In the final years of the peace talks that took place in Havana, Cuba, between 2012 and 2016, and especially during the preparation for the FARC’s transition from insurgency to a political party and its reincorporation to civilian life, within the armed group. One was led by Rodrigo ³¢´Ç²Ô»å´Çñ´Ç, known as Timochenko, with a clear will to move into the political arena. The other was the militarist wing led by Luciano Marín, aka Iván Márquez, which viewed the peace agreement with the Colombian government with mistrust and contemplated a return to armed struggle.

These differences became more evident as the implementation of the peace accord advanced, with several difficulties and delays on the government’s side, especially after the arrival to power of the current president, Ivan Duque, in 2018. The non-fulfillment of several agreements on the governments side —Ìýaccording to the , after two and a half years, 31% of the agreements have not yet been actioned — and the pressure to secure justice for war crimes committed by the armed group in the course of the decades-long conflict fostered mistrust among military commanders.

A Fracture

Márquez and his right hand in the Caribbean Block of the FARC, Jesús Santrich, are currently subjects of an investigationÌýfor alleged involvement in Ìýconducted after the signing of the accord, meaning a violation the non-repetition of criminal acts — a key element of the agreement. Currently, FARC combatants are not prosecuted by the ordinary justice system, and the (JEP) was created for the investigation of war crimes and other atrocities committed during the armed conflict. This means that many of them would either not go to jail at all or serve a maximum of five to eight years. However, in case of recidivism or failing to attend the JEP hearings, former combatants lose all their benefits and can face sentences of up to 60 years.

Although neither of the two men has been prosecuted at the time of the announcement, they had already missed their citations by JEP, widening the divide with Timochenko. After the video was released, the JEP authorized the attorney general to process the rebels through the regular courts and not the transitional justice system as was agreed in Havana.

Smaller dissident rogue groups were being formed by lower ranking leaders such as Gentil Duarte in various regions of the country, but no top member of the (its highest command structure) has openly deflected the peace process. Márquez will now have to convince leaders like Duarte to join him. What will he offer? The end goal of such an alliance is not clear, as these groups already have weapons, territorial control and established drug routes. What will they do now that they aren’t already doing? Gaining a political halo could be the only clear gain for these rogue criminal groups.

On the other hand, now comes the struggle between the leaders of the political wing who remained within the transition process and the new dissidents. Both sides are pressuring former combatants to join their respective sides, and many are deciding between the path of legality —Ìýdespite the non-fulfillments and delays of several parts of the agreement —Ìý or whether they return to armed struggle.ÌýCurrently, who laid down their weapons are still in the reincorporation process under the leadership of Timochenko. The official data of Colombia’s Reincorporation Agency puts the number .

A New Type of Warfare?

At the same time, according to several sources (including military intelligence), the , and some analysts suggest that the that kept up the drug trafficking were coordinated with individual FARC commanders. While there is no proof of this beyond the cases of Márquez and Santrich, there are nearly who have rearmed in smaller rogue groups, including the faction led by Márquez.

However, Márquez’s announcement contains a clear of an alliance with the other main guerrilla group still active in Colombia, the National Liberation Army (ELN). This could mean a bigger threat, as an alliance between the dissident wing of the FARC and the ELN can change the current status quo of armed actors in several regions of the country where there is still a current readjustment of structures after the peace accord.ÌýFor the last two years, guerrillas and organized crime groups such as the — the biggest organized crime structure in the country also known as theÌýGulf Clan — have been dividing their areas of influence and occupying previous FARC zones around the country.

Márquez announced that the faction will change its methods and stop targeting the local population or even soldiers, who, like the guerrillas, come mostly from peasant and lower-class families. The FARC stated that it will target the political, economic and military elites of the country.

For some, this could be a return to the idealistic guerrilla warfare of the 1960s Cold War era, but those who know Márquez better can expect something more than just emulating the glory of old times and the romanticism of the struggle. In the 21^stÌýcentury, with access to advanced weaponry, even a small armed faction can become a serious concern for the country. It could also mean a new time of tension in the cities, instead of open confrontation in the field, reviving the seen in Colombia in the 1990s and the first years of the 21^st century. Many are expecting a new era of asymmetrical confrontation.

An Element of Tension

The alliance with the ELN carries not only a national impact, but has also created tensions with the government of President Nicolás Maduro in neighboring Venezuela. As has been stated by several sources within both the media and the Colombian government, the . Its commander, Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista, aka Gabino, and members of the ELN’s central command like the former negotiator Antonio García and Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo, aka Pablito, who lead the strongest structure of the ELN, operate across the border between Colombia and Venezuela.

Colombian intelligence reports estimate nearly 1,000 ELN men and nearly 600 FARC dissident combatants . There are no clear statistics, however, and reports suggest the numbers could be even higher. Not all fighters are Colombian, as Venezuelans are also being recruited.

Venezuela’s position regarding the FARC has been ambiguous, especially during the tenures of �lvaro Uribe and Hugo Chávez. Venezuela’s ties with the Colombian guerillas are undeniable, yet in these times of the war against terror, Caracas doesn’t openly admit that it supported the armed group. On the other side, in moments of crisis, Venezuela’s intervention has been useful for dialogue between the Colombian government and the guerrillas. In order words, the neighboring countries are not fully enemies despite the tensions, nor are they allies despite their contributions to the peace process.

Currently, the current administrations both in Caracas and Bogotá are close to their predecessors’ ideologies and, consequently, hostile to their respective neighbors. Maduro’s position is crucial in order not to create more tension in the bilateral relations or increase concerns for the Colombian government regarding what happens in Venezuela. The refugee crisis is escalating in the region, giving Colombia a leading role against Maduro’s embattled regime. While many dismiss a possible clash among the two countries, numerous ongoing crises and provocations could escalate to a breaking point.

