The Cypriot character

The 50-year intractability of the Cyprob shows a great deal about the character of Cypriots. Over the past 25 years, both sides have engaged in political posturing and rhetoric about achieving an enduring solution, and have participated in an endless of UN-mediated talks and negotiations. Yet they have found every imaginable to withdraw. Their defining characteristics are stubbornness and a compulsion to secure total partisan victory and globally recognized justice at all costs.

As my Cypriot lawyer once observed, “Ah, Alan-mou, you British are so sensible when you weigh up the pros and cons of taking legal action. All my Cypriot clients are hell bent on their day in court! They really do believe that venting their indignation in court will guarantee them a well-deserved just outcome for all the world to see. Regrettably, it is rarely so. Einai megalo diskolo [it’s a big problem]. They fail to recognize that the other party also has rights and maybe a good case and that compromises and trade-offs may be required. They refuse to accept that getting 80% of something is better than getting 100% of nothing.” So far, both sides in the Cyprob dispute have obtained the latter.

Despite such obstinacy, the hostility between them has markedly declined over the past 25 years. They have developed a healthy modus vivendi — an agreement for conflicting parties to coexist peacefully. GCs and TCs tend to regard themselves as Cypriots first and foremost, and value their shared heritage. Although they acknowledge a vague fealty to their respective ancestral origins — Greece and Turkey, respectively — Cypriots tend to trust their Cypriotness first. They back away from any perceived diktats or interference from the capitals of Athens or Ankara.

Official crossing points over the Green Line first opened up in 2003. There are now nine. The nearest to my house was in the next village of Pyla (Pile); it provides the most scenic rural route up to north Nicosia, then across the Pentadaktylos Mountains and down to Kyrenia (Girne) and its picturesque harbor surrounded by quayside restaurants. Looking down on Kyrenia from the north slopes of the Pentadaktylos is the village of Bellapais. Its name means “beautiful land” in its original Italian, and sure enough, it is home to an old abbey from the Venetian era. Bellapais (Beylerbeyi) was also the home of famous English author Lawrence Durrell, and the site where he wrote his acclaimed , Bitter Lemons of Cyprus.

Opposite the abbey is the Tree of Idleness corner. Legend suggests that countless writers and others who sat under a 200-year-old robinia tree here were overcome with a soporific lack of motivation. Today, the Tree of Idleness Restaurant is the legend’s legacy.

From my many visits, I can attest to the restaurant’s good food and hospitality. On one occasion, it was closed for a private party: the annual dinner and awards ceremony of a wrestling and martial arts society. Yet the maître d’ found a spare table and invited me in, provided I did not mind sharing the private party’s menu. Mind? Of course not! It was a wonderful evening with great cuisine, Kavaklidere red wine, Efes beer, raki and a cabaret, plus socializing with Turkish wrestlers!

Readers may have noticed that most Cypriot towns and villages have multiple names: one Greek, one Turkish and sometimes one English. The capital, known outside Cyprus by its English name of Nicosia, is Lefkosia to the GCs and Lefkosha to the TCs. The eastern city known as Famagusta in English is Ammochostos to the GCs and Gazimaguza to the TCs. Road signs may chop and change between all versions, which can confuse inexperienced foreigners.

Every day, many TCs travel across the Green Line to work or trade in the GC-controlled south. Meanwhile, GCs travel across to the TRNC area for leisure and to purchase cheap commodities. On weekends, GCs head up to Kyrenia in droves to gamble in the casinos there, which are more numerous and lightly controlled compared to the stricter regulation in the south.

Cyprus’s split totals some 1.36 million. Approximately 933,500 people live in the Republic controlled by the GCs, which covers the southern two-thirds of the island. The rest dwell in the breakaway TC-controlled northern third. Additionally, the summer period from early April to late October sees another four million tourists temporarily swell the population by over 500,000 per month in the GC-controlled area alone. Foreign tourists also arrive in the TRNC via the Erjan (Tymbou) international airport near north Nicosia.

A culture of warmth and pleasure

Present-day Cypriots reflect their rich heritage, not only genetically, but culturally and linguistically. For example, the GCs in the Republic-controlled south still officially use Turkish terms and concepts from the Ottoman period. Some examples include the aforementioned mukhtar for the local mayor, donum for a measure of land and kochan or gotchan for a title deed.

There is a distinctly cosmopolitan feel about Cyprus, mainly owing to the broad spectrum of foreigners who are either residents, tourists or business visitors. Cypriots are relatively sophisticated and as up-to-date with technology, business and social trends as any developed European nation. Yet, paradoxically, the Cypriot culture is essentially that of a big village, with all the parochial characteristics that implies. The GCs even have a descriptive word for it: choriatiki, derived from the Greek word chorio (village). Everyone in a village seems to be somehow related to the next person and to others in neighboring villages or beyond. Foreigners often forget the close-knit familial links; many have incurred displeasure when they criticized a particular Cypriot, unaware that the listener is his/her relative.

Cypriots are highly sociable people. Strangers exchange greetings in the street, just like they did in my childhood village in England during the 1950s and 1960s. They enjoy being with people and talking a lot. They call each other mou, eg Alan-mou (“my Alan”) or fili mou (“my friend”), as a term of endearment. When sitting at a table chatting to someone, they touch the other person’s forearm as a sign of trust and affection.

To Cypriots, time is an elastic concept — ignoring timetables, schedules and deadlines a part of etiquette. After all, why rush and get stressed when having a chat and a metrio or sketo coffee in the kafeneon or taverna is much more pleasant? “Siga-siga!” (“Slow down!”) the GCs say, while the TCs invoke, “Yavash-yavash, rahatlamak!” (“Slow down, relax!”)

