When the army is restless and distrustful,

trouble is sure to come from other feudal princes.

— , 6th century BCE

The in late January of General Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission, spawned rumors of a coup d’état, with fringe Western online showing AI-doctored videos of tanks purportedly in Beijing suburbs, and some even reporting gunfire around General Zhang’s residence. Wherever political systems are shrouded in secrecy and opacity, conspiracies flourish. China’s closed political culture, in particular, nourishes conspiracy theorists both domestically and abroad.

Debunking myths: understanding power dynamics within the Chinese Communist Party

The traditional Western commentariat has been somewhat constrained, yet it is still feeding the that Chinese President Xi Jinping is under pressure from party factions, and that the arrest of General Zhang was an example of Xi’s struggle to retain presidential power through tenuous control of the military. Prominent US papers alleged Zhang was , selling officer commissions and even leaking nuclear secrets to the Pentagon.

No outsider can truly know what takes place within the labyrinths of power in the Chinese Communist Party (the Party), let alone the military, but the causes of General Zhang’s demise are more likely his strategic and tactical differences with President Xi, and his determination to pursue his own line, supported by a number of other senior commanders. This represented a faction or, at least, the seeds of one. That Xi moved against a figure as powerful as Zhang so swiftly and without tanks in the streets of Beijing demonstrated his power, not his vulnerability.

There is a China of common reality and a China of the foreign imagination. In the latter, the economy is always on the brink of collapse, and the government, led by recalcitrant communists, is mired in factional conflict. In reality, while social change over the decades has been radical, the day-to-day experience of both civil and public life is largely stable and predictable. The Party and government are stronger and more integrated with society than at any stage in modern Chinese history, and the People’s Liberation Army () is obedient to the Party as never before, even more than under Mao Zedong.

Transforming the PLA: challenges, reforms and strategic aspirations

In 2013, a year after his ascension to power, Xi a series of military reforms. Former Chinese Leader Deng Xiaoping also drove military reforms in the , a time when units of the air force still practised formation flying with little models of Mig fighter jets in their gloved hands, moving in unison around basketball courts. China’s military had come a long way from the post-revolutionary, post-Korean War army, but was still backward, running exercises that were largely performative. Rivalry between the various branches of the armed forces was rife, and corruption was endemic. Commissions were traded widely, affecting advancement for even the lowest ranks and disrupting the meritocratic principles upon which the PLA was based. In 2013, the PLA still functioned much like a giant, inefficient state-owned enterprise, with more soldiers employed supplying food, uniforms and equipment than in fighting units.

China’s last significant military action was a limited incursion into Vietnam’s border provinces in , in which both sides suffered heavy casualties, and after which both claimed victory. The US and Indian armed forces, on the other hand, have fought in a number of engagements, creating an experienced officer corps and competence in deploying modern weaponry. The of the PLA has been informed by China’s close observation of recent conflicts, particularly the Russia–Ukraine War, yet the modern PLA remains untested in combat.

Despite this, observers would be mistaken to assume that Chinese soldiers lack the logistical skills needed for combat, for the PLA is for disaster relief and has consistently met practical and leadership challenges, while winning the widespread respect of the people.

President Xi’s proposed changes to the PLA seem rational: the formation of small, flexible brigades that can respond to crises quickly and deploy mobile missile capabilities. He has the Marine Corps to more than 50,000 soldiers to support China’s increased, largely defensive naval capacity and has invested heavily in drone and unmanned-submarine development. As the Ukraine–Russian conflict is , drones are now a critical factor in battle, and China already has the capacity for the deployment of unmatched massed drone swarms.

It is significant that General Zhang was the last serving senior military commander with actual battlefield experience, which he gained in the 1979 war. His removal seems to undermine Western that Xi plans to invade Taiwan next year. After a succession of , the Central Military Commission, chaired by Xi, has only two of the mandated seven members left. As much as he will need to establish a political succession plan should he take a fourth term, Xi now needs to appoint the next generation of military leaders to fill the vacancies his purges have created.

Rethinking Western strategies: a diplomatic approach to China’s military evolution

The West’s sense of exceptionalism and attendant lack of humility means that its policymakers and commentators alike often fail to appreciate the experimental nature of China’s political and industrial evolution and the scale of development across all parts of Chinese society. The Chinese military is no exception. The US and its allies will need to do better than invest in the poor science fiction that is , or rely on the chimera that is to counterbalance China. They would benefit from reconsidering their conventional approach of holding annual war games in Chinese sovereign waters, which amount to sound and fury, signifying little and increasingly damaging diplomatic trust and trade relations.

