In fact, since events escalated, this charged rhetoric has since slowly diminished. It is crucial that the territorial disputes at the center of it all be rectified through diplomatic measures rather than heightened hostilities, for which regional key players have little appetite.

Back to 2008

As noted, certain events of the last weeks are reminiscent of the build-up to the 2008 conflict. Similar to recent events, in the summer of 2008, Russia and Georgia were deadlocked in a diplomatic dispute. This was related to Moscow’s actions in the region — the lifting of Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) sanctions on Georgia’s other breakaway region of Abkhazia and subsequent recognition of post-Soviet separatist states. Georgia later announced that it would no longer participate in the CIS and will push for future NATO membership accession (which has still yet come to fruition).

Carl Bildt, then the Swedish foreign minister, deemed the actions as “.” Such terminology is familiar because the phrase “occupier” has been used to describe Russian activities in the region and has led to a deterioration of relations between Moscow and Tbilisi.

The tone between the belligerents increased in severity for months prior to the ultimate standoff. Similar discourse and actions are apparent now. The issue of the border between South Ossetia and Georgia proper has been simmering for a while. Reports from early August state that Russian forces continued the construction of a — or fencing — that encroached on Georgian-controlled territory around the village of Gugutiantkari and cut off some residents from access to their properties.

Tensions were further inflamed in late August when Georgian police forces established a checkpoint in the village of Chorchana, an infringement on South Ossetia’s self-proclaimed border. Tskhinvali issued an ultimatum that its authorities would “” if the checkpoint was not removed by August 30. The deadline passed without any significant actions.

Instead, South Ossetian President Anatoly Bibilov to construct their own checkpoint near the Georgian marker once negotiations over the matter fell through. Bibilov subsequently and assured them that his forces guaranteed their safety. The key difference in the contemporary situation is that South Ossetia currently releases statements and negotiates as a de facto independent republic, rather than Russian officials representing the area.

Once again, claims of military build-ups around the borderlands between South Ossetia and Georgia have surfaced. An increase of troops along borders is often pinpointed as the precursor to armed engagements. Such movements ahead of the outbreak of fighting in 2008, and current reporting highlights the fluctuations of armed forces in the vicinity. On August 29, South Ossetia announced it would send its security forces to the border area in reaction to the installation of the contested checkpoints. Tbilisi warned that such actions could into a “serious confrontation.” At the same time, South Ossetia observed an increase in Georgian military activity in the shape of an additional carrying small arms stationed just across the de facto boundary.

The downing of drones also features prominently, then and now. Months prior to the five-day war, were destroyed by Russian forces over Abkhazia, and different explanations on how the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) met their end were offered. Current tensions peaked when South Ossetia accused Georgian forces of one of their UAV’s near the border village of Uista. Tskhinvali subsequently requested the assistance of the European Union Observer Mission in Georgia and the Geneva Discussions on Security and Stability in the South Caucasus to introduce measures to prevent any further escalation.

Divergent Scenarios

It is at this point that the two scenarios diverge significantly. Georgia and South Ossetia have been involved in active negotiations within the framework established by the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) to reach a suitable settlement that appeases both sides in regard to police checkpoints and border infringements. They met, to no avail, on August 30, and agreed to further broach these issues on September 2.

Once again, four hours of meetings in any viable resolution, but both sides agreed to continue discussions. Continued deliberations that followed on September 9 remained unproductive. The latest round of talks took place on September 13, and it is obvious that the two sides remain deadlocked in a stalemate.

The latest meetings demonstrated a complete lack of any sort of headway. Georgia that it will not take down the roadblock and asserts that it is an innocuous installation. Georgian representatives refuse to discuss it further at any level. South Ossetia contends that the same barricade creates a sense of insecurity because armed Georgian personnel infringed upon its denoted territory. The head of the South Ossetian delegation to the IPRM, , stated: “This Georgian roadblock must be removed, armed persons must be escorted out, and when this happens, South Ossetia will take the corresponding measures on defusing tensions.” It seems like a logical resolution, but it is especially complex due to the factors of unrecognized sovereignty, history and politics.

It is apparent that neither Georgia or South Ossetia will budge. This situation is an example of all the smaller issues that materialize within the broader context of unrecognized autonomous republics. Resolutions or agreements that favor one side versus the other are often unfeasible, but they have wider political implications too. Georgia does not officially acknowledge the self-imposed borders of South Ossetia outright, therefore succumbing to demands out of Tskhinvali could be interpreted as a sense of legitimacy toward the republic.