President Duque scaled the situation by contacting Venezuela’s interim president, Juan Guaidó, who is currently defying Maduro’s regime, and asked for his support in controlling Colombian guerrillas on Venezuelan territory. To make matters worse, several Colombian high-ranking officials and members of the cabinet have accused the Maduro regime of backing the new armed groups and the ELN guerrillas as a way to destabilize Colombia. Maduro has reacted by ordering military drills along the border.

On September 8, SEMANA magazine published anÌýarticleÌýthat revealed Bolivarian National Intelligence Service documents dated August 9, with evidence of internal orders to provide logistical support and training to “red groups.â€� According to SEMANA, these alleged “red groupsâ€� are in fact Colombian guerrillas. It is important to recall that the date on the documents is two weeks before Márquez’s announcement of the new rebellion. Did the Venezuelan intelligence have privileged information?

 Fragile Implementation

Where does this leave the embattled peace process? Not everything should be viewed from an apocalyptic perspective. As already mentioned, the vast majority of the ex-combatants are still active in the reincorporation process, and there is a chance for the Colombian government to send a powerful message by strengthening the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization as well as other entities in charge of implementation. This might complement the pressure of the expected military response to this not-so-new and expected threat.

Whether these new developments will derail the peace process and complicate regional politics will largely depend on the Colombian government’s response. The situation is escalating: Local elections are coming up in October, and two candidates from different political parties have already been killed. Political participation is one of the keys of the Havana agreement and will become a test for President Duque as well as for the FARC’s political aspirations to win seats across the country; while its chances are not very high, several alliances could make it possible in some areas. Duque will have to protect the voters and candidates as well as prevent any intrusion or indirect interventions of armed actors or neighboring countries.

Last year, the presidential election was the most peaceful in the country’s recent history. It would be catastrophic to face a violent voting season just a year later. Can these new dissidents, plus the border crisis and the remaining armed actors, sabotage what was gained in the peace agreement?

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

The post Dissident Guerrillas Are Rearming in Colombia appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

During the months of August through October of last year, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas transformed into a law-abiding political party. Giving up their weaponry and triggering the demobilization of combatants as agreed upon in the Havana peace accords, Latin America’s longest-active rebel group entered Colombia’s democratic scene as a refashioned political force. But the transformation wasn’t wholehearted. At the FARC’s first congress as a political party in September 2017, the majority of militants, led by key members of the governing body, voted in favor of maintaining the group’s acronym under a new name — the .

Two years after the decisive peace accords were signed in Bogotá, FARC party cadres occupy eight seats in the Colombian congress, out of the 10 that were agreed upon in the Havana peace deal. Meanwhile, the majority of foot soldiers are being reintegrated into civilian life through spread throughout the countryside. However, ideological divides within the guerilla group continue to exist within the political party and now threaten the future of the FARC. When it comes to the implementation of the peace deal, the now-political cadre of the FARC can be broadly divided into two groups, the skeptics and the optimists.

The skeptics, like , , and Hernán Darío Velásquez (known as “El Paisa�) believe that the Colombian government will not uphold the of the Havana peace deal. Therefore, this group of former combatants, who belong to the more militant sectors of the FARC political party, is hedging its bets by maintaining readiness to go back into clandestine economic activities and guerilla warfare at any time.

On the other hand, the optimists, including the Rodrigo ³¢´Ç²Ô»å´Çñ´Ç (known as Timochenko), and , are much more committed to the success of the Havana process and to a full transition into political life. Likewise, the former combatants are far less willing to go back to the guerilla camps in the jungle. Thus far, this sector of the FARC has complied with the law and kept up its end of the peace agreement through regular appearances before courts and commissions.

During the political party’s foundational conference, when the group’s cadre and members were choosing a new name for their political movement, the skeptics prevailed over the optimists in their effort to maintain the instead of choosing a brand new party name. Ivan Marquez and other leading skeptics opposed the name New Colombia, championed by the optimists, because they argued that maintaining the name FARC would make it easier to transition back into a guerrilla formation if ultimately necessary.

Schism

The schism within the FARC, which is palpable today, has been in place since the passing of former commander-in-chief, , in 2011 during a military offensive in the early years of Juan Manuel Santos’ presidency. The election for Cano’s successor led to a clash between FARC leaders Ivan Marquez and Rodrigo ³¢´Ç²Ô»å´Çñ´Ç, a rivalry that was still evident when the FARC leadership was discussing what former combatants would do following the demobilization. Even though would ultimately become FARC’s commander, Marquez remained a hardline member of the FARC’s secretariat and would gain important allies within the guerilla’s cadre. Eventually, Marquez became the FARC’s second-in-command and would lead the guerilla delegation during the years-long Havana negotiations.

Over this summer, a handful of left-wing leaders throughout Colombia — including the presidential runner-up Gustavo Petro, as well as Senators Ivan Cepeda and Aida Avella — strongly urged Ivan Marquez to take up his seat as senator at the swearing-in ceremony on July 20. However, Marquez to become the FARC’s political leader in congress. A few weeks before the ceremony, Marquez left Bogotá and joined former FARC combatants in southern Colombia, citing the fear of prosecution after the arrest and extradition process advanced against his close ally Jesus Santrich on , which happened to be one of the guerrillas’ preferred financing methods.

Even though Marquez led theÌý, he is a vocal critic of the ongoing implementation of the peace deal. Marquez argues that the government is not holding up its end of the bargain, which is why he moved to the southern Caquetá department in the Amazon region to join with other FARC leaders. Moreover, throughout Colombia’s southern departments, such as Caquetá, Putumayo and Nariño, there are several camps for combatants demobilized as part of the peace process amongst whom Marquez feels at home, as well as that never demobilized and are still militarily active.