There is little any power can do to stop China from continuing to develop a military commensurate with its demographic, geographic and economic scale. But the US and its allies’ actions can and will impact China’s perceptions of strategic and military threat. Unlike the US, China can point to its track record of avoiding military deployment outside its borders (with the exception of peace-keeping missions) for nearly 50 years, and it is unlikely to discard this record casually.

[ first published this piece as a business report.]

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A party enforcer at the helm

Apart from other high-profile roles serving the CCP in multilateral institutions, Zou as Deputy Secretary-General of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (), one of the CCP’s core instruments for enforcing ideological discipline and manufacturing consent. Despite its benign-sounding name, the CPPCC is not a debating society or a pluralistic forum. It exists to align elites, interest groups and public opinion with party doctrine, ensuring that major policy decisions are not merely implemented but legitimized. Its role is coordination and control, not consultation in any Western sense. In short, she is an enforcer, just like her predecessor for a decade, Jin Liqun.

That pedigree matters because leadership in a multilateral development bank is not just about capital allocation or project appraisal; it is about institutional direction, norms and credibility. A president steeped in party discipline is not likely to treat the AIIB as an independent lender guided by developmental additionality, transparency and borrower need. She will undoubtedly use it as a strategic instrument — just as her predecessor did — one more lever in Beijing’s expanding toolkit of economic and political statecraft.

Deepening alignment with China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Under Zou, the AIIB can be expected to continue, and likely deepen, its alignment, since its inception, with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (). The creation of both was hatched by the CCP at exactly the same time in 2013. Despite repeated assurances from management that the AIIB is distinct from BRI, the practical overlap has long been evident: shared corridors, synergistic priorities and cofinanced projects that advance China’s geopolitical reach while diffusing financial and reputational risk. The AIIB offers Beijing something the BRI alone cannot: a multilateral veneer that softens political resistance and draws in the capital and legitimacy of advanced democracies. That is why countries like the US and Japan chose not to join.

In this sense, Zou is the perfect candidate. Like Jin, she combines international polish with unwavering loyalty to the party line. The continuity is not accidental. The CCP does not leave strategically important institutions to chance, especially those that intersect with global finance, infrastructure and influence. Leadership succession at the AIIB has followed the logic of absolute loyalty to the Party.

The complicity of non-Chinese shareholders

What is equally troubling is the acquiescence of AIIB’s non-Chinese shareholders. Countries such as Australia, the UK and India , their taxpayers underwriting projects that often advance China’s strategic objectives more than their own national interests. This persistence reflects a combination of foreign influence, elite capture and bureaucratic inertia: once inside the tent, exit becomes politically awkward, diplomatically uncomfortable and institutionally resisted. 

Canada is even considering rejoining the AIIB after concerns were first raised by the Bank’s former head of Communications, Bob Pickard (a Canadian), in 2023 about a subterranean management cabal run by the CCP within the Bank, resulting in a “toxic culture.” Canada took the allegations very seriously and with the Bank then, but this week, Prime Minister Mark Carney was essentially kissing the ring while visiting Beijing.

The justification offered is familiar. Staying in allows these countries to “shape from within,” to promote high standards and to prevent the Bank from becoming a purely Chinese instrument. Yet years of experience suggest that this influence is marginal at best. Governance remains heavily weighted toward Beijing. Strategic direction tracks Chinese priorities. And leadership selection — arguably the clearest signal of institutional “independence” — has remained firmly under Chinese control.

Meanwhile, participation carries real costs. Membership lends credibility to projects that may undermine debt sustainability, distort regional power balances or crowd out genuinely independent development finance. It normalizes a model in which multilateral institutions are repurposed to serve the geopolitical goals of their dominant shareholder, eroding the very norms that postwar development banks were designed to uphold. The AIIB is not the only guilty party among the multilaterals, of course, many of which are similarly highly politicized and experience oversized influence from their leadership overlords. What distinguishes them is that the CCP is not a benevolent force in the world — it is malignant.

Zou’s appointment should therefore be read not as a routine personnel decision, but as a strategic inflection point. It confirms that the AIIB is entering a phase of tighter political alignment with Beijing at a time when China’s external posture is becoming more assertive, not less. For democracies that continue to participate, the question is no longer whether the Bank might drift toward serving Chinese interests. That drift occurred from its inception. The question is whether their continued involvement makes them complicit — and it does.

Multilateral legitimacy captured

Multilateralism only works when institutions are more than instruments of the powerful. When leadership is drawn directly from a ruling party’s ideological enforcement apparatus, claims of neutrality ring hollow. The AIIB under Zou Jiayi is unlikely to surprise anyone who has been paying attention. It will be efficient, disciplined and outwardly cooperative — while quietly reinforcing the expansionary objectives of the state that controls it.

At some point, member countries will have to decide whether symbolic influence is worth substantive compromise. If the answer remains yes, Beijing will have learned an important lesson: multilateral legitimacy, once captured, is remarkably easy to keep.

