In his post-election statements, Tarique Rahman espoused a “” approach, asserting that the country’s foreign policy would henceforth be guided by national interest and the welfare of the people. However, uncertainty clouds the next administration. Will the incoming BNP government’s foreign policy mark a sharp departure from its predecessor, or will structural and regional constraints limit it to pragmatic adjustments?

India–Bangladesh relations at a crossroads

Bangladesh and India maintained a particularly strong bilateral relationship during the tenure of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, which was largely shaped by New Delhi’s objective of maintaining political stability in Dhaka. Given Bangladesh’s strategic geographic location, India has consistently sought to ensure stable access to its northeastern provinces via the Siliguri Corridor through transit agreements with Bangladesh. At the same time, India was concerned about China’s growing presence in the Bay of Bengal, which influenced these ties. However, following the of Sheikh Hasina’s government in a mass uprising in 2024, relations between New Delhi and Dhaka worsened significantly.

The diplomatic fallout was marked by Indian accusations of religious minority repression in Bangladesh, misinformation campaigns and trade restrictions. Most significantly, India’s to extradite Hasina, who fled to the country following her ousting, despite Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal having sentenced her to death for her role in the 2024 protests, exacerbated the diplomatic tensions further.Ěý

Under the interim government led by , anti-Indian narratives gained increased prominence among opposition groups and segments of the broader public in Bangladesh. Moreover, India’s continued for the Awami League in recent elections contributed to rising public dissatisfaction in Bangladesh and heightened perceptions of Indian interference in the country’s internal politics. These developments have complicated bilateral relations and ignited domestic debates over issues of sovereignty and foreign policy autonomy in Bangladesh.Ěý

Nevertheless, India has started to adapt to the new political reality in post-Hasina Bangladesh. In February 2026, Indian Foreign Minister attended the funeral of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, whose son Rahman is poised to assume leadership. In addition, following the BNP’s victory, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi congratulated Rahman and reaffirmed his country’s support for a democratic and inclusive Bangladesh.

Informed observers predict that the BNP will adopt a pragmatic approach toward India, grounded in mutual benefit and strategic necessity. Given India’s status as Bangladesh’s closest neighbor, the new government has significant incentives to restore a productive working relationship with New Delhi, irrespective of whether the relationship reverts to the level of political intimacy seen during the Hasina administration. Therefore, Dhaka must adopt a cautious middle ground in its relationship with India.

For the BNP government, redefining relations with India will require recalibrating the country’s strategic cooperation with New Delhi while maintaining Bangladesh’s political autonomy and decision-making authority. Maintaining such a delicate diplomatic balance amid prevailing anti-India and anti-Bangladesh sentiments among certain groups in both countries will be challenging, especially given that such vitriol is often amplified by rumors, misinformation and political propaganda.

In this context, the BNP government may face domestic pressure to adopt a firmer rhetorical stance toward New Delhi, even though strategic interdependence and regional stability require continued engagement and cooperation with India.

A recalibrated engagement with China? 

Relations with are likely to pose the most consequential strategic challenge for the incoming BNP government. Under former Prime Minister Sheikh, Beijing expanded its influence in Bangladesh through infrastructure projects linked to its Belt and Road Initiative and closer defense cooperation with Dhaka. This trend continued after the political transition, with the interim government reportedly receiving over USD 2.1 billion in Chinese loans and grants, as well as diplomatic recognition, through high-level talks with Beijing.Ěý

In 2026, China is expected to remain Bangladesh’s largest trading partner and a core part of the country’s defense plans. This growing defense relationship is evident in the , under which China agreed to build a drone manufacturing plant in Bangladesh, as well as ongoing talks to acquire . China has successfully institutionalised its close relationship with Bangladesh, thereby narrowing the strategic choices for the next government. The BNP is therefore likely to continue economic engagement with Beijing, as protecting Chinese investments in the country aligns with Bangladesh’s national interests.Ěý

Although historically perceived as aligned with Beijing, the BNP’s diplomatic record reflects a pragmatic foreign policy strategy of alliance diversification. Under ’s administration (1977–1981), Bangladesh strengthened diplomatic and military ties with China to broaden external partnerships beyond India and the Soviet bloc. This hedging approach continued under , when military cooperation and economic engagement with China expanded through several agreements, including infrastructure, trade, and technical assistance.Ěý

However, Dhaka’s hedging strategy toward China will likely come under intense scrutiny from great-power players, pressuring the incoming government to navigate mounting hostility from India and the United States to China’s expanding regional influence. Questions about the sustainability of large-scale infrastructure financing and accusations of Chinese debt entrapment will further shape Dhaka’s approach toward Beijing. Consequently, BNP is likely to strike a balance between strategic prudence and economic collaboration in its engagement with China. It would be wise for the BNP to avoid placing Bangladesh at the center of the intensifying strategic competition between China, the United States and India.

Pakistan’s bid for re-engagement

During the Awami League government, remained relatively distant from Bangladesh, largely due to Dhaka’s long-standing strategic alignment with New Delhi. Furthermore, unresolved historical grievances over Pakistan’s atrocities during the Bangladesh Liberation War continued to shape Dhaka’s diplomatic posture and constrained the prospect of closer bilateral engagements. However, this dynamic changed during Muhammad Yunus’ interim government, when Bangladesh and Pakistan took steps to restore ties. In an effort to rebuild mutual trust, the two countries resumed direct air links, increased civilian and military exchanges, and relaxed visa policies. Moreover, Islamabad explored renewed defence cooperation with Dhaka, including discussions on the potential sale of fighter aircraft.

Beyond official diplomatic channels, Pakistan has pursued soft-power outreach by engaging Bangladeshi cultural figures and media platforms, including the participation of Bangladeshi artists in . Amid persistent anti-India sentiment among segments of Bangladeshi youth, Pakistan appears to be leveraging cultural diplomacy and public engagement to shape public opinion in its favour and encourage closer ties with the new government in Dhaka.

Looking ahead: Bangladesh’s foreign policy choices

For Dhaka, diversifying external partnerships is an ideal strategy to reduce overdependence on any single regional actor. This approach involves balancing relations with both Islamabad and New Delhi and engaging with partners in the Middle East. Bangladesh will also need to maintain a transactional approach toward both India and Pakistan, ensuring that its engagement with both regional players remains transparent, structured and guided by clearly defined national interests rather than ideological alignment. 

For the incoming administration to be successful, the BNP’s “Bangladesh First” policy must prioritize the country’s national interests, diversify external partnerships and address regional challenges, such as the Rohingya crisis. The incoming BNP government, therefore, should avoid entanglement in great-power rivalries between the US, India and China. Instead, the new administration’s diplomacy should be grounded in pragmatism and strategic calculation rather than rhetorical posturing.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Our Japanese sources are worried about the increase in China’s defense budget and military capabilities, as well as Beijing’s growing aggression toward its neighbors. Their worries have been confirmed by China’s furious reaction to Takaichi’s speech. Beijing has demanded that Japan “fully repent for its war crimes” and “stop playing with fire on the Taiwan question.” Note that this over-the-top reaction comes after almost two years of deteriorating relations:

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has launched a global diplomatic against Japan. Beijing is also putting immense pressure on Tokyo to hurt Japanese businesses and taxpayers. The tensions have escalated to limited military actions, which are short of clashes but are increasingly dangerous.

Diplomatically, China is painting Japan as an aggressor. They point to Japan’s brutal colonization of Taiwan and parts of China as evidence of mala fide intentions. The CCP is peddling the narrative that Takaichi is an aggressive nationalist who aims to undermine Chinese sovereignty. They also paint her to be an unqualified, inexperienced and irresponsible leader. This Chinese narrative seeks to weaken Takaichi’s ability to govern Japan and damage her international reputation.

In a now-deleted social , a Chinese diplomat in Osaka commented that “the dirty neck that sticks itself in must be cut off.” This post was seemingly directed at Takaichi, as the post was linked to a news article on the prime minister’s Taiwan remarks. The various arms of the Chinese government have been singing in one chorus condemning Takaichi for launching a new era of aggressive Japanese nationalism. Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s claim that Japan has crossed a red line and that all countries have the responsibility to “prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism” has upped the diplomatic ante.

FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, believes China’s diplomatic outrage to be “a tempest in a Beijing-made teapot.” He points that China has been pushing nearly all its Asian neighbors around, notably in the South and East China Seas. Most recently, the PLA conducted large-scale military exercises against Taiwan at the end of 2025. In a threatening two-day exercise, the PLA simulated a blockade of Taiwan for the second time in the year, increasing anxieties in both Taipei and Tokyo.

Carle holds that this bullying of neighbors, other states and even foreign citizens who do not adhere to the CCP party line makes Japan rightly nervous. He argues that Beijing’s constant refrains to historic wrongs and use of the “Japanese militarism” card is self-serving, hypocritical and dishonest. The CCP uses this narrative cynically, often to divert attention from a domestic problem or to put pressure on Japan. Carle believes that Beijing damning Tokyo is akin to “blaming the person being bullied for going to the gym to get in shape so that he can stand up better to bullying in the future.”

Undeterred by such concerns, Beijing is tooting its diplomatic horn as loudly as it can. In a large-scale coordinated campaign, China has sent two letters to the UN criticizing Japan, accusing it of threatening “an armed intervention” over Taiwan and conducting “a grave violation of international law.” Beijing has also leaned on Russia and North Korea to publicly denounce Japan. China is also signaling South Korea’s claim to the Takeshima/Dokdo islets, which is disputed by Japan. 

Analysts suggest that Beijing has also managed to come to some form of a backroom deal with Washington, which has led to the absence of high-level backing for Takaichi. Notably, the Japanese feel some angst over the lack of a forceful statement from the White House. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s delicate balancing act — he has that the US will find ways to work with China without undermining Washington’s security commitments to Japan — has not reassured Tokyo.

Tensions between the two nations are at a high point. China is not only turning the diplomatic ratchet but is also using economic leverage and military maneuvers to pressure Japan to backtrack. 

Tensions go beyond diplomacy

Beijing has issued an advisory to its citizens against traveling to Japan. This has reduced the number of Chinese tourists to Japan. Sales of goods and services have suffered. Over the last few years, Chinese shoppers have provided a big boost to the Japanese economy. Now, department stores and the retail industry are hurting. Hotels have suffered from cancellations. From January to November, tourists from Mainland China and Hong Kong accounted for of all tourists to Japan. The number of Chinese tourists during this period grew by 37.5% since last year.

Recently, Japan has emerged as a key destination for Chinese students. Not only do they come to study at universities in Tokyo and Osaka, but they also flock to private boarding schools. Rugby School Japan (RSJ) and Harrow International School Appi are two examples of posh destinations for rich Chinese students. The CCP has asked Chinese students to reconsider studying in Japan, hurting a growing sector of the Japanese economy.

China has also reinstated a de facto import on Japanese seafood. After the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Beijing imposed this ban on August 24, 2023, and only lifted it in of this year. Although Japanese exports a record in 2024, the lack of Chinese demand has slowed their growth. China is a valuable export market for Japan, and Beijing’s ban hurts Japanese exporters.

China has also Japanese film releases and canceled cultural events. Demon Slayer: Kimetsu no Yaiba — Infinity Castle, a Japanese anime, was China’s top-grossing foreign film of the year. China is the second-largest cinema market in the world, and Japanese anime has enjoyed a breakout year in this market in 2025. Now, six Japanese anime productions, which would have been otherwise released, find themselves in cold storage. Japanese cultural performances such as and anime events have been gaining in popularity in China. They are also on hold.

Notably, China has not yet restricted rare earth exports to Japan this year as it did with the US in 2025. Most other Chinese products are still coming to Japanese markets as well. In earlier crises, Beijing called for boycotts of Japanese products. This time, it has . In private, Chinese officials have been assuaging concerns of Japanese executives running their operations in China. 

Yet Japanese investor confidence has been falling in recent years. According to Japan’s Ministry of Finance, the country’s net foreign direct investment into mainland China fell by in the first three quarters of 2023, reaching the lowest amount since the data series began. That year, in a poll by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in China, only 10% of the 8,300 firms surveyed said they planned to increase investments. Our business sources in Tokyo confirm this trend. China-Japan trade relations have suffered because of the latest crisis, but tensions have been increasing in recent years.

Both nations ramped up military actions, but there are limits

Military maneuvers have caused greater concern. On December 11, two American B-52 bombers with Japanese fighters over the Sea of Japan. That very day, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Japanese Defense Minister ShinjirĹŤ Koizumi their commitment to deterring aggression in the Asia-Pacific in a call and reaffirmed the US-Japan Alliance. 

This followed an alarming incident on the first weekend of December when Chinese J-15 fighter jets twice targets on Japanese F-15 fighters. The Japanese jets were monitoring the People’s Liberation Army Navy aircraft carrier CNS Liaoning in international waters near Japan’s Okinawa Islands. 

In addition, two Russian Tu-95 nuclear-capable strategic bombers from the Sea of Japan toward the East China Sea to rendezvous with two Chinese H-6 bombers. The Russian and Chinese bombers performed a “long-distance joint flight” in the Pacific. Four Chinese J-16 fighter jets joined them “as they made a flight between Japan’s Okinawa and Miyako islands.” The Miyako Strait between the two islands is classified as international waters, but a joint Russian-Chinese operation here is seen by Tokyo as highly provocative. Japan also simultaneous Russian air force activity in the Sea of Japan, consisting of one early-warning aircraft A-50 and two Su-30 fighters. Clearly, Beijing has decided to increase pressure on Tokyo and has the support of Moscow to do so.

Our sources in China, not only in the government but also in the private sector, suspect Japan plans to remilitarize. They fear Japanese military support for Taiwan and Tokyo strengthening claims on disputed islands. They also fear the Japanese military fortifying positions in islands currently under its control, such as the Senkaku Islands and the Yonaguni Island. Yonaguni marks the tail end of an archipelago stretching north to Japan’s main islands. Since Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi Taipei in 2022, China has increased the pressure on Taiwan and strenuously to Japanese plans for Yonaguni.

The Japan Times us that “up and down the 160-strong Ryukyu island chain, Japan is putting in place missile batteries, radar towers, ammunition storage sites and other combat facilities.” Tokyo is also deploying major military assets on Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan’s four main islands. These include F-35 fighter jets and long-range missiles. Tokyo is also increasing the presence of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, Japan’s version of the US Marine Corps.

Chinese suspicions about Japan’s intentions are also fed by Tokyo’s rapid increase in defense spending. In 1976, Prime Minister Miki Takeo capped Japan’s defense spending at 1% of GNP. In 1987, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro abolished this official limit but Japan did not cross the 1% mark for decades. In December 2022, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio announced Japan would increase its defense budget from 1% to 2% by the 2027 fiscal year. To Chinese eyes, Japan is abandoning its postwar pacifism and embracing militarism again. However, it is important to remember that the increase in the Japanese budget has occurred over a period when the yen has depreciated substantially against the dollar. While the Japanese have been able to increase purchases of domestic weapons, higher budgets have not translated into proportionately more US arms: 

Yet despite higher defence spending, demography and politics mean Japan faces barriers to military development. In common with Germany, Japan is a major country looking to build a realistic military capability to face a larger potential adversary. Both have shrinking native populations and more attractive civilian opportunities for potential recruits. The Japan Self-Defense Forces regularly fall short of recruitment goals, often by 50%. Technology cannot, at present, fully compensate for major shortfalls in personnel.

Politically, Japanese leaders are becoming increasingly concerned about their reliance upon the US for defence needs. Our military sources in Tokyo share that a growing segment of these leaders expect Japan to become more capable of and more willing to engage in military actions without US support.

Even if recruitment shortfalls are overcome, and disquiet over US reliability wanes, military strength now requires advanced capabilities that remain in short supply in Japan. Just as in Germany, there are not enough skilled personnel in AI and machine learning, cybersecurity, data analytics and cloud computing. Indeed, Japan faces a general shortage of IT skills: In 2021, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) reported a deficit of 220,000 IT personnel in 2018, rising to 790,000 by 2030. Japan simply does not have enough people, including those with much-needed skillsets, to prosecute a major war.

In a nutshell, China’s real and imagined fears about Japanese remilitarization are grossly exaggerated. Note that Beijing’s own defense spending has 13-fold in 30 years. The Center for Strategic and International Studies points out that China’s official defense spending was nearly $247 billion in 2025, but other estimates are much higher. One study places this figure to be $471 billion. More importantly, China has manufacturing muscle. Its navy, air force and missiles have expanded dramatically. China has dual-use satellites and technologies, and can churn out drones by the millions as well. Some analysts even argue that China is a more powerful version of pre-World War II Japan. Unsurprisingly, as Carle points out, Tokyo is hitting the military gym.

The dark shadow of history

Even though China has emerged as a global superpower, it still carries burning resentments. Our Chinese sources constantly point out that Taiwan was Japan’s first colony and Tokyo ruled the island for years until the end of World War II. Imperial Japan beat Qing China in the Sino-Japanese War, which ended with the 1895 of Shimonoseki. This inaugurated the era of , the Southern Expansion Strategy, which held that Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands were Japan’s sphere of influence. Similar to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine that regarded Latin America as lying in the US sphere of influence, Nanshin-ron led to the creation and then expansion of the Japanese empire in Asia. 

Imperial Japan tried to turn Taiwan into a showpiece “model colony,” establishing order, eradicating disease, building infrastructure and creating a modern economy. Thanks to these , “Taiwan soon became the most-advanced place in East Asia outside Japan itself.” On the flip side, the Japanese ruthlessly crushed local rebellions and forced the Taiwanese to learn Japanese as well as absorb Japanese culture. Nevertheless, many of our Taiwanese sources say that Taiwan’s experience of Japanese rule was much better than the experience of their Chinese relatives in the 1950s and 1960s under the CCP.

In Mainland China, many still bitter memories of the period of Japanese imperial expansion after Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria. On December 13, the CCP an annual national memorial ceremony — this began in 2014 after Chinese President Xi Jinping came to power and inaugurated a period of more aggressive nationalism —  for the victims of the Nanjing Massacre. In 1937, 88 years ago, Japanese troops infamously tortured, looted, raped and 100,000 to 200,000 Chinese civilians, which the country remembers to this day.

China is also emotional about another seemingly trivial and largely symbolic issue. Our Chinese sources are unhappy with Japanese leaders visiting Yasukuni Shrine. This shrine honors about 2.46 million people who died in wars from the late Edo period (1800s to 1868) to World War II. Of these, 14 were held to be “Class A war criminals” by victorious allies. They were enshrined in 1978, kicking off a diplomatic and political controversy that rages to this day. Takaichi is a nationalist who has regularly paid respects at Yasukuni in the past. Koizumi, her defense minister, , “It’s true I have paid respect there every year on the anniversary of the end of the war.” As you can expect, this has kicked off a furor in Chinese nationalist circles.

Our Japanese sources are tired of China’s constant harping on the past. They politely point out that the CCP conveniently forgets the tens of millions who died in Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward and the complete chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Since World War II, Japan has abided by its US-imposed pacifist , invested hugely in China and funded schemes around the world, especially in the Global South. Note that Japan is still the financial contributor to the UN.

Besides, the Japanese think that the CCP is using history as a weapon to cut the nationalist Takaichi down to size at the very start of her prime ministership. An examination of Japan’s recent history vindicates their argument. Shinzo Abe, Takaichi’s political godfather and Japan’s longest-serving prime minister, Beijing that attacking Taiwan would be “economic suicide.” In a virtual keynote on December 1, 2021, Abe said, “A Taiwan contingency is a Japanese contingency, and therefore a contingency for the Japan-U.S. alliance.” 

When he made the speech, Abe was no longer prime minister, but he was still the leading light of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). He was echoing the 1972 US-China Joint , also known as the Shanghai °ä´ÇłľłľłÜ˛Ôľ±±çłÜĂ©, which adopted a “One China” policy and called for “a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question.” In the communiquĂ©, both the US and China agreed that “international disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force.” That is precisely what Abe and Takaichi want in relation to Taiwan.

Note that other Japanese politicians have also taken a similar view to Abe’s. In 2021, Nobuo Kishi, the then defense minister, claimed, “The peace and stability of Taiwan are directly connected to Japan.” The same year, his LDP colleague Tarō Asō, the then deputy prime minister, said, “If a major problem took place in Taiwan, it would not be too much to say that it could relate to a survival-threatening situation” for Japan. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Kishida, prime minister from October 2021 to October 2024, repeatedly asserted that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” which was clearly alluding to a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Takaichi is not as out of line with her Japanese predecessors as the CCP and Chinese nationalist outrage would suggest.

Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks are viewed differently by both sides

Takaichi’s comments on Taiwan were not part of a speech or statement. She was merely responding to a question in parliament from Katsuya Okada of the Constitutional Democratic Party. The prime minister did not say that Japan would use military force to defend Taiwan or commit to any specific action in aid of Taipei in the case of a Chinese invasion. After mentioning the possibility of a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan in the case of a Taiwan contingency, Takaichi said that the Japanese government would make its judgment by synthesizing all information based on the specific circumstances of the actual situation.

Japanese diplomats painfully point out that their prime minister’s language reflects Tokyo’s consistent position on the issue. Saya Kiba, one of our Japanese authors, explains “how Japan’s strategic ambiguity, security law and US alliance constrain direct defense of Taiwan.” She points out that, while Takaichi’s explanation did not formally violate Japan’s existing Taiwan policy, it went further than previous prime ministers had dared to go in the past.

Beijing takes a different view and sees  Takaichi as a potential threat. The first female prime minister of Japan is the daughter of a policeman and is perceived as a security hawk. Takaichi has positioned herself as Abe’s heir and Beijing has no love lost for the late leader who “from Japan’s pacifist policies to confront China’s nationalistic designs.” Abe visited Yasukuni and fathered the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in 2007 to keep the Indo-Pacific “free and open”. The CCP has not forgotten or forgiven these actions.

China Daily, an English-language newspaper owned by the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP, has that Takaichi is hyping up the “China threat” to consolidate her right-wing political base and accelerate military expansion. In 2024, the China Institute for International Studies (CIIS) objected to the 2022 Japanese National Security Strategy that its communist neighbor to be “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge” to Japan. Per CIIS, Japan these words only to rationalize and legitimize its remilitarization.

In addition, US President Donald Trump’s October visit to Japan has not gone down well with China. The dealmaker-in-chief and Takaichi that Japan would invest $550 billion into American industries and pay a baseline 15% tariff rate, apart from buying energy and weapons from the US. Beijing believes that Takaichi is appeasing Trump to win American support against China.

On the other hand, Tokyo is increasingly nervous about Beijing’s increasing belligerence. Shrill nationalist condemnation in the media, diplomatic actions, economic pressure and military actions rightly make Japan anxious. The end-of-year military drills around Taiwan described earlier rightly raise security concerns in both Taipei and Taiwan. Note that Carle and this author raised the alarm about a joint Russian and Chinese fleet Japan’s main island of Honshu in October 2021. In our eyes, this was a watershed moment and we took the view that Tokyo would have no choice but to boost its defense. As we predicted, Japan has done so since.

Today, the stage is set for rising tensions between China and Japan. At the heart of the China-Japan dispute are two contrasting worldviews. The “One China” policy is sacred for the CCP, which views a Taiwanese declaration of independence and third-party support for Taiwan’s independence as a direct threat to China’s sovereignty. Popular opinion in China patriotically supports the CCP position on Taiwan, and Chinese rhetoric on social media is increasingly jingoistic. In contrast, Japan views Taiwan as a de facto independent state and China as an increasingly aggressive revisionist power. Also, Tokyo views a Chinese threat to Taiwan as a risk to Japan’s national security. Chinese control over Taiwan would facilitate Beijing’s ability to take over islands both China and Japan claim as their own. 

China’s belligerence and Japan’s response has set into motion a chain of events that could end dangerously. Even though Japan recently its post-World War II pledge never to possess nuclear weapons, talk of acquiring its own nuclear deterrent is now in the public domain. This is a first since Japan surrendered to the US after suffering the twin nuclear disasters of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japanese leaders seem to be heeding the advice Carle gave them when he visited Tokyo: “Hold America as close as possible, but Japan should count only on itself.”

As a result, East Asia is increasingly dangerous. Both Japan and China are quietly preparing for a potential armed conflict. A slight misjudgment, miscalculation or misstep by leaders in Beijing or Tokyo, or even a pilot or sailor, could lead to far-reaching global consequences.

[ assisted the author in researching for and editing this article.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The rise of the Global South and new institutions

These geopolitical developments produce a constant shifting of the epicenter of world order crafted by the West to the Global South. The recently concluded Shanghai Cooperation Organization () Summit in Tianjin is a demonstration of this shift in the global order, as Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the establishment of the SCO Development Bank, with $280 million in grants and an additional $ 1.4 billion in loans for SCO members.

China leveraged the SCO Summit to demonstrate its global ambition to lead the new world order, an alternative to the one led by the US. This new world order will, in addition to addressing the development needs of SCO member countries, serve as an antidote to unilateralism, hegemony and coercion of countries in the Global South. For instance, China pledged to deepen cooperation with Central Asian countries to meet their energy needs at the SCO Summit.

The underlying concern of either the SCO Summit or the BRICS Summits is to carve out a new world order that supports multilateralism and a rules-based, transparent order, with new governing institutions such as the SCO Development Bank and the BRICS Development Bank that could perfectly address the particular needs and aspirations of the countries of the Global South. In fact, to reduce the influence of the US Dollar as a means of transaction in the Global Economy, countries like India have the idea of de-dollarization by commencing regional trade among the BRICS nations in their local currencies.

In a nutshell, the fundamental objective of these geopolitical initiatives is to counter the abrasive, threatening and hypocritical attitude of US President Donald Trump. By waging a against BRICS countries and imposing a on Indian goods recently as a penalty for importing crude oil from Russia, the US under Trump accorded strategic space to countries like China, especially, which has long awaited the opportunity to marginalize the US’s geopolitical and geostrategic influence in order to lead the world as a global superpower.

The decline of US hegemony and its global consequences

In addition to waging tariff wars against numerous countries without a second thought, other factors are contributing to the continuous decline of US hegemony in the world order. World history shows that whenever the US wages war against any country, be it Afghanistan in to quell Al-Qaeda in the wake of the 9/11 attack on the US, the Vietnam War () or the Bay of Pigs Invasion (), it either loses the war or leaves it in the middle without any conclusion.

It is ironic for a country like the US, which claims to be a global superpower, that it lacks the diplomatic and military capabilities to win or conclude a war. Very recently, during the US elections, as part of his election manifesto, Trump that he would end the Russia-Ukraine War, but miserably failed. He also failed to prevent the recent . Cumulatively, these incidents signal that the list of countries that do not obey, bow down to or recognize the US, which has been the global hegemon to date, is growing.

Additionally, the world’s political history is replete with examples demonstrating that the US has the trust of its allies due to its high level of hypocrisy. For instance, on the one hand, the US firmly Israel when it launched military action against Gaza. On the other hand, it condemned Russia for its invasion of Ukraine in the name of safeguarding democracy.

Factors such as Trump’s unpredictability, which led to a with its strategic allies such as India, and the from international organizations such as the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (), and the are also accelerating the decline of US hegemony in world politics.

Moreover, sharp of many of its allies, such as France, Germany and even Canada, on issues like green energy and immigration, by the US at the recently concluded United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session prompted the countries to pursue an independent foreign policy. In fact, dialogues among participating countries at the Munich focused on developing their own security policies and defense capabilities independent of the US.

Cumulatively, these strategic and geopolitical developments signal the US’s rapid decline in stature within the current global order and the emergence of a new world order led by the troika, namely, India, Russia and China.

The challenges of forging a new world order

Further geopolitical upheavals must be analyzed to forecast the emergence of a new world order, as geopolitics is a function of continually shifting national interests. More crucially, the effectiveness and potential of any bloc, whether it be BRICS or SCO, depend on the degree of convergence of all national interests of its member countries to a common agenda, which is nothing but transforming the contours of the present global order, a task that is very difficult in the current geopolitics due to its constantly changing nature.

This is the point that the US is watching very patiently and calmly, maneuvering the strategic space that emerged from the long-standing dissensions and contradictions among the SCO or BRICS member countries. Most importantly, it is also watching China’s global power ambitions to lead the new world order by surpassing the US, by hook or by crook.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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CPEC initially focused on infrastructure and connectivity, including roads, power projects and ports. It’s now creating more room for cooperation in other areas, such as technological partnerships, agricultural development and human capital building. Hence, the China-Pakistan partnership is now pivoting from an infrastructure-only initiative to something broader and more long-term with reforms, institutional development and knowledge-based growth. This is expected to further strengthen China and Pakistan’s strategic economic alliance.

CPEC and China’s reform blueprint for Pakistan

CPEC is a vital project under the flag of China’s Belt and Road Initiative . This initiative was introduced to provide connectivity to the African, European and Asian regions with the help of infrastructure projects. To enhance the regional connection between the in Pakistan and the area of China, a network of pipelines, roads, railroads and industrial zones was initiated.Ěý

It has now developed into a comprehensive platform that fosters business, commerce and interpersonal relationships. Hence, Pakistan-China’s cooperation is evolving into a multifaceted relationship that combines social development and economic collaboration. Iqbal highlighted CPEC’s role in transforming bilateral ties into a broader social and economic partnership, enabling the relationship to grow beyond just diplomacy and into a deeper economic and social connection.

China’s rapid transition from an agricultural economy to the world’s industrial powerhouse is a success story that Pakistan is looking to emulate. Pakistan is now seeking to accelerate its own growth trajectory by applying China’s model of scientific economic planning and reform trajectory. Pakistan has been attempting to China’s policy framework since the 1970s to enhance its effectiveness and update its economic institutions.

Boosting the export-based economy of Pakistan

Gaining access to China’s import market is one of Pakistan’s current top priorities. At the same time, are underway to further integrate Pakistan into global value chains. As Pakistan seeks to deepen integration into global value chains through Chinese cooperation, Minister Lu Hao expresses confidence in Pakistan’s export-led growth strategy. This strategy aims to create jobs, increase foreign exchange reserves and lessen reliance on imports.

The new deal between China and Pakistan provides a foundation for both economic improvement and institutional revolution. aims to transform the country into a $1 trillion economy by 2035. A significant part of the plan involves deepening ties with China, particularly in areas such as trade, infrastructure, technology and investment. The idea is to establish a stronger foundation for long-term growth, boosting Pakistan’s role and influence in the region.Ěý

This goal is centered on technology transfer, export-led growth and knowledge-based businesses. The new agreement aligns national development goals with sustainable and equitable growth by laying down the foundation for institutional reform and economic vision.

Building institutions for sustainable growth

Beyond infrastructure and commerce, both parties agreed that institutional skill development is a crucial component for their economic cooperation. Joint research and training programs are required to boost Pakistan’s institutional capacity. It is anticipated that expert exchange between Pakistan and China will strengthen economic governance, thereby providing Pakistani institutions with cutting-edge planning, management and implementation capabilities.

One of Pakistan’s most well-known reform initiatives with a long-term sustainability goal is “”. This program spearheads economic reforms for long-term sustainability. Since the launch of Uraan Pakistan, the nation has witnessed a notable macroeconomic rebound, along with a bullish capital market and a steep decline in interest rates from 23% to , marking a major economic turnaround. Pakistan Stock Exchange reached a record high of , indicating resilience and investor optimism.

Addressing the structural issues

Despite development, the existing inefficient bureaucracy, extensive corruption, political instability, foreign policy challenges and weak governance mean Pakistan is persistently facing heavy . This has discouraged foreign investment and sustainability growth. Hence, political stability and consistent policies in Pakistan are vital to help keep its economic growth on track.Ěý

Both countries recognize that Pakistan’s political instability and inconsistent policies are hindering sustained growth. By collaborating on stability, China is pushing for stronger institutions and long-term investments. The idea is to keep the economy moving forward instead of letting uncertainty and constant shifts in leadership derail it. To promote sustainability, Pakistan further needs a stable climate for drawing foreign direct investment and promoting changes.