While some claim that Marquez hides for personal safety, and others argue that he should be arrested, on September 22, Marquez and “El Paisa� sent a letter to the Colombian senate. In it, the discontented FARC leaders outlined the reasons for their hiding, voicing their mistrust of the current administration, claiming that the government is not meeting its financial obligations toward demobilized guerillas, and explaining what they call the “betrayal� of the Havana process.

What’s Next?

Naturally, have become a subject of discussion in Colombia’s political circles. This issue is particularly contentious given that FARC cadres have to respond to the country’s Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), an ad hoc court that was created as part of the Havana peace accords. Even though Marquez has regularly sent written statements to the court via his lawyers, he has not appeared before it himself. However, the same cannot be said of Marquez’s close associate “El Paisa,� who has refused to appear before the JEP court system.

It is no secret that Ivan Marquez maintains communications with dissident guerrilla groups that have refused to participate in the peace process from the outset. Moreover, it is possible that he might be aiding in the structuring of new guerrilla fronts along Colombia’s Caribbean coastline, along the Magdalena River valley or along the southern . Given that Marquez was the commander of the FARC’s Caribbean block for several years, and that he has powerful allies in neighboring Venezuela, there is widespread speculation surrounding his activities, whereabouts and future plans. At this point, Ivan Marquez is the most prominent FARC leader operating along the margins of the Havana framework. Thus, all former combatants and dissidents who are unhappy with the implementation of the Havana agreement see in Marquez a willing fighter who prefers the guerilla camps to the halls of congress.

Thus far, FARC politicians in congress are keeping up their end of the Havana accords and actively participating in Colombia’s democratic process, in spite of the fact that President Ivan Duque’s party has been very hostile to the implementation of parts of the peace process. On the other hand, while figures like Ivan Marquez, and “El Paisa� have stated their intentions of complying with the accords, their actions suggest otherwise.

President Duque, who prides himself in being a law-and-order leader, is no fan of the Havana deal. Yet Duque is well aware of how delicate the unfolding situation is and has stated that he is considering the issue of an arrest warrant against Marquez if the FARC leader does not comply fully with the terms of the peace deal. Nevertheless, as long as Marquez remains in hiding, issuing an arrest warrant would guarantee that the FARC leader goes back in clandestine activity, further emboldening the skepticism of dissident guerrillas throughout Colombia and creating more uncertainty around the country’s unstable peace.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

The post Can the FARC Overcome Its Historic Divides? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The inauguration of Ivan Duque as Colombia’s new president took place on August 7, on what was an extremely windy afternoon in the capital city of Bogotá. The inclement weather seemed fitting given the current political climate. Duque’s swearing in ceremony marks the rise to power of the Democratic Center —Ìýuntil now a major opposition party. During the ceremony, the head of Colombia’s senate and one of the most radical members of the Democratic Center, Ernesto Macias, delivered a fiery speech that lauded the party’s founder, former President Alvaro Uribe, and accused the outgoing president, Juan Manuel Santos, of leaving behind a country overrun by criminal groups.

This polarizing episode, which featured chants of “Uribe, Uribe!â€� and a standing ovation to the former president, comes on the heels of a quickly unraveling political saga. On Friday, July 20, new members of congress took their seats, including, for the first time in the country’s history, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the form of five senators and five representatives under the newly created (also FARC).

However, the new president’s troubles do not stem from his political archenemies. Rather, pressure comes from within his own party ranks, whose members are openly attacking the independence and legitimacy of the country’s judicial branch.

Bombshell Accusations

On July 24, Colombia’s political scene was shaken by the announcement that former president and current senator, Alvaro Uribe, was being summoned by the country’s supreme court to answer questions on witness tampering and bribery charges. Specifically, Uribe and fellow congressman Alvaro Hernan Prada are being accused of bribing several individuals, particularly a current inmate in Colombia’s prison system, in order to extract exculpatory statements before a court. The main witness in question is Juan Guillermo Monsalve, who had previously testified alongside one of Uribe’s main political enemies, Senator Ivan Cepeda, against the former president and his brother, Santiago Uribe, on charges of .

For years, Uribe’s inner circle has been entangled in a web of judicial proceedings, focused mostly around his brother, who is currently in the middle of trial for his alleged leadership role in a paramilitary death squad known as the Twelve Apostles. However, before July 24, Alvaro Uribe himself had never personally been targeted in such a serious and damning way.

The bombshell accusations against Colombia’s most powerful man who has ushered his anointed protégé, Ivan Duque, to the country’s presidency, even led Uribe to initially submit a from his post in the senate (which he subsequently withdrew on August 1) — a dramatic step given that he won more votes than any other senate candidate in the country.

Simultaneously, over the last two weeks, Uribe and his lawyers have led an all-out media offensive claiming that the charges against him are part of a political hit job orchestrated by political enemies. The gravity of the accusations against Uribe put President Duque in a serious bind. The new president, who tried to strike a conciliatory tone during his inaugural speech, must choose between respecting the independence of Colombia’s judiciary and standing by the innocence of his political mentor (whom Duque has defended for years). Thus, Duque’s actions over the coming weeks could drive a wedge between himself and his long-time political mentor.

If Duque were to break with Uribe, the former president’s allies like Ernest Macias would take this as an unforgivable political betrayal. This was already the case with President Santos, after his election under the Uribe banner in 2010. Santos, who broke with Uribe over the peace talks with the FARC rebels, was able to survive this political breakup with his predecessor and the country’s right-wing political base.

But he paid dearly for this rift during the 2016 referendum on the FARC peace deal, which was narrowly defeated thanks in large part to right-wing opposition. Moreover, as Macias’ speech on August 7 demonstrated, Democratic Center loyalists will never forgive Santos and will always stand by Uribe. Walking away from Uribe would present similar challenges for Duque because he would lose the support of Uribe’s Democratic Center, which was founded in 2013 by the former president as an opposition to Santos. Even if all the other parties within Duque’s congressional coalition remained loyal to him, his majority would be substantially slimmer without the Democratic Center, making it much more difficult to enact his domestic agenda. Most importantly, by turning his back on Uribe, Duque would draw ire from the base that elected him under the banner of the Democratic Center.