[ edited this piece.]

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However, determining who the world’s number one autocrat is is not an easy task. Is it the one who is most ruthless? Or the one that has accumulated more personal power? How about the one whose country wields more international might? Undoubtedly, harshness and a domineering nature are necessary requirements to qualify for the group. However, the defining element must come from the degree of global power held by the nation they lead. Nicaraguan President — even if utterly callous and — could never aspire to be at the top of the list.

Xi Jinping’s autocracy

If that is the case, the prize undoubtedly goes to Chinese President Xi Jinping. To understand how the world’s leading autocracy operates, it is essential to analyze Xi’s comprehensive control over the country, considering both the negative and positive aspects that may arise from it.

The 20th Party Congress, held in October 2022, marked a significant milestone for Xi in establishing this comprehensive control. During this event, Xi was formally as President, thus ending the ten-year-term limit for the nation’s top leader. Although this limit had already been in 2018 via a constitutional amendment imposed by Xi, his formal reelection entailed crossing the Rubicon (i.e., the point of no return). Unsurprisingly, China’s expert adjunct professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Willy Lam, that “Xi Jinping has become a sort of emperor for life”.

To reach that point, Xi first had to the system of collective leadership that had governed the country for decades. Former leader of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), , the system after the death of (the founder of the PRC), with the intention of preventing the excessive concentration of power in a single figure. 

Although Deng asserted himself as the “” and retained some fundamental decision-making authority, he increasingly encouraged the Politburo to rule collectively during the 1980s. This indeed became the nature of the Chinese ruling system under his successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who were just first among equals.

Decision-making under such conditions required compromise and consensus among the nine members that made up the Politburo Standing Committee. Not long after being elected, Xi managed to the Committee to seven members, subduing the other six into accepting his voice as the only one that counted. Even the management of the economy, normally entrusted to the Prime Minister, passed into his hands. Surpassing even Deng’s power, the degree of political control attained by Xi became comparable only to that of Mao Zedong.

A three-step process was responsible for this change. First, his sweeping — through which he removed his rivals — was able to intimidate the other members of the Committee. Second, he created and personally the so-called “Leading Small Groups”, through which he bypassed the Standing Committee. Third, by 2016, he had the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) formally him as “core” leader.

By 2017, the 19th Party Congress had his name and (“Xi Jinping Thought ”) within the Party Constitution, a privilege previously reserved only for Mao. The following year, term limits for the presidency were abolished, clearing the way for Xi to rule indefinitely. Finally, his reelection in 2022. On that occasion, Xi the Standing Committee and the Politburo entirely with loyalists.

Overcoming systemic risks

The key question to be asked is how Xi’s autocracy has impacted the effectiveness of the CCP regime. The truth is that, from the start of his rule, the regime suffered from multiple systemic risks — a collective mandate equated to weak leadership. Weak leadership, in turn, resulted in overly powerful . These were represented by the Tuanpai or Youth League faction, the technocrats graduated from Tsinghua University, the so-called Shanghai gang and the princelings or heirs to former party leaders.

Overly powerful factions meant a constant struggle between vested interests vying for dominance. More significantly, weak political leadership led to two additional problems. The first: an armed force (the People’s Liberation Army []) that was utterly detached from civilian control. That is, a virtually autonomous armed force. The second: a regime that lacked the strength to stand firm against an increasingly vociferous nationalism of public opinion.

The first of such problems was severe enough. Indeed, when Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, there was concern that the civilian leadership was no longer in a position to the military. Meanwhile, the party was by corruption and internal power struggles that threatened to lead to fragmentation. The fear that the country’s control of the Chinese Communist Party has entered a countdown was palpable. Not surprisingly, the last chapter of Singapore’s well-known journalist Peh Shing Huei’s 2014 on China was titled “Will the Party End?”.

Xi used his anti-corruption campaign not only to address this particular and pressing issue, but also as a means to eliminate his rivals and consolidate his power over the factions. Beyond the civilian establishment, the campaign also served as a proper tool to subdue the military’s independence.

The sheer scale of his anti-corruption crusade defied imagination, with of civilian party members and military officers being investigated and sanctioned. Not even members of the party’s powerful Politburo or the cabinet were spared from this onslaught. At the same time, more than two dozen were sanctioned.

Furthermore, Xi’s militant and assertive nationalism has served to create a connection with a public opinion that exhibits strong nationalist tendencies and desires for its country to be respected globally. Indeed, according to the Chinese Citizens’ Global Perception Survey 2025, of those surveyed believed that China was the most influential global power. Xi’s position has thus helped to restore the party’s legitimacy in the eyes of its population.

