the realm of nuclear power, biofuel production and will account for almost half of globally distributed photovoltaic power. In addition to this, Chinese demand is also predicted to account for 40% of global electricity sector growth by 2030, up from 28%. It was as a consequence of East Asiaā€™s growing appetite for clean energy that, in 2016, global electricity investment outpaced that of oil and gas for the first time in history.

However, as with everything, there will be winners and losers. While electricity is on the up, sluggish global oil demand has led to falling oil prices. With demand predicted to in the 2030s, there is a growing urgency for Gulf Arab states to diversify as oil becomes more of a burden than a blessing. Yet, in their hurry to claim their stake in the new energy world order, Gulf countries may begin to look east rather than west for a friend to rely on.

China and the Gulf

Sino-Gulf relations are not a new occurrence. As the worldā€™s importer of oil and natural gas, these two commodities dominate Chinese trade relations and have been the basis of the Saudi-led Gulf alliance. The Gulf Cooperation Council supplies over of Chinaā€™s oil imports, with Saudi Arabia topping the list, accounting for of the oil import total. Nevertheless, in a world that is increasingly turning its back on oil, GCC states and China may increasingly look to each other to secure their respective energy futures.

From the establishment of the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) in 2004 to the China–GCC Strategic Dialogue in 2010, Sino-Gulf relations have grown from strength to strength. As such, it was hardly surprising when China gave the GCC a starring role in its Belt and Road Initiative. Announced in 2013, this global infrastructure project that seeks to boost physical connectivity, financial integration, trade and economic growth has become the core pillar of Chinaā€™s increasingly active foreign policy approach under Xi.

During the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the CASCF in 2014, Xi about the Gulf Arab states as ā€œnatural cooperative partners in jointly buildingā€ the BRI. This set the stage for a of multi-billion-dollar investments and agreements between China and the Gulf states, advancing the Belt and Road Initiative in the Arabian Peninsula and deepening economic ties.

Chinese investment activity in the Gulf has followed the ā€œā€ Sino-Arab cooperation framework. This features energy cooperation as its central axis, investment and infrastructure, and accelerating breakthroughs in three high-tech sectors, namely aviation satellite, nuclear energy and new energy. However, there is no doubt that the BRI aims primarily to strengthen this central pillar of energy cooperation. Aptly described as ā€œoil roads,ā€ the initiative will enable China to establish the necessary infrastructure, transport and refinery facilities needed to secure its energy future and keep GCC coffers full.

These ambitious plans will be of greater significance in the years to come. Despite the economic and energy market turmoil triggered by the pandemic, Sino-Gulf relations show no signs of . Rather, the pandemic may have made way for a greater mutual dependence between China and the Gulf states. This is particularly true for the GCC, whose economic wellbeing depends heavily on the revival of global oil markets. China may prove to be the answer to Gulf ministersā€™ prayers, stimulating growth by providing a guaranteed revenue stream for the regionā€™s main export, no doubt stabilizing GCC economies.

Beyond the energy sector, however, the two regions offer a wealth of investment opportunities that will likely deepen relations, particularly as the GCC economies realize their various diversification plans. The synergies between the GCCā€™s ā€œv¾±²õ¾±“Ē²Ōā€ and Chinaā€™s BRI are extensive, thus acting as a major point of collaboration. The two are already in the final stages of the long-awaited China–GCC free trade agreement, a move that would no doubt propel economic cooperation and open the doors to a vast array of trading opportunities. Saudi Arabia has already taken active steps to consolidate this BRI-vision cooperation by various agreements and memorandums of understanding with China. Riyadh has since the BRI to be ā€œone of the main pillars of the Saudi Vision 2030,ā€ consequently making China ā€œamong the Kingdomā€™s biggest economic partners.ā€ 

Closer Partners

It is thus clear that, willingly or unwillingly, recent global events have further pushed China and GCC into each otherā€™s arms. Sino-Gulf relations can be expected to gain serious traction in the next few years, especially in the realm of energy cooperation, which is likely to continue to spearhead this strategic alliance as a sector of great mutual importance. Meanwhile, as China seeks to entrench itself in the Gulf, it may find itself caught in the middle of the regional power struggles that threaten stability, namely the Iran-Saudi rivalry. President Xi, however, shows no intent of mixing business with politics, as seen in his recent regional , which saw him visit both Saudi Arabia and Iran among others.

Nevertheless, if China wishes to grow its presence in the Gulf, ensuring regional peace will undoubtedly become a priority for Beijing. Chinese neutrality may be exactly what is needed to defuse regional tensions and maintain a level of accord that keeps the feud below boiling point. Yet despite Sino-Gulf relations taking center stage in the near future, China will not be replacing the United States as the dominant foreign power in the Middle East any time soon. Beijingā€™s focus on economic rather than political matters makes China, to use the of Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud, ā€œnot necessarily a better friend, but a less complicated friend.ā€

*[51³Ō¹Ļ is a  partner of .]

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After years of bitter rivalry, the Saudis and the Iranians are considering how they can dial down their mutual animosity. The formerly powerful Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) of Persian Gulf monarchs is atomizing because Saudi Arabia is losing its grip. And Washingtonā€™s former domination of the region appears to be in decline.

Some of these developments are longstanding, pre-dating the cruise missile and drone assault that knocked out 50% of Saudi Arabiaā€™s oil production. But the double shock ā€” Turkeyā€™s lunge into Syria and the September missile attack ā€” is accelerating these changes.

Saudi Arabiaā€™s Slow Backpedal

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan recently flew to Iran and then on to Saudi Arabia to lobby for dĆ©tente between Tehran and Riyadh and to head off any possibility of hostilities between the two countries. ā€œWhat should never happen is a war,ā€ Khan said, ā€œbecause this will not just affect the whole region ā€¦ this will cause poverty in the world. Oil prices will go up.ā€

According to Khan, both sides have agreed to talk, although the Yemen War is a stumbling block. But there are straws in the wind on that front, too. A partial ceasefire seems to be holding, and there are back-channel talks going on between the Houthis and the Saudis.  

The Saudi intervention in Yemenā€™s civil war was supposed to last three months, but it has dragged on for over four years. The United Arab Emirates was to supply the ground troops and the Saudis the airpower. But the Saudi-Emirati alliance has made little progress against the battle-hardened Houthi rebels, who have been strengthened by defections from the regular Yemeni army.

Air wars without supporting ground troops are almost always a failure, and they are very expensive. The drain on the Saudi treasury is significant, and the countryā€™s wealth is not bottomless.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is trying to shift the Saudi economy from its overreliance on petroleum, but he needs outside money to do that and he is not getting it. The Yemen War ā€” which, according to the United Nations is the worst humanitarian disaster on the planet ā€” and the princeā€™s involvement with the murder and dismemberment of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, has spooked many investors.

Without outside investment, the Saudis have to use their oil revenues, but the price per barrel is below what the kingdom needs to fulfill its budget goals, and world demand is falling off. The Chinese economy is slowing ā€” the trade war with the US has had an impact ā€” and European growth is sluggish. There is a whiff of recession in the air, and thatā€™s bad news for oil producers.

Riyadh is also losing allies. The UAE is negotiating with the Houthis and withdrawing its troops, in part because Abu Dhabi has different goals in Yemen than Saudi Arabia, and because in any dustup with Iran, the UAE would be ground zero. US generals are fond of calling the UAE ā€œlittle Spartaā€ because of its well-trained army, but the operational word for Abu Dhabi is ā€œlittle.ā€ The UAEā€™s army can muster 20,000 troops. Iran can field more than 800,000.

Saudi Arabiaā€™s goals in Yemen are to support the government in exile of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, control its southern border and challenge Iranā€™s support of the Houthis. The UAE, on the other hand, is less concerned with the Houthis but quite focused on backing the anti-Hadi Southern Transitional Council, which is trying to re-create South Yemen as a separate country. North and South Yemen were merged in 1990, largely as a result of Saudi pressure, and it has never been a comfortable marriage.

Turkeyā€™s Checked Ambitions in Syria

Riyadh has also lost its grip on the GCC bloc. Oman, Kuwait and Qatar continue to trade with Iran in spite of efforts by the Saudis to isolate Tehran,

The UAE and Saudi Arabia recently hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin, who pressed for the 22-member Arab League to re-admit Syria. GCC member Bahrain has already re-established diplomatic relations with Damascus. Putin is pushing for a multilateral security umbrella for the Middle East, which includes China.

ā€œWhile Russia is a reliable ally, the U.S. is not,ā€ Middle East scholar Mark Katz told the South Asia Journal. And while many in the region have no love for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, ā€œthey respect Vladimir Putin for sticking by Russiaā€™s ally.ā€

The Arab League ā€” with the exception of Qatar, Libya and Somalia ā€” denounced the Turkish invasion and called for a withdrawal of Ankaraā€™s troops. Qatar is currently being blockaded by Saudi Arabia and the UAE for pursuing an independent foreign policy and backing a different horse in the Libyan Civil War. Turkey is Qatarā€™s main ally.

Russiaā€™s 10-point agreement with Turkey on Syria has generally gone down well with Arab League members, largely because the Turks agreed to respect Damascusā€™ sovereignty and eventually withdraw all troops. Of course, ā€œeventuallyā€ is a shifty word, especially because Turkeyā€™s goals are hardly clear.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants to drive the Syrian Kurds away from the Turkish border and move millions of Syrian refugees into a strip of land some 19-miles deep and 275-miles wide. The Kurds may move out, but the Russian and Syrian military ā€” filling in the vacuum left by President Donald Trumpā€™s withdrawal of American forces ā€” have blocked the Turks from holding more than the border and one deep enclave, certainly not one big enough to house millions of refugees.

Erdoganā€™s invasion is popular at home ā€” nationalism plays well with the Turkish population and most Turks are unhappy with the Syrian refugees ā€” but for how long? The Turkish economy is in trouble and invasions cost a lot of money. Ankara is using proxies for much of the fighting, but without lots of Turkish support those proxies are no match for the Kurds ā€” let alone the Syrian and Russian military.

That would mainly mean airpower, and Turkish airpower is restrained by the threat of Syrian anti-aircraft and Russian fighters, not to mention the fact that the Americans still control the airspace. The Russians have deployed their latest fifth-generation stealth fighter, the SU-57, and a number of MiG-29s and SU-27s, not planes the Turks would wish to tangle with. The Russians also have their new mobile S-400 anti-aircraft system, and the Syrians have the older, but still effective, S-300s.

In short, things could get really messy if Turkey decided to push their proxies or their army into areas occupied by Russian or Syrian troops. There are reports of clashes in Syriaā€™s northeast and casualties among the Kurds and Syrian army, but a serious attempt to push the Russians and the Syrians out seems dubious.

The goal of relocating refugees from Turkey to Syria is unlikely to go anywhere. It will cost some $53 billion to build an infrastructure and move 2 million refugees into Syria, money that Turkey doesnā€™t have. The European Union has made it clear it wonā€™t offer a nickel, and the UN canā€™t step in because the invasion is a violation of international law.

When those facts sink in, Erdogan might find that Turkish nationalism will not be enough to support his Syrian adventure if it turns into an occupation.

The Middle East Thatā€™s Coming

The Middle East that is emerging from the current crisis may be very different than the one that existed before those cruise missiles and drones tipped over the chessboard. 

The Yemen War might finally end. Iran may, at least partly, break out of the political and economic blockade that Saudi Arabia, the US and Israel have imposed on it. Syriaā€™s civil war will recede. 

And the Americans, who have dominated the Middle East since 1945, will become simply one of several international players in the region, along with China, Russia, India and the European Union.

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In 1967, when asked ā€œwhat sequence of events you would like to see now in the Middle East?ā€ Saudi King Faisal bin Abdulaziz al-Saud swiftly replied, ā€œthe extermination of Israel.ā€ Since then, narratives in Saudi Arabia and the other five Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states toward Israel have undergone a dramatic change as, in April 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman that ā€œIsraelis have the right to their own land.ā€

Such an upheaval in official discourse has also been accompanied by a gradual and lengthy shift in the policies implemented by GCC monarchies toward Israel. Saudi Arabia contributed with personnel and resources to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The Arab League introduced the in 1945 and the ā€œThree Nos of Khartoumā€ in 1967: no to peace, recognition and negotiations with Israel. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) proclaimed an oil embargo against Israel supporters in 1973. All things considered, political relations between the Gulf and Israel have undergone a quiet, yet sweeping, transition.

Although the warming of relations seems to be proceeding at a faster pace only recently, the first clandestine contacts were already underway decades prior. In the 1960s, Israel assisted the Saudis in countering Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasserā€™s in Yemen, as well as in the 1970s when it Sultan Qaboos of Omanā€™s efforts to defeat a rebellion in the Dhofar province.

Shifting Sands

Since then, a series of events have incentivized a sharper realignment of interests. The peace process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), initiated at the Madrid Conference of 1991, led to significant openings: Qatar and Oman established trade offices in Tel Aviv, Israeli government officials visited Muscat and Manama, and the institution of the Middle East Desalination Research Center provided a forum for track II diplomacy among Israel and GCC states.

Progress in Israeli-Gulf contacts suffered a considerable drawback with the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada (uprising) in 2000. Several protests against Israel erupted throughout the Gulf, and Oman closed down Israelā€™s trade mission in Muscat. Similarly, in response to Israelā€™s Operation Cast Lead campaign of late 2008 and early 2009 in the Gaza Strip, Qatar also closed the Israeli trade mission in Doha. Saudi Arabiaā€™s then-Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz down an invitation to Washington by pointing out US support for Israel in the intifada.

However, in the midst of Israeli-Palestinian clashes, an impactful took place within the leadership of GCC monarchies. Between 1995 and 2006, all Gulf monarchs except for Oman were succeeded by younger rulers who gradually demonstrated openness to dialogue with Israel. Subsequently, the emergence of Iran as a regional power in the aftermath of the Iraq War paved the way to further consolidation of contacts and exchanges between the various parties.

In March 2002, Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud launched the (API) at an Arab League summit in Beirut, Lebanon. The proposal offered full recognition of Israel by all 22 Arab League states in exchange for complete Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and an ā€œagreed uponā€ solution to the issue of Palestinian refugees.

The effort was not successful, but it signaled a preliminary opening and, since then, reports of both official and informal contacts have multiplied at an exponential rate. In 2006, in the wake of the Second Lebanon War, then-Israeli Prime Minister with Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Arabiaā€™s national security adviser, in Jordan to the Shia threat posed by Iran and the Saudisā€™ ideas for peace. In 2009, Israel lobbied for the United Arab Emirates to host the newly-established International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in exchange for agreement to Israeli presence. The establishment of the Israeli delegation to IRENA marked the first opening of an Israeli representation office in an Arab country in almost 20 years. In 2015, Israelā€™s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Emirati senior officials in Cyprus to discuss the countering of Iranian influence.

Not Everyone Is Opening the Door

From to , Emirati and Israeli air forces have taken part in joint military exercises, along with other countries. Israel has reconnaissance drones based in the UAE. In 2018, Bahrain was seeking to normalize relations with Israel, while Israeli media for the first time that the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) met his Saudi counterpart on the margins of a conference in Washington for commanders of US-allied armies. ĢżNetanyahu, announcing an unspecified breakthrough in Israelā€™s outreach to Arab states, : ā€œWhat is actually happening with [the Arab states] has never happened in our history, even when we signed agreements. Cooperation between Israel and Arab states exists in various ways and different levels, though it still isnā€™t visible above the surface, there is much more than during any other period in the history of Israel. This is a tremendous change.ā€

Undoubtedly, GCC-Israel relations should not be lumped together as a uniform phenomenon. Oman, Qatar and Kuwait have followed relatively autonomous paths in shaping their dialogue with Israel. has maintained a remarkably solid position against Israel and has deviated from the undercover openings advanced by other GCC countries. In 2018, Kuwait Israel of violating Lebanese sovereignty in its Operation Northern Shield to destroy Hezbollah tunnels, while Bahrain supported Israel instead. Kuwait regularly condemns Israel for human rights violations in various international fora, while it prevents Israeli citizens from flying on its national airline. Moreover, it ruled out co-hosting the 2022 FIFA World Cup together with Qatar, as it would entail allowing Israeli citizens into Kuwait.

Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem on 6/14/2016 Ā© Roman Yanushevsky / Shutterstock

The constitutional monarchy presents a relatively more liberal political system when compared to its GCC counterparts, which sometimes grants the Kuwaiti parliament an assertive role. Remarkably, the speaker of the national assembly gathered widespread support when he shouted ā€œā€ at Israeli MPs attending the Inter-Parliamentary Union Assembly in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Besides a vocal parliament, an older leadership, Arab nationalism, less pervasive security apparatuses and a history of Palestinian immigration seem to be at the of Kuwaitā€™s behavior.

On the contrary, and have developed considerably closer ties with Israel, in an effort to assert their independence and enhance their geopolitical position as regional players. Oman, in particular, has always tried to maintain a neutral stance in foreign affairs under the leadership of Sultan Qaboos. Hence, through its traditional modus operandi, Oman has sought a balanced approach toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and has recognized Tel Avivā€™s permanent existence in the Middle East. In 1994, Muscat the first Gulf capital to welcome an Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin. As a result, the sultanate has emerged as a key regional actor capable of and pushing breakthroughs.

Notably, Netanyahu was by Sultan Qaboos in Muscat in October 2018 to ā€œthe achievement of peace and stability in the Middle East.ā€ The visit to the Gulf state was the first by an Israeli prime minister in over 20 years. What is more, it saw the of an Israeli leader across Saudi airspace, and it thus involved Riyadhā€™s approval. Through its typical balancing game, Oman took advantage of the meeting by presenting itself as independent from Iran and by standing out as a regional broker in the eyes of the US government. Accordingly, Omani Foreign Minister Yousuf bin Alawi later for the Trump administrationā€™s ā€œā€ for Middle East peace and , ā€œArabs must … try to ease those fears that Israel has through initiatives and real deals between us and Israel.”

Looking at the underlying strategies tying Israel with the other GCC monarchies, a clear logic emerges from the current historical context. Israel, for its part, has been pursuing diplomatic engagement with Arab counterparts even before its own establishment. In 1919, Chaim Weizmann, a Zionist leader and future president of Israel, met with Faisal al-Hashemi, son of the grand sharif of Mecca. Together they signed an agreement, never implemented, in which Arabs would encourage Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine, while the Zionist organization would have recognized a future independent Arab state outside Palestine.

Subsequently, ever since its establishment, Israel has strenuously taken advantage of any opening by Arab countries compatible with its vital interests. , the YouTube account of the Israeli Prime Ministerā€™s Office released an amateur video showing a closed meeting with top officials from the Gulf dismissing the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, affirming the primacy of the Iranian threat to regional stability and recognizing Israelā€™s right to defend itself. The video was quickly removed, but there are few doubts that the publication had occurred by mistake. Clearly, normalization with the most prominent historical allies of the PLO has the implicit consequence of downplaying the question of Palestine and legitimizing the expansionary ambitions of Israeli governments.

Iranian Influence in the Middle East

The actual shift in diplomatic posture has come from Gulf monarchies, in light of profoundly mutated domestic, regional and international contexts. The development of Iranian influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, together with the disengagement of the Obama administration from the Middle East, were commonly perceived by the Gulf and Israel, as they discovered each other as potential allies. Specifically, since 2010, unparalleled protests have broken out in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Algeria and Sudan, with relatively smaller turmoil in Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia.

For its part, Iran has many of these uprisings by playing into its revolutionary narrative to preserve and enhance its interests in the region. In 2011, as the events unfolded in various countries, Iranā€™s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, : ā€œThis is what was always talked about as the occurrence of Islamic awakening at the time of the Islamic revolution of the great Iranian nation and is showing itself today.ā€ Hence, Arab political instability and Iranian support translate into a serious threat for the geopolitical position of Gulf monarchies and for their very own regime survival.

On the international stage, the uncompromising approach of the Trump administration toward Iran has come a long way in bringing Israel and most GCC monarchies together in their quest to counter Iranian influence. Already during the Obama administration, US Secretary of State John Kerry that a ā€œnew alignment of interests between Israel and the Sunni Arab countries in the region against Iran presented an opportunity to shuffle the deck.ā€ However, inasmuch as Barack Obamaā€™s foreign policy of any enthusiasm for confrontation with Iran, the Trump administration today fosters and upholds such hostility by Israel and some GCC countries.

Besides the decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, the US government is actively trying to bring Gulf and other Arab countries together to target Iran and US regional presence. Israel is also seeking to partner up, with then-Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman in 2018:Ģżā€œWho supported Trump’s decision toĢżwithdraw from the nuclear agreement with Iran? Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states. ā€¦ it’s time for those moderate countries to ‘come out of the closet’ and start talking openly. Just like there’s an axis of evil, it’s time for the Middle East to also have an axis of moderate countries.”

More concretely, US President Donald Trump has announced the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA). Dubbed the Arab NATO, the initiative would as ā€œa bulwark against Iranian aggression, terrorism, extremism, and will bring stability to the Middle East.ā€ It would see the participation of the six GCC states, Jordan, Egypt (which has already ) and the US.

Although Israelā€™s membership has not been officially brought forward, Netanyahuā€™s government would enormously profit from Israelā€™s deeper with its Arab counterparts as an unofficial member by providing, for instance, intelligence support. The opportunity is already being seized as Netanyahu attended the Warsaw conference on peace and security in the Middle East in February, together with delegations from all the MESA participants. Once again, the US sponsored the event in an effort to push its toward Iran and to provide a diplomatic forum for Israel and Sunni Arab countries.

Israeli Technology in the Gulf

As a result of such developments, the role of enemy has progressively transitioned from Israel to Iran, allowing for considerable realignment between the Israelis and GCC states. However, Israel does not merely represent a resourceful ally to contrast the regional ambitions of the Islamic Republic. Over recent years, Israeli companies have provided Gulf monarchies with world-class technologies for surveillance, espionage and military purposes, thus contributing to their domestic stability. Since the Arab Uprisings in 2011, Gulf have increasingly cracked down on dissent by their surveillance mechanisms, updating their regime and upgrading their security apparatus. Israeli companies are helping because of the mutual requirement to protect the safety of society from the governmentsā€™ perspective.

In 2008, Abu Dhabiā€™s Critical National Infrastructure Authority $816-million worth of surveillance equipment from AGT international, a firm owned by Israeli Mati Kochavi, in order to monitor extractive infrastructure and public venues. Later, the same company formed a joint venture with Emirati firms to set up an Emirate-wide mass surveillance initiative called ā€œFalcon Eye.ā€ The project will involve a centralized system receiving live feedback from thousands of cameras and sensors installed across the whole of Abu Dhabi.

Israeli high-tech companies were also with repairing a breach into 40,000 Saudi Aramco computers allegedly at the hand of Iranian hackers. In 2014, an Israeli subcontractor to the construction of a high-tech barrier along Saudi Arabiaā€™s border with Iraq. Only , Israeli-founded Verint is allegedly providing Bahrain with systems to monitor many of Manamaā€™s neighborhoods and outlying towns. The IDF, for its part, played an important role in the development of the Israeli cyber security sector, by functioning as a with their numerous intelligence units and advanced training programs.

The Israeli government has also the sector abroad by setting up the National Cyber Security Directorate within the Prime Ministerā€™s Office. On this matter, : ā€œCyber is a serious threat and a very lucrative business.ā€ Indeed, the rapid expanse of purchasing Israeli surveillance equipment by the UAE only accelerated after the assassination of Palestinian operative Hamas military commander Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in a Dubai hotel by a Mossad hit team in 2010. The Israelis embarrassed the Dubai police and their advanced CCTV and intelligence system at the time, prompting the UAE to recognize the utility of boosting behind-the-scenes cooperation with the Jewish state.

Arab Public Opinion

In the aftermath of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggiā€™s murder in October 2018, Netanyahu how Saudi Arabia ā€œis important for the stability of the world, for the region.ā€ His remarks highlight the strategic value of Gulf-Israel ties in spite of their clandestine nature.

However, Arab public opinion remains largely hostile to normalizing ties with Israel. In various surveys conducted by the between 2006 and 2017, such rejection clearly emerged. In Bahrain, 79% of respondents were against the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East, 51% of Kuwaiti interviewees wished for the weakening of economic relations with Israel in the future, and almost half of Saudi respondents were against the recognition of Israel, even after a hypothetical permanent settlement of all issues regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Notably, a delegation of senior Israeli officials had to their participation to the 2019 Global Entrepreneurship Congress hosted by Bahrain between April 15 and 18. Israelā€™s economy minister, Eli Cohen, was scheduled to attend, while the deputy chief of Israelā€™s Innovation Authority had been invited to give a speech. However, they had to pull out following formal by the Bahraini national assembly, minor street protests in Manama and the alleged of a threatening video by a Shia terrorist group. Later instead claimed the visit did take place despite official denials, with Israeli diplomats holding meetings on the sidelines of the conference.

Such developments are highly revealing of the opportunities and constraints of Israeli-Gulf ties. While bottom-up pressures limit the extent of the openings, top-down strategies seek a pragmatic approach by furthering their self-interests. Therefore, the parties will have to keep developing their relationship through informal meetings, public denials, middlemen and foreign subsidiary companies. Such a of official denial and unofficial contact might seem problematic, but it provides considerable benefits to both sides.

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Donald Trumpā€™s foreign policy approach to the Middle East, such as it is, is a wild zigzag of a ride that is now being driven largely by his national security adviser, John Bolton. Boltonā€™s grandĢżidĆ©e fixeĢżis to effect regime change in Iran. In order to do that, he needs to capture the attention of a president who complains often and bitterly that Americaā€™s friends and allies never, ever do enough.

When Donald Trump peevishly asks why American soldiers remain in Syria while its Arab neighbors do next to nothing to assist in finishing off ISIS, John Bolton pops up with a ready answer by calling for the formation of anĢż. The force would consist of troops from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ā€” Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar ā€” as well as Egypt and Jordan.

When Bolton floated the idea, he was either blissfully ignorant or wilfully malicious in suggesting Qatar be part of the force. The Qataris are engaged in a bitter feud with the Saudis, the Emiratis, Bahrain and Egypt ā€” the so-called quartet ā€” who have waged a land, air and sea blockade for more than a year. The feud, largely driven by the Emiratis and the Saudis, has plunged to new depths of absurdity with Saudi Arabia, among other things, pirating Ģżand threatening to dig a canal to turn the country, which juts like a thumb off the Arabian Peninsula,Ģżinto an .

Meanwhile, Egypt has more than enough of its own brutal insurgency to cope with in the North Sinai with ISIS affiliate Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. Even were the Americans to use the big stick of threatening to cut off aid to force Egypt on board, it is highly unlikely the Sisi government would comply. Though it may be more than five decades ago, Egyptians well remember anĢżĢżthat destroyed a large part of the army in what came to be called their countryā€™s Vietnam.

Speaking of Yemen, Boltonā€™s army, for it to have any hope of success, would be largely reliant on the Emiratis and the Saudis. But they are embroiled in a three-year war that has brought huge misery to the people of the Middle Eastā€™s poorest country. The war remains largely stalemated, with Saudi Arabia in particular having precious little to show for its efforts, which include the destruction of essential infrastructure and the killing and maiming of thousands of civilians with an aerial bombing campaign that in its savagery has brought international condemnation down on the Saudisā€™ head.

The Emiratis, fondly referred to asĢżā€œā€Ģżby US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, may well be up for a further military adventure that would buttress their foreign policy ambitions, but Saudi Arabia, with an ongoing war on its southern border, would be well-advised to steer clear.

Jordan, for its part, finds itself deep in anĢżĢżthat has been exacerbated by the more than 1 million Syrian refugees that have flooded into the country. The last thing on King Abdullahā€™s mind, surely, is to join a campaign that would see a Sunni Arab army enter a country that is increasingly falling into the hands of the Alawite dictator Bashar al-Assad, backed as he is by Shia Iran and by Russia.

So Boltonā€™s Arab army is a fantasy woven out of ignorance and wishful thinking, one unlikely ever to see the light of day. Or will it? Given that he wants to overthrow the current regime in Tehran, a Sunni fighting force that found itself in Syria and in conflict with Hezbollah and soldiers from Iranā€™s Revolutionary Guard Corps could be just the spark that triggers the war that Bolton is eager to pursue.

His dilemma is that it must be a war that the US contributes to but does not lead. Trumpā€™s base is well fed up with American military interventions in places they do not care about and indeed may have only vaguely heard of. No American boots on the ground, then. Logistical support, leading from the rear and being in coalition with an aerial bombing campaign ā€” thatā€™s about as far as Trump can afford to go.

That is, however, well beyond where his defense secretary and the Pentagon are prepared to go. Mattis has been careful, noting, for example, that military options toward Iran remain viable and on the table, but steering well clear of the sort of inflammatory language that Bolton is prone to use.

The difficulty is that the defense secretary is an increasinglyĢż. More than one year into his presidency, Trump no longer feels the need to surround himself with people who refuse to pander to him and to give him assurances of personal loyalty. Buoyed by what he sees as his success with the North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, Trump believes that, like trade wars, foreign policy is an easy win. He is surrounding himself with people who flatter his gargantuan and demanding ego and reassure him that yes, Kim Jong-un will dance to the tune you play, when all theĢżĢżleads to the supposition that it is America that is likely to be doing the dancing.

It has been said of John Bolton that heĢżā€œ.ā€ĢżHe knows how to play the game, how to play up to Trump and how to bully those around him to get to where he wants to go. Make no mistake about it, Bolton wants regime change. To get that, he wants Americaā€™s allies in the Middle East, one way or another, to go to war with Iran, and as of now he couldnā€™t be better placed to push for that goal to become a reality.

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The comes amid growing evidence of the severity of the economic crisis affecting Saudi Arabia. Official data from July showed the for the first time since the 1980s as cuts in government spending compounded the impact of the fall in oil prices. The construction industry, which relies heavily on state-funded infrastructure projects, has been especially badly affected, with tens of thousands of foreign construction workers left stranded having not received wages for up to eight months.

The deteriorating economic outlook has given fresh impetus to the government to consider economic reform, and in June, Riyadh unveiled the $72 billion (NTP). The 110-page plan identifies the governmentā€™s key economic policies and targets for the five-year period from 2016-20, as part of the long-term economic blueprint laid out in the agenda. The NTP seeks to transform the economy by privatizing state-owned assets such as ports and companies, including a 5% share of national oil company Saudi Aramco. Key sectors such as pharmaceuticals, information technology, tourism, construction and mining are also prioritized for investment.

Although the plan demonstrates a greater level of urgency on the part of the government to address the countryā€™s structural economic challenges, more clarity on terms and regulations is necessary to attract investors. For example, Saudi Arabia has pledged to stimulate private-sector investment in the mining sector, but the government has not provided any specifics on promised regulatory changes or incentives for investors. Proposals to privatize state assets could also face local opposition over concerns that newly privatized firms will implement mass layoffs to trim bloated payrolls. Moreover, an historical lack of transparency at even well-regarded state enterprises such as Aramco may prove problematic for investors.

Businesses in Saudi Arabia will, however, benefit from planned bureaucratic and regulatory reforms, which will be less controversial than the privatization plans and far easier to implement. Saudi Arabia was ranked 82 out of 189 economies in the and plans to move up the ranking to number 20 by 2020.

In order to achieve this, Saudi Arabia plans to resolve some of the most frequent complaints voiced by foreign investors, including the difficulty of securing visas and permits. The government also plans to reduce the time it takes to resolve commercial disputes and tackle other issues related to contract enforcement, another key concern. Reducing the cost and difficulty of securing government approvals and complying with local requirements in areas like employment law will be critical to the outlook for investment.