South Ossetia is in a precarious situation of coming across as powerless and incapable of defending its interests, especially in regard to its territory and its declared independence, if it bows to Georgian ultimatums. The de facto Caucasian republic would consequently face another knock against its claims as a legitimate entity while it seeks greater international recognition.

Although past meetings have been futile, the extended focus on negotiations and a diplomatic resolution is encouraging. A bilateral agreement to eschew the use of force — even in small-scale skirmishes — would be constructive in a situation where armed factions are present on both sides of the border. Cooler heads must prevail not only at the highest levels of leadership, but among the soldiers and policemen on the ground as well.

The current situation could easily freeze into the new status quo in which barriers, a roadblock and armed personnel remain in position for the foreseeable future. In that context, either Tskhinvali or Tbilisi will shift their attention away to more pressing topics in the long term. An impasse combined with demonstrations of self-control could be the lasting result if neither side can reach an agreement.

Transcaucasia remains a post-Soviet region in flux. Disputes steeped in history encouraged by geopolitical visions resulted in outbreaks of conflicts that continue to have repercussions on afflicted states today. The current political environment differs from those prior periods, and civilians have no desire to live through such treacherous times again. Major shareholders in the region, primarily Russia, have little taste for another destabilizing conflict.

A border dispute between South Ossetia and Georgia is certainly a significant issue between the two entities, but it need not escalate. Returning to the negotiation table under the guidance of international brokers is the best bet toward achieving a far-fetched resolution or, at least, a sense of coexistence. In the end, Georgia and South Ossetia continue to present complicated questions and, as a result, warrant increased attention.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post A Caucasus Border Dispute Brings Back Memories of War appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

A Deterioration of Relations

In June, a series of anti-Russian protests broke out in the Georgian capital Tbilisi and across the country. The appearance of high-ranking  at the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy and his consequent seating in the speaker’s chair inflamed Georgian sensibilities. But to identify this act as a catalyst for the protests is to oversimply matters, as deeper frustrations with the Georgian Dream ruling party are a factor as well. 

The Georgian Dream attempted to balance relations with the West while at the same time ensuring a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia. Voters within the country are increasingly displeased with internal political affairs. The sight of a Russian politician occupying the chair of the speaker of parliament could easily be construed as Moscow’s long arm reaching toward its southern neighbor, or as an act of occupation. It was viewed through this lens when Georgian commentator Giorgi Gabunia went on a  labeling Russian President Vladimir Putin a “miserable creature” and “stinking invader.” Further, Gabunia crossed even the lowest of professional lines by mocking Putin’s deceased parents.

A deterioration of bilateral relations ensued. Russian lawmakers , but Putin rejected them. He cited the need to deescalate the situation and not act in a manner that could easily play in the hands of Georgian provocateurs. Rather, a  between the two countries became effective on July 8.

The act of labeling Russia as an occupier on Georgian territory is intrinsically linked to its financial subsidies and military installations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Phrases of this type are meant to send signals to governments at the highest level, as well as to opposition movements, but it is ordinary Abkhazians who are made to suffer the consequences. For instance, the bilateral distress urged Abkhaz authorities to close the  crossing, a passage point into Georgia proper. Students could not  on Georgian territory, foreigners were barred from entering the breakaway republic “indefinitely” and its citizens prohibited from leaving. Security services stated it was a compulsory action. Restriction of movement undoubtedly has negative effects on locals and their economic interactions.

Moscow often states that the international community’s general acceptance of the Georgian narrative regarding its breakaway republics is problematic for any future resolution. The term “occupier” must be handled with care in this context too. Georgia is entitled to that principle and to expressing displeasure over infringements of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Abkhazia is a matter that should be dealt with through dialogue between Sukhumi and Tbilisi rather than treated as a byproduct of Russo-Georgian relations, as has been done by the international community. For instance, a  by the US and various European countries called for Russia to remove its troops from the breakaway republics on the anniversary of the 2008 conflict. 

An Independent Streak

Abkhazia focused on independence during the Soviet era, and particularly following the extremely divisive and bloody war with Georgia in 1992-93. It is not a new phenomenon that must be understood as a homegrown movement. Russian military involvement (through the installation of army bases) undoubtedly supports the image of occupiers, but this narrative completely bypasses Abkhazian independence goals. It also negates a difficult inter-ethnic history in the Caucasian country. Hopes for independence or a quasi-independent status within Georgia are left unaddressed because the label of occupation suggests Russian presence is against Abkhazia’s will and Sukhumi is under duress.