Autocracy’s inherent risks

It would seem, thus, that Xi’s autocracy brought overly powerful and fractious factions and the increasingly independent military under control, while restoring the party’s damaged legitimacy. However, things are not so simple. The collective leadership system entailed a simultaneous institutionalized mechanism of governance and succession. Under autocratic leadership, not only do the limits on a single figure’s power disappear, but so do the limits on the length of his term.

Autocracy has its own inherent risks. For every Deng Xiaoping or (former Prime Minister of Singapore) — extremely efficient autocrats who brought about immense advances in their societies — there are dozens of autocrats who have led theirs to decline or collapse. That becomes the obvious when the fear imposed by an all-powerful figure doesn’t allow bad news from flowing into the top, when the errors of judgment of a single person affect the entire system or when getting rid of a bad leader ceases to be an option.

The fact is that Xi has created multiple problems for his country, both on the economic and international fronts. His zero-COVID , initially presented as a success, turned out to be an utter . Inflexibility in changing course translated into a drastic deceleration of the country’s economic growth and the fracturing of its supply chains.

Compounding the long lockdown imposed by this policy, other policies, such as the of the country’s private sector, particularly in the high-tech industry (where the bulk of its productivity resides), and the imposition of on foreign investments, led to a serious economic downturn.

Both private consumption of durable goods and private investment fell dramatically, while a worrying deflationary trend emerged. Xi’s emphasis on security over economics didn’t help much. Adam Posen, President of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, of an “economic long Covid”, represented by a decline in household and business confidence, brought on by rigid and arbitrary government intervention.

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has also become increasingly in relation to its regional geopolitical aspirations, boasting about its capabilities and global goals, and confrontational in its international interactions. Moreover, China began showing a linear rigidity in its actions that contradicted the sagacity that had been the country’s trademark during much of the preceding decades. All of it invited a massive reaction.

The hedgehog or the fox?

The country (at least before Trump 2.0 turned America’s alliances upside down) was by a gigantic geostrategic containment block, integrated by nations, mechanisms and organizations of four continents. As a result of Xi’s actions, the costs associated with the attainment of China’s regional and global objectives skyrocketed.

All of this relates to British philosopher Isaiah Berlin’s famous between the hedgehog and the fox. As he explained, while the spiky creature subordinates everything to a single central vision, the soft-hairy fox pays more attention to the swamps, deserts and chasms that might appear along the way.

By rigidly and obsessively following the dream of national rejuvenation — when the country would attain global leadership — Xi’s China is clearly following the hedgehog path. The inflexibility shown in this regard has not only substantially increased the costs of achieving its aims, but also goes against the subtle cleverness normally associated with that ancient civilization. One, where the attributes of the fox, and not those of the hedgehog, have been traditionally praised.

But not only is China unavoidably stuck with this rigid autocracy, with no change in sight, but the risks regarding Xi’s succession are unmistakably high. Should this overweight and overworked septuagenarian die, the country would be in great danger.

The complexities of political succession under Xi Jinping

Indeed, throughout its history, the PRC has experienced several traumatic episodes of political succession. From the mysterious death of (Mao’s first designated heir) to the of the so-called “Gang of Four” who attempted to seize power upon his death, to the political of Mao’s last appointed successor, Hua Guofeng and the ostracism of Deng’s first designated successor, , this has always been a complex chapter under the CCP regime. By abandoning the institutional and predictable rules of succession inherent in a renewable and collective leadership, the risk of leaping into the void has increased significantly.

From the Chinese communist regime’s perspective, Xi Jinping’s autocracy represents a mixed bag. On the one hand, it has clearly unified the party, restored its control over the PLA and increased its legitimacy in the eyes of the people. On the other hand, however, it has set in motion the spiral of risks normally associated with regimes where a single figure monopolizes power.

Xi’s political rigidity and the lack of alternatives to his leadership have multiplied the country’s problems both domestically and externally. Furthermore, the dangers involved in his succession have skyrocketed. Ultimately, while Xi Jinping’s autocratic approach has brought certain efficiencies and a semblance of stability, it has also deepened vulnerabilities that may pose significant challenges to China’s future governance and global standing.

[ edited this piece.]

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Authorities quickly the final toll: 126 dead, 337 injured and more than 3,600 homes in ruins. However, amid the devastation, a different reality emerged, one that exposed the harsh controls imposed on Tibet, where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strictly manages information, even in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

Controlling the narrative

Two days after the earthquake, Global Times, a Chinese tabloid known for promoting CCP propaganda, published an extensive on the aid response. This account never referred to the Himalayan nation as “Tibet” but instead used “Xizang,” a name the CCP in 2023. see this change as a deliberate attempt to erase the country from the map. 