Non-oil sector to struggle despite renewed government vigor

Compared to previous diversification strategies, there is evidence of a more substantive commitment by the government to tackle its structural economic challenges. Each of the countryā€™s 10 development plans announced since the 1970s has been unsuccessful in diversifying the economy. Earlier development programs lacked clear targets or mechanisms to stimulate the private sector, while politically difficult decisions, such as reducing subsidies and the public wage bill, have been avoided.

The NTP notably differs from past economic program in that it sets out 346 targets for government bodies and establishes units to monitor and track progress toward implementation. Cuts have also been made to costly subsidies on water and energy, though King Salmanā€™s decision to remove the utilities minister in April after higher water prices sparked a public backlash underscores the sensitivity of the reforms and potential opposition to measures that impact living standards. The king further signaled his commitment to reform by reshuffling the cabinet in May to bring into government figures with proven commercial experience like Labor Minister Adel Fakeih, former chairman of food company Savola Group.

Despite the positive intent demonstrated by changes announced to date, the non-oil sector of the economy is likely to grow slowly in the coming years. The private sectorā€™s dependence on state contracts and spending has been a key sticking point of past efforts to diversify the economy, and the non-oil sector has consequently suffered as the government cut planned spending by 14% in its 2016 budget. Local profits have been reduced by government austerity at the same time that economic disruption has limited the ability of Saudi firms to raise financing from banks.

The government has said the private sector would fund around 40% of financing, or $48 billion, for key projects such as new schools and power plants, but new taxes, fees and subsidy cuts will raise costs for local operators. Foreign investment will help to ameliorate the impact of this, but the ultimate level of interest will be determined by the specific terms and progress in resolving regulatory barriers.

Political, structural risks to reforms

The bureaucratic and personnel changes are indicative of the strong support for the economic program at the highest levels, most notably by Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman who has led the reform effort as its chief architect and champion. The plan represents the biggest economic restructuring effort since the countryā€™s founding, a move that risks upsetting traditional centers of power in the bureaucracy, royal family and clerical establishments. Prince Mohammedā€™s foreign and domestic policies have provoked criticism from other members of the ruling family, and his own lack of support within the ruling elite has the potential to leave him and his economic agenda isolated.

Progress in diversifying the economy will thus remain vulnerable to changes in the domestic political environment or resistance from vested political interests and conservative clerics who oppose liberalization.

Structural imbalances such as those in the labor force will remain, limiting the growth of the private sector. Less than 20% of all employees in the , a figure that reflects the poor quality of local education and a persistent mismatch in skills and training. In polling and employment, Saudis have also indicated their preference for less-onerous and more generous government positions. These structural challenges are unlikely to be reversed in the medium term, and the private sector will face greater pressure from the government to hire locals as the state seeks to trim spending on wages. While the failure to meet targets over the employment of local nationals could expose businesses to regulatory scrutiny, companies will likely struggle to recruit local workers with the necessary skills.

Weak economic conditions will also persist, resulting in a bleak outlook for the employment of foreign laborers in key sectors such as construction. In May, the regionā€™s largest construction firm, the Binladin Group, laid off up to 77,000 expatriate employees, many of whom had not been paid for months. The failure to pay wages and difficulties in securing exit visas have contributed toĢż. Although the overall threat from protest in Saudi Arabia remains moderate, a demonstration by hundreds of construction workersĢżĢżdisrupted traffic in Jeddah, while in May laborers set fire to Binladin Group property in Mecca. Mounting frustration over local conditions could manifest in more frequent and disruptive protests without government intervention.

*[This article is based on a report by .]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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How can health education develop a public health infrastructure based on prevention? In 2011, Forbes ranked the United Arab Emirates (UAE) number 18 on a list of countries with the highest obesity rates, estimating that .

Obesity is a including Type 2 diabetes, chronic kidney disease, osteoarthritis, cardiovascular disease and cancer. Public health initiatives and disease prevention are only effective through means of education, which the UAE is determined to improve.

Obesity is not a problem for the UAE alone as it has across all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Due to similar cultural and social norms, this issue has become a major public health challenge for the region.

The UAEā€™s obesity rates have not slowed in recent years. As a result, there is a of Type 2 diabetes in children, which is alarming. What factors have contributed to this problem? How can health education be used as an effective tool to develop a more health conscious society?

Factors

Generous hospitality is imbedded in Arab customs and culture. Food is central in gatherings and social events, especially the offering of sweetsā€”juices, dates, chocolates. Traditional Arab foods tend to be , with an increased intake of saturated fats and sugars and decreased intake of cereals, legumes, vegetables and fruits.

According to , ā€œhalf of all women and a third of all men in the region do not exercise enough. Studies by the World Health Organization (WHO) found that the Eastern Mediterranean Region, of which the UAE is a part of, was second only to the Americas in terms of low activity rates.ā€ There have been efforts made by the UAE to create parks and open spaces to encourage physical activity. However, in general, a sedentary lifestyle still prevails.

Furthermore, the population is at risk for developing a myriad of mental health problems such as depression, low self-esteem or issues related to body image due to obesity and a lack of activity. Preventative measures can be taken to reverse these dangerous trends. However, the culture of the GCC states does not have a preventative health care mindset.

This fatalistic behavior is rooted in the Arab and Muslim cultureā€™s surrender to ā€œGodā€™s will.ā€ This attitude offsets the recognition of necessary preventative measures. Many patients, especially those of Bedouin origins, who and are not educated on health awareness, do not believe in modern medicine. The combined intersections of culture, religion, eating habits and lifestyle choices make health education a growing challenge to integrate into not only schools, but throughout society as a whole.

Economic development in the UAE has experienced progress on a variety of fronts: better access to education, improved living standards and the rise and use of information and communication technologies.

Fast Food and Health Education

However, not all advancements have been associated with positive outcomes. Given the impact of globalization, an influx of Western fast food restaurants has dominated the food industry in the UAE: McDonaldā€™s, IHOP, Pizza Hut, KFC and Shake Shack just to name a few. The ā€œMcdonaldizationā€ of the food industry has enabled individuals to enjoy a more efficient, predictable and timely food experience. According to , ā€œThey offer a limited, simple menu, that can be cooked and served in an assembly line-fashion.ā€ Adding to this, have delivery options.

Combining these factorsā€”along with a sedentary lifestyle, hot climate and limited outdoor activityā€”creates a recipe for disaster, especially for the most vulnerable population: children. The over the past two decades, from 25.6% in 1980 to 31.2%ā€”a third of the nationā€™s youthā€”in 2013. Childhood obesity in the UAE is ranked 16^th in the world.ĢżWhat is being done?

In 2015, would be incorporated into Abu Dhabiā€™s school curricula by the 2016-17 academic year. According to Amer Al Kindi, a health manager for Abu Dhabi Education Council, ā€œit will be a separate curriculum that will be integrated into the system at all grades.ā€

In a recent study analyzing obesity rates in students attending government schools in the Emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah, it was found that obesity starts in toddlers and is most prevalent among boys. Early intervention strategies, such as improved school health policy and practice through initiatives involving better nutrition choices and exercise classes are of health education. Initiatives need to be created to raise public health awareness of issues affecting both children and adults.

Health EducationĢżInitiatives

The Health Authority of Abu Dhabi, along with the Abu Dhabi Education Council, launched the Iftah Ya Simsim initiative for health education this year across schools to promote and raise awareness of health issues for children. Iftah Ya Simsim is comparable to the American childrenā€™s TV show Sesame Street. The initiative contains a series of educational materials, including activities for students, parents and teachers. across Abu Dhabi are offered training workshops and necessary resources and tools to promote and encourage a healthy lifestyle inside the classroom.

What must remain clear is the role, importance and need for health education, which comes in many forms. It is not solely the responsibility of the education sector, but both public and private sectors, the media and the medical community.Ģż

The program focuses on nutrition, physical activity, oral health, hygiene and vaccination. In addition, the overall campaign also incorporates the of healthy habits through educational video games. It is a fun and interactive way to not only raise public health awareness, but to engage students, parents and teachers in the process. Children need to learn at an early age the impact of their eating habits and lifestyle choices.

As per the UAEā€™s 2021 Vision, the Ministry of Health and Prevention aims to between the ages of 5-17 to a target goal of 12%.

To reach this target goal, a variety of initiatives have been created to tackle childhood obesity. For example, over 1,200 students from public and private schools participated in the “letā€™s walk” activity in April 2015. The walkathon is part of the “Healthy Children 2021” national campaign to promote the and a healthy lifestyle.

Collective Responsibility

Health education should not only come in the form of initiatives, school curricula or awareness campaigns. Rather, physicians also play a vital role in a patientā€™s overall welfare; they act as educators, role models and advisors. An educated patient, who understands his or her illness or risk for illness, is more likely to be accountable and invested in health care. However, there are many instances where physicians fail to inform and educate their patients.

Generally speaking, doctors in the Arab world do not take the time to educate their patients, while at the same time most Arab patients do not feel the need to understand the science behind their ailment. There are many examples of cases where diseases such as diabetes can be prevented, but due to a lack of intervention measures by the doctor, patients will likely develop the disease.

The UAE is aware of these tremendous health challenges and has been proactive in creating initiatives, partnerships and importing Western health institutions.

In the United States, the UAE has a long-standing relationship with the Childrenā€™s National Medical Center in Washington, DC. Through generous donations from Abu Dhabi, the Sheikh Zayed Institute for Pediatric Surgical Innovation at Childrenā€™s National Medical Center was established in 2009. In 2015, other reputable Western institutions such as . The UAE continues to establish partnerships with US health institutions for the purpose of gaining Western health values, disseminating cutting edge research and creating preventative public health programs, as well as enhancing medical education and care.

The UAE has taken progressive steps to tackle some of theĢżmost challenging health issues facing its citizens today. What must remain clear is the role, importance and need for health education, which comes in many forms. It is not solely the responsibility of the education sector, but both public and private sectors, the media and the medical community. In order for the UAE to witness meaningful and lasting change, society as a whole would need to make conscious health choices and lead by example for future generations to come.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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In May, at the China-Arab Cooperation Forum in Doha, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang YiĢżĢżthat Qatar should take part in the realization of Chinaā€™s Silk Road Initiatives. Considering Qatar as a key partner to promote the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) project, which Chinese President Xi Jinping initiated in 2014, Yi said that the initiative shares common cooperative opportunities with the Qatar National Vision 2030, a future development roadmap launched by Doha in 2008.

To this end, China hopes to strengthen bilateral relations with Qatar in economic, political and cultural spheres. This, however, is not the first time China took a step in courting Doha to help in implementing its OBOR projects. Last year, ChinaĢżĢżto establish a Renminbi Clearing Centre in Doha, which was the first financial institution in the Middle East to offer access to Chinese currency and foreign exchange markets. This move is crucial as one of the most important steps taken by China to abet the Silk Road Initiatives is the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which among its goals is to expand the use of Chinese currency.

Thirsty for Energy

It should come as no surprise that China is making its way to Qatar, particularly with respect to the establishment of the Silk Road Initiatives. Despite China leading the initiatives, it is impossible for Beijing to do everything alone; international participation and contributions are needed. Therefore, it is logical for China to turn to Qatar for a significant role.

As China is thirsty for energy resources to fuel its projects, Beijing clearly sees the benefits of strengthening ties with the gas-rich Persian Gulf emirate. Indeed, in the past several years China has grown increasinglyĢżĢżon Qatarā€™s hydrocarbon resources. China is presentlyĢżĢżand the Silk Road Initiatives will require even larger amounts of energy resources for implementation.

Qatar has potential to become a major beneficiary. In recent years, some European nations have begun to relocate their industries to China due to low labor cost. The Qataris could establish petroleum and petrochemical facilities in China, which will help Doha acquire a lionā€™s share of demand and competitiveness.

Moreover, China and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are at the momentĢżĢżnegotiations for a free-trade agreement, which will likely have positive implications for both Beijing and Doha, the most important of which is that it will abolish customs duties imposed on the two sidesā€™ imports and increase their trade partnership. Throughout recent years, China has become the Gulfā€™sĢż, and their partnership continues to thrive. With Silk Road Initiativesā€™ focus on improving transport and connectivity infrastructure, the Sino-GCC trade ties will see further growth in the future as there are prospects for expanding and speeding up the travels of commodities between China and the GCC, as well as easing energy imports.

With respect to Chinaā€™s ambition to expand the use of its currency, Beijing hopes that through the RMB clearing center and currency swap agreements, a growing share of its trade partnership with Qatar will be cleared in RMB. Ultimately, it also hopes that oil and energy exports can be priced in its own currency, lessening trading time and transaction cost. This would also enable Beijing to conduct business with Qatar, and other regional countries, on its own rules.

Courting Qatar

Courting Qatar would also enable China to pressure these countries to solve the security issues in the region. Undeniably, en route to Europe, the Silk Road Initiatives encompass some of the most unstable countries and regions in the world, including the Middle Eastā€”areas that Qatar has increasingly engaged in. As the projects unravel, China is apparently facing different security issues, urging Beijing to pressure relevant stakeholders to resolve their conflicts to protect its interests.

Qatar, an enigma on the international stage, has a unique hand of cards as the worldā€™s top liquefied natural gas (LNG) producer and exporter. Situated between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, the uber-rich emirate sits between some of the worldā€™s most complicated geopolitical fault lines and the Middle Eastā€™s brightest sectarian flashpoints. To maintain its prosperity and stability, Qatar has traditionally relied on a foreign policy strategy of pitting competing agendas of international and regional powers against each other to further Dohaā€™s own strategic interests.

As host of USCENTCOM, Doha is a close and important ally of Washington. Yet like the other GCC states which have conducted foreign policies closely aligned to the United States, Qatar has embraced a Look East approach, taking stock of the global shift in economic prosperity from North America and Europe to the Far East. As Qatarā€™s second top LNG export partner, China has and will continue to offer Doha an opportunity to counter-balance the geopolitical interests of its Western allies, giving more important players in the international arena higher stakes in Qatarā€™s future.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Since theirĢżannouncementĢżin late 2013 during Chinese President Xi Jinpingā€™s visit to Indonesia and Kazakhstan, the ā€”also known as ā€œOne Belt, One Roadā€ (OBOR) initiativeā€”have been under intense scrutiny among academia and policymaking circles in China and around the world. In fact, during a press conference after a Chinese parliamentary session, Foreign Minister Wang Yi dubbed the project a primary concentrationĢżof Chinese foreign policy in 2015.

As a key element of the new Chinese governmentā€™s narrative, the Silk Road Initiatives have not only become ā€™s major priority, but they have also drawn significant attention from overseas, especially from neighboring governments.

In spite of the earnestness with which many countries are taking the projects, Arab Gulf countries have so far been averse and unenthusiastic in responding. Even though there have been , there are few thoughtful studies in the ā€™s (GCC) academic community on Chinaā€™s Silk Road Initiatives, nor any serious discussion at the governmental level.

The issue has been relatively neglected from the official Sino-GCC discourse. This might be down to the fact that there is a lack of clear inclusion of GCC countries in these initiatives, along with the immaturity of the project, which seems to require a long time to take shape. Additionally, there is a possibility that Gulf governments may have undervalued the importance of the OBOR, and in doing so could miss a great prospect to profit from a mutually beneficial partnership.

Even though the Silk Road Initiatives need further fleshing out and certain mechanisms to be established, their possible implications for the Gulf region are difficult to be overlooked. At the same time, the GCC could play a prominent role in Chinaā€™s efforts to revive these ancient trade links. These roles seem to have been acknowledged by Beijing, and this wasĢżevidencedĢżby during the sixth ministerial conference of the China-Arab Cooperation Forum in which he urged Arab governments to take part in the realization of its Silk Road Initiatives.

Economic stakes

It cannot be denied that the core dynamic to determine the nature of present China-GCC relations appears to be the salience of trade and investment issues, which have come to dominate the bilateral agenda and the terms of cooperation between China and the Gulf countries to a great extent. China has become the GCCā€™s largest trading partner, and the two-way in 2013. This trade interdependence should be a fundamental incentive for GCC countries to exert more attention to and engage in the Silk Road Initiatives. Since trade is considerably dependent on transport infrastructure, these initiatives will have significant implications for the Sino-GCC partnership.