There is no doubt that Russia officially interfered in the region by  to augment the number of Russian citizens in Abkhazia as early as 2002. However, the establishment of a military presence in Gudauta and  of Abkhazian troops with the Russian armed forces means that Russia acts as the guarantor of security for the de facto state. This not an ideal framework and definitely one that does not elicit agreement in the international community, but it provides Abkhazia with assurances that it will not face hard power, such as future military operations, from Georgia.

As a result, Tbilisi understood that soft power initiatives such as those involving commerce, education and social cohesion are the most advantageous ways forward. Investment in the future of Abkhazia is key to determining which side emerges as the most beneficial partner for Abkhazian interests.

It must be acknowledged that the use of strong diplomatic language begets a similar response. Reacting to the use of the phrase occupiers by the Georgian President , in Gabunia’s rant and on , Russian replied with equally strong rhetoric. Senior lawmaker Pyotr Tolstoy that “Abkhazia and South Ossetia will never be part of Georgia again. Remember that very well. They will never be your regions again … Russia will be supporting their independence.”

Such a reaction was to be expected as it makes little diplomatic sense to poke the sleeping bear that holds all the power. Georgians may be fighting for independence and autonomy in the political domain, but strongly pushing the occupation narrative has direct consequences upon the breakaway republics at the heart of the matter. This cannot be viewed as a rudimentary diplomatic mistake, but rather a vehicle to create solidarity in domestic politics. Georgians across the political sphere can agree that exhibitions of Russian influence internally are detrimental, and thus it is a cohesive angle.

Political Culture

Abkhazia is enormously dependent on financial assistance from Moscow and, accordingly, Russia is afforded political leverage. Nonetheless, it would be simplistic to argue that politicians are pawns acting according to the demands of their guarantors of security and capital. As Thomas de Waal succinctly summarized, authorities in Sukhumi  with Moscow in 2014 and continue to prohibit the sale of real estate to foreign (read Russian) citizens. Further, lawmakers remain wary of a situation akin to Russia’s annexation of Crimea developing and remain unhappy with a continued decrease in Russian aid. This aligns with an in 2016 by Mikhail Neyzhmakov, a senior analyst at the Russian Agency for Political and Economic Communications, that it “is hard to influence the situation in Abkhazia from Moscow.”

Abkhazia has its own political culture that is reflective of its ethnicity and ideas about independence. The breakaway republic hopes to one day exist as a sovereign territory, under neither Russian or Georgian authority. Meanwhile, presidential elections are scheduled for August 25 and, as a result, developments within the territory will keep it in the news cycle for the short term.

Elections in de facto states are often unmonitored and considered illegitimate outright, but they offer insight in internal affairs often overlooked by the international media. It may seem perplexing to those in established democracies, but the matter of independence has not dominated the Abkhaz presidential elections. Rather, important issues similar to those in sovereign states remain widely discussed. Each presidential campaign identified crime, corruption and the need for constitutional reform as the key topics important to the indigenous political class. Nevertheless, actionable plans to rectify large scale corruption or manage localized crime continue to escape those seeking to attain office. For instance, incumbent Raul Khajimba : “Corruption has not disappeared and never, I think, will disappear. We need to minimize it as far as possible.”

Abkhaz citizens of pertinent electoral concerns and visions of a new leader. They hope that a new president will address a lack of infrastructure and stable bureaucratic systems, such as policing. Unemployment and low wages continue to be a serious issue. Georgian sources assume that the in Abkhazia is between 40% and 70%. General criminality and government corruption round out the significant issues identified by citizens. Sadly, any changes in the near future.

Further, it is interesting to consider the qualities Abkhaz citizens hope will be embodied in their next president. Honesty, youth, education and love of country are replies typical of those seeking a leader representative of hope and change. These points are demonstrative of a country engaged in a unique political environment, rather than one often described as internally powerless and completely submissive to Moscow.

As in many post-Soviet spaces, elections stimulate drama. Aslan Bzhaniya, a high-ranking opposition figure and parliamentary deputy of the United Abkhazia party,  in the run-up to the original July 21 election date. Bzhaniya and his supporters insist that he was poisoned and is recovering after being hospitalized in Germany. A collective Abkhaz opposition requested that the current administration postpone elections until October so that Bzhaniya can take part. This request was consequently denied, and the opposition — a common manifestation of Abkhaz disenchantment. Khajimba finally relented and reached an agreement to hold elections in August.