In Cyprus, a stop into the local taverna (coffee shop) for a half-hour of relaxation is a daily ritual for locals and expat foreigners alike. In the summer months, al fresco tables and chairs under awnings or umbrellas offer a welcome respite from the blazing sun and daily bustle. Every year, the country enjoys up to 340 days of sunshine and, in the June–September period, temperatures may reach 40–45 degrees Celsius (104–113 degrees Fahrenheit). When I lived there, it was almost a guarantee that I could sunbathe from the end of January to mid-November.

Cypriot friendliness and hospitality are legendary. In a GC establishment, friends, acquaintances and servers typically greet new arrivals, even strangers, with a welcoming “Kalimera, fili mou! Eistai kala?” (“Good day, my friend! Are you okay?”) This person may then reply, “Eimai kala, efcharisto poli,” (“I’m good, thanks a lot,”) or perhaps “Etzi-getzi” (“So-so”) or “Beninda-beninda” (“50/50”).

In TC establishments, the call would be, “Günaydin, hoshgel deniz! Iyi misin?” (“Good day, welcome! Are you okay?”). A positive response would be, “Tashaköl, ben iyiyim. Tchok mamnoun.” (“Thanks, I’m fine. Much obliged.”) If you are not feeling on top form, you might reply, “Shül-e bül-e, yari-yariya” (“So-so, 50/50”).

Incredible nightlife and weddings

Cypriots like to party but they tend to start late. Bouzoukias (tavernas with live bouzouki music, more of a nightspot than simply a taverna) rarely start to fill up before 9:30 PM. Spontaneous Greek dancing starts around 10:30 PM or once enough alcohol has been consumed. It may last for hours, going well beyond midnight.

The sound of a well-played bouzouki is spell-binding. Everyone is invited, even expected, to join in. One of the most enthralling dances is the mono dance, which involves a single dancer watched by gathered patrons. The irregular dance steps and moves are beyond description but take great skill to perform. I spent years trying to understand it. Then one day, a Cypriot confided that the mono dance’s other name is the “drunkard’s dance.” This name is spot-on!

Despite that nickname, it is rare to see Cypriots get drunk. Unlike some northern Europeans, they do not descend on hostelries to get rip-roaringly intoxicated. Locals do consume beer, but tend to imbibe more wine and the local zivania spirit — a beverage similar to the Italian grappa (a clear, grape-based alcohol similar to vodka). I can attest to the fact that zivania is not for the fainthearted. I can hold my own with tequila but getting inebriated on zivania once was enough for me!

The smoking of tobacco products is now officially banned in all enclosed bars, restaurants, tavernas, nightclubs and similar establishments throughout the Republic including TRNC-controlled areas. During the seven summer months (May–November), patrons can sit outside; smoking is widely allowed in such al fresco areas. As a cigar smoker, I welcome this dispensation. Police raids are very infrequent in villages, and some establishment owners may turn a blind eye to indoor smoking.

When it comes to parties, my wife and I agree that nothing competes with a full-on Greek wedding, especially a traditional “village wedding.” Typically, the whole village and beyond are invited to the reception. This can easily amount to 500–1,000 people and sometimes many more. When our mukhtar’s son married, the family had to hire a special stadium miles away that could accommodate the 2,500 guests and catering facilities.

Many weddings are held in special wedding halls. There is no dress code, so some guests wear tuxedos, others casual clothes and even work garb. I vividly recall a brawny male guest at one wedding who was in well-worn denim dungarees with his shirt sleeves rolled up, making him look like a farm worker who had just gotten off a tractor! He walked back from the buffet to his table carrying a piled-up plate of food in one hand and three large bottles of Keo beer between the fingers of his other hand. These celebrations attract all types! This behavior was totally acceptable, but still provided conversation for the other chattering guests. The “anything goes” nature of Greek wedding receptions is always wonderful.

Cypriot enterprise culture

Another Cypriot characteristic is business acumen and a high prevalence of entrepreneurship, from small to large businesses. Today, these are typically in the broad spectrum of tourism, including hotels, restaurants, bars and travel; real estate, including developers, contractors, sales agents and rental agents; retailers of all description, and agriculture. Professional, business and IT services, both within Cyprus and regionally, also flourish.

Cyprus has long been a location for registration of marine fleets from around the world. I got to know representatives from most of these sectors, including some high-profile individuals. Some became my good friends.

The enterprise ethos does, however, mask a more difficult characteristic of a minority of participants, whether private business people or public servants. While most Cypriots are law-abiding and try to conduct themselves with integrity, some are less scrupulous and adopt a “what can we get away with?” attitude. This comes at a cost to customers and clients, as well as society and the economy as a whole. These rogues believe that they are entitled to enrich themselves or gain unfair advantage by questionable if not unlawful means.

Such miscreants exist in every country, but in Cyprus they have developed fraud and corruption into an art form. Fraud is widely regarded not as a “real” crime, but as a game and battle of wits. Even government ministers and attorney generals have referred to it by the quaint, minimalizing term, “cheating.” This implies that even when vast sums of money have been defrauded, it is only a trivial matter — just a bit of naughtiness by lovable scallywags. Unfortunately, few are truly lovable, and this bad minority has a disproportionate impact on the country.

The social attitude towards fraud and corruption is summed up by the typical reaction Cypriots have when challenged on the subject: “Afti einai i Kypros. Stin Kypro, ola einai pithana” (“This is Cyprus. In Cyprus, anything is possible”), coupled with a shoulder shrug and a knowing look. They imply that a person’s objectives can still be reached using corruption if more honest attempts have failed.