Dubai, UAE Ā© Shutterstock

It is argued that the long distance between China and the Arabian Peninsula has been a physical hindrance to unpacking the real potentials of their relationship. As the Silk Road Initiatives focus on boosting transport and connectivity infrastructure, there is considerable potential to expand and expedite the travels of commodities between the GCC and China, as well as to ease energy import, since China relies heavily on sea transport to import most of its energy needs.

Aside from the advantages of the faster movement of commodities, the GCC could also benefit from taking part in the Silk Road Initiatives. Even though the OBOR is a Beijing-led project, it is impossible for China to do everything by itself. Instead, global participations and contributions are needed. In this context, GCC states have a significant part to play and much to gain. As the region holds the worldā€™s largest oil and gas reserves, the GCC is expected to be the major suppliers of Chinaā€™s growing demand of energy, particularly for the implementation of these initiatives.

Not to forget, the GCC is also predicted to benefit from Beijingā€™s investment in these initiatives, which is estimated to be at $1.6 trillion. In April, ChinaĢżdecidedĢżto open the to facilitate Gulf companies to use the Chinese currency to do business with their Chinese counterparts. These positive economic prospects should be enticements for GCC countries to embrace Chinaā€™s Silk Road Initiatives and expedite the negotiations to reachĢża (FTA)Ģżwith the Chinese.

Security

Chinaā€™s Silk Road Initiatives could have a positive impact for regional peace and security in the Gulf. On its route to Europe, these initiatives encompass some of the most unstable countries and regions in the world, including Central Asia and the Middle Eastā€”areas that have security importance to the GCC.

As the Silk Road Initiatives unravel, China is likely to face different security hindrances, requiring the government in Beijing to play a more active role in these issues, or at least pressuring relevant stakeholders to resolve their rivalries to safeguard its interests. This has beenĢżreiteratedĢżby , Gong Xiaosheng, who believes the OBOR project could be a key to the Middle Eastā€™s peace problem. During his visit to Palestine in April, Gong verbalized his aspiration for the OBOR to act as a stimulant to advance stability and propel economic development.

Moreover, the (AIIB) could also serve as a catalyst in consolidating regional factions, while at the same timeĢż for the implementation of the OBOR projects. Most GCC member states,Ģż, have joined as associate members. Being part of the AIIB not only offers these countries a way to Chinese lucrative investments, but it will also consolidate them under shared economic aspirations.

Likewise, an all-inclusive Middle East participation in the OBOR project will significantly contribute to the minimization of youth unemployment and untwine unbalanced development growth in the region. In this manner, the project will go a great distance in the direction of solving root causes of instability.

Cultural exchange

In recent several years, Ģżby people-to-people exchange. As the partnership between the two sides has grown considerably, both sides have come to recognize the significance of cultural and people-to-people exchange to overcome linguistic-cultural barriers. Despite that, there has not been a robust mechanism established to further the cooperation in this particular field. In this regard, the Silk Road Initiatives are well-timed, as they pledge to add substance to people-to-people cooperation mechanism.

If referring to historical context, the notion of ā€œSilk Roadā€ was not limited to trade connections, but also possessed considerable cultural importance. It functioned as a bridge for the exchange of Western and Eastern civilizations, taking Chinese silk and Confucian teachings to far-away Europe while bringing Western science to the Chinese land. Undeniably, these interactions left profound traces on the advancement of both societies and civilizations.

In a similar sense, the new Silk Road Initiatives could serve as a cultural hub between China and the GCC, which must not only considered as ā€œtwo markets,ā€ but also as ā€œtwo civilizations.ā€ To date, discourses on these initiatives largely concentrate on economic issues, with the United Statesā€™ suspicions over the probable geopolitical repercussions, along with others putting emphasis on economic interests. In reality, however, the importance of the Chinese projects goes outside the tight economic concerns and political issues. It is predicted to light up new prospects and potential for international integration.

The GCCā€™s role

As recently initiated projects, the Silk Road Initiatives are still in need of strong and effective formulations. Realization will take even longer, considering the gross scope of the initiatives and the possible political-security challenges that lie ahead.ĢżThis, however, does not mean that GCC leaders should depreciate Beijingā€™s fortitude to realize the initiatives and the potential implications for the region. As elaborated, the Silk Road Initiatives have considerable implications for the GCC and for Sino-Gulf relations in different spheres. In this regard, Gulf states are not strangers, but important players in the projects.

For China, the GCCā€™s main role in the Silk Road Initiatives is to provide the much-needed energy sources and to open new markets, as well as opportunities for Chinaā€™s excess industrial capacity. Simultaneously, the GCC region could serve as a hub to expand both its economic and political footholds in the wider Middle East, Africa and Europe. Unlike its regional neighbors, the Gulfā€™s strategic value is further boosted by its fairly stable and peaceful disposition.

As reciprocal China-Gulf relations are expected to continue flourish in the coming years, the GCC will likely be under intense pressure to delve more in Chinaā€™s Silk Road Initiatives. It seems that the time has come for GCC governments to ponder about how to seize the benefits of these initiatives to revamp its ties with China.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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The 2022 FIFA World Cup may be sparking social change in the Gulf, but not (yet) in Qatar. Qatarā€™s winning of the hosting rights for the World Cup gave human rights and trade union activists the leverage they needed to more effectively pressure the Gulf state for reform of its controversial kafala (labor sponsorship) system, whichĢżputs employees at the mercy of their employers.

While focused on Qatar, the campaign also targeted other Gulf states and prompted activists to focus on high-profile construction projects like sites for Western museums and universities in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It also motivated countries across the region to tinker with their labor systems. While Qatar made lofty promises of reform and engaged with its critics, the UAE and other Gulf states rejected criticism and barred activists from entry to their countries.

Gulf Cooperation Council

Now, however, as Qatar continues to dither, the UAE has decreed the very reforms DohaĢżhas yet to implement nationwide, and a prominent Saudi intellectual has called for abolition of kafala in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Kuwait recently became the first Gulf state to pass legislation granting domestic workers greater rights. By contrast, in September, students denounced conditions for workers at Weill Cornell Medical College in Doha.

The UAE move and public debate in other Gulf states deprives Qatarā€”a supporter of change across the Middle East and North Africa with the exception of the Gulfā€”of its claim to be on the cutting edge of transition in the region. It also casts further doubt on the sincerity of Qatarā€™s promises.

Qatar has promised to pass legislation by the end of 2015 that would ease procedures for exit visas and improve recruitment, housing and working conditions for migrant workers, who constitute a majority of the Gulf stateā€™s population.

Several major Qatari institutions, including the 2022 Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy and the Qatar Foundation, have adopted standards that go a far way to meet activistsā€™ demands, but these have yet to be enshrined in national law. Qatar has suggested that its emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, would approve legislation by the end of this year.

Sharon Burrow, the secretary general of International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), noted after a visit to Oman in September that the Gulf state had just about as many migrant workers as Qatar does, but that its laws did not discriminate between Omani and foreign workers even though Omanis, migrant workers and Western expatriates have different contract terms. Burrow further noted that in contrast to Qatar, workers were allowed to unionize and elect their leaders and were accorded ā€œhumane accommodation.ā€

ā€œIn Oman, you feel optimism and the hope of a shared future. In Qatar, you feel discrimination, denial and a master-servant relationship. Common region, shared cultures, neighborsā€”why the difference?ā€ Burrow asked.

Leaving Qatar looking like a straggler, the UAE has decreed labor reforms that aim to tighten oversight of employment agreements for migrant workers, with the exception of domestic labor. The decrees focus on improving transparency of job terms and employment contracts, spell out how contracts can be broken and could make it easier for workers to switch employers.

Under the new policies, prospective workers would be asked to sign a standard employment offer in their home country, which would in turn be filed with the Labor Ministry before a work permit is issued. That agreement would then be registered as a legal contract once the worker arrives in the country, and no changes would be allowed unless they extend additional benefits that the worker agrees to. Contracts can be broken by either side under certain circumstances, and workers would be free to switch to a new employer after obtaining authorization from the Labor Ministry.

In Saudi Arabia, Khaled Almaeena, a prominent Saudi journalist, called recently for the abolition of the kafala system in the kingdom. Noting that his repeated efforts to get ministers to focus on labor reform had gone unheeded, Almaeena recently wrote: ā€œA media campaign should be conducted and people, both the workers and the employees, should be made aware of their rights and obligations. Contracts should be lodged with the Ministry of Labor rather than with employers. And the kafala system must go.ā€

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Oil Dependence

The push for reform in the Gulf is about more than ensuring adherence to international labor standards. In the smaller Gulf states, it raises the specter of giving rights to a majority of the population against the backdrop of a minority citizenry that fears losing control of its culture and way of life.

Concern is heightened by the fact that the social contract in Gulf states that involves surrender of political rights in exchange for a cradle-to-grave welfare system is fraying at the edges. Faced with population growth and reduced oil revenues, Gulf states have begun to roll back subsidies, sparking sharp rises of food prices in Bahrain and bringing fuel prices in the UAE to world market levels. Oman is mulling over the raising of fuel prices, while Kuwait is looking at the introduction of a value added tax and road tolls.

To many in the Gulf, labor reform is a Pandoraā€™s Boxā€”not only in terms of potentially laying the groundwork for foreigners demanding ever more rights, but also with regard to badly needed economic reforms in preparation of a post-oil age. Newborns in all Gulf statesā€”with the exception of Qatar and Kuwaitā€”are expected to witness their countries running out of fossil energy resources within their lifetimes.

Reforms would have to rebalance the relationship between the state and a private sector that remains dependent on governments. They would also have to restructure labor markets in which citizensā€”who largely enjoy comfortable government jobsā€”would have to compete with expatriates who are likely to sell their services at a lower price. As a result, Kuwait has moved to subsidize salaries of Kuwaitis employed in the private sector.

Inevitably, the reforms will be building blocks for a move from a rentier to a productive economy, in which citizens become productive rather than entitled members of society. That could spark greater interest in political change.

That change is inevitable and is likely with or without the 2022 FIFA World Cup. The tournament, however, is proving to be a catalyst.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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For over three months, a military alliance has been bombing in an attempt to weaken the , a predominantly Zaidi Shiite group, and their ally, former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

After the Houthis completed a coup dā€™Ć©tat in the capital Sanaā€™a earlier this year, and after Yemeni President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi and parts of his government fled to Riyadh, the Saudis began a military campaign in order to prevent the fall of the southern port city of Aden, to make the Houthis retreat and to pave the way for Hadiā€™s comeback.

Until now, the military operation has proved extremely short-sighted and largely failed to deliver. Despite the massive airstrikes, the Houthis have managed to hold their territorial control and extend the conflict to the Saudi-Yemeni border region. The only tangible result is large-scale destruction of Yemeni infrastructure, as well as a society being ripped apart by a multi-layered conflict.

Short-sightedness and miscalculation are terms equally applicable to the initiative of the (GCC), which in 2011 put an end to a months-long elite battle between then-President Saleh and his rivals. Many international observers described the GCC deal back then as an effective mechanism that succeeded in preventing a prolonged civil war, as well as a suitable model for other countries in transitionā€”notably Syria.

Momentarily, the GCC initiative stopped large-scale violence and set a transition process in motion, with the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) at its heart.

However, nearly four years after Saleh stepped down and handed over power to Hadi, his long-time vice president, it appears that Yemen has finally fallen down the brink and into the abyss of a protracted civil and regional proxy war. The GCC initiative can no longer be heralded as a model for other countries in transition, but merely as a better ceasefire that allowed the different groups to regain strength or to make their entry into Yemeni power politics.

The NDC aimed at renegotiating the social contract between the Yemeni people and the state. However, from the outset, this process was undermined by the continuation of the elite power struggle that started to emerge in the 2000s, and it eventually led to the violent elite conflict in 2011.

The continuation of this elite infighting was facilitated byā€”among other factorsā€”granting Saleh immunity and allowing him to stay in Yemen. The GCC deal did not take out the central pillar around which Yemenā€™s political economy was constructed for over 30 years. Instead, it gave Saleh ample opportunity to plot for his revenge and comeback.

Formed after the handover of the presidency, the national unity government also facilitated the continuation of political infighting. The 50-50 distribution of government posts between the former ruling party, the General Peopleā€™s Congress (GPC), and the former opposition coalition, the Joint Meeting of Parties (JMP), meant that most of the time government members were busy with blocking the implementation of each otherā€™s decisions, thereby contributing to the massive standstill over introducing vital reforms.

Although having helped to set in motion Yemenā€™s transition, the GCC did little to consolidate the process through economic aid and investment. Instead, in 2013, Saudi Arabia took the decision to revise its visa requirements. This resulted in large numbers of Yemeni workers having to leave the country and return to impoverished Yemen because they could not meet the new regulations, putting further pressure on the countryā€™s strained labor market.

Choosing Hadi as a successor to political fox Saleh proved to be a bet on a dead horse, given the formerā€™s lack of power and legitimacy. As he struggled to eliminate Salehā€™s influence in the armed forces, Hadi resorted to similar cooptation strategies as his predecessor but miscalculated the strength of groups such as the Houthis who, along with the secessionist Southern Movement (al-Hirak), were excluded from the negotiation process preceding the GCC initiative.

The Way Forward

Four years after the ink has dried on the paper of the GCC initiative, the dealā€™s short-sightedness has backfired on its initiatorsā€”the forefront of which is Saudi Arabia. The GCC deal mainly served short-term stability and security interests of Yemenā€™s neighbors by keeping most of the countryā€™s elite powerbrokers largely untouched and in place. Meanwhile, during the four year ā€œceasefire,ā€ frustration over the disastrous socioeconomic situation reached new heights and was exploited by groups such as the Houthis, in order to build and consolidate their popular support base and strike a powerful alliance with Saleh.

Equally, the last four years bore witness to the strengthening of the Sunni-Shiite narrative through the evolving dynamics of both the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts.

With the Saudi-led military intervention against the Shiite Houthis and the regionalization of the Yemeni conflict, this narrative is now being forced onto the Yemeni context and threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In order to avoid such a scenario from taking deeper roots and to prevent the impending destruction of Yemeni society, the international community should accelerate efforts to bring the conflict parties back to the negotiating table. For this, the parties to the conflict must be pressured to halt all violence. What is then needed is a comprehensive peace and transition process not only serving the stability and security interests of Yemenā€™s neighbors, but also aiming at a substantial renegotiation of the social contract to be supported by a concrete socioeconomic reform plan.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Over the past few years, the Sultanate of Oman has maintained an increasing growth rate and registered a mounting budget deficit against a backdrop of rising oil prices. As a middle-income economy, Oman relies heavily on energy revenues, which constitute as much as 45% of government revenues and around 50% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).

In turn, unemployment is considered as a significant problem in a country of 3 million inhabitants. In fact, unemployment in Oman has beenĢż at 15% among nationalsĢżand reached as much as 25% among young people aged between 18 and 29 years old.Ģż

Against this background, and in an attempt to reduce the rather high dependency on energy revenues, an economic strategy focused on the development of the private sector has been articulated in the past few years.

Oman has thus developed a vibrant private sector that operates in large part in tourism, retail, agriculture and textile. Strong and diversified, Oman’s private sector attracts more and more entrepreneurs and seeks to increase foreign investment as well. Moreover, it also aims to reduce unemployment levels, particularly among Omani youth.

51³Ō¹Ļ’sĢżNajlaa Habriri speaks to Omani entrepreneurĢż. Al-Khonji has founded several businesses in Oman in the past and is currently the CEO of Genesis International. He is also a board member of several Omani organizations.

Habriri and al-Khonji talk about the latter’s personal and professional insights on the business environment in Oman and the attractiveness of entrepreneurship to Omani youth.

Najlaa Habriri: The economy of states in the Middle East and North Africa, especially in the Gulf, is mostly characterized as being overly reliant on natural resource exports. Oil and gas have brought a lot of wealth to the region, but arguably inequality as well. How do you see the issue of natural resources and their impact on the region’s economy?

