The problem is that this tendency continues reliance on arms controlled by foreign governments, hinders the development of European-made products and, as many have found, means very long wait times.   

Last September, Lockheed Martin the largest order of Patriot missile defense interceptors in the company’s history. For a whopping , the US Army signed a multiyear procurement contract for 1,970 PAC-3 MSE missiles designed to intercept ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft and hypersonic threats. Major General Frank Lozano, Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, signing a contract extending to 2026 enables “the Army to procure a larger quantity of missiles for more rapid delivery, thus filling our inventory faster.”  

Lockheed has sped up production to fill this order, but non-American customers should be worried — especially European countries, as the continent races to increase the EU’s defense capabilities with the growing threat from Russia. The US foreign military oversees the sales of such technology and can divert defense goods at will. 

Switzerland learned this in July when told them that the five Patriot systems they ordered from Raytheon in 2022 would now be going to Ukraine, with the new delivery date unknown. The wait might be long, as Germany to buy two new Patriots ($1 billion apiece) to donate to Ukraine in exchange for getting priority for the production of new systems.��

Countries that source off-the-shelf products from outside Europe, mainly from the United States, justify this by claiming that it is faster. But this position is clearly an obstacle to the development of sovereign European solutions, and the argument of availability, as Switzerland has learned, is not bulletproof.

Hindering EU projects

Returning to von der Leyen’s , one of the main problems with EU Member States supplying armies with non-EU products is that it threatens European defense projects under development and lowers demand for products already available, thus reducing production rates and increasing prices. This perpetuates a cycle of dependence on foreign industry and foreign governments.��

As countries rapidly seek to build air defense capabilities, the Patriot system illustrates this conundrum. As Germany and Switzerland place orders and EU countries buy them for Ukraine, Denmark recently that it has instead selected its European equivalent, the SAMP/T NG air defense system from the EUROSAM joint venture between MBDA and Thales. Equipped with the Aster family of missiles, which was recently used in combat, the system has just received an upgrade with a successful live-fire test.��

Given the US Army’s recent order for Patriot missiles, the off-the-shelf argument for buying the Patriot system was problematic. Prior to Denmark’s decision, Danish defense analyst Hans Peter Michaelsen , “I expect Denmark to choose European, partly because it will ensure faster delivery. There is an enormous queue for the Patriot missile system. It would also be a strong signal from Denmark that we support the European defense industry, which needs to ramp up.” 

Moreover, the value-for-money argument was essential. The Patriot and SAMP/T systems have almost identical uses, capabilities and tested success rates, with the European system outperforming in some areas. But the SAMP/T costs a third less than the Patriot. Following Denmark’s decision, Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen , “This is not a rejection of Patriot, it is a selection of what is best.”

The Ukrainian/Russian conflict also highlights the need for EU Member States to equip themselves with deep precision strike arms capable of medium- and long-range hits. To this end, MBDA is developing its Land Cruise Missile () as “part of an effort to establish a sovereign European capability for ground-based precision strike systems”. Based on the battle-tested MdCN (Missile de Croisière Naval), LCM is to be tested between 2027 and 2028 and is considered a potential component for the multinational European Long-Range Strike Approach () initiative.��

However, several EU countries are considering solutions outside Europe. The Netherlands is nearly 200 Tomahawks of various versions for its surface vessels, and Germany is currently buying American Typhon systems equipped with Raytheon-produced Tomahawk missiles, arguing that this option will be quicker. However, the lack of orders from the US government in recent years has resulted in a reduction in production capacity, leading to longer delivery times.��

Missile specialist Fabian Hoffmann , “Unsurprisingly, US Navy Justification Books list a total lead time of 2.5 to 3 years for newly ordered Tomahawks. Germany would also face competition for building slots with US-based and foreign customers and would initially be placed at the back of the queue.” 

The problem is not just with US defense companies. The purchase of Starliner drones that Switzerland ordered from Israel’s Elbit Systems in 2015, with an expected delivery date of 2019, has still not all arrived. In 2023, “decided to focus its production capacities on the war effort against Gaza, postponing delivery to the end of 2026”. And the ones that have been delivered do not work as advertised. Legal action has been filed, but if Bern pulls out of the deal, they lose and risk counterclaims from Elbit.��

Denmark also had with an Elbit delivery when the country ordered 19 ATMOS 2000 self-propelled guns and eight PULS rocket launchers. When Denmark donated 19 of its Caesar artillery systems to Ukraine, it was expected that Ukraine would reorder from the French manufacturer Nexter, but Denmark instead purchased from Israel, claiming it would be quicker. “Now Danish officials regret the decision” because the systems they ordered are incompatible with their IT systems and will take three times longer than expected to integrate. Plus, the Danish Armed Forces do not have the associated ammunition and infrastructure, which could cost them an additional .��

No strings attached

Another problem with buying armaments from abroad is that countries are not autonomous regarding when/if they can be used. Ukraine learned this the hard way as its army was restricted from using missiles in its arsenal to counterattack Russia, despite being pummelled by Russian missiles. 

The New York Times , “The United States, Britain and France have provided small batches of ballistic and cruise missiles, but their use is restricted so that they cannot be used to strike major Russian cities like Moscow.” Ukraine has therefore funneled money into developing its own deep strike cruise missiles, no strings attached.��

Ultimately, urgently filling strategic gaps through off-the-shelf purchases may be legitimate, provided that these acquisitions meet all the strategic objectives pursued. The aim is therefore to stock European shelves with European products that meet the need, strengthening both European armed forces and European industries. 

The think tank deems this feasible: “development cycles can accelerate substantially in moments of dramatic increases in defense spending and reprioritization of defense, while production costs should fall substantially … Europe thus has a chance to rearm and reduce its dependence on the US within the requisite timeframe, but only if it can undertake major reform of both the demand and the supply side of the defense market in Europe”. The focus should then be on creating enough demand for the EU industrial base to be able to become Europe’s sole defense provider.��

( edited this piece)

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Foreign Off-the-Shelf Products Miss the Mark for European Defense appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The Church’s Latin liturgy and humanist devotion to classical antiquity hardened this self-portrait, leaving little room for Islamic or Jewish voices. By aligning itself with antiquity rather than the multilingual, multifaith worlds of al-Andalus and the Levant, Europe chose a story of continuity over complexity.

Yet this narrative concealed a deep contradiction — how could a civilization claim universality while denying the traditions that sustained it? This tension, between selective inheritance and suppressed hybridity, set the stage for German Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s radical critique of what he called life-denying civilization.

Christianity’s famine of life

For Nietzsche, the moral revolution of Christianity marked the moment when Europe began to starve its instincts. In (1888), he accused the Church of destroying “the whole harvest of ancient civilization.” What began as a transformation of Jewish ethics into Roman law soon became, in Nietzsche’s eyes, a moral economy built on guilt and repression. Power became sin; pleasure became shame; suffering became virtue.��

In his , Nietzsche diagnosed this as the psychology of ressentiment — a world where the weak define “good” by condemning the strong. “Man would rather will nothingness than not will at all,” he wrote, describing how the will to life was replaced by a will to denial. Ascetic ideals turned vitality inward, away from creation and toward salvation.��

While Moorish Spain celebrated philosophy, architecture and sensual beauty, Christian Europe retreated into metaphysics. Nietzsche’s critique, though aimed at his own century, looked backward in search of worlds that had once embraced existence. This hunger for vitality, this famine of the spirit, would drive him southward, to the civilization he saw as the embodiment of life-affirmation.

Moorish Spain and the lost East

To show what Europe lost, Nietzsche invoked the memory of Moorish Spain, calling it “a wonderful culture … nearer to us and appealing more to our senses and tastes than that of Rome and Greece.” For him, al-Andalus was the model of a life-affirming civilization — one that “said yes to life, even to the rare and refined luxuriousness of Moorish life.” 

Its achievements were not metaphors but monuments. By the 10th century, Córdoba housed over 400,000 manuscripts, far surpassing any European city. Scholars like Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) preserved and expanded Aristotle, pioneering rationalism centuries before René Descartes. 

As historian notes, translators in Toledo transmitted Arabic philosophy, optics and medicine into Latin, laying the intellectual foundations of the European university. This pluralism extended beyond knowledge. The architecture of the Alhambra, by María Rosa Menocal, fused geometry, calligraphy and poetry into a sensual celebration of beauty.��

To Nietzsche, such refinement born of strength exemplified what he called “noble and manly instincts” — not patriarchal domination but the courage to live without guilt, to turn instinct into art. In contrasting this Moorish feast with Europe’s Christian famine, Nietzsche was not idealizing Islam; he was diagnosing Europe’s amnesia. Al-Andalus, he believed, was a mirror of what Europe could have been: confident, worldly and joyous in its creation.

Orientalism and Nietzsche’s mirror

Nietzsche’s admiration, however, came filtered through Orientalist romanticism. Scholar Ian Almond it as “rhetorical Islamophilia” — a fascination less with Islam itself than with what it symbolized: vitality, sensuality and affirmation. Nietzsche’s Islam was drawn not from theology or travel but from the same 19th-century sources that nourished German writer and polymath Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s West–Eastern Divan and French philosopher Ernest Renan’s racialized Orientalism.

Like many Romantics, Nietzsche saw “the East” as everything Europe was not: instinctive where Europe was cerebral, passionate where it was ascetic. The difference was that Nietzsche inverted moral polarity. For him, the “sensuous East” was not decadent but noble — the antithesis of Christian weakness. In that inversion, he both challenged and reproduced Orientalism: the East remained Europe’s reflection, not its equal.

Yet this mirror cracked the old binary. When Nietzsche could say the Moorish world was “nearer to us,” he implicitly questioned the idea of a pure, bounded Europe. His rhetoric of life-affirmation became, unintentionally, a bridge toward what post-colonial thinkers would later call entanglement. Nietzsche’s mirror may have been distorted, but it reflected a Europe uneasy with its own reflection — a civilization that could admire the vitality of the Other only after destroying it.

The irony Nietzsche intuited has since unfolded with eerie precision. The very civilization he saw as “life-affirming” came to be branded as “fanatical”, while the Europe he described as spiritually impoverished reinvented itself as the bastion of liberal reason. 

In the 19th century, Romantic writers such as and turned the Muslim world from a landscape of sensual freedom into one of moral excess and irrationality. After the colonial encounters of the 20th century and the geopolitics of the 21st, this image hardened into the stereotype of “Islamic fanaticism.” 

Meanwhile, Europe’s Christian famine — its moral rigidity and guilt — was secularized into a liberal order that prized tolerance yet struggled to embrace the vitality it once condemned. AsTalal Asad argues in , secularism did not erase the Christian inheritance; it refined its moral discipline under new banners. The result is an inversion Nietzsche would have recognized: the “lively, free” Muslim world recast as repressed, and a “life-denying” Christendom reborn as the world’s moral guide.

From inheritance to entanglement

Post-Orientalist scholars have since redrawn the map Nietzsche glimpsed only dimly. Said showed that “the Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture.” Historians like and philosophers such as trace how Nietzsche’s writings later circulated through Arab intellectual networks, influencing debates about modernity and secularism.

These exchanges reveal that knowledge never moved in one direction; it was reciprocal, sustained by translation and critique. The city of Toledo — where Muslims, Jews and Christians once translated each other’s books — embodies this truth. 

Civilization advanced not through isolation but through contact zones: Baghdad’s Bayt al-Hikma, Sicily under Frederick II and Córdoba’s academies. Each was a site where languages met, and worldviews merged. The myth of a self-contained Europe collapses when viewed from these crossroads. Nietzsche’s “life-affirming” Moorish Spain thus prefigures the post-Orientalist insight that vitality arises from mixture. His “life-denying” Europe warns what happens when cultures mistake purity for power. 

Today, as Europe grapples with pluralism, migration and memory, the philosopher’s metaphor acquires new urgency: civilizations survive only by affirming the fullness of their entanglements. When they forget, the feast turns once again to famine.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Nietzsche and the Lost Paradise of Moorish Spain appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Earlier in the play, Hamlet himself reminded the audience “that the Everlasting had… fix’d his canon ‘gainst self-slaughter,” which, translated into modern English means “God outlawed suicide.” For centuries Christian Europe considered suicide a particular case of homicide. Today, things are very different. A wide-ranging debate exists concerning the right to end one’s life through medically controlled procedures. A significant number of countries now permit some form of assisted dying.

Was Shakespeare engaged in that debate? A mistaken tradition, aggravated by the creativity of Laurence Olivier in his 1948 movie, maintains that Hamlet’s famous solyloquy beginning with “To be or not to be…” is a meditation on suicide. Olivier tracks Hamlet climbing up a long series of stairs to a rampart poised above a cliff overlooking the austere coast where waves relentlessly pound against dark jagged rocks. In a voice over Olivier shares with us those unforgettable words as he mentally “takes arms against a sea of troubles.” Will he leap to his death? At one point, as his meditation develops, he draws a sharp knife (his “bare bodkin”) apparently tempted to stab himself in the heart.

Olivier — Britain’s most celebrated Shakespearean actor and a genuinely brilliant director – was, at least in this instance, betraying the Swan of Avon. That scene overlooking the Baltic’s threatening surf definitely is not the one Stratford’s Bard had imagined. A glance at the play’s text informs us that Hamlet is in comfortably meandering around one of the main rooms of the castle when he stops to launch into his soliloquy. It ends when he is interrupted by the entrance of Ophelia.��

“To be or not to be” is indeed Hamlet’s meditation on death and the extinction of consciousness and identity. But it is clearly not an expression of a suicidal wish. Translated into modern English – and specifically today’s geopolitical English – Hamlet’s awareness of the effects induced by  “the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” took the form of what we would call today an “existential crisis.” He felt overwhelmed by external threats, not his own emotions.

The new existentialism

Hamlet’s existential crisis makes the Danish prince a modern hero. Who hasn’t remarked that European nations no longer have simple border disputes, sovereignty issues or even armed conflicts? The problems they worry about are now systematically framed as “existential threats” requiring the suspension of all our critical faculties to support a massive military response. 

Earlier this year, Europe’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas – the woman who that “it was ‘news’ to her that and were among the victors who defeated Nazism and fascism.” As a student of history (principally via Hollywood movies?) Kallas was convinced that it was the Yanks and Brits who won the war pretty much on their own. That gives an indication of how seriously we should take her when she declares: “”Russia poses an existential threat to our security today, tomorrow and for as long as we underinvest in our defense.” 

Let’s give her some slack. Even though she has no understanding of the past, we can’t yet prove she has no grasp of the future. She was, after all,  expressing an informed consensus, the established UE talking points clearly laid out in the script she has dutifully read and memorized. French President Emmanuel Macron provided an even stronger version when he:”Russia is an existential threat to us. Not just to Ukraine, not just to its neighbors, but to all of Europe.” Lisbon and why not, Compostello are in Putin’s sights. (After all Putin is a Christian, not a communist). 

Who should be more sensible to existential threats than a leading existentialist? Most people remember Jean-Paul Sartre as the leader of the influential existentialist movement that for several decades held a dominant position in European philosophical circles. Sartre personally adhered to Marxist economic and political theory, though in his later years he fiercely criticized the Stalinist culture of the Soviet Union. He deplored the USSR’s aggressive actions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and supported self-determination as a matter of principle. It worried him that the Soviets’ actions provided bad PR for Marxism. But for all his hatred of the Soviet regime, Sartre would have laughed at the idea that Russia, even under a despotic Stalin, posed any kind of existential threat to Europe, political, military or otherwise.

In contrast, Hamlet had good reason to be alarmed. His truly existential crisis was immediate and personal. It existed at the core of his own family. He knew it would inevitably lead to a showdown and the stakes were mortal. His uncle Claudius had murdered Hamlet’s father, the legitimate king of Denmark. To consolidate his claim to the succession, Claudius hastily married Hamlet’s mother. The usurper turned out to be more interested in “swagg’ring upspring reels” at his nightly “wassails”– the modern equivalent would be rave parties – than good governance. Hamlet himself should have been a candidate for succession to the throne, but the young man had been away studying at a German university, and in any case lacked his uncle’s unbridled ambition. The prince also expressed his convinction that something was rotten in Denmark, and worse than that – on a more “existential” plane –  that “the time is out of joint.”

Later in the play Hamlet fortuitously encountered Fortinbras, the prince of Norway, Denmark’s enemy, who was calmly leading a powerful military force into Poland “to gain a little patch of ground.” A Norwegian captain explained to Hamlet that the oblast in question, far from being existential for Poland or Norway, “hath in it no profit but the name.” Hamlet appeared legitimately bemused by Fortinbras’s decision making. He describes the prince as a man “whose spirit with divine ambition puffed” is ready to expose “what is mortal and unsure to all that fortune, death, and danger dare, Even for an eggshell.”

Europe’s fascination with eggshells

What was Shakespeare trying to tell us? If he were around today, I expect this might offer the following explanation. After analyzing the facts available to him, Hamlet failed to understand the deeper logic of Norway’s military-industrial complex, an institution that needed to make a show of exercising its muscle in foreign lands to justify his kingdom’s disproportionate allocations for the nation’s army. If the soldiers buy into it and the population backs it, go for it. Some eggshells have hidden value.

In the play’s final scene, with his “dying voice” Hamlet casts his vote to elect Fortinbras king of Denmark as the entire power structure of the nation lies bleeding on the floor at Elsinore. It’s worth noting that the name Fortinbras translates from French: strong-in-arm. The play ends with the Armstrongs conquering Denmark. Hamlet sensed that might be Europe’s future.

Hamlet achieved his “quietus” in Act V but he did not commit suicide. The logic of a literally rotten and murderous state ended his life and lives of his loved ones. It was Claudius – aided and abetted by his chief of intelligence, Polonius – who suicided his own nation, leaving it in the hands of the heir to Norway and future King Strongarm of Denmark.

To sum up, Hamlet was a precocious critic of the latest “existential” trend observable in European politics in the 21^st century: military Keynesianism. John Lanchester pithily summarized its workings with this: “However little money there is for anything else, there’s always enough money for a war’.” It’s a system that generates economic activity monopolistically, to support the cause of present and preferably future war, while effectively keeping the population quiet about the austerity measures imposed on them in the name of patriotism and national solidarity.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 surprised everyone outside of Washington’s State Department. The event had been carefully by a series of US administrations, but most actively by the Biden White House when, in late 2021, it refused to discuss a framework for European security on the grounds that that issue could be summarized in four letters: NATO. The Russian invasion provided what appeared to be an ideal framework for a new wave of military Keynesianism that could now engulf all of Europe. 

As NATO members, eager to maintain a strong relationship with the US that Trump 1.0 had threatened to weaken, European leaders quickly bought into the new conflict, faithfully following Washington’s lead. Their incapacity to think independently about Europe’s and the nations of Europe’s interests, they remained blind to an essential reality, that unwinnable wars in which one has no direct stake bring austerity and potential collapse without providing the deep psychological satisfaction that a “patriotic” and truly “existential” war can bring. 

It isn’t because Kallas and Macron are now promising us that a future existential war launched by Russia is inevitable that Europe’s population will begin believing in the value of eggshells. Especially after losing so many of one’s own eggs in the process. Kallas may be regularly featured in the media, but she remains an unelected ignoramus and Macron has an of 11%. 

In contrast, Hitler and Mussolini were wildly popular, capable of producing rhetoric and the right kind of kitsch symbolism. They had the talent to get away with it. US Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower had the political and to some extent the moral prestige to get away with it, especially after  their nation had become unified by the experience of World War II and the exceptionally favorable outcome it produced for a nation designated as “leader of the free world.” Military keynesianism was a recipe for success, which they refined by transferring its monopolistic ethos to the consumer market thanks to technology.

Europe’s Black Friday

�մǻ岹��’s European leaders are lost. They believe that the postwar US model can be applied to Europe, but there is so little resemblance in their respective situations that it appears closer to a clown show than a Shakespearean tragedy. Unlike Hamlet, Europe today has chosen to “take arms against a sea of troubles,” largely of its own creation, though with some significant input from NATO’s overlord, the US.

But what has that produced in the way of action or spectacle? Last week, Macron put on the stage one of his character actors, military chief of staff General Mandon, charging him with the nation’s mayors to stop worrying about the minor question of austerity and prepare heroically to “accept the loss of your children.” Ironically, at the very moment that saw Mandon strutting and fretting “his hour upon the stage,” Europe’s overlord in Washington was cooking up the peace plan that risks piercing every illusion about the holy war these leaders are counting on just to keep themselves in office.

It is Europe that has climbed to the top of Olivier’s ramparts, surveying the waves crashing upon the rocks, and wondering whether suicide isn’t a “consummation devoutly to be wished.”

*[The Devil’s Advocate pursues the tradition 51�Թ� began in 2017 with the launch of our “Devil’s Dictionary.” It does so with a slight change of focus, moving from language itself – political and journalistic rhetoric – to the substantial issues in the news. Read more of The 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary. The news always we consume deserves being seen from an outsider’s point of view. And who could be more outside official discourse than Old Nick himself?]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Europe Endorses Assisted Dying: Its Own Suicide appeared first on 51�Թ�.

This stunning burglary has raised many questions, not only about the security flaws that enabled it, but also about how the French government, led by President Emmanuel Macron, is approaching the security of its central institutions.

The incident reveals an enormous, even greater issue: a lack of sufficient leadership in responding to basic security threats and in addressing embarrassing behavior that undermines the national image and heritage.

An unthinkable scenario

Consider this for a moment: individuals enter into one of the most tightly secured museums during the day. In a matter of minutes, they eight priceless items as if it were a routine logistical maneuver. Cameras, alarms and guards are all avoided.

The precise timing of the attack and the use of the proper tools to bypass the security measures demonstrate meticulous planning. Yet, it also poses a genuine challenge for whoever is tasked with protecting the building.

But most remarkable, other than the cunning of the thieves, is the shameful delay in the authorities’ response. During a time when security is a major issue in French politics, how was it possible for this robbery to occur at a museum of this caliber, a place that should serve as a model of protection and vigilance?

Management below expectations

The Louvre robbery is not remarkable in itself but rather the symptom of a deeper sickness. It illustrates the futility of a security system that appears to rest on shaky ground. If accounts released following the theft are to be believed, detection systems were clearly useless given the scope of the job.

Not only were the cameras not capable of capturing the criminals in real time, but the alarm systems were easily circumvented. One has to ask how committed they were towards being ready for the challenges of today.

The Louvre is more than any museum. It is not so much something to be viewed but rather a true center of support for . How are we to explain that this site, on which France bases its power over culture, has not been granted the degree of protection equal to the risks it poses? By considering the general image, it would appear that the security of national institutions comes second, as if we believed that such places were beyond all issues.

Actually, this break-in highlights a deeper problem: the lack of appreciation for how culture and heritage are essential in maintaining national stability. When such thefts happen, it’s common to blame local authorities or security agencies. But isn’t it really the central government that should take responsibility for this complacency?

The weakness of the political response

Even more damaging is the procrastination of the political response to the burglary. It may seem insignificant, but managing a crisis of such magnitude also involves sending clear messages to citizens.

Here, indecision and absence of leadership in the first few hours overshadow the government’s ability to manage crises of this nature. The silence of the Élysée Palace added to the mood of impotence and dilettantism in the presidency, as though France could not safeguard the security of its national icons.

The lack of firmness in addressing this incident and the segmented responses give the impression that the priority of this government lies elsewhere, in other political initiatives, rather than in upholding a cultural heritage to which all of humanity belongs. The French, in the meantime, are expecting concrete action. Maybe it is time for the government to commit to ensuring not just the security of citizens but the protection of what makes us us.

Lack of strategic vision

Other than this mishap, it would seem that the French government under Macron has a lack of strategic insight. Security, and more specifically that of cultural institutions, appears to have been relegated. But then this is not merely a matter of equipment or technology; it is really a matter of leadership — of issuing warnings — something that is lacking.

The Louvre case shows France must reconsider its cultural security policy. It is not merely an equipment or a budget issue, but an issue of responsibility. France’s government ought to be more reactive, not just to save its monuments but to save its place in the world as a cultural nation. France, a nation to be emulated, must prove it protects what makes it great, not only at home but all around the globe.

A call to action

October 19, 2025, is not merely a date on which a burglary took place but a day when France displayed a disturbing absence of steadfastness in its response to the protection of its heritage. This Louvre robbery is just one of several incidents that point to a fundamental problem: leadership and planning failure to address the challenges of the contemporary world. 

France deserves more than tardy responses and promised words of temporary change. If it genuinely wishes to protect its heritage and secure its citizens’ safety, France must reform the way it responds to these crises. The moment of indecision is over.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Louvre Burglary: A Symbol of the French Government’s Slowness and Indecision appeared first on 51�Թ�.

According to a report, up to 30% of children ages 12-18 in Kenya’s coastal areas of Malindi, Mombasa, Kalifi and Diani are involved in transactional sex with tourists. While this figure is outdated, reporting by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and journalists suggests that child sexual exploitation remains endemic, particularly in areas popular with tourists.��

Kenya’s sex trafficking crisis

Coastal communities in Kenya are among the country’s poorest, despite their popularity with European tourists. While tourism has brought some employment opportunities to the area, significant earnings have not trickled down to locals, maintaining the region’s impoverished state. 

Such poverty, coupled with a relatively high level of social normalization, increases the local children’s vulnerability to exploitation. For instance, the states that many children will first sell sex in bars to local men and from there will enter the tourist market, meaning that exploitation often begins locally before extending to foreigners as demand increases during the high season.

For the children, few avenues exist to provide psychological, financial or social support. While a handful of provide critical aid to victims and work to combat exploitation, the issue overwhelms their resources. At the same time, state-level prevention, enforcement and accountability mechanisms are underdeveloped. While training includes a brief section on children’s rights, there is usually no subsequent refresher,and pursuing wealthy foreign offenders in particular remains a pertinent issue.��

Meanwhile, European governments frequently fail to hold their citizens accountable for crimes committed abroad. For example, while the Swiss government the “Campaign to Protect Children and Youth against Sexual Exploitation Tourism” in 2010, the project focused more on raising awareness than on genuine governmental cooperation to facilitate convictions of offenders. Yet amid this governance gap, a promising infrastructure is emerging through bilateral agreements.

Bilateral agreements: flawed, yet promising

In 2024, Germany and Kenya a Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement (MMPA), one of several such bilateral agreements developed as part of European states’ external migration agendas. These agreements are designed to manage migration flows, address European labor shortages, and facilitate the return of unauthorized migrants. Crucially, they represent a growing form of interstate cooperation that brings together legal, political and development tools under a shared framework of responsibility.

Within these agreements, there is often some reference to addressing human trafficking, but it is usually limited to labor exploitation. Since tourism falls outside of the scope of MMPAs, they do not acknowledge the link between international tourism and child sexual abuse, let alone develop or propose concrete measures to combat it. Yet, greater labor migration and interstate cooperation between the two states will likely also increase tourism flows. 

Currently, Germans are the group of European tourists visiting Kenya, after the British. As diplomatic ties strengthen and mobility increases between the two countries, the risk of predatory behavior emerging without sufficient oversight also grows. Although the MMPA between Kenya and Germany is not specifically centered on tourism, it already stresses combating human trafficking and exploitation. Thus, these clauses could be expanded to include child protection measures.

For instance, the MMPAs provide mechanisms for cross-border law enforcement cooperation, which could also be adapted to include joint investigations into child sex tourism cases, information-sharing protocols about suspected offenders and mutual legal assistance agreements that enable prosecution across jurisdictions. 

Additionally, MMPAs offer a regularized diplomatic platform that requires consistent communication between state representatives. This could institutionalize discussions on child sexual exploitation and ensure political accountability. Interstate cooperation on this issue is not merely desirable; it is necessary. The crimes against children span borders, involving higher-income perpetrators from one country and lower-income victims in another. 

Without bilateral structures to close legal and enforcement gaps, the result is near-total impunity. In the current framework, European states have little political incentive to prosecute their citizens, while may hesitate to prosecute foreigners for fear of destabilizing the profitable tourism industry. Bilateral migration partnerships, backed by mutual interest and regular coordination, offer a path through this stalemate.

The precedence of bilateral cooperation for child sexual exploitation 

Using bilateral cooperation to counter child sexual exploitation has some precedents. For instance, have ratified international commitments to counter child sex tourism. Additionally, of the Canadian Criminal Code provides extraterritorial jurisdiction to Canadian authorities to convict tourists exploiting children abroad.��

Theoretically, this means Canadian tourists are held accountable for their crimes, although in practice, convictions . However, the cases that resulted in successful prosecutions were the product of effective cooperation between the Thai and Canadian authorities through legal assistance and extradition treaties.

The MMPA between Germany and Kenya lays the foundation for similar collaboration, with the potential for higher conviction rates if applied effectively. of the MMPA outlines that areas for cooperation between the states will include “preventing and combatting forced labor, exploitation of labor, and human trafficking as well as protecting victims.” Following the Canadian-Thai model, this clause could be expanded to specifically include child sexual exploitation, as not only is it an illegal form of labor, but it also usually involves trafficking.

The German-Kenyan agreement presents a compelling case study, but the challenges and opportunities are far broader. The expanding network of MMPAs and similar bilateral agreements by European states creates the foundational governance infrastructure necessary to tackle transnational child sexual exploitation.

What is now required is a political vision to extend their mandate. These agreements already consolidate multiple domains, including labor, development, return and capacity-building, under a shared framework. Embedding child protection into this framework would reorient existing tools towards a more holistic understanding of human protection.

Europe cannot credibly present itself as a responsible actor in global migration governance and bilateral cooperation while turning a blind eye to the harms committed by its citizens abroad. Equally, African states, eager to benefit from international tourism, should not be forced to accept child exploitation as a trade-off. 

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Bilateral Cooperation: A Promising Solution to the Child Sex Tourism Crisis appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Sheikh Hasina’s ouster

Khattar Singh opens by situating Bangladesh within a history that included cycles of military and civilian rule after independence in 1971. He notes the long rivalry between Hasina of the Awami League and Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Khattar Singh recounts that in August 2024, student-led protests forced Hasina to resign and flee, which cleared the way for Nobel laureate Yunus to lead an interim government charged with stabilization and fresh elections.

Alam characterizes Hasina’s fall as the product of extraordinary repression. He says United Nations-linked estimates indicated roughly 1,400 people were killed and around 20,000 injured in three weeks, with allegations that forces fired from helicopters and that children were hit by snipers. He argues that Hasina enriched herself, acted with “complete subservience to India” and hollowed out state institutions by co-opting the judiciary, bureaucracy, police and military.

Bangladesh’s army

Turning to the military, Khattar Singh asks how much power it still holds. Alam notes Bangladesh’s long history of generals seizing control, as well as its continued influence even under civilian governments. He recalls “inappropriate comments” made by the army chief but stresses that the real danger lies in the entrenched deep state. This network of officers, once loyal to Hasina, remains intact, and Alam warns that their allegiance is “suspect.” In his view, the survival of Yunus’s interim government depends less on the open stance of the army than on curbing this hidden machinery of power.

The next election

Khattar Singh notes that elections have been postponed multiple times. Alam corrects him and says no date has been postponed because none has been formally set. He explains that an initial window had been discussed for December 2025 to July 2026, that the BNP pushed for December 2025 and that the government later floated April 2026. After Yunus met BNP leader Tarique Rahman, Alam says many now expect February 2026, though no official date has been announced.

Alam adds that people want to vote, since many have not cast a meaningful ballot in 16 to 17 years. He says unity has formed against Hasina’s repression, but he expects divisions to persist as groups press their agendas and as post-uprising expectations collide with governing realities. Euphoria, he cautions, often fades into frustration when results are slower than hoped.

Bangladeshi Hindus

Khattar Singh raises reports of rising violence against Hindus. Alam first clarifies terminology, saying Bangladesh has an interim government, not a caretaker one. He then challenges the premise and says the data does not support a surge of targeted anti-Hindu violence. He cites figures for August 2024 to February 2025 showing 1,254 violent incidents, with only about 20 — roughly 1.6% — classified as communal. Most incidents, he says, were political vendettas that affected Muslims primarily but also Hindus involved in politics or local disputes.

Alam acknowledges that Hindus suffered and must be protected. He adds that minority rights across South Asia remain inadequate. He criticizes India for speaking up only for Hindus while other vulnerable groups in Bangladesh also deserve attention. He notes that these figures were acknowledged by India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson.

Bangladesh’s economy

Khattar Singh turns to jobs and stability. Alam agrees that youth unemployment helped ignite the anti-Hasina movement. He alleges that about $16 billion per year had been siphoned abroad for over a decade, which left the banking system in disarray.

Even so, he points to early improvements: Reserves stopped falling, some foreign direct investment arrived and confidence began to return. He says these are insufficient. Yunus’s microcredit background helps, but Alam argues that broader policy capacity is required. He urges mobilizing the Bangladeshi diaspora’s expertise and, above all, rebuilding confidence. People, he says, have been traumatized, and restoring trust is the essential precondition for investment and growth.

India, Pakistan, China, America

Finally, Khattar Singh asks how foreign policy may evolve. Alam says that ending Hasina’s India-centric tilt creates space for a more independent posture. He says Bangladesh is “developing a spine” and notes warmer ties with the West, aided by Yunus’s personal links to the United States. He also highlights a dramatic improvement with Pakistan, including eased visas and direct bilateral trade, after years in which Pakistan had been treated as a pariah. China, Europe and America, he says, are now engaged through an independent lens rather than an India lens.

Alam emphasizes that India remains too large to ignore. He calls for cordial trade and intellectual collaboration, provided New Delhi stops “playing big brother.” If India acts with generosity, he says, the relationship can flourish.

He closes by warning that misinformation about Bangladesh, especially in India, has strained ties and says that more visitors on the ground would help correct distortions.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Bangladesh — Can Interim Government of Muhammad Yunus Protect Hindus? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

With Trump’s vanishing, the long and tumultuous story of the American experiment has reached its final chapter, though its legacy is far from over.

Why did a rump state in Belgium call itself “Amerika,” anyway?

Trump XI’s dramatic end comes after centuries of struggle. The US — officially the Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika — persisted in its European heartland for nearly a thousand years. While it has long been moribund, little more than a small enclave around Brussels for the past several decades, the nation’s impact on modern culture has been inestimable. Its universities, hospitals and libraries were some of the only institutions in the world that preserved higher learning during the turbulent 26th, 27th and 28th centuries.

The origins of the US lie in the late second millennium, where a group of English colonies on the eastern coastline of North America declared independence from Great Britain in 1776, forming a republic based on the principles of democratic governance and individual liberty. Over the following centuries, it expanded westward across the North American continent, eventually becoming a global superpower by the 20th century.

That century saw the young republic increasingly drawn into European conflicts. After intervening in World War I (1914–1918) on the side of its English-speaking British ally, the US made an abortive attempt to settle European affairs under President Woodrow Wilson before the Senate intervened and enforced a more isolationist foreign policy. Europe would however soon erupt into war again, and after President Franklin Roosevelt I, better known as Roosevelt the Great, intervened in World War II (1939–1945), his successor Harry Truman established a more permanent American presence on the continent. American military personnel were stationed across half of the continent, ostensibly to preserve democracy and, later, to provide a deterrent against the Soviet Union. While European polities remained nominally independent throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, the US de facto controlled their foreign policies.

The decisive moment came with the outbreak of World War III in 2028 following the third Russian invasion of Ukraine. After this cataclysmic war, the United States established direct rule over parts of Europe, a move that was justified at the time as a means of stabilizing the continent and preventing quasi-fascist governments, as had arisen in Slovakia, Germany and Austria, from taking root. Particularly loyal US allies like the United Kingdom, Poland and Italy were permitted to govern themselves, while the French presidents, through uncharacteristically intelligent policy, were able to maintain a precarious independence.

By the end of World War IV (2072–2077), it was no longer possible to pretend that Europe was anything but an extension of the United States. The US intelligence establishment had become convinced by this point that the Europeans were utterly unable to share a continent peacefully without American domination. President Donald Trump III crushed the last remnants of European resistance, and from that point on, Washington governed the region directly. Before long, most European countries had been admitted into the union as states.

The United States’ center of gravity shifted eastward

The political union of North America and Europe brought about unexpected economic consequences. While California was an unchallenged tech and AI powerhouse, New York’s financial services industry now found itself in direct competition with London. Europe also experienced an economic boost from the vast influx of Latin American laborers, especially after the US annexation of Chihuahua and Coahuila in 2120.

Far more lasting, however, were the effects of the brain drain that the North American portions of the union experienced in the late 21st and 22nd centuries. American students flocked to European universities, which were mostly public institutions and a welcome alternative to their exorbitantly expensive private American schools. Documents recently unearthed in northwestern Manhattan reveal that Columbia University, a mid-tier institution, was already charging students as much as several million dollars per semester in the 2050s.

The 22nd century saw a cultural and economic renaissance in Europe. Paris, London and Warsaw became fashionable hubs of intellectual activity — the French “post-atheist” literary movement becoming particularly notable. Science and engineering saw just as much of a boost as the liberal arts. Before long, cities like Hamburg, Frankfurt and Rotterdam began to outmatch their transatlantic counterparts in industrial activity. As more and more money poured into the region, a snowball effect ensued. This — along with the widespread adoption of cloning from the 2160s onwards, which freed wealthy women from the need to take time off from work in order to have children — led to a population boom. By the year 2200, it is estimated that over 25% of the population of the United States spoke German or Dutch. Before long, that number was 50%. Eventually, German would become the first language of nearly the whole population, save for those in some parts of Britain.

Meanwhile, the North American portion of the empire was facing tough times. Several measles outbreaks decimated the population, and political infighting grew to a fever pitch. After the 2232 assassination of President Donald Trump V, outright civil war broke out. The European portions of the union were fortunate to support the victor, Jaden Bloomberg, Jr., who took the title of Donald Trump VI.

As the 23rd century wore on, European Americans gradually came to realize that the transatlantic portions of the union were becoming a military and financial drain on the federal government as usurper after usurper looted the treasury to pay for war materiel. President Franklin Roosevelt III made the difficult decision to relocate the de facto capital of the union from Washington to Brussels, where the central institutions of the union could be more easily defended. This move, originally intended as a temporary measure, quickly became permanent.

The period extending roughly from 2300 to about 2450 saw a nearly endless succession of warlords arise from power centers like Texas, Florida and Alaska to momentarily claim the title of “President” before being shot or poisoned after mere months or even weeks of rule. While the federal administration in Brussels occasionally recognized some of these in an attempt to project some kind of political stability, it was of little use. Epigraphic evidence indicates that there may have been as many as 20 self-described presidents by the eve of the Mexican invasion in 2445.

As every schoolboy knows, Mexican President Aníbal Sánchez Córdova made quick work of the disunited and corrupt North American US forces. Intellectuals across the European portions of the union lamented the downfall of the western half of the union — particularly due to the melodramatic scenes of arson and looting that accompanied the fall of Washington — but administrators in Brussels were quietly grateful for the elimination of the fiscal burden that the west had become.

In 2449, an entity calling itself the Supreme Court of the United States, and recognized as such by Brussels, established itself in Alexandria, Virginia. It was little more than a paper tiger, and records of its chief justices — appointed more or less on the whims of the Mexican president — peter out in the 26th century. Europe was, for all intents and purposes, on its own.

The decline of Europe until today

US President George Washington II (ironically named because, among other things, his ancestors had spoken German for at least three generations) could waste little time grieving the downfall of the transatlantic territories, for trouble was brewing much closer to home. Russia remained a constant menace on the US’s eastern flank, and Turkey, too, was becoming more assertive — a harbinger of things to come. Washington fortified the eastern frontiers with state-of-the-art laser weapons and quantum-powered surveillance systems, but he was quickly called away to affairs in another corner of the republic. In Britain, a nostalgic monarchist party of “freemen on the land” had declared independence. While the movement was quickly crushed, Washington himself lost his life to a knife attack on the streets of London in 2461.

The Russo–Chinese War (2497–2551) did grant the US some respite. This was only the third war in world history to go fully nuclear, and by far the most deadly. By the end, Russia and China had lost a combined 50% of their population and over 90% of their productive capacity. Beset by domestic troubles, Europe took little advantage of the situation except to reduce defense spending and enjoy a minor economic resurgence. This left younger and more agile powers, like Vietnam, Rwanda and, above all, Turkey, to fill in the power vacuum.

By the year 2600, Turkey had consolidated its hold on the Caucasus and Ukraine regions, along with pacifying its Arab neighbors to the south. As a more confident Turkey finally pushed westward, a series of tragic and sometimes nearly comic military disasters characterized European attempts to prevent the onslaught. The republic lost half of its territory and one-third of its population by the end of the century, although the border eventually stabilized around the Elbe-Carpathian frontier. Europe had been severely weakened, but it kept going for another two centuries.