When the Council of Europe’s Groupe d’États Contre la Corruption (GRECO) anti-corruption body initially Cyprus in 2005, its found that senior government representatives were in flat that corruption even existed in Cyprus. Since then, successive GRECO reports, including the latest (2023–2024), suggest that authorities have made some progress in combating corruption but still have some way to go.

Over the past 20 years, Cyprus has seen huge scandals involving fraud and . One of the most pervasive and notorious was the Cyprus Property Fraud and Title Deeds Scandal. I wrote a whole section on it, including seven case studies, in my 2013 , Corporate Risk and Governance. By 2008, over 30,000 properties fully purchased by an estimated 60,000 foreign buyers had not been issued with title deed transfers after five years. Mine took eight years to obtain, and some have taken over 30!

From 2007 to 2016, I contributed to the Cyprus Property Action Group (CPAG), led by Denis O’Hare and Nigel Howarth. This organization fought to bring justice to thousands of mainly foreign buyers of residential real estate in Cyprus who had been scammed. CPAG in Cyprus, the UK and in the European Parliament for changes to and enforcement of legislation concerning property purchases in the Republic of Cyprus.

Additionally, many buyers had lost their invested money to one of at least 12 categories of fraud perpetrated by developers, agents or lawyers, aided and abetted by corrupt officials. So many property fraud cases were reported to police that, by 2009, the Attorney General that property fraud was no longer a criminal offense. Therefore, the police would no longer take reports from who instead would have to raise their own cases in civil court.

Cyprus authorities, banks and lawyers often assert that Cyprus law closely follows English law, including property law. As I noted, “It is puzzling why property crime has been singled out for this dispensation. Why not also for murder, rape, robbery or blackmail? Why are long-winded civil cases forced on property victims before a criminal investigation is allowed, even when strong prima facie evidence of a crime exists? A perverse parody of English law appears to be acted out.”

The Cyprus Financial Crisis of 2013 escalated things. It involved the of Marfin Laiki Bank, the country’s second-largest bank; the near collapse of the Bank of Cyprus, the country’s largest bank, and the near bankruptcy of the government. The crisis was precipitated largely by the property market debt bubble and financial mismanagement by the banks and government. In order to get an emergency bailout by the EU, the European Central Bank and the IMF (dubbed The Troika), the government had to enforce stringent and requirements for numerous practices. These included corporate governance, banking practice, , loan applicant background checks, non-performing and delinquent loans recovery, foreclosure and title deeds .

Cyprus has made some advances. Title deeds issuance and transfer has seen process improvements, so its huge backlog has been reduced substantially. The policy of requiring a search certificate before transfer can proceed has reduced the level of hidden liens, earlier mortgages and encumbrances springing nasty surprises on innocent buyers. Nevertheless, Cyprus property expert Nigel Howarth that unacceptable delays in title deed transfers still remain, as does the requirement for innocent buyers to pay for prior planning infringements. As he told me recently, “the ‘victim pays’ culture is embedded.” Corrupt practices involving state actors also continue to .

Encouragingly, in 2014, a new Auditor General, Odysseas Michaelides, heralded a determination by authorities to clamp down on corporate and institutional fraud and corruption. As my December 2014 for Financial Mirror reported, a whole bevy of individuals in public and private sector organizations suddenly found themselves charged with major crimes, convicted and receiving long jail sentences. There was then hope for justice in Cyprus after all.

Nevertheless, new cases have arisen. The most high profile one followed an Al Jazeera in October 2020 of the Cyprus “passports for cash” . This case eventually had eight indicted defendants, including former Transport Minister Marios Demetriades, awaiting trial in September 2024.

Michaelides’s anti-corruption success and personal style eventually became too much for the patricians of the Cyprus Establishment. In September 2024, he suddenly faced a barrage — or perhaps an orchestrated attack — of pious public criticism by politicians and state officials. They received backup from a Supreme Constitutional Court decision that he had abused his position, exceeded his authority and prejudiced due legal process by his media statements. Michaelides’s as Auditor General was publicly announced as a fait accompli. Moreover, the “passports for cash” trial suddenly “disappeared.” Recidivism and “” are alive and well.

Cynics suggest the whole saga was engineered so the republic could slip back into its timeless, undisturbed, cozy and corrupt culture of yesteryear. This development does not bode well for Cyprus.

Shady characters, big and small

Among a Cyprus population of law-abiding citizens exists a minority cadre of what can best be described as shady characters. In addition to the white-collar crime proclivities described above, there are a few prominent gangsters running protection rackets, trafficking operations, money laundering and other well-honed criminal activities.

Arguably the most notorious gangster in recent times was , who died in 2017. Tales of his activities became legendary. He seemed to revel in what he portrayed as a persona — he was “helping” ordinary citizens obtain some justice, as they allegedly could not rely on the police or courts to resolve their issues. His protection rackets around the city of Larnaca were well-known; several of my acquaintances who ran small businesses there paid up to avoid retribution.

I even met one of Fanieros’s enforcers. This man regularly visited one of my taverna haunts to check that nothing untoward was afoot. He was a pleasant, affable fellow who would sit at my table and chat. He was even a talented Greek dancer. But, I always watched my words and behavior, just in case!

Fanieros was so prominent that he tried to as a Member of Parliament. However, he failed to obtain the essential “good character” certificate from the police. Rather than landing a parliamentary position, he earned a public rebuke from the Police Chief for his audacity.