Nine candidates are  to run for the presidency. The incumbent, Raul Khajimba of the Forum for the National Unity of Abkhazia party, has held the post since 2014 and will face challengers who have experience in governance. Both Shamil Adzinba and Oleg Arshba served in the Khajimba administration: the former as deputy prime minister and the latter as deputy foreign minister. For added drama, Arshba’s campaign headquarters in the early hours of August 21. Numerous businessmen with links to the government and particular sectors, such as telecommunications or agriculture, hope to succeed as well. Key factors for electability still focus on a continuation of positive relations with Moscow as well as keeping relative cohesion in Abkhaz society.

Also demonstrative of Abkhazia’s political culture is the appearance of different political parties. Active opposition comes in the form of , which originated as a public organization representing concerns of veterans of the 1992-93 war and then subsequently developed into a fully-fledged political party promoting Abkhaz nationalism. Its candidate, , was conscripted to represent the larger opposition bloc loyal to Bzhaniya. In the past, the party has gone as far as to  of President Khajimba due to a series of complaints over a asking whether early presidential elections should have been held that year. The political framework and interactions between parties sometimes appear chaotic, but it is demonstrative of a de facto state conducting internal political affairs according to its own internal dynamics. It is simply not the case of a protectorate following directions from Moscow.

Vladimir Putin’s  on August 6 in Sochi under the specter of strained relations between Moscow and Tbilisi and the forthcoming election resulted in strong reactions as well. The two discussed matters related to Abkhaz economic development and the possibility of opening an airport, but the real story rests with the symbolism of the meeting held on the anniversary of the eve of the Russo-Georgian War.

Tbilisi  meant to continue the delegitimization of Georgian territorial integrity. On the other hand, many considered the summit as  indicative of the Kremlin’s preferred choice in the upcoming election. The notion that Moscow prefers Khajimba above others is plausible but hardly set in stone. All candidates express positive views and trustworthiness toward Russian authorities, so there is room to maneuver within the sphere of Abkhaz politics. It is managed stability that Russia values more than the actors who will guarantee it.

Interest in Abkhazia’s politics will fluctuate according to the wider diplomatic environment surrounding it. It may be dramatic to use larger events to place Abkhazia’s woes in context, but addressing matters at this level only leads to histrionics and political maneuvering. The ongoing dispute between Russia and Georgia spurred by the accusations of occupation subsequently draws analysis away from political inference and toward matters where “occupation” is a tangible conclusion. However, a focus on accusations, bilateral relations and geopolitics negates the internal political environment in Abkhazia.

The election provides a mixed bag of political observations. It is important that Abkhaz political culture continues to develop and an opposition movement exists. These are laudable traits when the global community considers the Black Sea territory as a client state. At the same time, perennial problems such as corruption and a lack of development continue to dominate campaign discourse, but little is done to improve the situation. Abkhaz citizens want change; however, they acknowledge that it is unlikely due to the entrenched political class and lack of economic opportunity. It cannot be expressed enough that the Abkhaz question must be addressed independently, rather than as a side note of regional affairs.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post An Election Brings Abkhazia Back into Focus appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The Syrian government’s recognition of independence of the de facto republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was predictable. It is widely considered to be an appreciative act toward the Russian intervention that facilitated Bashar al-Assad’s continued rule. Universal condemnation by the United States, its global allies and international organizations was expected as well. Each entity demands peaceful resolution to post-Soviet frozen conflicts and identified Kremlin manipulation at the core of the inert diplomatic process.

The Syrian announcement is considered politically insignificant, but it demonstrates the lack of opportunities available to quasi-independent states when the international community eschews their reality and condemns their patrons. It is an additional reminder that the dramatics of the South Caucasus must shift away from geopolitical antagonism and focus on productive developments that leave questions of political legitimacy for later. Ongoing events surrounding a trade corridor in South Ossetia demonstrate this predicament.

Georgian influence in South Ossetia has continued to fade since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Allegations of ethnic cleansing and lack of viable economic opportunities mean few ethnic Georgians remain in the territory. A revealed that though the population of South Ossetia tallied at 53,532, only 3,966 Georgians, or 7% of the total population, remained. Subsequently, the education system is in the process of the primary language of instruction to Russian. On April 9, 2017, a majority of South Ossetians voted in a to alter the territory’s name to South Ossetia-Alania to pair with the neighboring Russian federal subject, North Ossetia-Alania. Shifts in demographics, a complex history and loyalties present challenging barriers to outright resolutions.