The latest dialogue between China and Pakistan marks a significant change in the evolution of their strategic partnership. CPEC has evolved from a collection of physical infrastructure projects to a platform for export-oriented growth, knowledge transfer and institutional transformation. 

The partnership has the potential to make economic dreams a reality with Pakistan’s tenacity as support and China’s reform experience as a guide. The objective of Pakistan to establish a trillion-dollar GDP by 2035 could be achieved if both countries continue to have the same political commitment and strategic vision.

[ edited this piece.]

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While renewable energy is rapidly growing, Iraq’s energy market influence is not waning anytime soon. Iraq’s relative stability its conflict against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) provides an for Chinese and American companies to invest in reconstruction and development efforts, with significant political influence likely to follow.

A tumultuous past

Since the Iraqi government’s declared victory over ISIS in December , both the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi Federal Government in Baghdad have engaged in targeted, succinct efforts to attract investment. One such example is the Localization Fund, which Baghdad in October 2024 as a part of an agreement with Egypt-based Elsewedy Electric to attract foreign investment in strategic projects in nonpetroleum industries to diversify its portfolio. 

The relatively recent return to stability in Iraq has, until recently, kept most major investments at bay, with fears circulating of violence. Nevertheless, instability in Iraq has continued, particularly from Iran-backed Shi’a militant groups, a possible resurgence from ISIS and regime change in Syria, in addition to wider regional instability since October 2023.

Confluence of investment models

The American and Chinese models of investment differ significantly; yet, Iraq has shown potential to benefit from both models, thereby maximizing its development and reconstruction potential. From a governance perspective, US investment transparency, regulatory reform and civil society engagement, whereas China prioritizes expediency and delivers large-scale infrastructure projects through state-directed capital with minimal political conditions, a point often in Chinese government publications. 

Economically, American approaches often involve public-private partnerships and market liberalization, while Chinese investment is typically through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and concessional loans, seen especially in Iraqi flagship oil-for-infrastructure agreements (despite speculation that some agreements have been practically ).

The American playbook: security and reform, then investment

Since the 2003 invasion, the US has had a multi-pronged approach to involvement in Iraq. Firstly, it established military bases to support the new transition government and to provide support to its counterterrorism mission. Secondly, the US has heavily relied on both development institutions and US government organizations, such as the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which provided reconstruction support and aid via the Iraq Rapid Assistance Program () to provide rapid relief operations to areas of need. The American playbook also included support for International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans that reconstruction while encouraging monetary reforms.

By the time of the victory over ISIS, American firms began stepping up investment projects in the country, which further encouraged business , regulatory reform and civil society engagement. American firms such as and GE Power began significantly investing in Iraq’s energy grid. 

In December 2020, GE Energy the overhaul of the Al Qudus Power Plant, delivering up to 125 megawatts of power to Iraq’s national power grid. GE also completed the upgrade of several power plants through an agreement with the Ministry of Electricity to enhance the performance and output of 46 gas turbines across 12 power plants. The support to Iraq’s power grid comes at a significant time. According to a Director at , a Baghdad-based energy company, Iraq is a power supply shortage of 12 hours per day during the summer.

American firms have also been involved in reconstruction efforts, especially in the petroleum sector. For example, a plethora of American firms are currently working with RASEP to develop the Nahr Bin Umar field in Southern Iraq, which Forbes could become “one of the world’s largest oil and gas fields.” 

Upon completion, the oilfield is expected to yield 300,000 barrels per day and 700 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. Unlike previously, American firms — through their coordination with RASEP — have empowered local Iraqi firms to benefit from this reconstruction too.

Overall, the US development strategy in Iraq has relied on establishing business-friendly environments through security and fiscal reform to facilitate private investment. Private investment’s role in modernizing Iraq only kicked into high gear once security returned to the country, and not sooner. China’s strategy, on the other hand, has been far more flexible. 

The Chinese strategy: infrastructure without interference

China, which has not hesitated to invest in unstable countries, has seen Iraq as a golden opportunity for access to petroleum and strategic infrastructure in the Middle East. So far, Iraq has over $10 billion in investments from Chinese companies through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) since 2015, ranking it as the fourth-largest recipient among countries. China, being Iraq’s top export destination every year from 2019 to 2023 — 99.3% of which was crude petroleum — further highlights the countries’ economic relationship.

Unlike US private investment, Chinese investment in Iraq was not hindered by the country’s security situation. For example, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) bought some of the first oil licenses issued to foreign companies after the 2003 invasion. 

In November 2008, CNPC also won a $3.5 billion contract to develop the Al-Ahdab field. By 2014, CNPC was the foreign investor in Iraq. China has also invested in roads, telecommunications and education. 

Huawei, China’s largest telecommunications SOE, has also actively invested in Iraq, with projects like telecommunications infrastructure and solar power project underway. Huawei has even in the Iraqi workforce through investments in education at universities in both the Iraqi Federal Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Investment has only increased since then. In 2019, Baghdad a 20-year, $10 billion infrastructure-for-oil deal, which stipulated that Iraq would export 100,000 barrels a day to China in exchange for infrastructure investments. These deals have continued, with Baghdad another contract in 2021 with China to finance 1,000 schools in exchange for petroleum. S&P that Chinese companies operate 7.27% of Iraq’s oil and gas development projects, the largest slice of any country besides Iraq; American companies own less than 2%.

Finally, China has positioned its approach as distinct from the US, emphasizing its noninterference in Iraq’s internal affairs. Chinese officials consistently their commitment to “safeguarding national sovereignty” and “territorial integrity,” a core message frequently reiterated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This stance is framed as a strategic advantage, potentially giving China an edge over the US in securing investment opportunities in Iraq.

Looking forward: decisions to be made

While the models differ, Iraq still has the potential to benefit from both simultaneously by leveraging China’s rapid infrastructure delivery for critical needs — such as roads, energy and housing — while using American partnerships to strengthen institutional capacity, promote entrepreneurship and improve transparency. 

To do so, the government must develop a clear national investment strategy that aligns short-term projects with long-term development goals, strengthens regulatory oversight and diversifies financing sources. Iraq should also legally require knowledge transfer for every project and create a commission specifically designed for corruption in foreign-funded projects under the . 

Establishing a sovereign wealth fund would also promote economic stability and transparency, create better social services for Iraqi civilians and increase national wealth from oil revenue for future generations of Iraqi citizens. 

If successful, Iraq’s strategy may serve as a model to other nations on how to navigate the US–China power competition in a “win-win” manner. Still, China’s lack of a contentious military history in the country, a contrast to the US, is a big advantage. This perception will ultimately affect how the Iraqi government navigates the US–China power competition and decides which investment model delivers sustainable reconstruction and development that the Iraqis can trust.

[The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and not of any other entity.]

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Economic cold war?

Khattar Singh begins by asking whether Trump’s tariffs mark the start of an economic cold war. Moran doubts this, pointing out that the policy is riddled with uncertainty. Some tariffs face legal challenges, and Trump himself has a history of walking back duties when they risk fueling inflation. While Trump sometimes frames tariffs as inherently good, Moran insists he is pragmatic enough to avoid market chaos or consumer backlash.

Moran highlights three questions to watch: which countries will get exemptions, which will strike free trade agreements and how courts will ultimately rule. For now, no one, including Trump, can say exactly where tariff policy is headed. This unpredictability makes life difficult for businesses, as seen with the failed 500% tariffs on Chinese imports that raised costs but produced no concessions from Beijing.

Does Trump want a deal?

On tariffs as a negotiating tool, Moran stresses the volatility of Trump’s approach. Duties could fall if parties reach agreements or rise if talks collapse. But Trump’s frequent public reversals mean even his advisors lack clarity. Moran recalls that the extreme tariffs on China hurt the US economy and consumers more than they pressured Beijing, underscoring the limits of this strategy.

Is Trump uniting BRICS?

Khattar Singh presses Moran on whether tariffs could backfire by pushing BRICS nations closer together. Moran concedes there is some risk: Resentment could bring members “slightly closer.” However, he doubts a 10% tariff would overcome deep divisions. India and China remain at odds, while Iran and the United Arab Emirates also clash. He predicts that as BRICS grows in influence, its geopolitical fractures will become more apparent.

The BRICS plan to set up their own payment system outside the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication has become especially controversial. Initially framed as a sovereignty tool, it now allows Russia to dodge sanctions. Moran warns that without guardrails, the system could facilitate dangerous activity. Washington, he argues, will grow increasingly alarmed, and Trump may try to use tariffs to block its expansion.

Trump and India

Moran singles out India as a vital partner. He sees potential for a bilateral trade deal with New Delhi and hopes for a deeper US–India alliance, especially given shared concerns about China. Defense is central here. Moran criticizes India’s reliance on Russian systems, citing Iran’s failure to stop Israeli attacks with its S-300 missile systems. He argues this is a “wake-up call” for India and urges the country to purchase US-designed systems instead.

Khattar Singh counters that US MIM-104 Patriot systems have struggled in Ukraine and that India’s Russian-made S-400s performed effectively against Pakistan. Still, he notes India’s growing trust in the United States, pointing to its purchase of Boeing AH-64 Apache helicopters.

A US–India trade deal

Turning to economics, Moran distinguishes between what a Trump–India deal might look like and what it should. Trump’s fixation on the Harley-Davidson motorcycle company complicates negotiations, while issues such as manufacturing and IT services remain sensitive. Yet Moran insists that bilateral engagement with India is far more practical than attempting to juggle hundreds of simultaneous agreements.

He allows that multilateralism with BRICS could serve US interests in some cases, but stresses that internal divisions make bilateral deals the safer path. For India, alignment with Washington on trade and defense could strengthen both nations’ positions in the global order.

The future of AI

Khattar Singh and Moran agree that AI will define the next economic era. Moran points to the UAE’s aggressive push to become an AI hub and warns against leaving the field to China, whose advances he identifies as potentially disastrous. He argues the US should not try to handle AI challenges alone.

Khattar Singh notes India’s vibrant AI ecosystem, from widespread use of ChatGPT to national investment in research. Together with the US and the UAE, India could anchor an AI partnership. By contrast, the European Union’s regulatory environment discourages innovation. As Moran bluntly notes, “None of these AI companies are European. Zero.”

Are Americans paying for tariffs?

In closing, Khattar Singh asks whether tariffs ultimately hurt Americans. Moran’s answer is a resounding yes. Economists are right, he says, that tariffs raise domestic costs. The effect depends on scale — targeted tariffs like those on Chinese aluminum in 2018 were manageable, but sweeping 500% tariffs would devastate consumers and industry.

Trump himself is inconsistent, sometimes framing tariffs as leverage, other times as revenue. That inconsistency suggests tariffs will not disappear quickly. Moran ends by stressing that the US needs competitive partners. While not excluding Europe, he doubts the old transatlantic alliance can deliver innovation. For him, the future lies in closer ties with India — on defense, trade and especially AI.

[ edited this piece.]

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The was considered highly important as it brought together several states involved in conflicts: Russia’s war in Ukraine for the past three years, Iran’s 12-day conflict with Israel and the 2025 standoff between Pakistan and India. However, this gathering offered an important opportunity for these countries to engage diplomatically, explore new alliances and address regional and global adversaries.

Modi after a seven-year gap, setting the stage for high-level engagement with Xi. His trip was significant as it reflected ongoing efforts to reset bilateral relations following the deadly border clashes in 2020, which had represented the worst period of hostility between the two countries in over four decades. In the past, PM Modi held meetings with Xi and Putin during the in Kazan. At the time, Western leaders had distanced themselves from Putin over the war in Ukraine.Ěý

During the summit, the world watched the involving Russia, India and China. Analysts suggested the Chinese president effectively used the summit to showcase a post-American-led international order, highlighting that the efforts by the White House since January to counter China, Iran, Russia and India had not achieved their intended effect. In this context, India also had the opportunity to pursue alternative partnerships, strengthen ties with China and Russia, and expand its strategic space following past sanctions under the Trump administration.

History of the SCO 

Leaders from Asia, Europe and Africa convened in the northern Chinese port city of Tianjin for the largest-ever SCO summit, setting the stage for the bloc’s development over the next decade. Originally established to address regional security concerns, the SCO has, over its 24-year evolution, grown into a comprehensive organization representing nearly half of the , a quarter of the global landmass and a quarter of global GDP.Ěý

The SCO traces its roots to the “Shanghai Five” mechanism in 1996, when China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan came together to manage border security after the Cold War. On June 15, 2001, the SCO was formally established with Uzbekistan joining as the sixth member. What began as a grouping has expanded with the accession of India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus, now comprising ten member states, along with two observer states and 14 dialogue partners.

Sharif traveled to China to attend the SCO Heads of State Summit in Tianjin. During the summit, PM Sharif met with key , including Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He was also scheduled to attend the military parade in Beijing on September 3, 2025. Meanwhile, Modi visited Japan and China from August 28 to September 1, 2025, to attend the 15th Summit and the 25th SCO meeting.Ěý

Notably, Japan’s top trade negotiator canceled a planned visit to the United States before Modi’s trip, signaling the emergence of new alliances aimed at countering the ongoing trade tensions. Modi’s visit aimed to strengthen ±ő˛Ô»ĺľ±˛ąâ€“J˛ą±č˛ą˛Ô relations, discuss global peace and hold sideline meetings at the SCO Summit with other leaders.

SCO failures 

Unfortunately, the SCO summit failed to provide a platform for dialogue between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, India and Pakistan. However, the strongly condemned terrorism in member states, such as the terrorist attack in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, as well as the terrorist attacks on Jaffer Express on March 11, 2025, and in Khuzdar on May 21, 2025. In addition, the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral was in the spotlight, particularly after US President Donald Trump trade tariffs affecting multiple countries, with India being among the most impacted.

In response, India sought out alternatives by deepening strategic and economic ties with Russia and China. Moreover, the Tianjin Declaration also announced the creation of the SCO , a joint security center and support for peace in Afghanistan. It also called for UN reforms to reflect modern realities and condemned the violence in Gaza.

In a nutshell, the 2025 SCO Summit in Tianjin highlighted the organization’s increasing influence in shaping a multipolar world. By bringing together regional powers engaged in conflicts, facilitating trilateral and strategic partnerships, and advancing initiatives like the SCO Development Bank and joint security measures, the summit highlighted the bloc’s potential to offer alternative frameworks for global cooperation. While dialogue between India and Pakistan remained limited, the summit reinforced the SCO’s role as a platform for diplomacy, regional stability and strategic realignments beyond the traditional Western-led order.

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Sheikh Hasina’s ouster

Khattar Singh opens by situating Bangladesh within a history that included cycles of military and civilian rule after independence in 1971. He notes the long rivalry between Hasina of the Awami League and Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Khattar Singh recounts that in August 2024, student-led protests forced Hasina to resign and flee, which cleared the way for Nobel laureate Yunus to lead an interim government charged with stabilization and fresh elections.

Alam characterizes Hasina’s fall as the product of extraordinary repression. He says United Nations-linked estimates indicated roughly 1,400 people were killed and around 20,000 injured in three weeks, with allegations that forces fired from helicopters and that children were hit by snipers. He argues that Hasina enriched herself, acted with “complete subservience to India” and hollowed out state institutions by co-opting the judiciary, bureaucracy, police and military.

Bangladesh’s army

Turning to the military, Khattar Singh asks how much power it still holds. Alam notes Bangladesh’s long history of generals seizing control, as well as its continued influence even under civilian governments. He recalls “inappropriate comments” made by the army chief but stresses that the real danger lies in the entrenched deep state. This network of officers, once loyal to Hasina, remains intact, and Alam warns that their allegiance is “suspect.” In his view, the survival of Yunus’s interim government depends less on the open stance of the army than on curbing this hidden machinery of power.

The next election

Khattar Singh notes that elections have been postponed multiple times. Alam corrects him and says no date has been postponed because none has been formally set. He explains that an initial window had been discussed for December 2025 to July 2026, that the BNP pushed for December 2025 and that the government later floated April 2026. After Yunus met BNP leader Tarique Rahman, Alam says many now expect February 2026, though no official date has been announced.

Alam adds that people want to vote, since many have not cast a meaningful ballot in 16 to 17 years. He says unity has formed against Hasina’s repression, but he expects divisions to persist as groups press their agendas and as post-uprising expectations collide with governing realities. Euphoria, he cautions, often fades into frustration when results are slower than hoped.

Bangladeshi Hindus

Khattar Singh raises reports of rising violence against Hindus. Alam first clarifies terminology, saying Bangladesh has an interim government, not a caretaker one. He then challenges the premise and says the data does not support a surge of targeted anti-Hindu violence. He cites figures for August 2024 to February 2025 showing 1,254 violent incidents, with only about 20 — roughly 1.6% — classified as communal. Most incidents, he says, were political vendettas that affected Muslims primarily but also Hindus involved in politics or local disputes.

Alam acknowledges that Hindus suffered and must be protected. He adds that minority rights across South Asia remain inadequate. He criticizes India for speaking up only for Hindus while other vulnerable groups in Bangladesh also deserve attention. He notes that these figures were acknowledged by India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson.

Bangladesh’s economy

Khattar Singh turns to jobs and stability. Alam agrees that youth unemployment helped ignite the anti-Hasina movement. He alleges that about $16 billion per year had been siphoned abroad for over a decade, which left the banking system in disarray.

Even so, he points to early improvements: Reserves stopped falling, some foreign direct investment arrived and confidence began to return. He says these are insufficient. Yunus’s microcredit background helps, but Alam argues that broader policy capacity is required. He urges mobilizing the Bangladeshi diaspora’s expertise and, above all, rebuilding confidence. People, he says, have been traumatized, and restoring trust is the essential precondition for investment and growth.

India, Pakistan, China, America

Finally, Khattar Singh asks how foreign policy may evolve. Alam says that ending Hasina’s India-centric tilt creates space for a more independent posture. He says Bangladesh is “developing a spine” and notes warmer ties with the West, aided by Yunus’s personal links to the United States. He also highlights a dramatic improvement with Pakistan, including eased visas and direct bilateral trade, after years in which Pakistan had been treated as a pariah. China, Europe and America, he says, are now engaged through an independent lens rather than an India lens.

Alam emphasizes that India remains too large to ignore. He calls for cordial trade and intellectual collaboration, provided New Delhi stops “playing big brother.” If India acts with generosity, he says, the relationship can flourish.

He closes by warning that misinformation about Bangladesh, especially in India, has strained ties and says that more visitors on the ground would help correct distortions.

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You’ll never know me, so my sincerity here could not be greater. I’m from the country you recently tried to impose a barrier over, even though your nation has had a trade surplus over us , and this year, , reaching $1.7 billion. I’m from Brazil, the fifth-largest country and the economy in the world. It wouldn’t surprise me if you don’t know anything about us, since your only visit here was for a in Rio, with your former wife Ivana, in 1989.

I’m one of the millions of Brazilians who were historically seduced by the greatest soft power of your nation over the last decades. And you got huge profits from it. Brazil has the fourth most users of , the third of and fourth of . From 2004 to 2024, we jumped from the 11th to most frequent visitors of your country. Hollywood has earned an incalculable fortune with us. From 2009 to 2019, in Brazil was 77%, against 13% from national movies and only 1% from China. We are the second with the most subscribers of , the largest VOD market in Latin America and one of the biggest globally, reaching subscriptions by 2027.

Millions of us also felt your government’s hard power in different ways in recent history, like when the US supported the 1964 that led to 21 years of military dictatorship, secretly supporting opposition leaders and police training to overthrow the democratically elected president João Goulart during Brazil’s best attempt at deepening reforms, like the long-awaited agrarian reform. Ironically, the US provided support to the dictatorship through , which you recently . Over those two decades, we witnessed deaths, human rights abuses, censorship and political repression under the dictatorship your government supported. In fact, it resembles what we are watching in your streets now.

But the reason for this letter is to express my shock at how fast you are melting US soft power in all areas, except, maybe, sports. Diplomacy, science, arts, entertainment and political values were all pillars of soft power that the US was admired for by other nations and cultures for almost a century are going down the drain faster than the hair on your head.

And if you think about it, soft power is the only long-term power the US can rely on after World War II, which, by the way, was the last war your nation had won in traditional terms, followed by the loss of Vietnam war, the mess left in the Gulf War, the false pretext of Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction that led to a new war and hundreds of thousands of since the 2003 invasion and the shameful withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan in 2021.

I know you love bombs just like Putin and your other role models in Doctor Strangelove. But deep down, you know you can never rely on nuclear weapons as hard power. Those weapons, tested by your government over civilians 80 years ago in Japan, triggered a worldwide race for the same device and initiated the Cold War, making the world a more dangerous place with weapons that can eliminate civilization in the hands of countries like North Korea, Pakistan, Russia and, of course, your own. No one can use it; otherwise, your golf club, hotels, mansions and family lifestyle will turn into dust.

And then there is China. The second-richest nation on Earth is learning to use soft power as fast as you melt yours. First, diplomacy: China has Israeli actions in Gaza and has a better relationship with Russia for a possible mediation over Ukraine. Although Beijing only stands on for peace, Xi Jinping uses diplomacy rather than blunting imposing tariffs or sabre-rattling with nuclear power to get his way.

Second, science. China has become a scientific superpower faster than any other country. , Chang’E 6 returned soil samples from the far side of the moon for the first time; developed the first primitive-based vision processor with complementary pathways, the first optical storage device with petabit capacity; a new approach in helium-free cryogenic technology and a treatment with genetically engineered CAR T cells for refractory autoimmune diseases.

Third by arts and entertainment. China’s domestic films are thriving. �’ became the only movie in history to reach $1 billion at the box office in just one market and the only non-Hollywood film to cross $2 billion globally. China’s music economy became the fifth-largest recorded music market in the world in 2023, with growth, making it the fastest in the world, with cultural policies emphasizing international competitiveness and developing talents by formal education and independent labels.

At last, there is social media. Since you got back to power, Chinese influencers flooded TikTok with very popular videos showing how fast and modern their cities became; one , with perfect English, has gone viral with a bold critique on how America killed its middle class and guys like you blame China; there’s even , called Chinese Trump, with the exact same voice, showing the beauties of Chinese culture and habits.

We Brazilians will survive your random tariffs. We’ve been through worse with previous US administrations. As you read in the , it’s pointless to distortedly use the Magnitsky law over our Supreme Court judge Alexandre de Moraes and cut his credit card as a veiled pretext to save your friend, former extreme-right president Jair Bolsonaro, now in house arrest for supposedly leading a coup after the 2022 presidential election.

After 44 years, and half my life researching cultural soft power, I found myself divorcing Mickey Mouse and flirting with pandas. Which, by the way, is a Chinese tool of diplomacy and wildlife conservation since 1941. Soft power.

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At the center of this deal is a proposed project in Kalimantan, a coal-rich region of Indonesia located on the island of Borneo, north of Java, where the capital, Jakarta, is located. An as-of-yet unnamed is reportedly in talks to revive a stalled effort to turn low-grade coal — an abundant but highly polluting fuel — into dimethyl ether (DME), a synthetic gas sometimes marketed as a cleaner alternative to traditional cooking fuels. The Indonesian government has promoted DME as a way to reduce its reliance on imported liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). But make no mistake: this is still a coal-based project — and a carbon-intensive one at that.

Kalimantan is no ordinary location. It’s a place of immense ecological importance, home to dense rainforests and rich biodiversity. It is also the planned site of Indonesia’s new capital, , envisioned as a modern, sustainable city that represents the country’s future. To channel billions into fossil fuel infrastructure in such a symbolically and environmentally significant region feels at odds with that vision.

Wealth grows as governments backpedal

The potential investment is not being driven by state-led climate policy. Rather, it appears to be a profit-oriented move by a private Chinese firm drawn by the project’s financial appeal. A senior official from Indonesia’s Ministry of Energy recently that the company’s internal rate of return is projected to exceed 15% — a figure that helps explain the commercial motivation, even if the environmental rationale remains weak.Ěý

This DME initiative is not new. It was initially in 2022 by PT Bukit Asam Tbk (PTBA), a major state-owned coal mining company under Indonesia’s mining holding company, Mining Industry Indonesia (). PTBA had partnered with the US-based energy firm Air Products, but the deal collapsed in 2023 when Air Products to redirect its investments to the US, where it could benefit from generous clean energy tax credits. Since then, PTBA has actively sought new foreign partners to fill the gap, with Chinese firms as leading contenders.

Daya Anagata Nusantara (Danantara), Indonesia’s sovereign wealth fund, is currently the feasibility of the project and is likely to play a central role. The fund has publicly committed to supporting clean and renewable energy, which makes its potential involvement — financial or political — all the more consequential. Danantara’s decisions will carry long-term implications not only for Indonesia’s energy mix but also for its credibility as a climate partner.

This moment presents a clear fork in the road. If Indonesia and China (understood here as a broader ecosystem of companies, investors and institutions) continue to back coal-linked development, they risk doubling down on an outdated model. Yet both countries are also uniquely positioned to pursue a different path. Indonesia’s vast geography offers for solar, wind and hydropower. China is home to the world’s most of solar panels, wind turbines and battery storage systems.

A green future, not business as usual

To be clear, it is not certain whether the Chinese government will be involved or not. And under international norms, it cannot control the decisions of private firms operating abroad. But perception matters. Beijing has spent the past decade a leadership role in green development, especially across the Global South. If Chinese firms continue to fund fossil fuel infrastructure — even in the absence of public money — it can muddy that message.

The same is true for Indonesia. Its continued emphasis on coal, even under the guise of cleaner technologies like DME, may satisfy near-term energy goals but could deter global investors from increasingly prioritizing sustainability. The economic case for is stronger than ever: Solar and wind technologies are not only cleaner but also often cheaper than fossil fuels. They also offer the potential to create more jobs, expand energy access and promote long-term stability.

It’s worth remembering that this project is not a done deal. The is still underway, and no final investment decision has been made. This gives Indonesian institutions — especially Danantara — a chance to change course. It also allows Chinese stakeholders to pivot their overseas investments toward technologies that align with their country’s official climate pledges.

This is not a call to halt collaboration between China and Indonesia, far from it. The two countries have a of economic partnership, and that relationship could become a catalyst for clean energy development across Southeast Asia. But for that to happen, both sides need to align their incentives with a shared vision of a low-carbon future — one that avoids locking in decades more of fossil fuel dependency.

The world is watching where major economies place their bets. The smart money — and the responsible leadership — is on renewables.

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Breaking from negotiations, Trump’s tariff salvo was an attempt to address simmering tensions in the Indo-US relationship by leaning on Pakistan through an oil deal and tariff concessions. Was this sudden shift a product of Trump’s ambitious economic agenda, or a mask for strategic signaling and transactional politics in this trade affair?

The latter seems likely, given America’s history of using deliberately exhaustive trade talks as a strategic tool to exert pressure on other nations, extract concessions or advance broader strategic objectives.

The deal

India was negotiating a Bilateral Trade Agreement () with the US, which began in February. By April, an had been drawn, reflecting US priorities of reducing India’s trade barriers and addressing its $45.7 billion goods trade deficit. From February to July, negotiations grew tense as India refused to liberalize or open up its agricultural and dairy sectors to US markets. India also pressed for , including lower US duties on steel (50%) and aluminum (25%), and preferential access for labor-intensive exports such as textiles, gems, jewelry and IT services. In return, India signaled willingness to provide the US greater market access.

However, apart from these two sticking points, India also US demands for reduced tariffs on auto components and acceptance of US Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, prioritizing its domestic industry and the campaign. Similarly, regarding non-tariff barriers, the US India’s Quality Control Orders (QCOs) and import regulations, which it viewed as barriers to market access for US goods. However, India defended them on the grounds of consumer and domestic industry safety.Ěý 

Trump’s negotiation style

The negotiations thus offered potential gains for both sides, but the costs and contentions were high. It made them intense and rigorous, conditions ill-suited to Trump’s negotiating style. The US’s negotiating approach under Trump, specific to trade and tariff issues, has been unconventional and rushed. 

A recent deal with Vietnam was concluded hastily under pressure. The US exploited Vietnam’s trade surplus and export dependence, using tariff threats and prolonged talks to secure concessions. Despite months of negotiation and goodwill gestures, such as liquified natural gas (LNG) deals, Vietnam ended up facing a and transshipment penalties — far less favorable than its proposed 0% reciprocal tariff.Ěý

Similar tactics were seen with countries like Japan, Indonesia, South Korea and many more. These examples illustrate Washington’s tactics of achieving win-win trade deals, even with allies and partners, demonstrating how transactional diplomacy now colors their trade relations. 

However, a closer look suggests that economic or trade calculations do not solely drive these deals. The US is using these trade deals as geopolitical tools — deliberately exhaustive negotiations to push countries toward aligning with its strategic objectives.

Economic attrition diplomacy

Economic attrition diplomacy involves leveraging prolonged trade negotiations to pressure a counterpart into aligning with geopolitical goals, often by creating economic uncertainty or exploiting asymmetric dependencies.

Vietnam’s case illustrates this. The US Hanoi to cut reliance on Chinese industrial goods and curb transshipments, directly serving its anti-China agenda. The negotiations were lengthy, with multiple rounds reflecting prolonged and exhaustive talks to force Vietnam to concur with the deal, leaving it little room to maneuver.

The cases of Indonesia and Japan are also noteworthy. The US pressured Indonesia to align its anti-China goals, primarily due to Indonesia’s attempt to diversify trade with members, and a investment deal with China made in November 2024.Ěý

In the case of Japan, Trump their bilateral relations by escalating dramatically: threatening 25% tariffs, then actually imposing them on Japanese goods, including automobiles, effective August 1. This was an unprecedented move against a US ally. Japan, burdened by its trade surplus and alliance status, yielded partial concessions under tariff threats and geopolitical pressure.Ěý

South Korea, too, faced a tariff of 25% in July, and ended up with a 15% “reciprocal” tariff, effective August 1. The US sought geopolitical advantages from Korea, pressuring it to increase dependency on US purchases, specifically F-35 fighter jets. Although no deal was finalized, South Korea greater market access for US goods, as well as defense commitments to avoid higher tariffs.Ěý

These tactics reveal that US trade negotiations often serve a larger purpose: pushing countries to align with its under the guise of economic bargaining. These echo Washington’s action from five years ago, when it used diplomacy against China. The US attempted to curb China’s technological rise by targeting firms like Huawei, pressured China on issues like intellectual property theft and signaled strength to its own allies.Ěý

During trade negotiations, the US repeatedly escalated tariffs and introduced complex demands, including structural changes to China’s economy, prolonging the uncertainty and pressuring China. Subsequently, China yielded partial concessions, providing the US with some limited success.

Aggressive attrition driven by frustration

Unlike other countries that faced standard coercion from the US with only tariff threats, India was hit with multiple salvos — tariffs, penalties and an embrace of Pakistan. The reasons were clear: the Russia factor, trade with Iran and India’s non-compromising posture during trade negotiations.

This aggressive attrition behavior is motivated by geopolitical frustration, something the US is familiar with acting on. In the 1930s and 1940s, US economic attrition against Japan, driven by frustration, culminated in the of 1941, contributing to the escalation of World War II. Negotiations were prolonged. The US demanded Japan withdraw from China and Indo-China, while Japan sought recognition of its territorial gains, creating a deadlock with no progress.Ěý

A similar situation is unfolding between the US and India today, where the former harbours geopolitical suspicion over India’s relationships with Iran and Russia, alongside deadlocked trade demands. These factors have likely fueled frustration and driven the US to send a strong strategic message by escalating risks and attrition, perhaps setting an example on the global stage.

Unconventional transactionalism: India must reassess its strategy

India must read the negotiating table more carefully and patiently, adopting measured and mixed negotiating styles instead of a confrontational approach, which at times frustrates the US. 