According to Global Times, rescue teams reached the epicenter within 30 minutes. The report claimed that, within days, affected residents had warm shelter and received three hot meals a day. It goes on to paint the picture of a unified response, where countless aid workers and volunteers provided relief without ethnic divisions. It declared, “While a natural disaster has torn a wound into the snowy plateau, the entire nation is working tirelessly to heal it,” calling the effort “the best interpretation of human rights.”

However, what this portrayal failed to mention was Tibet’s extreme restrictions. The Chinese government bans international media from entering the region, and Freedom House, a US-based advocacy group, Tibet alongside North Korea as one of the most repressive places in the world. In Tibet, sharing politically sensitive information online or communicating with someone abroad without permission can result in lengthy prison sentences. In the days following the earthquake, Tibetans posting on Douyin (the Chinese version of TikTok) reported strict censorship. One user refused to discuss the disaster, citing a Tibetan proverb: “If one does not control the long tongue, one’s round head will be in trouble.”

With the Chinese government controlling all official information, Global Times and similar outlets had total dominance of the narrative. Yet, in the weeks since the earthquake, Tibetan rights organizations and refugees contradicting the official reports. These sources revealed that the CCP carefully managed details of aid distribution and even the reported death toll.

Despite Global Times’ claims of “ethnic unity,” Chinese authorities restricted Tibetans’ movements within 24 hours of the quake. The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), a US-based advocacy group, new security checkpoints that limited access to the disaster zone, preventing Tibetans from delivering aid. 

One day after the quake, officials in Dingri, where the epicenter lay, posted a suspending relief donated by Tibetans. ICT suggested that authorities wanted to maintain control over the official narrative. The notice stated: “At present, Dingri County has sufficient reserves of various disaster relief supplies. After having discussions, it has been decided to stop accepting donations of disaster relief supplies from all walks of life from now on.” The Tibetan government-in-exile, based in India, with an open letter urging the CCP to allow more aid to be distributed, especially medical assistance. 

On dangerous ground

The Tibetan leadership also raised concerns about China’s regional development policies. The letter directly challenged Global Times’ claim that China had modernized Tibet, instead blaming “excessive” dam construction and mining for increased seismic activity. In , a devastating earthquake in Tibet killed nearly 70,000 people. Experts later suggested that a massive Chinese-built dam may have triggered the disaster, making it the deadliest earthquake linked to human activity.

China’s hydropower projects have drawn for their environmental and geopolitcal consequences. These dams disrupt major rivers flowing into India, Bangladesh and other parts of Southeast Asia. Concerns about their safety have for years. In the days following the quake, Chinese officials initially that none of their dams sustained damage. However, they later that five of the 14 dams in the affected area had developed structural problems. One of them had suffered such severe damage that its walls tilted, forcing the evacuation of 1,500 people living downstream.

The CCP’s lack of transparency has also cast doubt on the official death toll. Authorities reported 126 deaths within 48 hours of the quake and never revised. The tremors were strong enough to be felt more than 200 miles away, yet ICT research showed that officials based their count on just 27 villages within a 12-mile radius of the epicenter. Radio Free Asia, a US-government-funded news outlet, the death toll two days after its release. Reports from local Tibetans suggested that at least 100 had died in a single township. On January 11th, Radio Free Asia’s Tibetan Service  morgue staff who estimated the actual death toll exceeded 400. Given Tibet’s severe repression and isolation, the true number of casualties may never be known.

The next recovery phase will focus on reconstruction, but many Tibetans fear that Beijing will seize control of the process without consulting local communities. ICT a government whistleblower who revealed that after a 2010 earthquake killed 3,000 people, officials diverted emergency funds for personal gain, depriving many survivors of housing assistance. “China had painted a picture of remarkable recovery,” ICT stated. “However, reality is far from what the Chinese government claims.” If history repeats itself, the victims of this disaster may find themselves abandoned, while officials exploit the tragedy to strengthen their grip over Tibet. 

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Among the things Trump got right during his first residency in the White House was slapping Congress and the American public upside the head with a two-by-four to finally wake them up and realize that the Communist Party of China (CCP) is not a benign force in the world. This time around, Trump has the advantage of a Congress and an American public nearly unified in their opposition to the CCP, which should make it easier to ramp up the pressure on Beijing, particularly given the Republicans’ clean sweep of the Executive and Legislative branches.

Trump’s “subtlety of a Mack truck”-driven approach to foreign policy stands a good chance of backfiring vis-à-vis American businesses, however, as many of them continue to feed from the Chinese teat. Tens of thousands of American businesses continue to manufacture, import from and/or export to China despite the many hardships associated with COVID-19, the downturn in the Chinese economy and the crackdown on foreign businesses in recent years. Their voices will undoubtedly be heard at the White House as Trump attempts to tighten the noose on Beijing.