A second impediment to South Ossetian independence and reintegration with Georgia is a deep merging with Russian interests. The appearance of political leadership in the Russian protectorate exhibits more indigenous roots, but entrenched links and reliance upon Moscow remain. A nascent political culture emerged with the development of political parties, yet any opposition remains fundamentally pro-Russian. This was demonstrated in the 2017 presidential elections when United Ossetia candidate Anatoly Bibilov Kremlin-backed incumbent Leonid Tibilov. Both espouse the incorporation of South Ossetia into the Russian Federation despite being political opponents. Legislators in the de facto republic engage in politicking over universal topics such as inherent corruption and economic stagnation, but belief in Russia as their guarantor of security is fundamental.

Taking Direction from Legislation

Moscow engages more explicitly in Tskhinvali than , although both signed important integration treaties with the Russian Federation. The 2016Ěý resulted in strictly demarcated Russo-South Ossetian boundaries. Such an accord expresses a veneer of preserving South Ossetian independence since recognized frontiers represent physical division between Russia and the Georgian territories. Conversely, the purpose of this Russian regional tactic is to deepen a frozen conflict, while at the same time stifle the internationally condemned discourse surrounding annexation.

The 2015 Agreement Between the Russian Federation and Republic of South Ossetia on Alliance and Integration accentuated South Ossetia’s role as a . It ensured South Ossetia’s reliance on outside security, sustained a sluggish political culture and perpetuated allegations of impeding annexation. Long-term strategic interests, primarily the Russification of the breakaway Georgian territory, dominated the 25-year pact. Simplifying the process to acquire Russian citizenship may be the simplest part, but the of South Ossetian army units into the Russian armed forces ensures that questions of national security and quasi-territorial integrity remain firmly under Moscow’s direction.

It is rather unfeasible to imagine Russian interests leaving the breakaway region with such a formal, yet internationally , agreement. As a result, the for Russia to remove its military installations from South Ossetia are moot. Bibilov noted that such an occurrence is due to the elaborate joint security apparatus currently in place.

Further, the formal economic integration of South Ossetia into the general Russian budget, as expressed in the 2015 agreement, maintains reliance upon Russia for financial aid and as . South Ossetia may be steadfast in its claim of independence, but it resigned of its trade and customs to Moscow. A lack of international recognition and administrative inexperience in these areas necessitate the current political arrangement with Russian officials. Additionally, Russia assumed direct obligations to assist Tskhinvali in the payment of government salaries and an increase in pensions to residents. Any financial incentives are extremely persuasive for a separatist state of modest means and further uphold the dominant belief that Russia is the guarantor of autonomy from Georgia.

South Ossetia finds itself in a dilemma. A voluntary abnegation of its independence is unlikely, and its fundamental alliance with Russia assures political security. Nonetheless, its mountainous geography provides few natural resources for export and few concrete economic development prospects. International sanctions and contractions in the Russian economy resulted in decreased aid. Subsequent devaluation of the ruble instigated higher priced Russian imports inaccessible for average South Ossetians.

This culmination of variables boosts the exploration of any prospects that could result in a reduction of allocated subsidies and raises queries into de facto state financial security overall. Trade is a tolerable issue that can be independent from questions of autonomy.

An Active Shadow Economy

Shadow markets are traditional consequences of circumstances that proscribe licit and public trading of goods. Legal barriers rarely avert cross-border exchanges and grey areas of legitimacy especially validate this scenario. These conditions, fueled by necessity and incentives to earn, are conducive to fomenting corruption. In a nutshell, these are some obstacles and concerns that describe the economic situation in South Ossetia.

Trade between Georgia and its breakaway regions continues throughout their ongoing declarations of independence. Observers at the constant commercial interactions at the Georgian-South Ossetian border and an increase of trade since disruptions in the Russian economy. Growth of this informal system evolved even though the 2008 Georgian prohibits overt trade, and similar regulations in South Ossetia exist.

The 2008 law created severe bureaucratic impediments primarily because country of origin customs declarations are deemed illegitimate. If an enterprise pursued entrepreneurial ventures in the separatist republics, they would have to seek approval from Georgian authorities, which has not typically been done. Layers of bureaucracy and condemnation of political status prevent international interests from investing in the quasi-independent state, but it has on regional cross-border trade. Location on a viable trade route coupled with independence claims indicates the South Caucasian shadow economy is ripe for expansion. It is up to the power brokers of the frozen conflict — Russia and Georgia, along with the territories — to envision a strategy that utilizes trade as a tool for their distinct interests.