As India looks toward the prospect of a mini-deal by September-October, it should aim for strategic prolongation — progress with limited concessions — rather than dragging talks with no real progress. This will create more room for negotiations and reduce US frustration to some extent. 

India must also leverage its geopolitical value and diversify its trade relationships with Europe and other countries. This will strengthen India’s bargaining position, soften US demands and deter extreme measures. 

A similar approach saved South Korea from higher tariffs despite having no deal with the US, as South Korea adopted strategic prolongation, used measured negotiation tactics offering room via concessions and resisted hasty or pressured deals. 

India must remember that Trump is a master at playing unconventional transactional cards, where deals are more important than relations. India should demonstrate that an agreement is in progress and that there is something on the table, rather than leaving it empty.

[ first published a version of this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Nonetheless, while nuclear power could reduce domestic fossil fuel dependency and diversify the nation’s power source potential, the partners with whom the nation collaborates on this project will be most responsible for any potential generational fallout. As the Indonesian government’s 2025-2034 electricity fails to articulate that risk, we can discuss it from the perspective of a Chinese agreement in particular.

Approaching with Caution

Although signing a nuclear contract with China is not inherently problematic, as Indonesia has long benefited from its past infrastructure and trade cooperation, understanding what the Middle Kingdom could gain from this deal can help us see why any such partnership must be approached with care. 

Investing in nuclear technology is a regulatory ecosystem of commitment, demanding an extensive safety protocol, waste management system and technical support team for optimal energy return. With that said, as China aggressively promotes abroad, including those for small modular reactors (SMRs), its continued debtor could scare any potential buyers.

Should Indonesia still embrace an offer from China, their government must know that many of these project exports include state bank-supported finance packages, lengthy fuel supply agreements and often opaque clauses obligating their suppliers’ beyond construction timelines.

Into the Future

Unless President Subianto is comfortable with China using his country as a testing ground for their historically unreliable technology, or giving them prolonged control over Indonesia’s energy network, then he may best find a new ally.

Open negotiation, straightforward financing and incessant project oversight could ensure the security of Indonesian interests over another nation’s ambition. Therefore, as nuclear power is fast approaching the Equatorial Emerald, let us make sure it arrives on fair terms.

[ edited this piece.]

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Rare earths (the general term encompassing all REEs) are typically divided into light and heavy categories. While light REEs like cerium and lanthanum are more abundant, it is the heavy ones — dysprosium, terbium, neodymium and others — that are essential for permanent magnets used in high-temperature environments, such as electric vehicle motors, fighter jets and missile guidance systems.

Magnet strength declines significantly at high temperatures if lighter REEs are used alone. Thus, high-density rare earths must be mixed in to maintain performance. China controls of heavy REE processing, not just because of resource abundance, but because it has developed and protected its technical edge in separation processes. Moreover, Chinese firms often operate at a loss but are supported by state subsidies, which allows them to drive out global competition.

China’s rare earth dominance and the strategic supply chain asymmetry

Despite large-scale investment — over from the Department of Defense since 2020 — the United States remains dependent on Chinese magnets. For example, MP Materials, the leading US producer, plans to produce just 1,000 metric tons of neodymium-boron-iron (NdFeB) annually by 2025. That is less than 1% of China’s .

Even promising breakthroughs, such as USA Rare Earth’s 99.1% pure dysprosium oxide in early 2025, remain at the pilot stage. Commercial viability is years away. In the meantime, Chinese production continues to scale. In 2024 alone, China produced an estimated of NdFeB magnets. The US’s goal of an independent REE supply chain by 2027 remains aspirational, not assured.

China’s advantage lies in its vertical integration, from mining to refining to magnet production. It has built and subsidized its REE ecosystem through environmental externalization, industrial policy coherence and technological investment. In doing so, it has created a monopolistic grip on the midstream and downstream segments of the supply chain. This control gives Beijing strategic leverage, which it has exploited several times. In 2010, Beijing exports to Japan over maritime disputes, and in 2023–2024, it implemented licensing restrictions to retaliate against US semiconductor export controls and tariffs. These measures have not been wholesale bans but targeted, calibrated interventions designed to inject uncertainty, pressure adversaries and reassert industrial dominance.

The nature of this dominance reveals a deeper structural asymmetry: China is able to play a long game, enabled by centralized political authority and strategic continuity. Democracies, meanwhile, struggle to maintain long-term consistency across administrations. In game-theoretic terms, China acts as a high-commitment actor in a repeated, asymmetric game.

Without equivalent institutional coherence, the US and its allies are consistently reacting to Beijing’s initiatives rather than shaping the trajectory of the REE landscape.

Rare earths and US tariffs

In response to sweeping US tariffs in 2025 — up to on Chinese imports — Beijing strategically restricted the export of several rare earths, including dysprosium and neodymium. This move intensified concerns across global industries, with automakers and defense contractors warning of severe production disruptions due to limited alternative suppliers.

The tit-for-tat escalated until the two parties a provisional deal in London. China agreed to resume shipments of rare earths and magnets to the US in exchange for tariff reductions to 55% and the easing of restrictions on Chinese students studying in America. US President Donald Trump victory, stating that the “full magnets, and any necessary rare earths, will be supplied, up front, by China.” However, details remain vague and enforcement mechanisms unclear. Both sides characterized the deal as a “framework” still awaiting final approval from Chinese President Xi Jinping and Trump.

Despite this temporary truce, the rare earth dispute underscores the strategic risks of supply chain concentration. The US continues to rely heavily on China for processed REEs, especially heavy rare earths critical to defense. Unless structural diversification is achieved through domestic production, allied partnerships or technological alternatives, the geopolitical leverage China holds through its dominance in rare earths will remain a persistent vulnerability for the US and its allies.

US vulnerability and the emerging strategic response

of this strategic vulnerability has grown in Washington, especially given defense-sector . An F-35 fighter jet requires over 900 pounds of rare earths; a Virginia-class submarine demands more than 9,000 pounds. Yet despite years of warnings, the US remains almost entirely dependent on Chinese REE refining and magnet production. While upstream mining projects exist, such as in California, the absence of domestic separation capacity means that most US-extracted ore is still shipped to China for processing. In response, the US has initiated a patchwork strategy aimed at diversifying supply.

However, Greenland’s mining is constrained by structural limitations: limited infrastructure, complex permitting requirements and indigenous land rights. Moreover, mining in Arctic conditions is capital-intensive and environmentally risky. To succeed, US-led efforts must not only provide financial support but also demonstrate political maturity and long-term commitment. Greenland is, in effect, a test of whether democracies can engage in high-stakes resource development without compromising transparency or environmental integrity. Its trajectory will reveal whether values-based industrial policy can function at scale in strategic sectors.

Japan’s deep-sea initiative and the role of scientific autonomy

Japan’s experience offers a parallel yet distinct response to Chinese dominance — one rooted in scientific capacity and technological self-sufficiency. Following China’s 2010 embargo, Tokyo moved rapidly to secure alternative supply lines. It established recycling capabilities from electronics, formed bilateral mineral partnerships with countries such as Vietnam and India and launched intensive research and development (R&D) into seabed resource potential.

These efforts culminated in a landmark 2024 : Japan discovered over 230 million tons of cobalt- and nickel-rich manganese nodules within its exclusive economic zone near . China is preparing to test for rare metals in the Pacific Ocean, in waters near Japan’s island. This signals a bold move into seabed resource competition in the region.

While these nodules do not contain large concentrations of traditional rare earths, their richness in battery-critical minerals, namely cobalt and nickel, and the heavy REEs could dramatically enhance Japan’s strategic position in the broader clean energy supply chain. Equally important is the technological accomplishment of accessing resources at depths of 5,200–5,700 meters. Only a handful of countries possess the capability to conduct extraction operations at such depths with precision and environmental control. Japan’s pilot project, slated for initiation in 2025, aims to extract up to tons of nodules annually — potentially enough to meet its battery mineral needs for decades.

What makes Japan’s approach noteworthy is not only its innovation but its from China’s model. Japan is pursuing resource security through scientific rigor, environmental standards and alliance-building rather than through monopolistic or coercive tactics. If its deep-sea initiative succeeds, it could become a model for how technologically advanced democracies can secure strategic resources without replicating the extractive externalities that have defined China’s dominance.

Allied coordination, fragmentation and the limits of decentralized strategy

Despite individual national efforts, fragmentation remains a persistent obstacle to building a resilient non-Chinese REE supply chain. Australia, for example, hosts the project, which is one of the most promising sources of dysprosium outside China. Japan and Vietnam have increased collaboration on REE separation and materials R&D, and the European Union has launched its Critical Raw Materials to spur investment. Yet even the leading Western processor, Rare Earths, still sends intermediate products to China for final-stage processing. As China tightens export controls, Lynas’s shares surge, which reflects investor anticipation that global automakers may seek more secure, non-Chinese alternatives amid mounting supply chain vulnerabilities.

The underlying problem is the lack of full-cycle infrastructure coordination. A strategic REE supply chain requires not only mining capacity, but also processing facilities, magnet manufacturing plants, recycling systems and logistics integration across multiple geographies. The current system remains siloed, underfunded and inefficient. Moreover, without harmonized standards and cross-border investment frameworks, allied countries risk duplicating efforts or falling prey to lowest-common-denominator policies — compromise policies that reflect the minimum agreement among allies. These compromises often sacrifice ambition, efficiency or strategic coherence for the sake of consensus.

What is required is a high-level governance mechanism, possibly embedded in the Quad, Five Eyes or a NATO-adjacent security structure, to formalize critical minerals cooperation. This should include pooled investment funds; technology-sharing agreements; Environmental, Social and Governance standards alignment and industrial policy synchronization. In an age of resource competition, no single democracy can independently match China’s vertical integration. Only through coordinated decentralization with shared institutional scaffolding can the West generate sufficient strategic redundancy and resilience.

Political time horizons and the future of industrial strategy

The rare earths challenge lays bare a fundamental difference in political time horizons between autocracies and democracies. China’s one-party system enables decades-long planning, patient capital deployment and a stable industrial policy trajectory. The US, by contrast, suffers from electoral discontinuities, congressional gridlock and an industrial base shaped by short-term shareholder pressures.

To bridge this institutional gap, democracies must develop new mechanisms that insulate critical minerals policy from political volatility. This could involve establishing independent national critical minerals authorities with multi-cycle mandates, creating bipartisan legislation for industrial strategy permanence or structuring supply chain agreements through treaties that bind successor governments. Without such reforms, the long-term credibility of Western REE strategy will remain vulnerable to disruption.

The rare earths struggle is not simply about materials — it is about institutional capacity and statecraft. It is a contest over who gets to shape the technological platforms of the future, under what rules and with what environmental and political tradeoffs. China has shown that industrial strategy can be wielded as a tool of global influence. The question now is whether democracies can build equally powerful yet norm-conforming strategies in return.

The map of rare earth production is being rewritten. Whether it reflects a pluralistic, resilient system or one beholden to coercive concentration depends not just on markets or geology, but on whether the political systems of the democratic world can adapt to the strategic logic of the 21st century.

[ edited this piece.]

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The speakers introduce the three primary actors: the US, Israel and Iran, framing the discussion around the American attack that occurred in the weeks preceding the conversation.

Israel’s perspective and objectives

The dominant political faction in Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is the right-wing, on whom Netanyahu’s political survival depends. Netanyahu is running a coalition government that includes hardline far-right figures like Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich and Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir. Netanyahu is keen to prolong his rule because he fears trial in court on corruption charges. Smotrich and Ben-Gvir have extreme objectives, including seizure and colonization of the West Bank and Gaza. This implies the expulsion of Palestinians and the destruction of the Iranian regime.

Israel assesses that Iran poses an existential threat because Tehran is developing a nuclear weapon. Israeli leaders deem this as “absolutely unacceptable,” because this would put “Israel’s and all Jews’ survival … on the brink of extermination.” Therefore, Israelis consider regime change in Iran to be fundamental and necessary to alter the current strategic equation. This task is believed to be beyond Israel’s sole capabilities — it requires US involvement.

Atul and Glenn highlight recent Israeli actions, including the decapitation of top Iranian leadership. This was a “spectacular special ops Mossad” operation and “one of the great intelligence operations in history.” Israelis also hit a number of Iranian nuclear and missile sites and claimed control of Iranian airspace. Despite Iranian counterclaims, the Israelis experienced far fewer casualties (an order of magnitude less) than they had anticipated, which led to a less pessimistic reality than their initial fears. This suggested Iranian counter strike capabilities were less powerful than feared. However, the economic dislocation for Israel has been immense.

There is a strong belief among Israelis that the Iranian regime is a “paper tiger,” which is utterly corrupt and infiltrated at all levels. Atul and Glenn cite the killing of the Palestinian leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in a VIP guest house — equivalent to killing someone in Blair House that is next to the American White House — as evidence of the deep Israeli infiltration into the Iranian regime. This suggests that this regime, despite its outward appearance, is not as cohesive, effective or united as it was after the 1979 revolution.

For Netanyahu, the timing of the attack on Iran was crucial: “If not now, when? If not us, who?” He views himself as the “savior of Israel” and the “guarantor of Israeli security.” With Hamas weakened, Hezbollah’s top leadership dead and the Assad regime in Syria gone, Israelis perceive a significant opportunity to strike Iran. Netanyahu believes the Iranian proxies present minimal danger, giving Israel a historic opportunity to attack Iran.

The ultimate goal for Israelis is regime change in Iran. A new liberal, tolerant and friendly regime could potentially restore the pre-1979 amicable relationship between the two nations. Atul and Glenn believe that the 1979 revolution, which brought in a “crazy Islamic regime” based on Shia ideology, fanaticism and opposition to the US, was an unnecessary development. The US was manipulated by the UK in 1953 to conduct a coup against a democratically elected Mohammad Mossadegh. In 2025, some even believe the best course of action would be to eliminate Ayatollah Khamenei. Israelis think they can exert pressure and squeeze Iran due to its declining birth rate and persecution of Sunni minorities.

Atul and Glenn also explain the Begin Doctrine, which underpins Israeli national security. Per this doctrine, “none of Israel’s enemies or potential enemies should have or be able to have nuclear weapons.” Israel followed this doctrine to destroy an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and Syrian nuclear facilities in 2007. Note that Netanyahu attempted to apply this doctrine against Iran twice between 2009 and 2013. 

Netanyahu champions a hardline national security strategy but not all of Israel supports it. Many Israeli politicians, as well as intelligence and special forces personnel, oppose Netanyahu and his right-wing allies. The former head of Shin Bet left after much controversy. Historically, a strong majority of the Israeli population has favored a two-state solution and a negotiated solution with Iran, but this group is not currently in power. Many Israeli politicians and security professionals view the far-right’s desire for regime change as “a bridge too far.”

The US perspective

The US intelligence community’s assessment, as presented by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, differs from Israel’s dominant view: Iran is not manufacturing or possessing a nuclear weapon, and Ayatollah Khamenei has not reauthorized its manufacture. However, Iran has been “secretly developing weapons-grade fissile material,” which has only one use: a nuclear weapon. Iran is estimated to be anywhere from “days,” as Israelis assert, to “a good number of months” away from manufacturing one.

US President Donald Trump faced a dilemma: He had vowed not to engage in “forever wars” (precluding an invasion) but also stated he would not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. He ultimately aligned with the right-wing Israeli assessment that Iran’s capability to manufacture a weapon constituted an existential threat, irrespective of whether they currently possessed one. Faced with an “impossible dilemma,” Trump chose a minimalist attack on Iran’s nuclear capabilities and declared victory. He came to realize that regime change in Iran was not feasible and attempting it would make the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq “look like a birthday party.”

Iran’s perspective and resilience

The Iranian regime’s top priority is survival. Many analysts view them as “not crazies at all” but “very subtle and astute,” repeatedly signaling a desire for a resolution short of open war. In response to the US attack, Iran informed the Qatari government (and thus the US) in advance of their planned response, which involved a one-off missile attack on America’s largest base in the Middle East — symbolizing a strike at the heart of the US presence — before stopping.

Despite Israeli beliefs, Iran is more cohesive than its enemies imagine. It has demonstrated an ability to survive chaos, notably during the eight-year war with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. Note that Western powers and the CIA backed Saddam. After the attacks, Iran could experience zeereh parcham — “rally to the flag” — and nationalism could make regime change far more difficult.

Atul and Glenn emphasize that Iran retains the potential to manufacture a nuclear weapon because “knowledge” cannot be killed, even if all involved scientists were assassinated. Iran is a “sophisticated society with millions of brilliant people who can study science.” They also note that Iran’s nuclear program was initiated by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, not the mullahs. The Iranian moral police have reportedly “dialed down” because of protests. There is little likelihood of an imminent revolution. Significantly, 20% of Iran’s population still lives in villages and largely supports the current regime. The Iranians want “nuclear insurance.” They note that poorer neighboring Pakistan has managed to avoid foreign interference for all its faults because it has the nuclear weapon.

Note that the Iranian counter strike was not “painless for Israel.” It hit business districts and apartment buildings, causing immense economic strain.

Broader implications and strategic changes

Atul and Glenn highlight profound strategic and structural changes to the power dynamics in the Middle East since October 7, 2023. Israel’s “brilliant decimation” (more than decimation because that means a tenth) of Hezbollah and Hamas has forced them into a defensive posture. The Assad regime in Syria has fallen as well. Israel has achieved lasting structural change.

However, the deeper issue of Iran’s nuclear potential remains unaddressed. While the Iranian regime may be weakened and subject to collapse in the long run (“stable until the day it’s not,” “things last until they don’t”), it has survived to fight another day. If the mullahs fall, they are unlikely to be replaced by women protestors in the streets. Rather, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) might replace the mullahs unless the women can convince a section of the military to side with them.

The British, drawing on a longer historical memory, express skepticism about swift regime change. They recognize Iran’s “imperial memory” and argue the nation is more cohesive than its enemies imagine. The Brits also point out that killing top military officers, while providing short-term tactical advantage, might lead to their replacement by younger, more competent and potentially more aggressive higher-testosterone individuals (“proper nutters” who are happy to have bullets with their names on them).

The most recent conflict has broader implications:

• The US is now back in the Middle East, leading to lower attention and lesser support for Ukraine.
• China will have a freer hand in the Far East. It can now increase pressure on Taiwan’s sovereignty through more incursions into international and Taiwanese waters. The Chinese will shift the status quo of what is acceptable before military intervention.
• Pakistan will feel less constrained and controlled by the US, potentially leading to increased assertiveness against India and “fireworks by September.”

The current situation is a “fragile truce,” with both Israelis and Iranians believing there is “unfinished business.” While there may be no immediate large-scale flare-up, Iran will “lick its wounds” and strive to obtain nuclear weapons for “insurance” against foreign intervention and regime change.

The “most likely happy solution” from a Western perspective is proposed as an “Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) evolution,” where the Iranian regime evolves without collapsing. The current doctrinaire mullahs who are in their 70s and 80s are replaced by more educated and internationalist successors.

[ edited this piece.]

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In this environment, where Israel risks becoming a global pariah, it is necessary to revisit how Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Gaza strategy devolved from decisive military success into a spiraling political failure. Following the October 7, 2023 attacks, Israel declared two primary objectives: to secure the release of hostages held by Hamas and to eliminate the group entirely. The initial shock of Hamas’s tactics gave way to a strong and coordinated Israeli military response that expanded beyond Gaza, including escalations in Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

What is the end goal? 

Despite widespread skepticism, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) achieved significant operational gains. By systematically degrading Hamas’s military infrastructure, the IDF rendered the group incapable of sustaining combat operations. By late 2024, Hamas had lost its capacity to obstruct Israeli advances. The IDF established two operational corridors that effectively cut communication and resupply lines between Hamas units in the north and south, isolating them from external support.

These developments allowed Israel to claim victory against several of its regional adversaries. The campaign disrupted Iran’s proxy networks, weakened Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon, and undercut Syria’s military capabilities. However, these achievements came at a steep cost.

Israel’s current crisis stems from a fundamental political failure: the government’s refusal to articulate a clear vision for post-war Gaza. From Clausewitz to Kissinger, war has always been understood as a continuation of politics by other means. Without a coherent political strategy, even the most successful military campaign risks collapse. Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak that Netanyahu deliberately withheld his post-war plans to avoid acknowledging a politically inconvenient truth: eliminating Hamas would require replacing it with a governing body acceptable to regional actors, the international community, and Palestinians themselves.

Netanyahu’s refusal to define this political end state has hamstrung IDF operations and left Israel without a credible path to long-term stability. Commanders lacked guidance on how to shape military actions to support a sustainable outcome. The result has been tactical success without strategic clarity.

What can Sun Tzu teach Israelis?

In May, Israel Operation Gideon’s Chariots, a full-scale ground campaign in Gaza. Netanyahu publicly supported the idea—championed by former President Trump—of relocating Gaza’s civilian population, calling it a “brilliant plan” that would reshape the region’s geopolitical dynamics. However, the escalating violence has created a macabre scene that undermines any strategic gains made on the battlefield.

At this stage, the complete elimination of Hamas appears increasingly implausible. Rather than pursuing a fantasy of total victory, Israeli leadership should consider negotiations that prioritize the release of hostages and an end to hostilities. Sun Tzu’s Art of War offers a relevant lesson: when an enemy is encircled, leaving them a way to retreat can prevent desperate, destructive resistance. The so-called “golden bridge” allows a path for disengagement that avoids further bloodshed.

Strategic blowback

Israel now finds itself under growing pressure on two critical fronts. First, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza has tarnished the country’s moral standing and legal credibility. Many observers now compare Israel’s isolation to the international pariah status once reserved for South Africa’s apartheid regime. Second, global antisemitism has surged dramatically, even as the IDF continues its operations. The military campaign, while tactically effective, has not shielded Jewish communities abroad from rising hate crimes.

In the broader context, Israel’s ongoing war effort has strained its economy and compromised its global image. Neither outcome serves the long-term security interests of the state. A negotiated deal that facilitates the return of remaining hostages and opens the door to rebuilding Gaza would better preserve what Israel has tactically accomplished.

Sun Tzu’s wisdom, penned more than 2,000 years ago, still applies to today’s geopolitical realities. Netanyahu and his right-wing coalition now face the consequences of ignoring these ancient principles in one of the most volatile regions on Earth.

[ edited this piece.] 

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My forthcoming book Winds of Change began at Mong Khet, Myanmar, at the heart of the “”—the world’s most populous region. Lee Kuan Yew University professor Danny Quah once described it as an extraordinary encirclement of humanity, a dense cluster of 4.2 billion souls. First, there was COVID, starting from the same Valeriepieris circle, killing hundreds of thousands across Southeast Asia and around 7 million globally.ĚýEarthquakes and high geopolitics between India, China and the US shape the surrounding waters. Natural disasters merely turn a page in the ongoing upheavals — poverty, hunger, malnutrition and political-economic crises. Myanmar itself is a continuous struggle for stability, its people enduring a brutal civil war that has ravaged the nation. According to the UN, 17.6 million people in Myanmar required humanitarian assistance, where 1.6 million were internally displaced, with over 55,000 civilian buildings and infrastructure destroyed since 2021. The international community, having long cut off Myanmar, now finds itself reaching out to assist in the ongoing natural disaster — a fragile, fleeting gesture of humanity amid isolation.

Mandalay’s vulnerable foundations

The building shook for a few seconds, long enough to conjure mortality in the minds of those inside. People rushed out, some crying others silent in their fear. I joined them, moving with humanity’s current toward the open space. I witnessed mothers carrying their children, their eyes shadowed by the fear of death. What struck me was not the panic but the order, no pushing, no trampling — just a somber acceptance of the chaos. A discipline, perhaps ingrained into the fabric of their culture, revealed itself in those fleeting moments.

To be honest, I was ready for death. Just a few days earlier, I had completed a final act — burying my mother’s ashes. I had delayed it for nearly a year, postponed by during the previous government in Sri Lanka. The weight of that unfinished duty had hung over me, but now, with it done, I felt a strange calm amidst the turmoil.

I survived. Like many others, I was caught in the quake’s fury, just as the earth continued to tremble beneath us. Mandalay, lying on the eastern end of the Alpide Belt — one of the world’s most active seismic zones — has always been vulnerable. Yet vulnerability rarely prepares one for the shock. Thousands lay dead, more than 3,600 injured. The numbers, still uncertain, would only rise as rescue teams unearthed the buried from their cement graves. As I watched the scene unfold, I ł¦´ÇłÜ±ô»ĺ˛Ô’t help but see a reflection of the geopolitical tremors I had written about. The shifting alliances, the silent aggressions — fragile structures that seemed permanent until they suddenly weren’t. The earthquake was more than just a natural disaster; it was a reminder that instability waits for a moment to break free beneath the surface, whether of the earth or nations. Today, the people of Myanmar lie buried beneath rubble, but perhaps we are all buried under the same rubble of our own making.

The under-construction headquarters for the Auditor General’s office was the only building that collapsed among the many non-quake-resistant structures sitting on the soft soil of Bangkok. Another tremor of a similar magnitude would have taken down the apartment building I was staying in, where cracks had seeped through on every floor. Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar killed over a hundred thousand, floods and landslides continue to claim lives, and yet, disaster preparedness in the region lingers as an afterthought.

Transcending politics in times of crisis

Leaders of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation () gathered in Thailand. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will arrive, speaking of resilience, shared responsibility in the Bay of Bengal region, and BIMSTEC’s vision for collaborative disaster management. Afterward, Modi continued to Sri Lanka, where the new Marxist president, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, awaits. Politics will resume, but the earth has imposed its brutal order, disrupting human plans with indifferent force.

A Sri Lankan journalist I interviewed in Colombo shared a striking story. A Chinese fishing vessel, , capsized, resulting in the deaths of several fishermen. Sri Lankan naval officers salvaged it using a U.S.-donated vessel and salvage and diving training from India. This episode highlights a crucial lesson: when human lives are at risk, we set aside geopolitical competition in favor of synergy — a collective human responsibility toward a greater cause.

As people lie buried under rubble from the devastating earthquake, nations have come together, putting aside internal geopolitical tensions, including the ongoing civil war in Myanmar, to assist and save lives. In times of catastrophe, humanity transcends politics — a rare but powerful reminder of our shared fragility.

[ edited this piece.]

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Though no direct link to Beijing or the tariffs has been confirmed, the timing and reach of these stories warrant close attention.

The first wave centered on a provocative archeological claim: the supposed discovery of the revered Prophet Zulkifli’s tomb beneath the Great Wall. A short featuring this story quickly garnered 2.8 million views. Its appeal blended religious symbolism, cultural mystique and a spiritual connection to China that resonated with many Indonesian Muslims.

Comments poured in, both faithful and skeptical, some citing the often-misquoted hadith: “Seek knowledge even as far as China.” Others flagged the story’s reappearance, noting that it had circulated online as far back as 2022. 

Suspicion mounted: Why was it trending again in 2025? Was it being deliberately recycled to influence public opinion?

As the tomb story gained momentum, another narrative emerged, this time overtly geopolitical in tone. Social media accounts China had broken through Israel’s military blockade of Gaza to deliver aid, alone and undeterred. A popular Instagram post even China as the only country brave enough to challenge Israeli control and provide assistance to Palestinians directly.

The posts were persuasive and powerful, with imagery of trucks, soldiers and parachutes suggesting a righteous mission. The timing was compelling: since March 2, Israel had sealed Gaza’s borders, worsening a humanitarian crisis. In Indonesia, where pro-Palestine sentiment runs deep, the idea of China as a bold and compassionate actor struck a chord.

But fact-checkers at Tempo and other media outlets the truth. The narrative was a fabrication. The videos were stitched together from unrelated clips: old footage from 2024 aid deliveries, UNRWA operations and international air drops involving the U.S., Indonesia and European nations. While China pledged aid, it delivered via Jordan, not by breaching the blockade.

Despite these corrections, the damage had already been done. These narratives positioned China as both a spiritual partner to Muslims and a moral alternative to the West —  bold, benevolent and unafraid of confrontation. In the process, they also neatly diverted attention from China’s economic entanglement in the fallout from Trump’s tariffs.

Which brings us back to the bigger question: is this mere coincidence? 

It’s premature to assert that Beijing is behind this wave of disinformation. There is no forensic trail, no leak and no definitive evidence of state sponsorship. But the narratives’ resonance, the re-use of old content, and their alignment with geopolitical tensions suggest more than random viral noise. Whether pushed by nationalists, click farms, or covert actors, the effect is the same: to distract, seduce and divide.

It is also essential to understand the uniquely fertile ground in which these stories took root. Indonesia, with its vast and volatile digital ecosystem, is especially vulnerable. Religion, politics and pop culture intertwine online and weak regulations make disinformation a structural feature of the landscape. 

Global South, global patterns

This matters because Indonesia is not an isolated case. The dynamics unfolding here — the entanglement of foreign policy narratives with cultural identity, the weaponization of myth, the speed of viral deception — echo patterns seen across the Global South. As Chinese soft power expands and Western influence shifts, the battle for public opinion unfolds not in official press releases but on platforms like TikTok, YouTube Shorts and WhatsApp.

What’s happening in Indonesia is not an anomaly. It’s a preview of how geopolitical stories will be contested in a post-truth world. Tariffs may have sparked the moment, but the real contest is for hearts and minds, waged through symbolism and sentiment, not statistics.

We shouldn’t overreact. Not every viral post is part of a conspiracy. But neither should we dismiss them.  Dismissing these stories as mere oddities overlooks the strategic vacuum they fill and the damage they can cause. In a world where the line between news and myth continues to blur, vigilance, digital literacy and a renewed commitment to transparency are our best defenses.

We may not yet know who is behind these stories. But we do know what’s at stake: not just the facts behind a prophet’s tomb or aid to Gaza, but the credibility of the public sphere itself. And in the long shadow of trade wars and power shifts, that may turn out to be the most crucial battleground of all.[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Under this new policy, the military recruits 17½–21-year-old men as Agniveers — “fire warriors” — who train for six months before reporting for active duty in the army, navy and air force. These Agniveers will serve for four years, after which the military will retain 25% of them. Those retained by the military will serve as “regular cadre,” who currently stay on for 15 years, with possibilities of staying on for longer if they win promotions.

What do proponents of Agnipath hope to achieve?

The Indian and other proponents defend Agnipath on four primary grounds: structural reform, fiscal efficiency, creating a talent funnel, and decreasing the average age of soldiers.

They argue that the earlier recruitment system relied on outdated caste and ethnic divisions. India inherited this structure from the British, who designated certain groups — such as Sikhs, Gurkhas, and Rajputs — as “martial races” and recruited them into region- and caste-specific regiments. These regiments mirrored the British Army’s model, which still includes units like the Royal Irish Regiment or the Scots Guards. In post-independence India, many of these traditions persisted, especially in the Army’s infantry. While the Air Force, Navy, and several arms of the Army now recruit nationally, many regiments still rely on local or ethnic catchments. Supporters claim this approach reflects colonial divide-and-rule tactics, not the needs of a modern nation-state. They believe India should eliminate these legacies and replace them with ethnically neutral, numbered units.

They also highlight the unsustainable cost of the previous model. Previously, long-term soldiers received not just pay, but pensions, healthcare, housing, and rations. Pensions alone consumed nearly a quarter of the defense budget. This heavy financial burden limited the military’s ability to invest in modernization, including critical equipment upgrades and advanced weapon systems. By reducing the number of long-term soldiers, the Agnipath system will reduce pension obligations. In 2025–26, the government allocated ($1.29 billion) for Agnipath — only 3.5% of the total ₹3.12 trillion ($36.6 billion) defense budget. Proponents argue that the policy frees up funds for modernization while trimming bureaucratic bloat.

Supporters also claim that the Agnipath system will allow the best talent to rise. Under the policy, only a quarter of Agniveers will be retained, so competition is intense. Government officials argue that this structure incentivizes performance and ensures that only the most capable and motivated candidates transition into the permanent cadre. In their view, this merit-based filter will create a more effective fighting force in the long run.