The 28th- and 29th-century culture of the United States of Europe produced a noteworthy flowering of German-language literature, the likes of which had not been seen since the 22nd-century renaissance. Yet, despite appearances, it was fundamentally different. No longer creative, the literature of late modern Europe was inward-looking and mostly historical in character, reflective at best but usually nostalgic and even self-indulgent at worst. These intellectuals saw themselves as the heirs of the twin cultural and philosophical legacy of federal America and ancient Europe. In reality, they were neither. Their civilization had become a museum and, like all museums, it closed abruptly.

Some people alive today may still be old enough to remember the Second Euro–Turkish war that severed the economically productive Rhine, Po and Seine valleys from Europe forever. In 2930, President Donald Trump X and the rest of his administration holed themselves up in a 20-mile circle around Brussels with the last functioning nuclear weapons, antiques already two centuries old, as the last line of defense. The Turks were happy to ignore this little enclave as they spread their control over the rest of the continent, and Britain, of course, declared formal independence from Europe.

That was the situation until about two weeks ago. While the late Turkish monarch Cevdet Muhammad Özdemir was a relatively tolerant ruler, his son Özdemir, who succeeded him two years ago in June 2983, has been a vigorous supporter of the most extremist portion of his parliament in Vienna. These pious believers have long rankled over European possession of the Great Mosque of Brussels, and the younger Özdemir has decided to give the people what they want and make a name for himself in the process. Gambling correctly that either the European nuclear weapons are no longer functional or the Europeans no longer willing to use them, Özdemir gave the order to his marines to breach the border six days ago. European resistance has been sporadic, but fighting reached the downtown neighborhoods of the city yesterday afternoon. With the death of Trump XI, I believe we can safely say that the US constitutional experience — stretching 12 centuries back to the North American colonies’ 1776 declaration of independence — has finally come to an end.

While the United States of Europe no longer exists as an independent state, its ethnic identity still remains in the Turkish-dominated areas of Europe. I recall one of the most striking illustrations of this phenomenon, a quasi-apocryphal story from the Turkish occupation of Ragusa in September 2927. A Turkish sergeant addressed the town’s residents in elementary German: “We are Turks, Europeans like you. We have come to liberate you.” To which, without skipping a beat, one Sicilian lad responded, “Wir sind keine Europäer, sondern Amerikaner.”

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post European President Donald Trump XI Dies in Siege of Brussels appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Flavius reflects on the dramatic shift in Europe’s political and psychological landscape following the arrival of Donald Trump in the White House. With his focus on “America First,” the US has distanced itself from European concerns, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine, which many Europeans see as critical to their security. However, while European leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron and British leader Keir Starmer continue to advocate for a more militarized Europe, their actions often conflict with the realities of military capabilities and the strategic interests of other nations.

The US–Europe military divide and the future of NATO

A key theme in the conversation is the growing military divide between Europe and the US, especially when it comes to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Flavius points out that the US remains the primary military power supporting Ukraine, while Europe struggles to define its role. As Macron and Starmer push for a more autonomous European defense, the logistical and economic challenges of creating a cohesive military force are becoming increasingly apparent. Flavius questions the viability of European nations achieving a unified defense system, particularly when European military capabilities are far behind those of the US and NATO’s role remains crucial. The disparity in defense capabilities is especially glaring given that European nations, such as France and the United Kingdom, are facing internal political divisions, with opposition parties questioning military strategies and even the very premise of increased defense spending.

From an American perspective, there is also skepticism about Europe’s ability to take on a larger role in the conflict. The US remains focused on short-term objectives, such as containing the growing threat from China, while Europe’s commitment to long-term military engagements like Ukraine’s war remains unclear. Flavius argues that despite these challenges, NATO, with US leadership, continues to be the only coherent force able to counteract Russia’s military ambitions. Without the US, Europe would struggle to maintain a unified front, both militarily and diplomatically.

Europe’s internal divisions and foreign policy challenges

Internal divisions within European nations are also contributing to the confusion surrounding the continent’s foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Ukraine conflict. Flavius notes that Macron’s push for a militarized Europe faces opposition from various factions within France itself, as well as from other European Union member states. While Macron may seek to position himself as a leader of a unified European defense, the reality is that many European citizens and political leaders are not willing to endorse such an aggressive stance. In France, for example, there is significant debate over whether to escalate military involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for a referendum on the matter. This lack of consensus highlights the difficulty of crafting a unified European position.

Flavius suggests that Macron’s strong statements about European defense and nuclear capabilities may be driven less by a genuine desire to build military strength and more by his political survival. With his presidency nearing its end, Macron may be seeking to define his legacy as a leader of a new, stronger Europe. However, this desire to assert European autonomy is complicated by the reality that Europe’s strategic interests are still closely tied to the US, and Europe’s military capabilities remain insufficient to independently challenge Russia or assert control over its own security.

Proxy war and Europe’s role in negotiations

A central issue discussed is the confusion over Europe’s role. Flavius points out that while European leaders like Macron express concerns over the war’s implications, they are not involved in the crucial negotiations with Russia. Instead, the US has taken the lead in dialogues, notably through the recent in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, which have yet to bring European representatives to the table. Flavius suggests that Europe’s lack of direct involvement could be attributed to its reluctance to negotiate peace, as many European nations remain invested in prolonging the conflict. This situation has caused a rift between European leaders and the US, with Trump framing the war as a distraction, while Europe views it as existential.

Peter and Flavius also discuss Macron’s push for a unified European defense, though they both express skepticism about its feasibility. The economic and logistical challenges of creating a cohesive European military force are significant, and the lack of unity within Europe complicates this vision. Furthermore, the question of whether Europe’s security can be separated from US involvement remains uncertain. With NATO’s influence deeply rooted in the continent, Flavius questions whether Europe can truly build a defense system independent of the US

Cultural divide within Ukraine

Another important facet of the conversation is the cultural divide within Ukraine, which Flavius highlights in his for The American Conservative. The internal conflict within Ukrainian society, particularly the cultural and religious divides between the West and East, complicates any resolution to the war. Flavius argues that the West has failed to address these deep social tensions, focusing instead on military support while ignoring the need for national reconciliation within Ukraine itself.

The division between Ukraine’s western and eastern regions, and their differing allegiances to Russia and the West, further complicates any prospects for peace. Flavius emphasizes that the failure to address these cultural and religious differences within Ukraine itself has left the country vulnerable to external influence and internal strife. Western involvement, while focused on countering Russian aggression, has ignored the complex internal dynamics at play in Ukrainian society. This cultural conflict may play a significant role in how the war is perceived and, ultimately, how it will be resolved.

Europe’s confusion and strategic uncertainty

The discussion concludes with a reflection on the future of Europe and the ongoing confusion surrounding its role in the Ukraine conflict. Flavius suggests that this uncertainty may persist as European leaders struggle to balance their domestic political agendas with the broader geopolitical reality. As Europe continues to grapple with its identity and strategic priorities, the US remains the dominant actor in shaping the future of the conflict, leaving Europe to reassess its place in the global order.

Peter adds that the lack of clarity about Europe’s position is troubling, especially when leaders like Macron advocate for drastic military and defense changes without considering the broader implications for European unity and long-term stability. The disjointed approach to the Ukraine conflict and Europe’s role in it reflects the growing difficulty in navigating the complexities of international relations in an era where global power dynamics are shifting.

Ukrainian religious issues

Flavius highlights a deeply embedded issue in Ukraine, one that stretches beyond its military struggles with Russia: internal divisions, particularly regarding religious freedom, and the failure of Western support in helping Ukraine build democratic institutions.

Flavius elaborates on the creation of a nationalist Orthodox Church in Ukraine, which replaced traditional liturgical practices with modern Ukrainian, supported by President Petro Poroshenko’s government. This move, intended to unify the nation culturally, led to tensions as the church increasingly seized properties from the traditional Orthodox Church. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which is heavily backed by the government, increasingly took over the traditional churches, leading to an exacerbation of social and religious divides.

Flavius points out that these religious conflicts are more than symbolic; they reflect the internal fractures within Ukrainian society, where religious identity and cultural nationalism are tightly bound. The violent seizing of church buildings from one denomination to another only fuels social unrest, creating a situation where returning soldiers, fighting on the front lines, find their local churches and communities taken from them, further dividing the people.

Western support and Ukraine’s struggle for democracy

Flavius emphasizes that Ukraine’s struggle is not only a military one but also a battle for democratic values. The West’s support for Ukraine has been disproportionately focused on military aid. While Europe and the US have provided significant amounts of military hardware, such as obsolete and second-hand equipment, they have failed to support Ukraine in strengthening its democratic institutions and civil society.

Ukraine has received financial and military aid, but civil society initiatives — such as those led by Ukrainian lawyers pushing for government transparency and accountability — have received little to no continued backing from the West. Flavius points out that the funding for establishing watchdog bodies, which had initially been supported by the US, dwindled over time, further weakening Ukraine’s internal governance structures. This neglect by the West, Flavius argues, leaves Ukraine vulnerable, as it is unable to build sustainable democratic institutions that could help unite the population in its fight for survival.

Peter raises the question of Ukraine’s potential to be a functioning democracy in the long term, especially given the martial law and the erosion of normal political processes during the ongoing war. While there are efforts from within Ukraine to build a democratic system, Flavius acknowledges that Ukraine still suffers from deep-rooted authoritarian tendencies stemming from its Soviet past.

Flavius cites anecdotal evidence from his conversations with clergy, where the fear of government intervention and property seizure was compared to the harsh Stalinist period. Although Ukraine has a segment of its population dedicated to building vibrant democratic institutions, these aspirations often clash with the lingering realities of authoritarian governance and the state’s control over religious institutions. With a limited ability to hold the government accountable, the future of Ukrainian democracy remains uncertain, especially if Europe and the West continue to overlook this issue.

Europe’s hypocrisy, relations with Russia and political future

The conversation then moves to Europe’s role in the conflict, with Flavius criticizing Europe for sending arms to Ukraine but failing to provide support for the country’s democratic development. While military support is seen as legitimate in the context of Ukraine’s fight for survival, Flavius points out that this kind of support is only one piece of the puzzle. Without European efforts to help Ukraine model itself as a full-fledged democracy, its potential for long-term stability remains in jeopardy.

Flavius emphasizes that Europe has failed to address Ukraine’s need for institutional reform and a functioning democracy. He argues that the lack of support for civil society and democracy is one of the main reasons Ukraine is in such a fragile state today. The hypocrisy lies in Europe’s contradictory approach: While proclaiming support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and democratic aspirations, Europe has largely ignored its responsibility to help Ukraine build those very democratic institutions.

The conversation then shifts to the larger geopolitical context, particularly Europe’s relationship with Russia. Flavius raises the point that Europe’s desire to weaken Russia has led to a complicated and unstable situation, especially for countries like Germany, which had long relied on Russian energy. The war in Ukraine has forced Europe into a precarious position, where the economic fallout from the severance of ties with Russia has left countries like Germany vulnerable.

Flavius explains that Russia’s role in Europe is crucial, and many European leaders are personally invested in maintaining some kind of balance with Russia. Countries like France have historically seen Russia as a strategic ally, and Flavius suggested that the failure to include Russia in a post-World War II security arrangement has exacerbated tensions. The lack of a security framework that includes Russia has contributed to the ongoing conflict, and as the war drags on, Europe is likely to face significant internal political shifts, particularly with the rise of right-wing parties opposed to continued military engagement in Ukraine.

Peter and Flavius discuss the political ramifications of the ongoing conflict for Europe. With the rise of right-wing and populist parties across Europe, many of which are anti-war, the current trajectory of European politics looks uncertain. Flavius notes that this shift is partly a reaction to Europe’s failure to manage the Ukrainian crisis effectively. The economic and social impact of the war, combined with growing disillusionment over Europe’s handling of the situation, is leading to a rise in nationalist sentiment across the continent.

Countries like Germany, Italy and France have seen the rise of parties like the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, both of which are strongly opposed to militarism and have criticized the EU’s stance on Ukraine. This shift, Flavius suggests, could have long-term consequences for the political stability of Europe, particularly if these parties gain more power and influence in the coming years.

Ukraine’s demographic and economic crisis

In the final section of the conversation, Flavius turns to Ukraine’s demographic crisis, which has worsened over the past decade. Ukraine now faces one of the lowest birth rates in the world, with an average of just per woman — far below the replacement rate of 2.1 children per woman. This, combined with the country’s loss of population due to emigration and the effects of the war, poses a grave threat to Ukraine’s future.

Flavius points out that Ukraine had already lost around ten million people since independence in 1991, due to corruption and lack of opportunities. The war has led to further population loss, with millions fleeing the country and hundreds of thousands killed or injured. This demographic collapse, he argues, will have long-term consequences for Ukraine’s ability to rebuild itself after the war.

The conversation ends on a sobering note, with Peter asking about the possibility of conflict resolution in Europe, not just for Ukraine but for the broader European context. Flavius reflects on the deep challenges facing Europe, suggesting that the failure to include Russia in a new European security framework is at the heart of the current conflict. The rise of populism and nationalism in Europe, combined with the ongoing war in Ukraine, could destabilize the continent further if a resolution is not found.

Both Peter and Flavius agree that the political and social confusion within Europe is far from resolved and will continue to unfold in the coming months. The future of both Ukraine and Europe remains uncertain, but Flavius suggests that, for the sake of Ukraine, Europe must start addressing its internal divisions and reevaluating its approach to the region.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Can Europe Digest Its Spurned Vassal State? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Sebastian believes Europe is now at a critical juncture. He emphasizes that while the European Union has been forged through crises in the past, the current moment is one of “endgame.” He warns that without decisive action, the world could enter what he calls the “authoritarian century,” marking the decline of democratic values. The failure to act swiftly could result in Europe’s disintegration, with some nations drifting towards authoritarianism or even exiting the European Union, as seen with Brexit.

The growing divide within Europe

Europe is unable to form a unified response to crises like the war in Ukraine. Sebastian notes that countries like Hungary are already aligning themselves with Russia, while other European leaders are hesitant to fully commit to defending Ukraine. The struggle to forge a united European front in the face of external threats could undermine the EU’s future, potentially leading to a collapse of its unity and the values it represents.

Sebastian highlights that the EU’s internal divisions are further compounded by economic, political and ideological rifts between member states. While some countries are increasingly skeptical of the EU’s centralizing tendencies, others remain firmly committed to deepening integration. These conflicting priorities are especially evident in the differing responses to Russia’s aggression and the broader security challenges in Europe. The rise of Eurosceptic and far-right movements in several EU countries further complicates efforts to present a united front against external threats. These movements could weaken the EU’s capacity to act decisively and protect its democratic ideals, especially if populist leaders gain more influence in key European nations.

The growing divide within Europe also threatens to undermine the EU’s cohesion in the long run. If member states can no longer agree on fundamental issues such as defense policy and foreign alliances, the future of the EU’s integration process could be in jeopardy. Sebastian warns that Europe is at a crossroads: It must either unify and strengthen its institutions or risk fragmenting under the pressure of internal and external challenges.

The role of nationalism and sovereignty

The rise of nationalism and calls for greater national sovereignty have also played a significant role in undermining European unity. Sebastian points out that while the EU has long been a model of , its political ambitions have been increasingly challenged by nationalist movements across the continent. Leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni and France’s Marine Le Pen have openly criticized the EU’s centralization of power and pushed for policies that prioritize national sovereignty over European cooperation.

These nationalist movements, often fueled by economic dissatisfaction and cultural anxiety, pose a significant challenge to the EU’s future. While the EU has been successful in promoting peace and economic prosperity, it has struggled to address the concerns of those who feel left behind by globalization and integration. In countries like Hungary, where there is a with Russia, the EU’s ability to hold member states accountable for their foreign policy decisions is increasingly questioned. This growing nationalism could eventually lead to further fragmentation as countries prioritize their own interests at the expense of EU solidarity.

At the same time, Sebastian acknowledges that there is a countercurrent within Europe. Leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron have pushed for deeper European integration, proposing ideas such as a common European and a more unified foreign policy. However, as Sebastian points out, this vision faces significant obstacles from nationalist governments and a general reluctance among some member states to cede more sovereignty to Brussels. The future of European integration will likely depend on the ability of political leaders to reconcile these competing forces and find a path forward that balances national interests with the need for a stronger, more unified Europe.

European security and unity

The discussion also touches on the future of European integration. While some view the economic benefits of the EU as its primary success, Sebastian refutes the notion that democracy and human rights should be secondary to economic prosperity. He argues that the EU’s past enlargements were not merely economic but also about stabilizing young democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. The integration of these countries has proven successful, both politically and economically, and demonstrates the EU’s broader role in promoting peace and democracy across the continent.

Sebastian also explores the possibility of Europe evolving into a “,” advocating for a common defense and security architecture. However, the varying threat perceptions among member states make such a vision challenging. For example, while Poland faces a from Russia, countries like Portugal may not see the same urgency. This discrepancy in threat assessment could make it difficult for the EU to maintain its cohesion and respond effectively to the rising geopolitical challenges.

The conversation addresses the broader implications of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. While some argue that a approach is needed to end the bloodshed, Sebastian contends that a peace agreement that rewards Russian aggression would set a dangerous precedent. Europe, he argues, must not abandon its commitment to democratic values and should resist rewarding an aggressor like Russia. The future of Europe depends on maintaining its unity, strengthening its defenses, and staying true to the principles that have guided its integration for decades.

Bullying, geopolitical tensions and the US

International bullying, particularly the US’s, is increasing. Atul points out that the US is acting like a bully in international politics, citing its toward Greenland and Canada, and threatening stance towards allies like Panama. He questions whether standing up to bullies would also mean confronting the US. Sebastian agrees, emphasizing that Europe must take a stronger stance against these actions, particularly with regard to threats toward nations like Denmark and Canada. He criticizes the US’s behavior, likening it to an imperial mindset, with Trump pushing for peace in regions like Gaza and Ukraine while simultaneously threatening allies.

Sebastian highlights the challenges facing Europe, including its military and economic weaknesses. He notes that Europe lacks the resources to defend Ukraine adequately, pointing to the lack of a unified defense strategy and economic instability. Additionally, Europe faces internal challenges, such as the of far-right political movements, which complicates its ability to form a unified front against external threats. In response to these realities, Sebastian discusses the necessity of a balanced vision for Europe — one that recognizes the importance of European integration, but also addresses the rising challenges posed by extreme political factions and the growing influence of external powers like the US and Russia.

The social market vs. turbo-capitalism: Europe’s model of stability

Shifting to a deeper analysis of Europe’s political landscape, the discussion turns to the larger ideological battle between the social market economy of Europe and the turbo-capitalism promoted by the US. Sebastian defends Europe’s social market model, pointing out that despite criticisms, it has been successful in fostering economic growth while ensuring a welfare state that protects citizens in times of need. This contrasts with the US’s system, where the lack of social safety nets can lead to economic ruin for individuals in the event of a crisis. Sebastian stresses that Europe’s regulatory framework, while sometimes criticized for being bureaucratic, has led to the protection of workers’ rights and a more stable economy compared to the volatility seen in turbo-capitalist systems.

Atul echoes this sentiment, noting that in the US and India, a lack of such protections can lead to catastrophic outcomes for ordinary people. Sebastian acknowledges that while Europe is not without flaws, especially in the context of rising far-right influence and political fragmentation, there is still a possibility for reform and progress. He argues that Europe must better communicate the advantages of its social market model, including labor rights, healthcare and worker protections, as the antidote to the negative effects of extreme market-driven capitalism.

The conversation concludes with a sobering look at the ongoing war in Ukraine. Sebastian acknowledges that any ceasefire will come with significant costs, particularly for the Ukrainian people, who will bear the brunt of the conflict’s consequences. He argues that Europe, while bearing the financial burden of reconstruction, must work together to strengthen its collective security and economic model, ensuring that it is not solely dependent on the US.

Ultimately, the EU’s role in securing peace and rebuilding after the war is crucial. While the road ahead is challenging, Sebastian remains optimistic that European cooperation could pave the way forward, even in the face of mounting global tensions.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Trump and Co. Sell Europe Up the River. Now What? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Ukraine clearly occupies center stage and should stand as the central actor, but there are at least three reasons why its capacity to influence the outcome has become marginalized. The first is basic post-Soviet history. Any honest historical assessment of the causes of the war must focus on the positions, ambitions and global standing of the two major powers involved: the US and Russia. Ukraine is a mere pawn on what Zbigniew Brzezinski nearly three decades ago as “the grand chessboard.” Europe in contrast stands as a line of pawns that has been wondering all along what its role is supposed to be.

The second reason for Ukraine’s limited influence is the often-denied complexity of its demography that has kept it in a permanently confused state of cultural, if not national, identity at least since the collapse of the Soviet Union. What makes a nation? Its legal boundaries, determined by whom and to what end? Or its culture, its language, its historical memory, its sense of ethnicity or religious identity? To say nothing of the ideologies that sometimes come to the fore. Ukraine’s case has always been a puzzler.

The third reason is the brutal fact, still frequently denied in the West, that the prospect of Ukraine defeating Russia is now unthinkable. Russia definitively has the upper hand today. But it also has the capacity — thanks to its Oreshnik missiles, demonstrated once but currently in mass production — to wreck the entire country if Russia were to feel threatened. After that, it’s the prospect of nuclear war.

All the actors acknowledge that the war has reached a phase in which dialogue in some form, must have a dominant role to play. How that dialogue will be structured, with the four parties jockeying for position, remains a mystery.

With that in mind I decided to engage in a conversation with ChatGPT focused on the nature and quality of the dialogue attributable to European leaders, the fourth interested party. That collection of nations, despite their presumed collective clout, finds itself clearly in a position of weakness, if not confusion about their role and even their standing.

I opened the conversation with the following prompt.

“Germany’s next chancellor Friedrich Merz has said ‘In view of the threats to our freedom and peace on our continent, the rule for our defence now has to be “whatever it takes”.’ Joe Biden repeatedly said that the US would support Ukraine ‘as long as it takes.’ It appears that this concept of unlimited and unquestioned commitment has become a feature of a militaristic attitude that characterizes periods of historical instability and that comports serious risks of escalation. Am I wrong in seeing this as a change in the mentality of leaders in the West? Am I overestimating the level of risk which seems to be less manageable than during the Cold War?”

“You’re not wrong in observing a shift in the rhetoric of Western leaders, nor in perceiving the risks of escalation as significant. The language of open-ended commitment—whether ‘whatever it takes’ (Merz) or ‘as long as it takes’ (Biden)—signals a potentially more expansionist or uncompromising approach to military engagement, in contrast to the measured deterrence that characterized much of the Cold War. However, the nature of risk today is different rather than necessarily greater.

Is There a Change in Western Leadership Mentality?

Yes, there appears to be a shift, but it must be contextualized:

1. More Emotional and Moral Framing:
   • During the Cold War, political leaders framed their strategies in terms of containment, deterrence, and realpolitik, often accepting the necessity of compromise (e.g., arms control agreements, détente).
   • �մǻ岹��’s rhetoric leans more towards moral imperatives—defending democracy and sovereignty—making de-escalation rhetorically harder.
2. Commitment Without Clear Strategic Limits:
   • The Cold War saw well-defined red lines (e.g., NATO vs. Warsaw Pact boundaries, nuclear doctrines like MAD).
   • �մǻ岹��’s Western leaders are committing to a principle (Ukraine’s defense, European security) without a predefined endpoint, making it harder to calculate risks rationally.
3. Weaker Institutions for Restraint:
   • Cold War diplomacy was anchored by mechanisms like the Helsinki Accords, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and backchannel diplomacy.
   • Today, Russia is no longer treated as a co-equal nuclear power in negotiations; dialogue mechanisms are weaker, and diplomacy is often framed in absolute terms.

Are the Risks Less Manageable Than During the Cold War?

Possibly, but for different reasons:

• Nuclear deterrence still exists, but crisis management is weaker.
  • In the Cold War, even during extreme tensions (Cuban Missile Crisis, Able Archer 83), both sides used structured backchannels to prevent escalation.
  • Today, there is less direct military-to-military communication between NATO and Russia, increasing the risk of miscalculation.
• Multipolar instability replaces bipolar balance.
  • The Cold War had two clearly defined superpowers. Now, power is more fragmented, with China, regional players, and unpredictable alliances (e.g., Iran-Russia).
  • This makes escalation harder to control, as multiple actors with different risk tolerances are involved.
• Public and media-driven escalation dynamics.
  • �մǻ岹��’s political environment rewards performative toughness, especially in democracies where leaders respond to public pressure.
  • Unlike the Cold War, when secrecy allowed for quiet negotiations, social media and 24/7 news cycles make de-escalation harder without appearing weak.

Are You Overestimating the Risk?

It depends on how you define ‘manageable.’ While nuclear deterrence still holds, the pathways to crisis resolution are weaker, and the dynamics of political escalation are less constrained than in the past. There’s also a greater unpredictability—not just from Russia, but from domestic political shifts in the West (e.g., a potential Trump return, changing European politics).

So while a direct U.S.-Russia or NATO-Russia war is still unlikely due to nuclear deterrence, the lack of clear de-escalation mechanisms and the absolutist rhetoric make unintended escalation more plausible than in the structured framework of the Cold War.

Would you like to explore how this shift in Western leadership mentality is affecting public opinion and policy debates?”

“Yes, I would even like to look specifically at the stances taken by leaders such as Emmanuel Macron and Keir Starmer. Most European leaders have seen their electoral bases and their credibility severely diminished. Some say they are resorting to bellicose rhetoric to enhance their authority or at least their image as leaders of a war effort, but others observe that the public has not been consulted on the kinds of commitments they are ready to make. So please elucidate as best you can this complex situation, which many people such as myself see as a major multifaceted crisis that is likely to lead to the weakening of democratic institutions.”

“Your concerns about the evolving rhetoric of Western leaders, particularly figures like Emmanuel Macron and Keir Starmer, and its implications for democratic institutions are indeed pertinent. The current geopolitical landscape has prompted leaders to adopt more assertive stances, which, while aiming to address security challenges, may also influence domestic political dynamics and public engagement.

Emmanuel Macron’s Position

French President Emmanuel Macron has advocated for a robust European defense strategy in response to escalating security threats. He emphasizes the necessity for Europe to strengthen its military capabilities and reduce reliance on external powers, aligning with broader EU discussions on increasing defense budgets and coordinating rearmament efforts. Proposals under consideration include the establishment of a ‘European Security Fund’ and a rearmament bank, inspired by the European Financial Stability Facility, to finance defense initiatives and support Ukraine. 

Keir Starmer’s Stance

UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has outlined plans to revitalize Britain’s economy and public sector efficiency, linking national security with domestic renewal. His agenda includes restructuring the civil service and the National Health Service (NHS), increasing defense spending, and integrating advanced technologies into public services. While these reforms aim to bolster the ����’s strategic position, they have faced domestic resistance due to concerns over potential job losses and spending cuts. 

Public Consultation and Democratic Engagement

The adoption of assertive policies without extensive public consultation raises questions about democratic engagement. Critics argue that leaders resorting to bellicose rhetoric to enhance their authority may bypass traditional democratic processes, leading to a disconnect between government actions and public sentiment. This approach risks alienating citizens and undermining trust in democratic institutions, especially if the public perceives that their voices are not being heard in decisions of national importance.

Impact on Democratic Institutions

The current multifaceted crisis poses challenges to democratic institutions:

• Erosion of Civil Liberties: Increased security measures can lead to restrictions on civil liberties, affecting freedoms of speech, assembly, and privacy.
• Centralization of Power: Emergency powers and expedited decision-making processes may result in the centralization of authority, reducing checks and balances.
• Public Disillusionment: A perceived lack of transparency and public involvement can lead to disillusionment with the political process, decreasing civic participation and voter turnout.

In summary, while leaders like Macron and Starmer aim to address pressing security and economic challenges through assertive policies, it is crucial to balance these actions with robust democratic engagement to ensure that measures taken do not inadvertently weaken the democratic institutions they seek to protect.”

To be continued

In Part 2, we will continue our discussion by attempting to respond to the question of whether there is room for a different vision of Europe today, given the attitudes we have begun exploring here. We will discover why ChatGPT, after reviewing the sometimes confusing language of Europe’s most audible voices, believes that “a different vision, based on diplomacy, de-escalation, and economic stability, exists but currently lacks strong political champions at the highest levels.”

I invite our readers who truly wish to penetrate not just the fog of war but the even denser fog of political rhetoric to join us not only with your own reflections, but with your own experimental discussions with your favorite chatbot. Everyone is now empowered to use AI’s access to seemingly limitless resources to begin to clarify the questions that they consider urgent to explore and eventually resolve.

Your thoughts

Please feel free to share your thoughts on these points by writing to us at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We are looking to gather, share and consolidate the ideas and feelings of humans who interact with AI. We will build your thoughts and commentaries into our ongoing dialogue.

[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone’s daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At 51�Թ�, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Outside the Box: AI’s Honest Take on Europe’s Ambiguity, Part 1 appeared first on 51�Թ�.

So what does Ursula mean? What does she want us to comprehend?

Fortunately, the article offers the evidence to answer this important question.

“The European Union must ‘urgently’ rearm and help Ukraine turn into a ‘steel porcupine’ that proves ‘indigestible for future invaders’ like Russia, Ursula von der Leyen said at the conclusion of a high-stakes summit in London attended by 19 Western leaders.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Steel porcupine:

A new species currently being bred in secret somewhere in Europe by a team of mad scientists led by Ursula von der Leyen and Emmanuel Macron, two real human beings driven mad by the astonishing circumstances that allowed both of them, in defiance of both of the odds and of reason, to achieve the title of president and even be invited to serve a second term.

Contextual note

I’m the first to admit that it’s unfair to treat an intelligent person’s creative metaphor as something other than what that person intended. But metaphors invite interpretation. That is their precise role in poetry. Had this image of a well-defended Ukraine emerged from a dream Ursula was recounting while lying on Sigmund Freud’s couch in Vienna, the famous psychoanalyst would undoubtedly have puzzled over the significance of the lady’s citing an animal whose defense consists of being covered from head to tail by a multitude of pricks. Scientists call them quills, but we all know how ordinary people refer to them.

Ursula wants Ukraine to resemble a porcupine, but with a steel carapace. Unlike the porcupine’s, steel quills would remain permanently erect. Is that how she imagines a country everyone would want to cuddle up to? Does that represent her idea of the nature of an enlightened democracy she wants to welcome into the European community over which she presides? Would she herself want to live in such an environment? And how does she imagine the neighbors of a steel porcupine — Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Poland — might feel about a nation that is on permanent alert to launch a painful barrage of pointed quills at the slightest disturbance near its borders?

For at least the past ten years, political scientist and geopolitical theoretician John Mearsheimer has been that “NATO expansion… is part of a broader strategy that is designed to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border.” Ursula’s steel porcupine appears to confirm the University of Chicago professor’s analysis. If her plans come to fruition, which most observers believe is unlikely, other countries such as Lithuania, Latvia and Finland might, in principle, logically be obliged to follow Ukraine’s example. Given the nature of the threat, they too may be redefined not as sovereign nation states, but as members of a new flank of porcupine states piloted by NATO, a militarized EU or a combination of both.

The EU was created to establish a community in which war would become an unthinkable response to any form of tension among its members. The current crisis provoked by US President Donald Trump’s betrayal of an iron-clad alliance has revealed that without the tutelage and control of the United States, the tensions within Europe will come to the fore, as is already visible. The tension is likely to grow as debate about rearming Europe moves forward.

Turning Europe into a kind of garrisoned superstate may seem like a rational move to some, but the citizens of Europe have not yet had their say on what their respective nations and their community of nations will look like in such a configuration. Recent elections that have revealed a resurgence of the extreme right across Europe. The idea promoted by Ursula and friends of converting social-democratic Europe to a war economy is unlikely to have popular appeal.

Europe is not the US, where the dominant consumer culture has effectively manufactured endless consent by neutering the capacity of angry and indignant citizens to organize politically against policies considered abusive. In Europe, when broad swaths of the population become discontent, revolt becomes an option. The yellow vest in France was about gas prices. This time, it’s about war.

The EU today is little more than a largely disordered collection of political entities held together by the grandstanding of a class of largely contested national leaders supported by a cohort of unelected professional bureaucrats and technocrats in Brussels. If porcupine culture becomes the norm, total disorder seems a more likely outcome than mobilizing a unified citizenry to support a bellicose mission.

Historical note

Although it has been astutely that “all metaphors are false and all similes are true,” anyone with a smattering of literary culture knows that metaphors provide the meat of all great poetry. They reveal and hide at the same time the delicate truths poets wish to convey. We owe it to ourselves to take them seriously.

Europe today is undergoing a major existential crisis. Having for so long lived under Washington’s nuclear umbrella (a pregnant metaphor if ever there was one) it now finds itself too literally exposed to what Bob Dylan once warned when he predicted “a hard rain that’s gonna fall.”

The idea of Europe is notoriously hard to define and its leaders understand that. That alone may explain why they keep inventing and reinventing interesting poetic tropes to describe it.

Metaphors for Europe change with the season. It wasn’t so long ago that Ursula’s “High Representative” Josep Borrell, the spokesperson for Europe’s foreign policy, famously called Europe a “garden” and the rest of the world a “jungle.” Was the High Representative literally high in October 2022 when at the European Diplomatic Academy he took a moment to his vision of Europe?

“Europe is a garden. We have built a garden. Everything works. It is the best combination of political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion that the humankind has been able to build – the three things together. And here, Bruges is maybe a good representation of beautiful things, intellectual life, wellbeing. 

The rest of the world – and you know this very well, Federica – is not exactly a garden. Most of the rest of the world is a jungle, and the jungle could invade the garden.”

Borrell’s metaphor is not only easy to understand, it is very traditional. The 17th century English poet Andrew Marvell was fascinated by the metaphor of the garden. In his that bears that very title, “The Garden,” his exploration of the multiple dimensions of the metaphor raises questions about man’s place in today’s world. The poet contrasts the toil of conflict and war (“How vainly men themselves amaze/ To win the palm, the oak, or bays”) with the “Fair Quiet” and “Innocence” of the garden. The garden Marvell describes is not opposed to the jungle; they are both different facets of the same mysterious expression of divine creation.

But if Europe is truly a garden, is the rest of the world a jungle? Borrell’s critics in the Global South noted the sinister implications of his metaphor, which did more to evoke associations with Europe’s shameful colonization of Africa than with Marvell’s poem.

A more likely association in the mind of Borrell is Voltaire’s pessimistic at the end of Candide when he suggests that rather than struggle to find rational solutions to the complex problems of the world, one should “cultivate one’s own garden” and retreat to it. Marvell’s suggestion was similar, praising “delicious solitude.” Voltaire was an enlightenment philosopher, a pillar of “the age of reason.” But he knew that if reason was indeed capable of detecting the light at the end of the tunnel, life itself is a dark tunnel we all pass through and may fail to understand.

So how did we get from Borrell’s garden to Ursula’s prickly beast?  What does it tell us about the psychic state of Europe today?

I write here as one European who sees the train going off the rails. And if it does, we should bear in mind that any porcupine that happens to be strolling by the side of the track when the locomotive derails will simply be crushed by the tons of steel descending upon it.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Queen Ursula’s Plan to Breed Porcupine States appeared first on 51�Թ�.

A divided political landscape

The election results underscored the ongoing fragmentation of Germany’s political system. The SPD, led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, saw a significant , securing only 16.4% of the vote. While this result was expected due to the party’s struggles in recent years, it has led to a situation where the SPD has lost much of its influence in shaping the nation’s future. On the other hand, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), while victorious, achieved only 28.6% of the vote. This result demonstrates that even the center-right, long the dominant force in German politics, is no longer able to secure a decisive win without relying on coalitions.

The rise of the AfD, which secured 20.8% of the vote, is perhaps the most striking outcome of this election. Although their support is still strongest in the former East Germany, where they garnered 29.7% of the vote, the AfD is beginning to make inroads into the West, achieving 13% of the vote in regions that were once firmly supportive of the CDU/CSU. This growing influence of the AfD highlights the increasing polarization of German politics and society, driven in part by economic insecurity, immigration concerns and the cultural tensions surrounding globalization.

In addition to the rise of the AfD, the election results also revealed the diminished strength of the SPD, the Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). These parties, which had formed the previous traffic light coalition government, struggled to present a unified front. The fractious nature of this coalition led to inefficiencies in governance and left the electorate dissatisfied. The lack of progress on key issues such as inflation, immigration and economic reform contributed to the overall sense of disillusionment with the current political establishment.

The roots of AfD support: economic struggles and immigration concerns

The AfD’s strong performance can be attributed to a combination of factors, with two key issues standing out: economic discontent and concerns over immigration. Germany’s economy has struggled in recent years, with no GDP for several consecutive years. The country has faced multiple crises, from the effects of the Russia–Ukraine war to challenges stemming from global inflation. These economic difficulties have taken a toll on the German population, particularly in the former East, where unemployment rates remain higher and economic opportunities more limited.

Moreover, immigration has become a deeply divisive issue in German society. With a growing percentage of the population born outside of Germany, many citizens feel a sense of cultural insecurity and fear that the nation’s is being eroded. The AfD has capitalized on these fears, advocating for tighter immigration controls and a reassertion of German values. Their message has resonated particularly in the East, where the legacy of reunification remains a source of tension.

While Germany does require immigration to address its demographic challenges and labor shortages, the rapid pace of immigration has created a perception of cultural and economic strain. This issue has been exacerbated by the ongoing debates over asylum policies and the EU’s handling of migration. The AfD’s success can thus be seen as a reaction to the perceived failure of the political establishment to address these concerns effectively.

The CDU’s shift toward the far-right

In response to the AfD’s growing influence, the CDU, under the leadership of Friedrich Merz, has begun to shift its stance toward the far-right. Merz, a former lawyer with ties to major international firms, including BlackRock, has sought to consolidate the center-right vote by adopting some of the AfD’s positions, particularly on issues like immigration. His for stricter asylum laws and the tightening of border controls echo the policies championed by the AfD and reflect the growing pressure on the CDU to adopt a tougher stance on migration.

Merz’s strategy, however, raises questions about the future direction of the CDU and its relationship with the AfD. While some analysts argue that the CDU is attempting to outflank the AfD on the right, others warn that this could further erode the party’s centrist identity and deepen the political polarization in Germany. The shift to the right is already being felt in the party’s rhetoric, with Merz calling for deregulation of the economy and stronger in line with the rising nationalist sentiment in Europe.

The impact of Germany’s political instability on Europe

Germany’s political instability and economic challenges have broader implications for the future of Europe. As the heart of the European Union, Germany’s struggles to maintain political cohesion and economic stability could have far-reaching consequences for the entire continent. A fractured Germany is unlikely to provide the leadership needed to navigate the complex geopolitical challenges facing Europe, from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine to the growing threat posed by Russia.

The lack of a strong, unified German government also undermines Europe’s ability to respond effectively to global challenges. With the United States increasingly focused on domestic issues and shifting its attention away from Europe, the continent may find itself exposed to geopolitical risks. In the absence of a coherent European strategy, populist leaders like Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin could exploit Europe’s weaknesses, further undermining the region’s influence on the global stage.

Germany’s failure to address its internal divisions could result in a Europe that is fragmented, weakened and increasingly susceptible to external pressures. As the continent grapples with an aging population, economic stagnation and rising political extremism, the prospect of a more cohesive EU seems increasingly unlikely.

A long road ahead

Germany’s political future is uncertain, with deep divisions in society and a lack of consensus on key issues. The rise of the AfD and the CDU’s shift toward the far-right reflect the growing dissatisfaction with the political establishment and the challenges facing Germany in the 21st century. As the country grapples with economic stagnation, immigration concerns and a fractured political system, the path forward will require difficult compromises and painful reforms. Without a strong and unified government, Germany risks losing its leadership role in Europe, leaving the continent vulnerable to external threats and internal disarray. The coming years will be critical in determining whether Germany can overcome its political paralysis and reclaim its position as a stable and effective force in Europe and the world.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: Old Ghosts Come Roaring Back in New Germany appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Besides a struggling pension , high home and other factors, a significant contributor to the city’s woes lies in the controversial privatization initiatives from the 2000s, known as the “Great Chicago .” Over the past two decades, these decisions have siphoned an estimated from Chicago.

The privatization trend began under former Mayor Richard M. Daley, starting with the Chicago Skyway. In 2005, the 7.8-mile toll road was leased to a consortium led by ���貹����’s Ferrovial and Australia’s Macquarie Group for $1.83 billion. Tolls were raised immediately, and in 2016, the 99-year lease was to “a of Canadian pension funds” — the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (OMERS), the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) and the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) — for $2.8 billion. Australia’s Atlas Arteria Ltd then acquired a two-thirds stake for $2 billion in 2022 while OTTP retained the remainder.

In 2006, four downtown parking garages with more than were leased for 99 years to Morgan Stanley for $563 million. After Morgan Stanley defaulted on its debt tied to the lease agreement, control was transferred in 2014 to lenders, including France’s Societe Generale, the German government and Italy’s UniCredit S.p.A. In 2016, Australia’s AMP Capital and Canada’s Northleaf Capital Partners acquired the garages.