Trump’s cabinet and other nominations to date provide ample evidence that he is intent on burning the place down — so why stop at America’s borders? The foreign policy patch-up job Biden attempted to complete over the last four years — during which, many European governments, in particular, silently wondered whether an agreement with Washington was worth the paper it is printed upon — will be quickly eviscerated. An unvarnished foreign policy whose core is nationalism, protectionism and a zero-sum approach to engagement is sure to delight friend and foe alike.

Is China ready for four more years of Trump?

Beijing is certainly ready, with a list of countermeasures aimed at the American government and American businesses. US businesses in China are going to find operating there even more unpleasant for the next four years. The CCP may also be expected to attempt to strengthen its bilateral relationships around the world as America retreats and will undoubtedly find heightened levels of interest, especially in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The newly inaugurated mega-port in Peru is emblematic of how Beijing continues to use its Belt-and-Road infrastructure projects to strengthen its economic and diplomatic relationships. Trump’s re-election meshes nicely, also, with Beijing’s policy of self-reliance and the Made in China 2025 policy.

But the degree of economic, political and diplomatic malaise in China will also be impacted by Trump’s second term. The Chinese economy could be significantly smaller than official statistics suggest. It is spending more and more to produce less and less. Most of its natural resources are in decline, its workforce is shrinking, Xi’s dictatorial rule has prompted increasing domestic uneasiness, its economy is under growing pressure, and its Asian neighbors are ever ore alarmed by China’s aggressive actions in the region — and they are reacting to it. 

China is exhibiting classic signs of a peaking power. Xi’s crackdowns at home and increasing aggression abroad. The military buildup during peacetime is unprecedented. And China is much more willing to extend its security perimeter and to strengthen its alliances with some of the world’s most detestable regimes.

The Chinese word for crisis (��ŧ����ī) contains characters that signify danger (危) and opportunity (机), and Trump 2.0 represents both. Xi will want to use the next four years to de-emphasize China’s many domestic challenges and re-emphasize its growing stature in the world. If one envisions a cessation of the Ukraine and Israel/Gaza/Lebanon/Iran wars in 2025, Xi will feel he has more latitude to further strengthen China’s relationships with Russia, Iran, and Israel. Similarly, he is likely to feel more emboldened to introduce new initiatives to ingratiate China with a broader array of governments in areas where progress has been less pronounced, such as regarding climate change and natural disaster relief.

It seems doubtful that Trump will choose to embrace areas of possible collaboration with China, but we can expect a heightened degree of generalized competition, with an increased potential for conflict. Trump’s presidency will coincide with 2027 — the year Xi has targeted for the Chinese military to be ready to invade Taiwan. Trump will likely be tempted to cut some sort of deal with Xi (as he is so transaction-oriented) to essentially cede Taiwan to Beijing in return for something of substance for America. One can only speculate what that might be, but what seemed impossible only a few years ago seems increasingly possible, if not likely, now.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In response to international criticism, China has come closer to admitting that it has brutally cracked down on the strategic northwestern province of Xinjiang, in what Beijing claims is a bid to prevent the kind of mayhem that has wracked countries like Syria and Libya. The Chinese Communist Party’s Global Times the reports were aimed at stirring trouble and destroying hard-earned stability in Xinjiang. The province is China’s gateway to Central Asia and home to its Turkic Uighur and ethnic minority Muslim communities.

The crackdown, involving the world’s most intrusive surveillance state and the indefinite internment of large numbers of Muslims in re-education camps, is designed to quell potential Uighur nationalist and religious sentiment. It is also aimed at preventing blowback from militants moving to Central Asia’s borders with China after the Islamic State and other jihadist groups lost most of their territorial bases in Iraq and Syria.

Concern that national and religious sentiment and/or militancy could challenge China’s grip on Xinjiang —  to 15% of its proven oil reserves, 22% of its gas reserves and 115 of the 147 raw materials found in the People’s Republic, as well as part of its nuclear arsenal — has prompted Beijing to consider a more interventionist policy in the Middle East and Central and South Asia. This contradicts its principle of non-interference in the affairs of others.

The Global Times asserted that the security situation in Xinjiang had been “turned around and terror threats spreading from there to other provinces of China are also being eliminated.” The paper added: “Peaceful and stable life has been witnessed again in all of Xinjiang … [the region] has been salvaged from the verge of massive turmoil. It has avoided the fate of becoming ‘China’s Syria’ or ‘China’s Libya.’”

Five Chinese mining engineers were on August 11 in a suicide attack in the troubled Pakistan province of Balochistan, a key node in the $50 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is intended to link the strategic port of Gwadar with Xinjiang and fuel economic development in the Chinese region. The attack was claimed by the Balochistan Liberation Army, rather than Uighurs.