In addition to rewarding talent, the policy also aims to make the military younger. The government has stated that one of Agnipath’s goals is to reduce the average age of soldiers from 32 to 26. A younger military, it argues, will possess greater physical endurance, adaptability, and drive. Although the government has not set a specific timeline for achieving this demographic shift, officials maintain that a lower average age will inject josh aur jazba — zeal and passion — into the armed forces, enhancing both their morale and performance on the battlefield.

Agnipath will compromise the military’s effectiveness as a fighting force

Opponents of Agnipath raise serious concerns about morale, training, selection, and long-term stability. They argue that the policy reduces incentives, disrupts unit cohesion, and risks producing undertrained, undervalued soldiers.

They emphasize that young Indians often prefer government jobs for their job security. The civil service and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) offer permanent tenures. In contrast, Agniveers receive temporary contracts with no guarantee of retention. Even families with a long military tradition now encourage their children to join the police or other uniformed services instead. This shift undermines the Indian military’s recruitment base and makes it a less attractive career. The risks of combat remain high, but the pay is modest — ($350–$480) per month — and there are no pensions, no long-term healthcare, and no canteen privileges for most Agniveers. (Note that per capita annual income is around , as per the World Bank.) Soldiers know their service will be short, their benefits limited, and their families unsupported if they fall in battle.

This creates broader social concerns. Most recruits come from rural or semi-rural backgrounds, where honor and stability carry significant weight. A young man who returns home after four years without permanent employment may face stigma or struggle to marry. A large cohort of trained, armed, unemployed men could also increase social instability. History shows that unattached young men, especially those with combat training, often pose security risks — either by turning to crime or joining insurgencies.

Critics also challenge the policy’s impact on physical fitness and selection standards. To minimize corruption, Agnipath prioritizes exam scores over physical tests. This has led to the recruitment of candidates who may be academically capable but physically underprepared. Many do not come from traditional military communities and lack the pride and identity that comes with such lineage. Veterans and sergeants report that current Agniveers are less tough and less motivated than earlier cohorts.

The training regime reflects another key shortfall. Six months of training — compared to the 14-month programs of a decade ago — is too short to instill the physical and mental discipline needed for modern combat. Experts argue that recruits need at least three months of proper nutrition before they can even begin strenuous training. Furthermore, modern warfare, especially in the Air Force and Navy, requires highly technical skills. Even infantry soldiers now rely on sophisticated equipment, including night vision goggles, drones, and RPGs. If 75% of Agniveers leave after four years, the military has little incentive to invest in their advanced training. The result is a diluted, underprepared force.

The most serious concern raised by critics of Agnipath is the damage it inflicts on morale across the Indian military. Morale is not a superficial concern — it is the foundation of combat effectiveness, discipline, and sacrifice. A soldier who does not feel respected, valued, or secure in his role will not fight with conviction. The Agnipath policy signals, both symbolically and materially, that society places a lower value on military service than on other government jobs, such as those in the police or civil administration. Agniveers know that their employment is temporary, that their benefits are limited, and that most of them will be discharged after just four years. This awareness undermines their commitment and weakens the very institutions they serve. Over time, this constant churn of personnel erodes institutional memory and hollows out the experience base that any professional military depends on.

Compounding this morale crisis are the structural weaknesses embedded in the policy itself. Low pay, short training periods, and unclear criteria for retention all contribute to a sense of precarity and disposability among Agniveers. Soldiers who are not properly trained, not physically prepared, and not paid or treated on par with their long-term counterparts will naturally feel alienated from the institution they serve. These conditions send a clear message: that their contribution is short-term, replaceable, and ultimately expendable. Instead of fostering loyalty, camaraderie, or pride, the system incentivizes self-preservation. The Agnipath framework, by design, introduces a new class of temporary soldiers who lack a clear path forward — and that uncertainty saps morale at the core.

This shift is already changing the culture within the ranks. Officers and veterans report a steady decline in esprit de corps — the pride and unity that once defined the Indian military. Agniveers, occupying a lower rank than regular soldiers, now constitute a de facto new caste within the armed forces. Four years is simply not enough time to internalize regimental values or develop the kind of trust that makes soldiers willing to risk their lives for each other. In traditional units where soldiers fought for Nam, Namak, Nishan — honor, loyalty, and shared identity — such bonds took years to build. By contrast, Agnipath fosters a dog-eat-dog environment, where individual survival trumps collective mission. Agniveers, knowing they will soon exit the system and may never see their fellow recruits again, have little reason to form deep attachments. The result is a more fragmented, risk-averse, and ultimately less effective fighting force.

Agnipath will not achieve the benefits supporters claim

Given these contrasting sets of pros and cons, it would be easy to argue that its supporters and critics simply value different priorities — stability vs. flexibility, experience vs. youth, or institutional loyalty vs. cost savings. But this is misleading. In reality, Agnipath doesn’t just sacrifice one set of goals for another — it fails even on its own stated terms. Now, I will consider each of the pro arguments in turn and explain why Agnipath will not achieve the results it is meant to achieve.

On the issue of caste and ethnic regiments, critics agree that India should transcend colonial-era divisions. But they also argue that ethnic and regional identities still matter in India today. Regimental pride often draws strength from shared cultural backgrounds. Critics note that Nepal’s legendary Gurkhas — who have served with distinction in the Indian Army since 1815 — no longer find Agnipath attractive. They refuse to risk their lives for a temporary job that lacks honor and career progression. This rejection not only weakens the military but also strains India–Nepal relations. Meanwhile, Britain to recruit Gurkhas, and has begun studying their integration as a model for its own forces. Agnipath has already handed geopolitical advantages to India’s rivals.

Supporters emphasize that the new policy will reduce pension costs. Critics respond that this financial gain comes at too high a price. Pensions exist not just as a benefit but as a symbol of respect for those who serve. Retired soldiers often pass down institutional wisdom and support the military in civilian roles. Removing that link discourages recruitment and erodes long-term military culture. Young Indians may reject the Agnipath route in favor of more secure and stable careers — even if those offer less money. In times of crisis, India may find itself with fewer qualified and willing recruits. The Pahalgam attack of April 2025, which claimed 26 civilian lives, highlights the need for a military that blends the energy of youth with the judgment of experience. Budget cuts that hollow out that balance endanger national security.

Supporters claim that Agnipath rewards merit and competition. Critics disagree. They argue that the selection process now favors test-takers over patriots. Young men who want to serve their country long-term may never get the chance. Worse, those trained in arms for four years may return to society without a clear path. In rare cases, this may lead to radicalization or militancy — where the very training meant to serve the nation turns against it. More broadly, the lack of a reintegration plan will leave many Agniveers adrift, with no guarantee that their service will help them build a future.

Supporters say Agnipath will make the army younger. Critics acknowledge the potential benefits of youth, but they see no plan or timeline to reach the stated goal of reducing the average age to 26. They also question whether constant turnover will help the military. As Agniveers finally become competent in their fourth year, the military discharges most of them. This wastes training investment and drains institutional memory. Critics believe that a strong military needs both youthful vigor and veteran leadership — Agnipath provides neither in sustainable measure.

New Delhi must have the courage to change direction

The Agnipath policy has ignited widespread debate over its impact on the Indian military’s operational effectiveness. While the government introduced it as a step toward modernization, serious concerns have emerged — about the loss of experience, the difficulty of retaining talent, and the mental toll on short-term recruits. These concerns raise a pressing question: does the policy actually strengthen India’s defense, or does it compromise it?

Recognizing that this policy may have been a mistake is not a sign of weakness. It is a mark of responsibility. The government must have the courage to revise a flawed decision. Listening to veterans, defense experts, and those serving in uniform would allow the government to rework the scheme into something more stable, more effective, and more respectful of the armed forces’ mission.

This critique comes not from any lack of respect for the military, but from deep admiration for it. Indians owe an unshakable debt of patriotic gratitude to the men and women who serve, often at great personal risk. Out of that respect, we must insist that the military receive the support, resources, and long-term stability it deserves — not just symbolic praise, but meaningful policy.

The recent Pahalgam attack and continued threats on India’s borders make this need all the more urgent. A strong military cannot rely on youth alone. It must draw strength from the combination of youthful energy and experienced leadership. A recruitment policy that honors both will serve India’s security far better — and reflect the seriousness with which we regard those who defend it.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Josef Olmert: Hello. This is going to be our ninth and last episode in the current series about Syria. And I need to start with a methodical comment, I should say, because people ask me, knowing that’s going to be the last episode in this series, as to, “Why didn’t you talk enough about that issue or about this issue?” And obviously, Syria is a complicated, diversified and very important country. There’s so much to talk about, so I promise that I will talk more about certain aspects of the Syria situation in another series or in a couple or three more video presentations later on, and I will announce it to my followers on Facebook, on YouTube and all that. So this will happen.

Western media and grounded reality

Now, about what has happened in Syria recently, I have to again and again emphasize the fact that the media in the West — I have to say it. It’s not a campaign I conducted against the media in the West, but I want my watchers, my listeners, my followers to know what really is going on in Syria. There are lots and lots and lots of troubles between Sunnis and Alawis. Mostly the Alawis are now the victims. And the videos that come out from Syria — and they are authentic, they are authentic — are very bad, are very disturbing and should arouse concerns about what really is happening. Also, there are videos that show clearly that despite the image that the leaders of the new regime, particularly Ahmed al-Sharaa or al-Julani, are trying to portray about moderation or a more realistic approach, there are signs of attempts to enforce religious behavior. You see more and more women with the hijab in a lot of the videos, as opposed to before. And there are stories about the enforcement to do so and so on. And of course, the problems between the Turks and the Kurds in the northeast of Syria continue to simmer. So there are lots of issues that put together form a picture of a very fluid, unstable situation in Syria that doesn’t necessarily come to the attention of the world media. And it should, because we need to know what’s going on. Otherwise we shall be again surprised, like we were surprised so many times before, or at least those who were surprised — not everybody was as surprised. So today, in our last episode of this series, I would like to make some very concrete comments about what’s happening and will happen in Syria in the foreseeable future.

Elections and representation

And let’s start with the question: What government is Syria? Is the current guys that are in Damascus — al-Julani or Ahmed al-Sharaa, the people around him — are going to be the government of Syria? Or there might be elections? I would say that we cannot see or foresee — and that’s maybe a prediction — a situation whereby Syria will be conducted by a group of people that were not elected for a period of time that will be more than, say, a few months or so. It’s not that Syria has a tradition of elections. They used to have elections in Syria. There were elections in 1949, 1954 that were relatively democratic. But they don’t have a tradition of elections. So if this group of people, if this coalition of Islamic or Islamist groups, will continue to rule Syria without elections, there will be troubles. There will be also troubles if there will be elections, and the results will be the usual in some Arab dictatorships — of the 99%. There’s not going to be 99% in the real elections in Syria. You know, it used to be under Hafez Assad, under Bashar Assad. And you know, Hafez Assad was elected president for seven years, the term was, and it was like 99.96%. And then seven years later, it was 99.97%. And people asked me at that time, “What’s going on?” I said, “Look, he’s become more popular — from 99.96 to 99.97.” But we know, of course, this was elections. So we’ll see what happens about that. My prediction is there won’t be real elections in Syria that will be democratic on the basis of one person, one vote. And if there will be elections, there will be sham elections. Real elections in Syria should reflect the cleavages of society according to religious, ethnic and other divisions. I’ll say, to some in surprise, “Look, in Iraq, there were relatively free elections after the fall of Saddam. Under the American supervision, but they were more democratic than any time in Iraq before and maybe in most Arab countries at any time.” And what they showed was the role of local forces, of ethnic groups, of religious divisions as part of the overall new political fabric. Civil wars in countries like Iraq or Lebanon or Syria brought about a real breakup of society according to bases of loyalty that were primordial, traditional. And at the time of conflict, people went back to the original basis of their social and therefore political loyalties. And that was reflected, at least in the case of Iraq, in the results of elections. So if there will be real elections in Syria, there should be representation for people representing different regions, even within the Sunni community. And there are differences between Hama, Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. There are many differences. Regionalism is very significant. There will have to be representation for the various communities: the Kurds; the Druze; the Alawis, of course, they should be represented; the Ismailis, which is a Shia sect; the various Christian groups. And there are quite a few: Armenians, Assyrians, alongside the Greek Orthodox and the Greek Catholics of Syria and others. The Turkmen — there are lots of Turkmen people in the north of Syria, more than what people know about, over a million. It’s a large group of people. And the Turks will take care and they will be represented. So that remains to be seen, and that will be a test. So to sum up this point, there are not going to be real democratic elections in the foreseeable future. And if there will be elections, and the results will be the usual 90-whatever, you know it was sham elections. Real elections will show all those divisions that I talked about. They will have to show them if they are really real.

Islamization and social tensions

Islamization will be significant, even if these people claim to be more moderate, which is very logical for them to say and do and very clever politically, because they need to show a nicer face in order to be able to then talk to other governments and ask for economic aid or any of those, or political aid, diplomatic aid, diplomatic support. There will be definitely an Islamization in society that again will create issues with the religious minorities. Arab Sunnis in Syria are 55 to 60%. That means 40 to 45%, definitely around 40, are not Sunni Arabs. And any Sunni Islamization process that will be enforced from above is bound, therefore, to cause troubles. Very obvious it’s going to happen.

Regional relations and internal divides

When we talk about foreign relations of Syria, obviously Iran is out of the game. The question is the level and the depth of Turkish support to the new regime and influence over it. And we talked a lot about the Turkish part of all this. Iraq, neighboring country, Sunni Arab minority. Will they be encouraged by the new regime in Damascus? Possibly. Not necessarily going to happen. My prediction: will not be a major factor. More important is the connection between the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. That could be a much bigger problem for both the Syrians and the Iraqis. The Druze in the south will not like to separate themselves in any formal way from the Syrian state. Never mind what some agitated Israelis have in mind about that. It’s not going to happen. But I can see, and I believe it will be, an informal Israeli zone of influence in parts of south Syria bordering with Jordan as well, inhabited by the Druze of the Jabal, of the mountain, that will make sure, from their perspective, because of their interest, that the border will not become a zone of hostilities between any government in Damascus and Israel. And that will be a difference from what it was when the Assad regime was so much dominated by Hezbollah, the Iranians, that tried to turn the Syrian side of the Golan Heights into a zone of conflict with Israel. And what Israelis are doing in Syria or have done in Syria to destroy any presence of hostile elements in those areas of Syria was intended to make it easier for the local forces that are there to keep stability along the border, which will be their interest. The real problem will be between the regime in Damascus and the Alawis. Killing Alawis in the streets now, of cities in Syria which are not Alawi-dominated, is terrible. It’s one thing, though. Trying to invade the mountains and really take over the entire mountainous region of the Alawis and then enforce a regime upon them would lead to a bloodbath, to a real major bloodshed. It hasn’t yet happened. Hopefully, it will not happen. But then the question is, what will be the representation of the Alawis in the new regime, in the new parliament that will be in any body of influence in the country? It will be very small. And you can’t ignore a certain percent of the population if you adapt to this. Also the 2% of the Ismailis — about 50% that are closer to Shia Islam than to Sunni Islam.

Sectarian dynamics, regional influence and outlook

And, of course, the question of the relation between Syria and Lebanon. In a famous speech in 1976, when Hafez Assad justified the Syrian invasion of Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war at that time, he said in simple words, Syria and Lebanon is one country, is one nation. That’s the typical Greater Syria approach that was adopted by the Ba’ath regime, even though originally, it is the approach of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party of Antoun Saadeh, the SSNP, that was mistakenly in French called the PPS. It’s not the right acronym in Arabic. The Syrian regime now will have to let the Lebanese conduct their affairs by themselves, and they will have to leave Lebanon for itself. Lebanon will have its own problems. We don’t talk about Lebanon now. They elected a new president, he talks a lot about changes, and all this remains to be seen. We always have to take with a grain of salt what Lebanese politicians say, particularly after they are elected. But that remains to be seen. So Syria and Lebanon will not be one country, one nation. And that also depends on the Iranians. If Iran is not allowed to move anymore from Iraq via Syria to Lebanon, the Iranian influence in Lebanon will have to be weakened, and will be weakened. And it will be not totally destroyed. There are Shias that are always supporters of Iran — many of them — but it will be decreased dramatically. And it also depends on Israel, how Israel would tolerate or not any attempts to recreate connection between Syria and Lebanon that would have also adverse repercussions on the border between Lebanon and Syria. Now we come to the last point about this — foreign affairs — and this is the role of the powers. Russia is out of the game. There are talks about, if vacuum created by the absence of Russia, China will move in. Remains to be seen, I doubt it. There’s an opening here for other countries. The question really is, who would fill the vacuum? Mostly, initially, it will be by Turkey. But the Turks cannot do in Syria what everybody said that they intend to do. They don’t have the funds, the financial resources, the economic resources rather, to reconstruct Syria. That will have to come from the Gulf countries, which as of now keep their hands off. They’re very careful and will remain careful for time to come. And, of course, the role played by the US. What will the Trump administration do? Surely, they have to make sure that the Kurds’ virtual autonomy in the northeast will be maintained, but to try and do it in a way that will prevent Turkish–Kurdish war. That remains to be seen. I doubt whether the Trump administration will invest too much money in Syria or at all. So we are going back to the EU. Somebody will have to put some money because Syria is a ruined, destroyed country after all those years of civil war. And if you don’t rehabilitate, reconstruct, rebuild Syria, there will not be stability there. Doesn’t matter who rules the country. As of now, we hear statements from the Europeans about the desire to accommodate themselves to the new regime. And al-Julani shows how moderate he is, and visits by the German and French foreign ministers and all this. But in the meantime, no money is coming, and money will be the key here. I will leave you with that, because we can go on and on like this. But the picture coming or emerging — isn’t that the main point? Syria is in a very bad situation. Rehabilitating, rebuilding a country after such an atrocious civil war is not a simple matter. And even if you can establish some political institutions that will be considered representative, to rebuild the relationship between the various communities is another story altogether. The same problem in Iraq. We have the same problem in Lebanon. We have the same problem in Libya. We shall have troubles in Syria. We shall have troubles by Syria. We shall have troubles connected with Syria. And therefore, there will be more talks from me, more presentations, but not immediately. I will let you know when we shall do more. So I will leave you with that. Sometimes people like an end to a story like this to be a happy end. The history of Syria over 100 years is not a happy history. I have no reason to believe that we are witnessing now a dramatic departure from traditional Syrian history, unfortunately. Thank you, my friends.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Josef Olmert on Syria, Part 9 — Predicting Syria’s Future appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

China’s expanding public diplomacy in Indonesia

Over the years, China has strategically broadened its soft power initiatives in Indonesia across multiple sectors, including education, media, religion and economic development. Through scholarships, media partnerships, religious outreach and infrastructure investments, Beijing has strengthened its influence, which could expand with the gaps left by the US

China has actively engaged with Indonesia’s academic institutions by providing for Indonesian students to study in China and funding collaborations. These partnerships allow Beijing to connect with Indonesia’s intellectual circles, shaping discussions on economics, governance and international relations to align with China’s interests.

With the shutdown of VOA, the void in independent US-aligned media coverage would allow China to expand its media presence. Chinese state-run media outlets such as Xinhua have increased their footprint in Indonesia through and . These efforts enable Beijing to steer public discourse in ways that promote its geopolitical narratives and economic ambitions. Some Indonesian media that have collaborated with China are now critical news on China.

In addition, China has deepened its engagement with Indonesia’s influential Muslim organizations, including Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and the Lembaga Persahabatan Ormas Islam (LPOI). During Ramadan this year, for instance, events such as the (futuristic Quran recitation) and iftar gatherings, China has actively participated in religious discussions, seeking to counter concerns about Beijing’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims while reinforcing China’s diplomatic and cultural presence in Indonesia.

China’s growing investments in Indonesia under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have cemented its key development partner role. The withdrawal of USAID programs, which once health, education and anticorruption initiatives, has left an economic gap that Beijing is eager to fill. China will likely strengthen its presence even more in Indonesia by offering infrastructure investments, financial aid and development funds.

China’s expanding public diplomacy efforts serve multiple strategic objectives. By strengthening its influence in Indonesia’s educational, media and religious sectors, Beijing is shaping narratives that favor its policies, particularly regarding how its in Indonesia would benefit the country and human rights issues, like those in . The results of this approach are evident in Indonesia’s reluctance to criticize China’s human rights policies. While Jakarta has been outspoken in its condemnation of Myanmar’s persecution of the and Israel’s treatment of , it has remained largely on Beijing’s actions in Xinjiang. This selective advocacy reflects China’s successful diplomatic engagement and economic leverage over Indonesia’s decision-making on global human rights issues.

Indonesia’s Future in an evolving geopolitical landscape

As China deepens its presence in Indonesia, its narratives and strategic priorities are becoming more ingrained in Indonesian society. This shift can potentially reshape Indonesia’s long-term foreign policy stance and public perception of global power dynamics. While economic cooperation with China offers clear benefits, it raises concerns about Indonesia’s ability to maintain independent , particularly regarding human rights or any other issues pertaining to China, including Beijing’s growing in the South China Sea.

With the US retreating from its traditional soft power engagements, Indonesia faces a critical juncture. The growing reliance on China for economic, media and diplomatic engagement presents opportunities and challenges. While strengthening ties with Beijing may yield short-term gains, it also requires careful consideration of Indonesia’s broader strategic interests. As China continues advancing its public diplomacy efforts, Indonesia must weigh the long-term implications of its increasing dependence on Beijing.

To respond, the US should reinvigorate its public diplomacy initiatives in Indonesia. Reconsidering defunding for VOA and USAID programs would help reestablish American engagement in critical sectors such as media, education and governance. Expanding scholarships, cultural exchanges and research collaborations with Indonesian institutions can provide alternative avenues for intellectual and diplomatic cooperation. 

Furthermore, reinforcing economic partnerships through infrastructure investments and trade agreements would demonstrate a long-term US commitment to Indonesia’s development, providing Jakarta with more options beyond Beijing’s initiatives.

One thing remains clear: the geopolitical landscape in Indonesia is evolving, with China’s influence set to grow even further. How Indonesia navigates this new reality will determine its place in an increasingly multipolar world.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Authorities quickly the final toll: 126 dead, 337 injured and more than 3,600 homes in ruins. However, amid the devastation, a different reality emerged, one that exposed the harsh controls imposed on Tibet, where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strictly manages information, even in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

Controlling the narrative

Two days after the earthquake, Global Times, a Chinese tabloid known for promoting CCP propaganda, published an extensive on the aid response. This account never referred to the Himalayan nation as “Tibet” but instead used “Xizang,” a name the CCP in 2023. see this change as a deliberate attempt to erase the country from the map.Ěý

According to Global Times, rescue teams reached the epicenter within 30 minutes. The report claimed that, within days, affected residents had warm shelter and received three hot meals a day. It goes on to paint the picture of a unified response, where countless aid workers and volunteers provided relief without ethnic divisions. It declared, “While a natural disaster has torn a wound into the snowy plateau, the entire nation is working tirelessly to heal it,” calling the effort “the best interpretation of human rights.”

However, what this portrayal failed to mention was Tibet’s extreme restrictions. The Chinese government bans international media from entering the region, and Freedom House, a US-based advocacy group, Tibet alongside North Korea as one of the most repressive places in the world. In Tibet, sharing politically sensitive information online or communicating with someone abroad without permission can result in lengthy prison sentences. In the days following the earthquake, Tibetans posting on Douyin (the Chinese version of TikTok) reported strict censorship. One user refused to discuss the disaster, citing a Tibetan proverb: “If one does not control the long tongue, one’s round head will be in trouble.”

With the Chinese government controlling all official information, Global Times and similar outlets had total dominance of the narrative. Yet, in the weeks since the earthquake, Tibetan rights organizations and refugees contradicting the official reports. These sources revealed that the CCP carefully managed details of aid distribution and even the reported death toll.

Despite Global Times’ claims of “ethnic unity,” Chinese authorities restricted Tibetans’ movements within 24 hours of the quake. The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), a US-based advocacy group, new security checkpoints that limited access to the disaster zone, preventing Tibetans from delivering aid.Ěý

One day after the quake, officials in Dingri, where the epicenter lay, posted a suspending relief donated by Tibetans. ICT suggested that authorities wanted to maintain control over the official narrative. The notice stated: “At present, Dingri County has sufficient reserves of various disaster relief supplies. After having discussions, it has been decided to stop accepting donations of disaster relief supplies from all walks of life from now on.” The Tibetan government-in-exile, based in India, with an open letter urging the CCP to allow more aid to be distributed, especially medical assistance.Ěý

On dangerous ground

The Tibetan leadership also raised concerns about China’s regional development policies. The letter directly challenged Global Times’ claim that China had modernized Tibet, instead blaming “excessive” dam construction and mining for increased seismic activity. In , a devastating earthquake in Tibet killed nearly 70,000 people. Experts later suggested that a massive Chinese-built dam may have triggered the disaster, making it the deadliest earthquake linked to human activity.

China’s hydropower projects have drawn for their environmental and geopolitcal consequences. These dams disrupt major rivers flowing into India, Bangladesh and other parts of Southeast Asia. Concerns about their safety have for years. In the days following the quake, Chinese officials initially that none of their dams sustained damage. However, they later that five of the 14 dams in the affected area had developed structural problems. One of them had suffered such severe damage that its walls tilted, forcing the evacuation of 1,500 people living downstream.

The CCP’s lack of transparency has also cast doubt on the official death toll. Authorities reported 126 deaths within 48 hours of the quake and never revised. The tremors were strong enough to be felt more than 200 miles away, yet ICT research showed that officials based their count on just 27 villages within a 12-mile radius of the epicenter. Radio Free Asia, a US-government-funded news outlet, the death toll two days after its release. Reports from local Tibetans suggested that at least 100 had died in a single township. On January 11th, Radio Free Asia’s Tibetan Service  morgue staff who estimated the actual death toll exceeded 400. Given Tibet’s severe repression and isolation, the true number of casualties may never be known.

The next recovery phase will focus on reconstruction, but many Tibetans fear that Beijing will seize control of the process without consulting local communities. ICT a government whistleblower who revealed that after a 2010 earthquake killed 3,000 people, officials diverted emergency funds for personal gain, depriving many survivors of housing assistance. “China had painted a picture of remarkable recovery,” ICT stated. “However, reality is far from what the Chinese government claims.” If history repeats itself, the victims of this disaster may find themselves abandoned, while officials exploit the tragedy to strengthen their grip over Tibet.Ěý

[edited this piece]

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The Great Game 

In the past few years, especially after the Bangladesh crisis, India’s traditional sphere of influence was under tension as India’s eastern and western frontiers became unstable in the west— the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and east-Bangladesh witnessed a dramatic . The eastern frontier after the Dhaka episode became more tense as India was already negotiating a tense situation in Myanmar after a coup in 2021, keeping its northeast borders secure from and arms cartels, which had surged ever since the Manipur crises began in 2023. Measured diplomatic and watching from the fence approaches were a kind of mood-observing behaviours, which were no more effective given dynamically evolving strategic security where, at one end, Pakistan is pressing hard to develop strategic depth, especially after the Afghanistan debacle and Bangladesh crises. On the other hand, China used show-off tactics, and the clandestine drug-arm cartel was attempting to weaken the northeastern region, especially the Indo-Myanmar border. If we pay closer attention to recent regional developments in and around South Asia, undercurrents challenging Delhi’s Sphere of Influence are quietly building up.Ěý

Asim Malik, Pakistan’s Intelligence Chief, visited after decades, indicating that Pakistan is opening a sense of strategic depth against India after its Afghanistan strategy has backfired. If nurtured well, Pakistan can develop an interesting opportunity. First, sustainable strategic strategies against India by staging terror proxy groups this is a strategy that has been in an eroding position for a few years. Second, it sets the stage for Pakistan-China-Bangladesh strategic and economic cooperation, which can help Pakistan with its short-term financial problems. Third, suppose the above two things get into the flow. In that case, Pakistan can carve out tactical sustainability and pursue an anti-Taliban campaign in full throttle, which is currently limited due to multiple crises at home.

Easier said than done: Pakistan–China axis 

Pakistan’s diplomacy in Bangladesh, China and Turkey may be an effort to create a strategic competition that includes Bangladesh within the Pakistan-China axis against India. As noted earlier, this diplomatic maneuvering by Pakistan is significant, at least in the long term. However, it remains challenging for Pakistan to find a silver lining in this escalating diplomatic game in South Asia.

First, there is the absence of full backhand support in Bangladesh. Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus’s regime received clandestine support from the US, but as the US underwent a regime change, it adjusted to the evolving Asian geopolitical realities. Bangladesh would have limited options to bank entirely on China as Dhaka must also keep the US in its court. The void in full backhand support will create problems for Yunus, who will face mounting pressure to call early elections in Bangladesh.

Second, the Taliban threat in Pakistan has recently increased. Tajik militant organizations supported by the Taliban have established their presence in Afghanistan with the backing of Al Qaeda. The threat to Pakistan from Afghanistan is growing, especially after the ISIS-Khorasan resurgence, which is attempting to establish itself in Afghanistan. If it goes out of the grip, then this security nightmare is enough for Pakistan not to make much noise in the neighborhood.

Third, China and Turkey are close strategic partners to Pakistan and may carefully deal with it. Turkey has already observed a moderate response to the backdrop of Pakistan’s President’s visit. Turkish President Recep Tayyip recently made a statement that India and Pakistan should resolve the Kashmir issue through dialogue, unlike years ago when Turkey used to back Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. The backdrop of the visit shows some such signs. China plans to shift its focus toward the US, similar to its approach during the Trump administration. At the same time, the US intends to confront China directly, particularly in the South Asia theater. Such diverted attention and efforts of Pakistan’s all-weather partners will make initiating a strategic competition or great game-like situation targeting India challenging. This highlights Pakistan’s intricate challenges in the geopolitical game in South Asia.

India’s deft diplomacy and growing depth with the US 

India’s effective negotiations and organized tactics drive adjustments to adapt to the changing political scene in South Asia. On the one hand, this deft diplomacy will help moderate and negotiate with emerging threats and attempt to increase and secure India’s traditional sphere of influence.

New Delhi’s efforts to engage with the Taliban and even allow them to send a representative to Afghanistan’s embassy, which has seen almost no diplomatic presence since the Taliban’s takeover, were notable. The most notable deft diplomacy was with and Myanmar. New Delhi engaged with top BNP leaders and attempted to influence and moderate relations with Bangladesh, which underwent significant change after Sheikh Hasina’s ouster. Last year, New Delhi Myanmar’s rebel group to negotiate a deteriorating security situation at its northeastern border, which impacted Manipur.Ěý

The increasing clout of India’s deft diplomacy puts New Delhi in a good spot not only to progress but also to contest the changing power dynamics of South Asia. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to the US has led to tectonic movements in the power balance of South Asia. The US and India are deepening their strategic ties with initiatives like (“Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology”) and TRUST (“Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology”) to explore multi-dimensional areas of cooperation, especially in technology and defence, which can build a strong US axis in developing multilateral forums such as Indo-Pacific, enlarging strategic and political salience at the regional level.Ěý

However, what is intriguing is Trump’s of F-35 jets to India. This offer, which New Delhi should seriously consider, has the potential to influence the power balance in South Asia. India does not possess standalone air striking capability and does not have fifth-generation fighter jets. Suppose India agrees to this deal after considering its acquisition needs and calculations. In that case, it will be a game-changer, putting India in direct competition with China regarding air superiority. Air denial operations and air striking capabilities against Pakistan would significantly increase, giving India an option for carrying out more precise and in-depth strikes inside Pakistan without much noise, as the F-35 comes with a high degree of stealth. India’s increase in offensive and deterrence capabilities will surely stir the China–Pakistan axis, but that’s what the US wants. They want to push China to such a limit where the US can significantly influence Asian power dynamics against China to contain its overreaching sphere of influence in and around the South and Southeast region. At the same time, the US continues to develop its political and strategic clout in the region through the West- South Asia Connect and Indo-Pacific theatres.