Options for Economic GrowthĚý

The collection of tariffs, as well as the knowledge of administrative processes to do so, presented important deterrents to the regularization of trade between Georgia and the quasi-independent republics. Both elements offer legitimacy to claims of statehood and agreement to such arrangements counter Tbilisi’s ambition of reunification. At the current stage, a strategy of outright reintegration is futile as little diplomatic energy has been directed toward this particular impasse, the breakaway regions are reluctant to renounce their sovereignty and Russian interests are deeply interwoven into their constitutions. Discourse concentrated on questions of legitimacy and state integrity — and each player pursuing divergent gains — usually results in political stand-offs. Trade offers constructive conduits between Georgia, Russia and its protectorates.

In his 2009 speech to the Georgian parliament, former that prosperity and peace are at the core of future Georgian territorial integrity. A healthy economy and financial growth are more attractive to Abkhazians and South Ossetians than their current arrangements with Russia. In April 2018, Tbilisi announced the — a set of reunification policies focused on engagements with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali in the areas of humanitarian aid, free movement and easing of trade barriers. Economic perks included status-neutral labeling on exports, investments in entrepreneurship and access to European Union markets. While appealing, the protocol was quickly by South Ossetian authorities who perceived it as yet another unfeasible and predictable approach from Tbilisi.

The dismissal of the Step Toward a Better Future demonstrated the continual shirking of Georgian offers, and the Kremlin’s role is easily surmised. Moscow remains suspicious of dialogue between its protectorates and Georgian lawmakers. However, trade is an acceptable matter that offers assistance in financing the republics. Russia retains all the important levers of power as well as the dominant trade negotiator, since they were allocated that role in the 2015 integration agreement.

Nonetheless, it is tactically flawed to link intriguing economic incentives with the vehement rhetoric surrounding any topics of reunification or sovereignty. Any frank offers face rejection simply because South Ossetia is steadfast in its autonomous position. Discussions over trade opportunities removed from debates over long-term Georgian territorial integrity provide a more constructive approach to negotiations between the Russian Federation and Georgia as well as compliance by the Russian patrons in Tskhinvali.

Demand for New Trade Corridors

Debate over establishing trade corridors that traverse through separatist regions highlight the issues inherent in state legitimacy and trade. While three are proposed, for the sake of concise analysis, the route that crosses South Ossetia is the focus here.

As noted, the Russian protectorate has little natural resources or sources of intrinsic economic development. The collection of customs fees is an insufficient source of funding for the entirety of the South Ossetian budget, but they provide an important source of independent revenue. Tskhinvali secures fees from the newly established already. Further, being a passageway for the transportation of goods offers the prospect of creating partnerships with other regional neighbors, such as . Russia and Armenia promoted a north-south route through Ossetian territory so that their reciprocal trade is accelerated and streamlined. A lack of political legitimacy meant that any beneficial projects involving South Ossetia were placed on indefinite hold.

Necessity triggered the resumption of previously strained diplomatic channels. This was only possible once the overwhelming subjects of Georgian reunification and Russian patronage took a backseat to the benefits of facilitating commerce.

Currently, the only acceptable route is the Upper Lars corridor on the Georgian Military Highway, but it presents a unique set of problems. Political disputes between Russia and Georgia resulted in closure of the border crossing for almost seven years. Yerevan Moscow to reopen the checkpoint so that the free flow of trade between the two could resume unimpeded. Russian restrictions remain and as a result, the timeworn passageway has a serious problem with .

Natural disasters such as , and also hamper the smooth transportation of goods. These impediments and increased north to south trade pressed the need for construction of secondary routes. The most logistically and fiscally convenient route proceeds along the Transcaucasian Highway through the Roki Tunnel, the geographical point of connection between North Ossetia-Alania and its separatist neighbor. It would then continue through Tskhinvali and onward to the Georgian city of Gori.

Deliberations over trade corridors stalled because matters of state legitimacy dominated negotiations. Concern over the optics of a de facto state managing passport controls and subsequent administrative procedures alarmed Georgia. All the while, demand for routes to expedite regional trade and the strengthening of an informal economy demonstrated that political status was secondary to economic ventures in the Caucasus. Necessity triggered the resumption of previously strained diplomatic channels. This was only possible once the overwhelming subjects of Georgian reunification and Russian patronage took a backseat to the benefits of facilitating commerce.