Qais al-Khonji:ĢżAs an open market, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) offers a range of advantages and disadvantages. I personally believe there are inequalities within the GCC. Some people out there manage to make fortunes, whereas others fail but keep on trying. There is a third category of people who do not engage with entrepreneurship and prefer enjoying a fixed sustainable income.

Therefore, I believe that our governments should invest in education. We need “feeder brains” that can create a difference in our societies, whether in the GCC member states or in the wider Arab world.

In my humble opinion, I believe that two sets of knowledge are needed in our societies. We need more scientists and more entrepreneurs. People who make ideas and people who implement these ideas on the ground.

It is, therefore, necessary to invest in brains by offering the best quality education to young people in the region. That will allow these “brains” to make good use of our natural resources here in Oman and in the region.

Habriri: You are an entrepreneur in the Gulf yourself. What do you see as some of the best opportunities in today’s business environment and some of the most difficult obstacles? What needs to be done to tackle those obstacles?

Al-Khonji:ĢżI have personally faced various difficulties and have made so many mistakes before I could achieve success. I believe that all business endeavors should be this way.

As I stated above, the best combination to start a project, in my opinion, is if an engineer shakes hands with a businessman, provided that both share a strong passion toward the project.

As for the obstacles, there are many. I call the Omani market the market of the two “S-S” ā€” that is the market of the “too slow and the too small.” It is slow in executing any given business order, which results in higher execution costs and shortens the project budget cycle.

The market is also small in that it has a small population, and an even smaller active population. It is difficult to make a business idea flourish in a city like Muscat, where there are only 900,000 citizens. Only unique and innovative ideas would be able to “survive” in similar environments.

Based on my experience and the current business environment in the Omani market, I would advise the youth to invest in services rather than goods.

Habriri: Since you are from Oman and have started several businesses there, I would like to talk about the country. How would you characterize Oman’s business environment? And, how do you see Oman’s potential for economic and business development?

Al-Khonji:ĢżAs I said earlier, the Omani market is the market of the two “S-S.” Although it is quite a challenge, business indicators in the country seem to be heading toward sustained growth in the long-term. Our tourism sector is growing rapidly and new economic projects burgeon, making way for new opportunities.

Some of these include an upcoming railway project and the construction of the new airport. There are also a number of campaigns, some of which I am leading, to encourage entrepreneurship within Omani youth.

I consider entrepreneurship as the backbone of any given economy as well as its future. The government provides an important array of entrepreneurship opportunities by initiating big projects such as the ones cited above.

Habriri: Oman’s energy sector has strong ties with several Asian countries, especially China, exporting large amounts of oil and gas to the region. What is your view of the country’s economic ties and strategy?

Al-Khonji:ĢżOman has strong economic ties with Far-Eastern countries. The strategic vision of Oman has always been directed toward jobs creation. And this is clear from the country’s economic strategy over the past few years, which was based on responding to the steady growth of population with income-generating projects.

Habriri: What are some of the lessons you have learned from starting your own businesses?

Al-Khonji:ĢżMy entrepreneurial journey has taught me so much and still is. The beauty of starting a business is that one can learn from everyday changes. It can be a long journey, but the most important step is the first one.

My advice would be to take that first step, not to fear, learn, aim big and do not hesitate if one is convinced. One should never have any regrets as mistakes are part of the journey to success.

Habriri: As there are a non-negligible number of Western and multinational companies operating in the region, could you comment on their impact, potential and obstacles?

Al-Khonji:ĢżThere are indeed a number of multinational companies and foreign individuals doing business in Oman. These individuals bring their experiences with them and invest in profitable projects in the country.

I believe the most important component in a business success is the “know-how.” We usually associate this know-how with foreigners. That is why I couldn’t insist enough on the fact that quality education is fundamental to boost a country’s economic performance.

Further, multinational companies allow the national economy to maintain a steady growth level as they create jobs for the locals and transmit technical expertise to Omani citizens.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

Image: Copyright Ā©Ģż ĢżĢżĢżAll Rights Reserved

The post Oman’s Burgeoning Private Sector: An Inside Perspective appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The Russian intervention in Crimea is more direct and dramatic than the one in Syria, with actual troops deployed. But there are similarities.

One of the little-noted rationales of Russian support for the Ba'ath government in Damascus is that it is seen as more favorable, being secular and minority-dominated, toward Syria's roughly 2-3 million Christians — the bulk of whom are Eastern Orthodox (the same branch of Christianity that predominates in Russia and among ethnic Russians in Ukraine).

Indeed, there are more Eastern Orthodox Christians in Syria than in Crimea. Russian President Vladimir Putin is giving as a rationale for troop deployments in Crimea that the ethnic Russian population there is in danger from Ukrainian nationalists.

In both cases, Russia is exaggerating. The vast majority of Syrians who rose up against the Ba'ath were moderates. Only when the Bashar al-Assad regime responded to peaceful protests with massive military force did the opposition militarize, at which point Sunni extremists and al-Qaeda affiliates came to the fore as seasoned fighters with substantial Gulf money.

Most oppositionists are still moderates and most Syrians want more freedoms, not a Taliban state on the Euphrates. The Russian official press often slams those who oppose Russia's provision of huge amounts of money and arms to al-Assad as backing "al-Qaeda," but that is propaganda.

Likewise the popular movement in Ukraine against President Viktor Yanukovych was not primarily led or fueled by nationalist extremists. Most who went to the streets in Kiev were disturbed at Yanukovych's neo-authoritarian tendencies, his acquiescence in Moscow's demand that he move away from the European Union (EU), and his jailing of his opponent in the 2010 elections (Yulia Tymoshenko) on what seems likely to have been trumped up charges.

There is zero evidence of ethnic Russians in Crimea being menaced by Ukrainian nationalists, but plenty of evidence of foreign Russian forces intervening there. Of course, now that Putin has violated Ukrainian sovereignty so blatantly, there could be a backlash against Ukrainian Russians; Putin might even secretly hope for such polarization as a pretext for further intervention.

Turkey and Iran’s Stake in the Ukrainian Crisis

Those in the Middle East opposed to Russian backing for the Ba'ath regime in Syria are also unhappy about Moscow's intervention in Crimea.

Turkey is the country with most at stake. In essence, it is surrounded by countries in which Russia has intervened, with Syria to its south and Crimea just across the Black Sea to its north.

Ankara has a special interest in Crimea. Today, 12% of the 2 million residents on the peninsular are Tatars (Turkic-speaking Muslims); though before Russia's annexation of the territory from the Ottoman Empire in 1784, it was all Tatar. Russians immigrated in — they are now almost 60% of the population, with a quarter being ethnically Ukrainian. Joseph Stalin ethnically cleansed the Crimean Tatars during World War II; but after the fall of the Soviet Union, some 300,000 have gradually returned. Turkey is as interested in the fate of the Crimean Tatars as Russia is in that of the Crimean Russians.

Moreover, Turkey is opposed to Russian policy in Syria. So it is no surprise that Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu was in , consulting with the new Ukrainian interim government.

Turkey is the world’s 17th largest economy (by nominal GDP), but it cannot really offer Ukraine much beyond moral support itself. Still, Turkey is part of NATO and the Crimea crisis will increase its worth in the eyes of that organization. Because the Turkish navy is on the Black Sea, NATO is on the Black Sea.

Iran is likely to side strongly with Moscow in this crisis, and may benefit from it substantially. Of course, Iran is also concerned about the welfare of the Crimean Muslim community. But it should be remembered that Tehran has backed Christian Armenia against Muslim-majority Azerbaijan, so you can't read off its foreign policy from its supposed Islamic commitments.

The conservative Iranian daily Hemayat editorialized on Sunday:

"Many consider Ukraine as the new battleground between the West and Russia. Now that Russia is mulling military action against Ukraine, there are a few points that Russia is taking into consideration with regards to Ukraine.

"First, Ukraine's economy, especially its energy sector, is dependent on Russia. Half of Europe's gas supplies are imported from Russia via Ukraine's soil. Therefore, Ukraine cannot ignore Moscow and the West cannot exclude Moscow from Ukraine's equations either.

"The West will try to use the new Ukrainian government to enhance its bargaining leverage against Moscow. Being aware of this, Moscow will try to maintain its interests in Ukraine, especially since the economic crisis in the West has made it unable to provide considerable assistance to Ukraine. [Western officials'] current remarks are just aimed at helping the self-declared rulers of Ukraine establish their power." 

The US, China and Russia

Meanwhile, US President Barack Obama is threatening Russia with the same kinds of international sanctions that Washington has applied to Iran over the latter's pro-Palestinian stance and its civilian nuclear enrichment program.

China more or less defies the US on those Treasury Department sanctions. However, Russia had in the past been willing to allow United Nations Security Council (UNSC) votes against Iran, which involved sanctions.

If Putin now faces the same techniques from the Treasury as Tehran has suffered from, he may well start protecting Iran at the UNSC and allow Russian banks to do more open business there. (Before, Moscow had to worry about being sanctioned by the US, but if they are already sanctioned, they may as well make some money in Iran.) Russian firms like Gazprom may also decide to go in to develop Iranian natural gas, if they are under sanctions anyway.

Moreover, an attempt by President Obama to sanction the world's ninth largest economy could permanently blunt US financial power. Who would want the dollar as a reserve currency and who would want a US-dominated international currency exchange regime, if you knew at any moment it could be weaponized against you?

Russia and possibly China together could begin working on an alternative to an American stranglehold over global finance.

Russia, China and Central Asia have formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as an implicit challenge to the Bretton Woods institutions. Iran applied for membership but was only given observer status. If Putin feels that SCO has to up its game in response to US sanctions on the Russian Federation, perhaps he would push to admit Iran.

The Ukraine Crisis as an Impetus Toward Iranian Assertion?

With rumors flying around that Iraq may break US sanctions by purchasing Iranian weaponry, the current crisis could be another impetus toward Iranian reassertion, with Russian backing.

Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Gulf oil monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are already at odds with Russia over its Syria policy. They are also upset about the Obama administration's negotiations with Iran. The Gulf States are from the region and "weakness" — although the US has never intervened directly in eastern Europe and cannot be expected to.

The GCC's quiet support for the US invasion and occupation of Iraq demonstrates where they want to take US policy. In fact, they seem unrepentant about that disaster, desiring a repeat in Syria.

Egypt's interim government is miffed at US criticisms of the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohammed Morsi last July. It has declared the Brotherhood a terrorist organization and has mobilized against Sunni extremists in the Sinai.

Cairo has swung its support to al-Assad, who is struggling in Syria against the Muslim Brotherhood and Sunni extremists. This is an awkward situation, since Egypt's major financial patron is Saudi Arabia, which wants the Ba'ath government in Syria gone. However, Riyadh does not want to see the Brotherhood come to power in Damascus, since Saudi conservative monarchism is challenged by the group's republican populism.

Egypt has sent delegations to Moscow in search of Russian weapons and support, and as a way of diversifying from its mainly American and Gulf patrons.

The Egyptian foreign minister, Nabil Fahmy (kept over in the  that has just been formed) has not said anything about Crimea. It is likely that Cairo will try to avoid annoying Putin, whose may be seen as a model for Egypt by its current elites.

Still, if the US does sanction Russia, Egypt may be forced to reconsider buying arms from the latter.

If Russia is pushed further into Tehran's arms by US sanctions, then ironically al-Assad and Sayyid Ali Khamenei may be the biggest winners of the Crimean crisis.

At the same time, Turkey could also be a winner in the sense that its value to NATO, the US and the EU will be much enhanced because of its Black Sea presence and its own historical interests in Crimea.

*[This article was originally published by Juan Cole’s .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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In a bid to reassure Gulf states worried about a US-Iranian rapprochement and critical of American Middle East policy, the Obama administration has opted to back Saudi efforts for regional hegemony through greater integration of Gulf military capabilities in the framework of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).    

The United States-backed Saudi blueprint would effectively establish the kingdom as the region’s military superpower and first line of defense, while allowing the US to balance its commitment to the region with its goal of pivoting towards Asia. But it risks splitting the GCC, which was established to enhance Gulf security.

Giving Saudis What They Want

Speaking at a think-tank dialogue just a stone’s throw away from Bahrain’s restive Shiite neighborhoods, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel made this move on his first visit to the Gulf since last month’s agreement between the United Nations Security Council's permanent members – the US, China, Russia, Britain and France – plus Germany and Iran, aimed at resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis. 

Hagel handed Riyadh what it wanted: a first step towards a union of the GCC member states – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman – with the kingdom as the dominant power.

In doing so, Hagel went beyond seeking to reassure Saudi Arabia and its closest allies within the GCC that Washington's rapprochement with Iran would not be at the expense of the energy-rich, fragile Gulf autocracies. The US also wanted to show that it would remain committed to its defense umbrella for the region, despite focusing increasingly on Asia.

Confidence between the US and Saudi Arabia, home to a fiercely anti-Shiite puritan interpretation of Islam, has eroded as a result of Saudi opposition to the Iranian agreement because of the prospect of Shiite Iran reintegrating into the international community and emerging as a power house, capable of rivaling the kingdom.

Saudi confidence has been further undermined by American support for the popular uprisings in the Arab world; failure to provide Syrian rebels with the arms needed to defeat the regime of embattled President Bashar al-Assad; inability to force a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and an increased US focus on Asia rather than the Middle East and North Africa.

Saudi concerns have sparked a series of critical statements of US policy, and persuaded the kingdom to demonstratively refuse to join the UN Security Council when it was elected to a seat.

Fear of Being Swallowed    

By laying out a series of steps to put the GCC, in which Saudi Arabia is by far the most powerful member, rather than individual Gulf states at the centre of US defense policy, Hagel effectively endorsed Saudi calls for a union of Gulf states. This is a move that, so far, has been thwarted by fears among some of its smaller members that they would be swallowed by their big brother.

Indeed, the Saudis failed in their initiative in the last year to forge a union with Bahrain, where Saudi and UAE troops have been based since the brutal squashing of a 2011 popular uprising to bolster the regime.

In a rare public statement against Gulf union, Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Yousef bin Alawi al-Ibrahim, a one-time representative of a separatist movement, confronted his Saudi counterpart, Nizar bin Obaid Madani, in no uncertain terms.

"We absolutely don’t support [the] Gulf union. There is no agreement in the region on this… If this union materializes, we will deal with it but we will not be a member. Oman’s position is very clear. If there are new arrangements for the Gulf to confront existing or future conflicts, Oman will not be part of it," he said.

Al-Ibrahim suggested that the Gulf’s major problems were internal rather than external and should be the region’s focus. Last year, Ahmed al-Saadoun, at the time speaker of the Kuwaiti parliament, rejected a Gulf union, saying that as a democracy Kuwait could not unite with autocratic states.

Barely a hundred meters from where he spoke, police vehicles and machine-gun mounted armored vehicles patrol the perimeter of the Shiite neighborhood of Karbad. Graffiti on its walls reflects the area’s mood. Slogans include: "Down with King Hamad"; "Martyrdom is our habit"; "Our goal is toppling the regime"; and "We bow only in front of God." A local resident said: "This will never end. It’s gone too far. Reform is the only way out."

Saudis Pleased, But Not Smaller Gulf States

Hagel couched the new US approach in terms of "strategic agility" and "wise deployment of our influence." The US would help the GCC integrate its missile defense capabilities, he added, by emphasizing the GCC as a “multilateral framework that is the best way to develop an inter-operable and integrated regional missile defense.”

This would include missile defense in annual meetings of US and Gulf air force commanders and officials; making missile defense, marine security and counterterrorism-related sales to the GCC as a group rather than to individual member states; and instituting an annual US-GCC defense ministers conference. Hagel said the first such conference should be held in the next six months.

Saudi officials, endorsing Hagel’s proposals, said the defense secretary had understood the kingdom’s needs and, in doing so, had supported their effort to achieve a Saudi-led Gulf union. "This fits our agenda perfectly," one official said.

Integrating regional defense as a step towards a union is likely to prove easier said than done, due to more than just political resistance by smaller Gulf states. The GCC for one has no mechanism to make military purchases, despite its members having signed a joint security agreement a year ago. Even if it did, Gulf states would likely squabble over every detail of the acquisition.