With changes happening in West Asia and Europe, there is ample space for India’s deft diplomacy and the Indo-US relationship to explore geopolitical and geostrategic aspects. This exploration will open South Asia to significant multilateral connections, ultimately contributing to India’s strategic rise in the world order. However, a caveat in this bright possibility is the dangers of misadventure and miscalculations by those who will come under intense pressure to respond to India’s strategic rise and Asia’s changing power balance.

[ edited this piece.]

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Besides a struggling pension , high home and other factors, a significant contributor to the city’s woes lies in the controversial privatization initiatives from the 2000s, known as the “Great Chicago .” Over the past two decades, these decisions have siphoned an estimated from Chicago.

The privatization trend began under former Mayor Richard M. Daley, starting with the Chicago Skyway. In 2005, the 7.8-mile toll road was leased to a consortium led by Spain’s Ferrovial and Australia’s Macquarie Group for $1.83 billion. Tolls were raised immediately, and in 2016, the 99-year lease was to “a of Canadian pension funds” — the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (OMERS), the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) and the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan (OTPP) — for $2.8 billion. Australia’s Atlas Arteria Ltd then acquired a two-thirds stake for $2 billion in 2022 while OTTP retained the remainder.

In 2006, four downtown parking garages with more than were leased for 99 years to Morgan Stanley for $563 million. After Morgan Stanley defaulted on its debt tied to the lease agreement, control was transferred in 2014 to lenders, including France’s Societe Generale, the German government and Italy’s UniCredit S.p.A. In 2016, Australia’s AMP Capital and Canada’s Northleaf Capital Partners acquired the garages.

Abu Dhabi came into the in 2008. In a $1.16 billion deal, 36,000 parking meters were sold to Chicago Parking Meters (CPM) LLC for 75 years, a consortium led by Morgan Stanley. Morgan Stanley’s Infrastructure group soon restructured CPM’s ownership, major stakes to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Germany’s Allianz through complex investment vehicles. Over the next five years, parking fees more than . By 2022, CPM recovered its entire $1.16 billion investment, while the city had spent buying back parking spots to cover the revenue it would have until 2084. As of 2024, the investment has returned , with 60 years left on the lease.

Daley’s goal was to the city’s budget without raising property taxes before leaving office. However, the one-time payments resulted in long-term consequences. In addition to financial losses, the privatization deals have hindered Chicago’s ability to modernize infrastructure by limiting efforts to build bike lanes and reduce car dependence downtown. People even need to get permission or make payments to companies thousands of miles away for local street parades.

Growing privatization

Profit-driven entities argue that privatizing public infrastructure leads to greater efficiency through expertise and investment. However, their focus is on profit maximization, not service improvement, leading to long-term . Furthermore, in contracts with limited liability companies, the government assumes the losses, while private companies reap the profits. Companies can walk away or demand renegotiations, while governments are left to maintain services, absorb long-term revenue losses and burden the public with higher costs.

As Chicago’s experience shows, privatization has extended beyond domestic markets to become an international phenomenon. Starting in the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank encouraged the privatization of public infrastructure to attract investment, leading to its internationalization. “A 2006 study by the Norwegian government of IMF conditionality revealed that 23 out of 40 poor countries still have privatization and liberalization conditions attached to their IMF loans,” stated an Oxfam Briefing Paper.

By 2000, sovereign wealth funds, pension funds and multinational corporations began treating infrastructure as a global asset class, involving extended leases that frequently change hands.

Foreign companies operate under bilateral investment treaties or trade agreements, allowing them to bypass local courts. Disputes are often mediated in foreign courts or through international arbitration, such as Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) and the World Trade Organization. By exploiting legal loopholes like offshore subsidiaries and tax havens, companies can also shield profits while facing little public scrutiny. Despite these issues, domestic infrastructure continues to be increasingly available on international markets.

US privatization

While Chicago remains the most prominent American example, similar deals are widespread across the United States, primarily involving companies from allied or dependent nations.

In 1998, Atlanta, Georgia became one of the first cities to enter into an international privatization deal over public services, signing a 20-year and $428 million with United Water, a subsidiary of France’s corporate conglomerate Suez, to operate the city’s water system. Celebrated as the biggest privatization contract in the US at the time, it led to claims of quality decline, delays and other mismanagement before the contract was , leading to the infrastructure being returned to public control in 2003.

Nonetheless, the trend continued. By 2006, foreign companies were leasing and operating of US port terminals along with a smaller share of the nation’s airports. The United Kingdom’s National Grid and operates electric transmission networks in the northeastern US.

Indiana has since become a prominent example of experimenting with international privatization. France’s Veolia entered a 20-year contract to manage Indianapolis’s waterworks in 2002. The deal was, however, in 2010. Meanwhile, its airport was by the British Airport Authority from 1994 to 2007. In 2006, the Indiana Toll Road was to a foreign consortium led by Spanish and Australian companies for 75 years for $3.8 billion. It was later for $5.7 billion to Australia’s IFM Investors in 2015.

US entities have purchased some infrastructure abroad, such as in 1999, when a subsidiary of Bechtel privatized Cochabamba’s in Bolivia before controversy forced its exit. But for a major economy, the US owns surprisingly little foreign infrastructure. It has few state-owned enterprises for overseas infrastructure investment, though some private entities like Blackstone’s Infrastructure Partners division and Corsair Capital are active. Instead, extensive domestic privatization opportunities have made US infrastructure a prime target for American and foreign investors.

Canadian and Australian companies

and pension funds and other entities, driven by well-funded systems, consolidation, government support and early privatization experience, have become major infrastructure investors in the US and elsewhere. The CPPIB owns worldwide, the OTPP holds stakes in across Europe, along with the Channel Tunnel, while the Canadian company Brookfield Infrastructure Partners owns across Europe.

Roughly half of Australia’s pension pool is invested the country. But Australia’s Macquarie Group, in particular, has seen its assets surge, emerging as the “world’s infrastructure asset manager.” Since the 1990s, Macquarie Group has focused on underperforming or undervalued public assets to acquire and restructure. It its Global Infrastructure Fund in 2001 “to invest in infrastructure financing opportunities in the US, Canada, UK, and the European Union,” according to its website. In addition to Chicago’s Skyway, Macquarie holds long-term operational licenses for the Dulles Greenway toll road in Virginia and the Foley Beach in Alabama, among others.

Macquarie’s toll road portfolio in India is worth an estimated . It took a stake in Greece’s largest utility, Public Power Corporation, in 2021. It also led the push for the UK’s Bristol Airport in 2001, while Britain’s largest water utility was to an international consortium led by Macquarie Group from 2006 to 2017. Macquarie also took full of the UK’s National Gas Network in 2023.

According to a July 2023 The Guardian article entitled, “As Thames Water sinks, Macquarie Group continues its unstoppable rise,” Macquarie is “well known for taking advantage of volatile markets. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, it bet big on non-investment grade loans, known as junk debt. ​​The debt was cheap, but the quality was decent and the returns turned out to be excellent.”

European investment

The UK has been a for infrastructure investors since the global wave of privatization in the 1980s. Beyond Macquarie’s infrastructure holdings, the UK’s largest electricity generation company was privatized and by France’s Électricité de France (EDF) in 2009. Foreign investors have continued to diversify, with Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) poised to Newcastle Airport, after acquiring a 37.6% stake in Heathrow with French co-investor in 2024.

Europe’s collective experience with infrastructure privatization has been marked by controversy, largely due to Western European corporate dominance. As the EU expanded, some Western EU companies bought of critical infrastructure in Eastern EU member states. In 2015, Greece privatized regional airports, handing them over to a consortium led by the German company Fraport. This move was unpopular in Greece, especially following the austerity measures imposed by the EU and Germany during Greece’s economic crisis. However, the EU also provides safeguards in such deals, including and economic support to member states.

Outside the EU, resolving disputes is even more challenging. French water like Veolia and Suez are leaders in global privatization efforts but have ended up in court over dealings with in the 1990s, in the 2000s and in the 2010s. Argentina its oil company from Spanish company Repsol in 2012 after domestic backlash, damaging relations between the two countries. Such cases can be particularly sensitive when they involve former colonial powers and their former colonies, as economic disputes risk being seen as extensions of past dominance, with former ruling states accused of leveraging privatization to maintain influence.

Chinese stakes

China’s Belt and Road Initiative predominantly focuses on building infrastructure in non-Western countries, though the of Laos’s electric grid shows an exception. By contrast, Europe’s existing infrastructure has proven attractive for Chinese investment. Greece sold a 51% stake in its Piraeus Port Authority in 2016 to China’s China Ocean Shipping Company shipping, which later increased to in 2021.

China’s competitive pricing, strategic interests and substantial financial and productive resources have extended its infrastructure influence to countries with their own expansive foreign infrastructure portfolios. Chinese firms hold stakes in Belgian, Dutch, German, Spanish and Italian , as well as European and infrastructure.

In Australia, the Port of Darwin was for 99 years in 2015 to China’s Landbridge Group, with the Australian government resisting pressure to cancel the deal. The State Grid Corporation of China and its subsidiaries, meanwhile, hold large stakes in Australia’s electricity and gas , raising national security concerns due to its close ties to Chinese military and intelligence agencies. Furthermore, China’s control over Australian has granted it valuable water rights.

The geopolitical implications of these foreign investments in infrastructure are undeniable, with national security concerns forcing China to its stake in the US Port of Long Beach in 2019. Yet such investments are only becoming more common globally. While they may strengthen economic ties between countries, they reduce accountability, risk undermining sovereignty and disconnect public services from local oversight, sidelining effective public planning in favor of enriching foreign entities.

This trend appears likely to continue, requiring more responsible approaches to maintaining a healthy balance between the necessity for infrastructure investment and public needs. Shorter contracts, profit-sharing models and performance-based agreements could help countries and companies showcase their development models and expertise — potentially even at lower costs than local providers. However, profit maximization remains the driving force, particularly when financial entities dominate the field.

[This article was produced by , a project of the Independent Media Institute.]

[ edited this piece.]

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US may lose the dominant position in the US-China “competition”

Over the past half-century, due to its so-called advantages such as autocratic politics, the whole-nation system and unfair competition, China has developed rapidly in the fields of economy, science and technology. However, China’s bandit development logic over the years has also caused extreme dissatisfaction among most democratic countries in the world. This includes, most importantly, the US.

In 2018, under the impetus of President Donald Trump’s administration, Western countries led by the United States launched a “” against China. Since the US holds the most powerful weapon in global trade — the dollar — China has been forced into a very passive position regarding global trade. However, it is unrealistic for the US to defeat communist China with a few trade barriers. The competition between major powers is often a long-standing game that depends not only on who has the bigger fist but also on who has a stronger determination.

However, no one expected that in a few years, the US macro-economy would be in trouble. , the US has experienced severe inflation. Usually, this requires the Fed to raise interest rates, but this is not the case. With the US debt hitting new highs, breaking through the mark at the end of 2024, the Fed is forced to lower interest rates in order to halt the debt pressure.Ěý

If the Fed continues to cut interest rates, the advantage the US dollar has accumulated over the years will disintegrate more quickly. Many countries are now promoting a “multi-currency” settlement system under the active advocacy of China. China is also eroding the original advantages of the dollar bit by bit. Last August, as soon as the news of the Fed’s upcoming interest rate cut was released, the renminbi by more than 1,000 basis points within just one week. It can be said that the losses the renminbi suffered due to past US interest rate hikes were all compensated at once.

China is about to reap the US in reverse

The US is currently at a crossroads: raising interest rates is not feasible with the current debt situation, but lowering interest rates further will cause extreme consequences. First, when the dollar depreciates, or loses value, capital suddenly becomes the most mischievous troublemaker. Investors are likely to go to other places such as China to find better investment returns. Capital is profit-seeking, and investors will go wherever the profit is higher. This means that more dollar funds would flow into China. 

Second, if the renminbi appreciates, or increases in value, it will boost the real purchasing power of Chinese consumers. This will substantially minimize the Chinese people’s dissatisfaction with the government.

Third, there is a deeper “” brewing behind the scenes. The dollar’s global dominance has caused other countries to offload dissatisfaction onto the dollar. In other words, dissatisfaction with US monetary policy has reinforced China’s ability to challenge the United States to a certain extent.Ěý

Fourth, although the depreciation of the dollar might result in sluggish exports for China, the appreciation of the renminbi may buy China more bargaining chips in the global game. 

The macroeconomic situation of the US is not very optimistic. Under such circumstances, the turmoil brought about by this wave of interest rate cuts in the US may open up more strategic opportunities for China. Therefore, in the coming year, any minor strategic mistake in US monetary policy is likely to lead to a fierce and fatal counterattack from China, which has been eyeing the US for a long time.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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A moral groundwork

From its inception, America has framed its defining conflicts as to restore human and divine justice. For example, the Revolutionary War was not just a fight for independence; it was a battle against tyranny and a defense of individuals’ “unalienable rights endowed by a Creator” — a concept deeply influenced by Enlightenment philosopher John Locke. The Revolutionary War established of individualism, egalitarianism and activism, values rooted in both Enlightenment ideals and Judeo-Christian principles that celebrate individual liberty and human dignity.ĚýThese secular and spiritual ideals are embedded in foundational American documents such as the and the .

Similarly, the Civil War, while centering on economy and sovereignty, transformed into a moral crusade with President Abraham Lincoln’s opposition to slavery. By linking the war to the liberation of slaves, Lincoln set the groundwork for a United States based on equality and human dignity.

This moral foundation has defined America’s involvement in global conflicts throughout the 20th century. In both world wars, America intervened not merely out of self-interest but out of a sense of duty to preserve democracy, national interests with moral responsibility. President Franklin D. Roosevelt America’s fight against Nazism and fascism as a battle between good and evil, reinforcing the nation’s belief that democracy must prevail globally. Through its wartime efforts, America created a world order in which liberal values could thrive. The United Nations and its are the fruits of that moral American vision whose legacy has defined international order to this day.

The Cold War further emphasized America’s commitment to spreading liberal democracy. In contrast to the communist ideology that elevated the above the individual, America championed the right of every human being to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Democratic and Republican presidents, from to , equally emphasized the importance of this moral vision in the free world’s fight against communism. That philosophical commitment, more than mere technological or economic might, helped America win the Cold War and led to the spread of democratic governance across the world.

The loss of morality

Today, however, US foreign policy is increasingly abandoning its moral vision. This decline stems from a significant in bipartisan support for promoting democracy worldwide. Domestic challenges, along with perceived failures in recent nation-building efforts abroad, have dampened the American public’s and policymakers’ interest in democracy overseas. This shift has triggered an isolationist trend in US foreign policy arguably unseen since .

Because America’s global influence is built on not just military might or economic power, but a , the recent reluctance to follow that path risks undermining a legacy carefully built following WWII. By stepping back from the world stage, America risks creating a power vacuum that authoritarian regimes are eager to fill, leaving a more isolated US vulnerable to new threats in the long term.

When President Barack Obama from supporting democratic uprisings in and , he left in the lurch populations striving for freedom against brutal dictatorships, undermining American credibility. Similarly, President Joe Biden’s from Afghanistan ceded control back to the Taliban, reversing years of progress in women’s rights and civil liberties. Now, President-Elect Donald Trump may for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression when he goes back to the White House in January 2025. US foreign policy risks yet another retreat — one that could determine the fate of Ukraine’s sovereignty and, by extension, the resilience of democracy in Europe.

If Ukraine falls to Russian aggression, it could much of Eastern and Northern Europe and set a dangerous precedent for the unchecked expansion of the Kremlin’s authoritarianism westward. This scenario would ripple across the region, threatening the democratic security of the Baltic states, the Caucasus and potentially Central Europe, posing the gravest challenge to democracy in Western Europe since World War II.

A collapse of democratic resistance in Ukraine could also to expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific. If America and its allies hesitate in Europe, Beijing might seize the opportunity to assert dominance over Taiwan and pressure Japan, while North Korea could feel encouraged to take aggressive steps toward South Korea. The effects could reach as far as India and Australia. Such outcomes would jeopardize decades of democratic progress in the Indo-Pacific and destabilize an entire region critical to global economy and security.

In addition to these risks, a potential US withdrawal from NATO would not only embolden external adversaries but could also fracture Europe internally. This move could empower pro-Russian factions within the European Union to pursue closer ties with Moscow, sidelining pro-democracy and pro-American parties. An eastward European shift would strain Washington and lay the groundwork for a strategic encirclement of the United States.

Given the rise of authoritarianism worldwide, the US must renew its commitment to human rights and democracy. While both Democrats and Republicans may hesitate to champion liberal values abroad, now more than ever, the US needs to reset its moral compass, recommit to its moral foundations in foreign policy, and prioritize the promotion of democratic ideals in the world. This renewed commitment to democracy in foreign policy is essential for preserving America’s global leadership but also critical for keeping the world a freer and safer place.

[ edited this piece]

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The US emerged as the global superpower thanks to World War II. In 1945, Europe was in ruins. The war caused widespread destruction in Europe because of the bombing of cities and factories. European powers lost millions of people in the war. Being far from Europe and Japan, the incurred a very low rate of civilian casualties. There was almost no destruction of US infrastructure, with the Japanese attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii, as a notable exception. Naturally, the US emerged as the leader of the West. Although the Soviet Union was a US ally during the war, it competed with the US for global hegemony following the Allied victory, a period referred to as the Cold War.

During the Cold War, the US and its Western allies engaged in a brutal global competition with the Soviets and other communist states. Notable confrontations between these two power centers included the Korean War (1950–1953), the Vietnam War (1955–1975) and the Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989). Using Soviet influence as an excuse, the US intervened in many countries, including Iran. At the behest of the UK, the US overthrew the first democratically elected government of Iran. Only 26 years after the infamous 1953 coup, the Iranian Revolution deposed the Shah and established Iran’s independence from both the US and the UK.

The US tacitly supported European imperial and colonial powers when they committed some of the worst genocides in human history. The most notable include the horrendous atrocities committed in Congo, Kenya and Algeria.

After the fall of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the world looked forward to years of peace and prosperity. Although the US proclaimed that this new era was one of peace, it began with the Rwandan Genocide (1994), the Bosnian Genocide (1995), to the present day with the US-backed genocide against Palestinians and the takeover of Syria by al-Qaeda’s affiliates.

The of the Soviet Union did not make the world more peaceful; it worsened it under unilateral US leadership. The fall produced a power vacuum that has yet to be filled. In particular, it released nationalistic, ethical, cultural and self-determination movements in the former Soviet states. It led to social unrest, organized crime, terrorism and corruption. The ripple effects of the fall will “continue to be felt for some time yet.”

After the Soviets were gone, the US no longer faced any serious challenges to its global hegemony. However, the US considered Iran’s independence from US influence a challenge to its global domination and has supported efforts to undermine the Islamic Republic of Iran. Presently, the US efforts that have unseated Assad of Syria were meant to undermine Iran’s dominance in the region. 

Recently, reporters saw US President Joe Biden leaving a bookstore with a copy of The Hundred Years’ War on Palestine by Rashid Khalidi in his hand. The book describes the Palestinian struggle for their homeland. “Settler-colonial confrontations with indigenous peoples have only ended in one of three ways: with the elimination or full subjugation of the native population, as in North America; with the defeat and expulsion of the colonizer, as in Algeria, which is extremely rare; or with the abandonment of colonial supremacy, in the context of compromise and reconciliation, as in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Ireland,” Khalidi writes. 

Hopefully, Biden will read this book and realize that instigating the war in Ukraine, enabling Israel’s genocide against Palestinians and aiding al-Qaeda affiliates are immoral.

The US’s prestige is falling worldwide, all it can do is slow the fall

The world is waking up thanks to Iran. The US’s decision to back Ukraine in the war and enable Israel’s genocide against the Palestinians has placed global attention on Iran. In particular, Iran’s support of the oppressed Palestinians has been a popular move. In the US, like around the world, young people with the oppressed Palestinians.

Iran has become so notable for its global standing as a supporter of the oppressed that its archenemy, Israel, admits it. On July 25, Israeli Prime Minister , against whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, addressed the US Congress.

Hearing the loud protest outside, he felt frustrated with the protesters, crying in his speech that “Iran is funding the anti-Israel protests that are going on right now outside this building.”

Led by Iran, worldwide, people realize the US is not what it claims to be. The US is not a promoter of democracy or peace but a brutal warmonger with no regard for human rights and international law. Internationally, it has used its veto power since 1970 against UN resolutions concerning Israel, with four in the last year. In November, it vetoed the latest UN resolution calling for a ceasefire in . Recently, it blundered by the rise to power in Syria of HayĘĽat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) formerly part of al-Qaeda.

To stop the US’ destructive behaviors globally, China, Russia, Iran and some other countries have moved away from the US and formed the alliance. More countries are planning to do the same. Within the new alliance, China pushes for more collaboration between countries rather than subjugating them, as the US does.

No supporter of democracy, not even much of a democracy

Globally, people are becoming more aware that the US does not support democracy. Its ventures into other countries in the name of democracy are a ploy to access their resources and wealth. In pursuit of power and wealth, the US has destroyed lives. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen are just a few known examples where millions of innocent people were killed and billions of dollars of infrastructure were destroyed by US-led aggression.

The US is also a very flawed democracy itself. According to a poll from the Harris Poll and the Quincy Institute, around of Americans want the US to pursue peace with Russia. Yet, the US continues arming Ukraine against Russia. Likewise, of Americans disapprove of Biden’s handling of the “Israel–Palestine conflict,” but Biden continues arming Israel. Biden is acting as a dictator, ignoring the will of the people. This is not unique to Biden. US presidents have been getting the US in wars since its inception. Despite its global proclamation as a beacon of democracy, the US has never been a true democracy.

The US presidential system is flawed. The winner of the majority of Electoral College votes wins. In 2000 and 2016, George W. Bush and Donald Trump lost the popular vote but still became presidents because they commanded a majority of Electoral College votes. Furthermore, the US is dominated by two main parties. Third parties are not even on the ballot in many states. Big money in politics also strengthens the hand of the two main political parties.

This means that American politics makes for the strangest of bedfellows. Christian evangelicals voted for Trump despite his chauvinism, infidelity, nepotism, racism and corruption. So did many working-class Americans as well as a majority of white women and Latino men voted for this celebrity billionaire who has given and plans to give tax cuts to the rich. On the other hand, Ivy League elites largely voted for Democrats even if they had misgivings about Kamala Harris.

Giving the rich tax breaks and spending too much on the military-industrial complex has led to the US suffering the highest rate among industrial countries. The US ranks last in outcomes among the ten major developed countries despite spending nearly twice as much — about 18% of gross domestic product — on healthcare than the others. The crisis is also worse than in other Western countries and the country has the highest rate among high-income countries.

As is well known, American interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen and other countries led to the expansion of the military-industrial complex. Today, the US sends its poor to war who come back with post-traumatic stress disorder if not wounds or in body bags.

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 killed thousands of innocents. Its intervention in Libya caused a civil war that continues to this day. Today, the US is inflicting similar misery on Syria. Together with Turkey and Israel, the US is supporting HTS. Note that HTS is an affiliate of al-Qaeda. The HTS fighters are nothing but terrorists who have innocents, including 12-year-olds and Americans. That is the reason why the US put a $10 million bounty on HTS leader . Yet today the US has supported HTS to get rid of the Assad family, legitimizing the very fighters it has designated as terrorists.

Instead of continuing to support death and destruction, the US should support peace and harmony. First, Washington must stop threatening, invading and harming other countries. This includes stopping support for terrorists like al-Golani as well as dropping sanctions that hurt millions of innocents. Second, the US must stop its proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. A peace deal is in the interest of the entire world. Third, the US must support a free Palestine where Christians, Jews and Muslims can live together in peace.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Facilitating the Rise of HTS Is the Latest US Blunder appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Laid on the ocean floor, fiber optic subsea cables are the of international communication. They carry roughly of the world’s internet, data and voice transfers, and are considered to be the fastest and most route of data transfer. They have been critical to the process of and are essential to the modern global economy, with a daily transactional value of over .

Today, only an estimated subsea cables span 1.4 million kilometers of the ocean floor. But with these few cables accounting for most of the world’s internet, it is no surprise that there is a fight for dominance over them.

Due to the high risks and costs associated with laying new undersea ecosystems, these cables are usually owned by a of parties.

Nations and companies investing in these cables not only face the risk of being by tsunami-like natural disasters, fishing nets, ship anchors and marine life, but also face sabotage, spying and data theft.

That these pipes have little protection, are no thicker than a garden pipe, and yet power financial, government and military communications has become a cause of concern for governments across the world.

Historic coalition vs. Chinese player emergence

Three companies — America’s SubCom, Japan’s NEC Corporation and France’s Alcatel Submarine Networks — have historically the construction and laying of the fiber-optic subsea cables. But in 2008, a seismic shift took place when HMN Technologies (then Huawei Marine Networks) entered the market. It is one of the world’s and has increasingly occupied the market. By 2020, HMN had almost 25% of the world’s cables and supplied of them between 2019 and 2023.

Wary of losing their underwater ascendancy, the three companies began to pool efforts to oust HMN Tech and other Chinese firms to retain influence over the subsea cables. 

At the core of this competition for subsea dominance is America’s fear of conceding a critical component of the digital economy to China. US President Joe Biden’s push to bolster cooperation in the region on cybersecurity including undersea and whisk regional submarine away from China are beseeching Beijing to .Ěý

America’s “techo-diplomacy,” through which it urges its allies and telecoms from with Chinese companies, could stoke tensions with China. Notable is the involvement of alliances such as the Quad in a bid “to quality undersea cable networks in the Indo-Pacific.” 

According to Reuters, a 2023 campaign by America helped SubCom beat HMN Tech and  a $600-million contract to build South East Asia–Middle East–Western Europe 6 cable (SeaMeWe-6 cable). This was done through on consortium members, including and and exports controls. As Reuters points out, “This was one of the six private undersea cable deals in the Asia-Pacific where the US government intervened to prevent HMN from winning the contract, or forced the rerouting or abandonment of the cable deals.”

The US efforts to control the subsea cables have shone, with HMN Tech’s market share expected to contract to a mere . Though SubCom grabbed a mere of the total contracts between 2018 and 2022, it in turn accounted for 40% of the total undersea cable network laid.

Thus, China soon struck back by a $500 million Europe-Middle East-Asia internet cable. Known as (Pakistan and East Asia Connecting Europe), the project directly rivals the SeaMeWe-6 with in service and a planned length of 25,000+ km, superseding its rival project of and providing even bandwidth for the participating countries. This marked an escalation of underwater geopolitical rivalry between the two powers.

The fears that monger this tech-war

Many have dubbed subsea cables as “” for world intelligence agencies.

In 2020, the success of HMN Tech firm pricked up the US Department of Justice (DOJ)’s ears, who then raised national security concerns about China’s “ efforts to acquire the sensitive personal data of millions of U.S. persons.” In 2021, Washington HMN Tech to the list of entities that acted “contrary to the foreign policy or national security interests of the United States.” As recent as March this year, US officials have concern that the Chinese repair ships could be used for spying, though there is no of such an activity either.

In 2018, the US placed on Russian firms and nationals in suspicion of aiding its domestic security service, the FSB (Federal Security Service), in improving its “underwater capabilities” — specifically in relation to subsea cables. As recently as 2023, NATO countries haveRussian-registered vessels with equipment capable of undersea damage, as well as vessels carrying “unusual” communications equipment. These have brought forth fears of sabotage, in addition to suspicions that Russia is gaining intelligence through mobile “listening posts.”

The recent cable-cutting incident is the second such incident in the Baltic Sea with Chinese involvement. In October 2023, the anchor of a Hong Kong-flagged, Chinese-registered vessel named Newnew Polar Bear two subsea data cables and a gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea.Ěý

However,  there is no “publicly available” evidence that subsea cables are being or have been actively tapped or sabotaged by any country — be it China or Russia. Some recent speculations have seen such threats as overblown. 

Labeling concerns vis-Ă -vis “tapping into cables to , copy or obfuscate data” as “highly unlikely,” a European Union report in 2022 found “no publicly available and verified reports” indicating deliberate attacks, including from China. “The large-scale scenarios of a complete loss of connectivity … seem to be built not on prior incidents but on overall assessments of the geopolitical and threat landscape,” it said. It also added that the threat scenarios “could be exaggerated and suggest a substantial risk of threat inflation and fearmongering.”

Ironically in 2013, the Guardian’s investigations revealed that the UK’s spy agency, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), had more than 200 fiber-optic cables to access a huge volume of communications including between entirely innocent people, and shared sensitive personal information with its American partner, the NSA. These investigations were into documents disclosed to them by the US National Security Agency (NSA) whistleblower Edward Snowden. The documents also showed that the US was on its own allies in the so-called intelligence alliance named Five-Eyes: Australia and New Zealand.

The need for international cooperation

Most analysts believe that the biggest isn’t espionage, sabotage or even rogue anchors rather an uneven spread to the cable infrastructure that threatens the very promise of digital equity.Ěý

This leaves a need for cooperation to protect the flow of information they electronify.

But the US is stonewalling cooperation in an area that delivers international bandwidth and is for global digital transition. It has clearly proclaimed its intentions, such as the comments made in the �Joint on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World’ released on the sidelines of the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

It aspires to advance cooperation between the joint statement endorsers to “promote the selection of secure and verifiable subsea cable providers for new cable projects” as well as “protect cables and anticipate risks of intentional or unintentional damage as well as risks of communications and data being compromised.”

Cooperation between multinational companies has been the catalyst of submarine expansion and is crucial for the development of the digital economy especially in the Global South. 

But the kiasu approach of asserting a closed-group dominance over the underwater ecosystem is threatening to black out cooperation and divide the world in two geopolitical blocs — with each country forcing other states to choose its digital infrastructure. 

This simmering struggle for subsea supremacy must be lulled before it boils up and compounds global challenges.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Geopolitics of Cables: US and China’s Subsea War appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

But you want to know a dirty, little secret? In back alleys, encrypted group chats and off-the-record conversations, liberals will still support Trump on a case-by-case basis. Of course, they’d never vote for the guy, but they’ll give two cheers for some of his policies.

I discovered this ugly truth during Trump’s last term while writing an article on the shift in US policy toward China from lukewarm engagement to hostile decoupling. The general consensus among the foreign policy elite was that, at least in terms of relations with Beijing, Trump was a useful idiot for slowing China’s roll with harsh rhetoric and tariffs.

“Trump is a madman, but I want to give him and his administration their due,” one prominent liberal intellectual me. “We can’t keep playing on an unlevel playing field and take promises that are never delivered on. It’s really China’s turn to respond, and it’s long overdue.”

It wasn’t just China. For years, liberals and conservatives alike were, for instance, the concept of burden-sharing: getting US allies to cover more of the bill for their security needs. But it was only Trump who really made it happen by blackmailing NATO members and other US partners into doing so.

Sure, few warmed to the idea of the US actually pulling out of NATO, but even many of our European allies, though they publicly grumbled, were secretly happy about The Donald’s gaiatsu. That’s the Japanese word for outside pressure that enables a leader to force through unpopular changes by blaming it all on foreigners. The self-described liberal leader of NATO, Dutch politician Mark Rutte, even came out in the open after Trump’s re-election to the US president for making European countries more militarily self-sufficient.

It wasn’t just liberals who were thrilled about Trump’s unorthodox foreign policy during his first term, either. Some of those further to the left also embraced Trump the engager (with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un), Trump the isolationist (and his threats to close US military bases globally) and Trump the putative peacemaker (for concluding a deal with the Taliban to end the US military presence in Afghanistan).