A Degree of Independence

Conversely, walking away from Uribe could also give Duque a degree of independence that he has never before enjoyed as a politician. President Duque could distance himself from his warmongering mentor and announce that he will not seek to alter the Havana peace accord that the Democratic Center had previously threatened to tear to shreds. Duque could pursue a moderate political agenda that would be welcomed by many, maybe even some skeptics within the political ranks of the FARC.

The new president’s first step in demonstrating his independence could be to ask congress to stop limiting the power of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, which was set up as a key mechanism of the FARC peace deal to process criminal charges against former combatants using a reduced sentencing scheme. Such a position would certainly face pushback from some major parties within Duque’s congressional coalition, especially among Uribe allies, while it would likely be supported by a large number of center-left parties.

If President Santos was able to win over the minds and hearts of moderate Colombians by sliding toward the center and pursuing an uphill battle for peace, President Duque could also win over a centrist base by protecting the FARC peace deal at the expense of his more right-wing political base.

Over the coming weeks, Duque will have to choose a path, and his choice will send a clear signal on whether Uribe will survive this latest political storm. Meanwhile, if Uribe overcomes the judicial and political challenge before him, he will likely remain the most powerful figure in Colombia for years to come. However, if he is found guilty and has to serve any type of sentence, it would mark a new era for Colombian politics and for the country’s social fabric.

Duque will need to prepare for both eventualities and faces a difficult decision. In the meantime, the leaders of the Colombian opposition would be wise to maintain open dialogue with the incoming president, making it clear that there is an alternative to Uribe, should the new president decide to turn his back on him. Duque, much like his country, finds himself at an important crossroads and must seriously ponder a future without Alvaro Uribe.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:ÌýÌý/

The post How Will Ivan Duque Navigate Colombia’s Latest Political Storm? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

After finally seeing the end of the longest internal armed conflict in the Western hemisphere, Colombia is set to elect a new congress on March 11 and a new president on May 27. The 2018 elections cycle will be a response to the with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), signed in 2016, and its aftermath. Pro-peace politicians and skeptics are currently neck and neck in the opinion polls. Important criteria for voters includeÌýindividual candidates address current public concerns such as corruption, unemployment and security, as well as a strategy for negotiations with Colombia’s second largest insurgent group — the National Liberation Army (ELN).

The upcoming elections will mark the first time in Colombian history that former FARC combatants will hold seats in both chambers of congress and participate in presidential elections. Even though the peace accord automatically grants them five seats in both houses for two terms (until 2026), it remains to be seen whether they succeed or succumb to the same fate as Pablo Escobar’s foray into politics.

Peace Skeptics

Although most outsiders applauded President Juan Manuel Santos for signing the peace deal with the FARC (which won him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2016), his legacy in Colombia remains controversial. The main criticism has been leveled against a decision to grant immunity to the former guerrillas and allowing them to participate in political life — moves that were rejected by ordinary Colombians in a nationwide referendum. Wary of further objections, the Santos administration sought congressional approval rather than turning to the public to vote on amendments to the deal. It is hardly surprising that a by the pollster Invamer found that almost 70% of Colombians think that the peace agreement has been poorly implemented.

It would also be unwise to criticize Colombians for having such a dim view of the peace process. According to , about 7.7 million Colombians have been internally displaced by conflict-related violence since 1985. Additionally, the FARC performed more than 23,000 selective assassinations between 1981 and 2012 and 27,000 kidnappings between 1970 and 2010. According to the 2013 report, the group is also responsible for an additional 11,000 deaths or injuries resulting in amputations.

Finally, it’s by no means lost on the Colombian public that while the FARC has transitioned from guerrilla army to political party, it still uses the same acronym. The cosmetic name change from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia to People’s Alternative Revolutionary Force is supposed to reflect the group’s determination to actively participate in political life. “We have entered legal politics because we want to govern,â€�Ìýsaid Iván Márquez, a member of FARC’s secretariat. Since then, the group has launched its political campaign and endorsed Rodrigo ³¢´Ç²Ô»å´Çñ´Ç’s (or Timochenko, as the group’s former leader is known) presidential bid.

Both moves can be compared to Pablo Escobar’s aspirations for political power. Despite earning billions of dollars from exporting cocaine — a trade that ensured his place on Forbes’ richest list for seven consecutive years — the former head of the notorious Medellin Cartel dreamt of becoming Colombia’s president. With his increasing wealth, Escobar successfully ran for public office and even became a member of the lower house of congress. However, his political career was a short-lived strategic error. Being in the public spotlight meant Escobar had no choice but to confront his violent background, which eventually led to the revoking of his congressional seat. Thanks to their amnesty, FARC’s leaders have no such worries regarding their political careers.

Blank Ballots

Despite the fact that the peace agreement cannot be reversed until at least 2030 (in October 2017, Colombia’s constitutional court determined that the next three governments the accord commitments), the election campaign will be almost all about it. A recent indicates that the Partido Liberal (18%), which supports the peace deal, is garnering the same level of support as the Centro Democrático (CD, 16%), which rejects the accord. Additionally, similar to other parts of the world, independent candidates in Colombia with no apparent affiliations to traditional political parties are proving very popular (21%). Their popularity is strengthened by the findings of the latest , which suggests that only 10% of Colombians trust established political movements. What is more, 20% of Colombians said they will cast a in the presidential elections.

While the above opinion polls suggest that it is hard to predict who will win the next parliamentary elections, it nevertheless seems that CD, represented mainly through the ex-president Alvaro Uribe, is the most organized. The No campaign, which opposes the peace deal, is also particularly adept at mobilizing crowds and convincing people to turn out in high numbers on election day. It’s an altogether different story than President Santos’ Partido Social de Unidad Nacional (U Party), which is currently languishing at 8% in the polls.