In addition, smaller Gulf states are hesitant to rely on Saudi Arabia for their defense not only for political reasons, but also because of the kingdom’s checkered military record. Saudi Arabia was unable to defend Kuwait against Iraq’s 1990 invasion of the Gulf state. More recently, Saudi troops had a hard time confronting Houthi rebels on the other side of their border in the north of Yemen.

"The Omani foreign minister’s remarks were unprecedented. Other Gulf states may not say publicly no, but they certainly won’t buy into it," said an analyst from one of the smaller Gulf states.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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The world watched with great interest as mass protests, starting in December 2010, swept the Arab world, most prominently leading to the ouster of Egyptā€™s and Tunisiaā€™s long-standing presidents.ĢżIn Libya, an armed opposition campaign, with NATO air support, brought a violent end to Muammar Qaddafiā€™s 42-year rule.ĢżThe initially peaceful protests in Syria against the Assad government turned into a bloody civil war, which has cost more than 100,000 lives, led to over 2.1 million refugees, and continues to rage on.

Almost forgotten were protests in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf ā€“ namely the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain , Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. Apart from temporarily heightened coverage of the , events in the Gulf were mostly left in the background, as the turbulent events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria dominated the headlines.

The GCC countries are hereditary monarchical systems, with varying degrees of parliamentary influence. Kuwaitā€™s parliament, for example, first elected in 1963, has law-making and certain veto powers in the countryā€™s system of a constitutional monarchy in which the Emir has the final say on policies. In contrast to that, the Shura Council in Saudi Arabia, seen as an absolute monarchy, has very limited rights and draft laws are always to be approved by the king. In a recent move, however, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who appoints all members of the council, for the first time nominated to join the Shura Council.

Overall, parliaments in the Gulf are not the centers of power, as ultimate authority lies with the executive and its rulers.

The importance of this region derives from the fact that several key Gulf states, first and foremost Saudi Arabia and Qatar, are crucial players in the global energy market with Riyadh holding ā€œā€ and being the largest producer and exporter of total petroleum liquids. Ģżis currently the worldā€™s largest supplier of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and holds the third largest natural gas reserves in the world. Both states rely heavily on rents from natural resources; despite diversification efforts, a common pattern in the Gulf. Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates is the ā€œā€ in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Apart from economic ties, several Gulf states have close political and military relations with Western countries. Bahrain hosts the US Navyā€™s fifth fleet and signed a with the United Kingdom in 2012. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar serves as the forward headquarters of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). Moreover, Kuwait is considered as a counterterrorism partner for the US and played an important role in the Iraq War as a key platform for US and coalition forcesā€™ operations. US-Saudi relations have been a cornerstone of US strategy for the Middle East.

However, many human rights organizations have criticized Gulf states for their poor human rights record, which includes the repression of and . Qatar recently came under fierce criticism, following reportsĢżthatĢżwere made public byĢżĢżof serious mistreatment of migrant workers. These migrantsĢżwere brought to the country to build the 2022 FIFA World Cup construction sites.

51³Ō¹Ļā€™s Middle East Editor, , speaks to , a renowned expert on Gulf politics from the University of Cambridge.

Matthiesen is the author of the recently published book,Ģż, which talks about political uprisings and political dissent in the Gulf states. He received his PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, examining: ā€œTheĢżShia in Saudi Arabia: Identity Politics, Sectarianism, and the Saudi State.ā€ He is currently a research fellow in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at Pembroke College, University of Cambridge, and a research officer at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

Langendorf and Matthiesen talk about the stability of regimes in the Gulf, an upsurge in activism, Western interests at play, and the role of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Manuel Langendorf: You recently published a book entitled: Ģż Ģż. What is your main message in the book and what propelled you to write it?

Toby Matthiesen: I had worked on the Gulf States and sectarianism for my PhD, and was in Bahrain on a research trip when the uprising started. So I saw the historic events unfolding before me, and started to understand the sectarian logic behind the crackdown.

The main message of the book is that the Gulf regimes were willing to go all the way to prevent any GCC state from becoming a constitutional monarchy or a democracy, and one of the main tools they employed was increasing sectarianism.

Langendorf: How were protests in the Gulf states covered by the media? Were there any common patterns and shortcomings?

Matthiesen: While Bahrain did receive some coverage in early 2011, the Gulf protests and crackdowns have generally received much less attention than comparable events across the region. This is partly because of access restrictions for Western media, but also partly a result of PR campaigns financed by the GCC states.

Particularly, Bahrain has spent millions through PR companies in the US and in Europe to try and change its tarnished reputation.

Langendorf: As we witness continuous unrest, especially in Bahrain, do you see the stability of the GCCā€™s rulers in danger? What are the prospects for real change?

Matthiesen: I think it is a long process. The GCC states have been quite effective at repressing the different movements for change. Kuwait and Bahrain are the countries that may have to change first; the others will try to hold out for longer.

We should not expect the ruling families to give in to reformist demands without pressure. I think that if these countries do not profoundly reform, there may come a time when these states fracture and descend into civil strife.

Langendorf: Many human rights organizations criticize the Gulf statesā€™ repression of political and religious activists? A recent case was the warnings by Saudi ministries against participation in the October 26 campaign to demonstrate the factual ban on women driving cars. Have the Arab Uprisings which started in Tunisia almost three years ago brought an upsurge in activism in the Gulf?ĢżĢż

Matthiesen: Yes, definitively. Whether the ruling families like it or not, we have seen a new repertoire of contention spreading across the Gulf, including to Saudi Arabia. These instances of protests, petitions, driving campaigns, student protests, online debates and so on, may not be threatening the core of the system, yet they are steps towards a further politicization of the population on a hitherto unseen scale.

Langendorf: Given the fact that the Gulf still holds massive natural resources and the US Navyā€™s 5^th fleet is stationed in Bahrain, what role have Western interests in the Gulf played during the uprisings?

Matthiesen: They have been crucial in shaping Western non-responses, particularly towards the Bahraini uprising. The US does not want to jeopardize the future of its naval base in Bahrain by taking a too-strong position towards democratization.

The West has essentially sacrificed any interest it once had for democratization in the Gulf for economic, strategic and security interests. This strategy may be self-defeating, however, since long-term unrest and civil strife in Bahrain will also endanger the future of the naval base and of the security of the Gulf states more generally.

Langendorf: Several Gulf states have lent diplomatic and financial support to the new military-backed government in Egypt after the ouster of Mohammed Morsi in July. Many have interpreted that as part of these governmentsā€™ strong anti-Brotherhood stance. Was or is the Muslim Brotherhood a real threat to the ruling families of the Gulf?

Matthiesen: Yes, definitively. The Muslim Brotherhood is the most organized quasi-opposition force in most GCC states. This is why Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, in particular, sought to weaken them in Egypt, so that they will not be empowered in the Gulf.

We see a regionalization of Gulf security dynamics, where key Gulf states seek to defend their national security interests far from their borders in Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and elsewhere.

Langendorf: There has been much talk about a rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Both countries, for example, seem to back different Islamist forces in Syria and Egypt. As an observer of Gulf politics, what is your take on this rivalry?

All the smaller Gulf states, except Bahrain, are wary of Saudi Arabia’s influence in the GCC. Saudi Arabia’s size, wealth, and military power makes it the dominant force in the GCC. The rivalry with Qatar has to be seen in this context.

Also, Qatar wants to be the leader of a new kind of political Sunni Islam that is at odds with the ways in which the Saudis want to use Islam. This is why Qatar has supported the Muslim Brotherhood, while Saudi has cracked down on the Brotherhood. But Qatar punched above its weight, and while we still do not really know what the reasons for the abdication of former Emir Hamad were, the new Emir has certainly tried to ease tensions with the Saudis.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Background

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) provides a highly diverse picture of economic structures and characteristics. Its far from uniform regional economic structure can be traced back to before the establishment of the nation-state in the region.

The MENA region has witnessed major economic transformations since the 19^th century. While colonial regimes unarguably incorporated many countries in the region to the world capitalist system, whether it was through direct or indirect mandates, they also established a de facto dependence relationship between Arab colonies and their European patrons through inequitable terms of trade. Further, the colonial ties did not allow much margin for economic innovation and diversification, as the majority of Arab economies remained dependent on low-value exports and low-income generating agrarian activities.

The post-independence era witnessed the adoption of the Import Substitution Industrialization strategy (ISI). The adopted ISI model entailed protecting the domestic market from external competition through tariffs and barriers and diverting natural resources, including oil, gas, and phosphates to industry.

This strategy seemed to be highly productive in the 1970s, particularly in oil exporting countries, and led many experts to talk about a “regional economic boom.” However, this prosperity proved to be unsustainable with the volatility of oil prices due to the two oil embargos in the 1970s and the plummeting of oil rents in 1986.

The regional economic recessions that followed each of these episodes were exacerbated by the social benefits reaped in the earlier boom period, such as increased life expectancy and fertility and decreased infant mortality.

Detaining  of the world’s proved liquid oil reserves, the Middle East has heavily relied on energy exports to sustain its economic development to the detriment of other industries. The dependence on the energy industry has also allowed states to maintain tight control over national resources, which has led to the institutionalization of corruption and inequality.

Regional economic integration remains at a low level. Except for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which brought together the Oil Gulf monarchies, there is a lack of regional trading blocs as tariffs remain quite high. The lack of trade between North African countries is a case in point, as the low level of integration , according to the African Development Bank. 

Why is the Economy Relevant?

Many would argue that one of the main motors of social and political unrest in the MENA region stemmed from the deteriorating economic conditions and inequality from which the young population suffered, in particular. The same factor has also been used to explain why large social mobilizations succeeded in some Arab countries and not in others.

In addition to the , many identify the rapid growth of an increasingly young labor force as today’s main economic challenge facing the region. With per capital income in 2000 being similar to the 1980s and 1990s, Arab countries in the Middle East are characterized by stagnating living standards and high population growth.

The three most populous countries in the MENA region, for instance, have a very high percentage of young people with Egypt’s, Algeria’s, and Morocco’s populations standing at median ages of 20, 20 and 21 respectively. Based on demographic growth expectations, commentators have argued the region as a whole will witness a continuing increase in young labor force of  for the next decades. The Arab League, based on the , expects unemployment to increase  people over the same period. 

Further,  the poor economic performance in the region makes the Middle East and North Africa a fertile ground for religious extremism and the development of terrorist networks. That is one of the key factors which discourages both domestic and foreign investments and increases capital flight due to the increasing risk premium.

Hence, the Middle East and North Africa is a region where political regimes and economic performance are intertwined par excellence. Indeed, the soaring lack of political dynamism, particularly in a context of social change, fuels popular discontent and raises the level of political uncertainty. The increased possibility of turmoil and regime change are clear impediments to investment and economic growth.

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Recent geopolitical developments across the Middle East and Africa have added momentum to Iran and Sudanā€™s strategic partnership, an alliance driven primarily by an interest in weakening the power of Israel, and by extension the US, throughout East Africa. Other objectives include Sudanā€™s fight against other forces that constitute existential threats to the Khartoum regime, and Iranā€™s interest in establishing an alternative weapons corridor to Gaza and Lebanon, particularly given that Syria will likely remain destabilized for the near-to-medium term.

However, some of Sudanā€™s traditional Sunni Arab allies staunchly oppose further development of the Iran/Sudan partnership. It remains to be seen how far Khartoum can further entrench its ties with Tehran while maintaining its alliance with Saudi Arabia and other states in the region.

Background of Bilateral Ties

When President Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi rose to power in the 1989 coup that established an Islamist state in Sudan, one of the new regimeā€™s first diplomatic initiatives was to forge an alliance with Iran, whose own Islamic revolution a decade earlier inspired Sudanā€™s Islamists (despite the Sunni-Shia division). Five months after the coup, Bashir paid a visit to Iran and the two statesā€™ intelligence agencies signed cooperative agreements.

In 1991, then-Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani visited Sudan pledging $17 million in financial aid, delivery of $300 million of Chinese weapons, and 1 million tons of oil per year. Some 2,000 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) were reportedly sent to Sudan to train its Popular Defense Forces (PDF) during the second Sudanese Civil War. That same year, Khartoum hosted the infamous Popular Arab and Islamic Congress (PAIC), which brought together Osama bin Laden, Abu Nidal, Carlos the Jackal, and members of Jamaā€™at al-Islamiyah, Hamas, Hezbollah and the IRGC.

Over the years, Iran and Sudan have maintained varying degrees of support for non-state actors, including Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine. In 2008, the two states officially signed a military cooperation agreement, and in May of this year, the pace and scope of the construction of Iranian naval and logistical bases in Port Sudan was enhanced remarkably. In short, over the past two decades, the two countries have significantly deepened their political ties, and in the process, Sudan has become a magnet for a variety of militant extremist and jihadist individuals and groups.

Proxy War in Africa

Sudan has at the same time become an extension of Iranā€™s proxy war against Israel. Historically, Sudan and Israelā€™s relationship has been hostile. In 2012, Israel bombed Sudan for the fourth time since 2009, striking the Yarmouk factory near Khartoum. Israelā€™s motivation for targeting Sudan was likely to punish Sudan for allowing Iran to use Sudanese territory as a staging ground for arms shipments to Gaza and Lebanon via the Red Sea and Egyptian Sinai, in addition to Khartoumā€™s alleged support for Hamas and other militant Palestinian groups.

Israel knows that Sudan is a failed state with a military that is preoccupied with South Sudan and Darfur, among other concerns, and that Khartoum is not capable of responding directly to Israel. Simply put, Bashirā€™s bluff has been called as a consequence of his inaction to Israelā€™s air raids. Part of Israelā€™s message to Sudanā€™s government appears to be to refrain from forging deeper ties with Iran and Hamas; the more important message relates to Iran: If Tehran uses East Africa as a launching pad for its Palestinian/Lebanese proxies, Israel will apparently strike against Iranā€™s interests in the region.

Moreover, Israel has used its ally, South Sudan, in an effort to further weaken Khartoumā€™s regional clout. This partnership far precedes Iran and Israelā€™s standoff. During the first Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972), Israel armed and trained the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), which was consistent with the ā€œalliance on the peripheryā€ pillar of Ben-Gurionā€™s foreign policy. After South Sudanese independence in 2011, Jubaā€™s diplomatic gestures toward Israel established the worldā€™s newest state as a staunch Israeli ally. In March 2012, an Iranian drone was shot down by Juba-backed rebels and the Israelis have sent security experts to South Sudan to train their troops to operate T-72 battle tanks. If Khartoum and Juba wage war over the disputed oil-rich region of Abyei, Iran and Israel may be expected to use their leverage to back their respective sides, further establishing the Sudans as a battleground for one of the Middle Eastā€™s most dangerous power struggles.

Eritrea is another important piece to this puzzle, as Asmara courts a military partnership with Iran and Israel. From Eritreaā€™s perspective, a potential Ethiopian invasion constitutes the gravest national security threat. To counter this menace, Eritrea signed an agreement with Iran in 2008 that provides the Iranian military a presence in Assab (which for official purposes is to safeguard an oil field).

However, for a number of reasons (the most important being to gain greater support from Washington, which holds strong influence over Addis Ababa), Eritrea appears to have sought balance in its partnership with Iran by forming a relationship with Israel. Israeli naval teams have set up in the Dablak Archipelago and Massawa, and have also reportedly established a listening post in Amba Soira to monitor Iranā€™s presence in the country. Israel has a difficult task, as deeper ties with Asmara threaten to undermine its relationship with Addis Ababa. Nonetheless, Israel will likely continue to nurture its partnership with Eritrea as long as it serves to weaken Iranā€™s capacity to use East Africa to expand Tehranā€™s strategic depth.