Abu Dhabi came into the in 2008. In a $1.16 billion deal, 36,000 parking meters were sold to Chicago Parking Meters (CPM) LLC for 75 years, a consortium led by Morgan Stanley. Morgan Stanley’s Infrastructure group soon restructured CPM’s ownership, major stakes to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Germany’s Allianz through complex investment vehicles. Over the next five years, parking fees more than . By 2022, CPM recovered its entire $1.16 billion investment, while the city had spent buying back parking spots to cover the revenue it would have until 2084. As of 2024, the investment has returned , with 60 years left on the lease.

Daley’s goal was to the city’s budget without raising property taxes before leaving office. However, the one-time payments resulted in long-term consequences. In addition to financial losses, the privatization deals have hindered Chicago’s ability to modernize infrastructure by limiting efforts to build bike lanes and reduce car dependence downtown. People even need to get permission or make payments to companies thousands of miles away for local street parades.

Growing privatization

Profit-driven entities argue that privatizing public infrastructure leads to greater efficiency through expertise and investment. However, their focus is on profit maximization, not service improvement, leading to long-term . Furthermore, in contracts with limited liability companies, the government assumes the losses, while private companies reap the profits. Companies can walk away or demand renegotiations, while governments are left to maintain services, absorb long-term revenue losses and burden the public with higher costs.

As Chicago’s experience shows, privatization has extended beyond domestic markets to become an international phenomenon. Starting in the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank encouraged the privatization of public infrastructure to attract investment, leading to its internationalization. “A 2006 study by the Norwegian government of IMF conditionality revealed that 23 out of 40 poor countries still have privatization and liberalization conditions attached to their IMF loans,” stated an Oxfam Briefing Paper.

By 2000, sovereign wealth funds, pension funds and multinational corporations began treating infrastructure as a global asset class, involving extended leases that frequently change hands.

Foreign companies operate under bilateral investment treaties or trade agreements, allowing them to bypass local courts. Disputes are often mediated in foreign courts or through international arbitration, such as Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) and the World Trade Organization. By exploiting legal loopholes like offshore subsidiaries and tax havens, companies can also shield profits while facing little public scrutiny. Despite these issues, domestic infrastructure continues to be increasingly available on international markets.

US privatization

While Chicago remains the most prominent American example, similar deals are widespread across the United States, primarily involving companies from allied or dependent nations.

In 1998, Atlanta, Georgia became one of the first cities to enter into an international privatization deal over public services, signing a 20-year and $428 million with United Water, a subsidiary of France’s corporate conglomerate Suez, to operate the city’s water system. Celebrated as the biggest privatization contract in the US at the time, it led to claims of quality decline, delays and other mismanagement before the contract was , leading to the infrastructure being returned to public control in 2003.

Nonetheless, the trend continued. By 2006, foreign companies were leasing and operating of US port terminals along with a smaller share of the nation’s airports. The United Kingdom’s National Grid and operates electric transmission networks in the northeastern US.

Indiana has since become a prominent example of experimenting with international privatization. France’s Veolia entered a 20-year contract to manage Indianapolis’s waterworks in 2002. The deal was, however, in 2010. Meanwhile, its airport was by the British Airport Authority from 1994 to 2007. In 2006, the Indiana Toll Road was to a foreign consortium led by Spanish and Australian companies for 75 years for $3.8 billion. It was later for $5.7 billion to Australia’s IFM Investors in 2015.

US entities have purchased some infrastructure abroad, such as in 1999, when a subsidiary of Bechtel privatized Cochabamba’s in Bolivia before controversy forced its exit. But for a major economy, the US owns surprisingly little foreign infrastructure. It has few state-owned enterprises for overseas infrastructure investment, though some private entities like Blackstone’s Infrastructure Partners division and Corsair Capital are active. Instead, extensive domestic privatization opportunities have made US infrastructure a prime target for American and foreign investors.

Canadian and Australian companies

and pension funds and other entities, driven by well-funded systems, consolidation, government support and early privatization experience, have become major infrastructure investors in the US and elsewhere. The CPPIB owns worldwide, the OTPP holds stakes in across Europe, along with the Channel Tunnel, while the Canadian company Brookfield Infrastructure Partners owns across Europe.

Roughly half of Australia’s pension pool is invested the country. But Australia’s Macquarie Group, in particular, has seen its assets surge, emerging as the “world’s infrastructure asset manager.” Since the 1990s, Macquarie Group has focused on underperforming or undervalued public assets to acquire and restructure. It its Global Infrastructure Fund in 2001 “to invest in infrastructure financing opportunities in the US, Canada, UK, and the European Union,” according to its website. In addition to Chicago’s Skyway, Macquarie holds long-term operational licenses for the Dulles Greenway toll road in Virginia and the Foley Beach in Alabama, among others.

Macquarie’s toll road portfolio in India is worth an estimated . It took a stake in Greece’s largest utility, Public Power Corporation, in 2021. It also led the push for the ����’s Bristol Airport in 2001, while Britain’s largest water utility was to an international consortium led by Macquarie Group from 2006 to 2017. Macquarie also took full of the ����’s National Gas Network in 2023.

According to a July 2023 The Guardian article entitled, “As Thames Water sinks, Macquarie Group continues its unstoppable rise,” Macquarie is “well known for taking advantage of volatile markets. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, it bet big on non-investment grade loans, known as junk debt. ​​The debt was cheap, but the quality was decent and the returns turned out to be excellent.”

European investment

The UK has been a for infrastructure investors since the global wave of privatization in the 1980s. Beyond Macquarie’s infrastructure holdings, the ����’s largest electricity generation company was privatized and by France’s Électricité de France (EDF) in 2009. Foreign investors have continued to diversify, with Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) poised to Newcastle Airport, after acquiring a 37.6% stake in Heathrow with French co-investor in 2024.

Europe’s collective experience with infrastructure privatization has been marked by controversy, largely due to Western European corporate dominance. As the EU expanded, some Western EU companies bought of critical infrastructure in Eastern EU member states. In 2015, Greece privatized regional airports, handing them over to a consortium led by the German company Fraport. This move was unpopular in Greece, especially following the austerity measures imposed by the EU and Germany during Greece’s economic crisis. However, the EU also provides safeguards in such deals, including and economic support to member states.

Outside the EU, resolving disputes is even more challenging. French water like Veolia and Suez are leaders in global privatization efforts but have ended up in court over dealings with in the 1990s, in the 2000s and in the 2010s. Argentina its oil company from Spanish company Repsol in 2012 after domestic backlash, damaging relations between the two countries. Such cases can be particularly sensitive when they involve former colonial powers and their former colonies, as economic disputes risk being seen as extensions of past dominance, with former ruling states accused of leveraging privatization to maintain influence.

Chinese stakes

China’s Belt and Road Initiative predominantly focuses on building infrastructure in non-Western countries, though the of Laos’s electric grid shows an exception. By contrast, Europe’s existing infrastructure has proven attractive for Chinese investment. Greece sold a 51% stake in its Piraeus Port Authority in 2016 to China’s China Ocean Shipping Company shipping, which later increased to in 2021.

China’s competitive pricing, strategic interests and substantial financial and productive resources have extended its infrastructure influence to countries with their own expansive foreign infrastructure portfolios. Chinese firms hold stakes in Belgian, Dutch, German, Spanish and Italian , as well as European and infrastructure.

In Australia, the Port of Darwin was for 99 years in 2015 to China’s Landbridge Group, with the Australian government resisting pressure to cancel the deal. The State Grid Corporation of China and its subsidiaries, meanwhile, hold large stakes in Australia’s electricity and gas , raising national security concerns due to its close ties to Chinese military and intelligence agencies. Furthermore, China’s control over Australian has granted it valuable water rights.

The geopolitical implications of these foreign investments in infrastructure are undeniable, with national security concerns forcing China to its stake in the US Port of Long Beach in 2019. Yet such investments are only becoming more common globally. While they may strengthen economic ties between countries, they reduce accountability, risk undermining sovereignty and disconnect public services from local oversight, sidelining effective public planning in favor of enriching foreign entities.

This trend appears likely to continue, requiring more responsible approaches to maintaining a healthy balance between the necessity for infrastructure investment and public needs. Shorter contracts, profit-sharing models and performance-based agreements could help countries and companies showcase their development models and expertise — potentially even at lower costs than local providers. However, profit maximization remains the driving force, particularly when financial entities dominate the field.

[This article was produced by , a project of the Independent Media Institute.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Foreign Companies Driving the Global Privatization of Domestic Infrastructure appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Poland’s historical ties with Ukraine, rooted in shared experiences of external aggression and political transformation, have further solidified this partnership. Warsaw understands that Ukraine’s security is intrinsically tied to the stability of Central and Eastern Europe. This perspective has motivated Poland to assume a leadership role in advocating for Ukraine within NATO, the EU and other international platforms. Poland’s resolve will ultimately strengthen NATO’s eastern and provide long-term benefits for the whole of Europe, not just Ukraine.

Poland’s leadership in military aid

From military hardware to training and logistical assistance, the Poland has provided Ukraine is multifaceted. Poland has facilitated the transfer of key military equipment, including T-72 tanks with upgraded artillery systems and PT-91 Twardy tanks, which are modernized versions of Soviet-era models. Air defense systems critical to protecting Ukrainian cities from missile strikes, advanced reconnaissance drones and other modern technologies were also included.��

Moreover, Poland has hosted Ukrainian troops for advanced military . Because Ukraine is considered a neutral country – meaning it is not a part of NATO – Poland has equipped them with the skills needed to operate NATO-standard weapons and systems. This hands-on training has significantly boosted Ukraine’s operational capabilities on the battlefield. Ultimately, the hope is to align Ukrainian forces with Western standards.

Poland has also established itself as a logistical hub for military aid flowing in from other NATO countries. The geographical position of Poland allows for the rapid movement of supplies to Ukraine’s front lines. This logistical leadership ensures that Ukraine receives aid swiftly and efficiently, bypassing any bureaucratic delays that might result from a lack of proximity between aiding countries and Ukraine.

Poland is building resilient, long-term defense partnerships

Military assistance isn’t the only aid Poland is committed to providing. As a key NATO member on the alliance’s eastern frontier, Poland has been a vocal advocate about NATO’s future for Eastern Europe and Ukraine. Poland participated in several initiatives in order to strengthen the alliance’s presence in Eastern Europe. In June 2024, over from multiple NATO countries participated in joint military exercises in Poland and the Baltic region.��

In addition, Poland has urged for enhanced intelligence sharing to monitor Russian activities. Over the past year, intelligence sharing between NATO and its allies has to an unusual amount in an attempt to use it as a strategic against Russia. Despite Ukraine’s status as a non-NATO European country, NATO is now intelligence information regarding Russia. This decision came about during the first NATO-Ukraine Defence Innovation , which was hosted in and organized by Poland.

The building of defense partnerships also goes beyond the intelligence sector. Poland is heading the coordination of humanitarian aid and rebuilding efforts for Ukraine and its refugees. Over refugees have crossed from Ukraine into Poland, and have chosen to stay. of Poland’s GDP has gone to assisting Ukraine, with 4.2% going directly to refugee aid. This means Poland has granted nearly in aid to Ukraine since the start of the Russian invasion.

These factors demonstrate Poland’s broader commitment to ensuring security not just for Ukraine but for the larger region as well.�� Poland’s aid aligns with Ukraine’s long-term goals of NATO integration and enhanced self-defense capacity. Poland has also emphasized the need for NATO’s in countering hybrid threats, including and disinformation, which have been used extensively by Russia. By sharing its expertise in cybersecurity and digital defense, Poland is equipping Ukraine to face modern asymmetric threats.

Poland serves as a perfect model for defense modernization

Poland’s ambitious program, announced in July 2024, serves as an invaluable model for Ukraine. Poland’s investments in state-of-the-art technologies include the acquisition of Abrams tanks and K2 Black Panther tanks; the purchase of F-35 fighter jets to modernize its air fleet and the expansion of its missile defense systems including Patriot systems.

These advancements underscore Poland’s ability to transition from Soviet-era hardware to modern NATO-compatible systems in a timely manner. This is an evolution Ukraine must emulate in order to stay ahead of Russian offense. Poland’s domestic defense industry, including manufacturers like (Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa), offers further opportunities for joint production and technology transfer to Ukraine.

Poland must overcome challenges against deeper cooperation

While Poland’s leadership in supporting Ukraine has been widely recognized, political, economical and defense challenges remain. As a member of the EU, Poland must navigate broader political dynamics and European strategies that sometimes delay decision-making. Rising costs associated with military aid and domestic priorities pose financial challenges. In addition, Poland’s active involvement makes it a target for Russian hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks.

Despite these obstacles, Poland has proven itself a steadfast ally, demonstrating agility and resolve in responding to Ukraine’s needs. Poland has reaffirmed its position as a trustworthy and reliable ally in times of crisis. The nation’s strategic foresight and willingness to act — both formally and informally — underscore its to defending regional stability. Through its unwavering support, Poland has set a standard for proactive leadership, showing that nations of all sizes can shape the course of global security by standing firmly for sovereignty, resilience and shared values.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Poland and Ukraine: A Partnership Forged in Resilience appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The role of imperialism

Colonialism gave rise to the between developed countries (colonizers) and developing countries (colonies). These came with several facets: In , the indigenous populations faced genocide and were replaced by Europeans, bringing the settlements under the aegis of capital. Colonial empires of each colonizing country became sources of minerals and farm produce (obtained via a of surplus) and served as for manufactured commodities produced in the colonizing countries — this led to colonial while Britain import of manufactured commodities between the 18th and 19th centuries. were jointly oppressed by more than one colonizing country. Colonies also provided and to work in colonial mines and plantations.

Investment during the colonial period proceeded differently in the colonizing and colonized countries. In the colonies, investment was principally in mines, plantations and , which in tandem enabled colonies to export crops and minerals while importing manufactured commodities from the colonizing countries. The drain of surplus from the colonies not only 19th century Britain to open its domestic market for consumer goods exports from other colonizing countries (United States, Germany, France etc.), but also export capital to these other colonizing countries (, United States etc.).

The other colonizing countries deployed industrial policy whereby they initially imported capital goods from Britain but gradually ascended the technological ladder. By the 20th century, they had surpassed Britain technologically. The income deflation that British capital enforced on its colonies caused the drain of surplus to diminish. Japanese competition negatively impacted colonies’ ability to be reserve markets for British capital. Consequently, British capital tended to emphasize to the detriment of enterprise (relative to other colonizing countries) that cemented its technological lag.

After , World War I disrupted the world economy. British hegemony declined, and limited industrialization took place in some colonies, such as India. But that was also influenced by British policy designated defense procurement at the lower reaches of the technological ladder. On the other hand, increasing conflict among the colonizing powers allowed some policy space for limited industrialization in some Latin American .

When a wave of decolonization began in the middle of the 20th century, there existed several differences between the developed and the developing countries. First, there was a significant difference in average per capita income between developed and developing countries. Second, economic activities in the developing countries were principally located in the lower reaches of the technological ladder, especially production of minerals and farm produce, while the opposite was the case in the developed countries. Third, there existed a large labor surplus in the developing countries who were either unemployed, underemployed or engaged in petty production.

How has the picture changed since then? It is indisputable that the per capita income gap between developed countries and a few hitherto developing countries has declined. This group includes two types of countries.

The first is countries or territories that have small geography and populations, such as Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong. Thanks to the Soviet Union’s existence, these countries were able to form special political relationships with the US based on industrial policy after 1945. The policies ensured both market access for exports and relevant technology transfer. These countries were able to selectively ascend the technological ladder and achieve per capita income levels comparable to developed countries. Some of these gains after the 1997–1998 Asian Crisis when these US political compulsions declined following the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991.

Second, there are some oil exporting countries who have achieved high levels of per capita income. Like the first group, they have a special political relationship with the US. They have constituted themselves into the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The industrial structure of this second group is even less diversified than countries and territories in the first group.

The development experience of both these types evidently cannot be replicated in other countries. After all, the US is incapable of having a special political relationship with all developing countries.

China, a large developing country both in terms of population and land area, has experienced rapid growth. As a result, it has established a diversified industrial structure that is and an ascent of the technological ladder that is now at least to the US. But China’s per capita income level is well below that of developed countries.

As far as the other developing countries are concerned (which comprise a majority of the world’s population), their per capita income levels are either low or middle income. They still operate at the relatively lower reaches of the technological ladder and are characterized by a large labor surplus.

Therefore, the claim that the world economies are merely different in income levels but their internal functioning involves the same set of principles is empirically untenable. These differences between the developed and developing countries may be due to international (external) factors, domestic (internal) factors or some combination of both. 

In all three cases, development economics remains relevant. Let’s examine some of these themes after addressing some methodological points.

Institutions and economic development

It is being argued that the rise in per capita income levels of some developing countries and the increasing methodological convergence with mainstream economics have blurred the lines between development economics and other branches of economics. It is implied that as some countries have moved from low- to middle-income status, the unique characteristics of development economics — focused on addressing the problems of poor countries — are becoming obsolete.

Economists argue that institutions have played a key role in economic development. Our arguments in the previous section may be seen as positing the role of international institutions (imperialism) in determining the extent of diffusion of economic development.

Other , such as Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, have argued that inclusive political and economic institutions are critical for long-term sustainable development, whereas extractive institutions can stunt growth and create entrenched inequalities. Even countries with rising incomes can face stagnation or regression if their institutions remain or become weak or serve only the interests of existing elites. These views have been critiqued from .

Moreover, rising incomes can mask deeper structural issues such as decline or stagnation in life expectancy trends, inequality and deceleration in innovation. Without addressing these institutional deficiencies, some countries can easily revert to underdevelopment, political instability and systemic economic crises.

Therefore, development economics retains its distinctiveness by offering insights into how historical, social and political structures shape economic outcomes that differ across countries.

Development microeconomics and development macroeconomics

Ravi Kanbur    that “in the realm of theory and conceptualisation, many of the ‘old’ development economics perspectives on departure of individual choice behaviour from textbook rational choice theory, or of market failure, are now seen as very much part of mainstream economics debates.”

Two factors are relevant here. First, this quotation is about microeconomics. It’s true that some mainstream economists recognize that individual behavior departs from neoclassical tenets. This is the case in both developed and developing countries.

Second, the macroeconomic setting within which behavior of individuals unfolds is quite different in developed and developing countries. Eminent economists Utsa and Prabhat Patnaik that imperialism involves a set up where the production pattern of developing countries is decisively influenced by developed countries by constraining them to be open to specific types of international trade and capital flows. Consequently, farm produce and minerals, which are primarily produced in developing countries, are exported to developed countries by squeezing incomes of non-elites in developing countries. As long as this is valid, macroeconomic models of developed countries need not explicitly take into account the sector producing farm produce and minerals. Therefore, of developing countries do take into account the sector producing farm produce and minerals (often denoted as the agricultural sector in such models).

Similarly, in a world where the US dollar is the reserve currency, it does not follow that all other countries face identical external constraints. For instance, the interest rate differential between the US and other developed countries on average significantly falls short of the average interest rate differential between the US and developing countries. Consequently, the contours of trends vary between developed and developing countries.

Neoliberal globalization and inequality

The wave of neoliberal globalization that began in the 1970s involved the following aspects: First, there’s the emergence of international , centered in the US but mobile across countries. This emergence has attenuated the effectiveness of policy interventions contradictory to international finance capital’s interests. Second, there’s limited mobility of enterprise capital (involved largely in economic activities at the relatively lower reaches of the technological ladder) in areas that are principally in and around China, on account of . Third, due to the first and second factors, the share of wages in output in developed and developing countries has declined, leading to a of world demand. The wage gap between the developed and developing countries has not declined to such an extent (taking into account other elements of cost and demand) that labor arbitrage could result in a worldwide transfer of production capacity, at all levels of the technological ladder, from the developed to the developing countries.

More broadly, Amit Bhaduri that globalization has not only widened the gap between rich and poor on a global scale, but has exacerbated inequalities within both developed and developing countries. A.K. Dutt that an export-led growth model tends to confine developing countries to the lower reaches of the technological ladder, unless there is investment that furthers technological change and market access remains intact. It also results in developing countries being dependent on developed countries for commodities that are at the upper reaches of the technological ladder. The model makes developing countries more vulnerable to external shocks even if they are sector-specific, as long as this sector is key to the exports of a particular developing country.

It is worth reiterating that all countries in the world engage in export-led growth since world exports identically equal world imports. Besides, if all developing countries seek to push out exports of commodities that are produced at the lower reaches of the technological ladder then that would only contribute to the of inflation in developed countries. Bhaduri’s commentary illustrates the relevance of development economics by giving rise to a critique of export-led growth in developing countries and making the case for a domestic, demand-driven approach to economic development. Only through an industrial policy that nurtures local industries and domestic living standards can developing countries seek to attain meaningful strategic autonomy.

Since the 1970s, economic policy has been dominated by neoliberalism and has pressed working people the world over. As a result, inequality has risen, as by Pranab Bardhan. The rise in equality has principally involved capital gaining at the expense of labor. Moreover, there has been a further squeeze in the magnitude and composition of public welfare (or social wage including education, healthcare, infrastructure etc.). But this squeeze has been more pronounced in developing countries where besides the unemployed, petty producers and the underemployed a new category of a has emerged. These people are poor in spite of working full time — workers in the are an example.

Using a critical examination of neoliberalism, A.K. Dutt also seeks to a need for development strategies centered on redistribution and active state intervention in developing countries. Dutt argues that the fundamental inadequacies of neoliberal policies, by design, neglect issues of social welfare and equity. Neoliberalism places profits of firms (primarily in the developed countries) over people, failing to address the structural issues that keep developing countries trapped in poverty and inequality.

By emphasizing the importance of non-neoliberal state intervention, Dutt challenges the neoliberal orthodoxy. He goes on to propose that governments in developing countries take an active role in regulating markets, redistributing wealth and investing in public goods such as education, healthcare and infrastructure. These measures promote equitable growth and lay the foundation for more resilient economies in developing countries.

The need for context-specific development strategies

Leading economist, Dani Rodrik’s of mainstream economics underscores the critical role of development economics in making a case for inclusive development. Mainstream economic models often adopt a one-size-fits-all approach, assuming both developed and developing economies are homogeneous. This view overlooks the unique historical, institutional and social contexts of each country. This oversight is particularly harmful in the Global South, where policies grounded in such untenable generalizations have exacerbated inequality and failed to address the needs of marginalized people.

Rodrik points to the failures of neoliberal policies, such as the Structural Adjustment Programs of the 1980s and 1990s, which prioritized austerity and market liberalization without considering local realities and, arguably, their rationale. These programs often deepened poverty and eroded state capacities, demonstrating the limitations of mainstream economics. In contrast, development economics fills this gap by advocating for context-specific economic strategies.

Nobel laureate Amartya Sen the need for an inclusive approach to development. He argues that it should be measured not merely by economic growth, but by improvements in human well-being and freedom. Sen’s Capability Approach aligns with the principles of development economics, which prioritizes the expansion of human freedoms, access to education, healthcare and other social goods as central to development — issues especially relevant in developing countries.

Joseph Stiglitz, also a Nobel laureate  the failures of neoliberal policies in fostering sustainable development. He argues that laissez-faire alone cannot solve deep-rooted issues like inequality and that state intervention is crucial in providing public goods and ensuring less inequitable outcomes. Like Rodrik, Stiglitz asserts that development strategies must be context-specific, acknowledging that different countries face different barriers to growth.

These economists collectively reinforce the centrality of development economics in creating inclusive development strategies that recognize the complexities of each country’s unique difficulties. Their work emphasizes the need for economic policies that go beyond growth and efficiency, focusing instead on equity, human welfare and sustainable, context-sensitive development. By addressing these dimensions, development economics remains essential in designing pathways to more inclusive economic growth.

The case for industrial policy

Influential economist and author known for his critiques of neoliberalism and advocacy of industrial policy, Ha-Joon Chang that developed countries advocate that developing countries must adopt laissez-faire policies. Yet as previously explained, they themselves have used industrial policies to attain the status of developed countries. These trends have been well , though US policy makers have gone to great lengths to their use of industrial policy.

Chang’s critique reveals that industrial policy remains crucial for countries at every stage of economic development. Faced with the strategic challenge from China, developed countries — the US most of all — are resorting to import bans, tariffs, subsidies, export controls etc. Neoliberalism, which denies developing countries these tools, perpetuates the very structural inequalities that imperialism engenders.

Chang’s insights are particularly relevant today as many developing countries still operate in the relatively lower reaches of the technological ladder. If it challenges neoliberalism, development economics could provide a framework for promoting industrial policies that can support the long-term structural transformation these countries need for economic development.

The persistence of underdevelopment and the fallacy of convergence

Kanbur’s argument fails to account for the persistent structural barriers to convergence between rich and poor countries. According to mainstream growth models, developing countries should grow faster than developed countries if they have similar levels of technology and institutional quality. Yet convergence remains elusive for a number of reasons. First, technological levels are never the same between both sets of countries, not least because of technology controls instituted by developed countries. Second, institutional quality does vary among developed and developing countries — weak, non-participative institutions and deficits in infrastructure exist in developing countries. Mancur Olson’s on institutional inefficiencies shows how these barriers prevent convergence.

More generally, convergence between developed and developing countries if four conditions are met. First, there must be full mobility of enterprise capital across countries. Second, there must be full mobility of workers across countries. Third, exports of developing countries to developed countries must be adequately large. Fourth, consumption, especially of elites, in developing countries and composition of capital goods that constitute investment must be sufficiently elastic with respect to the relative price of domestically produced commodities vis-à-vis commodities produced in the developed countries.

Evidently, the second and fourth conditions are not satisfied. The first and third are also not satisfied despite China’s role in the world economy. This is because the share of other developing countries in and greenfield foreign direct isn’t high enough to sufficiently narrow the development gap.

Development economics as a field of resistance

Development economics remains not only relevant but essential, as developed and developing countries are linked but dissimilar. Its focus on industrial policy and context-specific policies offers the tools necessary to resist the status quo and grapple with economic development challenges in a world with no convergence.

By focusing on the structural difficulties that perpetuate poverty and inequality, development economics serves as a field of resistance, pushing back against neoliberal orthodoxy.

Needless to say, development economics is pluralist by definition. We have highlighted several diverse perspectives here, even ones we do not necessarily agree with.

The assertion that development economics has lost its distinctiveness is not just misguided, it’s reductionist. It overlooks that development economics comprises development microeconomics, development macroeconomics and related fields like international economics. Kanbur’s proposition involves the conflation of development microeconomics with the whole of development economics.

It is true that per capita income levels in some developing countries have risen. However, the gap between the average per capita income levels of both sets of countries tends to be large. Moreover, even some mainstream economists have that developing countries face a middle income trap. No matter how this middle income trap is theorized, it is the case that this is a challenge only for developing countries.

This narrow focus solely on per capita income overlooks the pervasive structural inequalities, historically persistent divergences and the adverse impact of neoliberalism that continue to shape the world economy. Far from obsolete, development economics remains indispensable in addressing these multifaceted issues.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Enduring Relevance of Development Economics in an Unequal World appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The extremist groups threaten to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and spread instability across Africa. This is terrible for Africa and poses significant security and financial risks for the United States and Europe as well. Of the over three million refugees and internally displaced people in the Sahel, one in five needs humanitarian assistance. That’s around 16,000 victims in 2022 and 19,000 in 2023. Indeed, this conflict has taken a heavy toll.

This escalation of violence is mainly linked to competition between the region’s two main jihadist groups: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP), which are affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, respectively. Jointly with other groups, they have taken advantage of the great instability in the region to launch indiscriminate on government forces and civilians.

Coups and rebellions escalate the violence

Experts attribute the expansion of violent extremism in the Sahel to weak governance, high corruption, democratic deficits and human rights violations combined with poverty and social marginalization. State power tends to be concentrated in urban regions while rural and northern areas, such as Mali, remain underdeveloped and ripe for exploitation by extremist groups. Simultaneously, the jihadist collective has sought to the increase in violence across the central Sahel, positioning itself as the defender of local communities and obtaining their support.

Moreover, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger experienced many military coups since independence. Recent military coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023 have redefined the political landscape.

Current instability is associated with the collapse of the Libyan state in 2011, which led to the proliferation of weapons and armed fighters in the region. In 2012, the influx of extremists into northern Mali reignited the dormant  — the Tuareg minority, organized under the Azawad National Liberation Movement, sought an autonomous state and aligned with multiple Islamist groups.

On September 17, 2024, Islamist armed fighters attacked two symbolic sites for the security in the Malian capital of Bamako: a gendarmerie school and a military base, causing about 77 casualties and hundreds injured. JNIM, the main jihadist group active in Mali, quickly claimed responsibility for the double attack. This follows a pattern of escalating violent incidents in the Bamako area in the past two years by the JNIM coalition, primarily the Macina Liberation Front.

This growing pressure on Bamako reflects a broader deterioration of security in Mali under the military junta. Recently, militant Islamist groups have demonstrated an to expand their into southern Mali from their fortifications in northern and central Mali. The Malian government intends to operations against the jihadists.

Do these attacks mark a turning point in the jihadists’ strategy? This is not an easy question to answer. The scale and impact of the September 27 operation show that JNIM now has the capacity not only to strike secondary urban sites, but to shake up the Malian forces in Bamako by expanding military operations to the state’s center.

Western withdrawal from the Sahel

This instability has had a major effect at the international level. In 2022, the definitive breakdown of diplomatic relations between France and Mali prompted French President Emmanuel Macron to announce the withdrawal of French troops from Malian territory. That November, the French military mission Opération Barkhane, which had deployed in the Sahel since August 2014, officially concluded. This profound revision of the region’s French military apparatus is in turn causing a for the entire security framework built by the international community over the last decade.

The US has also provided coordination and advisory support. The US military has increased its presence in the Sahel in the last decade, deploying approximately 1,500 troops to the region — particularly Niger. However, after making an agreement with a Nigerien military junta in May 2024, the US withdrew from Niger in September.

In June 2023, Mali’s government demanded the departure of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the UN peacekeeping force. The UN agreed to withdraw within six months, doing so in December 2023. This development raised of a power vacuum and setbacks for Mali’s transition to civilian rule.

The July 2023 coup in Niger dealt a severe blow to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts in the Sahel. Despite pressure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), including sanctions and the threat of military intervention, the coup leaders refused to cede power and declared a new government. In response, the African Union �����������.

However, some of the sanctions were recently lifted or eased as ECOWAS pushed for a new dialogue. Military regimes in Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali have backed the Nigerien junta, with the latter two considering a possible military intervention in Niger to be a “declaration of war.” In September 2023, the military leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger signed a mutual defense pact — the Alliance of Sahel States — solidifying, in recent months, their alliance against external intervention.

Russian movement into Africa

This “authoritarian epidemic,” which the Italian Institute for International Political Studies characterizes by the seizure of power by the military, is mainly due to the persistence of the security crisis. This has delegitimized civilian governments that are demonstrably incapable of responding to growing security pressures. Jihadist escalation and the authoritarian and nationalist drift of local governments have finally created the ideal conditions for an influential increase of other international actors in the region, starting with Russia. These military regimes have strengthened ties with the Asian power, which has moved in to fill the void.

The most obvious element of this Russian entry is the presence of mercenaries belonging to the private security company . The government in Bamako uses them to conduct counterinsurgency operations increasingly characterized by indiscriminate brutality committed against civilians.

Russia’s “African renaissance” seems able to increase, based on an economic and military diplomacy that exploits anti-French and anti-Western sentiments. It seduces part of the African elite, attracts old and new partners, winks at coup-plotting juntas and has supplanted France as the gendarme of countries in turmoil in its historic pré carré — “own little corner.” Russia’s representation is that of a just ally eager to create egalitarian ties with African countries, capable of emancipating them from the relationship with European powers. The opposition to “imperialism” present in Russian rhetoric creates further common ground between the country and the Sahelian military juntas.

The presence of the Wagner group, and now of the Russian , initially called to operate against the jihadists, now has the function of supporting the coup juntas. The numerous internal and external involved in this conflict, as well as the competition between global powers to increase their influence in Africa, make finding a solution extremely difficult.

In this framework, Ukraine’s involvement in the crisis is experiencing an increasingly pronounced setback. In August 2024, the three Sahelian military juntas wrote to the United Nations Security Council to allegedly denounce Kyiv’s intervention in Mali to support Tuareg rebellion. After Mali and Niger diplomatic relations with Ukraine, the Asian country received yet more confirmation that its image had been damaged: Andriy Yusov, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian military intelligence services, Kyiv had provided information for the JNIM and Tuareg rebels’ attack on the Malian army.

Learning that Ukraine is collaborating with its enemies, purely in an anti-Russian function, has raised concerns even outside the Sahel. Despite being amid a diplomatic crisis with the three coup juntas, ECOWAS has spoken out against any form of foreign interference.

Excessive militarization has proven counterproductive. In fact, local populations affected by repeated human rights violations have all confidence in international intervention as well as in international institutions.

The French era seems to have passed in what was once its African “backyard,” substituted by the Africa Corps that serves as the engine of Russian military penetration in Africa. The geopolitical revolution engulfing the Global South is redrawing global spheres of influence. Will this lead to a strategic downgrading of the West?

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Violence in the Sahel: Africa’s Never-Ending Crisis appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Republics have suffered total collapses throughout history. There’s no reason why the US should be immune. The fear of that often prompts a superficial reference to the final fall of the Roman Republic or the end of Greek democracy. But there’s a deeper history: Republics came into being far earlier in Middle Eastern and Mediterranean civilizations. And we can draw from a much wider range of examples to learn from as we try to understand the challenges and the opportunities.

A true republic is a political system without monarchy or concentrated political power in any office, branch or individual. Elected officials represent citizens to make decisions on their behalf, with separate branches of government providing checks and balances. While many associate republics with direct democracy in our times, there’s a much wider array of power structures that developed in the formative era of republics.

The 20th century established republics as the global standard. Monarchies declined after World War I and most former European colonies declared independence as republics following World War II. Fascist and communist countries, which centralized power in individuals or ruling parties, also reduced in number.

Despite their concentration of power, however, many fascist and communist states claimed the title of republics. While countries out of 193 identify as republics today, far less uphold republican principles and blend them effectively with democracy. Examining the historical evolution of republics highlights those best positioned to serve as the most resilient modern examples.

Republics require regular gatherings and assemblies, making them difficult to establish in sparsely populated agrarian societies, while empires generally concentrate power too heavily for self-rule to gain traction. It was in smaller city-states, particularly trade-focused ones, where citizens could form factions, exchange ideas and influence government decisions and rules for commerce.

The invention of republican ideals

Some of the earliest experiments with republican governance appeared in ancient Sumerian city-states (4500–2000 BC), centered in modern-day Iraq. Kings acted more as neutral rather than rulers, sharing power with aristocratic families and groups, as well as common citizens. In Kish, citizens could a new king during crises. In Uruk, assemblies of townsmen and elders had to ratify major military decisions.

The Sumerian city-states fell to the Akkadian and Babylonian Empires by 1750 BC. Phoenician city-states, emerging about 250 years later in what is now Lebanon, revived republican ideals. Here, monarchical power was often with a merchant class and citizen council. Egyptian records dating to the mid-14th century BC describe Phoenician cities sending delegates to represent citizens rather than monarchs, with mentions of and aid requests by the “men of Arwad” and “elders of Irqata.”

By the 6th century BC, the Phoenician city of Tyre had functioned for seven years without a monarch, governed instead under suffetes, or judges, elected for short terms. In Chios, a “people’s council” allowed citizens to debate laws and hold officials accountable. However, beginning in the 9th century BC and continuing over the next few centuries, Phoenician city-states were successively conquered or subjugated by the Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian and Macedonian Empires.

Like other civilizations, Phoenicians established colonies and trading posts. Carthage, founded by Tyre in 814 BC in modern Tunisia, grew into a powerful city-state with its own . By the early 7th century BC, two elected suffetes from aristocratic families replaced the monarchy. They governed alongside an aristocratic Senate, while newer merchants could gain influence and a popular assembly allowed citizens’ input on major decisions. Military and religious leaders also held considerable power.

Republican ideals weren’t confined to Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. Buddhist texts like the Maha Parinibbana Sutta mention Indian republics called in the 6th century BC. Some adopted republican styles of government, while others formed republican confederations, like Sumerian and Phoenician city-states, to make decisions collectively and protect against larger threats. The Indian republics were gradually absorbed by the Maurya Empire (321–185 BC) and other entities.

Greece and Rome evolved republics

Ancient Greek city-states also developed republican ideals. Sparta was governed by a constitution and popular assembly as early as 600 BC, though it remained largely monarchical. Athens established a direct democracy in 507 BC, known as demokratia, meaning “people” and “rule.” Greece’s slave-based economy allowed some citizens time to participate in politics, though this limited political fairness. In 431 BC, Attica, the region surrounding Athens, had an estimated population of 315,000, of which only 172,000 were citizens, and just 40,000 male citizens could vote.

Still, Athens’s allowed these citizens to frequently debate, deliberate and vote. They were overseen by the Council of Five Hundred, which was chosen annually by lot to draft laws and manage administration. However, following Athens’s Golden Age, 4th century BC Greek like Plato and Aristotle, and later 2nd century BC historians like Polybius, criticized the system for inefficiency and vulnerability to charismatic leaders to sway public opinion, leading to volatile policy shifts.

They emphasized balancing public, aristocracy, and monarchical roles to avoid the typical of chaos and order: First, a strong leader unites a restive society under a monarchy, which evolves into tyranny. It is overthrown and replaced by an aristocracy, which reduces into oligarchy. Democracy eventually replaces it but deteriorates into mob rule, restarting the cycle.

Invasions further weakened Greece’s republican and democratic systems. In 338 BC, Greece fell under the control of the Macedonian Empire, ending the independence of many city-states. Despite this, Greek states formed republican confederations to protect against threats, including the neighboring Roman Republic. The term republic derives from the Roman res publica, meaning “public affairs” — this emphasizes shared governance, civic participation and checks and balances. Since its founding in 509 BC, the Roman Republic’s political structure had evolved considerably. Polybius expressed for Rome’s system; two tribunes were elected annually to represent the common citizens, while two consuls were elected and held executive power, checked by an aristocratic senate.

Romans were skeptical of Greek democracy, especially in Athens, due to its instability, infighting and mob rule. Carthage’s republic seemed overly commercial and lacked the civic loyalty the Romans valued. This loyalty was central to Rome’s military, staffed by a citizen army motivated by . In contrast, Carthage’s strong, citizen-led navy protected trade routes, but its reliance on mercenaries for land campaigns made them costly and unpredictable.

These factors reduced the ability to push back against Roman rule. By 146 BC, Rome defeated both Greece and Carthage, cementing its dominance and expanding political system. Polybius suggests that Rome’s success over Carthage was partially due to its powerful, aristocratic Senate, while Carthage’s policies were increasingly shaped by popular influence. He believed that Rome’s decisions were made by elites versus the influence of the masses in Carthage.

Yet by this time, Rome was approaching its Late Republic phase. Scholar Harriet Flower’s argues that the Roman Republic wasn’t a single entity but a series of six republics, each with unique political characteristics. Others have also challenged the notion of a single Roman Republic, placing Republican Rome into three main periods characterized by changing centers of power.

The Early Republic (509–367 BC) was marked by tensions between patricians (aristocratic elites) and plebeians (common citizens). The struggle for plebeian rights led to significant reforms, including the establishment of tribunes, elected by the to represent common interests and often from the plebeian class.

During the Middle Republic (367–133 BC), the Licinian-Sextian laws of 367 BC were passed to again alleviate tensions between patricians and plebeians, limiting patrician land ownership, providing debt relief for plebeians and ensuring that at least one of the two consuls was a plebeian. However, political power increasingly concentrated in the Senate, undermining these reforms.

During the Late Republic (133–31 BC), Rome’s military success over rivals coincided with the growing influence of ordinary citizens in the judicial system, especially as jurors. Yet the republic was plagued by social conflict, corruption and civil unrest. Sulla’s march on Rome in 88 BC and his curtailing of the tribunes’ power exemplified rising instability. Afterwards, figures like in the ’70s BC and Julius Caesar in 59 BC began consolidating power, further undermining republican values. In 27 BC, Augustus formally transitioned Rome into an empire, while maintaining the of republican traditions.

Roman orator Cicero, a prominent defender of the Republic, inadvertently its demise through his support for Augustus, endorsement of dictatorial powers and willingness to suspend legal norms during crises, showing the dangers of sacrificing republican ideals to manage turmoil. For the next few centuries, republican ideals were largely sidelined.

The rise of modern republics

The collapse of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD saw and monarchies spread across its former territories and peripheral regions. This instability nonetheless allowed new republics to emerge, such as Venice, founded in 697 AD. It maintained a 1,100-year run as a through a political system that encouraged merchant participation and representation, shrewd diplomacy, social mobility, community cohesion and an extensive trade network. France eventually conquered it in 1797.