Even the innocent can sometimes fall foul of perceptions, as I once discovered at a wonderful mezedopoleon restaurant and nightspot in the village of Skarinou. The place was packed with Cypriots. I seemed to be the only anglos (Englishmen) in the place, but with my Cypriot friends around, I wasn’t at all nervous. The meze — a meal style consisting of small plates of various foods — served here was superb, the beer and wine were flowing and the live bouzoukia-style music had everyone in a good mood.

Once the meal was over, I noticed that some Cypriots at surrounding tables had lit cigarettes; this was customary. So, enjoying cigars as I do, I lit up a Cuban decimos cigar and started to puff contentedly. I became aware that several patrons at other tables were looking at me with slightly anxious expressions. Were cigars not allowed? Was I smoking in a non-smoking zone? What was the problem?

One of my companions explained: “It’s not the cigar that’s the problem. It’s you and the way you are smoking it. With several scars on your face and close-cropped hair, you look quite tough. And you hold your cigar like someone out of a gangster movie. They probably think you are one of the Limassol Russian mafioski [mafia member]. They are wondering why you’re here and if there’s going to be trouble.”

Me? I wouldn’t hurt a fly. I love Nisi-mou Afroditi too much.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The UN would typically be expected to support such a worthwhile endeavor. Indeed, when Greek Cypriots planned and built roads to Pile, the UN never criticized, restricted, or blocked them. However, when Turkish Cypriots wish to build roads or infrastructure – the UN has taken action immediately.

Suddenly, numerous new UN instruments are contravening the standard customs and processes of the TRNC. The UN has lost its impartiality in Cyprus and is applying different regarding its decisions involving Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

Inconsistent UN Actions

The TRNC has never hesitated to open up discussions with the UN and its southern neighbors, especially when the well-being of its can be improved – something that the Pile-Yiğitler road project would unquestionably achieve. Yet, at every turn, the goodwill and good faith attempts of Turkish Cypriots have not been reciprocated.

Pile is the only town in the buffer with both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, only Turkish Cypriot residents face constant checkpoints and when entering or leaving their homes. They are desperate for reasonable access into their village from the TRNC to finally have proper access to their humanitarian needs.

Since establishing the buffer zone, two new roads have been built from the Greek side into Pile. The Greek authorities even built a and theater in the buffer zone. However, when the Turkish Cypriot authorities tried to build a single road, the full of the UN’s might came down.

How can this double standard continue to be applied by the UN? Do they not see that this clearly violates their neutrality and demonstrates a clear and enduring bias? Turning a blind eye to Greek Cypriot projects and then blocking a Turkish Cypriot humanitarian endeavor is frankly outrageous.

This is a dangerous situation to be in. By minimizing Greek Cypriot restrictions and applying full restrictions to Turkish Cypriots, the UN is essentially removing any possibility of Turkish Cypriots living in Pile. Indeed, Turkish Cypriots have increasingly been forced to leave their homes as living in Pile becomes untenable without free access to healthcare, education and food.

It feels like a deliberate strategy to turn the only joint village in the buffer zone – one in a strategically important location – into a Greek Cypriot community. The UN is not to be trusted because it refuses to respect and honor its with our government.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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When a military coup shook Greece in 1967, it exposed the country to a brutal military dictatorship that brought numerous internal and external losses for the Greek people. Recalling this part of Greek history, and taking lessons from the , can enlighten us on what Turkey could have faced if the��, had been successful.

After long negotiations and the signing of international treaties between the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece, a joint state between the Greeks and Turks was formed in Cyprus in 1960. However, as neither Greeks nor Turks gave up their national aspirations, the Republic of Cyprus did not last long.

In 1963, inter-communal violence (from a Greek point of view) or Greek oppression (from a Turkish one) had started. In 1964, the ��was stationed on the island but did not succeed in ending the bloodshed. Turkey had decided to intervene in 1964 and 1967 in order to stop the killings, but was prevented from doing so by the United States.

Prometheus: From Greece to Cyprus

On the morning of April 21, 1967, Greeks woke up to learn that a group of a middle-ranking military intelligence officers led by anti-communist Colonel George Papadopoulos had seized power in the country. Coup leaders had not issued any prior warning, and they did not encounter any serious resistance. The coup was based on a modified North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contingency plan called��, which was originally created for the possibility of a communist takeover. The main aim of the coup was to prevent George Papandreu, and his son Andreas as heralded successor, from winning the May 1967 election.

Andreas Papandreu was a leftist who criticized the massive presence of American military and intelligence in Greece, and aimed at following a more independent path from the US. This had been enough to be����by the military, conservatives, NATO and the Americans. In fact, he was incarcerated later by the Greek junta, while his father was put under house arrest. The��, which protects freedom of thought and expression, was suspended.

On November 25, 1973, Papadopoulos himself was overthrown by a coup within a coup, led by Greek Military Police Commander Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, after a bloody anti-junta student revolt at Athens Technical University. Papadopoulos’ administration, which lasted about six-and-a-half years, was now replaced by an even more tough and uncompromising regime. As expected, the US saw this as an internal matter and quickly recognized the new government. During the dark and dirty seven-year period of junta rule—although relative stability and economic development was ensured—���ɱ������

In order to ensure public support, Ioannides decided to play on one of the most important national causes, namely��: the unification of Greece and Cyprus. In fact, many in the Greek junta had served in Cyprus and had emotional ties with the Mediterranean island.

However, even though the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III, had desired enosis, he opposed it—stating that it was not feasible or clever to make such a unilateral declaration under military rule.

Nevertheless, Ioannides was not willing to wait and decided to use Colonel Georgios Grivas (a former Greek war hero originally from Cyprus) and the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA-B)—a Cypriot paramilitary organization founded by Grivas and aimed at achieving enosis—in order to get rid of Makarios, having attempted to assassinate him several times. On January 3, 1974, he claimed publicly that the junta was trying to�����󾱳�.