A Third-Party Solution

The impasse over administrative obligations at the disputed borders required nuanced navigation. An established balance of power in the region would be disturbed if key participants — Russia or Georgia — appropriated these roles. Additionally, Russia faced strong international disapproval for exercising further jurisdiction over South Ossetian interests. States or international organizations are unviable as neutral third parties since the majority of the global community unambiguously backs Georgia. As a result, a corporate and non-politically aligned resolution makes the most sense and contravenes diplomatic deadlocks over lawful statehood.

The old adage that “politics is about who gets what, when and how” succinctly describes the tactful process that initiated a viable third-party solution to the South Caucasian trade gridlock. A lack of amenable diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia at the highest levels left this issue unsolved. However, political opportunity offers convenient prospects through discourse. Questions concerning Georgian legal status and border checkpoints in the separatist territories caused a major impediment to . It was politically expedient for Tbilisi to advance its position as it resulted in a continuous series of diplomatic talks to mutually resolve the issue. In the South Ossetian case, this centered on passageway through the Roki Tunnel.

Georgia stipulated Swiss-meditated discussions and the 2011 Agreement on the Basic Principles of the Mechanism of Customs Administration and Trade Monitoring from these talks. Swiss multinational firm . emerged as the practical third party capable of managing the logistical barriers that prevented the regularization of trade with the South Caucasian separatist republics. The highly-respected company has extensive experience in monitoring the inspection and transportation of goods, adherence to regulatory standards and trade protocols established by foreign governments.

In the case of the Georgian territories, SGS will be tasked with administrative procedures, such as the collection of duties and passport controls as well as gathering data on passing cargo. This includes the amount, as well as type of goods. As per the information sharing requirements in the agreement, Tbilisi is entitled to applicable trade data.

Strained diplomatic relations and protracted negotiations predestined the 2011 deal into a state of perpetual limbo. South Ossetia strongly any agreement, since Tskhinvali was not party to the deal or its arbitration. Movement toward eventual implementation transpired on December 2017, when ultimately became the first signatory. It was merely days after this event that that only inclement weather permits the use of the South Ossetian trade corridor.

Azerbaijan also remains critical of any trade corridors, especially involving Tbilisi, that benefit its Armenian foe. For instance, the long-awaited , expected to be essential for growth in South Caucasian trade, became operational in the fall of 2017. Although reluctant to ratifying the deal with Georgia, Russia eventually followed suit and the agreement on May 18, 2018. It is evident that politicization of these issues in the frame of local animosities restrains any movement toward valuable progress in the situations of breakaway territories, primarily South Ossetia.

The fact that current talks are managed by diplomatic arms specifically separate from politics and disputes over state legitimacy is a key factor. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin and Special Representative for the Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Abashidze are with negotiations concentrated on humanitarian, trade and economic matters only. This is vitally important since this framework remains the exclusive, direct and formal diplomatic interaction between the two participants at the current time.

The stimulus of trade discussions resulted in active discourse to which Karasin and Abashidze frankly assert their countries’ commitment to progression of the 2011 agreement. If requests of state legitimacy and reunification of the Georgian territories remained a primary demand prior to the meetings, elementary progress on the South Caucasian trade corridors remained questionable. On a wider scale, Georgia and Russia established a formula for diplomatic relations that would have remained closed otherwise.

Dependent-Independence

Although South Ossetia disputes any agreements made without its permission, Tskhinvali has no political influence to change the situation. This element and the universal protest against Syria’s recognition of the breakaway republics further demonstrate the conundrum faced by de facto states. Regional political strategy dictates their wider purposes to more powerful protectorates or states seeking reintegration to save the dignity of their sovereignty.

As a result, the international community sides along ideological fault lines that shun assertions of self-governance in dissident enclaves, demand aggressors leave and prohibit legitimate corporate ventures. These actions are employed to pressure vulnerable patron states such as South Ossetia to renounce independence and protectorates such as Russia to shift their strategy in the near abroad. A focus on geopolitics results in trivial concern for South Ossetian people, their economic interests and the quasi-independence of the land in question.