The leftist Polo Democrático Alternativo is tipped to benefit the most from the U Party’s declining popularity, especially if it can convince undecided voters to support them. Polo Democrático Alternativo’s hand is further strengthened by the support it receives from indigenous tribes, Afro-Colombians, farmers and other social groups that have largely been ignored by the current government. The last big player is former President’s Vargas Lleras’ center-right, pro-peace Cambio Radical party, which has steadily gained popularity since its establishment in 2006. predicts that the FARC party will receive only 0.5% of the popular vote.

The race for the presidency is more open. Thanks to a constitution that forbids aÌýthird consecutive term, we already know that neither incumbent President Santos nor Uribe can run. In keeping with the parliamentary elections, many candidates have started to explore ways to broaden their appeal through political coalitions and running as independents. Recent also suggest that focusing solely on the peace accord will not be popular. The successful candidate must address other concerns such as corruption (20%), the economy and unemployment (20%), combating terrorism (10%) and improving security (10%). Additionally, he or she must provide a concrete proposal for how the government should handle the implementation of the peace accord and possible negotiations with the ELN.

President Santos’ center-right coalition won the last two elections with promises of more equitable growth and the end of internal conflict. However, his critics say that instead of focusing on governance, he spent too much time, energy and political capital on accommodating a criminal group. As a consequence, his fell to 24%, a significant decline compared to 75% in 2011. It’s highly unlikely that his U Party will not endorse any candidate for the upcoming race.

Gustavo Petro, the leftist former mayor of Bogota and former member of the now-defunct M-19 rebel movement, currently with 22% support. He portrays himself as an anti-establishmentÌýcandidate and successfully attracts young people and those who do not trust traditional parties. Other candidates include Sergio Fajardo, the liberal former mayor of Medellin. His center-left electoral CoalicioÌ�n Colombia (which includes Partido Verde and Polo) supports the peace process and has built its campaign around anti-corruption and clientelism that plagues the Colombian public sector. Finally, there’s Centro Democrático’s Ivan Duque, a critic of the peace deal who is targeting the same groups that helped win the No vote in the referendum.

Flirting with Politics

The FARC’s flirtation with politics may become a curse rather than a blessing. Pablo Escobar’s example shows that being in the spotlight does not necessarily wipe the slate clean. However, his case also demonstrates that hunger for political power can be unstoppable. There is no doubt that the FARC has already achieved much more than Escobar. It can legally participate in political life and has been granted amnesty and seats in both chambers of parliament for two terms. However, Escobar’s dramatic fall from political grace should serve as a warning.

Last month’s further demonstrate the FARC’s lack of . This is particularly the case for its leader, Rodrigo ³¢´Ç²Ô»å´Çñ´Ç, who recently polled the among the presidential candidates (1.6%). It’s safe to say that Timochenko will not be the next president of Colombia. After two terms in Congress, the FARC should also assess its achievements in politics. It might be more practical to move into business rather than meddle in the political sphere.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:ÌýÌý/

The post Will the FARC Suffer Pablo Escobar’s Political Fate? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Colombia’s presidential elections, set to take place in the summer of 2018, the country’s first since the signing of the 2016 peace agreement in Havana, will be a test of Colombians’ acceptance of both the peace process and of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group’s transition into politics. Although the Colombian people have longed for an era of peace, the process that finally ended five decades of conflictÌý significantly polarized the country, both socially and politically.

On January 29, rebels following recent bombings that left seven policemen dead and injured 47 civilians. If Colombia wishes to maintain social and political stability, the next president will have to tread carefully between a passionate electoral base opposed to the peace agreement and a population that seeks healing through reconciliation.

The 2018 elections will be the first to include the newly baptized ,Ìýformed from the demobilized FARC. Former FARC commander Rodrigo ³¢´Ç²Ô»å´Çñ´Ç’s candidacy for president will also be the first time in over 50 years that Colombians will engage with FARC actors in a political, rather than insurgent, capacity.

Colombians have mixed feelings about the peace agreement negotiated by President Santos, and they in a popular referendum in 2016. This was as much a testament to how out of touch Santos is with the Colombian public as to popular concerns with the peace agreement itself. As a result, there is little public support for candidates who actively favor the Havana agreement, now so closely associated with the unpopular Santos. Unsurprisingly, no candidate wants the peacemaker’s endorsement.

While a number of Colombians view the Havana accord as much needed closure of a tragic and violent chapter in the country’s history, many still retain a profound disdain for, and suspicion of, former FARC members, even with the group’s transition into democratic politics. President Santos’ political opposition has successfully exploited this social tension by playing up the public’s fear that the country will be Ìýnow that former Marxist guerrillas have entered the political arena. Just a handful of FARC party representatives in the national congress, key right-wing political figures argue, could lead the country down a path similar to Venezuela’s.

This dynamic has paved the way for former Vice President Germán Vargas Lleras to emerge as the strongest presidential candidate. Running as an independent, Vargas Lleras is seen as an opposition figure who will stand up to the . This is a serious challenge for former president and Democratic Center Party head Alvaro Uribe, who led the successful “No� campaign against the Havana agreement. After months of anticipation, Uribe and the Democratic Center finally announced on December 10, 2017, that Senator Ivan Duque would be the party’s presidential candidate. However, despite the strength of Uribe’s endorsement, Duque is widely regarded as too young, and the party’s base views him as soft on many key issues.

This leaves the field wide open for Vargas Lleras, who will likely become the default candidate for Colombia’s wide center-right base and attract the support of Uribe’s constituents during the second round of presidential voting. With the remaining center-left and left-wing parties too numerous, divided and unpopular, it is difficult to see Vargas Lleras facing a serious left-wing challenger.