Sudanā€™s Gamble

Given that nearly three-quarters of Sudanese exports reach the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Khartoum is economically dependent on states that would view the growth of Iranā€™s footprint in East Africa as a significant geostrategic setback. As Saudi Arabia and Iran wage a proxy war in Yemen, the build-up of Iranā€™s military presence in the Red Sea is troublesome from the Saudi perspective. Voices within Sudanā€™s opposition have criticized Bashir for permitting Tehran to establish a greater military footprint in their country, on the grounds that Sudanese-GCC ties will suffer and it undermines prospects for any potential rapprochement with the United States.

From Bashirā€™s perspective, it is reasonable to assume that the most imminent threats to his regimeā€™s survival are reduced as a result of the growing partnership with Iran. With Darfur rebels having struck major blows against the Sudanese state earlier this year, and as the conflict with South Sudan is likely to linger for years to come, the influx of more advanced weapons and training from Iran should strengthen Khartoumā€™s position.

Bashir has every reason to continue to deepen Sudanā€™s ties to Iran. He knows that Iran is determined to expand its influence in Africa, and that Sudan has a unique role to play in furthering that objective. Thus, with Iranā€™s ongoing battle of words with Israel and the US over Tehranā€™s nuclear program, the continuation of the Syrian crisis ā€“ which threatens to break-up the Middle Eastā€™s ā€œaxis of resistanceā€ ā€” and the tension between Sudan and South Sudan, Iran and Sudan have apparently come to view each other as indispensable strategic partners for the long haul.

The recent news that Zimbabwe has signed a Memorandum of Understanding to sell Iran uranium will certainly raise the stakes in Iranā€™s presumed pursuit of nuclear weapons, and will only serve as an incentive for Sudan to enhance the role it is playing in broadening Iranā€™s pursuit of power and influence in the Middle East and beyond. There is no real incentive for them to change course, nor any meaningful way for other countries to reduce the significance of the impact that relationship has had, and will presumably continue to have, on Africa and the Middle East. As a result, Sudan should be expected to continue to play an indirect and influential role in the unfolding landscape of Africa and the Middle East.

*[This article was originally published by the .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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The cycle of calamity plaguing Syria continues to intensify with no end in sight. Syria’s predicament today is far removed from the initial outburst of mass dissent witnessed in March 2011 that saw the Ba’athist regime violently suppress demonstrations demanding political change and reform. This sequence of events paved the way for the incremental militarization of the uprising by defected members of the Syrian army and ordinary civilians. While the circumstances behind these early episodes of the rebellion remain relevant, the initial displays of violent resistance combined with the formation of various competing political opposition blocs inside Syria and abroad have since given way to a lethal and expansive insurgency, increasingly influenced by hardline Islamist currents.

The stream of foreign fighters that are filling the ranks of the insurgency has added another layer of complexity to the Syrian imbroglio. These facets of the rebellion are particularly salient when contemplated against the backdrop of the opposition’s repeated demands for lethal arms and political recognition from foreign powers. In this context, understanding the role of foreign actors, especially the Persian Gulf monarchies led by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in aiding and sustaining the various political and violent strands of the Syrian opposition, is essential to deciphering Syria.  

Saudi Arabia and Qatar

Saudi Arabia and Qatar appear united in their opposition to the Ba’athist regime. This appearance of unity, however, masks a deeper rivalry for regional influence that is being played out in parallel with the broader, multi-dimensional proxy battle that has come to embody Syria’s civil war. This shadow conflict is reflected in the agendas of the competing factions being backed by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The friction between Saudi Arabia and Qatar has been readily apparent as the Syrian National Council (SNC), National Council for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCR), the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC), and other movements vie for primacy within the Syrian opposition. The existing overlap in terms of ideology between the disparate insurgent factions and growing indications of their tactical and operational collaboration on the battlefield, does not offset the persistence of major rifts between these groups.  

Widely viewed as the most active in its support for the Syrian opposition, Qatar has been accused of empowering many of the most ideologically extreme militant factions. This includes armed detachments affiliated with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and others associated with al-Qaeda, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (The Victory Front). Ultraconservative Salafist factions, such as Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya (Islamic Movement of the Free Men of the Levant) and the umbrella Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) under which it operates, are also known to be favored by Qatar. In contrast, Saudi Arabia is seen as enabling armed factions operating under the auspices of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and its Supreme Military Council (SMC), as well as Islamist factions deemed to be lying outside of al-Qaeda’s purview. Saudi Arabia also tends to favor the factions that make up the umbrella Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF), which is seen as comparatively more moderate than those who make up their SIF counterpart.  

Officially, the US reluctance to provide more extensive and lethal forms of military support to the Syrian opposition is being attributed to the prevailing influence of radical Islamist currents within the insurgency. Reports that Saudi Arabia, with US encouragement, has effectively supplanted Qatar as the principal supporter of the Syrian rebellion add another layer of intrigue to an increasingly convoluted situation. The decision by former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani to abdicate his throne in favor of his son, may also suggest that important changes are forthcoming in regards to Qatar’s position toward Syria.

The new emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, declared his opposition to the sectarianism and other divides that affect the Arab world. This statement may reflect a coming shift in Qatar’s stance on Syria to one that is more in line with Saudi Arabia’s position. Yet, the muddled and fluid nature of the Syrian uprising is not conducive to engineering an insurgency whose elements adhere to narrowly defined parameters. The role of independent financiers, charity organizations and sympathetic publics in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, among other places, is also vital to fueling the insurrection. The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a violent faction believed to be an offshoot of al-Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), has raised another set of anxieties. ISIS’s July assassination of Mohammed Kamal al-Hamami, an FSA commander and member of the SMC in Latakia, is illustrative of the extent of the ideological divides within the insurgency.  

Geopolitical Backdrop

Due to Syria’s alliance with Iran and Hezbollah – a bloc known as the “Resistance Axis” – the uprising in Syria quickly assumed geopolitical overtones. The insurrection in Syria afforded the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) a chance to undercut Iranian influence in the Middle East. In this regard, the resort to sectarian vitriol by the Sunni-led monarchies and affiliated clergy emphasizing the Shi’a pedigree of the Islamic Republic and the prominent Alawite face of the Ba’athist regime was calibrated to stir up religious tensions between Sunni and Shi’a believers. The provision of support for radical Islamist movements, especially ultraconservative Salafist groups, has been central to the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia and fellow GCC members.

Consequently, the positions of Saudi Arabia and Qatar are often portrayed interchangeably when it comes to their shared goal of toppling the Ba’athist regime. Their fellow GCC allies, particularly the Sunni-led monarchies representing the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and Bahrain, as well as wealthy private donors, religious associations and ordinary individuals, have likewise provided extensive moral, financial and logistical support to the political and armed factions struggling against the Ba’athist regime. Saudi Arabia in particular saw the uprising in Syria as an opportunity to undermine the Hezbollah-led March 8 coalition in Lebanon, while strengthening the March 14 coalition headed by the Sunni-led Future Movement. 

The fall of entrenched despots in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, coupled with the groundswell of grassroots mobilization in Bahrain that would later prompt Saudi-led forces to intervene to prop up Manama under the auspices of the GCC’s Peninsula Shield force, sent shockwaves throughout the Persian Gulf. The ongoing crackdown by UAE authorities against purported members of the al-Islah (Reform) movement, which is accused of engaging in subversive activities and receiving support from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, combined with intensifying exhibitions of dissent by opposition forces in Kuwait, continue to raise anxieties within the GCC. While not a member of the GCC, Jordan is also highly vulnerable to the developments emanating out of Syria. It has become apparent that the royal dynasties are no longer insulated from the political turbulence shaking the Arab world.  

A close inspection of the respective approaches of Saudi Arabia and Qatar toward Syria reflect divergent strategies. While a number of the key protagonists closely involved in Syria, including Saudi Arabia, have formally cut ties with Damascus and are actively engaging with the opposition, Qatar, for example, has gone as far as to transfer Syria’s embassy in Doha to the NCR. While Saudi Arabia has maintained an uncompromising diplomatic posture toward Damascus, the realization has started to set it in in Riyadh that the Ba’athist regime has proven far more resilient and capable than initially believed, while there is a consistent inability on the part of the political opposition and insurgents to assert and consolidate meaningful authority and some semblance of legitimacy.  

*[Read the on August 23.]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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The quirky Emir of Qatar since the mid-1990s, Sheikh Hamad bin Issa al-Thani, stepped down in favor of his fourth son, Tamim, 33, on Tuesday morning. It is a historical step, insofar as it might form a precedent in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) of six Gulf sheikhdoms — heretofore mainly ruled by old men.

Al Jazeera

Sheikh Hamad presided over the growth of Qatari GDP from $8 billion annually in 1996, to $174 billion a year, today. The Qatari citizen population is only about 250,000, making the peninsula the wealthiest per capita in the world (mainly based on natural gas exports). Sheikh Hamad innovated in allowing the Al Jazeera satellite news channel to be founded and to operate relatively independently. It changed Arab television journalism forever, airing multiple points of views on key issues and allowing critics of the various Arab regimes to be heard. Al Jazeera gave a platform to the revolutionaries of 2011, at a time when local Tunisian, Egyptian or Libyan media attempted to downplay the revolutionary youth movements. Qatar also began playing a mediating role in disputes in the region, as when it negotiated a truce in 2008 between the Shiite Hezbollah and its Sunni opposition in Lebanon.

In the past two years, Qatar’s reputation has suffered among many Arab youth because of its backing for the religious Right (Ennahda in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria and elsewhere). Qatar has been a hawk on Syria, seeking the overthrow of the Baathist regime of Bashar al-Assad and being willing to arm even radical Sunni groups who have affiliated with al-Qaeda. On the other hand, its Arabic-language television station has been quiet about the crackdown on Shiite protesters in Bahrain by a Sunni monarchy. Sheikh Hamad once had a reputation for even-handedness, which in recent years he has squandered in pursuit of the spread of Sunni fundamentalism in the region. Likewise, the imprisonment of a Qatari poet for 15 years for insulting the ruling family pointed to a deep hypocrisy, since Al Jazeera had pointedly criticized Hosni Mubarak in Egypt for his crackdown on dissent and criticism of his regime.

Sheikh Hamad explicitly made reference to the creative role of Arab youth in recent years, saying:

“Our young [people] have proven over the past years that they are a people of resolve and fortitude; capable of accommodating the spirit of their time; realising its necessities fully and profoundly; coping with its newest; and above all contributing by their original thinking and creative initiatives. Thanks to all this, I recall the words of the fourth Caliph, Ali bin Abi Taleb, may Allah be pleased with him, who said: ‘Teach your children other than that what you were taught; as they are created for a time other than yours.’”

The absolute ruler of a Gulf sheikhdom urged Generation Y to put their faith in science (al-ulum, and not just "knowledge" as the official translation has it):

“The future lies ahead of you, the children of this homeland, as you usher into a new era where young leadership hoists the banner; bearing in mind the aspirations of future generations; working restlessly and relentlessly to achieve them, seeking guidance and support from God first and from the citizens; deriving force from the experience gained in running the country’s affairs; and the profound knowledge of realities in our region, particularly the Arab World. While I am certain you are up to the responsibility, I urge you to fear God by seeking knowledge and working hard; let [the sciences] be the beacon lighting your path; helping you build the future of the nation to its best; by knowledge emerge able generations, capable of shouldering responsibilities and embracing the straight right path.”

While Sheikh Hamad is among the more interesting political minds in the Middle East, and he has helped shake the region up in ways that are often positive, there are a number of potential steps his successor could take that would be truly revolutionary.

The New Emir

Sheikh Tamim will likely revive the plan to move to an elected consultative assembly. But what would really change the Gulf would be for him to accept becoming a constitutional monarch. Kuwait was, six years ago, the closest of the GCC countries to that form of government, but it has become much more authoritarian. It is a hard sell for Qatar to promote democracy elsewhere in the Arab world, yet to lack it at home in Doha.

Likewise, the GCC countries suffer from a local labor shortage produced by their vast hydrocarbon wealth, which generates the need for workers and for businesses beyond what local populations can supply. Millions of Indians, Sri Lankans, Pakistanis, Filipinos and others have flooded into the region. Qatar’s population is 1.8 million, but about 1.5 million of that consists of guest workers. Guest workers in the Gulf states most often need an in-country patron or kafeel, whose relationship to them can often be exploitative. Even workers from India or the Philippines who have lived for many years in a Gulf country are limited to relatively short-term visas. They can easily be deported or denied renewal of their visa, which is how any concerted attempt at workplace unionization or strikes are dealt with. There is typically no path to citizenship for these guest workers, even if they live in a GCC country all their lives.

Using Qatar’s natural gas wealth as a platform on which to pursue renewable energy, its export to energy-hungry Pakistan and India would help firm up Qatar’s future in a world where hydrocarbons are likely to decline in value. Qatar is vulnerable to losing coastline if the seas rise three or four feet in this century, as is expected because of climate change.

So another really important innovation Sheikh Tamim could pursue would be to offer citizenship to long-time residents, to regularize immigration laws and establish a path to citizenship for immigrants, and to allow unions, strikes and more justice for the workers who are making Doha run.

This step, in turn, would require a national educational system that could induct the immigrants into a Qatari national identity.

A return of Al Jazeera to more even-handed editorial policies would increase Qatar’s prestige.

Sheikh Tamim would raise his country’s esteem in the eyes of the world if he pardoned poet Muhammad al-Ajami and established genuine freedom of speech in the country. Qatar achieved its current stature by demanding more open societies elsewhere in the Arab world. It risks undermining those achievements by being seen as hypocritical.

And a return of Qatar to its 2008 role of mediator and peace-maker would benefit it and the region. Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt has been a disaster, and the Sunni radicals in Syria are damaging the reputation and prospects of the rebels there. For Doha to pick winners so boldly risks a backlash if they don’t do well. And violent interventions like that in Syria could someday backfire by attracting violence to Doha.

*[This article was originally published by Juan Cole’s .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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Around the country, observers see a wide gap between the media’s illusion of a military ‘transformation’ and the reality of a one-sided ‘purge’ that neither unites Yemen’s armed forces nor contributes to a safer environment. Consensus among Yemenis in the north and south is that while presidential decrees provide glimpses of hope, people worry about the growing lapse in security. National Dialogue delegate Moneer al-Mawri, and Dr. Ali al-Subaihi, a southern activist in Sana’a, agree that the situation may be improving in the capital, but armed conflicts continue in al-Baydha, Hajja, and the Taiz provinces. Government forces remain fragmented, unwelcomed, and therefore unable to interfere to settle these conflicts. The so-called restructuring process has failed to alter the character of the armed forces, and the ongoing political positioning by winners and losers from presidential decisions contributes to a growing security vacuum across the country. 

While media and international actors focus on making Yemen’s transition a model success story, proposed solutions are merely cosmetic and completely ignore the nature of deeply rooted conflicts. The military is a legacy institution with strong historical roots in the north and the south. A unified military was a major issue during negotiations to unify the Yemen Arab Republic (north) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (south) in 1990. The failure to share power according to the unity agreement, especially within the armed forces, was a precursor to the civil war of 1994. This grievance continues among southerners who claim northern hegemony over all national institutions has merely placed southern officers under the grip of traditional centers of power, and marginalized the southern population which is lacking employment opportunities and has no access to safety-net institutions like the military. Such issues have not played a role in the process of restructuring that merely aims to solve the political conflict of 2011 between the two main forces dominating the military: former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar. 

Ongoing Proxies: Obstruction and Incitement

The illusion of restructuring, never mind transformation, is viewed by many as a reshuffling of military officers. This process, which is well negotiated by all concerned actors, has only moved officers from one brigade or region to another. The officers are still under the direct influence of their patrons, and are not yet granting loyalty to President Hadi. As a matter of fact, loyalties remain divided. Even though the president has exerted much effort to place allies in key positions, he lacks sufficient power to exclude those loyal to traditional centers of power. The latter have ambitions beyond the National Dialogue and recognize that every presidential decree must be carefully negotiated to safeguard long-term interests.