During the Italian Renaissance (14th to 17th centuries), urbanization, advancements in communication and Enlightenment ideals enabled the rise of new city-states. Merchant classes and other groups established republican systems as alternatives to European monarchies elsewhere as well. However, they were ultimately absorbed by empires, partly due to their inability to exploit the expanding Atlantic trade routes that reduced the importance of the Mediterranean.

Republics were not confined to Europe. The in modern-day Malaysia, particularly the Lanfang Republic declared in 1777, arose when Chinese settlers recruited by local sultans for mining formed companies to safeguard their interests. Over time, they evolved into self-governing territories with elected leaders and various levels of democratic governance. The Lanfang Republic was eventually defeated by Dutch colonial forces in 1884, with the rest absorbed through treaty or militarily defeated by the century’s end.

The establishment of the US marked the reemergence of the large-scale republican state. In 1787, after the American Revolution, the nation formally became a constitutional republic, aiming to eliminate monarchy while avoiding a chaotic direct democracy. The Founding Fathers created a , balancing public participation with safeguards against aristocracy and emphasizing consent of the governed (though limited to white male landowners). The debates over constitutional amendments and expanding democracy for decades, paralleling similar discussions in post-Revolutionary France after 1789.

Today, many republics exist, but their authenticity and stability can be compromised. Being conquered imposes outside authority, while others pursue foreign expansion themselves, centralizing control and subjugating other territories. Republics such as those in 16th century Netherlands, 17th century England and 18th century US and France grew into empires or reverted to monarchies, adapting in ways whose lessons are still relevant today. These expansionist policies, often justified as essential for wealth and security, led to the abandonment of certain republican and democratic principles.

Risks of devolution

Republics can shift toward authoritarianism, with modern policymakers perceiving more open democratic systems as unstable and vulnerable to manipulation. In recent years, China and Russia have seen reductions in public accountability, civil liberties, meaningful political participation and concentrations of power behind Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, respectively. In North Korea, power has been concentrated in the leader’s office since its founding, with leadership passed within the Kim family. Similarly, a dynasty has developed under the Aliyev family in since the 1990s, with concerns that may follow.

Countries with strong presidential systems, common in the Americas, risk in the executive branch. Fixed terms limit the removal of unpopular leaders, since, unlike in parliamentary democracies, no “confidence vote” mechanism exists for crisis situations. can also weaken checks and balances; coups can be common.

Alliances and federations of Greek city-states like the and , as well as the Native American , formed assemblies and councils for representation and collective decision-making, influencing models like the and European Union (EU). The statement that the US is “a republic, not a democracy” reflects the original aim to keep political power within the states rather than the federal government. However, authority has increasingly centralized in Washington, DC, reducing state sovereignty, tensions in the EU between individual states and Brussels.

Political apathy and extremism can also stem from the influence of billionaires and corporations over the political process, government corruption and the erosion of social mobility. Social media platforms offer the chance for heightened political participation, but are increasingly vulnerable to disinformation spread by big tech and political actors. This reveals new ways in which democracies can veer toward .

The diversity of republics today reflects their historical variety, with countries still navigating the governance structures in their own contexts. Kazakhstan, initially authoritarian, has seen some toward a more balanced system with a more powerful parliament following popular protests in 2022, though it remains less democratic. Similarly, Singapore, often described as authoritarian, is still considered a republic due to some , maintaining a blend of controlled leadership and political structure.

The future of republic governance

An informed and engaged citizenry, supported by a strong economic base, is essential for a successful republic. Citizens must feel the benefits of their system, and these must endure through fair elections, the rule of law and due process. Effective foreign policy also relies on wide-ranging trade networks and adaptable alliances, while maintaining a strong military and avoiding military overreach or falling into the trap of foreign conquest.

Historically, empire and monarchy have been more common than republics, shaping world order through hierarchical and anarchic systems. Within the global United Nations framework, which is designed to support the sovereignty and equality of nations — a principle rooted in republican ideals — republics can govern more democratically by collaborating in a way similar to ancient confederations. The Achaean League and Lycian League consisted of states with varying political systems cooperating within a loose, republican-style confederation. Modern blocs like the EU, Association of Southeast Asian Nations and African Union allow countries to work together under common principles and boost their voice in the international system.

Changes in domestic politics have seen the growth of in the 2010s, as more referendums and popular votes of legislative and constitutional issues emerged globally, but especially in Europe. While larger republics like the US, Germany and India still avoid national-level votes on major issues, direct democracy is increasingly apparent at regional and local levels. Challenges remain in terms of deliberation and integration, as states like California and Arizona have seen ballot initiatives rushed, leaving limited time for meaningful debate.

Modern , based on those originating thousands of years ago, have also elevated these referendums in recent years and provided an alternative to traditional political processes. They have influenced major policy changes, from climate policies in France to abortion laws in Ireland, with assemblies, typically convened by legislative bodies in partnership with nonprofits, designed to reflect demographics. While they have led to concrete policy shifts, some recommendations have not been adopted as lawmakers cite the importance of expert-led decision-making.

With the US election behind us, reassessing republican ideals, both domestically and globally, is crucial. As the Grand Old Party potentially gains control over all three branches of government in a divided nation, how it implements policies will either ease concerns or amplify them. The future of republicanism depends on the US shaping its domestic agenda for the common good and using its influence on the global stage in line with democratic principles.

[, a project of the Independent Media Institute, produced this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post What Are Republics, Exactly? It’s a Good Time to Learn appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Fast forward 75 years. The world has changed dramatically, yet NATO persists as a relic of a bygone era. The Soviet Union is no more, replaced by a Russia with a GDP than Italy’s. The European Union, along with the United Kingdom, boasts a combined economy nearly ten times the size of Russia’s. France and the UK possess their own nuclear deterrents. Yet, inexplicably, US taxpayers continue to foot the bill for Europe’s defense.

With Russia weakened, Europe is getting a free ride

Some argue that Russia’s actions in recent years, particularly its invasion of Ukraine, justify the US’s continued NATO membership. They paint a picture of a resurgent Russian threat, echoing the Cold War narratives of the past. But this comparison falls flat when we examine the facts.

During the Cold War, the US faced off against an empire of comparable might. The Soviet Union’s military and economic power posed a genuine threat to both Western Europe and US interests. �մǻ岹��’s Russia, however, is a shadow of its former self. With a GDP of about , it pales in comparison to the combined economic might of the and the , which totals more than $22 trillion.

Moreover, the population demographics tell a similar story. Russia’s population is less than , dwarfed by that of the EU and UK totaling more than 500 million. The combined military spending of the and stands at $370 billion, far outstripping Russia’s total defense budget of . Yet, despite these advantages, Europe continues to rely on the United States for its security.

Ironically, the US’s persistent role in NATO may be making Europe less secure, not more. What matters for European defense isn’t raw might, but speed, agility and political will. NATO’s cumbersome decision-making process, requiring consensus among 32 members, is ill-suited to respond to modern threats. An army of motivated Polish and German fighters willing to fight and die to protect their freedom is a far greater deterrent to Russia than a US military that is truly awesome in its capabilities, but reliant on the whims of a foot-dragging US Congress for that to translate to the battlefield. The current arrangement doesn’t strengthen Europe; it weakens it, leaving the continent less prepared to address threats from Russia and elsewhere.

While US citizens shoulder the burden of NATO’s defense spending, Europeans have grown complacent. They’ve built generous welfare states where they enjoy long vacations, early retirements and universal healthcare. Meanwhile, US workers struggle with rising healthcare costs, minimal paid leave and relentless anxiety about how they will pay the bills.

This disparity is not just a matter of different priorities; it’s a direct result of Europe’s ability to skimp on defense spending, knowing full well that Uncle Sam will always be there to pick up the slack. It’s time to ask: Why should the US taxpayer subsidize Europe’s lavish lifestyle?

A new era demands new priorities

Proponents of NATO often point to the US’s nuclear umbrella as a critical component of European security. But this argument ignores a crucial fact: Both the UK and France possess their own nuclear arsenals, which was not the case when NATO was formed. These two European powers have more than enough nuclear capability to deter any potential aggressor. The idea that US nuclear weapons are necessary for European security is a Cold War anachronism that does not stand up to scrutiny.

As we approach 2025, the world faces challenges that were unimaginable when NATO was founded. Climate change, cyber and biological warfare and the rotting minds of our children addicted to social media platforms like and like Fortnite are the true existential threats of our time. These are the battles that will define the 21st century and beyond, not a rehash of 20th century geopolitics. If there is a new Cold War between rival superpowers, it exists across the North Pacific, not the North Atlantic.

It’s better for the US to leave

Some will argue that leaving NATO is too risky, that it could destabilize Europe and embolden Russia. But this view underestimates Europe’s capabilities and overestimates Russia’s. By continuing its outdated commitment to NATO, the US is fostering dependency and resentment, preventing Europe from developing the military self-reliance it needs.

Proponents of NATO often point to its invocation of Article 5 after the September 11 attacks as proof of the alliance’s value. However, this argument ignores a crucial reality: The response to the attacks would have happened with or without NATO. When faced with acts of aggression that demand a response, the United States has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to rapidly form and provide leadership to coalitions outside of formal alliance structures.

The First Gulf War in 1991 serves as a prime example. In response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the US quickly assembled a coalition of 42 nations, many of whom were not NATO members. This “coalition of the willing” included fighters from countries as diverse as Japan, New Zealand and Afghanistan. The swift and effective formation of this coalition underscores a fundamental truth: When genuine threats arise, nations band together to address them, which can be easier without the cumbersome framework of an organization like NATO.

Game theory offers another compelling reason for the US to leave: the strategic value of . In a world of mass surveillance where concealing actions is increasingly difficult, being predictable can be a significant disadvantage. Consider a poker game where one player always has a pair of kings, while the other has queens or aces with equal probability. Despite each player having the stronger hand half the time, the unpredictable player will on average win more.

This principle applies similarly to military strategy. NATO’s rigid structure and well-defined protocols make its responses predictable. By leaving NATO, the US introduces an element of uncertainty that can serve as a more effective deterrent. Potential adversaries would no longer be able to rely on a known command and control structure or anticipate specific responses. This unpredictability can in turn force adversaries to be more cautious, preventing conflicts before they begin.

Moreover, while it is true that P implies Q does not mean the same as not P implies not Q, there is often an implicit assumption that it does. By the United States declaring “If there is an attack on a NATO country, there will be an overwhelming response from the United States” it suggests to potential enemies that “If there is an attack on a non-NATO country, the United States will not respond with overwhelming force.” This is clearly seen in Ukraine, where Putin is in plain sight employing the principle: “Ukraine not NATO, therefore Ukraine fair game.”

The reality on the ground is that the Iron curtain no longer exists and we live in a world with fuzzy borders and hybrid warfare. The correct response to this is illustrated regarding Taiwan. Will America go to war to defend Taiwan? It might. That should be the answer to every question of that form. Will America go to war over a sabotaged undersea cable or gas pipeline? It might. Will it go to war over an act of terrorism? It might. Will America go to war to defend Europe? It might. America should go to war when the American President and Congress decide that it should, not because of a treaty from three quarters of a century ago born of a different age. By withdrawing from NATO, the United States would put Ukraine on equal footing with not just Poland but also France and Germany, and be a masterstroke of expanding not contracting American influence.

In essence, by stepping away from NATO, the US would paradoxically enhance global security by keeping potential aggressors guessing about the nature and extent of possible responses to their actions.

It’s time to go

The time has come for bold leadership. President-elect Donald Trump’s landslide victory and Republican control of Congress provide a unique opportunity to reshape the US’s foreign policy. The nation must seize this moment to chart a new course. Leaving NATO will not only serve the interests of the US taxpayer, it will also help Europe by teaching it the pride of taking care of its own needs with its own hard work.

The US’s departure from NATO won’t be easy. It will require careful diplomacy, detailed planning and time. But it is a necessary step for both the US and Europe to address the real challenges of the 21st century.

And to those reading this in a nice coffee shop in a town square in Europe, I say this: If you want to continue enjoying your wine and your swimming pools, and your relaxed way of life, it’s time for you to fight for it — and pay for it — yourself.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post It’s Time for the US To Bid Farewell to NATO appeared first on 51�Թ�.

To make that forecast, the historian conducted what he called “a more realistic assessment of domestic and global trends.” Starting with the global context, he argued that, “faced with a fading superpower,” China, India, Iran, and Russia would all start to “provocatively challenge U.S. dominion over the oceans, space, and cyberspace.” At home in the US, domestic divisions would “widen into violent clashes and divisive debates… Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair, a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric, demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal.” That historian concluded, “the world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.”

Now that a “far-right patriot,” one President-elect Donald Trump, has indeed captured (or rather recaptured) the presidency “with thundering rhetoric,” let’s explore the likelihood that a second Trump term in office, starting in the fateful year 2025, might actually bring a hasty end, silent or otherwise, to an “American Century” of global dominion.

Making the original prediction

Let’s begin by examining the reasoning underlying my original prediction. (Yes, I was the historian.) Back in 2010, when I picked a specific date for a rising tide of US decline, this country looked unassailably strong both at home and abroad. President Barack Obama’s administration was producing a “post-racial” society. After recovering from the 2008 financial crisis, the US was on track for a decade of dynamic growth — the auto industry saved, oil and gas production booming, the tech sector thriving, the stock market soaring and employment solid. Internationally, Washington was the world’s preeminent leader, with an unchallenged military, formidable diplomatic clout, unchecked economic globalization and its democratic governance still the global norm.

Looking forward, leading historians of the empire agreed that the US would remain the world’s sole superpower for the foreseeable future. Writing in the Financial Times in 2002, Yale professor Paul Kennedy, author of a widely-read book on imperial decline, that “America’s array of force is staggering,” with a mix of economic, diplomatic and technological dominance that made it the globe’s “single superpower” without peer in the entire history of the world. Russia’s defense budget had “collapsed” and its economy was “less than that of the Netherlands.” Should China’s high growth rates continue for another 30 years, it “might be a serious challenger to U.S. predominance” — but that wouldn’t be true until 2032, if then. While the US’s “unipolar moment” would surely not “continue for centuries,” its end, he predicted, “seems a long way off for now.”

Writing in a similar vein in The New York Times in February 2010, Piers Brendon, a historian of Britain’s imperial decline, the “doom mongers” who “conjure with Roman and British analogies in order to trace the decay of American hegemony.” While Rome was riven by “internecine strife” and Britain ran its empire on a shoestring budget, the US was “constitutionally stable” with “an enormous industrial base.” Taking a few “relatively simple steps,” he concluded, Washington should be able to overcome current budgetary problems and perpetuate its global power indefinitely.

When I made my very different prediction nine months later, I was coordinating a of 140 historians from universities on three continents who were studying the decline of earlier empires — particularly those of Britain, France and Spain. Beneath the surface of this country’s seeming strength, we could already see the telltale signs of decline that had led to the collapse of those earlier empires.

By 2010, economic globalization was cutting good-paying factory jobs here, income inequality was widening and corporate bailouts were booming — all essential ingredients for rising working-class resentment and deepening domestic divisions. Foolhardy military misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, pushed by Washington elites trying to deny any sense of decline, stoked simmering anger among ordinary US citizens, slowly discrediting the very idea of international commitments. And the erosion of the US’s relative economic strength from half the world’s output in 1950 to a quarter in 2010 meant the wherewithal for its unipolar power was fading fast.

Only a “near-peer” competitor was needed to turn that attenuating US global hegemony into accelerating imperial decline. With rapid economic growth, a vast population and the world’s longest imperial tradition, China seemed primed to become just such a country. But back then, Washington’s foreign policy elites thought not and even admitted China to the World Trade Organization (WTO), that “U.S. power and hegemony could readily mold China to the United States’ liking.”

Our group of historians, mindful of the frequent imperial wars fought when near-peer competitors finally confronted the reigning hegemon of their moment — think Germany vs Great Britain in World War I — expected China’s challenge would not be long in coming. Indeed, in 2012, just two years after my prediction, the US National Intelligence Council that “China alone will probably have the largest economy, surpassing that of the United States a few years before 2030” and this country would no longer be “a hegemonic power.”

Just a year later, Chinese President Xi Jinping, drawing on a massive in foreign-exchange reserves accumulated in the decade after joining the WTO, announced his bid for global power. This would come in the form of what he called “the ,” history’s largest development program. It was designed to make Beijing the center of the global economy.

In the following decade, the US–China rivalry would become so intense that, last September, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall : “I’ve been closely watching the evolution of [China’s] military for 15 years. China is not a future threat; China is a threat today.”

The global rise of the strongman

Another major setback for Washington’s world order, long legitimated by its promotion of democracy (whatever its own dominating tendencies), came from the rise of populist strongmen worldwide. Consider them part of a nationalist reaction to the West’s aggressive economic globalization.

At the close of the Cold War in 1991, Washington became the planet’s sole superpower, using its hegemony to forcefully promote a wide-open global economy — forming the in 1995, pressing open-market “” on developing economies and knocking down tariff barriers worldwide. It also built a global communications grid by 700,000 miles of fiber-optic submarine cables and then 1,300 satellites (now 4,700).

By exploiting that very globalized economy, however, China’s soared to $3.2 trillion by 2016, surpassing both the US and Japan, while simultaneously 2.4 million US jobs between 1999 and 2011, ensuring the closure of factories in countless towns across the South and Midwest. By fraying social safety nets while eroding protection for labor unions and local businesses in both the US and Europe, globalization reduced the quality of life for many, while creating inequality on a staggering scale and stoking a working-class reaction that would crest in a global wave of angry populism.

Riding that wave, right-wing populists have been winning a steady succession of elections — in Russia in 2000, Israel in 2009, Hungary in 2010, China in 2012, Turkey in 2014, the Philippines and the US in 2016, Brazil in 2018, Italy in 2022, the Netherlands in 2023, Indonesia and the US again in 2024.

Set aside their incendiary us-vs-them rhetoric, however, and look at their actual achievements and those right-wing demagogues turn out to have a record that can only be described as dismal. In Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro the vast Amazon rainforest and left office amid an . In Russia, President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, his country’s economy to capture some more land (which it hardly lacked). In Turkey, President Recep Erdoğan caused a crippling , while 50,000 suspected opponents. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte 30,000 suspected drug users and China by giving up his country’s claims in the resource-rich South China Sea. In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has wreaked havoc on Gaza and neighboring lands, in part to in office and stay out of prison.

Prospects for Donald Trump’s second term

After the steady erosion of its global power for several decades, the US is no longer the — or perhaps even an — “exceptional” nation floating above the deep global currents that shape the politics of most countries. And as it has become more of an ordinary country, it has also felt the full force of the worldwide move toward strongman rule. Not only does that global trend help explain Trump’s election and his recent re-election, but it provides some clues as to what he’s likely to do with that office the second time around.

In the globalized world the US made, there is now an intimate interaction between domestic and international policy. That will soon be apparent in a second Trump administration whose policies are likely to simultaneously damage the country’s economy and further degrade Washington’s world leadership.

Let’s start with the clearest of his commitments: environmental policy. During the recent election campaign, Trump climate change “a scam” and his transition team has already drawn up to exit from the Paris climate accords. By quitting that agreement, the US will abdicate any leadership role when it comes to the most consequential issue facing the international community while reducing pressure on China to curb its greenhouse gas emissions. Since these two countries now account for (45%) of global carbon emissions, such a move will ensure that the world blows past the target of keeping this planet’s temperature rise to C until the end of the century. Instead, on a planet that’s already had 12 recent of just such a temperature rise, that mark is expected to be permanently reached by perhaps 2029. That is the year Trump finishes his second term.

On the domestic side of climate policy, Trump last September that he would “terminate the Green New Deal, which I call the Green New Scam, and rescind all unspent funds under the misnamed Inflation Reduction Act.” On the day after his election, he committed himself to increasing the country’s oil and gas production, a celebratory crowd, “We have more liquid gold than any country in the world.” He will undoubtedly also wind farm leases on Federal lands and the $7,500 tax credit for purchasing an electrical vehicle.

As the world shifts to renewable energy and all-electric vehicles, Trump’s policies will undoubtedly do lasting damage to the US economy. In 2023, the International Renewable Energy Agency that, amid continuing price decreases, wind and solar power now generate electricity for less than half the cost of fossil fuels. Any attempt to slow the conversion of this country’s utilities to the most cost-effective form of energy runs a serious risk of ensuring that US-made products will be ever less competitive.

To put it bluntly, he seems to be proposing that electricity users here should pay twice as much for their power as those in other advanced nations. Similarly, as relentless engineering innovation makes electric vehicles cheaper and more reliable than petroleum-powered ones, attempting to slow such an energy transition is likely to make the US automotive industry uncompetitive at home and abroad.

Calling tariffs “the greatest thing ever invented,” Trump has slapping a 20% duty on all foreign goods and 60% on those from China. In another instance of domestic–foreign synergy, such duties will undoubtedly end up crippling US farm exports, thanks to retaliatory overseas tariffs. Simultaneously, it will dramatically raise the cost of consumer goods for US citizens, stoking inflation and slowing consumer spending.

Reflecting his to alliances and military commitments, Trump’s first foreign policy initiative will likely be an attempt to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine. During a CNN town hall meeting in May 2023, he he could stop the fighting “in 24 hours.” Last July, he : “I would tell [Ukrainian President] Zelenskyy, no more. You got to make a deal.”

Just two days after the November 5 election, Trump reportedly Putin over a phone call “not to escalate the war in Ukraine and reminded him of Washington’s sizable military presence in Europe.” Drawing on sources inside the Trump transition team, the Wall Street Journal that the new administration is considering “cementing Russia’s seizure of 20% of Ukraine” and forcing Kyiv to forego its bid to join NATO, perhaps for as long as 20 years.

With Russia drained of manpower and its economy pummeled by three years of bloody warfare, a competent negotiator — should Trump actually appoint one — might indeed be able to bring a tenuous peace to a ravaged Ukraine. Since it has been Europe’s frontline of defense against a revanchist Russia, the continent’s major powers would be expected to play a . But Germany’s coalition government has just collapsed; French President Emmanuel Macron is crippled by recent electoral reverses and the NATO alliance, after three years of a shared commitment to Ukraine, faces real uncertainty with the advent of a Trump presidency.

US allies

Those impending negotiations over Ukraine highlight the paramount importance of alliances for US global power. For 80 years, from World War II through the Cold War and beyond, Washington relied on bilateral and multilateral alliances as a critical force multiplier. With China and Russia both rearmed and increasingly closely aligned, reliable allies have become even more important to maintaining Washington’s global presence. With 32 member nations representing a billion people and a commitment to mutual defense that has lasted 75 years, NATO is arguably the most powerful military alliance in modern history.

Yet Trump has long been sharply critical of it. As a candidate in 2016, he the alliance “obsolete.” As president, he mocked the treaty’s mutual-defense clause, even “tiny” Montenegro could drag the US into war. While campaigning last February, he that he would tell Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to a NATO ally that didn’t pay what he considered its fair share.

Right after Trump’s election, caught between what one analyst “an aggressively advancing Russia and an aggressively withdrawing America,” Macron insisted that the continent needed to be a “more united, stronger, more sovereign Europe in this new context.” Even if the new administration doesn’t formally withdraw from NATO, Trump’s repeated hostility, particularly toward its crucial mutual-defense clause, may yet serve to eviscerate the alliance.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the US presence rests on three sets of overlapping alliances: the entente with Australia and Britain; the with Australia, India and Japan and a chain of bilateral defense pacts stretching along the Pacific littoral from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. Via careful diplomacy, the administration US President Joe Biden those alliances, bringing two wayward allies, Australia and the Philippines that had drifted Beijing-wards, back into the Western fold. Trump’s penchant for abusing allies and, as in his first term, from multilateral pacts is likely to weaken such ties and so US power in the region.

Although his first administration famously waged a trade war with Beijing, Trump’s attitude toward the island of Taiwan is bluntly transactional. “I think, Taiwan should pay us for defense,” he in June, adding: “You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything.” In October, he the Wall Street Journal that he would not have to use military force to defend Taiwan because Xi “respects me and he knows I’m f—— crazy.” Bluster aside, Trump, unlike Biden, has never committed himself to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack.

Should Beijing indeed attack Taiwan outright or, as appears more likely, impose a crippling on the island, Trump seems unlikely to risk a war with China. The loss of Taiwan would break the US position along the Pacific littoral, which for 80 years has been the fulcrum of its global imperial posture. This would push its naval forces back to a “second island chain” running from Japan to Guam. Such a retreat would represent a major blow to the US’s imperial role in the Pacific, potentially making it no longer a significant player in the security of its Asia-Pacific allies.

A silent US recessional

Adding up the likely impact of Trump’s policies in this country, Asia, Europe and the international community generally, his second term will almost certainly be one of imperial decline, increasing internal chaos and a further loss of global leadership. As “respect for American authority” fades, Trump may yet resort to “threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal.” But as I predicted back in 2010, it seems quite likely that “the world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.”

[ first published this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Requiem for an Empire: How America’s Strongman Will Hasten the Decline of US Global Power appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Iran isn’t the only nation advancing its nuclear capabilities in recent years. In 2019, the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned intermediate-range land-based missiles, citing alleged Russian violations and China’s non-involvement. The US is also its nuclear arsenal, with to deploy nuclear weapons in more NATO states and proposals to extend its to Taiwan.

Russia, too, has intensified its nuclear posture, expanding nuclear and updating its on first use. In 2023, the nation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limited US and Russian-deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In 2024, it stationed in Belarus. Russia and China have also deepened their , setting China on a path to rapidly expand its arsenal, as nuclear security collaboration with the US has steadily over the past decade.

The breakdown of diplomacy and rising nuclear brinkmanship among major powers are heightening nuclear insecurity among themselves, but also risk spurring a new nuclear arms race. Alongside Iran, numerous countries maintain the technological infrastructure to quickly build nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear proliferation would require significant collaboration among major powers, a prospect currently out of reach.

The US detonated the first nuclear weapon in 1945, followed by the Soviet Union in , the United Kingdom in , France in and China in . It became evident that with access to uranium and enrichment technology, nations were increasingly capable of producing nuclear weapons. Though mass production and delivery capabilities were additional hurdles, it was widely expected in the early Cold War that many states would soon join the nuclear club. Israel developed nuclear capabilities in the , India detonated its first bomb in and South Africa built its first by . Other countries, including , , , , and , pursued their own programs.

However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enacted in 1968 to curb nuclear spread, led many countries to abandon or dismantle their programs. After the end of the Cold War and under Western pressure, Iraq its nuclear program in 1991. In a historic move, South Africa voluntarily its arsenal in 1994. Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine the nuclear weapons they inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1996, securing international security assurances in exchange.

Nuclear proliferation appeared to be a waning concern, but cracks soon appeared in the non-proliferation framework. Pakistan conducted its first in 1998, followed by North Korea in , bringing the count of nuclear-armed states to nine. Since then, Iran’s nuclear weapons program, initiated in the 1980s, has been a major target of Western non-proliferation efforts.

Nuclear ambitions in the Middle East, Asia and Europe

Iran has a strong reason to persist. Ukraine’s former nuclear arsenal might have deterred Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022. Elsewhere, revolutionary Muammar Gaddafi, who Libya’s nuclear program in 2003, was overthrown by a NATO-led coalition and local forces in 2011. If Iran achieves a functional nuclear weapon, it will lose the ability to leverage its nuclear program as a to extract concessions in negotiations. While a nuclear weapon will represent a new form of leverage, it would also intensify pressure from the US and Israel, both of whom have engaged in a cycle of escalating sometimes deadly confrontations with Iran and its proxies over the past few years.

An Iranian nuclear arsenal could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Its relations with Saudi Arabia remain delicate, despite the brokered by China. Saudi officials have they would obtain their own nuclear weapon if Iran acquired them. Saudi Arabia gave significant to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, with the understanding that Pakistan could extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, or even the latter with one upon request.

Turkey, which hosts US nuclear weapons through NATO’s , signaled a policy shift in 2019 when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan foreign powers for dictating Turkey’s ability to build its own nuclear weapon. Turkey’s growing partnership with Russia in could meanwhile provide it with the enrichment expertise needed to eventually do so.

Middle Eastern tensions are not the only force threatening non-proliferation. �����貹��’s renewed friction with China, North Korea and Russia over the past decade has intensified Tokyo’s focus on nuclear readiness. Although Japan a nuclear program in the 1940s, it was dismantled after World War II. �����貹��’s , however, remains measured in months. Despite this, for nuclear weapons remains low, given the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where nuclear bombings in 1945 killed more than 200,000 people.

In contrast, around of South Koreans support developing nuclear weapons. South Korea’s nuclear program began in the 1970s but was under US pressure. However, North Korea’s successful test in 2006 and its severance of , and to the South in the past decade, coupled with the of peaceful reunification in early 2024, have again raised the issue in South Korea.

Taiwan pursued a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, which similarly under US pressure. Any sign of wavering US commitment to Taiwan, together with China’s growing nuclear capabilities, could prompt Taiwan to revive its efforts. Though less likely, territorial disputes in the South China Sea could also motivate countries like Vietnam and the Philippines to consider developing nuclear capabilities.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has also had significant nuclear implications. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently to the European Council that a nuclear arsenal might be Ukraine’s only deterrent if NATO membership is not offered. Zelenskyy later his comments after they ignited a firestorm of controversy. Yet if Ukraine feels betrayed by its Western partners — particularly if it is forced to concede territory to Russia — it could spur some factions within Ukraine to attempt to secure nuclear capabilities.

The war has also spurred nuclear considerations across Europe. In December 2023, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer a European nuclear deterrent. Donald Trump’s re-election in the 2024 US presidential election could amplify European concerns over US commitments to NATO, with France having increasingly an independent European nuclear force in recent years.

Nuclear collaboration

Established nuclear powers are unlikely to welcome more countries into their ranks. But while China and Russia don’t necessarily desire this outcome, they recognize the West’s concerns are greater, with Russia doing in the 1990s to prevent its unemployed nuclear scientists from aiding North Korea’s program.

The US has also previously been blindsided by its allies’ nuclear aspirations. US policymakers underestimated Australia’s determination to pursue a nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, including covert attempts to obtain a weapon from the UK. Similarly, the US was initially of France’s extensive support for Israel’s nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s.

Smaller countries are also capable of aiding one another’s nuclear ambitions. Argentina offered considerable to Israel’s program, while Israel assisted . Saudi Arabia financed Pakistan’s nuclear development and Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist is of having aided Iran, Libya and North Korea with their programs in the 1980s.

The slippery slope to nuclear conflict

Conflicts involving nuclear weapons states are not without precedent. Egypt and Syria attacked nuclear-armed Israel in 1973 and Argentina faced a nuclear-armed UK in 1982. India and China have clashed over their border on several occasions. Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression. But conflicts featuring nuclear countries invite dangerous escalation, and the risk grows if a nation with limited conventional military power gains nuclear capabilities; lacking other means of defense or retaliation, it may be more tempted to resort to nuclear weapons as its only viable option.

The costs of maintaining nuclear arsenals are already steep. In 2023, the world’s nine nuclear-armed states spent an estimated managing their programs. But what incentive do smaller countries have to abandon nuclear ambitions entirely, especially when they observe the protection nuclear weapons offer and witness the major powers intensifying their nuclear strategies?

Obtaining the world’s most powerful weapons may be a natural ambition of military and intelligence sectors, but it hinges on the political forces in power as well. In Iran, moderates could counterbalance hardliners, while continued support for Ukraine might prevent more nationalist forces from coming to power there.

Yet an additional country obtaining a nuclear weapon could set off a cascade of others. While larger powers are currently leading the nuclear posturing, smaller countries may see an opportunity amid the disorder. The limited support for the , in effect since 2021, coupled with the collapse of other international treaties, reinforces the lingering allure of nuclear arms even among non-nuclear states. With major powers in open contention, the barriers to nuclear ambitions are already weakening, making it ever harder to dissuade smaller nations from pursuing the ultimate deterrent.

[, a project of the Independent Media Institute, produced this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Which Countries Are on the Brink of Going Nuclear? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

News has always been a business. Back in that golden age, it was a risky business. The kind of truth the public took an interest in could potentially diverge from the particular financial and ideological interests of the owners. In recent decades, media owners have developed several techniques to limit that risk.

Expectations about what the public expects to find in the news have changed. In times past, the news cycle was punctuated by what we can call “moments of crisis.” These were typically dramatic developments in various kinds of political, financial or cultural power struggles. They might appear as showdowns, political shakeups, or even scandals. Crises generally highlighted specific moments of a conflict or sudden revelations.

I’m tempted to call some of those events “aristocratic crises.” In the US there was Watergate that brought down a president, the Church committee’s challenge to the CIA, leading to new laws restricting its actions, or President Bill Clinton’s Monica Lewinsky scandal that led to impeachment. Through those events, powerful people or institutions saw their authority challenged and their status modified. 

But there was another category I like to call “popular crises.” They resonate throughout society and affect the entire body politic. Unlike an aristocratic crisis that may lead to changes for the personnel of the ruling class, a popular crisis transforms the way society interprets the dominant narratives. One salient example took place around 1967. That was when the US public’s perception of the “meaning” as well as morality of the Vietnam War irrevocably shifted. It created political chaos for an incumbent president, spawned a massive protest movement as well as a backlash and changed the perception of the role of the US military, including transforming it into a professional army when President Nixon abolished the draft.

Because the owners of the corporate media have focused on reducing, if not eliminating risk by constricting and restraining the amount of unbridled truth-seeking reporting they permit, it is far rarer to see popular crises of the kind that dramatically challenged the US government’s policy in Vietnam or the French government’s control of higher education in 1968. It’s not that the truth can no longer emerge. If it is in any way disruptive, it simply won’t be mentioned in the legacy media. Instead, social media has amply filled in the gaps concerning truth-telling. But because social media is structured in the form of ideological silos, it can never achieve the scope required to change the general perception of a crisis.

This evolution in the culture of journalism has had a curiously transformative effect on the nature of the concept of crisis itself. UnHerd columnist Thomas Fazi highlights this phenomenon in an dedicated to Europe’s incapacity to manage its culture of democracy. In his article, “Von der Leyen’s authoritarian plot: National democracies will be subordinate to her Commission,” Fazi describes an evolution, based on one woman’s ambition, towards a curious form of dictatorship that has the potential to destabilize Europe.

“Over the past 15 years,” Fazi writes, “the Commission has exploited Europe’s ‘permacrisis’ to radically, yet surreptitiously, increase its influence over areas of competence that were previously deemed to be the preserve of national governments — from financial budgets and health policy to foreign affairs and defence.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Permacrisis:

A state of extreme and growing tension and aggravated contradiction maintained indefinitely by those in power as the means of avoiding any initiative aiming at the kind of resolution that might call into question their hold on power.

Contextual note

Two years ago, Collins Dictionary elected “permacrisis” its “word of the year.” The publisher’s head of learning that the choice was made because of “how truly awful 2022 has been for so many people.” The neologism first appeared officially a year earlier, when Europeans used it to describe the or a “new normal” characterized by “volatility, uncertainty, and a prolonged sense of emergency.”

Though some explain it as a of the long drawn-out trauma of the Covid-19 pandemic, I see permacrisis as a cousin of another somewhat older neologism, “forever war,” a concept many commentators have identified as a prominent feature of the 21st century geopolitical landscape. The practice of forever war began in earnest when US President George W. Bush launched the infinitely expandable idea of his “global war on terror” and began applying it to multiple countries. President Joe Biden carried on the tradition when he solemnly promised that NATO’s war against Russia in Ukraine would last “as long as it takes” and subsequently agreed to offer “ironclad” support to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s war of extermination intended to last until the coming of the Messiah.

Europe is already three years into its latest forever war for which Ursula von der Leyen has demonstrated her enthusiasm. She has also thrown her institutional weight behind another war whose initiator, Netanyahu, clearly wishes to endure and become his own forever war.

Historical note

When author Naomi Klein formulated the theory called “the shock doctrine,” she described an approach to international relations that aimed at implementing Washington’s neoliberal economic agenda across the globe. It featured a strategy of “disaster capitalism.” By exploiting or even provoking crises in different countries, neo-liberal economic doctors could step in to provide cures for the disease.

Her theory made sense in the era predating social media, when a crisis was expected to last for only a limited amount of time. Each of the crises Klein describes was expected to lead to a predictable solution: typically, one that would play out following rules established by Milton Friedman’s Chicago School of Economics and correlate with the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

It was a veritable system. Everyone agreed that there existed a universal cure, especially for complaints that a local leader sought to address with a local cure. Chilean Prime Minister Salvador Allende, for example, in 1973 set out on a path of economic reform that included the nationalization of industries including banks, agrarian reform, state control of the economy and health and education reforms. The US State Department considered those very cures to be the symptoms of a disease that required a universal cure.

Like a Hollywood studio that understands the tried-and-true value of remakes, the CIA invoked and executed the same scenario that had successfully played out 20 years earlier in Iran, when Britain and the US ganged up to oust a democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Allende himself did not survive the coup. He may have preferred suicide to the type of cure his successor, the dictator Augusto Pinochet, was likely to administer.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the same pattern evolved into a sophisticated template called “color revolutions.” That trend continued and culminated in Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution in 2014. That was the occasion in which Victoria Nuland, a key operator in US President Barack Obama’s State Department, appeared to single-handedly engineer the intended outcome when she put her man, “Yats” (Arseniy Yatseniuk), in the catbird seat after chasing Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from power.

It was shortly thereafter that the concept of the sudden dramatic crisis began to give way to the more efficient concept of permacrisis. In his article on the transformation of European politics, Fazi describes the ongoing coup engineered by Ursula von der Leyen, who today is entering her second term as president of the European Commission. Her plan consists of “placing loyalists in strategic roles, marginalizing her critics, and establishing a complicated web of dependencies and overlapping duties that prevent any individual from gaining excessive influence.” Perhaps more efficiently than Benito Mussolini’s March on Rome in 1922 or Adolf Hitler’s success when he merged the positions of Chancellor and President following President Paul von Hindenburg’s death in 1934, Madame Ursula is exploiting a prolonged state of crisis to exercise absolute power.

But unless she thinks NATO is under her command, she will be a dictator without an army, reminding us of Joseph Stalin’s famous remark: “How many divisions has the Pope?” And though, as I write, one of the pearls of German industry, Volkswagen, has fallen into a deep crisis manifestly linked to policies Washington imposed and Von der Leyen enthusiastically embraced — policies that have crippled Germany’s economy — she must certainly be gloating about her achievement, as she prepares, with increased authority, to reign over 27 countries for another five years.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Will Queen Ursula’s Crisis Management Skills Make Her the Empress of Europe? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

PACE is a key institution within the Council of Europe, the platform for cooperation and dialogue among Europe’s 27 nations. PACE focuses on promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law across Europe. These are topics of universal interest one might expect United States news media and especially the US government, who spent so much time and money seeking Assange’s extradition, to be keenly interested in. But the story got little coverage in the West and practically none in the US. The last time The New York Times even mentioned PACE was over a year ago, in September 2023, in an with the title: “In occupied areas of Ukraine, Russia is holding local elections that have been widely denounced.”

PACE not only monitors the implementation of Council of Europe conventions and agreements between member states, it also elects judges to the European Court of Human Rights. You would be justified in thinking of it as the “conscience” of Europe. Its role in human rights advocacy empowers it to adopt resolutions and make recommendations to improve human rights protection. In that capacity, following Assange’s testimony, PACE “ deep concern at ‘the disproportionately harsh treatment’ faced by Julian Assange and said this has had a ‘dangerous chilling effect’ which undermines the protection of journalists and whistleblowers around the world.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Disproportionately harsh treatment:

The US administration’s chosen strategy for dealing with anything or anyone that in any way threatens or even criticizes its actions abroad.

Contextual note

Assange’s legal saga began in 2010, four months after the publication of classified documents on the war in Iraq. It lasted until June 26, 2024 when Assange entered into a guilty plea agreement with the US justice system.

In the opening act, the Australian journalist and founder of WikiLeaks was charged with a sexual offense in Sweden. The case was closed in 2017, as the evidence required for a conviction had not been gathered. Simultaneously, the US Justice Department initiated an investigation using the pretext of the 1917 Espionage Act, a tool that the administration of former President Barack Obama became fond of using against whistleblowers. Fearing extradition to the US, the Ecuadorian embassy granted Assange asylum in London, where he remained for seven years. Then on April 11, 2019, he was forcibly handed over to the British authorities after the election of a new Ecuadorian president, whom WikiLeaks had accused of corruption.