Whoever becomes Colombia’s next president will face significant challenges, including the monumental job of guiding a divided population into a new era of peace. In many ways, Vargas Lleras is not the president Colombia needs, but he seems to be the president most Colombians want: a straight-talker, grandson of a former president and, most importantly, highly critical of the FARC.

But the risk of Vargas Lleras’ no-nonsense approach is that the country’s social and political polarization will become so entrenched, former FARC guerillas will be pushed out of mainstream politics and back into the jungle, restarting another cycle of violence. To avoid this, Colombia — both the political elite and the general population — must accept and formalize political space for these former guerrilla soldiers. Whether they do so will decide the future of the country’s fragile peace.

*[Young Professionals in Foreign Policy is a partner institution of 51³Ô¹Ï.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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Colombia’s big city streets are full of ambulant vendorsÌýoffering you anything from chewing gum to a single cigarette to prepaid cell phone minutes. Walking through Bogota’s roads during the first weeks of 2017, you could also purchase a small booklet detailing theÌý. For the first time in over two decades, the government has updated theÌýcode that now includes significant fines for offenses such as loitering and jaywalking.

This new reality for the average Colombian contrasts starkly with the political corruption currently pervading the government, so it is not just average Colombians who need to revise their code of public conduct. Today, international corruption scandals such as those disclosed inÌýthe Panama Papers have stained the reputation and credibility of the highest echelons of the Colombian political class.

Corruption is an urgent issue that must be tackled if Colombia expects theÌýwith the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to succeed in achieving a lasting peace and a robust democracy.

Dark Forces andÌýDirty MoneyÌý

To many observers, and even some political figures, the implementation and execution of the peace dealÌýwould represent the end of dirty money and dark forces within civil society and politics in Colombia. However, as the dust of armed civil conflict and fratricidal war begins to settle for the first time in half a century, Colombia must tackle the swamp of corruption that has been quietly spreading within the country’s leading institutions.

Recent corruption scandals throughout Latin American have highlighted the importance of a free and robust press as well as the systemic weaknesses and lack of transparency of Colombia’s democratic institutions. For instance, throughout the last two decades, it is estimated that the Brazilian construction giant, throughout a dozen countries in order to secure the construction of public projects.

Another major source of corruption controversies in Colombia is the state-owned petroleum company, Ecopetrol. For instance, a decade ago, Ecopetrol began construction on the ambitious Reficar project to build South America’s largest oil refinery in the coastal city of Cartagena. Today, the project is yet to be completed, has gone over budget by $4 billion dollars, and ongoing investigations point towards mass contracting fraud, possibly .

It is tragic that the FARC has intended to advance its political agenda through violent means for more than fifty years. However, the level of systemic corruption uncovered puts into perspective other deep-seated issues facing the country. Furthermore, the reliance on corrupt practices by mainstream politicians and political parties in Colombia will be a severe impediment to the successful implementation of the peace treaty with the FARC guerrillas.

As part of the peace treaty with the national government, the FARC is set to transition into a democratic political formation—a FARC political party, yet to be officially formed—with representation in Congress and participation in electoral politics. This has sparked contentious debate within Colombia given that the FARC party isÌýÌýduring the next two electoral periods while it completes its transition into national politics. While some politicians argue that this measure is necessary for the FARC to successfully become a non-violent political movement, those who opposed the peace treaty claim that such a concession to the FARC is too generous and undemocratic.

Unfair Advantages

Nevertheless, given its extremely polarizing nature, the eventual FARC party will be held to higher standards and put under higher scrutiny in terms of transparency and financing than Colombia’s traditional political players. The freedom with which mainstream political formations in Colombia utilize dirty money to finance their campaigns and keep their electoral machines running is shamefully evident to all sectors of civil society.

After weeks of mounting public pressure and revelations, President and Nobel Peace Laureate Juan Manuel Santos made a public declaration on March 14, 2017, recognizing the presence of . President Santos stated that he was unaware of said funding at the time and called for those responsible to be punished.

The uneven playing field that will exist between the FARC and mainstream parties in Colombia could jeopardize the proper functioning of the democratic transition agreed to in the peace deal. The transition mandates that all guerrilla fighters convene in specified camps throughout the country to hand over their weapons and begin reintegrationÌýinto civilian life, all of this under the supervision of the United Nations.

Simultaneously, mid and high-level FARC officials will go through a special court process where they will confess their illegal activities in exchange for shorter and alternative sentences. Finally, the FARC party commits to non-violent political participation without funding acquired through illegal activity, under the supervision of the competent national authorities. In this regard, the corrupt practices that are part of the machinery of mainstream political parties will represent an unfair advantage over the FARC party and could give the FARC a legitimate reason to cry foul against the government, potentially undermining the negotiated peace itself.

If corruption is not eradicated to level the political playing field, the systemically flawed democratic process will destroy any prospects of a lasting peace. Even thoughÌýsome Ìýas part of the implementation of the peace treaty, several members are defecting and hedging their position by staying in place while the process evolves. Some of these are FARC elements involvedÌýin illegal economic activity that could easily morph into drug-financed non-state actors. They includeÌýthe ÌýandÌýÌýas well as Front 48 and Front 57.

As Colombia traverses a unique and historic moment, the Colombian people must pressure the political class to revise its own code of public conduct and possibly hand out booklets throughout the power halls of Congress. If not, we can expect new non-state actors to emerge either as fully rogue criminal groups or as political proxies for the FARC party. The latter scenario is particularly likely, especially if the future FARC party decides that it needs a dirty political machine to do its groundwork.

*[Ìýis a partner institution ofÌý.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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In the year ofÌýthe , Colombians rejected a landmark peace deal withÌý. This referendum was held on October 2, Mahatma Gandhi’s birthday. This is not quite the present that the old man would cherish. So, what is going on?