On June 5, 1974, Makarios sent a public letter to Greek President Phaedon Gizikis and demanded that Greek soldiers be called back to Greece. The letter brought about his end. He had once said: “I have survived 13 Greek Governments; I can survive the 14^th.” But on��July 15, he lost his presidency through a military coup.

International Crisis

The US had warned Greece several times that a coup attempt in Cyprus would cause an����that would include Turkey as well.��However, Ioannides seemed not able to think rationally about this issue. During a meeting with US representatives, he seemed to have suffered a��. Jumping, shouting and hitting the table, he had told American diplomats the stories of the historic wars between Byzantium, Hellenes and the Ottomans, including the conquest of Istanbul in 1453.

On the morning of July 15, 1974, Makarios’ presidential palace was attacked with tanks, armored vehicles and commandos. The Cypriot president was welcoming a group of children as guests at the time but was able to escape through the back door. His supporters and police were not able to resist for long. While Turkish Cypriots organized under Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) were waiting to find out the result with great anxiety, tourists were trapped in their hotels as the airports and seaports were seized.

Not only militarily, but also politically, the coup was organized with great awkwardness. Perhaps the greatest mistake of the coup leaders was to make Nikos Sampson, who was an EOKA-B member, a famous killer and widely known as��“Turk Eater,”��the new president. Makarios was able to make a��, where he explicitly accused the Greek junta of organizing the coup. He also said Greece was a greater threat than Turkey. His demand for international intervention by the United Nations (UN) was, in fact, only met by Turkey.

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Junta members had dismissed many qualified officers and instead promoted the incapable but loyal ones. Loyalty to the regime had replaced competence. However, an unexpected consequence of these mistakes for Greeks and Greek Cypriots was the loss of one-third of their beloved island. Turkey saw the coup by the Greek junta as a serious threat to Turkish Cypriots and Turkey’s security and as a violation of international treaties and decided to intervene.

Turkish Intervention in Cyprus

The intervention in Cyprus started on the morning of July 20, 1974. However, since Greeks were too exhausted from fighting each other in these three consecutive coups, and since many of the qualified officers were dismissed by the junta and polarized, they were incapable of mounting a strong resistance, nor were they organized well enough to repel Turkey’s military operation. Fortunately, Ioannides’ order to start a war against Turkey was not obeyed by his generals, who believed this was an impossible mission.

Once the cradle of European civilization, Greece had become a pariah of Europe after these coups and lost its international standing. Turkey’s intervention came when Greece was excluded from the international community and under a partial arms embargo. This was one of the reasons why world powers did not put forward a strong response to Turkey’s initial intervention.

The embarrassment caused by the defeat in Cyprus and the inability of Greece to fight against Turkey led to senior Greek military officers withdrawing their support for Ioannides. Instead, Constantine Karamanlis, a well-known politician who had lived in Paris, was invited on July 23 to assume the role of prime minister. The tide turned against Turkey immediately after Greece returned to democracy.

One can evaluate Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus as an invasion and a pretext for partitioning the island, or as a legal and just humanitarian intervention to save Turkish Cypriots. But in the aftermath, because of these coups and the internal turmoil they produced, the Greeks lost a third of the island, and Turkey found a chance to create a comparatively large safe zone for Turkish Cypriots. No doubt, the Turkish army could have won the war in any case, even without these coups. However, it would have caused considerably more casualties for Turkey and resulted in even greater international pressure.

Turkey Coup of 2016

If the coup of July 15, 2016, in Turkey had been successful, an important part of the military and civilians would have challenged and continued to fight against the junta for a long period. It was officially declared by Turkish armed forces that��of the military joined the coup attempt with inadequate military vehicles. However, an important number of generals, especially with one or two stars��(), were on their side. Had they been successful in controlling governmental institutions, the main military command buildings and perhaps killing or detaining key political figures, including President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, it was almost certain that the remaining army staff would have fought back after recovering from the initial shock.

It is also well known that the Kemalist section of the military has no��sympathy for , an exiled Muslim cleric who has been accused of instigating the coup attempt. Instead, there has been a serious struggle between Kemalists and Gulenists since 1980s, which came to a highpoint during the��Ergenekon�����Ի���Balyoz��(Sledgehammer) court cases organized unlawfully by Gulenists against the Kemalist officers. In addition to that, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and President Erdogan have the support of����of the Turkish population.

The day of the Turkey coup clearly showed how a large section of the public was ready to fight against the tanks and die in order to defend the country’s democratic choices. The decisive resistance of the Kemalist commanders, but especially the comparatively ill-equipped policemen, should also be taken into account.

Therefore, considering all these dimensions, the aftershock of the coup would not have subsided quickly. Instead, a confrontation between army officers, the police and civilians could have lasted for months.

Besides other terrorist organizations, the involvement of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the confrontations was also a strong possibility, since it has been fighting against Turkey for years and could have seen the weakened position of the army and police as a good opportunity to realize its aims. The tensions between the secular and the religious factions should also be kept in mind.

Escaping Blood

Considering all of these factors, Turkey would have fallen into turmoil or even a bloody civil war, and would have paid very high price both internally and externally.

Now, the most important aim for the Turkish government should be to accurately identify the criminals from the innocents, and not to turn the investigations into a witch hunt.

It is well known that this type of infighting can cause major violations of human rights and may end up with —sometimes with right intentions but sometimes as a pretext for an invasion. A long-standing internal conflict in Turkey would have threatened all of Europe, which could have entailed an elimination of the Turkish barrier to Syrian refugees seeking to reach Europe. It would have also resulted in new Turkish and Kurdish refugees, an easy transit for terrorist groups to Europe, smuggling and illegal trafficking, instability, xenophobia, and more nationalist policies and rhetoric.