The Global Times admitted that Chinese efforts to ensure security had “come at a price that is being shouldered by people of all ethnicities in Xinjiang.”

Internment Camps in China

China has not acknowledged the existence of re-education camps, but the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination  on August 10 that it had credible reports that 1 million Uighurs were being held in what resembled a “massive internment camp that is shrouded in secrecy.” The UN assertion of the existence of the camps is corroborated by �����Ի��� based on interviews with former camp inmates and relatives of prisoners, testimony to a ,�����Ի���recent revelations in a  by a former employee in one of the camps.

Writing in The Wall Street Journal, US Republican Senator Marco Rubio, the chair of the congressional committee, for the sanctioning of Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary and Politburo member Chen Quanguo and “all government officials and business entities assisting the mass detentions and surveillance.” He also demanded that Chinese security agencies be added to a “restricted end-user list to ensure that American companies don’t aid Chinese human-rights abuses.”

Stymying the international criticism and demands for action before they gain further momentum is imperative if China wants to ensure that the Muslim world continues to remain silent about what amounts to a Chinese effort — partly through indoctrination in its re-education camps — to encourage the emergence of what it would call an Islam with Chinese characteristics. China is  to adopt a similar approach.

Concern that Uighur militants leaving Syria and Iraq will again target Xinjiang is likely one reason why Chinese officials suggested that, despite their adherence to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of others, China might the Assad regime in taking on militants in the northern Syrian province of Idlib. Syrian forces have , a dumping ground for militants evacuated from other parts of Syria that have been captured by the military and the country’s last major rebel stronghold, in advance of an expected offensive.

Speaking to Syrian pro-government daily Al-Watan, China’s ambassador to Syria, Qi Qianjin, said Beijing was “following the situation in Syria, in particular after the victory in southern [Syria], and its military is willing to participate in some way alongside the Syrian army that is fighting the terrorists in Idlib and in any other part of Syria.” Chinese participation in a campaign in Idlib would be Beijing’s first major engagement in foreign battle in decades.

China has similarly sought to mediate a reduction of tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is in an effort to get both countries to cooperate in the fight against militants and ensure that Uighur jihadists are denied the ability to operate on China’s borders. It has also sought to facilitate peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Chinese officials told a recent gathering in Beijing of the Afghan-Pakistan-China Trilateral Counterterrorism dialogue that militant cross-border mobility represented a major threat that needed to be countered by an integrated regional approach.

Potentially, there’s a significant economic upside to facilitating regional cooperation in South Asia and military intervention in Syria. Post-conflict, both countries offer enormous reconstruction opportunities. Middle East scholar Randa Slim, discussing possible Chinese involvement in the clearing of Idlib, : “You have to think about this in terms of the larger negotiations over Chinese assistance to reconstruction. Syria doesn’t have the money, Russia doesn’t have the money. China has a stake in the fighting.” It also has the money.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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As events unfold quickly in Ukraine, Russia's increasingly close ally China is hedging its bets on an uncertain outcome. China has been quick to condemn US and European involvement in Ukraine's affairs, but has withheld judgment either for or against Russia's military actions in the country.

Meanwhile, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propagandists have made use of the unrest in Ukraine to serve as a warning for Chinese citizens of the dangers of rapid political change.

Cold War Mentality

In official state-run media, the Chinese government has accused the West of maintaining a "" against Russia in the contest for influence in Ukraine, and of "" in Ukraine's affairs by manipulating popular opinion against Russia to favor Western interests.

Before the fall of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych, that the West "frequently interferes in [Ukraine's] internal affairs by instigating the opposition party to challenge the incumbent government," and warned that China must resist Western influence to avoid the "torment" and "turbulence" countries such as Ukraine have experienced.

Since the fall of Yanukovych and the onset of hostilities with Russia, China has assumed a toward Russian moves while continuing to criticize the West and to use the unrest in Ukraine as a . "China is deeply concerned with the current Ukraine situation,"  Spokesman Qin Gang on March 2, urging a "political solution," and adding that "there have been reasons for today's situation in Ukraine" without detailing what those reasons might be.

The CCP, as China-based writer , "views unrest anywhere in the world as a teaching moment for those who might clamor for more rapid reforms in China."

To begin with, China is one of the few countries in the world whose leaders the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR) and the disintegration of the Soviet empire. While Western audiences cheered the fall of the Berlin Wall, Chinese leaders must have wept and quaked with fear at the prospects for their own future hold on power. (In statements that must have deeply endeared him to Chinese leaders, Russian President Vladimir Putin the collapse of the USSR a "genuine tragedy" and "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century.) "With its disintegration," , "the USSR that could once help resolve the contradiction between East and West Ukraine will help no more."