In theÌýSeptember 4 edition of , this author delved into the history of the Colombian conflict in some detail. For over a century, this tortured land has been blighted by violence and strife. From the Thousand Days’ War of 1899-1902 toÌýla ViolenciaÌýof the 1940s and 1960s to the more recent insurgency ofÌýFuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC, this Latin American country of over 48 million has experienced almost incessant civil war.

Like other Latin American countries colonized by the Spanish, Colombia remains a deeply unequal society. This author has pointed out earlier that Latin America is the world’s most unequal region, with the richest 10% owning 71% of the total wealth. In the , the former governor of Antioquia, a region made famous by drug lord Pablo Escobar, “with the exception of Haiti, Colombia is the most unequal country in Latin America, and Antioquia is the most unequal region in Colombia.�

Two centuries ago, none other than Simon Bolivar was complaining about the “aristocracy of rank, office and wealthâ€� that regarded “the lower classes as their perpetual serfs.â€� Fajardo’s comments echo Bolivar’s and Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr’s words,Ìýplus ça change, plus c’est la même chose—the more things change, the more they stay the same—ring eerily true. To add salt to the wound, inequality in Colombia is combined with a culture of flagrant illegality and rampant corruption. As if this was not enough, the trafficking of narcotics and the unending guerilla conflict have combined to severely sunder the country’s social, political, economic and cultural fabric.

Clearly, theÌýstatus quoÌýin Colombia is untenable. So, why did Colombians vote against the peace deal?

As the vote demonstrates, the country is deeply divided on the issue of a peace deal with FARC. The issues are complex andÌý. Like all deals, this peace deal was imperfect. Many Colombians detested the special treatment for FARC guerrillas. They believed that the creation of a new law above the law of the land to deal with the guerrillas was simply unacceptable.

The most vigorous opponents of the agreement such as former President Ã�lvaro Uribe viewed the deal asÌý. They claimed to want peace but they could not accept impunity. As is well known, Uribe’s father was murdered in 1983 and he has always blamed FARC for it. Others have also suffered from the brutality of FARC whether it is killings, kidnappings, explosions, extortions, threats or other forms of violence.

As this author hasÌý, FARC was born after the brutal suppression of reformist liberals duringÌýla Violencia. As in other parts of Latin America, Uncle Sam played a big role in creating the conditions for the birth of FARC. Lauchlin Currie, yet another American economist, deemed that Colombia needed industrial agriculture to supply products to the United States and inaugurated the Accelerated Economic Development (AED) policy. To implement it, legislators drafted a new law providing for the “efficient use of the land.â€� This law was used by the state to dispossess hundreds and thousands of families of their land.

Under Currie’s infamous AED policy, the state effectively acted as Robin Hood in reverse. It robbed the poor for the rich. Then it used taxes collected from the poor to give subsidies to the rich. Cattle ranchers and big farmers profited, while peasants and laborers suffered enormously. Even the right-leaning Hoover Institution of Stanford University published a book whereÌýÌýthat “subordinate ethnic (Indians, Blacks) and class (peasants, rural workers, the urban poor, and segments of working and middle classes) groupsâ€� got shafted by Currie’s eminently humane policy.

Such oppression and exploitation inevitably led to a violent reaction. Two idealistic organizations emerged, both of them finding inspiration in the bearded prophet Karl Marx:ÌýEjército de Liberación NacionalÌý(ELN) and FARC. Their goal was to fight the good fight for land reform and greater equality. However, guerrillas like philosophers need to eat. They also need to buy guns to fight their good fights. Both FARC and ELN degenerated into armed gangs that lived off extortion and trafficking narcotics. As they tasted power, the guerrillas proved only too human. They shed blood, often gratuitously, and acquired wealth, not infrequently with much cupidity.

Colombia has since been caught in the crossfire between men in guns offering either order or revolution. All parties to the conflict have their hands soaked in blood. As a result, the peace talks that began in November 2012 in the Cuban capital Havana were protracted, tortuous and charged. After all, if Colombia was not such a deeply polarized country, it would not have experienced so much civil war.

As mentioned earlier, the charge against the peace deal was led by Uribe. This is the man who decimated FARC when he was president and, in some ways, paved the path for the Havana talks. For Uribe, FARC’s political participation and amnesty from justice were thin red lines that he was unwilling to allow his country to cross. For him as for many others, this was not a fair peace. This was peace at all costs. Even as erstwhile rivals such as Cuba and the US wereÌýÌýon, many Colombians could not swallow it.

Of course, in such stories the political and the personal are often intertwined. Uribe has a ferocious rivalry with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, who not too long ago was Uribe’s defense minister. It was under Uribe that Santos directed military firepower against FARC,Ìý. Santos waltzing off as a peacemaking statesman might have been too much for Uribe to bear.

The referendum demonstrated that Colombia is deeply divided about the peace deal. Charged discussions in media and social media were proof of the fact that emotions were running high. The result was “a damn close-run thing� and, like Brexit, weather might have played a part. The coasts and outlying provinces voted for the peace deal, while those inland and nearer the capital voted against it. Rain lashed the coasts though, lowering voter turnout there. In fact, this author was informed by Colombian friends glued to the news that turnout in the entire country itself was a measly 38%. These factors certainly influenced the referendum result.

Other factors might have played a role too. Taxi drivers furious with UberÌý. Colombia is a deeply devout Catholic country that has centuries of prejudice against homosexuality. In April, the country’s highest court gaveÌý. SantosÌýÌýand Gina Parody, the minister of education, is openly lesbian. She has been in hot water overÌý. A handbook that she was championing attracted the ire of many conservative voters.

Many conservative voters see Santos and Parody threatening the sanctity of the family. They are horrified at the mention of lesbian, gay and transgender communities. For them, conflating Marxists like FARC with lesbians like Parody was not that big a leap. They might have voted against the peace deal simply in protest. In any case, Santos’ had dismal approval ratings and was deeply unpopular in the face of a sluggish economy and a lack of jobs. This made a protest vote highly probable.