Yemen’s armed forces are indeed a priority to all actors. Those with rooted interests in the military aimed at protecting their role, and those threatened by a strong military, simply want to avoid drastic changes to the status quo. The military is not only a legacy institution, but its historical nature and role in society has also been a product of constant negotiating among centers of power — protecting tribal interests or political parties. The nature of the armed forces goes beyond the ‘guardian of the revolution’ in the north or ‘guardian of the [Socialist] party’ in the south. It has also been an economic pillar: the military runs the Yemen Economic Corporation, and the militarization of the security establishment has created wealth for both patrons and clients. 

The armed forces consist of a weak, aged and mismanaged Air Force whose modernization represents a strategic threat to regional neighbors. Naval forces are weak, small, and untrained. The Coast Guard, highly funded by Western governments, remains weak, inexperienced and mostly focused on safeguarding Yemen’s waters from increasing human trafficking from Africa. Special Forces, either under the control of the Ministry of Defense or the Counter-Terrorism Unit of the Ministry of Interior’s Central Security Forces, are new and its numbers are diminishing. In light of reports that over 3000 officers have disappeared from the ranks with their weapons, the forces have proven inefficient after years of intense training by Western governments. The army is a pillar of society, always regarded as the guardian of the republic, but it is deeply fragmented with loyalties to individuals rather than the institution. While it is a safety-net institution for many Yemenis upon their 18^th birthday, soldiers are underpaid and corruption not only obstructs modernization but also depletes government coffers. 

Recent incidents have proven both the lack of capacity and the divided nature of the armed forces. Rallies by the Islamist party al-Islah have resulted in violent clashes and even deaths of demonstrators at the hands of security forces. In southern Aden province, this led to increased anti-central government sentiments and heightened tensions between the Southern Movement and Islah. In Sana’a, although they remain peaceful, rallies organized by Ali Abdullah Saleh, president of the General People’s Party, continue to show his power and serve as messages to national political actors and the international community. In other conflict areas like central al-Baydha province, where Ansar al-Sharia Islamists continue to gain ground, observers see clashes as proxies to either increase territorial gains or repel existing gains by political rivals. Moreover, instability in the oil-rich eastern province of Mareb is also said to stem from political infighting. Tribesmen attack power lines, leaving the capital in darkness for hours each day, as part of political clashes under the cover of complaints for losing commercial tenders or detained relatives.        

Security Vacuum & Growing Instability

Infighting within the armed forces goes beyond negotiations leading to presidential decrees. Conflicts extend to clashes among military units occupying the same military base or streets. Turf wars directly affect ordinary soldiers who fear losing their job or place in the hierarchy as a result of changes in command.  Army units under commanders with links to Ali Abdullah Saleh increase their animosity toward troops from the Ministry of Interior, perceived as being under the influence of al-Islah. Conflicts are erupting between army units or military and law enforcement units in areas like Rada and Taiz. In the south, where jihadists seem to benefit from ongoing calls for secession, as recently commented by , the situation is increasingly ripe for a protracted armed conflict that may engulf Yemen and spread to neighboring countries. 

While secessionist leaders deal with increasing pressure from the population to escalate beyond protest and sit-ins, people in Abyan are growing dissatisfied by the government’s inability to fill the vacuum created after Ansar al-Shaira militants were defeated in June 2012. Even though Ansar al-Sharia lacks a strategy to recall its fighters and engage the tribal Popular Committees now guarding most of southern Abyan province, journalist Abd al-Razeq al-Jamal says residents of cities like Jaar and Zinjibar reminisce over perceptions of stability and order under the authority of Ansar al-Sharia from March 2011 to June 2012. This is of concern as militants are now present outside al-Anad in Lahj province, outside Rada in al-Baydha and spreading throughout Hadhramawt in the east. Such widespread presence by Sunni Islamist militants in southern territories will present a second front for secessionists who already experienced the conflict once — as Arab-Afghans were recruited to fight southerners during the 1994 Civil War.

In northern areas, government forces remain unable to exercise authority in the Houthi-controlled Sadah province, militias clash in Hajja and tribes have moved toward the Saudi border to put further pressure on Sana’a and its relations with Saudi Arabia. In December 2012, Yemen’s army moved into Surwah, the Mareb province, against Sheikh al-Mu’alli and known al-Qaeda operatives living in the area. The operation led to violent clashes, with houses being destroyed and a number of foreign fighters captured. As it is common with such operations against tribal elements in Mareb, allies of al-Mu’alli joined the fight and continue to disrupt security in the province. In the same month, the army also moved against elements of Ansar al-Sharia in southern al-Baydha province. The initial motive behind this operation was a rescue attempt of foreigners kidnapped in Sana’a who were believed to be held in the area. Militants have gained strength in al-Baydha once again as a result of an alliance with the al-Dhahab family, involved in the attempt to establish an Islamic Emirate in Rada in early 2012. 

Growing instability now plagues areas previously without a history of such armed militancy or banditry. The resurgence of tribal forces in the southern province of Taiz is now blamed for increasing insecurity. The provincial governor, Shawqi Ahmed Anam, has been unable to deal with resistance from political forces, which grew from the 2011 crisis. Universities continue to be closed, the economy continues on a downward spiral and people fear vigilantism and revenge conflicts. Sources also indicate that the neighboring province of Ibb, a green and otherwise highly productive region of central Yemen, is now a point of gravity for Islamist militants. Unconfirmed reports by observers indicate military units now include recruits from among such elements in various areas of Ibb. The authority vacuum in such areas grows from internal fighting in the armed forces and a broken chain of command. In Taiz, insiders admit orders from the governor are often ignored and officers refuse to answers phone calls. Tribal elements, believed to have ‘guarded the revolution’ in 2011, are now demanding rewards for their role and obstruct the work of civil authorities.          

Measuring Success

Provinces like Aden and Taiz once boasted of their unique social character and civility. People in these areas rejected tribalism and were proud of their educated classes. Now they are overwhelmed by political maneuvering and the inability of the central authority to provide basic services. In Sana’a, people are reminded daily of their vulnerability at the hands of tribesmen in Mareb which are beyond the reach of government troops. Hodeida is now threatened by tribesmen following a relative’s death during clashes with government troops. The soldier accused of killing the tribesman is from Hodeida. Examples of flaring points are abundant across Yemen at a time when all political capital is vested in the success of the National Dialogue process.  

Few major actors in Sana’a will admit that President Hadi was pressured to launch the dialogue without being fully confident of its success. Nevertheless, many will agree that the threshold for success is fairly low, and while political actors recognize the process will not solve core issues, they believe acceptable success means no major armed conflict between political factions and an acceptable modus vivendi within the armed forces. This will of course not satisfy the international community, which remains focused on the growth of al-Qaeda in Yemen as momentum grows for al-Qaeda affiliates in areas like Syria. The fight against al-Qaeda, even after Hadi’s May 5, 2012, speech promising to elements from all provinces that al-Qaeda terrorism will be eradicated, is still not a priority for Yemen’s government. Abd al-Razeq al-Jamal confirmed a temporary truce between al-Qaeda and the government during the period of the dialogue, but the truce proved short-lived when another officer was assassinated on April 14. The ongoing restructuring process may lead to fewer allies within the armed forces willing to risk political capital in pursuit of al-Qaeda operatives. Regional neighbors will continue to be engaged in Yemen hoping to dissuade actors from further falling under Iran’s sphere of influence. The Gulf monarchies lack a cohesive strategy, and their success is the containment of instability within Yemen’s borders, avoiding a spillover effect. Relations with various political actors will allow Gulf States to manage the usual balance, thus preventing a total breakdown of the military and the state. 

The transition process has not been easy, nor will the coming months be too promising for President Hadi’s balancing act. Amidst rumors of a potential rapprochement between parties involved in the fighting of 2011, observers see a cooling off period as a major success. Each side has made its gains so far, and in efforts to avoid granting others opportunities for expanded influence, each side may resolve to simply guard its position. This scenario would obviously prolong the authority vacuum and grant non-political actors opportunities to advance their own ambitions. Groups like Ansar al-Sharia may lack a comprehensive strategy to recover lost territory, but having spread throughout the country such elements will become assets for militias aiming to keep government troops out of their areas. The same expert source commenting on the new regional commands also said “weakened Special Forces units will lead to a lack of capacity by the state to repel any militias threatening state institutions,” or elements threatening the capital itself. This scenario would affect prospects for national reconciliation and continue to prevent any degree of economic recovery over the coming months. 

*[Note: Some sources in this article have not been explicitly named. The authors and 51³Ō¹Ļ respect their right to remain anonymous.]  

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

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The post Military Restructuring in Yemen Opens a Second Power Vacuum: Part 2 appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

On April 10, 2013, Yemen’s transitional President, Abdo Rabo Mansour Hadi, issued Presidential Decree No. 104/2013, making the most significant changes to date under the existing agreement to restructure the armed forces. Hadi’s decree was well received by people around the country and Yemenis abroad via social media networks. In particular, people were elated at the president’s surprising move to legislate the removal of direct control over military troops under the authority of Generals Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar and Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, former President Saleh’s son. While such decisions contributed to a surge in optimism, the general view among southern leaders, northern Houthi rebels and observers in Sana’a is that the process still fuels proxy conflicts creating opportunities for militants, militias and sheikhdoms.

Nearly a year and a half after President Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to step down under a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sponsored agreement, his rivals have begun to rejoice in the success achieved with regards to the removal of Saleh’s family members and allies from positions of power. As part of the agreement signed in Riyadh on November 23, 2011, and in exchange for full immunity from prosecution, opposition leaders had maintained this as a primary political aim since February 2011. The international community, having witnessed events in Egypt and Tunisia, saw the GCC agreement as the best possible scenario preventing all-out war in Yemen. The Group of 10, meaning the ten embassies that contributed to the transition agreement, have since devoted all their political capital to ensuring a peaceful enforcement of the Riyadh agreement. Ambassadors have rallied behind President Hadi in order to ensure all political actors understand that any attempts to obstruct the transition process will result in major international sanctions against individuals, their families and assets they may hold outside Yemen.

With such threats against obstruction enshrined in , political actors on all sides have engaged creative alternatives to oppose threats to their power base. All sides currently engage national media campaigns demonizing rivals on television, and in print and online media. At the same time, such media outlets are used to increase the stake in popular support by each side, from the Sunni Islamist party al-Islah to the Southern Secessionist Movement (Hirak), Ali Abdullah Saleh and the General People’s Congress (GPC), as well as the northern Zaydi rebels under Abd al-Malik al-Houthi. Nearly daily rallies see hundreds of supporters around the country turning up for each side as a show of force, including now demonstrations organized by parties covertly against major issues of concern. This creates an uncomfortable environment for President Hadi who is unable to crack down on demonstrations without the use of force, or without escaping the need for security forces to respond to incidents of violence.  

Reconstructing Balance, Not Change

Political actors and observers in Yemen remain skeptical over the success of the month-long National Dialogue Conference or other components of the transition process. Nationwide, the process is still perceived as imposed from outside and as negligent of ongoing political positioning by various actors awaiting either international fatigue or signs of eminent failure. In particular, the Southern Secessionist Movement, both at the popular and leadership level, perceives foreign interference as having a negative effect on the political conflict. It believes the international community’s myopic approach fails to address conflicts that preceded the 2011 intra-regime conflict between Ali Abdullah Saleh and members of the oppositional Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) led by al-Islah and supported by Maj. Gen. Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar.   

Structurally, the latest presidential decree does ensure command and control under the office of the president through the Minister of Defense, rather than in the hands of individual commanders, a family or tribal leader. This role was primarily strengthened by the move to appoint Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar as an advisor to the president within the Ministry of Defense, and by appointing Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh ambassador to the United Arab Emirates. In addition, a Yemeni expert insider points out that such “restructuring, including the establishment of seven new regional commands, makes no sense when the Dialogue has just started and there is no finite agreement on what Yemen’s State will look like after the Dialogue process.” Independent journalist Gamal Hassan says this would make Mohammed Nasser Ahmed, Minister of Defense, the first true military commander with decision-making ability without interference by any other center of power. However, many remain pessimistic over the fact that only Ahmed Ali was removed as a military leader, and from the country, while Gen. Ali Muhsin remains within the military. 

Southern secessionist leader Qassem Askar, allied to exiled leader Ali Salem al-Baydh, indicated Ali Muhsin was a pillar of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime for 33 years, and now he is received as the guardian of the revolution of 2011 and commemorated by the Chinese government. Mr. Askar, Secretary-General of the Supreme Council of the Southern Movement, said that while the international community chastises the movement for boycotting the National Dialogue Conference and accuses factions of links with Iran, G10 ambassadors have ignored southern demands since the start of their recent uprising in 2007. He criticizes the current political process as a mere reshuffling of benefits in reward for support against Saleh in 2011. Political actors in the north are not concerned with the progress or outcome of the dialogue according to Mr. Askar, but are only concerned about sharing the spoils, as structures are divided among traditional centers of power.

With regards to restructuring the armed forces, Radfan Saeed Salem Saleh, a young Hirak leader from southern Dhalae province, indicated this has been a long-standing grievance for southerners. Radfan insisted the restructuring process is evidence of the myopic approach by the G10 who merely look at addressing the decade old conflict between Ali Abdullah Saleh and Ali Muhsin, but fail to address true structural causes of northern hegemony over the rest of the country. Both Mr. Askar and Radfan claim the current process, ignoring southern grievances, simply adds to the list of reasons why Hirak insists on boycotting the National Dialogue and sees secession as the only remedy. As long as southerners continue to be underrepresented in military recruitment and within the leadership, the people and their leaders will perceive current policies from Sana’a as a violation of the Unity agreement of 1990 that created the Republic of Yemen, continued collective punishment as a consequence of the 1994 Civil War, and the south as occupied territory. 

Securing Loyalty and Interests

Southerners are not alone in their criticism of the political transition process. To Hirak activists, the military remains divided and loyalties remain with individual centers of power rather than the nation. For Houthi rebels there are no threats to their positions from any military forces, only from militias in northern areas like Hajja and al-Jawf provinces. These militias are loyal to rival parties like al-Islah and its military and tribal allies. Gamal Hassan observes that while the military does remain fragmented at all levels and indeed the restructuring process is merely interested in addressing divisions exacerbated by the 2011 conflict, full disintegration of the military would result in nationwide chaos. In his opinion, the biggest success so far has been the de-escalation achieved within the capital Sana’a by removing troops loyal to Maj. Gen. Ali Muhsin and Brigadier Gen. Ahmed Ali. 

De-escalation, however, still remains fragile. Although President Hadi issued a degree disbanding Ali Muhsin’s First Armored Division (al-Firqa) and Ahmed Ali’s Republican Guard, the process is ongoing and the streets of Sana’a are still guarded by troops from these military units. Changes within the military, made in 2012 and recently, still remain far from being fully implemented. Much of the chaos spreading across the country extends from resistance within military bases to resistance by newly appointed commanders. This infighting in areas like al-Baydha and Hadhramawt represent greater threats to stability than similar incidents in early 2012.    

While President Hadi continues to make gains on the ground through support obtained following his decrees, a growing gap still remains between him and a potential popular power base. Observers like Gamal Hassan admit people’s optimism rises when decrees are published, and it often shows confidence spurring short-term economic activity. However, as reality sets in and political actors respond to Hadi’s decisions, pessimism returns once again. As a legacy institution — valued and simultaneously considered guardian of the northern revolution and the southern socialist party — the armed forces are a pillar of power to some and a major threat to tribal actors. As a major institution within the economy, the military is also rife with corruption. The so-called restructuring of the Yemeni armed forces cannot be seen by any observer as more than a poor attempt at extinguishing an intra-regime conflict, since traditional centers of power like tribes, military commanders and families will continue to oppose strong constitutional powers for presidents and strong cohesive military institutions. There is also the widely accepted belief that Yemen’s neighbors will not accept a strong military on the southern flank, in what remains the only aspiring democratic republic in a region of hereditary monarchies.  

Read the on April 26.

*[Note: Some sources in this article have not been explicitly named. The authors and 51³Ō¹Ļ respect their right to remain anonymous.]  

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļ’s editorial policy.

Image: Copyright © . All Rights Reserved

The post Military Restructuring in Yemen Opens a Second Power Vacuum: Part 1 appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.