State-run media in China abound with pro-CCP explanations on the crisis in Ukraine and how China can avoid similar problems: CCP theoretical magazine Seeking Truth (Qiushi) as "the root of the problem," because voting allows ethnic differences, religious differences, and differences of opinion among people to get in the way of national unity. As long as China has a one-party dictatorship, says the CCP, Chinese people never need worry about any such differences getting in the way of Chinese national unity.

Qiushi’slist of things for Chinese people to fear and avoid also included "" leading to "social unrest" and "chaos"; and "" incited by the United States based on its "need to dominate the world."

A New Axis of Autocracy

China and Russia have been described as a "," jointly pursuing a common interest in preserving anti-Western authoritarian rule by "" and collaborating in a mutual support network with anti-Western autocrats throughout the world.

For China, this effort includes promoting the "China model" of authoritarian state capitalism over the "Washington consensus" of free markets and liberal democracy, promoting national sovereignty over international law on human rights issues, assisting struggling autocracies in methods of crowd control and legal repression, and exporting internet censorship technology.

For Russia, this effort has mainly focused on backing pro-Russian autocrats like Viktor Yanukovych and cultivating grassroots pro-Russian support in former Soviet satellite states — the latter includes to Russian speakers in former satellite states, so as to have a ready population of Russian citizens to "protect" through military intervention.

If anyone is guilty of harboring a "Cold War mentality," it is not America and the West but China and Russia.

China's autocrats are surely hoping for a Russian victory over pro-Western forces in Ukraine. No one likes to be caught rooting for a loser, however, and China has in Ukraine that will be important for Beijing in any event. For the present, therefore, China's autocrats are , and warning their own citizens against any similar turn of events in China.

*[This article was published in partnership with the .]

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A new leadership has taken charge in China; its decisions are going to determine the fate of the Middle Kingdom and the rest of the world.

Background

The Chinese Communist Party (CPC) has just concluded its once-in-a decade congress. Delegates, no less than 2270 of them, met in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing to nominate the Middle Kingdom’s new leadership.

The official line is that the party’s Central Committee has elected the members of the Politburo and the Standing Committee. The former is a group of 25 people who oversee the party while the latter is China’s most powerful decision making body. The truth about the congress is that there was no election. Outgoing members and party elders selected the new leadership in back room deals many months ago.

Xi Jinping succeeds Hu Jintao as General Secretary of the Communist Party, Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission and President of China in March 2013. Xi is the son of a former top party leader and supposed to be rather conservative.The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) next Prime Minister is Li Keqiang who will assume power in March 2013, too. He is a lawyer and an economist who once did manual labor before beginning his meteoric rise to power.

The new Chinese leadership is divided into two factions. Gone are the days when a Mao or Deng, could impose his will on the nation. Decisions are now made after much negotiation and after arriving at some sort of consensus. One faction, the so called “Princelings”, comprises the children of former party bigwigs such as the head of party discipline, Wang Qishan. The second faction consists of members like Li Keqiang, who worked their way up to the top. Continuing China’s success story will require serious reforms that include the limiting privileges of the ruling elite. The biggest challenge that Xi and Li face is convincing their own party to embrace political reform and give up some of its powers.

Why is the change in leadership relevant?

China is the world’s second largest economy, the biggest exporter, the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves and the biggest recipient of foreign direct investment. Its economy proved resilient in the recent global financial crisis. China is the world’s latest growth engine and has formed the backbone of the global economic upswing.

The world’s most populous nation is now a major military power.  It has the largest army in the world. Furthermore, the country’s  and. Though China is still decades away from rivaling American military pre-eminence, it is now increasingly able to project its might for strategic interests.

At the same time, China faces massive challenges.  Its current economic system is unsustainable. The country is too dependent on investment and exports. It needs a new economic model with more domestic consumption and a larger private sector. The enormous income gap that exists between rural and urban areas has to be tackled. The huge economic differences between the coastal and inland provinces have to be mitigated as well.  Corruption is an ongoing issue and  ranks China 75^th out of the 183 countries it surveyed.  Unjust enrichment by party officials is breeding fury and a failure to deal with corruption might eventually lead to the collapse of the party itself.

The Middle Kingdom also faces the threat of becoming old before it becomes rich. Its society is rapidly aging and the one child policy means that fewer young people will be paying for more retirees. Air pollution has reached alarming levels, especially in urban areas. Water is in short supply. Massive pollution, ongoing desertification and continuing deforestation add to the problem.  reveal that environmental issues are now starting to lead to civil unrest.

Clearly, the new leadership has a full plate. Xi, Li and the other leaders will have to be bold and imaginative in tackling the challenges that lie ahead.

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