The denouement came after Assange had spent five years in a high-security Belmarsh prison in the UK. It is still unclear why Washington agreed to his release. It should however be obvious that the administration of current President Joe Biden — used to benefiting from European indulgence, if not solidarity with even the harshest of US foreign policy positions — was not expecting the conclusions reached by PACE following Assange’s testimony earlier this month. The Parliamentary Assembly pulled no punches as it reached a conclusion with potentially deep implications for the behavior of all self-respecting democracies, especially those that like to lecture other nations about human rights, freedom of expression and the need to respect a rules-based order.

PACE noted explicitly that Assange’s treatment has had a dangerous deterrent effect on journalists and whistleblowers worldwide. “Chilling” is the term it chose. For the sake of the future of democracy, it becomes urgent to ask ourselves on both sides of the Atlantic: After the Assange case, will journalists and whistleblowers be better protected? On the basis of this judgment, we should hope so, but at the same time we must ask ourselves: Are the politicians in the US and in Europe even listening?

PACE specifically called on the US to go beyond its concern for the protection of journalists by actively combating the tradition of impunity for state agents guilty of war crimes. Will this call be heeded? In the context of ongoing conflicts today in which the US has become implicated, and at a moment when a democratic US presidential candidate openly embraces and celebrates the “service” of former Vice President Dick Cheney, there is reason to doubt it.

Historical note

This episode underlines the perception most people have today that we are living through a period of rapid historical transition. The question of the survival of democracy appears to be on everyone’s mind. We easily understand that democracy can never be perfect, but now that it appears threatened from various sides, can we even find the means to preserve it? Should we consider whistleblowers like Assange and Edward Snowden servants of a citizenry focused on the integrity of governance or dangerous enemies of a system that must be protected not just from physical assault but from critical assessment of any kind?

At a time when the fight for information control has been in the headlines with new pressures on Telegram and Twitter, we should see PACE’s resolution as a strong signal of encouragement to journalists and whistleblowers and a warning to governments easily tempted to justify or paper over the most extreme acts of their militaries and allies in times of war. European governments should be the first to take its recommendations on board. Journalism is already threatened in its theoretical independence by the domination of the economic interests that control or influence the media. If the wheels of justice can be manipulated to suppress truth-telling, democracy cannot survive.

PACE looks beyond Europe and its media. It specifically addresses the US, a nation that has persistently and assiduously put Assange through more than a decade of confinement and even torture. That he is now free to circulate and speak publicly is something of a victory, but it is a victory in a battle that should never have taken place in a democratic society. The atrocities revealed by Assange in his WikiLeaks must not be hidden from the public in the name of a nation’s raison d’Etat.

If PACE’s resolution has any real impact, it means that a clarified legal context will make it more difficult for governments to gag the media and allow crimes committed by their agents to go unpunished. In 2010, WikiLeaks published incontrovertible evidence of atrocities committed by American and British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Governments and armies will always attempt to conceal acts they find embarrassing. But the press must be allowed to uncover them and publish the truth, with no fear of legal repercussions for doing so.

In recent times, European institutions have been the object of justified and unjustified criticism. Europe today suffers materially and psychologically from its ambiguous relationship with the most powerful member of the Atlantic Alliance. Defining Europe’s “strategic autonomy” is an ongoing. The Council of Europe is once again proving itself to be a major institution for the protection of human rights. In 2005, this same Council the late Dick Marty to investigate the CIA’s secret prisons in Europe. In 2015 and 2016, the European Court of Human Rights condemned Poland, Lithuania and Romania for housing such detention centers.

The governments called into question by such actions will always react defensively to such initiatives. They are rarely “brought to justice” in the sense of holding individuals and institutions legally and formally responsible for identified crimes and atrocities and subject to punishment under the law. But such resolutions help to set standards that will reduce the amount of abuse meted out to independent voices seeking to keep the public informed.

Assange is a journalist whose career was interrupted at the height of his powers and his potential contribution to society and democracy effectively silenced. In Gaza and Lebanon today we are seeing other cases of “disproportionately harsh treatment” that for some political leaders appears to be their privileged form of governance, if not a way of life. Even “proportional” harsh treatment needs to be used as sparingly as possible. As a society, we need to bring the taste for disproportionality under control. For some, it appears to be an addiction.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Europe Calls Assange a Victim of Disproportionate Harshness appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Dr. Rod Berger: The entrepreneurial path is often as unique as the person behind the solo pursuit. Please share your transition from research to Over Easy Solar. 

Trygve Mongstad: I spent many years as a physicist, and about a decade ago, I was more comfortable in a lab with my dreadlocks. The transition wasn’t immediate, but I was drawn to challenges outside my comfort zone. I realized I wanted to do something impactful and saw an opportunity in solar energy that few had explored. The move was driven by a growing confidence and the supportive societal framework in Norway, which encourages taking risks.

Berger: When you were growing up, were you creative? Would you say you had an innovative spirit early on?

Mongstad: Growing up in Norway with educators as parents made my life quite typical. However, even as a child, I was fascinated by innovation. I remember sketching floating wind turbines at the age of ten. While I was a quiet and shy boy, the idea of creating solutions for environmental challenges was always there.

Berger: You have been public about the impact of your time In Malawi on the work you are doing today. How does the Norwegian ecosystem of support compare with your time overseas?

Mongstad: My experience in Malawi was transformative. It’s one of the poorest economies in the world, yet the enthusiasm and positivity of the people is incredible. I learned a lot about happiness and community values, which differ from Norway’s more structured support system.

Berger: Let’s talk about sustainability and its role in your path forward as a company.

Mongstad: Sustainability has been at the core of my mission from the very start. It’s not just about creating a product; it’s about contributing to a better world. In Norway, sustainability is part of the everyday conversation, and I hope to embody it in my company.

Berger: What challenges have been the most daunting for you as a CEO?

Mongstad: Coming from the research sector, understanding the language of investors has been a challenge for me. The financial climate is tough, and while there’s recognition of the need for sustainable solutions, bridging the gap between innovation and investment remains a daily endeavor. I am encouraged, though, by the increased awareness among investors about the long-term benefits of supporting sustainability-focused ventures.

Berger: How have you navigated the pressures of entrepreneurship while maintaining your stated mission?

Mongstad: It’s about perspective. I regularly reflect on our progress, which helps me appreciate the journey. While many might scoff, I enjoy writing monthly investor reports because they allow me to see our tangible progress. It’s a balancing act, but the drive to create meaningful impact keeps me motivated and focused on the bigger picture.

Mongstad’s understated presentation shouldn’t dissuade onlookers from honing in on Over Easy Solar’s rapid ascent. There is a quiet and engaging confidence about Mongstad that reminds us that it isn’t always the bluster of an entrepreneur that reigns supreme but rather the belief in oneself to constantly churn against convention and comfort toward a common goal.

[I have edited and condensed this interview for clarity.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Over Easy Solar CEO Trygve Mongstad Goes to the Roof appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The euro, underpinned by the Eurozone’s robust institutional framework, offers political stability and a solid monetary authority. These traits make it a compelling candidate for a global reserve currency. Nevertheless, the structural and political within the European Union and fiscal policies among its member states undermine the euro’s reliability as a universal reserve asset. As of 2023, the euro accounts for just of global foreign exchange reserves compared to the US dollar’s commanding 58%. Even with the issuance of euros (over $447 billion) in jointly backed debt during the Covid-19 crisis, the Eurozone still lacks the deep and liquid debt markets needed to elevate the euro’s status as a reserve currency.

China’s rapid economic growth and its expanding role in global trade have significantly boosted the renminbi’s global status. In 2023, the renminbi accounted for of global payments by value, according to Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT). Its share of trade finance payments from 4% in 2022 to 8% in 2024. These advancements, driven by China’s economic prowess, have positioned the renminbi as a potential global reserve currency.

However, it still faces substantial obstacles that deter other countries from adopting the renminbi as a reserve currency. These include strict capital controls, a lack of transparency in financial markets and the Chinese Communist Party’s centralized political power.

The dollar’s competition

Recent discussions highlight potential shifts that could influence the demand for dollar alternatives. For instance, emerging markets might begin issuing more debt in the currencies of their trading partners, like China. In 2023, China’s Panda bond market experienced , with foreign issuers raising over $15.3 billion in renminbi-denominated bonds, up from $12.4 billion in 2022. This major growth signals an increasing confidence in the renminbi as a funding currency, potentially advancing its status as a reserve currency.

Also, China’s efforts to promote the renminbi as a global currency include the 2015 establishment of the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System () and the development of the (e-CNY). These initiatives aim to reduce reliance on US-dominated financial systems like SWIFT and increase the renminbi’s global accessibility. However, the renminbi’s share of global reserves remains minimal, at just compared to the dollar’s 58%.

Furthermore, the introduction of central bank digital currencies () could reshape the global currency landscape. However, the dollar’s dominance in DeFi trading, where of stablecoins are pegged to the dollar, suggests that any expansion in digital currencies will likely reinforce the dollar’s role.

Why the dollar endures

Despite the growing presence of the euro and renminbi, the dollar remains firmly in the lead. Its stability and liquidity, combined with the US’s geopolitical influence — which is underpinned by a military budget — ensures its continued dominance. The euro faces significant hurdles due to political fragmentation within the EU and differing fiscal policies among its member states. These undermine its reliability as a universal reserve currency despite its relatively large share of global reserves.

Geopolitical factors also play a crucial role in maintaining the dollar’s dominance. Its status as the world’s leading currency is reinforced by US political and military supremacy, as well as its unrivaled . Countries that rely on the dollar for international trade and financial transactions are more likely to align their policies with US interests. This further entrenches its central role in the global financial system.

From an , the strength of the dollar evidently endures compared to the euro and renminbi. By quantifying the divergence rates between the dollar and these currencies, analysis reaffirms the dollar’s role as the core of the global financial system from 2001 to 2022. Even with emerging challengers, its dominance is likely to persist. It is supported by the unparalleled liquidity of US financial markets, the US’s geopolitical influence and the historical legacy of the system.

While the euro and renminbi have made notable strides in global trade and finance, they do not yet present credible alternatives to the dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency. The structural and political challenges both currencies face suggest that the dollar’s dominance will continue for the foreseeable future.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Can the Euro or Renminbi Really Challenge the US Dollar? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In their joint effort, CIA Director William Burns and MI6 Chief Richard Moore must recognize the weakening of the Western security architecture and the rapid rise of China. And the reality of the international situation is graver than their piece expresses.

A fragile security framework amid global unrest

The intelligence chiefs deliver a sobering assessment of the mounting hardships facing the world today, particularly those compounded by rapid technological advancements. They argue that the international system is now more contested than ever, with unprecedented threats necessitating global cooperation and swift action. However, while they acknowledge the dangers that lie ahead, their call for a strengthened security architecture and partnership is open to scrutiny.

Simply strengthening the existing architecture may no longer be viable given recent failures: the of European security, growing in Asia, the US’s disastrous from Afghanistan and the current in Bangladesh. Each event has contributed to a growing wave of anti-US sentiment across several regions.

Although a strong partnership between the US and UK may work on a bilateral level, their vision of it serving as a reliable counterweight to the shifting geopolitical landscape seems overly optimistic at best. For Burns and Moore, the idea of such a partnership standing firm in the face of current global upheavals remains a distant hope.

Europe’s crumbling security net

Europe’s security architecture has been deteriorating for years. The US has experienced mounting pressure to provide a sustainable defense against the looming threats from Russia and the possible resurgence of ISIS. Despite widespread anti-Russian rhetoric across Europe, the region’s security response has been lackluster. Many European nations have failed to adequately fund their militaries. Critical arms deals, such as the to supply 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine, have seen delays. Meanwhile, the US has received criticism from NATO for its military assistance to Ukraine, further straining relations.

Russia’s escalating offensive along Europe’s frontlines highlights the disjointed coordination between Europe and the US on both security and strategic fronts. The notion of preemptively halting Russia’s invasion no longer holds weight, as the post-invasion reality has seen the transatlantic alliance weaken, leading to significant setbacks for Ukraine. Even with occasional Ukrainian victories, sustaining the fight against Russia without US support appears increasingly improbable.

As the US heads into an election this November, Europe faces added uncertainty. In his campaign rhetoric, former US President Donald Trump openly criticized Europe’s failure to meet defense spending commitments, that Russia can “do whatever the hell they want” about countries that don’t pull their weight. His words underscore a glaring issue: Europe’s defense sector remains outdated and underfunded, lacking the modernization necessary to confront modern threats.

On the economic front, Europe is equally strained. Former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi recently that the EU is at risk of “slow and agonising decline,” according to his scathing report. With Europe struggling to keep pace on both security and economic fronts and the US grappling with its own “,” the prospect of a strong transatlantic partnership to counter Russian aggression seems more like a political talking point than a realistic solution to bridging the deepening strategic gaps.

The US’s soft decline in Asia

The abrupt and chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 left South Asia teetering on the edge of security and humanitarian crises. Although the of al-Qaeda chief Ayman al Zawahiri in 2022 attempted to salvage some strategic credibility, it did little to mask the US’s broader challenge: its diminishing influence in the region. As China’s rise continues to reshape Asian dynamics, the US has struggled to maintain its foothold through both strategic and tactical efforts.

US-led initiatives like the Quad and the AUKUS military alliance, aimed at China’s growing power in the Indo-Pacific, have so far delivered underwhelming results. Australia’s maritime defense remains underfunded and underdeveloped, despite the country’s capital of Canberra being a critical frontline for AUKUS. Politically, the Quad has also struggled, with consensus-building proving elusive. Former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull added to the skepticism, that the US will not exacerbate its own submarine deficit by selling vessels to Australia — a decision Canberra residents have received poorly.

Even Europe’s stance on AUKUS has been fraught with tension. The submarine deal between the US and UK sparked fears that the transatlantic relationship could be undermined. These developments highlight a stark truth: Trust and transparency in defense alliances are far more difficult to build than they appear.

A recent by the Lowy Institute titled, “Asia Power Snapshot: China and the United States in Southeast Asia,” paints an even grimmer picture. It concluded that the US has steadily lost influence to China in Southeast Asia over the past five years across key sectors, including diplomacy, culture, defense and economics. This soft decline, coupled with alleged backdoor politics and clandestine psychological maneuvers in countries like Bangladesh, underscores the depth of America’s waning influence in South Asia. Meanwhile, the UK grapples with its own politico-economic struggles, further complicating its role in transatlantic security and broader geopolitical challenges.

Intelligence and terrorism: a new battleground

Burns and Moore have underscored the growing dangers posed by artificial intelligence in their analysis of evolving warfare tactics, particularly in the Russia–Ukraine conflict. They argue that AI has dramatically altered war-fighting techniques, with implications far beyond the current battlefields. These threats, however, are not confined to Ukraine; they are global in scope and demand collective action.

Similarly, terrorism — despite facing setbacks in recent years — has seen a quiet resurgence. The re-emergence of ISIS in Europe’s periphery, coupled with recent terror incidents in and even the Russian capital of , has forced the US to reconsider its position amid the deterioration of European security.

Both the CIA and MI6 chiefs have also pointed to sabotage operations conducted by Russia and China, taking a firm stance on countering such threats. Yet even intelligence operations face significant challenges. The US has suffered setbacks in China regarding its covert presence, while Russia’s GRU intelligence unit has orchestrated several subversive activities across Europe, such as against NATO and the EU. The GRU’s meddling has revealed cracks in the Western security structure.

The fragile facade of the CIA–MI6 partnership

Despite the tough rhetoric, the CIA and MI6 chiefs have publicly endorsed ideals such as “trust, openness, constructive challenge, and friendship.” They assert that these qualities will sustain the US–UK partnership well into the future, and that the relationship will continue to serve as a pillar of “global peace and security.”

However, the hard truth is that these characteristics are in constant tension. The fragility of this so-called special relationship is apparent, as it has delivered few lasting results in recent years. While such words make for polished diplomacy, both spymasters must now grapple with the uncomfortable fact: Real progress in strengthening their partnership has been slow and insufficient. It remains to be seen if their renewed efforts can finally solidify the bond that has been repeatedly tested by mounting global pressures.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post New Spymasters Piece Is Too Optimistic About a Foul Situation appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Why this report? Europeans are increasingly anxious about their future. Stagnating growth and a lack of innovation threaten the European way of life. As the global landscape shifts, Europe must adapt. Both the US and China have adopted protectionist measures and are aggressively promoting their domestic industries. Meanwhile, Europe has fallen behind. In 1995, European productivity was 95% that of the US; today, it stands at just 80%.

A significant part of Europe’s problem lies in its reliance on banks for corporate borrowing. In Europe, 75% of corporate loans come from banks, compared to just 25% in the US, which boasts deeper and more liquid capital markets. This gives the US a stronger growth engine. Europe lags behind in key sectors like artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, self-driving technology and other cutting-edge fields.

In response, Draghi’s report calls for a bold €800 billion “new industrial strategy for Europe.” This proposal represents a fundamental shift in economic policy and signals the end of the post-Cold War era of European economics. The report’s key recommendations include:

• A complete overhaul of investment funding in the EU.
• Relaxing competition rules to allow market consolidation in industries like telecommunications.
• Greater integration of capital markets and centralized market supervision.
• Joint procurement in defense.
• A new trade agenda for the EU.
• The creation of European Advanced Research Projects Agencies, following US models, to drive world-leading research.
• Raising investment by both the private and public sectors from 22% to 27% of GDP.

This marks a shift in the global economic zeitgeist. Industrial policy, long dismissed by free-market economists as inefficient, has become a central strategy for the US, China and now Europe. Countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and India are also pursuing industrial strategies with some success. It has worked for Europe before, as the success of Airbus demonstrates. Draghi and his team aim to make Europe more competitive while keeping it distinctly European.

There are still some flies in the ointment. Will European nations be able to integrate sensitive sectors like defense, banking and telecommunications? Can the famously divided EU countries overcome their differences and work together? And the most pressing question: Can the EC actually spend the €800 billion that Draghi’s report proposes?

Besides, isn’t this just more of the same old story — a push for greater European integration that will inevitably be resisted? This time, the stakes are different. Europe faces a crisis of competitiveness unlike any before.

The European powers are simply no longer as influential as they used to be. Individual nations can no longer hope to negotiate trade deals on equal footing with powers like China. They must negotiate as a bloc.

The world has changed. France and Britain have lost their colonies. Technology has changed. Volkswagen cannot keep up with Tesla in the electric car space. Europeans are afraid of slipping off the cliff into irrelevance.

Recent developments have convinced Europeans their position is precarious. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, the failure to effectively integrate immigrants and the rise of far-right movements across Europe show that the European project itself is at risk, unless leaders can prove to their populaces that it can work for everyone.

This report, and the broader conversation it represents, could mark a pivotal moment in Europe’s future trajectory.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: Mario Draghi Calls for a New European Industrial Policy appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Furthermore, I believe opposition to CBI risks politicizing monetary policy. I recommend strengthening legal protections for CBI, enhancing the legal framework and prioritizing long-term stability over short-term political gains. Additionally, we should promote international agreements and cooperation among central banks to effectively manage global economic spillovers. These measures are essential for preserving the integrity and effectiveness of central banks in a rapidly changing global economy.

The role of central bank independence

Central bank independence is essential for maintaining a balanced approach to monetary policy, particularly in managing the trade-off between inflation and unemployment.

According to the (or the Fed), the Federal Reserve System is “independent within the government:” It works within the framework established by Congress. By operating independently of the government, central banks can focus on long-term economic objectives rather than succumbing to short-term political pressures. This independence governments from using monetary policy to achieve electoral gains, such as artificially lowering interest rates to stimulate the economy before an election.

Moreover, an independent central bank is better positioned to manage inflation, which is a critical component of economic stability. When inflation is allowed to rise unchecked, it can purchasing power, destabilize financial markets and harm economic growth. By maintaining a focus on price stability, central banks prevent these negative effects and actively an environment conducive to sustainable economic development. This offers a hopeful outlook for economic growth.

CBI has long been regarded as a cornerstone of sound economic governance, particularly in an increasingly globalized economy. As nations become more integrated through trade, finance and technology, the ability of central banks to operate independently from political influence has become crucial for maintaining economic stability.

One of the key drivers behind the global movement toward CBI is the need to attract and retain foreign investment. In a globalized economy, countries compete for capital and investors seek stability and predictability in monetary policy. Central banks perceived as free from political interference are more likely to inspire confidence among investors. As a result, many countries, particularly emerging markets, adopted or strengthened CBI as part of broader economic reforms aimed at integrating into the global economy.

The experience of countries like and in the 1990s illustrates this. Both nations, seeking to stabilize their economies and attract foreign investment, implemented significant reforms that enhanced the independence of their central banks. These reforms were instrumental in reducing inflation and fostering economic growth, demonstrating the positive impact of CBI in a globalized world.

During the Eurozone debt crisis that began in 2009, the European Central Bank (ECB)’s independence was critical in the collapse of the euro. As several Eurozone countries, including Greece, Ireland and Portugal, faced severe financial difficulties, the ECB resisted political pressure from member states to engage in direct bailout financing. Instead, it implemented unconventional monetary policies, such as the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program. This provided a backstop for sovereign bonds without directly compromising its independence. This approach was pivotal in financial markets and restoring investor confidence, helping to prevent the crisis from spreading further across Europe.

Donald Trump’s opposition to CBI and the risks of weakening it

Former United States President Donald Trump has expressed his that, as president, he should have more influence over monetary policy. He has suggested that his business success gives him better instincts than those at the Fed. He criticized Fed Chairman Jerome Powell for poor timing in policy decisions, asserting that central banking is largely based on “gut feeling.”

During a press conference in August 2024, Trump , “I think that, in my case, I made a lot of money. I was very successful. And I think I have a better instinct than, in many cases, people that would be on the Federal Reserve or the chairman.” Trump’s business success, particularly in the real estate sector, where he has built a multi-billion-dollar empire, gives him a unique perspective on economic growth. Trump’s preference for easy money and low interest rates reflects his background in real estate, where tight money can harm developers.

Trump’s desire for more direct control over the Fed is reminiscent of historical instances where political influence over monetary policy led to disastrous outcomes. A notable example is US President Richard Nixon’s over Fed Chairman Arthur Burns in the 1970s, which resulted in policies that contributed to the stagflation of that era — characterized by high inflation and stagnant economic growth. Trump’s approach risks repeating these mistakes by prioritizing short-term economic gains over long-term stability.

Trump Jerome Powell as Fed Chairman but later him when the Fed did not lower rates. Trump also favors a weak dollar, believing it benefits exports; critics, however, argue that this approach harms Americans. Regardless, Trump would need a legal change to gain more control over the Fed. This is unlikely given the political risks and the Senate’s role in confirming any Fed Chair.

Trump criticized the Fed’s timing on monetary decisions. In particular, he noted that its models are outdated, still relying on a flawed tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. He pointed out that the Fed’s policies, such as quantitative easing (QE) and the expanded balance sheet, have given it excessive influence over the economy. Trump believes a debate over the Fed’s mandate and models would be beneficial. Economists, however, warn that focusing on easy money and a weak dollar could lead to more inflation and economic problems in a potential second term.

Trump’s criticism of the Fed, particularly his calls for lower interest rates and more accessible monetary policy, reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of central banks. As a businessman with a background in real estate — a sector that thrives on low interest rates — Trump’s preference for easy money is understandable but misguided when applied to national monetary policy. His critique overlooks the risks associated with such an approach, like the potential for inflation to spiral out of control.

Trump’s advocacy for easy money is particularly concerning in the context of inflation. While low interest rates can stimulate economic growth in the short term, they also increase the risk of inflation if not carefully managed. The Fed’s primary mandate is to balance the goals of maximum employment and price stability. However, political interference that prioritizes growth at any cost could lead to the of this careful balance, resulting in higher inflation and economic instability.

Additionally, weakening CBI could undermine the Fed’s ability to respond effectively to economic crises. The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated the importance of a strong and independent central bank in stabilizing the economy. The Fed’s swift actions, including quantitative easing and emergency lending facilities, were crucial in preventing a deeper recession. Political influence that hampers the Fed’s ability to act decisively in future crises could have severe consequences for the US and global economies.

Weakening CBI can also exacerbate economic inequality, which is a growing concern in many advanced economies. When political figures influence monetary policy to achieve specific economic outcomes, like lower interest rates to spur growth before an election, the benefits often accrue disproportionately to certain sectors, like those reliant on cheap credit. Meanwhile, the costs — such as higher inflation — can disproportionately impact lower-income households. Inflation erodes the purchasing power of fixed incomes and savings, which can wealth disparities and strain the social fabric.

The Biden administration’s commitment to CBI

The global shift towards CBI is not just a change in monetary policy but a significant evolution that carries the weight of history. It is a response to the devastating inflationary episodes of the 1970s and 1980s, a movement that was a deliberate rethinking of the central banks’ role. This shift is rooted in the understanding that politically driven monetary decisions could lead to destabilizing and unsustainable economic conditions.

In the US, the passing of the Federal Reserve Reform (1977) marked a pivotal moment in this global shift. By enshrining the Fed’s dual mandate — promoting full employment and maintaining price stability — Congress also took crucial steps to protect the central bank from political interference. Incumbent President Joe Biden’s administration, building on Trump-era policies, has pursued significant investments in key industries through initiatives like the CHIPS and Science (2022) and the Inflation Reduction (2022). Some of these major industries include green energy and semiconductor manufacturing.

These initiatives demonstrate a strategic alignment of fiscal and industrial policy, aiming to strengthen domestic supply chains and promote technological leadership. While advocates argue that they enhance economic resilience and innovation, they also raise questions about the potential erosion of CBI. Central banks, traditionally insulated from political pressures, might face increasing demands to coordinate with government-led industrial policies. This would challenge the delicate balance between fiscal and monetary objectives.

Though a more collaborative approach between fiscal and monetary policy could generate short-term economic benefits, it also risks the central bank’s ability to act independently to stabilize inflation and manage long-term economic health. This legislative move was significant because it showcased the importance of allowing the Fed to operate independently. It recognized that short-term political pressures could undermine the economy’s long-term stability.

The US experience set a powerful example that soon influenced global economic policy. In 1997, both the Bank of England (BoE) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) were granted formal . This signaled a major shift away from the historical norms of political control over monetary policy. Establishing the European Central Bank (ECB) in 1998 exemplified this trend. The ECB’s creation marked a new era in European monetary policy: It replaced national central banks that had been subject to varying degrees of political influence, thereby promoting a standardized and politically neutral approach to monetary governance across the Eurozone.

Empirical evidence robustly supports the benefits of this move towards CBI. It has become increasingly prevalent among advanced economies, connecting with a significant reduction in inflation rates and more firmly anchored long-term inflation expectations. These outcomes tie directly to the enhanced credibility and predictability that independent central banks bring to monetary policy. They allow them to focus on long-term economic health rather than short-term political considerations.

The global commitment to CBI has only strengthened over time. A comprehensive of 370 central bank reforms from 1923 to 2023 reveals a resurgence in support for CBI since 2016. This underscores its continued relevance as a fundamental pillar of economic stability. The renewed commitment is particularly noteworthy given the complex and evolving challenges facing global economies today, reaffirming CBI as a critical tool in maintaining macroeconomic stability.

Within the Biden administration, the historical context of CBI serves as a crucial guide. The administration’s steadfast support for CBI is not just a matter of policy preference, but a deep-rooted commitment to economic stability. In analyzing the Biden administration’s commitment to CBI, it is essential to recognize the delicate balance between fiscal policy and monetary authority. CBI is often celebrated for its role in safeguarding economies from politically motivated monetary policy that could destabilize inflation control. The separation between monetary and fiscal policy has been vital in maintaining long-term economic stability. The Fed’s autonomy is seen as critical to ensuring that monetary decisions remain focused on inflation and employment targets rather than short-term political gains.

The Biden administration wielded considerable influence over the economy using extensive fiscal policy measures. The American Rescue Plan (2021), the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, as well as strategic executive actions such as the of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserves and student-loan debt , reflect a pragmatic approach. They leveraged fiscal tools to influence economic outcomes in ways that monetary policy alone could not have achieved in such a short time.

While CBI remains a pillar of long-term economic stability, the administration likely recognized that, given the nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, fiscal measures were indispensable. The unique conditions meant fighting inflation and stabilizing the economy required a broader, more immediate response — one where fiscal and executive action played a leading role, complementing rather than conflicting with the Fed’s independence. This dynamic, while preserving the long-term ideal of CBI, also underscores the reality that fiscal policy and executive power can shape economic outcomes in ways that transcend central bank interventions alone. Therefore, reversing the hard-earned progress towards CBI risks rekindling the inflationary pressures that once wreaked havoc on global economies.

Index of Central Bank Independence (CBI) in Advanced Economies, 1970-2022. Via .

Enhancing coordination and the role of globalization

While CBI is crucial, improving coordination between monetary and fiscal policy is merited, as Trump’s critique suggests. Fiscal policy, controlled by Congress and the executive branch, also significantly influences aggregate demand and inflation. Better communication and coordination between these two arms of economic policy could to more coherent and effective economic management.

One proposal to achieve this without compromising the Fed’s independence is to include the National Economic Council director and the Congressional Budget Office director as ex officio nonvoting members of the Federal Open Market Committee. This would allow for better between monetary and fiscal policies while the Fed’s autonomy in decision-making.

However, private conversations about economic stability are being held. The June 2024 between the BoJ, the Ministry of Finance and the Financial Services Agency highlights a critical moment in �����貹��’s economic policy. (Worth noting is the fact that the Minister of Finance, the Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy and their designated delegates cannot . When attending Monetary Policy Meetings, they can express opinions, submit proposals and request the Policy Board to postpone a vote until the next meeting.) The yen’s depreciation against the US dollar has raised concerns about its potential impacts on inflation and overall economic stability in 2024. The discussion about the BoJ’s independence becomes particularly pertinent in this context. Though the BoJ traditionally operates with a degree of autonomy to implement monetary policy based on economic conditions, the yen’s current weakness and its repercussions are stirring discussions of whether more direct government intervention is needed.

The independence of the BoJ is rooted in its mandate to focus on price stability and economic growth without undue political influence. This separation is intended to ensure that monetary policy decisions implement policy with the aim of maintaining price stability with long-term objectives, not short-term political pressures. However, there is a growing sentiment within the government to take more assertive actions. This is evidenced by recent statements from key figures such as Minister of Digital Affairs Taro Kohno, who has hiking interest rates in response to the yen’s weakness. Such proposals indicate that some policymakers view the BoJ’s current policy stance as insufficient to address the immediate challenges posed by the depreciating currency.

The involvement of other members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) further complicates the issue. Its discussions about potential interventions, including those that could impact the BoJ’s policy decisions, reflect a broader concern about the yen’s trajectory. While the BoJ has a clear mandate and operational framework, the mounting pressure from the government to align monetary policy with broader economic goals raises serious questions about the feasibility of maintaining its independence. If the government were to exert more influence, it could potentially undermine the BoJ’s ability to focus on long-term economic stability. This would pose significant risks to the economy.

CBI is closely linked to controlling inflation, which is a primary concern in advanced and emerging economies. Independent central banks are better equipped to resist the political pressure to pursue expansionary monetary policies that could increase inflation. This is particularly important in a globalized economy, where trade and financial linkages can transmit inflationary pressures across borders.

Empirical evidence supports the notion that CBI is associated with lower inflation. Countries with more independent central banks tended to experience lower and more stable inflation rates. For example, the relationship between CBI and inflation control became especially evident during the inflationary period of the 1970s and 1980s, when many central banks were subject to political interference, leading to high and persistent . This finding has been corroborated by subsequent research, which has shown that CBI contributes to the anchoring of inflation expectations, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy.

The relationship between CBI and inflation control became particularly evident during the inflationary period of the 1970s and 1980s. Many central banks were subject to political interference during this time, leading to high and persistent inflation. Several countries, including the US and Germany, responded by granting greater to their central banks, resulting in a significant decrease in inflation.

Central banks navigate an increasingly complex global environment, balancing domestic objectives with the need to manage the global spillovers of their actions. The independence of central banks is critical to ensure economic stability and long-term growth.

In a globalized economy, the actions of a central bank have implications that reach far beyond national borders. The US dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency means that the Fed’s policies global financial markets, international trade and the economic stability of other nations. The importance of a non-politicized Fed in maintaining international confidence in the US dollar cannot be overstated. It helps capital flight, currency volatility and a potential shift away from the dollar as the dominant global currency.

Globalization has fundamentally altered monetary policy dynamics, particularly in the context of central bank independence. As economies intertwine, the actions of one central bank can have profound effects on others, amplifying the importance of independent decision-making. The growing complexity of global financial systems necessitates that central banks adapt rapidly to new challenges, such as capital flow volatility and cross-border financial risks. 

One critical aspect of globalization is the transmission of economic shocks across borders. Central banks must be vigilant in mitigating these shocks while maintaining domestic economic stability. For instance, the 2008 financial crisis demonstrated how quickly financial turmoil can spread globally, underscoring the for independent central banks to act swiftly and decisively. The also showcased the of international cooperation among central banks; while this is necessary, it must be balanced with preserving domestic policy autonomy.

Looking forward, central banks must navigate the delicate balance between maintaining independence and participating in global monetary coordination. The potential for conflicts between domestic objectives and international pressures will likely increase, requiring central banks to adopt more sophisticated and transparent communication strategies. Ensuring that these institutions remain insulated from political pressures while engaging in necessary international cooperation will be crucial for economic stability in an increasingly interconnected world.

The Global Financial Crisis and central bank coordination

One historic economic event is especially imperative to study. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008–2009 marked one of the most significant economic downturns in recent memory, with worldwide impact. The crisis began in the US but quickly spread to other economies, highlighting the interconnectedness of global markets.

The US is one of the largest economies in the world, and its trade relations influence other nations’ economies substantially. For instance, during the GFC, the collapse of US demand had a , causing major slowdowns in export-driven economies like those of China, Germany and Japan. This exemplifies how shocks in the US “export” financial stress across the world, while the reverse influence is often less pronounced. The rapid transmission of financial shocks underscored the need for coordinated action among central banks worldwide to stabilize the global economy.

During the GFC, central banks took the following actions:

1. The Fed played a pivotal role by implementing a series of unconventional monetary policies, including lowering to near-zero levels and introducing . These measures involved buying assets to restore liquidity to financial markets and support economic recovery.
2. Faced with a severe sovereign debt crisis in several Eurozone countries, the ECB lowered and provided long-term refinancing operations to banks. The ECB later introduced the , which was crucial in stabilizing bond markets and preventing the collapse of the euro.
3. The BoE reduced interest rates and launched its own to support the UK economy. Its actions were coordinated with those of other major central banks to ensure a unified response to the crisis.
4. The BoJ expanded its asset purchase and maintained a low-interest rate to support the Japanese economy, which was also affected by the global downturn.

Central banks recognized that unilateral actions would be insufficient to address the global nature of the crisis. Therefore, they engaged in unprecedented levels of cooperation, particularly through these mechanisms:

1. Currency Swap Agreements: Central banks, including the Fed, ECB, BoE and BoJ, established currency swap lines to ensure that banks in other countries had access to US dollars, which were in high demand. This move crucially prevented a liquidity crisis and stabilized global markets.
2. Coordinated Interest Rate Cuts: In October 2008, several major central banks, including the Fed, ECB, BoE and BoJ, conducted a coordinated interest rate cut to reduce borrowing costs globally and stimulate economic activity.
3. G20 Summits: The G20, which includes both advanced and emerging economies, played a critical role in facilitating international coordination. The 2009 G20 in London prompted commitments to provide fiscal stimulus, increase resources for the International Monetary Fund and enhance financial regulation to prevent future crises.
4. Bank for International Settlements (BIS): The BIS serves as a platform for central banks to exchange information, coordinate policy responses and discuss strategies for maintaining financial stability. Its role in fostering international cooperation was vital in ensuring a coherent global response to the crisis.

The coordinated efforts of central banks were instrumental in mitigating the worst effects of the GFC. The rapid implementation of monetary easing measures, coupled with international cooperation, helped stabilize financial markets, restore confidence and set the stage for a gradual economic recovery. The crisis demonstrated that in a globalized economy, the actions of one central bank can have significant spillover effects on others, making international cooperation essential.

The experience of the GFC showcases the importance of sustained international cooperation among central banks. As global markets become more interconnected, the potential for spillover effects increases, making coordinated policy responses critical for maintaining global economic stability.

Moving forward, central banks should continue to strengthen their cooperation through global forums like the G20 and BIS, ensuring that their policies are harmonized to prevent adverse cross-border impacts. Additionally, they should work together to develop frameworks for managing future crises. In an interconnected world, the stability of one economy often depends on the stability of others.

What is the solution?

The independence of central banks like the Fed is vital for ensuring sound monetary policy, economic stability and global financial confidence. While Trump’s critique of the Fed highlights legitimate concerns about the need for better coordination between monetary and fiscal policy, his desire for more direct control over monetary policy risks undermining the very foundation of economic stability. A politicized central bank, driven by short-term political goals, would likely lead to higher inflation, economic instability and global volatility.

In an increasingly globalized economy, the role of central bank independence extends beyond national borders. The interconnectedness of global markets means that the actions of central banks can have profound spillover effects on other economies. Central banks must navigate complex global dynamics, where their decisions influence global capital flows, currency stability and international trade.

The solution lies not in reducing central bank independence but in enhancing the mechanisms for policy coordination while preserving the autonomy of institutions critical to the economy’s long-term health. By maintaining a strong, independent Fed, the US can continue navigating the complexities of a globalized economy while safeguarding its economic future. Central bank independence can secure a stable and prosperous economic environment domestically and globally by focusing on policies like the Fed’s : maximum employment and price stability.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Central Bank Independence Is Unbelievably Valuable for the World Economy appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Both global and domestic issues defined the election

The European election campaign is better understood as 27 rather than one common one. Campaigns typically focused more on domestic rather than EU-wide issues. This year, in several countries such as , voters used the European elections to express unhappiness with the policies of the parties forming the current national government.��

had dominated the last European election campaign in 2019 when , inspired by the young Swedish activist Greta Thunberg, brought the topic to the headlines. This time around, climate policy was hardly discussed. Instead, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 brought the topic of security and defense to the of the agenda. In addition, domestic issues like the cost of living, energy prices and inflation took precedence amongst voters.��

Concerns over likewise played a big role. This is not a new development, as immigration has been a major topic already for the last decade. Anti-immigrant rhetoric was used in a lot of countries, including in those in which there is actually not a lot of immigration, such as the Czech Republic.

The center-right has risen in the ranks

Domestic issues such as the ones above ultimately garnered intense support for far-right parties in the EU elections. However, despite the gains of far-right parties, the coalition of the center parties continues to hold a of seats in the EU Parliament. There has been a shift to the right, but overall the result of the European elections shows more continuity than disruption. This came as a relief to those predicting a far-right sweep of Parliament.

The European People’s Party Group (EPP), a center-right group bringing together Christian Democrats and conservatives, emerged as the of the election. In total, the group comprises 188 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), or slightly more than 25% of seats. The Socialists and Democrats (S&D) remained largely stable, winning 136 seats. As recorded in the outgoing 2019 Parliament , both parties continue to be the two largest groups in the European Parliament.��

But the liberal Renew Group, which came in third in 2019, only won 77 seats and is now the fifth largest group after the extreme-right Patriots for Europe (84 seats) and the radical right Conservatives and Reformists (78 seats). Along with the Liberals, the other big loser of the elections were the Greens, who are now only the sixth biggest group with 53 members. Further, The Left in the European Parliament group and the extreme-right Europe of Sovereign Nations group comprise 46 and 25 seats respectively.

It is likely that the problem of the far-right on the European level will not play out in the European Parliament, but rather in the European Council, which assembles the heads of states and governments. Past mandates show that the far-right is a very bloc, especially when it comes to foreign and security policy. Internal make it difficult for the far-right to have any real influence on policy.

Already in the last few years, Viktor Orbán from the right-wing populist party Fidesz has often acted as a , or an obstruction, towards coherent policy.�� He has made it for EU leaders to find agreements, particularly when it comes to supporting Ukraine. As more far-right parties join governments at the national level across Europe, the problem of fractured policies is only likely to increase. Creating a solution to this problem falls on the shoulders of Ursula von der Leyen, who won another mandate as the EU Commission President.

Von der Leyen faced a challenging re-election

Despite the fact that the EPP, von der Leyen’s party family, emerged as the strongest force, the re-election of Ursula von der Leyen was by no means a given. In order to become Commission President, a candidate must not just be nominated by the Council comprising the EU heads of state and government, he or she must also secure a majority of MEPs in the European Parliament. 

In 2019, the lead candidate of the EPP had been German Manfred Weber. But in the aftermath of the elections, some heads of state expressed with his nomination, pointing to his lack of executive experience. Instead, the Council Ursula von der Leyen in a move that came as a surprise to everyone. She went on to secure a very narrow majority in the European Parliament, winning just in a secret ballot — only nine more than the required minimum.