Trump, in other words, was not just an unanticipated crisis; he was also an opportunity. Deep in their hearts, anyone unhappy with the status quo will support a disrupter. Quite a few Democrats disgusted with this country’s border policies, inflation and its coastal elites even to vote for Trump in November because they wanted change, regardless of the consequences.

Trump 2.0 is going to be the same but worse, like a strong cheese voted out of the refrigerator only to grow ever more pungent as it molded in a dark corner of Florida. The latest version of Trump has promised more violence and destruction the second time around, from mass deportations to mass tariffs. And he’s planning to avoid appointing anyone to his administration who might have a contrary thought, a backbone to resist him or the least qualification to enact sensible policy.

In the face of such a vengeful and truculent force returning to the White House, surely, you might think, it will be impossible to find any liberals embracing such anarchy the second time around.

Think again. This is how US politics works, if only for liberals. The modern Republican Party routinely boycotts Democratic administrations: blocking Merrick Garland’s Supreme Court nomination, working overtime to shut down the federal government, voting en masse against legislation it would have supported if introduced by a Republican administration. The MAGA crowd has, in fact, turned noncooperation into something of an art form.

Liberals, on the other hand, pride themselves on bipartisanship, on getting things done no matter who’s in power. So, inevitably, there will be cooperation with the Trump team as it sets about the “deconstruction of the administrative state” (as Trump cheerleader Steve Bannon once it). Worse, there will even be some silver-lining liberals (and a few leftists) who pull up a seat to applaud the wrecking ball — not perhaps for its wholesale destruction of neighborhoods, but at least for its demolition of a select number of buildings that they deem irreparable.

Each time such destruction takes place, the self-exculpatory comment from such silver-liners will be: “Well, somebody had to come along and do something!” If Trump is the only tool in the governing toolbox, some liberals will indeed try to use him to pound in a few nails they think need hammering.

Burning bridges with China

In his 2024 State of the Union address, President Joe Biden argued that he did a better job than Trump of standing up to China. He certainly devoted more to containing China. And not only did he not roll back Trump’s tariffs on Chinese products, but he added some of his own, including a 100% tax on Chinese electric vehicles. Biden also made concrete moves to decouple the US economy from China’s, especially when it came to the supply chains for critical raw materials that Beijing has sought to control. “I’ve made sure that the most advanced American technologies can’t be used in China,” he insisted, , “Frankly for all his tough talk on China, it never occurred to my predecessor to do any of that.”

Biden’s moves on China, from export controls and subsidies for chip manufacturers to closer with Pacific partners like Australia and India, received the enthusiastic support of his party. No surprise there: It’s hard to find anyone in Washington these days who has a good word to say about engaging more with China.

So when Trump takes office in January, he won’t actually be reversing course. He’ll simply be taking the baton-like stick from Biden while leaving all the carrots in the ground.

That said, Trump’s proposed further spike in tariffs against China (and Canada and Mexico and potentially the rest of the world) does give many liberals pause. It threatens to unleash an economically devastating global trade war while boosting prices radically at home. But trade unions backed by such liberals support such measures as a way to protect jobs, while the European Union only recently imposed of their own on Chinese electrical vehicles.

So, yes, neoliberals who embrace free trade are going to push back against Trump’s economic policies, but more traditional liberals who backed protectionist measures in the past will secretly (or not so secretly) applaud Trump’s moves.

Back to the wall

On taking office, Biden rolled back his predecessor’s harsh immigration policies. The rate of border-crossings then spiked for a variety of reasons — not just the repeal of those Trump-era laws — from an average of half a million to about annually. However, in 2024, those numbers despite Trump’s campaign claims — but no matter. By then, many Democrats had already been reborn as border hawks.

That new, tougher attitude was on display in Biden took in 2024 as well as the border security that Democrats tried to push through Congress earlier this year. Forget about finding a path to citizenship for the millions of undocumented immigrants who keep the US economy humming, Biden’s immigration policy focused on limiting asylum petitions, increasing detention facilities and even more money to build Trump’s infamous wall.

As Elora Mukherjee, director of the Immigrants’ Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School, on the eve of the November election, “What we are seeing is that the center of the Democratic Party is now adopting the same policies, the same postures, that MAGA Republicans were fighting for about six years ago.”

And yet such punitive policies still weren’t harsh enough for MAGA Republicans and their America First followers. The bottom line was that immigration-averse voters didn’t want to support Democrats pretending to be MAGA Republicans. When it came to the White House, they wanted the real thing.

As politics change hands in Washington next January, it’s going to be difficult to find any Democrats who will support the mass detentions and deportations Trump is promising. Yet many liberals, like the of Latinos who pulled the lever for Trump in 2024, do want major changes at the border with Mexico. In Arizona, Democrat Ruben Gallego won a squeaker of a Senate election by emphasizing and even backing a border wall in certain areas. Such liberal border hawks will be happy when the Republican president does the dirty work so that Democrats don’t suffer the political fallout that is sure to follow.

Remapping the Middle East

On the face of it, the Abrahamic Accords were a liberal nightmare. The brainchild of Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, they to repair relations between Israel and the major authoritarian regimes in the region: Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Morocco and Sudan. The deal was a reward for illiberal leaders, particularly Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu. The primary losers would, of course, be the Palestinians, who would have to their hopes for a separate state in exchange for some Saudi handouts and the Sahrawi people who lost their claim to the Western Sahara when the US and Israel Moroccan sovereignty over the entire region.

Instead of shelving the Accords, however, the Biden administration pushed ahead with them. After roundly criticizing Saudi autocrat Mohammed bin Salman for, among other things, ordering the of a US-based Saudi journalist, Biden mended ties, fist-bumping that rogue leader and continuing to discuss how and when the Kingdom would normalize relations with Israel. Nor did his administration restrict Washington’s staggering weapons deliveries to Israel after its invasion and utter devastation of Gaza. Yes, Biden and crew made some statements about Palestinian suffering and tried to push more humanitarian aid into the conflict zone, but they did next to nothing to pressure Israel to stop its killing machine, nor would they the Trump administration’s decision on the Western Sahara.

The liberals who support Israel (come what may) like Pennsylvania Senator , New York Congressman and the in the House of Representatives are, of course, going to be enthusiastic about Trump’s ever tighter embrace of Netanyahu next year. But there are also likely to be quiet cheers from other corners of the liberal-left about the Trump is likely to take against Tehran. (Remember Kamala Harris’s during her presidential run that Iran was the main adversary of the US?)

The Arab Spring is long gone and a strong man in the White House needs to both schmooze with and go toe to toe with the strong men of the Middle East — or so many liberals will believe, even as they rationalize away their relief over Trump’s handling of a thoroughly illiberal region.

Looking ahead (or do I mean behind?)

Anyone to the left of Tucker Carlson will certainly think twice about showing public enthusiasm for whatever Trump does. Indeed, most liberals will be appalled by the new administration’s likely suspension of aid to Ukraine and withdrawal from the Paris climate accord, not to mention other possible hare-brained maneuvers like sending US troops to narcotraffickers in Mexico.

Trump will attract liberal support, however quietly or even secretively, not because of his bridge-building genius — in reality, he even get a bridge-building infrastructure bill through Congress in his first term — but because all too many liberals have already moved inexorably rightward on issues ranging from China and the Middle East to immigration. The MAGA minority has seized the machinery of power by weaponizing mendacity and ruthlessly breaking rules, in the process transforming politics much the way the Bolshevik minority did in Russia more than a century ago. In the pot that those Republicans put on the stove, the water has been boiling for more than a decade and yet the left-of-center frogs barely seem to recognize just how altered our circumstances have become.

In normal times, finding overlapping interests with your political adversaries makes sense. Such bedrock bipartisanship stabilizes fractious countries that swing politically from center left to center right every few years.

These are, however, anything but normal times and the second-term Trump team is anything but center-rightists. They are extremists bent on dismantling the federal government, unstitching the fabric of international law and turning up the heat drastically on an already dangerously overcooking planet.

In 2020, I raised the possibility of a boycott, divestment and sanction (BDS) movement against the US if Trump won the elections that year. “People of the world, you’d better build your BDS box, paint �Break Glass in Case of Emergency’ on the front, and stand next to it on November 3,” I then. “If Trump wins on Election Day, it will be mourning in America. But let’s hope that the world doesn’t mourn: it organizes.”

Four years later, Trump has won again. Do I hear the sound of breaking glass?

Here in the US, a stance of strict non-engagement with Trump 2.0, even where interests overlap, would not only be a good moral policy but even make political sense. When things go disastrously south, laws are broken and the government begins to truly come apart at the seams, it’s vitally important that no left-of-center fingerprints be found at the crime scene.

Let’s be clear: The Trump administration will not be playing by the rules of normal politics. So forget about bipartisanship. Forget about preserving access to power by visiting Mar-a-Lago, hat in hand, like Facebook’s or the of MSNBC’s Morning Joe show. “Fascism can be defeated,” historian Timothy Snyder immediately after the November elections, “but not when we are on its side.”

So, my dear liberal-left, which side are you on?

[ first published this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Everyone (Sort of) Loves a Disrupter appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The direction of these policies largely depends on the incoming administration’s appointees, particularly within the Treasury and Commerce departments. However, President Trump’s unpredictable nature adds another layer of uncertainty. How these priorities will play out remains open to speculation.

Some administration advisors support tariffs as a negotiating strategy, while others prefer a more aggressive approach. These tariffs could greatly impact American consumers and businesses, raising inflationary pressures, disrupting supply chains, and increasing costs for goods. Proponents believe such measures could help revitalize American manufacturing and create blue-collar jobs. The administration’s stance on this issue will be crucial as it formulates its trade policy.

The Impact of Trumponomics 2.0 on Growth and Global Relations

The second Trump administration faces numerous challenges, including a divided House of Representatives, existing bureaucratic resistance, and pressing concerns like inflation and immigration. The effectiveness of Trumponomics 2.0 will depend on the administration’s ability to harmonize differing interests and deliver results. While deregulation and tax cuts have the potential to stimulate growth, the threat of trade wars and tariffs could pose significant risks to businesses and consumers. Businesses and individuals must adapt and plan strategically to navigate this volatile economic environment. As such, understanding the political landscape will be crucial to seizing opportunities that arise.

As the United States enters this uncertain economic chapter, domestic and international consequences are at stake. The global community will closely monitor how Trumponomics 2.0 will affect international relations, trade agreements, and geopolitical dynamics. The administration must carefully balance ambitious goals and the complexities of a highly interconnected world. The impact of its economic policies will resonate beyond U.S. borders, influencing global markets. Ultimately, the long-term effects of Trumponomics 2.0, whether they promote prosperity or amplify challenges, remain to be seen.

[Peter Choi edited this podcast and wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Making Sense of the New Trumponomics Starting in 2025 appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The Biden years To Trump 2.0: resetting the White House 

A mix of socio-economic failures and the decline in the US’s geopolitical influence created the conditions for a reset in the White House.

Following Trump’s dramatic exit from power in 2021, the Joe Biden administration embraced a “measured” and retrained strategic response toward global politics. This put pressure on the US’s position of global influence because of the emerging high-power rivalries the US has with China and Russia. Biden’s foreign policy may have contributed to the emergence of a strong alliance against the US between (PRICK).

One of Biden’s greatest international was the Build Back Better World (B3W) plan. The 2021 plan was an international economic development initiative by the G7 countries to counter China’s Belt and Road initiative and stabilize regional economies after COVID-19. However, the plan failed to gain traction and was as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment with much less ambitious goals.

On the domestic front, the Biden White House made other miscalculations. One of these missteps was the economic failure of Biden’s big policies, such as the American Rescue Plan, which led to . Biden’s energy policies were another blunder, experiencing since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war. the Keystone XL pipeline put additional pressure on the US energy sector.

Another domestic failure was an increase in the crime rate. According to , “Violent crimes have dramatically increased during the Biden-Harris administration, according to a recent Department of Justice study that appears to refute consistent claims by the Harris campaign.” Other , such as immigration and rejecting identity politics also influenced voters.

The US’s realpolitik

The US’s realpolitik has two key features: influence and competition with emerging powers. During the Cold War, the US deep state used every available strategy to counter the Soviet Union’s increasing influence. However, one major player in the US realpolitik significantly influenced the US’s approach to global events, sometimes even challenging branches of the deep state.

Two significant presidents during the Cold War were John F. Kennedy and Gerald Ford. To some extent, both had a “measured, strategic response” rather than an assertive, strategic response, which in the 1980s with President Ronald Reagan. Kennedy’s hesitation in using the CIA as a significant tool for US foreign policy goals, instead slashing its , created difficulties in steering US foreign policy during the initial phases of the Cold War.

Similarly, the Soviet–US détente supported by President Ford was by analysts and Ford’s Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger. The Détente was a strategic failure, with the Soviet Union Afghanistan in 1979. A major setback came when Ford ordered the immediate evacuation of US personnel from South Vietnam in 1975, causing a similar to the disastrous US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021. The CIA faced during Ford’s presidency when an investigative journalist exposed the CIA’s Operation CHAOS, which engaged in domestic surveillance of US citizens, in of the National Security Act of 1947.

Following the Cold War, President Bill Clinton attempted to adjust the US’s foreign policy strategy back to a “measured response.” Clinton’s main focus was on policy and . His foreign policy has been described by analysts as the , which favored the promotion of free markets and democratic principles in other countries. To some extent, this policy was responsible for the failure to restore democracy in Somalia, which resulted in the resignation of Clinton’s Secretary of Defence after the failed Operation Gothic Serpent. The Clinton administration also failed in 1993 when it was unable to oust Haiti’s military dictator, Raoul Cedres, and in 1994 when it did not intervene in Rwanda to prevent genocide.

These failures share many similarities with those of the Biden presidency. Biden the nuclear deal with Iran, from Afghanistan and made other miscalculations in Europe and the Middle East. Similar to Biden’s predecessors, who embraced a similar foreign policy, these errors caused significant setbacks to the US’s geopolitical position.

Now that Trump will be back in the White House, the US’s foreign policy will be better suited to navigate the ever more complex world order. Trump’s second term promises an assertive response to global and regional crises, making it worth observing how wars in the Middle East and Europe unfold after he assumes office.

Trump’s second term may ease on the trans-Atlantic security architecture and provide more freedom for European countries to make their own security and defense decisions. This new policy contrasts the Biden years, when the US was too involved in European security decisions, leading to friction with European countries, especially .

Some have that US realpolitik is hampered by Ukraine. However, if the US engages in an “assertive, strategic response” to re-building confidence among European nations and shore up European security architecture, the US may be able to check Russian influence.

During Trump’s , his “assertive, strategic response” effectively addressed evolving geopolitical dynamics, keeping China under the radar and Russia in check without straining relations with the US. Similar adjustments are expected in Trump’s second administration, but with a key difference in the Middle East. The space for Iran, which expanded under the Biden administration, is likely to shrink rapidly under Trump. This shift will allow the US to adopt a more assertive stance toward Iran while rebuilding strategic relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

It is unlikely that Donald Trump will eliminate the so-called , which consists of officials embedded within the executive branch of the US government who espouse an ideology that may be contrary to the administration’s. Instead of being completely eliminated, the deep state could be reduced in size, as it plays a significant role in the US’s realpolitik, particularly for any incoming Trump administration. During Trump’s first term, the deep state functioned in a limited yet operational manner. For instance, Trump appointed Gina Haspel, the first woman to serve as deputy director of the CIA and later as CIA director in 2018, despite strong reservations from some senators. These examples suggest that the deep state under a Trump administration could continue to function effectively with minor adjustments.

India–US relations: and upward trajectory 

The India–US is currently on an “upward trajectory,” with the Comprehensive Global and Strategic Partnership between the two countries recently . The partnership will receive more traction in the Trump Administration. During Trump’s first term, the US understood India’s interests much better than the Biden administration, with few exceptions. The Trump administration’s superior understanding of India will help build much-needed trust between the two nations, whose relations have been by US criticism of India’s internal affairs. However, trade between India and the US will not change much during Trump’s second term, given the implications of his America first policy for trade and high tariffs.

When Trump enters office, he has to re-adjust the US’s realpolitik to revive the US’s declining influence on the global stage. The move from a measured to an assertive approach will only come after the realization that restrained and measured approaches lead to significant policy and strategic failures for the US. Biden’s foreign policy failures are the most recent example of this.

[Joey T. McFadden edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Resetting US Realpolitik In Trump’s Second Term appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The German traffic light coalition government of the Social Democrats, Free Democrats and Greens (respectively red, yellow and green) has fallen. So has the French minority government led by Michel Barnier of Les Republicains. Now, neither France nor Germany has a government or a budget. Note this has not happened before.

Social divisions and political polarization

Germany and France are the two beating hearts of the EU. They created the EU and still drive it. With both in political limbo, the EU is lost.

Internally, both these countries are no longer homogenous or cohesive anymore. They have experienced unprecedented levels of immigration. This has created problems of assimilation since, unlike the US, Europe does not have a tradition of mass immigration. In Germany and France, immigrants form a greater percentage of the population in the US. Furthermore, Muslim immigrants in these countries tend to be more conservative than the local population or even their relatives back home. For example, German Turks voted for Recep Tayyip ·ˇ°ů»ĺ´ÇÄź˛ą˛Ô in much higher percentages than in Turkey. Many Muslim women also tend to wear headscarves in societies where sunbathing nude or topless is no longer a big deal.

Most people find change uncomfortable. Europeans are no exception. People do not like the way their communities are changing so rapidly. They may not be racist, but they want to retain their character. The French want to remain French and the Germans want to preserve their Germanness. Yet the political correctness that blights expression in the US also censors conversations in Europe. If someone is uncomfortable with headscarves or Turks voting for ·ˇ°ů»ĺ´ÇÄź˛ą˛Ô, she or he is denounced as a racist and an Islamophobe. People find such denunciation deeply alienating and often turn to the far right in revolt.

European economies are in big trouble

Economically, European countries are in trouble. They have huge debts, high deficits, slow productivity growth and low birth rates. There is no way Greece or Italy can pay back all their debts. Furthermore, the Russia–Ukraine War has increased energy prices, weakened industry and unleashed inflation in the economy. People are hurting. Naturally, they do not want to keep paying for a war with no end in sight.

In contrast, European elites have committed themselves to Ukraine’s defense. So, they want to keep spending on the war even as they seek budget cuts elsewhere. Naturally, legislators are unable to agree upon the cuts and governments are falling. At the moment, no resolution to the budget crisis in either Berlin and Paris is in sight.

The euro is not the world’s reserve currency. That privilege belongs to the dollar; so, unlike the US, Europe cannot print money to finance its deficits and prosecute endless war. So, Germany, France and the EU find themselves in a bind; their monetary and fiscal options are limited.

Europe has other problems too. Europe needs to increase the flexibility of its labor markets. Given an aging population, this can only happen with immigration and less rigid labor laws. The oppressive regulatory state is throttling growth and needs urgent reform. None other than German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has called for a war on red tape despite his socialist roots. European countries also have to reform and even shrink the welfare state. Only British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ever really achieved that in the last 50 years in Europe.

European economies have also suffered from external shocks. Chinese demand has declined and the US has taken a protectionist turn under both Republican and Democratic administrations. This protectionism will only increase once Donald Trump takes charge of the White House in January.

At a time of such upheaval, European political culture is in total flux. The traditional left and right are dead in France. They have been replaced by a constellation of pro-business centrists, the far right and a hodgepodge combination of leftist groups. German politics is also fragmenting, and the rise of the far-right Alternative fĂĽr Deutschland (AfD) shows the degree of disaffection with the status quo in a country still haunted by Adolf Hitler. Something was not right in the state of Denmark and some things are certainly not hunky dory in Europe today. A full-blown crisis is now underway.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: Why is the EU in Crisis? What Lies Ahead? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The West has tried to Russia internationally, defeat it militarily and, through an array of draconian sanctions, cause its economic collapse. It has met none of these objectives.

Russia’s connections with China have deepened strategically. India has preserved its strategic ties with Moscow despite Western pressure. Russian with several African countries also have a new momentum. Moscow is strongly present in the West Asia region and has a close relationship with key Arab countries. Its partnership with some Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries is gaining steam, too.

BRICS’s expansion

The of BRICS in 2023 with Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia had already signaled that major countries in the Global South had a very different perspective on Russia than the West did. It sees Russia as a friendly country, not an adversary. That almost 40 countries have shown interest in joining BRICS, a forum in which Moscow plays a key role, signifies that Russia is an attractive partner to them.

The Global South seeks a reformed international system that would reflect the shifts in power equations away from the West, both economic and political, that have occurred over the years. These countries want more attention to be paid to their concerns and priorities.

The West’s double standards regarding its “values-based” policies, its military interventions, its use of various means to bring about regime changes, its use of sanctions as a policy tool, its weaponization of the United States dollar and the US’s global financial system have increasingly pushed non-Western countries to hedge themselves against Western pressures by joining forums such as BRICS. If Russia earlier looked westwards, the West has turned its back on Russia. Now Russia is much more focused on its Eurasian identity and is looking eastwards.

Non-Western countries cannot opt out of the existing international system or create one of their own. What they hope to do is to change the balance of power within the existing system and reform it to ensure more equality and equity in its functioning. The Global South countries, which also have close relations with the West, are being attracted to join BRICS or associate with it in order to increase their political, economic and security options.

The fact that 24 world leaders attended the Kazan summit, including those of five founding members and the four new permanent members, show that the West’s already failing efforts to isolate Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, have been strongly rebuffed.

More members may bring complications

With so much interest in BRICS in the Global South, the question of expanding its membership and the criteria to do that pose difficulties. BRICS is a consensus-based forum. With the expansion, building a consensus on issues would become more difficult. That would affect the operation and credibility of the forum.

The of the BRICS Foreign Ministers in June 2024 at Nizhny Novgorod in Russia, also attended by the four new members, could not issue a joint communiqué because of differences on certain points.

Putin has himself publicly recognized the downside to any further expansion. He noted that the existing members have worked together for years and know how the forum functions. The process of absorbing the new members into the methods and spirit of the forum will be the immediate focus, not its expansion.

The decision, therefore, has been not to broaden the BRICS membership for the moment but to enlarge its base by accepting new countries as partners. Developing a consensus within BRICS on which countries should be admitted as partners was presumably not an easy exercise; all the BRICS members, old and new, had effective veto rights. It had to be ensured that no member country was particularly advantaged by the choice of partners and that the final list reflected a balance between the preferences of the forum’s members.

A wide spread

The Kazan summit saw the of 13 new BRICS partners: Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. It is significant that four members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also among these.

Algeria, much to its disappointment, become a member when BRICS expanded last year. It has now obtained partner status. Two key Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) have become partners, too. Other Central Asian countries could obviously not be included as that would have weighed too much in favor of Russia’s interests. Already, the inclusion of Belarus is a clear Russian preference. The geographical spread of the new partner countries is noteworthy.

Russia’s obvious preference for Turkey was also accommodated given the latter’s for Russia, even though giving partner status to a NATO country might not fit into any normal criteria for deciding BRICS partnerships. Should NATO get a foothold in BRICS? From the Russian point of view, this would be a welcome political development in NATO’s eastern flank. The US, which sees BRICS as an organization created to rival the West in the global system, would be obviously perturbed by Turkey’s decision.

Why Pakistan was kept away

It would seem that China has not exercised its own special geopolitical preferences too visibly. If it were interested in Pakistan’s inclusion, as it could well have been — it had linked India’s Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) membership with that of Pakistan — it would have run into India’s strong opposition. In September 2024, while visiting Pakistan, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk its inclusion in BRICS but stated that such a decision would have to be based on a consensus. India clearly scotched any move to reach out to Pakistan, to the point that Pakistan seemingly was not invited to the summit.

India had reservations about Turkey becoming a partner because of its on Kashmir in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Ultimately, India did not stand in the way of Turkey becoming a BRICS partner.

The last BRICS summit approved the membership of Saudi Arabia, but it has not its acceptance. It was represented at the Kazan summit by its foreign minister. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Riyadh while the summit was being held in Kazan, which tells its own story.

Do not overestimate BRICS’s pace

The importance of BRICS’s expanded partnerships across Asia, Africa and Latin America should not be underestimated. It shows dissatisfaction with the current international system. Non-western countries want an end to the West’s hegemony. They suffer from the West’s self-centered, arbitrary policies. They see strengthened multilateralism reflected in multipolarity as the key to change.

At the same time, the pace at which BRICS can bring about this change should not be exaggerated. The goals of BRICS in forging alternatives to the dollar-dominated financial system are not easy to achieve. Within the BRICS countries, there are rivalries and divisions. Their political systems differ. Some are deeply anti-West. Others have friendly ties with the West even when they seek more space for themselves in a West-dominated global system. There are large economic disparities within the group. The policies of some both help and hurt the interests of the Global South.

When all is said and done, BRICS’s expansion, with all its challenges, is a vehicle for a much-needed re-balancing within the global system — something India also seeks.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The West’s Efforts to Isolate Russia Are Failing appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Identity politics and culture wars

One important factor in Trump’s success is the growing resentment among many Americans towards “woke” language policing. This refers to the effort to change language to be more inclusive, such as the use of terms like “Latinx,” a gender-neutral alternative to “Latino.” However, Latinos detest the term. Spanish is a gendered language where even tables and chairs are assigned a gender. So, “Latinx” came across as gringo imperialism to many of them and a majority () of Latino men voted for Trump.

Many Americans, including progressives, find this focus on language divisive and unnecessary. For example, in Boston, one can hear complaints that the word “jimmies” (a term for chocolate sprinkles) is racist because it supposedly derives from “Jim Crow,” a discriminatory system of laws from the years of segregation. This kind of language policing is part of the culture wars and has alienated millions of Americans from the Democratic Party. Democrat social justice warriors do not realize the extent of the backlash language policing has caused, especially among socially conservative minorities.

The fixation on trans issues and the insistence that trans women are women is unacceptable to many Americans. Democrats have obsessed over trans issues as part of their social justice agenda. Allowing this tiny group to suck the oxygen in the room has alienated millions struggling to put food on their table.

Economic and social concerns, media and technology

Trump also won because discontent among working-class Americans is running extremely high. Many Americans, including recent immigrants, fear that immigration is driving down wages and increasing competition for jobs. Although inflation has decreased, food prices have continue to rise faster than real wages. This has led to greater economic frustration. High prices for childcare, healthcare, education, housing and housing insurance also weigh heavily on many Americans, creating acute financial insecurity.

This economic anxiety is compounded by a sense that the political system is out of touch with ordinary people. The Democratic Party is run by a managerial elite with few working-class leaders. Furthermore, Democrats have been trying to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds. With war in the Middle East, when Democrats please Arabs in Detroit, they upset Jews in Philadelphia.

Working-class whites, especially in states like Pennsylvania and Ohio, feel alienated. These voters have felt neglected by the Democratic Party’s shift towards identity politics and social justice. The Democrats rarely speak about the bread-and-butter issues faced by the working class. For this reason, they support Trump, who has championed issues like tariffs and border control. Both will put upward pressure on wages even if they cause a rise in prices.

Trump’s victory is also tied to changes in the media landscape. With the rise of 24-hour cable TV, social media and smartphones, Americans have been able to isolate themselves. Thanks to algorithms that create filter bubbles and echo chambers, most voters only consume information that reinforces their beliefs. They rarely engage with diverse viewpoints and have come to distrust mainstream media, which has become increasingly partisan over the years.

Furthermore, Russia’s efforts to spread disinformation, starting from the 2016 election, have succeeded. They have created an environment of distrust in the US. While Russia does not necessarily want Americans to support Trump, it certainly seeks to sow chaos and weaken confidence in American institutions.

America’s individualistic culture also plays a role. In the US, anyone’s opinion can be as valued as that of a leader or expert, making it easier for misinformation to spread unchecked. The combination of social media and distrust in the media has made it easier for Trump to connect with voters who feel left behind by the political establishment.

Globalization and social disruption

Globalization and demographic changes have also fueled divisions in American society. As immigration increases and the country becomes more diverse, new social tensions arise. A family of conservative Muslims probably does not appreciate the emphasis on LGBTQ+ issues, and they may turn away from the Democrats even if they detest Trump. So might many Latinos who are deeply Christian and oppose abortion.

The rise of global powers like China has added to these tensions. Many Americans are worried about the loss of manufacturing jobs to China and other countries. Trump’s promises to bring back jobs through tariffs have resonated with many working-class voters. While many experts argue that tariffs will increase inflation, these voters seem simply not to believe them, or else they feel that is a price worth paying.

Many Americans are also tired of increasing red tape. Under Trump’s leadership, the Republican party has focused on dismantling the so-called “administrative state” — the vast network of government agencies and regulations. Trump’s supporters believe that reducing the size of government will limit the power of elites and unleash a “sonic boom” in the economy. 

Ideologues like Glover Glenn Norquist have long argued that the American state needs to shrink. The Trump team buys into this argument. It also belongs to the isolationist strand of American politics and wants a quid pro quo approach to foreign policy. The new policymakers do not believe in multilateralism, rules that act as fetters on the US, or in the need for allies or institutions such as NATO or even the World Trade Organization. America First is all about championing national interests boldly and unashamedly. This puts into question the rules-based order the US has championed since 1945.

The 2024 election reveals deep divisions in American society. Trump’s new picks reveal a drift to authoritarianism. The US faces choppy waters ahead.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: Why Donald Trump Won Again and What Happens Now appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The UN has been a nightmare. It is as dysfunctional as the League of Nations. The world has not seen peace even for a day since the UN’s inception in 1945. Delegates should have foreseen the UN’s failure in 1945. The organization came into existence for the UK, the US and the Soviets to expand their hegemony across the world. They projected peace for themselves, and not necessarily for the rest of the world.

How the Allies became the United Nations

On September 1, 1939, started with Germany invading Poland. The United Kingdom (UK) and France declared war on Germany as allies. The Soviet Union (Soviets) invaded eastern Poland on September 17. In June 1941, the Soviets joined the Allies. The Big Three (the UK, the US and the Soviets) formed a united organization of nations to maintain their global peace and security. The Allied powers met and signed the , pledging collaboration in fighting aggression. It proclaimed that “the only true basis of enduring peace is the willing cooperation of free peoples in a world in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security.”

The US Constitution strictly limits the president’s power and rests the war declaration with Congress. However, President Franklin D. Roosevelt short-circuited the Constitution, by authorizing the US to finance and arm the UK and France. In March 1941, Congress put this policy into law in the form of the without the constitutional process of declaring war. Germany and its allies, Italy and Japan (the Axis Powers), of course, considered the US to be aiding the enemy in war. 

The US later entered the war formally. In December 1941, Japan’s air force attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in Honolulu, Hawaii, catching the US by surprise. Within days, that attack triggered the US to declare war on Germany. Within hours, Germany also declared war on the US. That month, China joined the Allies while resisting Japan’s expansion in China since 1937.

In August 1941, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill signed the pledging to stop territorial expansion, engage in free trade, collaborate with other nations, have access to “high seas and oceans”, stop the use of force, and work for a world peace free of “fear and want”, where all individuals are free to choose their form of government and enjoy economic advancement and social security. In January 1942, about four weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Big Three (the UK, the US, and the Soviet Union) and China, along with 22 other countries, signed a document pledging to accept the , which is referred to as the Declaration by the United Nations.