Therefore, if Turkey had not been able to end the crisis in a short period of time, NATO could have decided to intervene in a member state one way or another, for the first time in history. It is not impossible to bypass the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and international law, or reinterpret it—as was the case in the Kosovo intervention that was executed without a valid UN Security Council resolution—when vital interests are at stake and all members agree. However, past experiences have proved that foreign��military��interventions can cause even greater crisis and instability, as seen in Libya and Iraq.��

If the coup attempt had reached its initial aims, it could have produced unexpected outcomes for Cyprus as well.

Turkey has more than 40,000 army personnel on the island. Even though it would not have been rational, had the coup organizers been successful in toppling the Turkish government, the Turkish army in northern Cyprus could have been ordered to do the same there. Indeed, just after the coup attempt, the commander of the Turkish army in Cyprus resigned and other top generals were retired by the supreme military council.

Turkey had used the military coup of 1974 in Cyprus and the humanitarian crisis as justifying factors for its military intervention. This time, the same arguments could have been used by the Greek and Greek Cypriot armies in order to take back Cyprus, as the Turkish army would have been in disorder. In fact, former Greek Member of Parliament Christos Rotsas proved that this was not just a conspiracy theory by absurdly stating that the����by not attacking the Turkish army in Cyprus and capturing the north.

Another common practice of powerful countries in this kind of situation is to intervene militarily in order to—or at least using the excuse—protect their own citizens. In fact, a��spokesman for�� said: “Everything must be done to protect human lives.” The��, which has never hesitated from intervening militarily in neighboring crises—as was the case in Crimea, Ukraine and South Ossetia—declared that Russia’s priority was to secure the safety of Russian institutions and citizens in Turkey.

Even though President Erdogan had chosen to mend Turkish relations with Russia just before the coup attempt, the tension between the countries had reached a concerning level after a Russian fighter jet was shot down by Turkey in 2015.

Turkey is a NATO member. However, past experiences show that Russia could choose to step up to NATO as it did in Kosovo—but it clearly would not do so when a vital neighboring country is in question: Syria. The historical����over Turkey and Syria should also be considered.

The Greek people lost so much both internally and externally due to three consecutive coups. But considering all the dangerous possibilities mentioned above, Turkey could have lost even more if the coup attempt of July 15 had succeeded. Therefore, the anti-coup and Kemalist part of the Turkish military personnel, police and civilians who resisted and prevented the coup have actually saved Turkey from a real catastrophe—and even the world from serious regional instability.

Now, the most important aim for the Turkish government should be to accurately identify the criminals from the innocents, and not to turn the investigations into a witch hunt. Instead, this regrettable incident should be used as a chance for a new beginning and reconciliation between the polarized segments of Turkish society.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Germany’s new foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who replaced Guido Westerwelle following the 2013 general elections, is famous for having donated one of his kidneys to his wife in 2010. His sacrifice attests a noble devotion to his beloved spouse.  

As debates over Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU) have reached new heights in the past few months, Ankara has been wondering whether the Social Democrat minister and his party will demonstrate such devotion to Turkey while Chancellor Angela Merkel’s reluctance remains unchanged.

Domestic Tensions in Turkey

As political tensions in Turkey are at their peak due to the ongoing struggle between the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Gulen movement, Ankara is in desperate need for its political climate to adopt a new direction. Indeed, the recent  and the series of  have tarnished the country’s prospects of political stability.

After its formerly strong alliance with the AKP broke down, the pro-Gulen cadres in the judiciary and police steered several large operations exposing corruption and bribery cases that embroiled cabinet ministers, as well as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his son.

On the other hand, the potency of the Gulen movement in Turkey’s bureaucracy, evidenced by the  of the movement’s leader, Fethullah Gulen, plainly indicate that Gulenists have already moved beyond the apolitical norms of a civic organization and rather turned out to have a very strong sway on politics, as well as on media and business.

While Erdogan and his supporters of forming a "parallel state" and a "secret clique," the movement underscored the corruption allegations by publicizing leaked videos and telephone calls that manifest bribery and fraud involving the government and certain businessmen.

The parties of the conflict also have major disagreements over foreign policy. Gulen, who has resided in Pennsylvania for the last 16 years, and his followers are known to have reservations toward Erdogan’s (and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s) very eager engagement in the Middle East’s chaotic issues.

In turn, they are accused by AKP circles of conspiring with Israel and the United States to undermine "Turkey as a rising star in the ."

Restoring Relations with Europe

Erdogan’s growing suspicions toward Washington seem to have restored Turkey’s once-lost appetite to sit at a table with Europeans.

On January 21, the Turkish PM paid an official visit to Brussels (the first one in four years) to meet with senior EU officials. A week later, , marking the first official visit to the Turkish capital by a French president in 22 years. On February 4, Erdogan’s plane landed in Berlin, while Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy held talks with his Turkish counterpart in Ankara on February 11.

Meanwhile, Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders, Nicos Anastasiades and Dervis Eroglu, , which were suspended more than a year ago.

This heavy traffic between Ankara and several European capitals is far from an ordinary occurrence, given the stagnancy of EU-Turkish relations throughout the last seven to eight years. It clearly indicates Turkey’s willingness to open a new page with Europe. However, other factors have also impacted upon this apparent resumption of relations.

In France, President Hollande is much more inclined to support Turkey’s EU bid than his predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy.