This time around, heads of state and government agreed on the nomination of Ursula von der Leyen relatively . As part of a package deal that included Socialists and Liberals, the Council further agreed on the of the Portuguese António Costa as President of the European Council and the Estonian Kaja Kallas as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Political fragmentation will create a challenge

The real challenge von der Leyen faced was not the nomination — the problem lay in securing support from the European Parliament. The combined majority of EPP, S&D, and Renew, the traditional coalition of the center parties, is much smaller than in the previous mandate and several MEPs from those three groups that they were not going to vote for her. Von der Leyen faced a political conundrum — should she reach out to the radical-right Conservatives and Reformists, angering Socialists and Liberals? Or should she reach out to the Greens, angering her own EPP, which had turned against several Green policies during the last mandate?

In the end, von der Leyen pulled off the perfect balancing act. She managed to bring a majority of to her side without turning her own party against her. In the that laid out her plans as Commission President, von der Leyen included promises to a lot of different groups. Ultimately, she was confirmed with in favor.��

In her last term, Ursula von der Leyen significantly the role of the Commission, shaping the EU’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In her second term, she seeks to continue this work, this time with a special focus on bolstering the Commission’s role in the realm of defense, economic security, and economic competitiveness.��

But the next five years are unlikely to be smooth sailing. Europe’s changing political landscape will make her job harder. In the Parliament, the increasing political fragmentation will make coalition-building more difficult. An increasing amount of legislation will likely need to pass with ad-hoc coalitions that focus on specific issues instead of passing legislation through the traditional grand coalition of EPP, S&D, and Renew.

Henry Kissinger supposedly once asked, “Who do I call when I want to call Europe?” For now, this question seems answered. National leaders like French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have been weakened by the European election results, with their parties or coalitions suffering heavy losses. Instead, it is Ursula von der Leyen who has emerged with strength and confidence from the European Parliament election, ready to take on a leadership role as chief of the European Commission once more. Yet, the term ahead of her will be a challenging one. 

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Political Fragmentation Poses a New Challenge for the EU appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Following the guide’s lead, we climb a hill to find one of many cave monasteries. This one is rather hidden, so most tourists miss it entirely. 

My guide showcases a cave monastery above the Răut River, where tourists rarely find their way. Author’s photo.

A picture from the inside of the cave looking out. Author’s photo.

The surrounding area is an unusual sight. The sloping bank of the Răut River emerges from a perfectly flat field, looking almost man-made. However, it is a natural reminder of how landscapes evolve. You can find perfect seashells on the limestone bank in a country with no coastline, much like on a sandy beach. Millions of years ago, the Răut River was part of the ancient Sarmatian Sea, just like the lands of today’s Moldova.

Scenic views of Old Orhei. One can barely see the river under the hill. Author’s photo.

My guide, Professor Sergiu Musteață, knows this site incredibly well. He is a renowned historian from Moldova and a professor at the Faculty of Philology and History at “Ion Creangă” State Pedagogical University. He has worked to educate locals about the history of Old Orhei and how to develop tourism businesses. He has also guided them in creating guesthouses and writing proposals for funding to build flushing toilets in their homes.

Old Orhei has been one of the main subjects of his research since 1996. “I know everyone in Orheiul Vechi [the Romanian version of the name]!” he laughs. He also knows all of the approximately 300 caves in the area and has personally researched many of them.

Professor Sergiu Musteață says that people working in Moldovan tourism need to understand that the basis of it is history and heritage. Author’s photo.

A scenic journey through unknown sites

Musteață leads us along a hidden path lined with cherry trees from an old student’s base. Researchers have been excavating this area for decades, as the unique landscape reveals layers of settlements dating back to prehistoric times.

“When we come here with students, we usually clean the neighborhood and cut the grass first,” Musteață says, pushing branches away from the path. If only tourists knew about this shortcut hidden in nature.

Professor Musteață peers through a rustic gate. Author’s photo.

“We have organized 20 years of summer camps for the locals during the excavations, including summer schools for local kids. Lots of students, both locals and internationals, participated!” he states emphatically.

Despite many efforts, only a few locals have made a name for themselves in the tourism sector. “I don’t know why. There is not so much interest. It should be the most prominent place among tourists,” Musteață comments.

Unlike other visitors, we walk past the Peștera cave monastery, the main tourist attraction of Old Orhei. The current underground tunnels date back to 1820. However, the caves in these limestone hills have existed since the 14th century. Orthodox monks found solitude and a place for spiritual retreat in this isolation.

“There is another cave monastery here. Locals know about it, but only a few tourists will visit it,” says Musteață. This is where we are heading.

We walk past the Peștera cave monastery and head off-road to find another lesser-known monastery. Author’s photo.

We walk on the bank, passing through the Church of Ascension of St. Mary. The view of the valley and fields is breathtaking. Turning left, the professor leads us onto an almost unrecognizable road downhill from the bank. Our slippers aren’t ideal footwear for this leg of the journey, but nevertheless, we climb down the limestone bank to a land of grazing cows.

Musteață guides us onto a new path, leading down the limestone bank. Author’s photo.

After walking, we climb again to another obscure cave monastery of Old Orhei, built above the Răut’s waters. There isn’t a single soul up here now, but historically, monks isolated themselves in this cave. As a result, the monastery is covered in signs of human habitation.

The church’s facade is engraved with Slavonian writing: “This church was built by the slave of Bosie, pircalab (Chief Magistrate) of Orhei, together with his wife and his children, to cherish God, to forgive his sins.”

The professor shows us around. We see where the monks would sleep and where they built their fireplace. All the caves are in remarkably good shape, with few signs of dripping rocks.

We view the monastery’s exterior, which has endured for centuries. Author’s photo.

This structure often goes unexplored by tourists. “It’s a bit too far and difficult to access. That’s why people don’t know much about it and wouldn’t end up here,” Musteață explains.

Musteață teaches us about the monastery. Author’s photo.

On the whole, Old Orhei is a fascinating, history site. And its antiquity is richer than one might expect.

Mankind has loved this region since ancient times

The surroundings have been populated since the Paleolithic era due to good location — the river protects Old Orhei from three sides. The land is suitable for agriculture and flowing water is nearby.

Archaeological findings suggest that the built some fortresses and settlements in this region during the 4th to 3rd centuries BCE, taking advantage of the natural fortifications provided by the rocky outcroppings and riverbanks.

In the 14th century CE, Old Orhei became part of the medieval state of Moldova (Țara Moldovei) after the collapse of the Golden Horde, a that controlled this territory as well.

After the Tatar period in the 12th to 14th centuries, an Orthodox Christian community developed during medieval times. Political stability and the protective embrace of nature made Old Orhei an important center. Moldovan hero and ruler the Great, whose rule lasted from 1457 to 1504, appointed his uncle, Peter III Aaron, to rule there. The area was fortified with strong defensive walls and towers.

Life in Old Orhei slowly faded in the 17th century. The administration moved to neighboring New Orhei, and gradually, the monastic community began to disappear. The last monks are believed to have left Old Orhei at the beginning of the 19th century. By this time, many monastic communities in the region faced significant challenges due to political changes, invasions and pressures from the expanding Ottoman Empire. The decline in monastic life at Old Orhei was part of a broader trend affecting many religious sites in the region.

At the beginning of the 20th century, a new Virgin Mary Church was built atop the bank near a cave monastery to revitalize the area’s spiritual significance. It serves as a symbol of Old Orhei’s continued religious heritage, even after the original monastic community dispersed.

Though the region’s religiosity remains, Old Orhei’s authenticity, unfortunately, has recently declined.

The loss of authenticity in a historic land

Many historical sites in Old Orhei face the problem of random preservation efforts, which are not concerned with preserving the site’s authentic look.

In 2023, the road from Butuceni village in the Cultural-Natural Reserve was asphalted, which led to an by the Ministry of Culture. It ruined the village’s authenticity but gave locals more logistical freedom.

Climbing on the bank, we notice a brand-new red-roofed dwelling that, from a logical viewpoint, should not have been built in the reserve. But there it is, like the newly constructed path to the Peștera cave monastery and the asphalted road in Butuceni village.

This modern tampering is one thing preventing Moldova from having its first United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization () World Heritage Site.

“There is too much industrialization in a place where authenticity is worshiped,” Musteață laments. The Old Orhei Reserve has been on the UNESCO tentative list for years but is not moving forward any time soon. “I don’t think there is much hope at the moment,” Musteață admits honestly.

The situation saddens him. He and other researchers have worked for years to put this site on the world map as a part of humanity’s historical cradle, to no avail.

“The landscape and the density of settlements since prehistory is special. You can see the changes in this part of the world, moving from East to West. The Golden Horde, the Islamic period, Christians — there is a huge variety of artifacts describing how people lived in this area,” Musteață explains.

Life has moved on from this relic. The Orthodox Church still holds significant power in the small country of Moldova, but only traces of the glory the church once had in Old Orhei remain. In the 1940s, the Soviet Union started excavations in the region, which also disrupted the old sites; they built a new road through the Golden Horde citadel and cut it in half.

“A historic road should go around the citadel. It’s completely doable,” Musteață says.

The professor feels that many of Moldova’s stories remain untold, even that of such a landmark as Old Orhei. “It is frustrating. We need to tell our story!” Musteață suggests.

He thinks the country itself should put Orhei at the top of the list of tourist destinations in Moldova. After all, it’s the most important tourist site in the country. “It should be declared a state priority, a national strategy,” he says. “People working in this field in Moldova need to understand that the basis of tourism is history and heritage.”

That is another reason why Moldova’s Old Orhei is not on the UNESCO list. “Our country overall is underrepresented,” Musteață believes.

According to UNESCO, the organization is not in a position to comment on what is missing for Old Orhei to receive its World Heritage Site title. Moldova first proposed the area as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2008 but its nomination the following year.

In September 2015, Moldova submitted a new version of the nomination dossier as “Orheiul Vechi Archaeological Landscape,” a cultural site. Following the evaluation process and a recommendation by the International Council on Monuments and Sites, Moldova withdrew the nomination again.

Luckily, Moldova appears on the UNESCO list as part of a group of countries with the Struve Geodetic Arc, a of survey triangulations spanning ten countries and over 2,820 kilometers. This chain reaches from the world’s — Hammerfest, Norway — to the Black Sea. The listed site includes 34 points across all ten countries, one of which is in Moldova. The country is eager to earn its very own World Heritage Site title, even if it isn’t Old Orhei.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Moldova’s Old Orhei: An Amazing Site With Rich History appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Madrid’s political focus on Catalonia has intensified since 2017. After holding what was deemed by Spanish authorities an illegal independence referendum, Catalonia’s President Carles Puigdemont and other officials fled to Belgium, a diplomatic crisis. Spain then imposed direct rule over the region, with the EU backing its decision and citing the need for constitutional approval of referendums. In the aftermath, local support for Catalonia’s independence , offering Madrid a way in.

���貹����’s and autonomous movements are among Europe’s most well-known, and its management of them is watched closely across the continent. Many other European nations, particularly in larger countries, have autonomy seeking devolution, self-government or outright independence. The perceived of European-level efforts to resolve these issues has led countries to maintain their own policies. Although few movements are considered serious threats, attempts to assert themselves often provoke direct interventions by national governments — when these governments have the capacity to do so.

The struggle between nationalism and separatism

Many of Europe’s once-distinct regional identities have only waned in recent times. The rise of in Europe in the 1800s led to unitary states that integrated peripheral regions with the capitals, a trend known as “capital magnetism.” Additionally, increasing in other large cities weakened to local communities and support systems.

Integration and assimilation pressure was also exerted on regional identities to create more national identities. At the time of Italy’s unification in 1861, for example, of Italians spoke the Tuscan dialect which began to be promoted as . Steadily, its use in public and administrative life, mass media and other methods led to a decline in the use of other regional dialects and languages. Similarly, French policies promoted the Parisian dialect as standard French, and the German Empire promoted High German.

Modern EU states face greater limitations on language suppression. The framework provided by the EU’s “post-sovereign” system implores member states to minority language protections and other rights. Nonetheless, national governments have modernized their approaches to establishing national uniformity. Proficiency in majority languages is often a prerequisite for education, media and employment opportunities, while immigration favors majority-language learners. As a result, dozens of minority European languages are on the of extinction.

Nonetheless, autonomous movements in Europe do wield political power. Political networks like the , a group of pro-independence political parties, operate in the EU parliament and serve as political outlets for separatist movements, using democratic processes.

Italy is constantly attempting to more effectively tie to itself its autonomous regions: the islands of Sicily and Sardinia as well as three northern regions. The 2018 of the regional political party Lega Nord into a national one, Lega, demonstrated some success. The autonomy movements, however, were similarly adaptive. Other northern Italian parties recently to vote to approve legislation approving them greater autonomy in June 2024. South Tyrol, Italy’s German-speaking region, brings the added challenge of receiving support from Austria. Austrian leaders have repeatedly proposed granting Austrian to German speakers, and, in January 2024, voiced support for , drawing a reflexive rebuke from Rome.

Hungary’s disputes with its neighbors are even more notable. The 1920 breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire left significant Hungarian communities across , and . Today, the Hungarian government supports these communities by funding cultural institutions, providing financial aid and fostering solidarity, which has sparked tensions with these countries. However, as a smaller nation, Hungary struggles to exert significant influence, especially in EU member states like Romania and Slovakia, and it has also found limited success in Ukraine.

Western European states remain resilient

Aside from cases like these, EU countries generally tend to avoid interfering in each others’ separatist movements. This has helped France to consolidate its rule over its mainland territory. However, it hasn’t yet done so over the Mediterranean island of Corsica, purchased by the French in . The rollback of the French Empire after World War II reignited historical tensions, further inflamed by the arrival of many French people and Europeans from to Corsica in the 1960s. Though violence largely subsided in Corsica after the 1970s, a ceasefire was not reached , and pro-separatist riots in 2022 show the situation .

the unrest, French President Macron raised the possibility of granting Corsica greater autonomy. Previously, , as tensions were building in neighboring Spain over Basque separatism, France raised the administrative autonomy of its own Basque territory by granting it single community status, unifying several local councils under one regional authority. Contrastingly, the merger of the region of in 2016 with two other French areas reduced its autonomy and integrated it more into the national apparatus. The different approaches demonstrate the diverse policies used by national governments to manage their regions.

Germany, the most populous country in the EU, administers several regions with aspirations for greater autonomy. However, its , which grants states greater authority over areas such as education and language, has helped temper separatist sentiment and reduced the need for management from Berlin.

A federal system has not resolved the challenges faced by Belgium. The country’s and French-speaking regions have sought greater autonomy, with some advocating for unification with a greater Dutch or French-speaking state. While increasing regional autonomy has been part of the solution, the regions remain interconnected through the capital, Brussels, and its wider role as the capital of the EU.

That has not deterred breakup advocates from proposing a similar “” between Belgium’s regions, like the peaceful split between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992. a victory in June 2024 for Vlaams Belang, a party whose leader ran on reaching an agreement to dissolve the country or declaring Flanders’s independence. But their shock defeat ensured Belgium’s continuity and thus the stability of the EU.

Outside the EU, Europe’s autonomy issues are also in flux. In the late , the UK granted greater autonomy to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Scottish independence efforts were then disrupted after a failed 2014 referendum and the ����’s subsequent departure from the EU two years later. The Scottish National Party established a Brussels office to maintain EU connections, the European Friends of Scotland Group, founded in 2020. The Scottish Independence Convention plans to hold a in Edinburgh in October 2024 featuring more than a dozen European groups to coordinate their independence initiatives, though the participation of separatist movements within EU countries may limit the extent of EU involvement.

Brexit also reignited secessionist sentiment across the UK, particularly in , but also in Wales. Even within England, regional parties like CumbriaFirst, the East Devon Alliance and Mebyon Kernow for their own regions’ autonomy, and devolution within England has been increasingly in recent years. London has struggled to counter these movements since Brexit, but it has succeeded in preventing a resurgence in paramilitary activity since it ended it in Northern Ireland in the 1990s.

In Eastern Europe, separatism is a persistent threat

Western Europe’s relative success in reducing armed conflicts over the last few decades contrasts with its resurgence in Eastern Europe. The region’s fragile borders and the emergence of weak states in the wake of the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have seen separatist movements gain increasing power.

The EU and NATO played a pivotal role in the collapse of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new states, often at the expense of Serbia. In response, ethnic Serbian separatism has surged across and , with supporters citing the EU’s and NATO’s support for separatist movements in the 1990s as justification for their actions.

Russia has also inflamed separatism in parts of the former and the former Soviet Union to counter EU and NATO expansion or to incorporate these regions into it. Beyond supporting Serbian interests in the Balkans, Russia has utilized, to varying degrees, separatist movements in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Russia has long performed to separatist movements in the West, including inviting representatives to like the Anti-Globalization Movement of Russia, though largely consisting of fringe groups. Russia itself has its own separatist and autonomy movements, however, including in Chechnya, Tatarstan and elsewhere. These have found support from Western actors, including through the launch of the . has also supported Russian separatist movements, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan meanwhile the 50-year anniversary of the Turkish invasion of EU member state Cyprus in 1974 in support of local Turkish separatists.

Most separatist movements in Europe lack the infrastructure to become independent states without external support but persist in their pursuit of independence nonetheless. And European countries with territories outside of Europe, such as France with or Denmark with , must manage their burgeoning independence movements. Access to the EU may be influential in convincing them to remain, but , such as Azerbaijan’s recent support for New Caledonia’s independence, could potentially play a stronger role.

Related Reading

Making Sense of the Trouble in New Caledonia

A new concern for national governments may emerge closer to home. In the , the tension between Russian minorities and national governments remains evident, and the situation faces uncertainty amid the war in Ukraine. The rise of the Alternative für Deutschland political party in the former East Germany has in turn highlighted the enduring divides within the country less than 40 years after reunification, and how new political entities can emerge to exploit such sentiments.

Islamic separatism is a live issue in Western Europe

Yet the most pressing issue appears to be emerging in Western Europe’s major cities. French President Emmanuel Macron, aiming to address concerns over what French authorities describe as “parallel societies” of Muslim immigrants and their descendants, proposed a law in 2023 to the education, finances, and propaganda networks of radical Islam, often from foreign countries. Macron labeled this phenomenon as “separatism.” He was referring to marginalized communities on the outskirts of major French cities in the famed banlieues, which are increasingly beyond state control and driven by domestic grievances and dissatisfaction with French foreign policy. While France’s situation appears the most severe, such sentiment is common across Western Europe.

Related Reading

FO° Exclusive: Make Sense of the Hellish Rioting in France

The EU’s handling of autonomous and separatist movements has frequently faced criticism from nationalist governments, and balancing separatism with nationalism remains a sensitive challenge. However, major countries like Germany and smaller ones like Denmark demonstrate it is possible to manage these issues within national frameworks. Switzerland, a non-EU state, shows similar success in keeping itself together. Clearly, despite nationalist policies, centuries-old communities are resilient and difficult to absorb and erase, even without outside support. Managing these long-standing issues, as well as emerging movements, will require continual adaptation.

[, a project of the Independent Media Institute, produced this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Separatism Remains A Challenge From Western To Eastern Europe appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Politics in France have been coming to a boil. The past elections symbolize the lessons people have drawn from the fact that there is a more substantial influence of the extreme right, including Germany and Austria. French President Emmanuel Macron called for snap elections after the European Union Parliament elections. This move concerned many, seemed counterintuitive and provided further momentum toward the National Rally candidate, Marine Le Pen. On the other hand, there is hope that the next election will be different.

Surging right wing

Germany and Austria are other countries where the extreme right surged in the most recent European parliamentary election. Right now, the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats), a center-right political group, holds a of the seats with 188 out of 720 total seats. However, the far-right, represented in Germany by Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), has been on the rise. AfD is the strongest in East Germany and among new voters. It finished , with 15.9% of the national vote, behind the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CDU/CSU).

In Austria, the Freedom Party has seen a similar rise in popularity. Austria will hold its regular parliamentary elections in September.

It is helpful, however, to take a step back and avoid drawing strict comparisons between different nations’ political situations. The media has been permanently interested in the far right challenging the center. This obscured the meaning of the center, with the media distorting perceptions of political alignment. If Le Pen were an American, she would be to the left of the democratic party. She advocates for social programs and supports the working class, something that no accepted party in the US is willing to do. Yet the media creates the perception that she is far-right and that the far right is therefore on the rise in France.

Since World War II, France has had a very solid right wing which consolidated around Charles de Gaulle. Francois Mitterand emerged after World War II and formed France’s left wing. Mitterand increased greatly in electoral appeal. He nationalized all big banks and major industries. Until 2017, France expected either the socialist party or a rightwing party more or less in the Gaullist tradition to rule, but that is when France started shifting to legitimizing the far right as an alternative to the two establishment wings of the ruling political spectrum: the socialists and the traditional post-Gaullist right. 

How united is Europe?

The EU Parliament elections are not just a single election; they are 27 national parallel elections. A question that many may ask “Are people voting for the whole of Europe or just their country?” This is what makes elections so difficult on a European level. For example, people in Bratislava will not be interested in issues such as those of the Social Democratic Party in Austria. Voters will focus on the issues and problems of their own countries. This has created an identity problem in Europe.  Europeans are more focused on their national identity and national issues rather than being united as Europeans with European problems. 

The European project must move forward. Countries that trade with each other should not go to war. Europe has progressed in the past decades. When traveling in Europe, people once had to stop at border checkpoints, but now people can drive straight through. Europe also adopted the Euro in 1999, providing a universal currency for Europe. This has allowed for swift and easy transactions and removed the need to calculate exchange rates.

The gradual rise of far-right parties and the challenges to the political center have sparked intense debates about the nature of political alignment and the identity of the electorate. The issue of European unity remains a complex and pressing concern, as national interests often overshadow the broader European agenda. Despite the challenges, hope still exists for a more united and prosperous Europe.��

[ wrote this first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Can Europe Vote Itself Out of Its Crisis? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

This trend is not unique to the UK; in recent centuries, the role of royalty in politics has declined considerably worldwide. As political ideals royal authority in Europe, European colonial powers undermined their authority overseas. The strain of World War I helped cause several to collapse, and World War II their numbers further. After, the Soviet Union and the US divided Europe along ideological lines and sought to impose their communist and liberal democratic ideals elsewhere, and the remaining monarchs faced accelerating marginalization.

Today, fewer than are politically active on a national scale. Some trace their lineages back more than a millennium, like and the , while Belgium’s is less than . Several have adapted by reducing political power while maintaining cultural and financial relevance, while others have retained their strong political control. Their various methods and circumstances make it challenging to determine where royals may endure, collapse, or return.

European monarchies exercise soft power

Alongside the UK, the royals of Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands have all seen their powers become largely ceremonial. Smaller European monarchical states like Andorra and the Vatican City are not hereditary, while Luxembourg, Monaco and Liechtenstein are — though only the latter two still wield tangible power.

Attempts to exercise remaining royal political power have often highlighted its increasing redundancy. Belgian King Baudouin’s refusal to sign an abortion bill in saw him declared unfit to rule before being reinstated once it passed. Luxembourg’s Grand Duke Henri, meanwhile, lost his legislative role in after refusing to sign a euthanasia bill. Due to increasing scrutiny of Queen Beatrix’s influence, the Dutch parliament transferred the Dutch monarch’s role in forming coalition governments to parliament , depriving her of the ability to dissolve parliament. 

The British monarch’s decline in is also evident, but it can still prove helpful. The royal family uses its global popularity to , while royal visits can help seal important agreements, particularly in countries with other royal families. The leaders of also pledge allegiance to King Charles III as their head of state.

Additionally, the monarchy can bypass certain democratic processes. In , the British government advised Queen Elizabeth II to withhold Queen’s Consent, preventing parliamentary debate on the Military Action Against Iraq Bill, which would have restricted the ability to take military action without parliamentary approval.

Royal efforts to cultivate soft power and maintain a positive public image have also been crucial for their survival. Many see Belgium’s royal family as an essential source of political stability and unity. In Spain, former King Juan Carlos played a in the country’s transition to democracy in the 1970s. Modernizing their image as neutral political guardians with who engage in advocacy and humanitarian work often gives European royal families higher approval ratings than politicians.

Royal families have also downsized in recent years to exercise discretion and reduce costs. In 2019, Sweden’s king , duties and some privileges from five of his grandchildren. The Danish queen implemented similar changes in 2022. Norway’s royal family now consists only of the King, Queen, Crown Prince and Princess, while the British royal family has hinted at its current number of 10 “working royals.”

Despite these efforts, European royal families continue to face scandals and intense public and media scrutiny. , Spanish and Swiss authorities began investigating former Spanish King Juan Carlos for allegedly receiving $100 million from a deal with Saudi Arabia. In , Belgium’s Prince Laurent was accused of fraud and extortion by Libya’s sovereign wealth fund. The UK royal family’s recent treatment of and the departure of Prince Harry and Prince Andrew’s association with have also rocked Britain. Since the death of Queen Elizabeth II in 2022, has reinforced the unprecedented challenges facing the British monarchy. The King’s and Princess Kate’s cancer diagnoses have also added to the sense of fragility.

Cultural shifts, concern over and increasing political irrelevance have threatened European royal families. Movements like the Alliance of European Republican Movements, created in to abolish monarchies altogether, reflect the increasing disregard for royal power.

The opaque nature of royal finances, however, has granted some respite. Grand Duke Henri of Luxembourg’s officially makes him Europe’s richest royal. However, suspicions abound regarding billions more in assets like trusts, jewelry and art collections that point to more significant degrees of wealth.

Extensive efforts go into hiding these fortunes. Liechtenstein’s royal family operates a bank criticized by the for aiding clients in tax evasion, dodging creditors and other misconduct. Queen Elizabeth II once used the Queen’s Consent to change a so that her wealth remained concealed, while the revealed huge undisclosed European royal assets. Europe’s in Belgium saw King Phillippe declare the monarchy’s wealth at roughly £11 million , but the European Union Times estimated it at £684 million.

The estimated net worth of King Charles $750 million to over $2 billion, while the collective fortune of the British royal family, also referred to as “the Firm,” is estimated to be between and almost . Britain’s monarchs also enjoy more institutionalized ties to national wealth than other European royals. Through the that upholds British nobility, a network of support from wealthy , Marquesses, Earls, Viscounts and Barons helps the monarchy remain firmly entrenched in the ����’s wealth centers.

Outside Europe, monarchies are in decline too

Royal families in the Asia-Pacific consist of Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia, Brunei, Japan and Tonga. Thailand’s King is the world’s richest, with a net worth of . However, he faces his own controversies relating to and the use of that have led to an anti-monarchy movement. Malaysia has a rotational system of who rule their states and serve as head of state every five years. While the sultans’ formal authority is limited, they command influence in cultural and religious matters, and despite constitutional amendments curtailing their powers, they occasionally intervene in politics. , the monarchy is similarly politically and culturally influential.

Brunei’s absolute monarchy has granted its Sultan, Hassanal Bolkiah, supreme authority over his country for more than 50 years. His fortune makes him the second-richest monarch in the world. As a microstate, Brunei’s influence in international affairs is limited. The reduced power of �����貹��’s monarchy since 1945 has made it most like European monarchies, though its powers have remained steady. In sub-Saharan Africa, partnerships with British colonial authorities have allowed Lesotho’s monarchy to retain largely ceremonial influence, while Eswatini’s King Mswati III exerts strong control over the country. Nonetheless, alongside Europe, most regions have seen general declines in royal power over decades.

Arab monarchies retain a tight grip on power

Bucking the trend of decline is the Middle East, where monarchies previously had limited authority under the Ottoman Empire. Its collapse after World War I allowed them to increase their power considerably, even those under loose French and British protectorates.

By exploiting their increasingly , Gulf monarchies have thrived. Today, absolute monarchies exist in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait with complete control over media, government branches and law enforcement. No opposition is tolerated, and they are backed by religious lobbies that reinforce their status as custodians of cultural traditions. Despite the heavy-handed approach, they largely enjoy strong support, even among the youth. The Saudi Crown Prince has long been popular among in particular.

As in Europe, Middle Eastern royal wealth is often hidden and difficult to discern. Estimates for the combined wealth of the Saudi royal family range from roughly . Other estimates put the UAE’s of Abu Dhabi as the most affluent royal family in the world, with more than in wealth. The royal families of Kuwait and Qatar often possess fortunes that people frequently measure in the hundreds of billions.

The other Middle Eastern royal families in Oman, Jordan and Morocco have less influence but still more so than in Europe. They have also withstood democratization pressures by promoting stability. During the Arab Spring, as other Middle Eastern states faced revolutions and civil wars, the monarchies and their political systems .

However, the downfall of royal families in Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, North Yemen, Libya and Iran during the 20th century shows the risks of instability. Today, this often comes from within the royal families themselves. Saudi royal disputes out in public, including a mass purge in 2017. In , Jordan’s crown prince was placed under house arrest for an attempted coup, only to emerge days later and pledge loyalty to the king. A 2017–2021 crisis meanwhile saw Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt sever diplomatic relations and blockade Qatar following accusations of supporting terrorism and supporting Iran.

Worldwide, monarchs show solidarity and occasional signs of strength

While some of their positions may be precarious, royal families maintain some solidarity among them. Marriages between European royals throughout history mean that the current ruling royals in are all related, similar to some . Following controversy over corruption allegations, ���貹����’s Juan Carlos lived in exile in the UAE for .

Royals have also taken more active roles to support one another. The British royal family played a significant diplomatic role in supporting the against the Ottoman Empire in World War I. In 1962, the British monarchy, which had a close relationship with the Brunei monarchy, helped lobby to send British forces to the country and quash an armed rebellion, maintaining British influence in Southeast Asia.

Other royal families could still return to power. Spain restored its monarchy in 1975, and Cambodia later did in 1993, making it the latest to be reintegrated into politics, leaving more than 20 royal families with no country to reign over. In Romania in , an estimated one million people took to the streets to welcome former King Michael, who abdicated in 1947. The daughter of former King Michael, Margareta of Romania, now lives in Elisabeta Palace in Bucharest and other family members have taken a in politics.

Bulgaria’s former Tsar, Simeon II, lived in Spain after being overthrown in 1946 and returned to Bulgaria after the communist government crumbled, serving as prime minister from . Albania’s Prince Leka, grandson of former King Zog I, attempted to reinstate the monarchy in a but failed. In , family members of former Italian King Umberto II sought damages for their exile and the return of assets, countered by Italy’s government suing for damages due to royal collusion with Mussolini.

The case of the Italian royal family shows how disputes involving exiled royals can have political implications. Greece’s royal family now lives in London and frequently appears at royal functions. Meanwhile, members of Iran’s former royal family and descendants of Ethiopia and Russia’s royal family live in the US Although there is no current method or desire to launch a political movement to put them back into power, leveraging diaspora communities’ support for royalty can still help host governments wield influence through them.

Having survived fascism and communism, monarchies have largely relinquished political power in the modern liberal world order. Yet, as symbols of state continuity, some monarchs have maintained their relevance by providing long-term stability. While incompatible with communism, royalty’s adaptability to democratic and fascist regimes highlights their resilience. Their ability to reinvent themselves and demonstrate their usefulness to contemporary politics may secure their survival — though their dwindling numbers suggest this will remain challenging.

[ produced this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Power and Enormous Wealth of the Remaining Royals appeared first on 51�Թ�.

For example, in Germany, the ruling social democratic party was annihilated with only 13.9% of the popular vote. The Conservative Christian Democratic Union won with 30%. In a shocking turn of events, the far-right alternative party Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) came in second with 15.9%. Even though the far-right didn’t win outright, in the former East Germany region, the AFD increased their vote share from 5% to 16% among voters younger than 24. The result is a good litmus test to measure just how far Europe is sliding to the right. 

An attempt to break the far-right fever

France has also become an example of the far-right frenzy. During the elections, the far-right party Rassemblement National (RN) won 32% of the vote. That’s more than double the vote share current French president Emmanuel Macron’s centrist party received. Created in 1972 by the reactionary Jean-Marie Le Pen, the party is now led by his daughter Marine, who has moderated it somewhat. Although she curtailed the neo-fascist elements within the party, RN remains a nationalist, populist party focused on extremely strict immigration controls.

RN has already left its mark on the French market. Bondholders are wary because RN economic policies are weak and promise spending. France could very well be facing potential instability. Fearing this, Macron called for a snap . He hoped to break the far-right fever dominating his country. If people were made to vote again, he reasoned, they may remeasure the RN. 

If the RN won, RN’s Jordan Bardella would have been declared France’s next prime minister. Because the French constitution allows the head of government to be from a different party than the head of state, Macron would face a fractured and unstable political situation. However, France appears to have avoided disaster for the moment. Leftist and centrist candidates were able to cooperate, dropping out in each other’s favor when one held the edge. In the final result, RN came merely in third place. However, they had still increased their vote share significantly.

Why is this happening?

During the Cold War, there wasn’t a call for concern regarding the far-right — most countries were more concerned about the rise of communism. Now, however, a mass reaction against uncontrolled immigration has contributed to the rise of the far-right. France, for example, needed North African immigrants for factory work. However, these immigrant workers were never integrated into the society and culture. This created a significant “us vs. them” chasm. Europeans feared immigrants would threaten their “pure” society.

The biggest issue, therefore, lies in assimilation. A new population or culture is viewed as exotic up until it reaches 10% of the dominant population. As soon as it reaches that point, the population is suddenly viewed as disruptive and is rejected from the dominant society. It also takes about three generations for an immigrant family to fully integrate. That’s a long time. Something needs to be done about integration and immigration quicker.

The far-right has chosen to point their fingers in the direction of immigration as the cause of sociological issues. In actuality, the blame lies with the political elites who have failed to formulate proper immigration policies. A modern fault line runs through politics: Politicians rely too heavily on spin and not enough on real problems to receive votes. The lack of leadership in acknowledging present problems, most notably immigration, has led to a rise in populist, far-right leaders. 

With the rise in inflation, cost of living, and unemployment, people turn to scapegoats to blame. They have found an easy one in immigration issues. So when a charismatic, populist leader comes along promising an end to such issues, it’s only natural that the voter population will begin to turn right.

As this trend continues, there will be a strengthening of nationalism. Such a rise gives way to a decline in protectionism and multilateralism. A new world order is asserting itself, and it seems like European social democracy is increasingly discredited.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: Volatile Europe Catches New Election Fever appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The EU initiated anti-subsidy on Chinese EVs on June 12. From the moment these began, Germans from the government to industry insiders expressed opposition. Chancellor Olaf Scholz even publicly that the German automotive industry would be able to compete with Asian car manufacturers.

Typically, a company applies for an investigation. This time, the EU Commission an investigation on its own. So why does European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen not even give the German automotive industry a chance for “?” The EU clearly had a pre-established position, and the results of the investigation are foreordained. It only targets China; one can only call it another witch hunt.��

The EU’s anti-subsidy investigation on Chinese EVs launched in October 2023. Von der Leyen warned that the vehicles would “” into Europe. This had the potential to destroy the continent’s automotive industry. It was a reasonable fear; from 2012 to 2013, China damaged Europe’s solar energy industry by selling and illegally €21 billion (over $22 billion) of solar panels there.

Von der Leyen intended to use this new investigation to further the EU into a geopolitical institution, which has been a core goal of hers since she took office. Von der Leyen is running for as EU Commission president, and if that fails, she could try for the position of NATO Secretary-General with French and United States aid. So she is simultaneously using the investigation to gather political support, as she presents herself as a hardliner against China in her campaign.

But at what cost is she doing all this? Perhaps the destruction of the Eurasian continent due to trade conflicts? That’s not her concern.

Right-wing protectionism attempts to protect European industry

There’s been a significant rightward in the EU’s politics, as evidenced by the of the 2024 EU parliamentary elections. This change undoubtedly casts a heavy shadow over China’s tariff policy. conservative European forces will inevitably use trade protectionism to defend their own industries and employment. In response, these member states have further strengthened their demands to protect their own automotive jobs. Currently, at least EU countries provide land subsidies for industrial investment and several more preferential loans to enterprises.

This move completely caters to . (What comes after the rightward turn? The last time Europe faced the storm of populism and trade protectionism was in Germany before World War II.) Given China’s cost and technological in EVs and wind power, the EU’s restrictions will also delay its efforts in energy conservation and emission reduction. This further delays its goals to address global climate change, which is incongruous with the EU’s claims of leading global climate governance.

Trade protectionist policies initiated by the US have also propelled the growing protectionism within the EU. In 2022, the US introduced the Inflation Reduction , which provides up to $7,500 in tax credits for new EVs and loans for used EVs. This move raised concerns within the EU about the impact on its own automotive industry and has led to the adoption of trade protectionist measures.

Meanwhile, the US’s recent trade war and decoupling practices against China have intensified the EU’s concerns about its own industrial development and security. In May 2024, the US announced an in tariffs on Chinese EVs from the previous 25% to 100%. The European Commission immediately followed suit by firing at Chinese EVs. This was hardly a coincidence.

The EU’s discriminatory subsidies and weaponized tariffs

For a long time, China and Europe have maintained a “cold politics, hot economy” model of cooperation — ideological differences do not affect both sides as important trade partners. However, this new emotional prejudice will chill the few commonalities between China and Europe. Von der Leyen seems to have forgotten that it was Europe itself that initiated the subsidy era in the field of new energy.

On February 1, 2023, von der Leyen officially launched the Green Deal Industrial . This relaxed restrictions on government subsidies to enterprises, which is usually prohibited by the rules of the EU single market. But under the current policy on batteries, EU member states can offer financial assistance to battery manufacturers.

This plan was originally intended to improve Europe’s competitiveness in the field of clean energy, but its actual implementation has created discriminatory subsidies. According to statistics, the EU has provided ($3.2 billion) in subsidies to battery manufacturers.

This EU tariff investigation has exposed the division within the EU, with countries like Germany and Hungary expressing . Meanwhile, countries that do not export their own cars to China, represented by France, support the EU’s imposition of tariffs. In fact, Paris plans to raise the threshold for Chinese EVs entering the EU market, forcing Chinese manufacturers to invest and construct factories in France. As early as May, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire publicly stated that he the automotive manufacturer BYD to build factories there.

Like France, those who support increasing tariffs on Chinese cars have communicated with Chinese officials and car companies, expressing their will to cooperate. These countries do not oppose Chinese EVs, but rather the fact that they cannot benefit from them. They hope the companies will cooperate to drive the development of Europe’s automotive industry.

Objectively speaking, this goal is not difficult to achieve. Before this tariff policy started, manufacturers such as BYD had already started factories in the EU. However, if Europeans use tariffs as a weapon to force China to build factories on their soil, that is a different story.

Can the EU’s automotive industry really develop if Chinese EVs are kept away? The protective tariffs have achieved nothing but delaying the use of low-cost, low-carbon energy in Europe by a few years. The EU’s anti-subsidy can’t solve the problems faced by the EU in related industries, but may further worsen the situation. European consumers welcome inexpensive electric vehicles as well as low-carbon energy; after the anti-subsidy investigation, the EU members may have to buy Chinese EVs at higher prices. The only group not grateful for the reduced carbon dioxide emissions because of China is the EU, which has chosen a tariff war.

Europe and China could cooperate

The cooperation potential between China and Europe’s automotive industries far exceeds their differences. With electrification and — the use of artificial intelligence with decision-making capability — the proportion of the cost of chips in car prices will rise dramatically. Although the Netherlands has technology and Germany has , the majority of the chip industry’s profits goes to the US and the non-European countries like Japan and South Korea.

In this regard, China and Europe have common interests. China must develop its own chip industry. With its production capacity, the chip prices will definitely be reduced followed by the increased proportion of its chips in the global market. This is already in effect.

From January to May 2024, China’s integrated circuit amounted to 444.73 renminbi (over $62 billion), a year-on-year increase of 21.2%, even exceeding the 20.1% of cars. It became the country’s second-largest industry with year-on-year growth. China has already occupied the popular mature process of 28-40nm. Most car chips use 28nm or 40nm chips, so cooperating with China to use its chips can greatly reduce the production cost. The two countries would gain a competitive edge over US and Korean cars.

If the European automotive industry can’t cooperate with China in this game, Europe cannot participate as a player. Rather, it would be more like a bargaining chip. Habeck’s visit to China is a signal that Berlin has reached a consensus with Beijing to “decrease the impact” while Paris is still facing choices.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Launching Tariffs Targeted at Chinese Automakers? Not Right, EU. appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Everything may seem unchanged–Josep Borrell Fontenes, The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, continues to focus on his prominent political issues. The leaders of France, Germany, and the UK remain in the primetime news spotlight. European media produce a considerable amount of content featuring prominent European leaders. Sadly, all of this is just a beautiful facade.

In reality, things are quite bleak for Europeans. Borrell seems unable to become the voice of a unified Europe on the international stage, although he still desires it greatly. It was well-highlighted by POLITICO-Europe, “Borrell has always condemned the Hamas attacks, called for the unconditional liberation of all hostages, for a humanitarian pause leading to a sustainable cease-fire, for the humanitarian provision and a two-state solution, along the same line of the European Council conclusions that leaders unanimously agreed in March.” Nevertheless “during a meeting of EU leaders, German Chancellor and his Austrian counterpart Karl Nehammer confronted Josep Borrell on his months-long outspoken critique of Israel as the death toll in Gaza mounted, according to two officials briefed on the exchange.”