During World War II, the devastating effect of that war encouraged the the Big Four, to put aside their differences and collaborate in the war. To avoid such a war in the future, they began planning for the world. As the discussion progressed, the idea of a united world organization emerged. In October 1943, the Big Four signed the , recognizing “the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

In November- December 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met for the first time in Tehran, Iran. They discussed the post-war arrangement and partitions. Roosevelt and Churchill assured Stalin that he could expand Soviet territory into Poland and Germany. President Roosevelt was so infatuated with Stalin that he called him Uncle Joe. “I began to tease Churchill,” the American President boasted, “… Winston got red and scowled and finally Stalin broke into a deep, hearty guffaw. It was then that I called him Uncle Joe.” This cavalier attitude of President Roosevelt regarding Eastern Europe is a typical example of a public servant intoxicated with power, and turning into a despot. Such a cavalier is responsible for the US presidents’ empowering the Zionist genocide against Palestinians and the takeover of Palestine. At the end of the Tehran meeting, they agreed on the Tehran Conference. They said: “We are sure that our concord will win an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the goodwill of the overwhelming mass of the world’s peoples and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.”

The victorious Allies founded the UN

In October 1944, the Big Four met at Dumbarton Oaks, in Washington, DC. They proposed a United Nations consisting of the following:

• A General Assembly, composed of all the member nations oversees an Economic and Social Council. Nowadays, it oversees other councils, too.
• A Security Council is composed of eleven members, five permanent and six chosen by the GA for two-year terms.
• An International Court of Justice.
• A United Nations Secretariat.

After the war, they all wanted to be in of the global issues. The US had risen to the most powerful one among the Big Three but felt needed Soviet cooperation to finish the war. The Soviets did not trust the UK or the US. They insisted on restoring the old Russian Empire and succeeded. 

In April 1945, delegates from 46 nations attended the and discussed and approved the UN. They set up the UN objectives to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war…to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights…to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.” 

On June 25, 1945, the delegates met in San Francisco. After days of meetings, they unanimously passed the UN Charter. The major debacle was the veto power of the Big Five (the UK, the US, France, the Soviets, and China). Less powerful nations feared that if a veto power threatened peace, the Security Council would lose its significance. They wanted more power distribution. Finally, they went along in the interest of global peace. 

On September 2, 1945, the war ended. The Big Three decided to expand the United Nations by inviting other nations to join it. 

The shortcomings of the victors’ peace

To ensure their global hegemony, they planned the UN Security Council (UNSC) in the UN. The UK insisted on limiting the UNSC to the UK, the US and the Soviets. The US wanted China to be included because of its strong resistance against Japan, which freed the US to support Europe. To ensure Western control, the UK insisted on adding France to the Council. That is how the Big Five surfaced. The Soviets felt outnumbered by the West and asked for veto power, which was granted to all permanent members. 

The UN General Assembly (UNGA) is the only organ in the UN in which all member nations vote. Regardless of size or population, each member nation has only one vote. A simple majority decides procedural questions while a simple majority or a two-thirds vote decides substantive ones, depending on importance. It is mainly a deliberative body empowered to make recommendations to the UN Security Council (UNSC) regarding international issues. 

In contrast, the UNSC is primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It is an exclusive club. Nowadays, it has 15 members, 5 of whom are permanent members and endowed with veto power on every issue. The permanent members are the US, the UK, China, France, and Russia, also known as the Big Five. The GA chooses the other ten for two-year terms.

Like the League, the UN’s primary purpose has been to preserve peace and security. The UN members have promised not to use force except in self-defense and to use force collectively to preserve peace. In apparent violation of the UN Charter, the veto powers granted to certain member states have led to conflicts and wars, rather than preventing them. Until the fall of the Soviets in December 1991, the world faced two superpowers, the US and the Soviets, competing for global influence, a period known as the Cold War. They incited proxy wars nearly everywhere. 

Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the US emerged as the world’s sole superpower. This shift in global dynamics has led to military interventions and interference in various countries, resulting in significant human suffering and destruction. Presently, the US is responsible for much of the global deaths and destruction, particularly in Iraq, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen. The US complicity in the genocide against Palestinians is the talk of the world these days.

Given these ongoing challenges, it is clear that the current state of the UN is not conducive to achieving lasting global peace. Meaningful reform or even the dismantling of the organization may be necessary. Adding Brazil, Germany, India, Japan or another country is unlikely to address the fundamental issues.

[ and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Can You See Why the UN Is Bad at Peace? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Both Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia often find themselves at the periphery of global decision-making, despite playing key roles in global events. For instance, while fighting fiercely for sovereignty, Ukraine has faced challenges in influencing broader political dynamics. Limited resources, military constraints and insufficient global representation contribute to this difficulty, a struggle also familiar to many Southeast Asian countries.

Strengthening ties between Eastern European countries such as Poland, the Baltics and Slovakia, and Southeast Asian nations like Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, could provide an avenue for mutual self-determination. This partnership would help smaller states align their interests in ways that larger powers often overlook. Global events like US presidential elections, the war in Ukraine and China’s aggressive economic policies have far-reaching effects on these regions, introducing risks that may not be the primary concern of dominant powers.

Pursuit of partnerships

While existing initiatives within NATO and the EU have laid the groundwork for some cooperation, they still operate under the influence of a few powerful states. To maximize their potential on the global stage, Eastern European and Southeast Asian nations must explore partnerships that emphasize greater independence and equal decision-making.

The EU has already fostered economic cooperation with Southeast Asia through agreements like the European Union–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement () and the European Union–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (). These agreements open up new markets and strengthen trade ties, providing a platform for Eastern European countries, such as Poland, to expand exports, especially in sectors like renewable energy technologies, machinery and chemicals.

In terms of security, NATO’s operations in the Asia-Pacific — primarily focused on counter-piracy and anti-terrorism have indirectly benefited Eastern European nations like Estonia and Latvia, which rely on secure international trade routes. Although NATO’s formal role does not extend deeply into Southeast Asia, there is growing collaboration in counter-terrorism and cybersecurity, which further strengthens the security frameworks of Eastern Europe.

Benefits of Eastern European–Southeast Asian cooperation

The economic benefits of cooperation between these regions are undeniable. Southeast Asia’s present a prime opportunity for Eastern European nations like Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States to diversify their economies beyond their traditional reliance on Western Europe. Eastern European countries have strong industrial sectors, especially in manufacturing and , which align with Southeast Asia’s need for infrastructure, energy solutions and high-tech products. In turn, Southeast Asia offers an expanding consumer base and growing sectors in biotechnology, Information and Communication Technology and manufacturing — areas in which Eastern Europe can make inroads.

Both regions also share common security concerns. Eastern Europe faces from Russia while Southeast Asia grapples with challenges posed by China’s . Despite these differences, lessons learned from Ukraine’s resilience in the face of Russian aggression could offer valuable insights for Southeast Asian nations aiming to safeguard their sovereignty. Joint defense exercises, intelligence sharing and enhanced military cooperation could further improve security for both regions.

As Eastern Europe’s digital sector continues to grow, particularly in countries like , Southeast Asia stands to benefit from expertise in areas like e-government, cybersecurity and smart cities. Conversely, Eastern Europe can learn from Southeast Asia’s rapid advancements in mobile technology and e-commerce platforms, where Southeast Asia has outpaced many other regions.

Challenges and solutions

Despite these opportunities, several challenges remain. Eastern European countries often find themselves constrained within broader EU or NATO frameworks, with their foreign policy decisions heavily influenced by larger EU members like Germany or France. Similarly, NATO’s priorities are often shaped by the US, limiting the ability of Eastern European nations to fully engage in independent partnerships with Southeast Asia.

Moreover, Southeast Asia’s dependence on China complicates the situation. Many Southeast Asian nations are cautious about antagonizing China, which could limit their willingness to deepen ties with Eastern Europe, particularly given Russia’s ongoing role as an ally to several Southeast Asian countries.

To navigate these challenges, both regions should take gradual, incremental steps. They can begin by focusing on non-contentious areas like trade, technology and cultural exchange. Multilateral organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations () Regional Forum () and the EU–ASEAN dialogue provide platforms for both regions to build consensus on broader security concerns without escalating geopolitical tensions.

While the road to deeper cooperation between Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia is not without its obstacles, the potential for mutually beneficial partnerships remains strong. By focusing on economic, technological and security cooperation, Eastern European countries like Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States can reduce their dependence on traditional allies and assert greater autonomy on the global stage. Leveraging existing frameworks like the EU and NATO while navigating the complex geopolitical landscape will be crucial in fostering ties that give both regions a stronger voice in global affairs.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Republics have suffered total collapses throughout history. There’s no reason why the US should be immune. The fear of that often prompts a superficial reference to the final fall of the Roman Republic or the end of Greek democracy. But there’s a deeper history: Republics came into being far earlier in Middle Eastern and Mediterranean civilizations. And we can draw from a much wider range of examples to learn from as we try to understand the challenges and the opportunities.

A true republic is a political system without monarchy or concentrated political power in any office, branch or individual. Elected officials represent citizens to make decisions on their behalf, with separate branches of government providing checks and balances. While many associate republics with direct democracy in our times, there’s a much wider array of power structures that developed in the formative era of republics.

The 20th century established republics as the global standard. Monarchies declined after World War I and most former European colonies declared independence as republics following World War II. Fascist and communist countries, which centralized power in individuals or ruling parties, also reduced in number.

Despite their concentration of power, however, many fascist and communist states claimed the title of republics. While countries out of 193 identify as republics today, far less uphold republican principles and blend them effectively with democracy. Examining the historical evolution of republics highlights those best positioned to serve as the most resilient modern examples.

Republics require regular gatherings and assemblies, making them difficult to establish in sparsely populated agrarian societies, while empires generally concentrate power too heavily for self-rule to gain traction. It was in smaller city-states, particularly trade-focused ones, where citizens could form factions, exchange ideas and influence government decisions and rules for commerce.

The invention of republican ideals

Some of the earliest experiments with republican governance appeared in ancient Sumerian city-states (4500–2000 BC), centered in modern-day Iraq. Kings acted more as neutral rather than rulers, sharing power with aristocratic families and groups, as well as common citizens. In Kish, citizens could a new king during crises. In Uruk, assemblies of townsmen and elders had to ratify major military decisions.

The Sumerian city-states fell to the Akkadian and Babylonian Empires by 1750 BC. Phoenician city-states, emerging about 250 years later in what is now Lebanon, revived republican ideals. Here, monarchical power was often with a merchant class and citizen council. Egyptian records dating to the mid-14th century BC describe Phoenician cities sending delegates to represent citizens rather than monarchs, with mentions of and aid requests by the “men of Arwad” and “elders of Irqata.”

By the 6th century BC, the Phoenician city of Tyre had functioned for seven years without a monarch, governed instead under suffetes, or judges, elected for short terms. In Chios, a “people’s council” allowed citizens to debate laws and hold officials accountable. However, beginning in the 9th century BC and continuing over the next few centuries, Phoenician city-states were successively conquered or subjugated by the Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian and Macedonian Empires.

Like other civilizations, Phoenicians established colonies and trading posts. Carthage, founded by Tyre in 814 BC in modern Tunisia, grew into a powerful city-state with its own . By the early 7th century BC, two elected suffetes from aristocratic families replaced the monarchy. They governed alongside an aristocratic Senate, while newer merchants could gain influence and a popular assembly allowed citizens’ input on major decisions. Military and religious leaders also held considerable power.

Republican ideals weren’t confined to Mesopotamia and the Mediterranean. Buddhist texts like the Maha Parinibbana Sutta mention Indian republics called in the 6th century BC. Some adopted republican styles of government, while others formed republican confederations, like Sumerian and Phoenician city-states, to make decisions collectively and protect against larger threats. The Indian republics were gradually absorbed by the Maurya Empire (321–185 BC) and other entities.

Greece and Rome evolved republics

Ancient Greek city-states also developed republican ideals. Sparta was governed by a constitution and popular assembly as early as 600 BC, though it remained largely monarchical. Athens established a direct democracy in 507 BC, known as demokratia, meaning “people” and “rule.” Greece’s slave-based economy allowed some citizens time to participate in politics, though this limited political fairness. In 431 BC, Attica, the region surrounding Athens, had an estimated population of 315,000, of which only 172,000 were citizens, and just 40,000 male citizens could vote.

Still, Athens’s allowed these citizens to frequently debate, deliberate and vote. They were overseen by the Council of Five Hundred, which was chosen annually by lot to draft laws and manage administration. However, following Athens’s Golden Age, 4th century BC Greek like Plato and Aristotle, and later 2nd century BC historians like Polybius, criticized the system for inefficiency and vulnerability to charismatic leaders to sway public opinion, leading to volatile policy shifts.

They emphasized balancing public, aristocracy, and monarchical roles to avoid the typical of chaos and order: First, a strong leader unites a restive society under a monarchy, which evolves into tyranny. It is overthrown and replaced by an aristocracy, which reduces into oligarchy. Democracy eventually replaces it but deteriorates into mob rule, restarting the cycle.

Invasions further weakened Greece’s republican and democratic systems. In 338 BC, Greece fell under the control of the Macedonian Empire, ending the independence of many city-states. Despite this, Greek states formed republican confederations to protect against threats, including the neighboring Roman Republic. The term republic derives from the Roman res publica, meaning “public affairs” — this emphasizes shared governance, civic participation and checks and balances. Since its founding in 509 BC, the Roman Republic’s political structure had evolved considerably. Polybius expressed for Rome’s system; two tribunes were elected annually to represent the common citizens, while two consuls were elected and held executive power, checked by an aristocratic senate.

Romans were skeptical of Greek democracy, especially in Athens, due to its instability, infighting and mob rule. Carthage’s republic seemed overly commercial and lacked the civic loyalty the Romans valued. This loyalty was central to Rome’s military, staffed by a citizen army motivated by . In contrast, Carthage’s strong, citizen-led navy protected trade routes, but its reliance on mercenaries for land campaigns made them costly and unpredictable.

These factors reduced the ability to push back against Roman rule. By 146 BC, Rome defeated both Greece and Carthage, cementing its dominance and expanding political system. Polybius suggests that Rome’s success over Carthage was partially due to its powerful, aristocratic Senate, while Carthage’s policies were increasingly shaped by popular influence. He believed that Rome’s decisions were made by elites versus the influence of the masses in Carthage.

Yet by this time, Rome was approaching its Late Republic phase. Scholar Harriet Flower’s argues that the Roman Republic wasn’t a single entity but a series of six republics, each with unique political characteristics. Others have also challenged the notion of a single Roman Republic, placing Republican Rome into three main periods characterized by changing centers of power.

The Early Republic (509–367 BC) was marked by tensions between patricians (aristocratic elites) and plebeians (common citizens). The struggle for plebeian rights led to significant reforms, including the establishment of tribunes, elected by the to represent common interests and often from the plebeian class.

During the Middle Republic (367–133 BC), the Licinian-Sextian laws of 367 BC were passed to again alleviate tensions between patricians and plebeians, limiting patrician land ownership, providing debt relief for plebeians and ensuring that at least one of the two consuls was a plebeian. However, political power increasingly concentrated in the Senate, undermining these reforms.

During the Late Republic (133–31 BC), Rome’s military success over rivals coincided with the growing influence of ordinary citizens in the judicial system, especially as jurors. Yet the republic was plagued by social conflict, corruption and civil unrest. Sulla’s march on Rome in 88 BC and his curtailing of the tribunes’ power exemplified rising instability. Afterwards, figures like in the ’70s BC and Julius Caesar in 59 BC began consolidating power, further undermining republican values. In 27 BC, Augustus formally transitioned Rome into an empire, while maintaining the of republican traditions.

Roman orator Cicero, a prominent defender of the Republic, inadvertently its demise through his support for Augustus, endorsement of dictatorial powers and willingness to suspend legal norms during crises, showing the dangers of sacrificing republican ideals to manage turmoil. For the next few centuries, republican ideals were largely sidelined.

The rise of modern republics

The collapse of the Western Roman Empire in 476 AD saw and monarchies spread across its former territories and peripheral regions. This instability nonetheless allowed new republics to emerge, such as Venice, founded in 697 AD. It maintained a 1,100-year run as a through a political system that encouraged merchant participation and representation, shrewd diplomacy, social mobility, community cohesion and an extensive trade network. France eventually conquered it in 1797.

During the Italian Renaissance (14th to 17th centuries), urbanization, advancements in communication and Enlightenment ideals enabled the rise of new city-states. Merchant classes and other groups established republican systems as alternatives to European monarchies elsewhere as well. However, they were ultimately absorbed by empires, partly due to their inability to exploit the expanding Atlantic trade routes that reduced the importance of the Mediterranean.

Republics were not confined to Europe. The in modern-day Malaysia, particularly the Lanfang Republic declared in 1777, arose when Chinese settlers recruited by local sultans for mining formed companies to safeguard their interests. Over time, they evolved into self-governing territories with elected leaders and various levels of democratic governance. The Lanfang Republic was eventually defeated by Dutch colonial forces in 1884, with the rest absorbed through treaty or militarily defeated by the century’s end.

The establishment of the US marked the reemergence of the large-scale republican state. In 1787, after the American Revolution, the nation formally became a constitutional republic, aiming to eliminate monarchy while avoiding a chaotic direct democracy. The Founding Fathers created a , balancing public participation with safeguards against aristocracy and emphasizing consent of the governed (though limited to white male landowners). The debates over constitutional amendments and expanding democracy for decades, paralleling similar discussions in post-Revolutionary France after 1789.

Today, many republics exist, but their authenticity and stability can be compromised. Being conquered imposes outside authority, while others pursue foreign expansion themselves, centralizing control and subjugating other territories. Republics such as those in 16th century Netherlands, 17th century England and 18th century US and France grew into empires or reverted to monarchies, adapting in ways whose lessons are still relevant today. These expansionist policies, often justified as essential for wealth and security, led to the abandonment of certain republican and democratic principles.

Risks of devolution

Republics can shift toward authoritarianism, with modern policymakers perceiving more open democratic systems as unstable and vulnerable to manipulation. In recent years, China and Russia have seen reductions in public accountability, civil liberties, meaningful political participation and concentrations of power behind Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, respectively. In North Korea, power has been concentrated in the leader’s office since its founding, with leadership passed within the Kim family. Similarly, a dynasty has developed under the Aliyev family in since the 1990s, with concerns that may follow.

Countries with strong presidential systems, common in the Americas, risk in the executive branch. Fixed terms limit the removal of unpopular leaders, since, unlike in parliamentary democracies, no “confidence vote” mechanism exists for crisis situations. can also weaken checks and balances; coups can be common.

Alliances and federations of Greek city-states like the and , as well as the Native American , formed assemblies and councils for representation and collective decision-making, influencing models like the and European Union (EU). The statement that the US is “a republic, not a democracy” reflects the original aim to keep political power within the states rather than the federal government. However, authority has increasingly centralized in Washington, DC, reducing state sovereignty, tensions in the EU between individual states and Brussels.

Political apathy and extremism can also stem from the influence of billionaires and corporations over the political process, government corruption and the erosion of social mobility. Social media platforms offer the chance for heightened political participation, but are increasingly vulnerable to disinformation spread by big tech and political actors. This reveals new ways in which democracies can veer toward .

The diversity of republics today reflects their historical variety, with countries still navigating the governance structures in their own contexts. Kazakhstan, initially authoritarian, has seen some toward a more balanced system with a more powerful parliament following popular protests in 2022, though it remains less democratic. Similarly, Singapore, often described as authoritarian, is still considered a republic due to some , maintaining a blend of controlled leadership and political structure.

The future of republic governance

An informed and engaged citizenry, supported by a strong economic base, is essential for a successful republic. Citizens must feel the benefits of their system, and these must endure through fair elections, the rule of law and due process. Effective foreign policy also relies on wide-ranging trade networks and adaptable alliances, while maintaining a strong military and avoiding military overreach or falling into the trap of foreign conquest.

Historically, empire and monarchy have been more common than republics, shaping world order through hierarchical and anarchic systems. Within the global United Nations framework, which is designed to support the sovereignty and equality of nations — a principle rooted in republican ideals — republics can govern more democratically by collaborating in a way similar to ancient confederations. The Achaean League and Lycian League consisted of states with varying political systems cooperating within a loose, republican-style confederation. Modern blocs like the EU, Association of Southeast Asian Nations and African Union allow countries to work together under common principles and boost their voice in the international system.

Changes in domestic politics have seen the growth of in the 2010s, as more referendums and popular votes of legislative and constitutional issues emerged globally, but especially in Europe. While larger republics like the US, Germany and India still avoid national-level votes on major issues, direct democracy is increasingly apparent at regional and local levels. Challenges remain in terms of deliberation and integration, as states like California and Arizona have seen ballot initiatives rushed, leaving limited time for meaningful debate.

Modern , based on those originating thousands of years ago, have also elevated these referendums in recent years and provided an alternative to traditional political processes. They have influenced major policy changes, from climate policies in France to abortion laws in Ireland, with assemblies, typically convened by legislative bodies in partnership with nonprofits, designed to reflect demographics. While they have led to concrete policy shifts, some recommendations have not been adopted as lawmakers cite the importance of expert-led decision-making.

With the US election behind us, reassessing republican ideals, both domestically and globally, is crucial. As the Grand Old Party potentially gains control over all three branches of government in a divided nation, how it implements policies will either ease concerns or amplify them. The future of republicanism depends on the US shaping its domestic agenda for the common good and using its influence on the global stage in line with democratic principles.

[, a project of the Independent Media Institute, produced this piece.]

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That man’s hunger stayed with me, gnawing at my mind like an unwelcome guest. Was he a symbol of the growing chasm between Washington’s polished rhetoric and the raw, unvarnished reality endured by millions? Beneath the lofty ideals of the capital, something vital had been lost. I had walked through the terminals of Dubai and Singapore, temples to modern prosperity, but here, in the seat of American power, lay a quiet tragedy — its citizens scavenging for dignity amidst the remnants of forgotten promises.

This dissonance has followed me through the years I have lived in Washington, Kentucky and Wisconsin. In Washington, policies are crafted, narratives spun, yet the struggles of the everyday American seem distant, almost abstract. In Kentucky, I saw families crushed under the weight of inflation, paychecks stretched to breaking. In Wisconsin, I heard echoes of lost industries, lives upended by decisions made far from their grasp. To them, Washington is a myth — a city of marble halls that speaks in platitudes while crises rage beyond its borders.

It is into this void that former and future President Donald J. Trump has re-emerged, his message of strength and renewal cutting through the polished but hollow discourse of the capital. His November 5 electoral victory was not merely a political event; it was a seismic rejection of the status quo. Against all odds — assassination attempts, endless litigation — Trump stood defiant, embodying the resilience and anger of a nation disillusioned. His landslide win, sweeping seven swing states, sent a clear message: the American people were no longer content with promises; they demanded action, even if it came wrapped in controversy.

The fatigue gripping the nation is deeper than weariness; it is a spiritual exhaustion, a slow erosion of belief. Rising prices, policy paralysis and a fractured foreign policy have left Americans adrift. Inflation haunts them like a specter, while the immigrant crisis stirs frustrations in communities already stretched to their limits.

Abroad, the erosion of American influence is palpable. In South Asia, where I often work, Washington’s focus feels narrow, shaped by a myopic, India-centric lens that overlooks the region’s complexities. The US military’s chaotic retreat from Kabul, captured in the image of a man clinging to an aircraft, epitomized this decline. Meanwhile, China has seized the moment, extending its influence from the Solomon Islands to Sri Lanka, filling the void left by America’s absence.

Today, Sri Lanka is ruled by a Marxist oriented political party for the first time, the legislature and executive branch taken over under the shadows of significant Chinese influence. A US senior academic explained to me that “stacks of money was given during Sri Lankan elections by China to the Marxist.” Meanwhile in the Solomon Islands, Jeremiah Manele, a former foreign minister, was appointed prime minister and pledged to continue the policy of .

In conversations with foreign diplomats and thinkers, the critique is unrelenting. A Jordanian contact of mine once described America’s alliances as fleeting, its loyalty uncertain. A Cambodian policy director lamented the unpredictability of , even after . These voices echo a growing disillusionment — a realization that the ideals of American leadership often fall short of its actions.

At a recent Indian Army Defense Dialogue, I met Israeli academic Carice Witte from SIGNAL Group, who matter-of-factly that “US weakness is projected now which is not good; we must have strong, smart leadership who is not afraid to deal with hard power.” Yet, even as she spoke of strength, I wondered if that was truly what Americans desired. Did they yearn for victory on the world stage, or had the years of conflict and economic decline made them crave something simpler, like peace or stability? Trump positioned himself as the “man for peace,” a perfect fit for the many Americans who do not wish to entangle themselves with endless wars.Ěý

Trump’s triumph taps into this discontent, presenting himself as the answer to America’s unraveling. He a golden age. “This will be the golden age of America,” a return to strength and self-reliance. But his rhetoric, though potent, is laced with contradictions. His campaign spoke of peace, even as it celebrated power; of stability, even as it thrived on division. His call for a new era resonated with those weary of endless wars and economic decline, but the challenges he inherits are immense. The fractures in American society and the entanglements abroad will demand more than slogans — they will require a vision that Washington has long struggled to deliver.

As foreign policy expert aptly noted, Trump’s reelection is likely to embolden him, fueling a belief in his infallibility. With renewed vigor, he will seek “trophy achievements” abroad, confronting a world that views his leadership with equal parts fascination and skepticism. Yet the question remains: Can this new era heal America’s divisions, or will it deepen them further? Will Trump’s promised golden age be a time of renewal, or will it add another chapter to the long tale of unfulfilled promises?

Beneath the triumph, a quiet truth lingers: America’s fractures cannot be mended by strength alone. Its renewal will require not just power, but wisdom, humility and a return to the ideals that once made it a beacon for the world. Trump’s America stands at a crossroads, and the path it chooses will determine whether this chapter is one of redemption — or another in a litany of squandered opportunities.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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To make that forecast, the historian conducted what he called “a more realistic assessment of domestic and global trends.” Starting with the global context, he argued that, “faced with a fading superpower,” China, India, Iran, and Russia would all start to “provocatively challenge U.S. dominion over the oceans, space, and cyberspace.” At home in the US, domestic divisions would “widen into violent clashes and divisive debates… Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair, a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric, demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal.” That historian concluded, “the world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.”

Now that a “far-right patriot,” one President-elect Donald Trump, has indeed captured (or rather recaptured) the presidency “with thundering rhetoric,” let’s explore the likelihood that a second Trump term in office, starting in the fateful year 2025, might actually bring a hasty end, silent or otherwise, to an “American Century” of global dominion.

Making the original prediction

Let’s begin by examining the reasoning underlying my original prediction. (Yes, I was the historian.) Back in 2010, when I picked a specific date for a rising tide of US decline, this country looked unassailably strong both at home and abroad. President Barack Obama’s administration was producing a “post-racial” society. After recovering from the 2008 financial crisis, the US was on track for a decade of dynamic growth — the auto industry saved, oil and gas production booming, the tech sector thriving, the stock market soaring and employment solid. Internationally, Washington was the world’s preeminent leader, with an unchallenged military, formidable diplomatic clout, unchecked economic globalization and its democratic governance still the global norm.

Looking forward, leading historians of the empire agreed that the US would remain the world’s sole superpower for the foreseeable future. Writing in the Financial Times in 2002, Yale professor Paul Kennedy, author of a widely-read book on imperial decline, that “America’s array of force is staggering,” with a mix of economic, diplomatic and technological dominance that made it the globe’s “single superpower” without peer in the entire history of the world. Russia’s defense budget had “collapsed” and its economy was “less than that of the Netherlands.” Should China’s high growth rates continue for another 30 years, it “might be a serious challenger to U.S. predominance” — but that wouldn’t be true until 2032, if then. While the US’s “unipolar moment” would surely not “continue for centuries,” its end, he predicted, “seems a long way off for now.”

Writing in a similar vein in The New York Times in February 2010, Piers Brendon, a historian of Britain’s imperial decline, the “doom mongers” who “conjure with Roman and British analogies in order to trace the decay of American hegemony.” While Rome was riven by “internecine strife” and Britain ran its empire on a shoestring budget, the US was “constitutionally stable” with “an enormous industrial base.” Taking a few “relatively simple steps,” he concluded, Washington should be able to overcome current budgetary problems and perpetuate its global power indefinitely.

When I made my very different prediction nine months later, I was coordinating a of 140 historians from universities on three continents who were studying the decline of earlier empires — particularly those of Britain, France and Spain. Beneath the surface of this country’s seeming strength, we could already see the telltale signs of decline that had led to the collapse of those earlier empires.

By 2010, economic globalization was cutting good-paying factory jobs here, income inequality was widening and corporate bailouts were booming — all essential ingredients for rising working-class resentment and deepening domestic divisions. Foolhardy military misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, pushed by Washington elites trying to deny any sense of decline, stoked simmering anger among ordinary US citizens, slowly discrediting the very idea of international commitments. And the erosion of the US’s relative economic strength from half the world’s output in 1950 to a quarter in 2010 meant the wherewithal for its unipolar power was fading fast.

Only a “near-peer” competitor was needed to turn that attenuating US global hegemony into accelerating imperial decline. With rapid economic growth, a vast population and the world’s longest imperial tradition, China seemed primed to become just such a country. But back then, Washington’s foreign policy elites thought not and even admitted China to the World Trade Organization (WTO), that “U.S. power and hegemony could readily mold China to the United States’ liking.”

Our group of historians, mindful of the frequent imperial wars fought when near-peer competitors finally confronted the reigning hegemon of their moment — think Germany vs Great Britain in World War I — expected China’s challenge would not be long in coming. Indeed, in 2012, just two years after my prediction, the US National Intelligence Council that “China alone will probably have the largest economy, surpassing that of the United States a few years before 2030” and this country would no longer be “a hegemonic power.”

Just a year later, Chinese President Xi Jinping, drawing on a massive in foreign-exchange reserves accumulated in the decade after joining the WTO, announced his bid for global power. This would come in the form of what he called “the ,” history’s largest development program. It was designed to make Beijing the center of the global economy.

In the following decade, the US–China rivalry would become so intense that, last September, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall : “I’ve been closely watching the evolution of [China’s] military for 15 years. China is not a future threat; China is a threat today.”

The global rise of the strongman

Another major setback for Washington’s world order, long legitimated by its promotion of democracy (whatever its own dominating tendencies), came from the rise of populist strongmen worldwide. Consider them part of a nationalist reaction to the West’s aggressive economic globalization.

At the close of the Cold War in 1991, Washington became the planet’s sole superpower, using its hegemony to forcefully promote a wide-open global economy — forming the in 1995, pressing open-market “” on developing economies and knocking down tariff barriers worldwide. It also built a global communications grid by 700,000 miles of fiber-optic submarine cables and then 1,300 satellites (now 4,700).

By exploiting that very globalized economy, however, China’s soared to $3.2 trillion by 2016, surpassing both the US and Japan, while simultaneously 2.4 million US jobs between 1999 and 2011, ensuring the closure of factories in countless towns across the South and Midwest. By fraying social safety nets while eroding protection for labor unions and local businesses in both the US and Europe, globalization reduced the quality of life for many, while creating inequality on a staggering scale and stoking a working-class reaction that would crest in a global wave of angry populism.

Riding that wave, right-wing populists have been winning a steady succession of elections — in Russia in 2000, Israel in 2009, Hungary in 2010, China in 2012, Turkey in 2014, the Philippines and the US in 2016, Brazil in 2018, Italy in 2022, the Netherlands in 2023, Indonesia and the US again in 2024.

Set aside their incendiary us-vs-them rhetoric, however, and look at their actual achievements and those right-wing demagogues turn out to have a record that can only be described as dismal. In Brazil, President Jair Bolsonaro the vast Amazon rainforest and left office amid an . In Russia, President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, his country’s economy to capture some more land (which it hardly lacked). In Turkey, President Recep ·ˇ°ů»ĺ´ÇÄź˛ą˛Ô caused a crippling , while 50,000 suspected opponents. In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte 30,000 suspected drug users and China by giving up his country’s claims in the resource-rich South China Sea. In Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has wreaked havoc on Gaza and neighboring lands, in part to in office and stay out of prison.