As for Germany, although Merkel still opts for a privileged partnership with Turkey and opposes Ankara's full membership, Social Democrats are now part of the new government coalition and Foreign Minister Steinmeier favors more receptive policies toward Turkey.

Last but not least, Turkey’s new EU minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, is the former president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). His recent replacement of  bodes well for refinement in relations with the EU, as Bagis was largely criticized for his flippant statements toward European leaders.

However, tangible progress would entail more substantial steps since the support of pro-Turkey politicians in Europe is not unconditional. They expect the Turkish government to embrace democratic standards such as freedom of speech, press freedom, judicial independence and the rule of law.

Besides, despite the recently resumed talks in Cyprus between the Greek and Turkish sides, the issue will probably remain unsettled for a long time. Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu believes the upcoming round of talks might be  for a lasting settlement in the island. 

The bottom line is that Erdogan’s quest to counterbalance Washington’s potential siding with the Gulen movement has generated heightened diplomatic traffic with the EU and European countries, but it will remain difficult for his government to overcome the current constraints.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Even the supporters of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) are disappointed with the results from Ahmet Davutoglu’s foreign policy. Only 53 percent of AKP voters agree with his Syria policy; in total, 56 percent of Turks are opposed to it. However, not only with regards to Syria, Turkey’s overall foreign policy has hit the brick wall. There has only been very little progress in other areas as well: whether it is Cyprus, Greece, or Armenia – none of Turkey’s “old” problems with its non-Muslim neighbors have been resolved.

Moreover, relations with Muslim neighbors Iran and Iraq – with the exception of Kurdish northern Iraq – as well as Egypt are tense. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the AKP has lost its past influence over the involved parties. Neither Israel, nor the PLO or Hamas look to Ankara anymore. Little is left from Turkey’s stance as a regional power.

Even in the US, which until recently saw Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Davutoglu as almost equal partners, Ankara is a factor of secondary importance. One would rather avoid talking about the relations with the European Union (EU).

Nevertheless, there are almost no signs of self-criticism coming from officials in Ankara. In the eyes of Prime Minister Erdogan and his chief foreign policy advisor, Ibrahim Kalin, Turkey today is a lone voice which holds up the principle of democracy in the foreign policy realm. Erdogan accuses the West of doublespeak and Kalin says: “.”

Erdogan and Kalin claim that the Turkish government’s unconditional solidarity with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the push for a military strike to topple Bashar al-Assad, are directly related to its commitment for democratic values. Because Turkey is quite isolated in both cases, Kalin now speaks of a “worthy solitude” which draws its value also from the fact that it ultimately shows the right way. Is this only misapprehension or delusion?

Ideological Musings in the Way of Realizing Political Realities

This false sense of security/righteousness stems, to a large extent, from the fact that the AKP’s leadership has viewed global political shifts through an ideologically tinted lens, and thus perceived them only one-sidedly.��For example, the economic and political weakening of Europe and the US’ waning influence in the Middle East were seen by the AKP as a new chance to establish Turkey as an influential player in the region.

The calculation was that Turkey, as an actor anchored in the Middle East, could effortlessly build on the traditions of the Ottoman Empire. For long, the AKP leadership believed they were chosen to give Turkey’s history a new, ideal direction. The fact that the dissolution of the old order, especially in the Middle East, also carries certain dangers with it – which could make Ankara’s even closer cooperation with Europe and the US necessary – was neglected.

Another example is the global weakening of the nation state. Six months ago, Foreign Minister Davutoglu welcomed overcoming this model in the Middle East. According to him, it was now finally possible to revise the order imposed by the Sykes-Picot Agreement from 1916, which drew Middle Eastern borders conforming with the interests of European imperialists. Ankara felt that it was acting in accordance with the tide of world history and was about projecting strength in the region which was derived from a romantic conception of history.

What these musings completely overlooked, however, were the enormous conflicts which emerge during the disintegration of a state and its institutions. The catastrophes on the territory of former Yugoslavia and the horrible situation in Iraq would have served as solid basis for a sober assessment of the situation and its inherent dangers.

A last example concerns the AKP’s enthusiasm for reviving and strengthening traditional identities. In this situation as well, the ruling party sees itself as acting in accordance with the trend of the time, witnessing an invigoration of indigenous and religious identities at the cost of western and secular orientations everywhere, from China to Africa. In its own country, the AKP has enacted a lot of initiatives to ensure that pious Muslims in Turkey are no longer culturally, economically, and politically marginalized.

However, the struggle against the marginalization of the pious has turned into an open favoritism and privileging of religious identity and morality by the government. The AKP still does not, or does not want to, acknowledge that such policies simultaneously push other groups, especially Kurds and Alevites but also secular forces, to focus on their own culture and thus automatically on the divisive aspects in society. Thus far, the Turkish government has not found the answer to how privileging certain religious and ethnic identities can go together with political equality.

Concerning the weakening of Europe, the crisis of the modern nation state and the revival of indigenous identities, the AKP only saw the upside of things and believed itself to be in unison with global developments. This explains why Ankara saw itself for so long as a regional power and did not react to signals suggesting the opposite – and why it still champions the idea of the “worthy solitude” despite contradicting realities.

However, the government will not insist on the “worthy solitude“ for long. As a matter of fact, Turkey is already carefully backpedaling. It wants to reconnect with Tehran. In another development, Washington’s request to end support for radical groups in Syria did not fall on deaf Turkish ears anymore. Cooperation with Turkey on foreign policy matters could become easier in the future.

*[This article was originally published by��, and translated from German to English by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In my view, the European Union’s (EU) rescue of Cyprus will be seen as a milestone event, and will have a lasting impact on the EU’s ability to manage the process of European integration and the future integrity of the euro zone for key reasons.