It looks like the euro bureaucracy restricts Borrell’s freedom. He always feels free to give . E.g. he is notorious for his “garden vs. jungle” metaphor that made him the EU’s top diplomat.�� Many times, he ends up in awkward situations. Now, hardly anyone can take him seriously and perceive him as an influential politician following his own policy. On the contrary, his behavior represents what the global West will become – noisy but increasingly irrelevant.

One after another, new nationally oriented African leaders asked France to leave the region. Following coups in those countries, neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso have already kicked out France’s forces. This has weakened its influence in its amid a wave of anti-French sentiment.

Paris does it without resistance, not even formally attempting to negotiate its interests. For more than two months, French President Emmanuel Macron took a defiant stance, ignoring the ultimatum set by the junta in Niger, who came to power in July after a military coup. France refused to engage with the junta leaders or move on their demands to remove stationed in the country to fight terrorism.��  

It withdrew its military contingents. Meanwhile, President Macron is trying to make history calling for an “” during the Olympics scheduled to take place from July 26 to August 11, 2024, in Paris.“We will do everything to have an Olympic truce, we will work on it,” Macron said in an interview with BFM television. But his voice is still weak and Europe is reluctant to listen to him, let alone Moscow. Macron pleads for an Olympic truce but suffers . What happens now does not align well with France’s international reputation and Macron’s ego.

Half of the opposes China’s influence. At the dawn of a new political era, the German population’s growing mistrust of China has significant implications for the country’s foreign policy. The other half “dreams” of Beijing coming to their country and “taking it over as an investor.” associations widely welcome China’s economic strategy.�� 

However, when Scholz arrived in China on an official visit this April, he faced a change in attitude toward him by the Chinese officials. Scholz was forced to deal with the low-level diplomatic reception. The Vice Mayor Zhang Guozhi was the only official who met him upon arriving at the airport. It was a flagrant breach of to receive foreign leaders or diplomats at the wrong level. It sends a negative message when you receive or offer to receive another country leader at a lower level. The MFAs of any country know that, but Scholz had no choice but to accept this reality.��

At Tel Aviv airport, air sirens forced Chancellor Scholz to lie on the ground due to a missile attack threat from Hezbollah. That was a severe blow to the image of the head of one of Europe’s leading countries. People in the Middle East will remember this episode for a long time. Video showed panicked German officials fleeing a plane amid a missile threat in Israel became top news. It is challenging to follow up the tough guy position during future contacts after such public experience, especially in the Middle East, where value leaders and individuals who uphold personal strength are challenging.

Despite Britain not being a part of the EU anymore, it maintains the first-line position among the leaders of Europe. London nowadays took a wait-and-see approach and preferred not to stick its neck out unnecessarily. The English have always been characterized by a healthy sense of caution. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak is formally active and visible, traveling the world and talking even more. He says the right things, but they are not his thoughts and ideas. He repeats everything already said at various levels in Washington, not adding personal insight into the situation. This wise behavior allows him to avoid taking responsibility and escape unnecessary scrutiny of his personality.

The above is just a small part of what people in Asia and the Global South observe. And they are not at all happy about it. What these countries need is and development. Alongside North America, Asia is where the European Union and its member states are most deeply economically intertwined – through trade, supply chains, investment, financial flows, and mutual reliance on market demand.�� 

But it is only possible when a partner, even a stronger one, behaves consistently and predictably. As even Prince Michael of Liechtenstein admits, European countries say they base their on values – but doing so has led to inconsistency in how they treat international partners.�� Europe is these qualities in the eyes of people living on other continents.

Many people in Asia have come to perceive Europe as a political open space leaning towards its decline. They still have money and technology, but long-term investors and manufacturing capacity are steadily moving to other world regions. The stability of the European economy depends more and more on China and Asia. The leaders of Europe are already rushing to the region and are looking back and forth at each other.

Europeans still influence global politics, e.g. as a global actor, the EU and the UK inspire countries worldwide and strengthen international development in many ways. At the same time, they have continued to fail to influence the end of the war in Ukraine. The conflict has been going on for three years, and European approaches still oscillate from bravado to panic. It is unlikely that Moscow or Kyiv will take such a political approach seriously. Europe should be more persistent and figure out its goals, ways and means more unambiguously, speaking with one voice to clarify its position for everybody.

Human rights continue to represent one of the core values of Europe. But in the face of the conflict in Gaza, many European countries are losing the moral right to lecture others on the issue. Although this is not just a European problem, the Europeans are not able to come up with an effective formula to stop the endless and merciless bloodshed on both sides.

The results of the European elections held over the past month — notably, the significant of right-wing parties — have sent another clear message. Europeans are tired of dealing with the consequences of current social and economic policies and want change.��

Calling snap elections in France for June 9, Macron described his decision as an “act of confidence.” However, his centrist Renaissance party showed a significant lag (21.27%) behind the far-right Rassemblement National (31.4%) in the first round. While he managed to of total defeat by with the Left to exclude Rassemblement National, his position is seriously compromised. This suggests that Macron’s “confidence” stemmed from his erratic policies, which lost touch with the real issues faced by the French people.��

On July 4, Britain’s ruling Conservative Party was thrown out of government after 14 years of rule. Here, unlike on the continent, the establishment belongs to the Right, and it was to the Left that the people turned to express their discontent. The Labour Party won a landslide victory with 411 out of the House of Commons’ 650 seats. Voters deserted the Sunak-led ruling Conservative Party due to his numerous mistakes, which have led the country to its current state.  

Considering what is happening now, it would be understandable for Asian countries to seek more stable and predictable relations. That’s why so many governments are willing to join . Countries from Iran to Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Algeria, Indonesia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Cuba and Kazakhstan have considered joining.

China’s One Belt, One Road initiative also attracts an increasing number of supporters. There are 150 countries formally affiliated with the Initiative, and six more are considering joining it shortly. Cooperation within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership is gaining momentum. Europe and Western countries participated insignificantly in all of this. Once again, in its history, Europe has faced the need to clearly understand itself and its role in the rapidly changing modern world. The emerging confrontation between the West and the East requires an adequate and balanced response.

Europe has to stop reflecting on the past. The old international world order is already fading into the past. The Global South is developing rapidly and demands fair consideration of its interests. Asia is closely watching Europe lose its power but dreams of its colonialism-based part of the US-led rule-based order. Europeans need to accept the new reality as quickly as possible and keep up with the times.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Europe Needs to Find a New Path appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Europe is in an even more dramatic bind than the US. The ambiguity surrounding Biden himself means that the likelihood of a new Trump White House has never been greater, despite Trump being a convicted felon thanks to the of a criminal court that same June. Europeans are dreading the unpredictable consequences of a new Trump administration.

Even without that factor of ambiguity, Europe is immersed in its own problems. The major event of the month was the initiation of what may turn into a new French Revolution. Reacting to the disastrous showing of his coalition in the European parliamentary elections on June 9, President Emmanuel Macron, as soon as the results were announced, precipitously hatched his daring, potentially suicidal gambit. He called for new to “clarify” the balance of political forces in France. Already struggling to deal with the expense, uncertainty and disappointing evolution of NATO’s tragic war in Ukraine, Europe was thrown into a state of suspended animation as it awaited the outcomes of the British and French elections. Those took place in the first week of July.

On June 13, four days after Macron’s act of folly, Alex Gloy offered this “quick observation” based on the state of the global bond markets. He sees the unmistakable seeds of a European banking crisis.

“These are current 10-year government bond yields (except TYX, which is the US 30-yr). The focus here is on the difference, or spread, in yield between Germany and France. A week ago, that spread was 0.50%. It is rapidly widening, now at 0.71%. This is worrying. Why? You can purchase government bonds in the same currency but get different yields. This does not make sense unless there is a difference in default probability and / or exit from the Euro. Both of which would be catastrophic events for Europe.

Germany has fiscal deficit of 2.5% of GDP, while France is running at 5.5%. Germany has a debt-to-GDP ratio of 63.6%, while France stands at 111%.

Financial markets hate uncertainty, and the outcome of French elections is unknown, with the risk being a populist right-wing government ignoring the fiscal constraints of the Treaty of Maastricht (max 3% deficit, max 60% debt-to-GDP, both which are already being ignored).

France’s fiscal position is now worse than Spain (3.6% deficit, 108% debt-to-GDP). France should tighten its belt, but that would probably cause more social unrest.

The spread-widening in the government bond market has led to pressure on European bank stocks; BNP fell from EUR 72 to 60 and Deutsche Bank from 16.70 to 14.60. Banks usually have positions in government bonds. Another banking crisis is the last thing Europe needs now.

Still, it is worth mentioning that all Euro-members, including Greece, are currently paying less than the UK or the US.”

Related Reading

Money Matters: Revealing Who Is Holding Billions of US Banknotes

Our colleague Edward Quince offered his own reflections, provoked by another destabilizing event in the month of June: the presence of a Russian nuclear off the coast of the US.

“A�����,

Mr. Putin ain’t dumb. The alarming part of his seemingly nonsensical attitude toward the USD is his informed confidence about what is to come next. Note that he almost always refers to the USD in the past tense. I’ll detail the not-so-secret weapon he has up his sleeve after I finish documenting the events surrounding the Russian nuclear submarine docking in Havana, Cuba today. The short answer, however, is ‘BRICS Bridge, blockchain, and gold derivatives.’

When I researched the work done by Russia and China since 2008 to establish a new, more equitable, and less risky finance and trade environment, BRICS emerged as the ultimate cooperation framework and platform. After having read a ton, it is apparent that a tremendous amount of very focused and deliberate work has been done since then. This 2015 Ufa Declaration the goals, the underlying strategy and some tactics behind the major finance and trade initiatives. The key framework there is the Contingent Reserves Arrangement. Nine years and several global crises later, Mr. Putin has told us just a tiny bit about what has been built on that foundation.

On a separate note, I’ve just finished re-reading Henry Kissinger’s ‘.’ The intricate political play that Kissinger orchestrated in the 70s and the 80s now looks like an elaborate short-term trap for China in the American long-term game against Russia. I can only imagine the depth of resentment and distrust towards the US in Beijing these days. Alternatively, it is possible that there has never been any such trust, and China played the long game knowing that one day the USA would inevitably turn adversarial once again. Nevertheless, since there is nobody resembling Mr. Kissinger in Washington now, there seems to be no going back to the status quo to which we all grew so accustomed.”

With the drama continuing to develop, on June 29, I offered my own testimony. I am a voter in the coming French election, and potentially the US election in November.

“As a dual citizen of two nations, each with a president clearly demonstrating suicidal behavior, I have to wonder about the continued political coherence and even institutional solidity of both. Tomorrow I will be voting in an election that in all probability will establish the contour of what promises to be twelve months of political and I expect even deeper cultural chaos. On July 8 France will most likely have a ‘hung by the rafters’ parliament and a situation of maneuvering that will take place as much on the streets as in the Assemblée Nationale.

The point of a presidential as opposed to a parliamentary regime is that at the core of government there is a human being who symbolizes the unity of the nation. Political wrangling is a permanent feature of all democracies, but there is always some kind of symbol that makes even the worst confrontations palatable. In the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and even Spain, the monarchy plays its role in stabilizing the question of national identity. In presidential regimes, it can only be the president and the flag.

On Sunday, June 9, Emmanuel Macron miscalculated when, by announcing the the Assemblée, he effectively declared two things: 

• That any pretense of political unity for the nation was compromised beyond negotiable repair;
• That the president, as a lame duck because of serving his second term, had now become a non-entity, deprived of the quasi-absolute power De Gaulle had defined for the office.

Macron hoped to address the first point but he was in denial about the reality of the second one, despite its being obvious to everyone else, including his own inner circle.

For three quarters of a century Europe has developed as a zone of relative peace and prosperity in the shadow of the US nuclear umbrella and the US dollar, despite the launch of the Euro. In the context of the war in Ukraine, it has now implicitly embraced the growth of what Dwight Eisenhower – alone among all modern presidents – had the temerity to : the military-industrial complex. 

Europeans have long worried about the role of what President Giscard d’Estaing called the “exorbitant privilege” but accepted the floating dollar as a feature of the new world order. De Gaulle led the campaign against the dollar that eventually led to Nixon’s of the dollar and gold, creating a new global landscape supported by the petrodollar and the Eurodollar. De Gaulle also dared to counter the US by withdrawing from NATO’s central command structure, with the futile aim of achieving military autonomy.

Europe is still struggling mightily with these two issues. It will be interesting to see how this year’s elections influence those developments.”

Previous episodes of Money Matters are available here:

Join the debate

Money Matters…, is dedicated to developing this discussion and involving all interested parties.

We invite all of you who have something to contribute to send us your reflections at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We will integrate your insights into the ongoing debate. We will publish them as articles or as part of the ongoing dialogue.

*[51�Թ�’s “Crucible of Collaboration” is meant to be a space in which multiple voices can be heard, comparing and contrasting their opinions and insights in the interest of deepening and broadening our understanding of complex topics.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Crucible: Money Matters in a Multipolar World, Part 8 appeared first on 51�Թ�.

“Policy learning” and Italy and Albania’s risky plan

A clear aim of the conference was to foster “policy learning” practices among participants. Italy, led by right-wing Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, serves as an example for other European leaders to follow.

The Italian government and Albania, led by Prime Minister Edvin Rama, have a five-year asylum deal. The plan is to build asylum processing facilities under Italian jurisdiction in Albania. They will receive asylum seekers coming via the Mediterranean route, and accelerate processing and repatriation of those whose asylum is declined.The plans are now already in the phase.

By financing and remaining in control of these facilities, the Italian government aims to sidestep potential breaches of international conventions. The Rwanda plans promoted by Denmark and the UK have in fact faced difficulties due to international conventions that prohibit deporting asylum seekers to countries where their fundamental rights cannot be assured.

The Italian–Albanian contract highlights however the high costs of outsourcing asylum processes. They are projected at a minimum of €30 million (over $32 million) annually for basic operational expenses, with total costs far surpassing the initial of €650 million (over $694 million). These financial burdens necessitated substantial cuts in other critical public welfare areas, such as education, health, public transport.

Several factors underscore the major costs, precariousness and inadequacy of such agreements. The contract is rather ambiguous. It will be difficult to monitor the centers’ humanitarian conditions, and there are high risks of during the construction and management of the facilities. Additionally, political instability in Albania might cause the country to withdraw from the contract altogether.

The Social Democrats on asylum outsourcing

But with Rome and Tirana’s plan in the background, the Copenhagen  event served as a strategic platform for Denmark to re-propose its contentious scheme to transfer asylum seekers to a non-Schengen third country. The was influenced by similar initiatives in the UK that faced legal from the Supreme Court over concerns of refoulement and severe violations of international law. It was previously negotiated in Rwanda in 2021, under a preliminary agreement by former Immigration Minister Mattias Tesfaye and Rwandan Foreign Minister Manasseh Nshuti. The plan followed the legislative changes to the Immigration and Repatriation Acts endorsed by the Danish Social Democrats () and right-wing parties in June 2021. It has now stalled.

The conference signaled a reinvigorated attempt by the Danish SD and representatives of other EU countries to discuss and explore joint strategies for externalizing asylum reception and processing. This approach reflects a broader policy trend among EU right-wing populist and conservative governments; they commend the SD asylum model and recommend its replication and expansion. Additionally, the European Parliament elections, which the political spectrum further to the right, suggest these viewpoints may gain prominence over the next five years.

Politicians are increasingly discussing and employing the outsourcing of asylum processing to third countries, but the practice raises significant humanitarian, economic, legal and political concerns. The great financial burden and potential political instability in these countries underscore the risks of such approaches. These factors cast serious doubt on the viability and long-term sustainability of these so-called solutions to asylum. They also suggest a strategic turn by the Danish SD towards more neoconservative and nativist right-wing positions, influenced by electoral dynamics and dissatisfaction among certain voter groups.

This shift also raises vital questions about the compatibility of such policies with established EU democratic and humanitarian values and the core ideals of social democracy. The Danish SD’s decision not to endorse the Party of European Socialists (PES) Berlin , which commits to resisting far-right influences in the European Parliament, marks a transformation within the party. It could exacerbate differences within the broader European political family.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Copenhagen Now Brings a Risky Right-Wing Shift in Asylum Policy appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Traditionally, the role of the diplomat has been to promote peace by keeping political leaders informed. Diplomats serve not only as their government’s voice but as its eyes and ears in world capitals. They speak with important leaders, assess the mood and motivations of their host country and relay their assessments back home. These assessments are vital for giving political leaders the options they need to best manage relations and avoid or end war.

In the era of modern warfare, however, things have changed. The West is involved in two ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza. In these conflicts, governments increasingly rely on intelligence services and military intelligence to provide assessments and recommend policy options. This trend has reached a tipping point that has now endowed intelligence services with greater influence in defining policy than diplomats. Political leaders have largely sidelined diplomats, relegating them to the role of mouthpieces who announce decisions they have already made in consultation with intelligence.

This is a dangerous trend. An intelligence analyst is not a substitute for a diplomat. Diplomats bring a unique and invaluable perspective to the table. They seek to comprehend not only their nation’s interests but also the complex web of interests of all actors involved. Effective diplomats develop an acute understanding of the concept of indivisible security, which is to say, the security and interests of all of the actors involved. While intelligence and the military focus on security alone, diplomats have the task of bringing into the equation essential political, historical, cultural and religious aspects, making their role pivotal in shaping policy options.

The legacy of Cold War tensions

The issues in Israel have become a diplomat’s nightmare. Diplomats have been crying for a between Israel and Palestine, but nothing has come of their repeated attempts. Part of the issue with a two-state solution is that no major political capital has been willing to invest in finding and implementing a solution.

Russia is the other major problem that diplomats must now deal with. Ruch maintains that the war in Ukraine could potentially have been avoided, well before the Russian invasion. When Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, US President Bill Clinton was finishing up his second term. Putin met with Clinton and suggested the idea of Russia joining NATO. Clinton appeared favorable to the suggestion, but later that same day, when the two met again, Clinton explained that his people told him Russia’s joining NATO was not possible.

Europeans have debated the question of pan-European security for decades. Moscow advocated but never implemented ot. French President Macron at various times before, and even after the Russian invasion he was favorable to a solution based on this principle, but to no effect. 

The issues with Russia have always been present, and this is because the mentality of the Cold War never disappeared. The West perceived the Soviets as a threat to the West because they came with a totally different model of society. After the Cold War, the US and the Soviets needed to reach some kind of mutual understanding, if only to prevent a nuclear holocaust, which the world came close to experiencing during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The most important of these agreements was the of 1972. George W. Bush scrapped this treaty in the early 2000s at the same time he was launching new wars in the Middle East.

Since those events, mistrust has become a dominant factor in the relationship between Washington and Moscow.

[Jean-Daniel Ruch’s latest book, Crimes, Hate, Tremors: From One Cold War to the Other, in Pursuit of Peace and Justice, is now available on .]

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: The Evolving Role of Diplomats in a New World Order appeared first on 51�Թ�.

A completely new political balance is at stake in the Old Continent. Paradoxically, the voter turnout is to rise even while the support of towards anti-EU parties is increasing.��

The more Europeans love Europe, the more they hate it.

The more active the European Union is in managing crises, the more its bureaucracy, flaws and difficulties become visible to the public. This has become fertile ground for right-wing parties demanding a return to national sovereignty. Meanwhile, the political center is shrinking.

A recent Bertelsmann Stiftung indicates that 60% of Europeans intend to vote. Despite an East–West disparity — only 29% of the population of the Czech Republic voted in 2019 — the trend is generally positive, especially among young Europeans.

According to a recent TUI Siftung , 58% of 16- to 20-year-olds consider European elections “important.” The most convinced are young Germans (67%), while the French are the least (50%). Nearly two thirds of Greek youth say that European elections are far more important than national ones. Between 50% and 70% see themselves as “European” and not only as citizens of their member states.

Under-30s could pull turnouts up. According to a from Eurobarometer, 64% of young voters intend to vote. The most enthusiastic are Romanians (78%) and Portuguese (77%).

Despite the EU’s appeal to the youth, right-wing and populist parties are gaining momentum. These parties generally ask for “less Europe.” They’re no longer asking for a Brexit-like solution; they want simply more sovereignty. They don’t want a bigger European budget, or a common European foreign or defence policy. They prize their individual veto, as Hungary has been showing by several rounds of EU military funding for Ukraine. What these “Eurosceptics” have in mind is just Europe à la carte — the union is good and useful when it provides money and alliances, and bad when it asks for something in return.��

Two hard-right parties stand to be the biggest beneficiaries this year. French politician Marine Le Pen’s , which is part of the European parliamentary group Identity and Democracy (ID), and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s , which is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists group.

Germany’s extreme-right Alternative für Deutschland, however, has in recent polls. The party used to belong to ID but was after corruption scandals involving Russia and China and after the recent extreme right declarations of spitzenkandidat Maximilian Krah, who La Repubblica that one shouldn’t “generalize” all SS officers as criminals.

In Belgium, where federal and European elections are both taking place June 9, another ID party, the Flemish nationalist Vlaams Belang (VB), is at in the polls and has a good chance in the federal elections. Across the border in the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom, has already been part of the ruling coalition in Amsterdam for a few weeks, the polls. Last but not least we have the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreich, another ID party, which was part of the first Sebastian Kurz cabinet in Vienna from 2017 to 2019. This nationalist and extreme-right party is now getting great hype, leading the polls with .��

The center will not hold

While the far right is moving forward in Europe, center-right and center-left parties are extremizing their own positions. In Germany, this phenomenon is called Polarisierung. Two good examples of this are the center-right Christian Democrats (CDU) in Germany and the center-left Democratic Party (PD) in Italy.

The CDU, with its leader Friederich Merz, turned rightwards after Chancellor Angela Merkel’s tenure ended in 2021. The party’s manifesto now that Islam only belongs to Germany if Muslims “share our values.” The CDU favors of stricter migrant . Merkel’s 2015 slogan about migration, “We can do it!” is now a bad memory. The CDU is now for asylum applicants to be processed outside the EU in a “safe third country,” after the Rwanda model proposed by British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.

A similar but opposite process is ongoing with the PD under the leadership of Elly Schlein. She is leading the party on a far leftist path compared to five years ago. The “new” PD promises social policies like , the maintenance of the public health system against and for all.

The parties may be doing so in order to counteract the appeal of the radical right. Whether this strategy will be successful remains to be seen.

Europe stands at a crossroads. The current elections will determine whether the European Union remains a political force or becomes a mere region on the map.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Are the 2024 European Elections Really Relevant? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Kazakhstan is pushing for peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This two-pronged effort aims to solidify Kazakhstan’s position as a regional leader while unlocking economic benefits. A peace deal would not only boost trade between the warring nations, but also pave the way for the trade route — a strategic path that conveniently runs through Kazakhstan. By facilitating peace, Kazakhstan hopes to loosen Russia’s grip on the region and forge stronger ties with other nations.

Astana and Yerevan turn a new page in south Caucasus relations

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers in Almaty for talks aimed at a lasting peace between the longtime South Caucasus rivals. Tokayev offered to mediate after his first official to Armenia on April 15. However, these negotiations occur amidst growing street in Yerevan against a demarcation deal, with Baku aiming to solidify gains from last year’s swift offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Astana and Yerevan, partners in various regional organizations, haven’t had a presidential visit in five years. Tokayev’s trip to Armenia a turning point. Relations soured in recent years because Astana backed Baku in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This harsh protests in Armenia against then-Kazakh President Nazarbayev in 2016, forcing him to his planned visit. With the region’s situation changing, the current leaders are seeking a fresh start.

Economic cooperation and investment took center stage during the discussions. Both leaders pushed to expand trade. Tokayev pledged to significantly increase Kazakh exports to Armenia, for $350 million — a huge jump from the reported $33.4 million this year. Road transport boomed in 2023, with a in volume compared to 2022 (6,936 tons vs. 5,748 tons). To smooth operations between Astana, Almaty, Shymkent and Yerevan, the leaders amended and ratified a 2006 on international road transport. Tokayev further praised Armenia’s efforts to restore transit connections in the South Caucasus and endorsed Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s initiative, which aims to improve communication channels between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey.

Armenia is actively distancing itself from past alliances. Pashinyan’s recent of the (CSTO) and the of the Eurasian Economic Union under Russia’s leadership signal a clear shift in Armenia’s foreign policy. Furthermore, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine significantly impacted Armenia’s recalibration. With the Kremlin preoccupied with Ukraine, Armenia sees a window of opportunity to pursue new alliances without immediate Russian pressure. Kazakhstan’s of Russia, alongside its ties to Baku and Ankara, shows a strategic move for its own interests in the shifting region.This situation offers mutual benefits for both Armenia and Kazakhstan.

The EU and Central Asia forge a new trade route

On April 15, Tokayev and Pashinyan vowed to deepen Caspian ties and fast-track the Middle Corridor. This is critical. Before the Ukraine war, 86% of Europe-China land went through Russia’s Northern Route. Western sanctions its appeal. The EU greenlit the construction of a . This cable will carry energy from Azerbaijan and Georgia all the way to Hungary, Romania and the rest of Europe. Moreover, the EU seeks to break free from Russian dependence and champions the Middle Corridor, a new Central Asian route.

Kazakhstan positions itself as a key player on the Middle Corridor, mirroring the ancient route from China to Europe. Astana recognizes the abundant opportunities this presents and numerous EU leaders have to the capital with high-profile visits..

The EU is pushing for stronger ties between the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s oil and uranium exports are a boon to the EU. Kazakhstan as the world’s leading producer and exporter of raw uranium, supplying over 21% of the EU’s nuclear energy needs. Central Asia aligns perfectly with the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative, a major project focused on improving port and rail infrastructure. The EU strategically itself in the region and views the Middle Corridor as a crucial route for infrastructure development.

The South Caucasus and Central Asia, sharing a two-century history, have the potential to form a formidable regional bloc to address contemporary uncertainties. South Caucasus and Central Asian nations are forging their own foreign policy paths, independent of external powers. While regional differences exist, a trend towards regional cooperation is emerging. Brawley Benson that Azerbaijan’s President, Ilham Aliyev, has actively strengthened ties with Central Asia’s Turkic states, indicating a strategy to diversify foreign partnerships. Kazakhstan holds a special place within the Turkic world for Aliyev, akin to a favored cousin.��

The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) twelve global middle powers, with Kazakhstan standing out. A central player in Central Asia, Kazakhstan leverages its abundant resources and serves as a vital link in the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan pursues a multi-vector foreign policy, strengthening partnerships for mutual cooperation. However, the region faces instability and external shocks. The Black Sea-Kazakhstan corridor risks disruption from escalating West-China competition. The Ukraine conflict adds another layer of uncertainty, as a Russian victory could hinder development of a rival economic corridor.

Divided rather than united, the eight states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia risk becoming entangled in rivalries. This vulnerability empowers assertive global powers. To counter this, the region must prioritize cooperation over competition. Embracing reconciliation can foster unity and strengthen their position in the face of global challenges.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Why Is Kazakhstan Making Forays in the Caucasus? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

This year, Schaffer returned by visiting the cities of Uzhhorod and Lviv. This trip was safer, yet more psychologically draining than the first. In 2023, morale was high. Ukrainians were confident. Now, the fatigue is palpable. Constant attacks on civilian infrastructure wound and kill people as Western support trickles in slowly . 

This is the Kremlin’s strategy, and it’s succeeding. Momentum is clearly on Russia’s side, and the longer the campaign lasts, the further Ukrainian morale sinks.

Will Russia win? What could this victory mean for Europe?

NATO vs. Russian expansionism

It’s unlikely Russia can fully occupy Ukraine. Russia can’t win by suffocating Ukrainian morale until they stop resisting — and Ukrainians know a loss would bring death, destruction and rape.

No one knows now exactly what a Russian victory could bring. Political scientist John Mearsheimer argues that Russia is not expansionist and it will stop after it secures the territory it now holds. Others say that Russia intends to overrun Ukraine entirely and that it will bring its conquest to other countries next. This would usher in a perilous era for Central and Eastern Europe.

Mearsheimer argues that Russia acted to achieve one political aim: preventing NATO from expanding further eastward. Russia sees its near abroad as a defensive bulwark against potential NATO military invasion. The United States reacted similarly in the 1960s when Soviet Union tried to into Cuba.

Hypothetically, Russia could achieve certain goals and then freeze the conflict. But to do that, it would have to control what it believes is now its sovereign territory, namely four Ukrainian of Kherson, Luhansk, Donetsk and Zaporizhia. Russia organized sham referenda to annex these areas. As long as these oblasts remain partly outside of Russia’s grasp, negotiation seems unlikely. Likewise, on the Ukrainian side, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy cannot negotiate a peace that would involve the surrender of national territory. This would violate Ukraine’s constitution.

Mearsheimer is right that the positioning of NATO missiles in Ukraine would be an existential threat to Russia that the federation would necessarily have to stop. But this could have been achieved through negotiation and reasonable planning. Instead, Russia denied Ukrainian statehood and began gobbing up pieces of it. Far from carrying out a defensive action, the Kremlin used the purported threat of NATO to justify its of international law.

The European divide

The Russia–Ukraine War is the first large-scale conflict in Europe since the fall of Berlin in 1945. French President Emmanuel Macron tried making peace with Putin in 2022, but now he’s asking for Western troops in -Ukraine. Once a dove, he’s now become a hawk. In his view, if Ukraine falls, others will follow.

Despite this, Europe will not get tougher with Russia. There are too many sovereign states with too many different approaches for that to happen. This is a hybrid war — a war that combines conventional and irregular warfare. A narrative battle rages inside each country in tandem with the deadly campaign in Ukraine.

Many countries are noticing this extra dimension. The last two years have brought a fundamental shift in thought: If Europe can’t defend the Ukrainians who are fighting for the EU’s values, how can it protect those principles? Europe’s security structure was destroyed on February 24, 2022; its freedom, values and democratic way of life are in jeopardy. Further, Europe cannot rely on NATO’s to defend itself. The US will not necessarily interve to defend Europe in the event of a limited engagement in eastern Poland or the Baltics, which Russia could plausibly try. If of the — the EU’s mutual defense clause — is not to be a dead letter, Europe must have an independent defensive capability.

This viewpoint has divided Europe. Many Europeans lack the will to fight, believing the threat to be exaggerated. Italy and Spain are far from Russia and protected by high mountains; the idea of Russian tanks threatening these southerly nations sounds like science fiction.

France and Germany have always shared the Great European Plain — easy to drive tanks across — with Russia and so perceive the possibility of war, however remote, as more realistic. Yet both nations are internally split on Russia. France has a semi-presidential system where Macron can dictate policy, but many in the National Assembly do not share his  hawkish views.

On the other side, Germany has a parliamentary system where three parties form the government coalition: the Social Democratic Party, the Green Party and the Liberals. There are hawkish Social Democrats, dovish Liberals and both tendencies in the Green Party. It’s difficult for these parties to compromise when debating a common policy.

On February 27, 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz delivered the famous Zeitenwende (“Watershed”) speech in the Bundestag. He announced a to the country’s security and foreign policy, upping defense spending significantly. Germany was to take an active role as a member of NATO. Yet Germany doesn’t want to get involved in this war. Unlike France, it has a large, resource-hungry manufacturing industry — and no nuclear plants to power it. This makes Germany much more dependant than France on Russian fossil fuels. War means that energy costs skyrocket, growth plummets and industry suffers. Already, Germans are saying that they’re the real losers of the war.

Danube regional affairs

Along with Ukraine and Germany, Europe’s Danube consists of Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova. As Ukraine’s neighbors, these countries would be directly affected if Russia occupied its entirety.

In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has taken a questionable, pro-Russian attitude. Traditionally, Hungarians are suspicious of Russia, with dark memories of Soviet tanks rolling into Budapest to crush the Hungarian uprising against Bolshevism in 1956. Yet Orbán’s social contract with the Hungarian people relies on growth that cheap Russian gas fuels. Hungary has notoriously made a long-term contract with Russia’s energy corporation. Meanwhile, Budapest vetos EU measures to aid Ukraine. The country’s stance seems rooted in business, not ideology.

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico from power in 2018 over a political crisis: Journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée, Martina Kušnírová, nearly exposed a financial flow running through the government, but were mafia-style. Now, Fico regained the people’s favor by using their frustration with the war; he was in 2023. He blames his country’s high inflation on the war and the war on anti-Russian Western policy.

Just outside the Danube region, Poland is also divided on how to should position itself. Supporters of the nationalist Law and Justice party are less hawkish on Russia. Yet Law and Justice is no longer in power as of 2023. Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s new government marks a return to European values and feels that, if Europe does not stop Russia at the Donets, they will soon have to do so at the Bug.

Poland is a hotspot because, if it feels threatened and insufficiently protected by NATO, it may decide to develop its own nuclear weapons. Indeed, Europe needs a nuclear deterrent independent from that of the US. This war has caused Europe to see that it must stand on its own two feet, invest in military production and prepare to defend itself. If Russia makes a move, the Yanks may not be coming.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Where Is Ukraine Headed Now? What Does Europe Think? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Back in 2017, Murray had made a major impact on British media with the publication of his book, The Strange Death of Europe. It provided a detailed justification of the kind of xenophobia that enabled the triumph of Brexit in the previous year’s referendum. In her review of the book, The Guardian’s Gaby Hinsliff Murray’s style of diatribe as that of someone specialized in delivering “a slightly posher, better-read, more respectable way of saying that you’d rather not live next door to Romanians or think Muslims are coming to rape your womenfolk.”

Brexit and the election of Donald Trump seemed to mark 2016 as the year when xenophobia became the new foundational value of a world order that everyone sensed was about to undergo serious change. Britain, for once, appeared to be the harbinger of things to come. Alongside the faux working-class demeanor of alehouse oracle Nigel Farage and the transparent, self-assured mendacity of Boris Johnson — the twin pillars of the “Leave” campaign — the nakedly vulgar xenophobia they championed desperately required a gentrified version to achieve full legitimacy.

That’s where Murray stepped up to the plate. His ideology was far more extreme, but it sounded much better educated because of his gift for condescending mockery, which he probably acquired as an Oxford debater. By 2016, Johnson’s own Oxford veneer had been seriously compromised by his years spent as hack tabloid journalist. Farage, of course, had no university credentials. Instead, in his own, he thrived in public because he was “unafraid of the limelight, a bit noisy and good at selling things.” Murray, in contrast, appeared to be someone who delved below the surface to reveal deeper truths. All three of these promoters of xenophobia proved effective in their respective roles.

Xenophobia combines two well-known psychological psychiatric disorders. A 2021 European Management Review article the Brexit xenophobia in these terms: “Paranoia and narcissism combine to create the perfect xenophobic storm.” Murray’s brand of xenophobia may be the most perfect of them all.

Most people see xenophobia as correlating strongly with extreme nationalism. But nations no longer stand as the unique reference. In Murray’s case, the nation that was the “empire on which the sun never sets” now only receives its twelve hours of sunlight per day, more often than not interrupted by rain. Murray’s chauvinism now extends well beyond “this sceptered isle, other Eden, demi-paradise” to quote Shakespeare’s John of Gaunt in Richard II. Murray’s homeland is far too small. Like Hitler, he clearly requires more Lebensraum. In a he gave last week while accepting the Alexander Hamilton Award for his “unwavering defense of Western values,” Murray made clear that his homeland stretches westward, across the Atlantic and as far as the Pacific, and eastward, first to Ukraine and then beyond, to Israel, a nation he truly deems an “other Eden.”

In his speech, after evoking both Ukraine and Israel, Murray cites a UK poll that reports the depressing news that “a mere 27% of young people said that they would be willing to be enlisted to fight for their country.” He cites similar estimations in the US. “It doesn’t surprise me,” he continues, “that a lot of young Americans wouldn’t be willing to fight for their country if they’ve been told from the cradle that their country was rotten from birth and had nothing going for it other than slavery, colonialism and everything else. You’ve really got to miseducate Americans into this kind of self-loathing.”

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Self-loathing:

A pathological condition affecting the youth of Western countries that consists of employing their intellectual powers for the illegitimate purpose of critiquing their own government on the spurious grounds that its policies are in direct and flagrant contradiction with its stated democratic principles and humanistic ideals.

Contextual note

“Self-loathing” is a less common variant of the expression “self-hating.” The concept originated in the late 19th century with the rise of the Zionist movement. It became consecrated as an insult. “Self-hating Jews” became the go-to insult to apply to Jews who failed to identify with Zionist ideology or dared to critique the Zionists’ political ambitions.

In his diatribe against Americans reluctant to enlist and defend a foreign policy they find morally repugnant, Murray seriously stretches the meaning of “self-loathing.” The US defines itself as a land of racial and religious diversity. That means the root of individual identity for most Americans is very different from that of Jews. No one would imagine calling someone a “self-hating Roman Catholic” or a “self-loathing Korean,” “Mexican” or “Irishman.” No other religion or ethnicity expects members who identify with it to adhere and show indefectible loyalty to a political program. Islam, even when pushed to its theocratic extremes, does not conceive of using national politics as a litmus test for religious identity.

Most groups feel justified in highlighting and condemning disloyalty to the community or deviation from its norms. In the US, the emancipated black community used the label “Uncle Tom” to condemn blacks who appear to identify with a white supremacist order. But no one would regard them as self-hating.

How is it, then, that, among ethnic and religious minorities, Jews alone can be saddled with the term “self-hating?” And where does the British Douglas Murray find the presumption to call another group of people, defined by their citizenship alone, “self-loathing?” That’s a case of pushing xenophobia beyond even the extremes Murray seems so comfortable with.

Historical note

Murray is a Manichean thinker and a professional pessimist who has famously written about “the strange death of Europe.” But the obituary should not concern Europe alone. Instead, accumulating evidence points towards an ongoing decline and potential impending death, not of Europe nor the West itself, but of the Western “rules-based order.” For all his intellectual credentials, Murray appears little interested in analyzing “order.” That implies understanding organic structure and non-linear thinking. Murray prefers raw emotion and decisive action, preferably in the form of combat. Systems, whether declining or emerging, to the extent they are systems, will adapt to and counter the kind of decisive action Murray envisions.

The Israeli system, as it has functioned at least since 1967, cannot survive. Israel as a state may and should survive, but the system will have to assume a different profile or perish. Creative minds should be focused on retrieving what is viable within it to ensure systemic adjustment. But Manicheans, like Murray or the current Washington, DC, power structure, notoriously resist thinking in those terms.

Murray endorses manifestly genocidal violence with enthusiasm because he believes it is a response to absolute evil. His side is the enlightened European tradition now dying in Europe but thriving in the US, Ukraine and Israel. He calls Hamas “a cult of death, a cult that wishes to annihilate an entire race, and which, after dealing with that race, has made very clear what it wants to do with Christians, everyone in Britain, everyone in America and everyone else next.” This is a wild, unjustified, irresponsible fantasy, like the idea that Putin will not stop at Ukraine, but seek to conquer the rest of Europe.

Hamas is clearly guilty of terrorist acts, which it carries out in the name of resistance to occupation. But it is clearly not a cult of death. Neither is Israel, even though its state terrorism easily eclipses in scale the very real crimes of Hamas.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Fear of Critical Thinking Is the Ultimate Xenophobia appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Differences on crucial issues pushed the three countries apart during these two decades. Germany and France opted for strengthening their relations with Russia and declined to deepen the European–US alliance, whereas Poland represented the opposite stance, warning against Russia and following a more Atlanticist defense policy while increasing expenditure on its own armed forces. The 2015 rise of a populist conservative government in Poland further cooled relations. The new government used openly anti-German rhetoric and also had reservations about France.

Recent events, however, have reversed the situation. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the 2023 election of a new pro-European government in Poland gave an impulse for renewed cooperation. Already in February 2024, all three countries’ foreign ministers met in France, followed by a previously unplanned meeting of French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Germany in March. The next high-level meeting, in Poland, is planned for June.

The authors of this article, a Pole, a German and a Frenchman, met in Vienna. What sounds like the beginning of a joke turned into a serious discussion about the potential, shortcomings and the varying national perspectives of this minilateral format. We will explain what our respective countries hope to achieve and what they will need in order to do so.

How do Berlin, Paris and Warsaw see the revived forum?

Many in Berlin hope that the revived Weimar Triangle will alleviate the strained relations between Scholz and Macron. They are excited about the possibility of putting together (a) the biggest economy in the EU, (b) a permanent UN Security Council member and nuclear power and (c) the most populous and most important country in Central Europe. Together, these three nations represent around 40% of the EU population, or 188 million inhabitants.