Interestingly,Ìý. The media was disconnected from ground realities as well. Few saw the result coming and the rejection of the peace deal has sent shockwaves domestically as well as internationally. So, what changes now?

The answer is not much. First, the referendum choices might have been binary but the result is not. No one seems to be in a hurry to go back to war. Both FARC and the Santos government are likely to digest the results and try to push for a deal if not this one. Second, the shock referendum result adds to Colombia’s economic uncertainty. AÌýÌýis in the offing as oil revenues have fallen. Its future might be in question. The peace dividend and US President Barack Obama’s promisedÌýÌý$450 million assistance are also up in the air. However, the uncertainty is unwelcome but it not debilitating.

Colombia’s referendum result poses one big question though. Are referendums the right way to decide emotive issues, especially pertaining to peace?

The democratic answer is an unqualified yes. However, if people do not understand the complexity of a deal, if passion runs too high, if the people in power are too unpopular, if demagogues take center stage, if not too many show up to vote, and if victory or defeat is an impostor with a razor thin majority in a deeply divided society, then are referendums necessarily the best way forward?

*[You can receive “The World This Weekâ€� directly in your inbox by subscribing to our mailing list. Simply visitÌýÌýand enter your email address in the space provided. Meanwhile, please find below five of our finest articles for the week.]

A Polarized Referendum Puts Peace to the Test in Colombia

© Robi_J

Voters will decide if the negotiated settlement ending decades of conflict with the FARC moves ahead.Ìý

As the sun was setting in Cartagena, Colombia, on Monday, September 26, thousands of national and international spectators, including dozens of world leaders and US Secretary of State John Kerry, gathered to bear witness to a sight that not long ago would have been unimaginable: Timoleón Jiménez, commander of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country’s largest guerrilla group, signing a peace accord with President Juan Manuel Santos.

The agreement ends 52 years of armed conflict between the two groups that has cost over 220,000 lives and left over eight million conflict victims. As an international witness, I was swept up by the emotions of those around me. Flags waved in the breeze, groups of victims and children sang, and the sunset over the Caribbean seemed a harbinger for a new dawn of peace. Over four years of negotiations had…

Beyond Business Plans: Women Entrepreneurs in MENA

© Petar Chernaev

Greater support for female entrepreneurship will help the MENA region achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), a region that is more often in the news for bombs and bullets than booming businesses, is experiencing a startup revolution. Nearly six years since the start of the Arab Uprisings, entrepreneurship is on the minds of those as young as 15. With unemployment and underemployment still being key factors in a region that sits on a powder keg, MENA youth are hungry to shape their own future. Alongside them, however, there is an even hungrier demographic that is having theirÌýaha moments: women.

Women entrepreneurs provide the MENA region with an economic opportunity. To understand the issue, it is important to look at the underlying problems. As this author and Casper Wuite explained inÌýThe Arab Uprisings: An Introduction, the key catalysts behind the revolts of 2010-11 included poor economic growth, inequality, unemployment…

Yazidi Refugees Tell Their Story

Sharya Camp, Duhok © Siraj Davis

Yazidi refugees reveal tragic and inspirational stories of surviving ethnic cleansing by the Islamic State.

The Yazidi people are an ethno-religious group with aspects of their religion entailing a mixture of Christianity, Islam and Zoroastrianism. They are monotheistic, worshipping one God, but their most holy religious figure isÌýSheikh Adi ibn Musafir al-Umawi, who meets all criteria of a prophet but is described by some Yazidis as only a saint. Their holy scripture includes Jesus, Mary, Adam and Eve, Moses, Muhammad and other prophets shared in monotheism.

The Yazidis have resided in northern Iraq/Kurdistan since Mesopotamian times, along with other communities in Turkey, Syria and Armenia. However, as with the Assyrian Christian population, they have been in significant decline due to centuries of persecution, discrimination and violence. According to their narrative, they are survivors ofÌý72 genocidal campaignsÌýagainst them. In August 2014, the Islamic State (IS orÌýDaesh) conducted a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against the…

Make America Debate Again: The Qualifying Round

© WildLivingArts

InÌýthe first presidential debate, candidates failed to provide clues about possible political responses to any of the real questions about America’s future in the world.

Judging from the results of the first “Super Bowl of presidential debatesâ€� it would appear that the following three statements, if not true, are at least credible:ÌýDonald Trump is manifestly not qualified to be president;ÌýHillary Clinton may not be qualified to be president; it isn’t clear what it really means for a person to be qualified to be president.

The first debate somewhat predictably contained very little substance. Instead it danced around the relative weaknesses of each candidate, reflecting the mood of the nation, which appears to be on the verge of deciding which candidate to vote against.

There is no set of established criteria concerning the qualification to be president other than being a natural-born citizen of at least 35 years of age. A lot of people, especially on…

Singapore’s Road to Multiculturalism

Little India, Singapore © LeeYiuTung

What lessons can multicultural Singapore offer America in light of the latter’s ongoing racial and religious tensions?

Raw feelings over race and religion dominate the American political season. The talk is of walls and deportations to keep some out, “extreme vetting� for immigrants of a certain faith, and a debate over whose lives matter that is playing out in mindless violence on the streets.

The conflicting feelings over people of a different race, color or creed cannot, of course, be resolved to any one person’s or group’s satisfaction. But good answers to the divisiveness seem elusive. How can Americans see past their differences and get along?

As an American, I watch from afar where I live in Singapore, one of the most racially and religiously diverse nations in the world. This small country offers an approach. A national pollÌýreleased a few weeks agoÌýfound most Singaporeans try to live out multiracial ideals and believe in meritocracy…

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï’s editorial policy.

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