Loss of Credibility

The EU leadership has suffered another loss of credibility. The fragility of the Cypriot banking system was a surprise to no one. The potential financial rescue of Cyprus was on the EU agenda for months as Cypriot banks remained fragile since the write-down on the value of neighboring Greece’s sovereign debt, having . However, when it finally came to negotiating an agreement on the Cypriot “bail out” deal, the EU process became a last minute exercise in brinkmanship between EU finance ministers, the European Central Bank, and the Cypriot Parliament. Consistent with past behavior, EU leadership also showed a lack of foresight and sensitivity to potential financial market reactions to their policy actions and words. It was a missed opportunity to show proactive EU management of another chapter of the debt crisis, one that doesn’t instill confidence that EU leadership is capable of keeping the euro zone together.

The "political will" of the EU fragmented further. The EU is a political union to create peaceful economic prosperity through a unified political will to overcome diverse interests, as it has been since its post-WWII inception. The Cyprus rescue illustrates the degree to which the EU political will is again fragmented, and that the euro debt crisis isn’t over. Over the course of the last year, German Chancellor Angela Merkel had demonstrated pragmatic leadership by balancing the policy objectives of her German constituency to curtail financial transfers to debt-burdened “peripheral” member states, while also being . In the Cyprus rescue, however, she seems to be now siding fully in sympathy with her “bail out”-weary German constituency, certainly in anticipation of upcoming national elections. Chancellor Merkel and other EU leaders will find it increasingly difficult to formulate balanced policy as political extremism consolidates between those who refuse to "bail out" the periphery, and the periphery that wants no part of the "bail out" medicine of austerity measures. The deep-set trends of social and political fragmentation will continue, and are at the root of the EU's policy departures in Cyprus.

“Whatever it takes”

The European Central Bank will not do “whatever it takes” to keep the euro zone intact. While ECB President Mario Draghi has gone above and beyond what most expected of him to keep the euro zone together, he will not use ECB policy mandate to do “whatever it takes” to protect it. He certainly will not protect insolvent banks, nor should he. Though he criticized the EU’s bailout plan, he also faulted Cyprus and emerged as taking a hardline stance in negotiating the terms for Cypriot banks. The chairman of the Bank of Cyprus, Andreas Artemis, quit following the negotiations, complaining he was ignored during the regarding the future of the bank.

The important thing to remember is that Cyprus is not “unique” and its “bail out” has policy implications for the future. In spite of the country’s unique “business model” of relying on financing from large depositors from the former Soviet Union, Cyprus is not an isolated case. Each EU country on the list of “peripheral” nations that has unsustainable debt is unique in its own way, each due to an excessive practice of its own. As a consequence, policy emerging from the Cyprus “bail out” is relevant to future potential rescues. EU leadership has already stated that the Cypriot bail out may become a , a public knowledge that can create a contagion of the worst type: fear. With the confiscation of deposits as a potential new policy tool, the EU can expect money from individuals and corporations to flee banks in countries that are candidates for EU “bail out” assistance over time.

Geopolitical Tensions

There has always been a foreign policy component to economic blocks, as there has been throughout the history of the EU. In the current era, foreign policy aspects of the EU are less accentuated, particularly the East-West relations. However, Chancellor Merkel expressed concern when Cypriot authorities, who upon initially saying “no” to the rescue plan, sought financial aid outside of the EU, from Moscow. Cypriot Finance Minister Michalis Sarris flew to Russia to seek a deal, but returned to Cyprus rebuffed by Moscow and unable to secure financial support. Chancellor Merkel expressed irritation at the absence of Cyprus authorities as the deadline approached.

It is easy to speculate that Cyprus could eventually exit the euro zone in spite of the current “bail out.” Cyprus already faces deteriorating economic conditions and a devastated banking system. The country will face the lasting political and social repercussions of bearing the costs of austerity and prolonged recession that staying in the euro zone will require of the Cypriot population. If Cyprus were to exit, in itself a very costly alternative even if negotiated with the Troika, the country could again look to Moscow for financial support, thereby creating geopolitical tensions within the EU.

Looking forward, Eastern European countries that are prospective euro zone members may question joining the euro zone. Polish Prime Minister Tusk is , an economic powerhouse, on joining the euro zone as he likely ponders the benefits and costs of doing so. There are, however, more benefits to joining the EU than not and it is likely that Poland would eventually choose to join even if the popular vote were against it.

But investor sentiment in EU policy is damaged: it is common knowledge that investor confidence is a critical factor in successful European integration and that no Euro country can manage its financial markets, nor hope to meet the financial convergence criteria (that qualifies to maintain a Euro membership) without favorable investor sentiment and the resulting inflow of investor capital. Unsettling to investors is the unprecedented measure of introducing capital controls to restrict capital flight from Cyprus. The measure also technically creates a second Euro currency, one that has restrictions in Cyprus, and one that does not in other member states.

Disintegration of the Euro Zone?

Against the backdrop of the well-understood structural problems in the euro zone, the headwinds of bail out fatigue, a European recession, social unrest, and euro-pessimism, integration remains particularly vulnerable to political mismanagement. The EU decisions on the Cypriot “bail out” plan is one such milestone case of mismanagement as it has already contributed to financial loss, further investor anxiety, social unrest, capital flight, currency controls, nationalism, and further disruptions, to name but a few measurable and immeasurable impediments to further euro zone integration. The policy effects on Cyprus are just beginning. The implementation of the “bail out” policy will also have lasting effects, as Cyprus is likely to face a severe recession, teeter on the cusp a euro zone exit, and remain as the top candidate for a euro zone departure in the years to come.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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