On March 15, the partners they would jointly procure weapons for Ukraine on the world market. This, along with ramping up production, is music to many German ears given Scholz’s notoriously hesitancy in providing Ukraine with the means to defend itself. like “Two Churchills and half a Chamberlain” appeared in the aftermath of the announcement, comparing Scholz to the infamously dovish British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain who failed to take a firm stance against Adolf Hitler.

Germans also relish the historic opportunity to polish up the city’s name. “Weimar” has unfortunately become a byword for the failed Weimar Republic, which Hitler transformed into his dictatorship. More importantly, they look forward to finally getting some tangible results from one of the many minilateral formats that have sprung up across the EU.

In France, the inauguration of Donald Tusk’s new government in Poland has caused a resurgence of enthusiasm for the Weimar Triangle. Historically, Paris has perceived the Weimar format as unbalanced, dominated by German–Polish ties at the expense of French-Polish relations. However, France is coming to see this format as a potentially valuable and beneficial complement to the traditional Franco-German “couple,” which is currently going through a rough patch due to differences over the war in Ukraine. France sees Poland as a valuable partner in encouraging Germany to adopt a more aggressive posture in the East.

For Poland, Russia’s war in Ukraine raging and the possibility of a Donald Trump victory in the US presidential election heighten the need for a European security “back-up plan.” Poland shares a border with Ukraine and could be under threat if the war expanded. Warsaw thus has a vested interest in countering “solidarity fatigue” within Germany and France. Hence, it has proposed future “Weimar + Ukraine” meetings.

The revival of the Weimar Triangle has become a flagship project for the Tusk government. After eight years of right-wing rule marked by conflict with the EU and neighbors under the Law and Justice party, the format represents a chance to move away from the troublemaker image. Tusk wants Poland to be seen as a key player in European affairs.

Further, unlike at the outset of the format in the 1990s, Poland is striving to be seen as an equal partner with Germany and France that represents the sentiments of Central and Eastern Europe — although it is disputable whether all countries within that region would agree. Additionally, the Polish press enthusiastically portrays Poland’s role as a between Germany and France.

Moreover, the format is also convenient for ameliorating strained Polish–German relations. On the other hand, the Law and Justice party has circulated unfounded rumors about Donald Tusk being a “” and “,” and so they could use frequent bilateral meetings with Germany against the government.

Coincidentally, Scholz, Macron and Tusk also represent three different factions in the European Parliament. This adds to the possible benefit of the format on a EU level. Coordination between these factions could help to counteract the expected surge of far-right, Eurosceptic parties after the European elections in June. However, it remains to be seen if the Chancellor, the President and the Prime Minister can actually bring added value to their respective factions. Macron may face an uphill battle within Renew Europe, but the European People’s Party, to which Tusk belongs, will likely remain the biggest political group, resulting in a second term for European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

How successful can the format be?

Although minilateral formats are indeed many, few operate across the ominous European East–West divide. If they do, they involve smaller actors (e.g., Slavkov Triangle of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria). The Weimar Triangle would be the exception.

The format faces certain headwinds. It lacks institutions and is dependent on personal chemistry between politicians. The next elections could change these dynamics.

Further, cooperation on the side of civil society is sorely lacking. It needs to be intensified, which would require more funding for NGOs and think tanks.

For the Weimar Triangle to evolve into a significant and effective minilateral framework, it cannot remain confined to contacts between leaders and foreign ministers. Secondary-level relationships, like parliamentary exchanges as well as municipal and regional connections, should be developed. Those relationships must be institutionalized, or at least systemized, and assigned a more strategic importance.

Will the Weimar Triangle meet expectations and use its potential to become a new power engine for the EU? The Weimar Triangle could be just what Europe needs at a crucial moment, but nothing is set in stone yet. Like great inventions, successful cooperation formats are often a matter, not only necessity and a good idea, but also of the right timing.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Will the France–Germany–Poland “Weimar Triangle” Be Europe’s New Powerhouse? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

For a long time, House Republicans prevented aid going to war-torn Ukraine. They either did not want to transfer any money, could not agree on the amount or wanted to tie the Ukrainian vote to other issues such as border control. But now, Speaker of the House Mike Johnson has finally shepherded a bill with Democratic support that gives Ukraine $95 billion in aid. The bill the House on April 20, 2024, and the Senate approved it on April 23.

This aid package is significant, but is it too late? What are the consequences of this aid?

Ukraine should thwart Russian offensive but Putin will still remain in charge

The aid package cannot reverse the tens of thousands of casualties Ukraine has suffered, nor will it save the territory it has lost so far to the Russian armed forces. Yet it might save the country from still more dire consequences. Ukraine was losing territory and its complete collapse to Russia was probable. Now with this US package and equal European aid, Ukraine has a shot at avoiding that grisly fate.

Without the aid, NATO would have taken a crippling blow and US–European strategic relations would have suffered with Europe would have been left on its own to fund Ukraine. Ukraine, as we know it, would almost certainly have been destroyed.

Another potential consequence would have been the confirmation of Russian imperium in Central Europe and the Baltic states. If Russia successfully toppled Ukraine, it seems likely that Moldova, Georgia and the Baltic states would be in extreme danger. Poland, especially, would have had to think long and hard about its response. It would probably try to develop a nuclear weapon, which would not help global stability.

Failure to pass the package may have confirmed and strengthened what people derisively view as the Russia–China–Iran axis. The three countries view their alliance as a defensive one against US imperium.

So, what happens now? With disaster presumably averted, there will probably be a period of stasis. Then, Russia will likely launch a major series of offensives in June or earlier. However, these are unlikely to achieve much success. It is difficult to say if peace negotiations are now more likely to happen in 2025. But US aid makes such a future possible.

The Russia–Ukraine War is causing suffering akin to World War I’s trench warfare. Modern technology has made offensives more difficult than ever, because nothing can be hidden on the battlefield. So, a potential Russian offensive is unlikely to succeed.

Yet this is unlikely to affect Russian President Vladimir Putin. He and his assistants excel at projecting the image of authority, strength, stability and control. When dealing with a dictator, those things are true until they aren’t. For now, Putin will persist as Russia’s ruler. Note that Russia is more motivated than the US to win the war, its economy is doing well while the Ukrainian economy has cratered and European allies might be losing the will to continue the fight.

US aid bolsters Europe and deters China but Russia remains ascendant

Thanks to the aid package, US relations with Europe will improve. The US has also bolstered its centrality in international relations. Thus, the normative system and the stability it brings might still hold.

Europe remains a key player in global affairs, but it cannot defend itself. The US subsidizes Europe’s security through NATO. Pax Americana — a state of relative international peace typically overseen by the US — guarantees peace in Europe, but Europe would need to assemble its defenses to increase its international influence. Even if Europe moves decisively, it will take a decade to build defense capabilities under the best of circumstances.

There are implications for Asia as well. Russia has struggled to defeat a much smaller neighbor with which it shares a border. China has surely paid attention to that fact. Invading Taiwan would be an amphibious exercise and thus even more difficult. China had hoped the US might balk in the event of a Chinese military invasion to bring Taiwan into its One China system. But the US has shown a surprising ability to sustain a beleaguered country that will surely give China pause.

The Russian economy is doing fairly well. The country’s big challenge was — a large-scale exodus of financial assets and capital from a nation due to political or economic instability. Russia sold commodities — particularly oil and gas, but also nickel, copper and other metals —  but the money that came into Russia would immediately flow out to yachts in Monaco and football clubs like and in England. Just as World War II was good for the US economy, so is the Russia-Ukraine War good for Russia’s.

Related Reading

The Myth of Economic Armageddon: The Truth About Western Sanctions on Russia

Furthermore, from the paranoid Russian perspective, the expansion of NATO is an existential threat. The government seems to believe that if Ukraine were to join NATO, Russia would face a disaster equivalent to the Mongol invasion. Russia’s fighting ability has not weakened and its forces are on the ascendant in the battlefield.

In contrast, the Ukrainian economy contracted by an estimated 35% in 2023. Economic and military aid is keeping the country together. At some point, this aid might not be forthcoming. Russia is striving to capitalize on its enemy’s feeble condition. Pro-Putin candidates are on the rise in Europe as , Hungary and demonstrate.

Yet Russia is unlikely to claim massive swathes of Western Europe or even western Ukraine. Likewise, Ukraine is unlikely to win back territory that Russia now controls. A frozen conflict looms for the near future.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: US Congress Gives Ukraine Sizable, if Not Timely, Aid appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In order to pass the new immigration bill, Macron negotiated with the far-right majority in the French Senate. Shockingly, he agreed with many of the extreme conservative amendments added to the bill by Marine Le Pen’s party, National Rally. Consequently, the immigration bill has passed successfully.

The National Rally began in the 1960s as the militant, racist, fascist National Front created by Marine’s father, Jean-Marie Le Pen. Many of its ideals remain the same. Thus, Macron’s deal with the party has caused a great political upheaval in France. So far, no ruling president has worked with this far-right party. Now, all of a sudden, Macron and the far right have struck an alliance on immigration. Why has the French president switched teams? The answer lies in the concentration of power in Élysée Palace — the French president’s official residence —and Macron’s narcissistic opportunism.

French elections are not like American ones

Every five years, France goes to the polls and elects presidents and legislators. Earlier the presidential term was seven years. This allowed for a midterm legislative election and often led to cohabitation. This term referred to the phenomenon in which the president and the prime minister, who enjoyed a legislative majority, belonged to opposing parties. This curtailed the power of even charismatic presidents like François Mitterand and Jacques Chirac.

Cohabitation often led to gridlock, so the French now have five-year terms for both the president and the legislators. This constitutional change has concentrated further power in the hands of the president.

In 2022, Emmanuel Macron was reelected, defeating Marine Le Pen. Despite her attempts to clean up National Rally’s appearance, Marine is really just about as far-right as her father Jean-Marie. The French held their noses and voted for Macron, but the vast majority did not want him to have the extensive powers of the presidency. For the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic, which Charles de Gaulle founded in 1958, the president did not win a majority in the French national legislature.

Macron has tricked the French people

Macron and Le Pen squaring off in the last election demonstrated, the traditionally dominant parties of the center-right and the left have lost credibility. Macron replaced the socialists while Le Pen has defenestrated the Gaullists. Of course, Macron came to power first. He gave France the illusion that he was moderate, centrist and willing to listen to the public.

Once in office, it became clear Macron did not have the public’s interest in mind. He fell in popularity after revealing his pro-business, free-enterprise model for the government. Furthermore, Macron’s narcissistic personality began to reveal itself. His narcissisme pervers showed right from the start when he named his own political party — En Marche — curiously with the same abbreviation as his initials.

Extremely narcissistic personalities are often attracted to high office. Patrick Weil’s biography The Madman in the White House captured the increasing narcissism of US President Woodrow Wilson. In his latter days in the White House, Wilson refused to be confined by the constitutional constraints of his office. Weil concludes that excessive power distorts a person’s ability to govern democratically and correctly.

Today, France is in crisis because of an extreme concentration of power in the hands of the president. Like Wilson a century ago, Macron does not want to be confined in his exercise of power. This former minister in a socialist government has now done a deal with the far-right to push through a draconian immigration bill, breaking all political precedent in the Fifth Republic.

The Fifth Republic is not defective

Some, including 51�Թ�’s Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh, argue that the Fifth Republic is dysfunctional. The president just has far too much power, and France today cannot be governed by a republic that Gaulle built in his image. The far right is now rising because the Fifth Republic is failing.

Weil does not think so. He believes that the French constitution does not need further change. The problems in France stem from narcissistic personalities who have become presidents and abused the power of the presidential office.

Related Reading

The World This Week: Another French Revolution

The solution for France is not a sixth republic but a return to the original text of the constitution of the Fifth Republic. Voters have to vote not for narcissists like Macron or Le Pen but for candidates who respect both the spirit and the letter of the constitution.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: France in Crisis: Macron Now in Bed With Far-Right appeared first on 51�Թ�.

World leaders such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and former US President Donald Trump perpetuate conspiracy theories that polarize voter bases and support ultra-nationalistic ideologies. It seems like fascism has taken upon a new face. No longer are conspiracy theorists and neofascists confined to backwoods musters or clattering away in some dank corner of the internet. Elected officials are now increasingly and mainstreaming far-right ideas. Across the global stage, far-right groups have quietly breached the mainstream without the cacophonous fury of a coup d’état. 

The junction between neofascism and conspiracy theory

Benito Mussolini introduced the ideology of fascism in the 1920s. was a reactionary response to communism, socialism and liberalism. is its modern iteration.

Neofascism encompasses a spectrum of ultra-nationalistic beliefs and practices, but it rejects left-wing, center-left and center-right positions. This modern form of fascism is marked by racial supremacy, populism, authoritarianism and nativism. It strongly opposes liberal democracy, Marxism, communism and socialism, often promoting xenophobic ideas and anti-immigration views. Neofascists have a fanatical focus on their country and its , which they blame on immigrants, liberals and those of different racial identities. 

A common tool of neofascism is the . Conspiracy theorists posits that a situation or event is the result of a clandestine plot by influential actors, often with political motives. Not every theory about a conspiracy is a conspiracy theory; rather, the term suggests a reliance on prejudice or insufficient evidence. Often, conspiracy theories are reinforced by circular reasoning where evidence contradicting the conspiracy is reinterpreted as supporting it. Numerous neofascist factions employ conspiracy theories to radicalize individuals and fuel their agendas. The process of then involves presenting ideas of danger and loss. Neofascists seek to convince people that their way of life is in immediate danger.

Renaud Camus’s “” theory posits that an “elite” is orchestrating the replacement of white Europeans with non-Europeans. Brenton Tarrant, before he perpetrated the massacre, endorsed this theory in a manifesto. The Great Replacement is intricately linked to the “White Genocide” narrative, emphasizing white racial supremacy and propagating fear of demographic displacement.

Neofascist groups use these theories to directly radicalize people by perpetuating fear. Right-wing parties often nurture and propagate these ideas to secure voter support for a strong state to play the role of savior. 

Therefore, neofascism and the propagation of conspiracy theories go hand in hand. They reinforce each other to establish a new social compact between two groups: a part of society that views a liberal democratic world with fear, and political parties that see the return of neofascism as the only way to stop the decadence and chaos of the world.

The return of fascism in Europe

Orbán’s Fidesz Party has been in power since 2010. Under his leadership, Hungary has become not only one of the most anti-European, pro-Russian and pro-Chinese countries in the European Union but also one of the most conservative and anti-immigration, under the supposed defense of traditional and Catholic values. 

Despite being a member of the EU, Hungary sees the EU as threatening their vision of a strong, nationalistic society and economy. In 2019, during the European election campaign, the Orbán government launched a campaign with the faces of Hungarian philanthropist George Soros and President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker. The poster read, “You have the right to know what Brussels is planning to do.” Juncker’s chief spokesman Margaritis Schinas accused Hungary of peddling conspiracy theories against the EU.

The poster referred to the compulsory migrant relocation quotas established by the EU. In the eyes of Orbán’s Fidesz Party, Juncker is using his influence and capital to destroy European culture through plans for the mass reception of refugees. The EU even ruled Hungary’s deportation of immigrants as illegal, but Hungary continues to the EU with attacks upon its country’s values.

Hungarian citizens fear their values, culture and identity as a people are under attack by the EU. The leaders in Brussels have effectively isolated Hungarians, making them disillusioned in the leadership the EU provides. How could they follow a leader that doesn’t seem to protect their national identity? This is where the seductiveness of a leader like Viktor Orbán comes in. 

The simplicity of his moral narratives further bolsters Orbán’s charisma, offering a clear direction and scapegoating the EU government for erasing Hungarian ethnic identity. This fosters a in which Orbán is the perfect representative of Hungarian identity. Coupled with Orbán’s strong leadership persona, this attracts moderate Hungarians who perceive him as determined to uphold Hungary’s identity and values.

Orbán thus appeals to moderate Hungarians and attracts them towards the right, threatening the democratic principles of Hungary.

Orbán’s charisma comes from conspiracy theories that allow the disillusioned and radicalized to blame and responsibility. His conspiracy theories posit that the EU government is determined to erase Hungarian ethnic identity. As cognitive dissonance sets in — “These leaders are supposed to support us, but they’re not!” — Orbán offers an alternate direction. “If the leadership proves to be bad, it must be replaced,” he at a conference of European right-wing citizens.

For a disillusioned Hungarian who feels their identity is threatened, the right-wing, neofascist Orbán offers shelter. A lack of appealing leaders turns moderate citizens towards courageous and anti-systemic political leaders offering sharp, revolutionary solutions to systemic problems. As more and more previously moderate masses turn towards radical, neofascist leaders, democracy is on a perilous precipice. 

Democracy in the US is under attack

The phenomenon of neofascism is not constrained to Europe’s borders. Despite a myriad of legal troubles, Donald J. Trump is the Republican frontrunner to win the White House for the second time to become the 47th president of the United States. Much may still happen between now and the election time in November 2024, but all significant polls give Trump a lead over other candidates. He leads in most . He is perceived as on the economy than Joe Biden.

It is also clear that Trump has mostly stayed the same since he left the Oval Office. To begin with, he is a firm election denier. He still defends the theory that the 2020 elections were “.” Despite 91 criminal charges, including a federal case about organizing a to defraud the US electoral system, Donald Trump maintains that he is “a victim of one of the biggest smear campaigns in the history of the US,” an expression he in his rallies.

There are no facts to support a stolen 2020 election. Yet many groups, organizations, media platforms and paramilitaries on the ideological right still support him. Trump’s candidacy is firmly rooted in the aspirations and ideas of the MAGA movement. Among them, one can find the of the Great Replacement Theory, according to which there is an international conspiracy “to engineer the migration of non-white people to historically white countries in an attempt to ‘replace’ whites with a more pliant racially inferior population.” The idea is to emphasize the suspicion generated by the fear of “others” who are different from “us”.

For a population who is already deeply concerned about the US Federal government

eradicating individual freedoms, racial conspiracy theories offer a way to quell the disillusion of the center-right. Much of the social anger of white male conservatives is displaced. Fearing for their freedoms, conservatives displace their anger from the government to races they deem as a threat. As of now, politics no longer means rationality. 

Moderate, centrist or even right-leaning political leaders no longer appeal to the agitated right-wing voter base. Trump is the perfect candidate to fill that vacuum. The charisma of a leader like Trump comes from a seductive of protecting the purity of the “real” nation from external degeneration. 

Right-wing voters in the US increasingly see their moderate political leaders as unable to offer practical solutions to the problems they see in society. This paves a perfect road toward populist, extremist leaders like Trump. To the extreme right wing, no other option is viable.

A way forward

Extremist, neofascist leaders fuel violent conflicts within already-polarized societies. The challenge, therefore, lies in restoring moderation. A “healthy” critical, rational and mature conservatism must be rescued from the irrationality of neofascism and the disillusioned people.

Governments must begin to take social grievances seriously. We must revisit everything from concrete conditions like the daunting cost of living to deep issues like the prioritization of systems over the individual. Only vigilance and active participation in civic culture and public life can repress the scourge of neofascism. 

We must learn our lessons from the dangerous rise of neofascism. Until then, the world watches with bated breath.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Fascism Is Back and With a New Weapon: Conspiracy Theory appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Founded by Seleucus I Nicator, one of Alexander’s Macedonian generals, the Seleucid dynasty carved out a vast kingdom. They and Alexander’s other successors, collectively known as the Diadochi, vied for territory within the empire after Alexander’s chosen regent, Perdiccas, failed to hold onto power. When the dust settled, the Seleucids found themselves in control of the lion’s share of the empire. At its peak, the Seleucid Empire stretched from Anatolia (modern-day Turkey) to the Indus Valley in India.

Despite its geographical dominance and lasting influence, the Seleucids are often relegated to a footnote in discussions about the Middle East. They are overshadowed by their Egyptian counterparts, , who are famous in the West for collecting the Library of Alexandria and for the exploits of their last member, Cleopatra. The Seleucids enter Western narratives primarily in the context of their eventual defeat by the Romans.

This neglect has resulted in a significant gap in our understanding of the region’s development. The Seleucid Empire played a crucial role in shaping the Middle East, both culturally and politically. 

Architects of the Hellenistic world

The Seleucids’ impact extended far beyond the battlefield. They played a crucial role in bridging the gap between Europe and India, fostering cultural exchange and inadvertently shaping the world through their interactions with other powerful empires.

The Seleucids were heirs to the vast Hellenistic cultural tradition. This influence manifested in their grand projects, characterised by a blend of Greek, Mesopotamian and Egyptian styles. Cities like Antioch, their capital, boasted impressive public spaces, colonnaded streets, and temples adorned with statues in the Greek tradition.

Seleucid architects also played a key role in the development of urban planning, with a focus on geometric layouts and civic amenities. In philosophy, the Seleucids embraced the intellectual currents of the Hellenistic world. Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism all flourished under their patronage, attracting scholars and fostering lively debates.

One of the most significant contributions came from Megasthenes, a Seleucid ambassador stationed at Pataliputra, the magnificent capital city of Indian monarch Chandragupta Maurya, in the 3rd century BCE. Credited as one of the first Europeans to write extensively about India, Megasthenes’s work, , became a cornerstone for understanding the subcontinent.

His accounts, despite potential biases inherent in any ambassador’s view, a valuable source of information. Megasthenes’s detailed observations on Indian society, including the complex caste system, the role of elephants in warfare, and the practice of sati (widow self-immolation), as well as politics and geography, provided a window for Europeans into a previously unknown world.

Megasthenes’s work wasn’t just a standalone account. It served as a foundation for later writers like Strabo, who used and interpreted the Indica. It shaped European perceptions of India for centuries to come. Strabo Megasthenes’ descriptions of outlandish creatures, likely misinterpretations of real animals or cultural practices, which fueled European fantasies about the exotic East.��

The Seleucids may not be a household name, but their enduring legacy is undeniable. They were facilitators of cultural exchange, purveyors of knowledge and patrons of art, architecture and philosophy. Their influence transcended geographical boundaries and temporal limitations, leaving an indelible mark on the ancient world.

The Jewish rebellion against the Seleucids

Perhaps the most enduring legacy of the Seleucids, however, comes from their interaction with a small but ancient people in the southwestern corner of their empire: the Jews.

The Seleucids cast a long shadow over Judea in the 2nd century BCE. Under the oppressive reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, who earned the punning epithet “Epimanes” (the Mad) for his increasingly erratic and oppressive religious policies.

Antiochus deeply his Jewish subjects. He desecrated the Second Temple in Jerusalem, erected a statue of Zeus, and mandated the worship of Greek gods. He sought to hellenize Judea by promoting the Greek language, customs and religious practices. This included the suppression of traditional Jewish practices such as circumcision and Sabbath observance, a direct assault on Jewish identity and faith.

This oppression ignited a rebellion. In the small village of Modin, a Jewish priest named Mattathias Maccabaeus and his sons refused to comply with Antiochus’ decrees. Their defiance sparked a wider uprising. Skilled fighters with unwavering faith, the Maccabees adopted guerilla tactics against the Seleucid army. Their deep familiarity with the Judean terrain and religious fervour proved advantageous, leading to early victories. Judas Maccabeus, Mattathias’ most prominent son, emerged as a charismatic leader, uniting diverse Jewish factions against a common enemy. His leadership and military prowess were instrumental in the early successes of the rebellion.

The Maccabean Revolt transcended the battlefield; it was a struggle for the very essence of Judaism. This period had a profound impact on Jewish thought and identity. The trauma of the Seleucid persecution the creation of apocalyptic texts such as the Book of Daniel and the Book of Enoch. These works expressed themes of divine judgement, righteous suffering, and eventual deliverance, reflecting the anxieties of the Jewish people.

The Maccabean spirit of resistance against tyranny and unwavering faith in the face of oppression continues to resonate with Jews today. Their story serves as a potent reminder of the lengths to which communities will go to defend their beliefs.

Two books, now known as 1 and 2 Maccabees, became a part of the Christian canon of the Bible and told the tale of the Maccabean revolt to subsequent generations. Likewise, the Jewish tradition of Hannukah continues to commemorate the successful resistance of the Maccabees against their Hellenistic overlords.

The repercussions of the Maccabean Revolt extended far beyond Judea’s borders. The weakened Seleucid Empire presented an opportunity for the Romans, who exploited the conflict to expand their own regional influence. By using Judea as a in their power struggle, the Romans undermined the Seleucids. By the 1st century BCE, the Romans had made themselves masters of Anatolia, Syria and Palestine.

While Judea dominates the narrative of the Seleucids’ struggles in the West, the empire’s eastern borders also faced challenges. In their Iranian territories, revolts at reviving Persian customs posed a significant threat. Ultimately, the Seleucids failed to maintain control of Iran, paving the way for the rise of the indigenous Parthian and Sasanian dynasties.

This set the stage for a division of the Middle East between the rival Roman and Iranian empires, a pattern which would not be altered until the Arab Muslim conquest of the Levant and Iran seven centuries later.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Seleucids: The Valuable Architects of the Middle East appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The West has progressively raised its involvement by supplying long-range artillery, advanced air defense systems, tanks and air-launched cruise missiles, as well as sea-based weaponry, to hit Russian targets. Satellite intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) has been provided to Ukraine for more accurate strikes.

Western escalation is brewing

The New York Times has , somewhat surprisingly, that the CIA has been “financing” and “partly equipping” several underground bunkers near the Russian border. Their goal is to gather vital information on defenses and equipment, as well as assist the Ukrainian military in directing fire. Despite strong warnings from Russia, the Dutch have their decision to supply 18 F-16 aircraft to Ukraine.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg Radio Free Europe that Ukraine’s right to self-defense includes attacking legitimate Russian military targets outside Ukraine. Elsewhere, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz that UK and French special forces are on the ground in Ukraine to operate the advanced equipment supplied to Kyiv.

Scholz seems opposed to the supply of long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine. If these warheads are used for strikes inside Russia, it may draw Germany into direct conflict with Moscow. However, the exchanges between German officers suggest a huge disconnect within the German establishment. They seemingly discussed the efficacy of using Taurus missiles to target the Crimean Bridge and ammunition dumps to its north. They also deliberated about how to launch these strikes without directly involving the German government, suggesting that the missile’s manufacturer, MBDA Deutschland GmbH, could act as a front.

Another potential step could seriously exacerbate the situation. On February 26, at a summit of 20 European leaders in Paris, French President Emmanuel Macron the possibility of putting European troops on the ground in Ukraine. This disregards Russian warnings that such a move could trigger a direct war between NATO and Russia.

The US, Germany, the UK, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, among others, have ruled out the possibility of sending their troops to fight in Ukraine. Macron, however, believes that the people decrying this idea today are the same ones who decried the supply of tanks, aircraft or long-range missiles to Ukraine two years ago. In the face of rebuffs and political opposition at home, Macron insists that what he said was fully contemplated and that the intention is to put Putin in a “strategic dilemma.” He did not explain what that could be or why it would be only one-way.

Ukrainian support and Baltic aggression

The thought behind the proposals to increase EU military support for Ukraine is that European countries must take more responsibility for their own security. This is especially true considering the possibility of Donald Trump being re-elected as US president in November. He Europeans that if they do not ramp up their defense spending, rather than relying on the US for security, he will leave them to fend for themselves against unstated Russian threats. EU members are now increasing their defense budgets even when their economies are under pressure. Germany and the UK are facing a and social unrest is spreading in several European countries, as indicated by widespread from farmers.

France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, Italy, Denmark and Canada have bilateral security agreements with Ukraine. What these precisely entail is not clear. However, it seems the objectives are to give assurances of support to Ukraine, should there be a change in the US administration; to give Kyiv confidence that despite flagging public support for the conflict in European societies, aid will continue and to signal to Russia that the EU’s investment in the conflict will continue regardless of Ukrainian losses and the war of attrition favoring Moscow. There is also a hint that Ukraine’s entry into NATO may not be imminent. Kyiv needs assurance that individual European countries are willing to commit themselves to Ukraine’s defense.

The Baltic states are the most vociferous in pushing for a confrontation with Russia, both within the EU and in international conferences. Many countries of the Global South believe that the Russo-Ukrainian War is a European affair. This has adverse consequences for them economically because of the disruptions it is causing in food, fertilizer and energy supplies. The Europeans argue this conflict goes beyond their continent and involves the international community as a whole, claiming that it violates the UN Charter, international law and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. This is not a convincing argument; European nations are themselves guilty of such transgressions, and there is no guarantee that this will not continue in the future.

Russia has not attacked the Baltic states, which are members of NATO and have the bloc’s troops stationed on their soil. These countries are hardly central to international geopolitics, have a combined of only six million and have negligible military strength. Given their deep grievances against Soviet rule, their desire to drive an increasingly dangerous conflict in Europe, along with Poland, Finland and Sweden, is concerning to non-Western countries.

Russia may not escalate its warfare

The argument that Russia will attack other countries if it defeats Ukraine is fictitious. Putin has been in power for 24 years now, NATO has expanded five times and the bloc’s troops and US missiles are stationed close to Russia’s borders. Russia has only aggressively responded to Georgia and Ukraine. In both cases, Putin that Russia would take action if these two countries were drawn into NATO.

Putin’s repeated that Russia has no intention of attacking any European country are being dismissed, as they do not fit the narrative of Moscow’s threat to Europe. Why Russia would enter into a conflict with NATO is not explained. As for Russia’s imperial ambitions, it has refrained from tightening control in erstwhile Soviet territories in Central Asia. Armenia is the most recent example.

The other argument Europeans champion — that a Russian victory over Ukraine will embolden China to intervene militarily in Taiwan — is equally trumped up. The Taiwan issue long predates that of Ukraine. China will judge the rapport between Taiwan, the US and its regional allies, then make its decision based on that. Washington has itself to the “One China” policy, though it is against the use of force by Beijing to conquer Taiwan. China also has to take into account that the US is its biggest trading partner.

The prevailing belief among European nations is that, considering Russia’s past reactions to the West’s incremental support for Ukraine, Moscow is unlikely to escalate militarily. Even if the West continues to do so by supplying Ukraine with additional weapons to potentially damage mainland Russia, they likely will not exacerbate the conflict. This may explain why Europeans are undeterred by Russia’s formidable nuclear arsenal. But this could be a serious misjudgment, potentially leading the West to drag the world into a nuclear nightmare.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The West Risks a Disastrous Nuclear World Conflict With Russia appeared first on 51�Թ�.

For nearly a hundred years, from around the 1550s until the 1640s, silk embroideries from Satgaon, which the Portuguese commissioned for their homes in India and for the European market, were among the most coveted luxury goods. The Satgaon embroideries for clients in Europe were shipped to Lisbon, which city held a preeminent position in Europe in the trade of Asian luxury goods.

We do not know the designs on the early embroideries which the Portuguese ordered in Satgaon, but the iconography of most preserved examples, which are believed to date from the end of the 16th century onwards, is basically European. Drawings after European prints probably served as examples. Quite a number of the embroidered motifs are based on biblical stories and on classical mythology. They also include disparate images of mermaids, month-by-month rural activities in rural Europe, hunting scenes with European figures and marine scenes with European vessels. The double-headed eagle (symbol of the Habsburg dynasty) and the self-sacrificing pelican (symbol of the Eucharist and Christ), are also depicted, often rather prominently. Next to these European images, we find motifs derived from Hindu mythology, particularly from the Vaishnava legend of the Great Flood, as well as mounted elephants and tigers. The same images on several Satgaon embroideries indicate that drawn examples or stencils based on them were used repeatedly.

Almost all the embroideries are executed in pale yellow tussar silk, laid on two layers of white, plain-weave cotton fabric, with a layer of cotton wool occasionally sandwiched in-between. The motifs are embroidered in chain stitch, arranged in rows. French knots, a type of stitch where the thread is knotted around itself, are used in narrow borders and as fillings of non-figurative images. In a number of the embroideries, the space between the images is covered by tiny back stitches. The thread used, consisting of a number of S-twisted yarns, is rather thick.

The majority of embroideries made for European clients which are preserved in their complete form are colchas, the Portuguese word for coverlets (Fig. 2.1). Some colchas were kept in so-called Kunstkammern (‘Chambers of Art and Rarities’, also called ‘Cabinets of Curiosity’ and ‘Chambers of Art and Wonders’), which collectors installed in their houses, castles or palaces. When used, these embroideries served as canopies, wall hangings, bedspreads and floor coverings.

Capes made from Satgaon embroidery are preserved in much smaller numbers than colchas. They are generally pieced together from embroidered panels which are sewn together. However, a few examples made from a single length of embroidered fabric have also been preserved. The shape of these capes is based on the capes worn at the Spanish court. Although the ‘Satgaon capes’ look like copes, the iconography on the preserved examples is not specifically Christian, and there are no sources which indicate that they were used as ecclesiastical vestments.

Satgaon embroideries for European clients were shipped to Lisbon, which city held a preeminent position in Europe in the trade of Asian luxury goods. We know that as early as 1558, the Portuguese Queen Catharina of Austria (1507–1578), an avid collector of curiosities, received three Bengal colchas. These are probably lost.

Indeed, relatively few Satgaon embroideries survive, but thanks to their mention in inventories of the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, the Kunstkammer in Prague of Emperor Rudolf II and in the inventories of the Medici in Florence and royal and noble families in Spain and Portugal, we know that they were present in a number of palaces and wealthy homes in Europe. The extended Habsburg family in particular used these precious embroideries as gifts. In London, Satgaon embroideries were already being auctioned in 1618 and 1619.

A colcha and a cape are preserved in the Kunstkammer in Schloss Ambras in Innsbruck, which Ferdinand II, Archduke of Austria (1529– 1595) created in this castle. Both are mentioned in the 1596 inventory of the Ambras Kunstkammer. No other Satgaon embroideries have such a well-documented provenance.

In 1632, the Mughal army expelled the Portuguese from Satgaon. A number of Portuguese stayed on, however, and the production of embroideries for the European market probably continued for some time. Nothing is known about orders for Satgaon embroideries by employees of the Dutch and English East India companies who were engaged in the private trade of luxury goods. Both companies established various trading posts in Bengal in the 1630s, from which posts, however, hardly any Bengali luxury goods were shipped to Europe. Presumably, the embroideries no longer appealed to discriminating, fashion-conscious clients in northern Europe after the 1640s, as their representations, which were largely based on Renaissance imagery, had become obsolete.

[ has given 51�Թ� permission to publish this excerpt from When Indian Flowers Bloomed in Europe: Masterworks of Indian Trade Textiles, 1600–1780, in the TAPI Collection, Ebeltje Hartkamp Jonxis, Niyogi Books, 2022.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post When Indian Flowers Bloomed in Europe appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Macron’s basic preùise is that “we mustn’t let Russia win.” Should we understand that as the expression of an ideal to inspire hope or as a categorical imperative, that must be accomplished at all costs? And what does he mean? Who is the “we”? France, NATO, Europe, Macron’s government or all morally decent people? He can’t count on Pope Francis, who recently called for Ukraine to summon the “courage to raise the white flag.”

And what does he mean by not letting “Russia win?” Would retaining conquered territory and formalizing Ukraine’s neutrality be considered a “win” for Russia? Macron’s tone appears to signify that he not only wants to prevent Russia’s victory, but to inflict on it the humiliation he insisted, two years ago, must be avoided.

When in February, in the presence of 27 European leaders, he first suggested sending troops to Ukraine, Macron may have assumed no one would take his grandstanding seriously. Unfortunately, both his NATO allies and critics at home took notice and excoriated him for overreaching.

To deflect criticism, Macron cleverly confessed to practicing “strategic ambiguity.” No one should doubt Macron’s taste for ambiguity, but if he had any real sense of strategy he would have understood that the starting point for strategic thinking must be reality rather than the fantasy of French bravery galloping in on a shining steed to miraculously turn the tide. Most experts, even in his own military, are convinced Ukraine simply cannot defeat Russia.

In the interview, Macron offered this curious conditional statement: “If the situation were to deteriorate, we must be ready and we will be ready.” (Si la situation devait se dégrader, nous devons être prêts et nous serons prêts.)

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Situation:

Circumstances that, because they are beyond one’s control, may be invoked in provocative ways to create the illusion that one is capable of control.

Contextual note

Macron’s conditional assertion must be deemed odd, if only because every knowledgeable person about the state of play in Ukraine recognizes see the situation as already deteriorating. This is not a matter of speculation.

Monsieur le Président appears to be saying we must act now. But France cannot act alone. He has even labeled his allies cowards. Perhaps Macron sees himself in the role of NATO’s Jeanne d’Arc before the battle of Orléans, the heroic champion who mounts his horse and sallies forth to inspire courage in the faltering king’s forces, forcing the English – in this case the Russians – to flee.

To play such a role, serious drama is required. Macron describes the war in Ukraine as “existential for our Europe and for France” (“existentielle pour notre Europe et pour la France). The interesting word here is “notre.” What can he possibly mean by “our Europe?” Does he believe there are multiple Europes? Is Russia a different Europe?

More likely, “our” points to a class of people or an ideology within Europe. Macron has never made a secret of his own ideology and class, which is composed of ENA graduates, Rothschild bankers, hauts fonctionnaires (senior bureaucrats) and McKinsey consultants. Macron himself was a Rothschild banker. He notoriously paid McKinsey handsomely to play a significant role in guiding his policies of governance. The Europe of bankers, consultants and private think tanks is real. From the beginning of his career, Macron was groomed inside it and for it. The  Europe he calls “our Europe” is indeed facing an existential threat.

That class of professionals, largely shielded from direct contact with the people of Europe’s disparate nations, has governed and managed the European Union for decades. It’s the Europe of banks, multinationals, consultants, lawyers and an army of senior bureaucrats who comfortably make decisions and spend money within the very real and well-defended security of institutions that were designed to stand above the plebian masses with no accountability to the people. Though regularly challenged by multiple parties and movements, the self-satisfied, arrogant technocracy that reigns in Brussels and depends on US-led NATO for its security, is the “existing” Europe that Macron perceives as being existentially threatened.

Those in Europe who challenge an invisible hierarchy of financial and political interests tied by an umbilical cord to its protector, NATO (the US military-industrial complex), fall into three categories: nationalistic populists on the right, anti-capitalist parties on the left and a wide range of sometimes prestigious but largely marginalized intellectuals and independent thinkers. Prominent among them are personalities with historical connections to politics but no longer tied to established parties, such as Yanis Varoufakis, Greece’s former finance minister and Dominique de Villepin, former French prime minister. They, and the people of the European community, in the full ideological diversity, appear to belong to something other than Macron’s “notre Europe.”

Historical note

France did have its moment of very real influence during the Cold War. It even had several moments, despite its obvious weakness regarding the two competing superpowers. In 1966, De Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military command structure. De Gaulle believed that France should not be bound by decisions made by other NATO members, particularly the United States.

Similarly, under his leadership, France insisted on developing its own nuclear deterrent, including the testing and deployment of nuclear weapons. The French nuclear program aimed to ensure that France could defend itself independently, without relying on other nuclear powers.

Perhaps even more significantly in February 1965, de Gaulle announced France’s intention to exchange its U.S. dollar reserves for gold at the official exchange rate, effectively calling what had become the post Bretton Woods bluff. The general dared to call the dollar the “exorbitant privilege” that allowed the US to hold the world hostage to a currency everyone had to have and hold, meaning the US was free to print the money that allowed it to wage wars and conduct covert operations across the globe.

At a time when the US had become comfortable with the idea that a divided Europe was a good thing, even if it meant allowing the Soviet Union to pull strings in the east, De Gaulle advocated for a united Europe that could assert its interests on the global stage. He dared to evoke a Europe stretching “from the Atlantic to the Urals.” Though some in the US and Europe categorized the general as an impertinent nationalist, his thinking was consistently regional. As Henri Guaino, a close collaborator of President Nicolas Sarkozy, recently, De Gaulle “wanted sovereignty for France and independence for Europe.”

Guaino, and former prime minister Dominique de Villepin under President Jacques Chriac, are two prominent voices today who, not content to critique Macron’s bellicose foreign policy, argue strongly in favor of diplomacy rather than intransigent confrontation as the means of resolving conflict. Both invoke the Gaullist tradition.

De Gaulle left office in 1969 and died a year later. The irony of history is that today, six decades on, NATO is not only threatened existentially by its failure to master events in Ukraine but the almighty dollar also appears to be losing its exorbitant privilege as multiple forces line up to weaken its dominance.

No one can predict how the two current wars – in Ukraine and Gaza – will end or drag on. But the brightest minds understand that the Western “rules-based” and dollar-based order has lost a significant measure of its prestige. France’s politics, much like the US, have achieved a level of astoning incoherence. My prediction for France is that De Gaulle’s heritage will be felt again, not in a spirit of Make France Great Again, but by permitting to rethink France’s fundamental “existential” relationships across in Europe and elsewhere. An unpredictable multipolar world is emerging and France, but not Macron, will have something to contribute to it. 

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Replaying World War I, Macron Wants to Fight “Over There” appeared first on 51�Թ�.