The eventual establishment of trade corridors and regulated trade is politically expedient. Georgia will receive desired figures regarding trade between areas under its jurisdiction and those under separatist control. It retains importance as a regional trade route and gains a diplomatic avenue with Russia. The collection of duties and a meager increase in South Ossetian finances suggests that Moscow is presented with the prospect of decreasing aid allocated to Tskhinvali. New trade corridors provide Russian-Armenian bilateral trade with a more efficient passageway. Lastly, it makes sense to monitor a robust shadow economy for official numbers. This will aid in distinguishing the grey from the black markets.

It is astute to re-examine stagnant political situations to assess likely gains or predictable losses. South Ossetia is an exemplification of the ongoing Russification policy in the area and a case where a focus on entrenched views concerning legitimacy yields little progress. Shifting political discourse toward one with an emphasis on regulated trade and corridors in the de facto states provides diplomatic channels unobtrusive topics upon which to build future relations. The establishment of a framework for future diplomatic discussions grants a perceptible model that is applicable to other appropriate matters as they arise.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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For some, women are seen as weak and vulnerable, and it is no different when it comes to climate change. They are not considered to be agents of change. But this narrative needs to change.

Women are the most. In 2015, during the Young Feminists Day at the 21^st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) in Paris, Majandra Rodriguez, a climate activist from Peru, said: “Women are not inherently weak. Inequalities are created by societies.”

Women’s participation in policymaking

There has been significant progress over the years in terms of women’s participation and engagement in climate action.

“The women and gender constituency continues to grow strong. We went from having [a] relatively small presence in the lead up to Copenhagen to having an extremely large presence in the lead up to COP 21,” said Bridget Burns of the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO).

She also noted the shift toward a better understanding of women and gender issues inside the United Nations (UN) negotiations. “In the negotiations, we’ve seen a huge shift in terms of understanding around gender and climate change. We went from having no language to having a full set of decisions like the Lima work program on gender,” Burns added.

However, she also noted that while there is “progress in the process and in words,” it hasn’t necessarily translated to implementation. “We see that in COP negotiations, women’s leadership goes down because we see where there are bigger decisions being taken—women’s leadership is less. We also see a huge disparity between gender balance amongst regions so there’s a lot less participation in [the] least developed countries,” she said.

Mubanga Kalimamukwento, a negotiator from Zambia, agrees: “From where I come from, women don’t take a central role in the negotiations. So, many women are not yet properly informed on what they can do.”

Women and Climate Action outside the negotiations

But while women’s participation in policymaking and UN processes still needs a lot of work, many are actively seeking solutions to the impact of climate change.

Anna Samwel from Georgia shares how women in her community have been taking part in mitigation and adaptation actions. “We have been developing a gender [initiative called] Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) on sustainable rural energy. Rural women are pursuing the sustainable energy transition by adapting solar water heaters and energy efficient stoves and insulation, all made in their communities. Rural women pursue the adaptation of sustainable technologies,” she said.

Shalia Shahid says the same thing of Bangladeshi women. “Women are the resilient faces of Bangladesh. We’re doing all kinds of things to combat climate change. They are the water managers, they grow food, they work hard to ensure food security for the family and community,” Shahid shares.

However, Ipul Powaseu from Papua New Guinea, a woman with disability, also reminds the women and climate justice movement to also ensure the inclusion of disabled women who are often forgotten. “Women with disabilities are women but their needs are specific. When we talk about issues of women, we need to look at the group of women we have. A lot of times when there are discussions about gender, women with disabilities are left behind,” said Powaseu.

More women participation needed

However, grassroots action will only be beneficial when complemented with policies. This is why women who are involved in the UN negotiations, which conclude on November 18 in Marrakech, Morocco, emphasize the need for more women to be part of policymaking on a larger scale.

“From COP 18, when the gender agenda was introduced into the negotiations, I [wanted] to believe that it was an entry point for women, [and] many women now are part of the process. But the challenge we are having is that the agenda is not sensitive throughout,” said Winfred Lichuma, chairperson of the National Gender and Equality Commission.

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“Countries send representatives [to the UN] but we want to see more women at the decision-making table. Once you get to the decision-making table, the policies that are going to come out of future negotiations will definitely be gender sensitive. It’s not just about women being part of the group.” she added.

Gender Justice

Around the world, women have been actively seeking solutions to climate change, and more and more women are participating in policy- and decision-making processes. Although there is still a lot of work to be done, we have significantly moved forward and we hope these spaces for participation and engagement remain open.

We must ensure that in working toward climate justice, women, who comprise half of the world’s population, are not left behind. There will be no climate justice without gender justice.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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