Prospects for Donald Trump’s second term

After the steady erosion of its global power for several decades, the US is no longer the — or perhaps even an — “exceptional” nation floating above the deep global currents that shape the politics of most countries. And as it has become more of an ordinary country, it has also felt the full force of the worldwide move toward strongman rule. Not only does that global trend help explain Trump’s election and his recent re-election, but it provides some clues as to what he’s likely to do with that office the second time around.

In the globalized world the US made, there is now an intimate interaction between domestic and international policy. That will soon be apparent in a second Trump administration whose policies are likely to simultaneously damage the country’s economy and further degrade Washington’s world leadership.

Let’s start with the clearest of his commitments: environmental policy. During the recent election campaign, Trump climate change “a scam” and his transition team has already drawn up to exit from the Paris climate accords. By quitting that agreement, the US will abdicate any leadership role when it comes to the most consequential issue facing the international community while reducing pressure on China to curb its greenhouse gas emissions. Since these two countries now account for (45%) of global carbon emissions, such a move will ensure that the world blows past the target of keeping this planet’s temperature rise to C until the end of the century. Instead, on a planet that’s already had 12 recent of just such a temperature rise, that mark is expected to be permanently reached by perhaps 2029. That is the year Trump finishes his second term.

On the domestic side of climate policy, Trump last September that he would “terminate the Green New Deal, which I call the Green New Scam, and rescind all unspent funds under the misnamed Inflation Reduction Act.” On the day after his election, he committed himself to increasing the country’s oil and gas production, a celebratory crowd, “We have more liquid gold than any country in the world.” He will undoubtedly also wind farm leases on Federal lands and the $7,500 tax credit for purchasing an electrical vehicle.

As the world shifts to renewable energy and all-electric vehicles, Trump’s policies will undoubtedly do lasting damage to the US economy. In 2023, the International Renewable Energy Agency that, amid continuing price decreases, wind and solar power now generate electricity for less than half the cost of fossil fuels. Any attempt to slow the conversion of this country’s utilities to the most cost-effective form of energy runs a serious risk of ensuring that US-made products will be ever less competitive.

To put it bluntly, he seems to be proposing that electricity users here should pay twice as much for their power as those in other advanced nations. Similarly, as relentless engineering innovation makes electric vehicles cheaper and more reliable than petroleum-powered ones, attempting to slow such an energy transition is likely to make the US automotive industry uncompetitive at home and abroad.

Calling tariffs “the greatest thing ever invented,” Trump has slapping a 20% duty on all foreign goods and 60% on those from China. In another instance of domestic–foreign synergy, such duties will undoubtedly end up crippling US farm exports, thanks to retaliatory overseas tariffs. Simultaneously, it will dramatically raise the cost of consumer goods for US citizens, stoking inflation and slowing consumer spending.

Reflecting his to alliances and military commitments, Trump’s first foreign policy initiative will likely be an attempt to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine. During a CNN town hall meeting in May 2023, he he could stop the fighting “in 24 hours.” Last July, he : “I would tell [Ukrainian President] Zelenskyy, no more. You got to make a deal.”

Just two days after the November 5 election, Trump reportedly Putin over a phone call “not to escalate the war in Ukraine and reminded him of Washington’s sizable military presence in Europe.” Drawing on sources inside the Trump transition team, the Wall Street Journal that the new administration is considering “cementing Russia’s seizure of 20% of Ukraine” and forcing Kyiv to forego its bid to join NATO, perhaps for as long as 20 years.

With Russia drained of manpower and its economy pummeled by three years of bloody warfare, a competent negotiator — should Trump actually appoint one — might indeed be able to bring a tenuous peace to a ravaged Ukraine. Since it has been Europe’s frontline of defense against a revanchist Russia, the continent’s major powers would be expected to play a . But Germany’s coalition government has just collapsed; French President Emmanuel Macron is crippled by recent electoral reverses and the NATO alliance, after three years of a shared commitment to Ukraine, faces real uncertainty with the advent of a Trump presidency.

US allies

Those impending negotiations over Ukraine highlight the paramount importance of alliances for US global power. For 80 years, from World War II through the Cold War and beyond, Washington relied on bilateral and multilateral alliances as a critical force multiplier. With China and Russia both rearmed and increasingly closely aligned, reliable allies have become even more important to maintaining Washington’s global presence. With 32 member nations representing a billion people and a commitment to mutual defense that has lasted 75 years, NATO is arguably the most powerful military alliance in modern history.

Yet Trump has long been sharply critical of it. As a candidate in 2016, he the alliance “obsolete.” As president, he mocked the treaty’s mutual-defense clause, even “tiny” Montenegro could drag the US into war. While campaigning last February, he that he would tell Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to a NATO ally that didn’t pay what he considered its fair share.

Right after Trump’s election, caught between what one analyst “an aggressively advancing Russia and an aggressively withdrawing America,” Macron insisted that the continent needed to be a “more united, stronger, more sovereign Europe in this new context.” Even if the new administration doesn’t formally withdraw from NATO, Trump’s repeated hostility, particularly toward its crucial mutual-defense clause, may yet serve to eviscerate the alliance.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the US presence rests on three sets of overlapping alliances: the entente with Australia and Britain; the with Australia, India and Japan and a chain of bilateral defense pacts stretching along the Pacific littoral from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. Via careful diplomacy, the administration US President Joe Biden those alliances, bringing two wayward allies, Australia and the Philippines that had drifted Beijing-wards, back into the Western fold. Trump’s penchant for abusing allies and, as in his first term, from multilateral pacts is likely to weaken such ties and so US power in the region.

Although his first administration famously waged a trade war with Beijing, Trump’s attitude toward the island of Taiwan is bluntly transactional. “I think, Taiwan should pay us for defense,” he in June, adding: “You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything.” In October, he the Wall Street Journal that he would not have to use military force to defend Taiwan because Xi “respects me and he knows I’m f—— crazy.” Bluster aside, Trump, unlike Biden, has never committed himself to defend Taiwan from a Chinese attack.

Should Beijing indeed attack Taiwan outright or, as appears more likely, impose a crippling on the island, Trump seems unlikely to risk a war with China. The loss of Taiwan would break the US position along the Pacific littoral, which for 80 years has been the fulcrum of its global imperial posture. This would push its naval forces back to a “second island chain” running from Japan to Guam. Such a retreat would represent a major blow to the US’s imperial role in the Pacific, potentially making it no longer a significant player in the security of its Asia-Pacific allies.

A silent US recessional

Adding up the likely impact of Trump’s policies in this country, Asia, Europe and the international community generally, his second term will almost certainly be one of imperial decline, increasing internal chaos and a further loss of global leadership. As “respect for American authority” fades, Trump may yet resort to “threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal.” But as I predicted back in 2010, it seems quite likely that “the world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.”

[ first published this piece.]

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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“It’s important to note that the narrative �BRICS countries target the USD’ seems just a propaganda topic that the so-called mainstream media is pushing. It has very little to do with reality, but as far as propaganda is concerned, it works fine because few people seem to understand what is really going on anyways. The correct narrative is �The USD targets the BRICS countries.’ Here’s why:

The part that everybody seems to get wrong: the BRICS+ bankers are not trying to dethrone or attack the dollar. They have been compelled to decouple from the USD because some have already been locked out of USD trade via Western banks and had their assets frozen in Western banks. Others logically anticipate the same treatment at some time in the future. At the same time, they happily trade in USD when they can or need to, and still hold trillions of dollars worth of American treasuries and other paper denominated in USD, although the preference for holding T-bills is changing.

So, as I mentioned earlier, they are undollaring (diversifying away from dollar-only trade), but not dedollaring completely, and they are doing it out of necessity, not some strategic evil scheme they designed out of their own volition. BRICS Bridge is designed to trade in any currency, including the dollar – this fact alone runs counter to the many overarching statements under the â€�BRICS are the enemy of the dollar’ narrative.

The clever propaganda trick is to flip cause and effect, making it appear as though BRICS+ countries are deliberately undermining the dollar, when in fact, they are reacting to being forced out of the USD system. It’s like blaming someone for leaving a burning building when they had no choice but to escape. In this regard, no one has done more than the powers that be in the USA to push the world away from the USD.

One more peculiarity that nobody reports on: allegedly, at least two European banks already using or testing mBridge/BRICS bridge (quietly) are Rothschild & Co and The Institute for the Works of Religion. That got me thinking that this may explain why the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) found themselves between the rock and the hard place:

• BIS bureaucrats think they may have leverage over mBridge
• BIS may not have the authority to do anything about it at all. I would like to hear your thoughts on this.

Nevertheless, it certainly appears that Bloomberg and similar outlets are pushing a narrative that lacks any real analysis or investigation, but instead works to push someone’s divisive geopolitical agenda. The question is why and who is paying for the music?”

It was this question coming from Edward that prompted Alex to pen the response we featured in Money Matters, Part 12, a week ago.

“Who is paying for the music? $1.6 billion ($325 million for 5 years each) appropriated by US Congress to be distributed to journalists to â€�counter the People’s Republic of China Malign Influence’ and the “malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People’s Republic of China and entities acting on their behalf globally.” 

Should anyone be surprised that the US Congress is ready to spend so many of its citizens’ “hard-earned” tax dollars on “correcting” the vocabulary, themes and memes journalists are allowed to use? That sum of $1.6 billion gives us an idea of the cost of managing the news. “Undollar” holds no connotation of aggression, whereas “dedollar” sounds like an assault not just on the dollar, but implicitly on the “rules-based order” associated with it.

If “dedollar” and “undollar” exist, we might wonder whether there should also be a verb “to dollar.” It doesn’t appear so, though such a verb would accurately describe what happened to the global economy in the aftermath of World War II. That was the crucial moment in history when the US economy held all the cards, not just because of its industrial development, but especially because it held the debts of everyone else’s war spending. We sometimes forget that the post World War II world order drew its initial strength and based its stability on the value of a gold-convertible dollar.

°Ő´Ç»ĺ˛ą˛â’s dollar has seen its psychological stature as the universal solvent for international trade seriously diminished. This happened over time, but it now seems to be coming to a head. The dollar ceased being tethered to gold in 1971 when President Richard Nixon waved his hegemonic wand, effectively floating the greenback. But very quickly, by 1975, it had acquired a new platform of stability thanks to Henry Kissinger’s cleverly engineered petrodollar monopoly with Saudi Arabia. But that connection, though not completely broken, has been radically loosened over the past two years.

The dollar’s fundamental strength resides in the perception of the performance of the US economy. But the economy has thrived, above all, on the dollar’s special status. Giscard d’Estaing famously called it the dollar’s “exorbitant privilege.” Gold and then oil became the equivalent of the collateral a bank requires to secure a loan. But the link to both has been compromised. The world has now moved into uncharted waters. The risk of endemic instability for the currency of a nation that is rapidly heading towards an unmanageable accumulated debt of $36 trillion is real. And, like the debt itself, that risk is growing by the day.  

This period of political transition following this month’s election offers a new twist. During the campaign, President-elect Donald Trump to punish countries that “leave the dollar.” His choice for Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, recently a bill in Congress “to punish countries that de-dollarize.” Asia Times notes that “Rubio’s bill, ominously called the Sanctions Evasion Prevention and Mitigation Act, would require US presidents to sanction financial institutions using China’s CIPS payment system, Russia’s financial messaging service SPFS and other alternatives to the dollar-centric SWIFT system.”

Would such a campaign to sanction and punish be feasible? Does the Trump team seriously believe it can succeed without doing even more damage to the US itself than to the culprits it is seeking to harass? The same article, in its opening paragraph, reminds readers of Edward’s point. “Economic and financial sanctions often backfire. The most notable example is the weaponization of the dollar against Russia.” That, of course, was the event that put dedollarization in the headlines and made it a permanent talking point.

With the arrival of Trump, his cherished taste for trade wars is spawning something else: currency wars. Given that we already have a couple of ongoing hot wars that appear to be escalating, we may soon lack the vocabulary to describe the other wars that may be festering.

On that score, Alex shared with us this week a document that reveals yet another dimension of the war-infested mindset of today’s political and geopolitical culture. It’s a new kind of war with potentially cataclysmic consequences. Let’s call it the “quantum war.” The British mathematician and writer, Professor Hannah Fry, interviews some of the key players developing quantum computing. They all agree the stakes are very high. Impressed by the potential significance of quantum computing, Alex raised an interesting question:

“Can you imagine if China gets to build a quantum computer before the US does? It would be �game over,’ at least for the geo-political games the US likes to play in other countries’ backyards. China could disrupt the DTCC (Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation), the backbone of the US’s financial markets. It processed $3 quadrillion (!) in securities transactions in 2023.”

At one point in the video (19:19), Fry interviews Alexander Ling, a professor at the University of Singapore and head of the Centre for Quantum Technologies. Fry points out that Ling’s group “want to build an unhackable network so that anyone can use it.” She adds this surprising observation: “They also collaborate with US and Chinese companies.”

Ling evokes the period in which quantum technology was first being developed: the 1980s and 1990s. “Everyone was open to having an exchange of people and ideas at that time.” Noting that in her earlier interviews with specialists in the US and the UK, everyone appeared focused on security and the risk of proliferation, Fry calls into question the rhetoric “framed as a quantum race between two giant superpowers who are throwing everything they have at it.” She then asks the real question: “Will a high stakes duel for supremacy really define the future of global power?”

Whether considering reserve currencies or scientific research, for some people, every issue boils down to a duel for supremacy.

Join the debate

Money Matters…, is dedicated to developing this discussion and involving all interested parties.

We invite all of you who have something to contribute to send us your reflections at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We will integrate your insights into the ongoing debate. We will publish them as articles or as part of the ongoing dialogue.

*[51łÔąĎ’s “Crucible of Collaboration” is meant to be a space in which multiple voices can be heard, comparing and contrasting their opinions and insights in the interest of deepening and broadening our understanding of complex topics.]

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The only area where there might be some hope for ending a war is Ukraine. Rubio has come close to Trump’s position on that matter, praising Ukraine for standing up to Russia, but that the US is funding a deadly “stalemate war” that needs to be “brought to a conclusion.”

But in all the other hotspots around the world, Rubio is likely to make conflicts even hotter, or start new ones. Here are eight reasons why he would make a dangerous secretary of state:

Rubio’s obsession with Cuban regime change will sink any chance of better relations there

Like other Cuban-American politicians, Rubio has built his career on vilifying the Cuban Revolution and trying to economically strangle and starve the people of his parents’ homeland into submission.

It is ironic, therefore, that his parents left Cuba before the Revolution, during the US-backed dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. Batista’s executioners, secret police and death squads killed an 20,000 people, leading to a wildly popular revolution in 1959.

When President Barack Obama began to restore relations with Cuba in 2014, Rubio swore to do “everything possible” to obstruct and reverse that policy. In May 2024, Rubio his zero-tolerance for any kind of social or economic contacts between the US and Cuba, claiming that any easing of the US blockade will only “strengthen the oppressive regime and undermine the opposition… Until there is freedom in Cuba, the United States must maintain a firm stance.” Two months earlier, Rubio legislation to ensure that Cuba would remain on the US “State Sponsor of Terrorism List,” imposing sanctions that cut Cuba off from the US-dominated Western banking system.

These measures to destroy the Cuban economy have led to a massive wave of migration in the past two years. But when the US Coast Guard tried to coordinate with their Cuban counterparts, Rubio introduced legislation to prohibit such interaction. While Trump has vowed to stem immigration, his secretary of state wants to crush Cuba’s economy, forcing people to abandon the island and set sail for the US.

Applying Rubio’s anti-Cuba template to the rest of Latin America will make enemies of more of our neighbors

Rubio’s disdain for his ancestral home has served him so well as a US politician that he has extended it to the rest of Latin America. He has sided with extreme right-wing politicians like Argentinian President Javier Milei and former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. He rails against progressive ones, from Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to the popular Mexican former President López Obrador, whom he “an apologist for tyranny” for supporting other leftist governments.

In Venezuela, Rubio has promoted brutal sanctions and plots to topple the government of Nicolas Maduro. In 2019, he was one of the of Trump’s failed policy of recognizing opposition figure Juan Guaidó as president. He has also advocated for sanctions and regime change in Nicaragua.

In March 2023, Rubio urged President Joe Biden to impose on Bolivia for prosecuting  leaders of a 2019 US-backed coup that led to that killed at least 21 people.ĚýHe also the government of Honduras for withdrawing from an extradition treaty with the US this past August. This was a response to decades of US interference that had turned Honduras into a narco-state riven by poverty, gang violence and mass , until the election of democratic socialist President Xiomara Castro in January 2022.

Rubio’s major concern in this part of the world now seems to be the of China, which has become the second-largest of most Latin American countries. Unlike the US, China focuses on economic benefits and not internal politics. Meanwhile, US politicians like Rubio still see Latin America as the US’s “backyard.”

While Rubio’s virulent anti-leftist stands have served him well in climbing to senior positions in the US government, and now into Trump’s inner circle, his disdain for Latin American sovereignty bodes ill for US relations in the region.

Rubio insists that the US and Israel can do no wrong, and that God has given Palestine to Israel

Despite the massive death toll in Gaza and global condemnation of Israel’s genocide, Rubio still the myth that “Israel takes extraordinary steps to avoid civilian losses” and that innocent people die in Gaza because Hamas has deliberately placed them in the way and used them as human shields. The problem, he says, is “an enemy that doesn’t value human life.”

In November 2024, when CODEPINK if Rubio would support a ceasefire, he replied, “On the contrary. I want them to destroy every element of Hamas they can get their hands on. These people are vicious animals.”

There are few times in this past year that the Biden administration has tried to restrain Israel, but when Biden begged Israel not to send troops into the southern city of Rafah, Rubio that was like telling the Allied forces in World War II not to attack Berlin to get Adolf Hitler.

In a to Secretary of State Antony Blinken in August 2024, Rubio criticized the Biden administration’s decision to sanction Israeli settlers linked to anti-Palestinian violence in the occupied West Bank.

“Israel has consistently sought peace with the Palestinians. It is unfortunate that the Palestinians, whether it be the Palestinian Authority or FTOs [Foreign Terrorist Organisations] such as Hamas, have rejected such overtures,” Rubio wrote. “Israelis rightfully living in their historic homeland are not the impediment to peace; the Palestinians are,” he added.

No country besides Israel subscribes to the idea that its borders should be based on 2,000-year-old religious scriptures, and that it has a God-given right to displace or exterminate people who have lived there since then to reconquer its ancient homeland. The US will find itself extraordinarily isolated from the rest of the world if Rubio tries to assert that as a matter of US policy.

Rubio’s enmity toward Iran will fuel Israel’s war on its neighbors, and may lead the US to war

Rubio is obsessed with Iran. He that the central cause of violence and suffering in the Middle East is not Israeli policy but “Iran’s ambition to be a regional hegemonic power.” He that Iran’s goal in the Middle East is to “seek to drive America out of the region and then destroy Israel.”

He has been a proponent of maximum pressure on Iran, including for more and more sanctions. He believes the US should not re-enter the Iran nuclear deal, saying: “We must not trade away U.S. and Israeli security for vague commitments from a terrorist-sponsoring regime that has killed Americans and threatens to annihilate Israel.”

Rubio calls Lebanon’s Hezbollah a “full blown agent of Iran right on Israel’s border” and claims that wiping out Hezbollah’s leadership, along with entire neighborhoods full of civilians, is a “service to humanity.” He alleges that Iran has control over Iraq, Syria and the Houthis in Yemen, and is a threat to Jordan. He claims that “Iran has put a noose around Israel,” and says the goal of US policy should be regime change in Iran. This would set the stage for war.

While there will hopefully be leaders in the Pentagon who will caution Trump about the of a war with Iran, Rubio will not be a voice of reason.

Rubio is beholden to big money, from the weapons industry to the Israel lobby

Rubio has reportedly received over in campaign contributions from pro-Israel groups during his career. The Pro-Israel America PAC was his single campaign contributor over the last five years. When he last ran for re-election in 2022, he was the recipient of funding by pro-Israel groups in the Senate, taking in $367,000 from them for that campaign.

Rubio was also the recipient of funding from the “defense” industry in the Senate for the 2022 cycle, receiving $196,000. Altogether, the weapons industry has invested $663,000 in his Congressional career.

Rubio is clearly beholden to the US arms industry. He’s even more beholden to the Israel lobby, which has been one of his largest sources of campaign funding. This has placed him in the vanguard of Congress’s blind, unconditional support for Israel and subservience to Israeli narratives and propaganda. Therefore, it is unlikely that he will ever challenge the ongoing extermination of the Palestinian people or their expulsion from their homeland.

Rubio is so antagonistic towards China that China has sanctioned him — twice

at the Heritage Foundation in 2022, Rubio said: “The gravest threat facing America today — it is the challenge that will define not just this century, but my generation and every generation represented here in this room today — that challenge is not climate change, it’s not the pandemic, it’s not the left’s version of social justice. The threat that will define this century is China.”

It will be hard for our nation’s “top diplomat” to ease tensions with a country he has so maligned. He antagonized China by co-sponsoring the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which allows the US to bar Chinese imports over alleged Uyghur rights abuses — abuses that China denies and independent question. In fact, Rubio has gone so far as to accuse China of a “grotesque campaign of genocide” against the Uyghurs.

On Taiwan, he has not only introduced legislation to increase military aid to the island, but actually supports Taiwanese — a dangerous deviation from the US government’s long-standing One China approach.

The Chinese responded to Rubio by sanctioning him, not once but twice: once regarding the Uyghurs and once for his support of Hong Kong protests. Unless China lifts the sanctions, he would be the first US secretary of state to be banned from even visiting China.

Analysts expect China to try to sidestep Rubio and engage directly with Trump and other senior officials. Steve Tsang, the director of the China Institute at the United Kingdom’s School of Oriental and African Studies, told , “If that doesn’t work, then I think we’re going to get into a much more regular escalation of a bad relationship.”

Rubio knows sanctions are a trap, but doesn’t know how to escape them

Rubio is a leading advocate of unilateral economic sanctions, which are under international law, and which the UN and other countries refer to as “unilateral economic coercive measures.”

The US has used these measures so widely and wildly that they now a third of the world’s population. Officials from Treasury Secretary to Rubio himself have warned that using the US financial system and the dollar’s reserve currency status as weapons against other countries is driving the rest of the world to conduct trade in other currencies and develop alternative financial systems.

In March 2023, Rubio on Fox News, “We won’t have to talk sanctions in five years, because there will be so many countries in currencies other than the dollar that we won’t have the ability to sanction them.”

And yet Rubio has continued to be a leading sponsor of sanctions bills in the Senate. These include new on Iran in January 2024 and a in July to sanction foreign banks that participate in alternative financial systems.

While other countries develop new financial and trading systems to escape abusive, illegal US sanctions, the nominee for secretary of state remains caught in the same sanctions trap that he complained about on Fox.

Rubio wants to oppress US free speech

Rubio wants to curtail the right to enshrined in the First Amendment of the US Constitution. In May, he campus protests against Israel as a “complete breakdown of law and order.”

Rubio claimed to be speaking up for other students at US universities. “[They] paid a lot of money to go to these schools, [but are being disrupted by] a few thousand antisemitic zombies who have been brainwashed by two decades of indoctrination in the belief that the world is divided between victimizers and victims, and that the victimizers in this particular case, the ones that are oppressing people, are Jews in Israel,” Rubio said.

The Florida senator has said he supports Trump’s to deport foreign students who engage in pro-Palestinian campus . In April, he for punishing supporters of the Israel boycott movement as part of efforts to counter antisemitism, falsely equating any attempt to respond to Israel’s international crimes with antisemitism.

And what about those crimes, which the students are protesting? After visiting Israel in May, Rubio wrote an article for in which he never mentioned the thousands of civilians Israel has killed. He instead blamed Iran, Biden and “morally corrupt international institutions” for the crisis.

Rubio expects US citizens to believe that it is not genocide itself, but protests against genocide, that are a complete breakdown of law and order. He ł¦´ÇłÜ±ô»ĺ˛Ô’t be more wrong if he tried.

Students are not Rubio’s only target. In August 2023, he that certain “far-left and antisemitic entities” may have violated the Foreign Assistance Registration Act by their ties to China. He called for a Justice Department investigation into 18 groups, starting with CODEPINK. These unfounded claims of Chinese connections are only meant to intimidate legitimate groups that are exercising their free speech rights.

Conclusion: Rubio is a dangerous choice for secretary of state.

On each of these issues, Rubio has shown no sign of understanding the difference between domestic politics and diplomacy. Whether he’s talking about Cuba, Palestine, Iran or China, or even about CODEPINK, all his supposedly tough positions are based on cynically mischaracterizing the actions and motivations of his enemies and then attacking the straw man he has falsely set up.

Unscrupulous politicians often get away with that, and Rubio is no exception. He has made it his signature tactic because it works so well for him in US politics. But that will not work if and when he sits down to negotiate with other world leaders as secretary of state.

His underlying attitude to foreign relations is, like Trump’s, that the US must get its way or else. Additionally, other countries who won’t submit must be coerced, threatened, couped, bombed or invaded. This makes Rubio just as ill-equipped as Blinken to conduct diplomacy, improve US relations with other countries or resolve disputes and conflicts peacefully, as the United Nations Charter requires.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Reuters, like the Pentagon itself, sought to reassure the public that, however poor the performance, the DoD’s intentions were good. (Cue the Nina Simone, “I’m just a soul whose intentions are good; Oh Lord, please don’t let me be misunderstood…”)

For United States citizens, late 2021 was an odd moment in history. It was the first year of Joe Biden’s presidency. Following the withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 after 20 years of war, the increasingly bloated US defense establishment was, for a few months, no longer visibly involved militarily, diplomatically or logistically in an overseas conflict. Yes, there was some action in Syria and even Iraq. But the public felt this as a moment of peacetime. The perfect opportunity to set one’s house in order.

Reuters cannot be blamed for failing to notice that the State Department was busy at the time setting the scene for a war with Russia as NATO — but not the US on its own — was putting increasing pressure on the Donbas region in Ukraine. No journalist could predict the Russian invasion that would take place three months later. It was indeed a privileged moment for reassessing the entire defense establishment’s capacity to manage and even audit its own accounts.

In the meantime, that war not only began but is still going on, with hundreds of billions of US defense expenses transferred to Ukraine. Even less predictable than Putin’s “unprovoked” invasion of Ukraine, was the equally “unprovoked” Gaza revolt of October 2023 that put the DoD money machine into overdrive as the ironclad commitment to Israel had to be respected, no matter what.

So, with all that unexpected activity and the complex politics that accompanies it, we should not be astonished today to discover that not too much has changed on the audit front.

This time it’s Brad Dress writing for The Hill who offers us what has now become a somewhat predictable and repetitive: “Pentagon fails 7th audit in a row but says progress made.”

But the Beatles certainly got it right, since, according to no less an authority than Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer Michael McCord, the Defense Department “has turned a corner in its understanding of the depth and breadth of its challenges.” He even gave a reading of the dynamics when he added: “Momentum is on our side, and throughout the Department there is strong commitment — and belief in our ability — to achieve an unmodified audit opinion.”

°Ő´Ç»ĺ˛ą˛â’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Strong commitment:

In the language of military officials, vague intention, which is a generous reading for something that more likely means “a weak non-commitment.”

Contextual note

It may sound abusive to claim that a phrase such as “strong commitment” can mean literally its opposite, as we propose in our definition. But meaning comes from context. In baseball, a 7-0 shutout is a weak performance, and this one resembles a “no-hitter.”

But there is another linguistic test we can apply to determine the meaning here. If a Silicon Valley entrepreneur makes a statement such as, “We have a strong commitment to rival the market leader,” no one will doubt that the company’s focus will be squarely on achieving that goal. In contrast, we learn from McCord that “throughout the Department there is strong commitment.” First, we should notice that “there is” signifies a passive assertion, compared to the type of formulation that identifies a determined will. The “we” in “we have a strong commitment” includes the speaker. McCord’s assertion is so vague it would be true even if he himself didn’t for a moment share the commitment.

McCord uses the idea of “throughout the Department” to rhetorically magnify the effect, but instead it dilutes it. “Throughout” suggests a dispersion in space, a diffuse feeling rather than the kind of moral engagement one would expect him to affirm. But it’s his following parenthesis that gives the game away. He speaks of a “belief in our ability.” The idea of “belief” is considerably weaker than, say, “confidence in our ability.” Belief expresses a form of hope that relies on no concrete evidence.

McCord allows the fog of his reasoning to thicken. “I do not say we failed, as I said, we have about half clean opinions. We have half that are not clean opinions. So if someone had a report card that is half good and half not good, I don’t know that you call the student or the report card a failure. We have a lot of work to do, but I think we’re making progress.”

At least the Beatles affirmed that it’s getting better all the time, not that they “think” they’re making progress.

Historical note

In a January 2022 Devil’s Dictionary piece, we cited the of an observer of Beltway politics who provided a clue as to why things need not get better all the time. “None of the �centrist’ Democrats or Republicans who complained about the cost of the Build Back Better Act have said a peep about the ever-growing Pentagon budget — and the fact that it is somehow still growing even despite the Afghanistan pullout. It has grown about 25% in size over the past five years, even though the Pentagon just failed its fourth audit last month.”

We cited an earlier from 2019 that began with this astonishing sentence: “A Michigan State University economics professor discovered $21 trillion unaccounted for in the federal budget starting in 1998 until the end of fiscal year 2015.”

In other words, there is no reason to be surprised today that a “strong commitment” to conduct accurate audits is necessary and will continue to make headlines… probably for decades to come. And the only change will be similar to what we’ve already seen when, three years later, four failed audits turn into seven.

But let’s look more deeply at the historical context. The latest article cites what appears to be a serious deadline, only four years away. “The Pentagon said it is firmly committed to achieving a clean audit by 2028, as mandated by the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act.”

This leaves us wondering. Could this be related to another commitment we’ve been hearing about? Some will call it not so much a commitment, but a belief widely shared in national security circles and that concerns the medium term: that a war with China has been at least “mentally” programmed for 2027. Noah Robertson writing for Defense News this May published a two-part with the title: “How DC became obsessed with a potential 2027 Chinese invasion of Taiwan.”

This leaves us speculating about why 2028 was chosen as the objective. How convenient a hot war with China would turn out to be for anyone seeking to avoid having to face up to the first “clean audit” the following year. Who would dare to demand accountability in the midst, or even the aftermath of a hot war with China?

So, how much “confidence” should we have in the breakout of a war with China in 2027? Remember, this forecast of a war at a precise date was formulated at a time when no one expected Donald Trump to be elected for a second time. It isn’t Trump’s volatility that explains it, nor his promise to focus his attention on China rather than Russia.

Robertson explained the logic by citing a Joe Biden administration official who paraphrased the remarks of Chinese President Xi Jinping: “Look, I hear all these reports in the United States [of] how we’re planning for military action in 2027 or 2035.” Xi affirms: “There are no such plans.” Which many interpret as the proof that such plans do exist.

“That first year, 2027,” Robertson says, “is a fixation in Washington. It has impacted the debate over China policy — a shift from the long term to the short term. It’s also helped steer billions of dollars toward U.S. forces in the Pacific. And in the last several years, it’s been a question mark hanging over the Biden administration’s approach to the region.”

There’s the answer to the mystery of the failed audits. We know that the military-industrial complex is all about helping to “steer billions of dollars” in any chosen direction. At the same time, one steers one’s regard away from the auditor’s books.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51łÔąĎ Devil’s Dictionary.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Among the things Trump got right during his first residency in the White House was slapping Congress and the American public upside the head with a two-by-four to finally wake them up and realize that the Communist Party of China (CCP) is not a benign force in the world. This time around, Trump has the advantage of a Congress and an American public nearly unified in their opposition to the CCP, which should make it easier to ramp up the pressure on Beijing, particularly given the Republicans’ clean sweep of the Executive and Legislative branches.

Trump’s “subtlety of a Mack truck”-driven approach to foreign policy stands a good chance of backfiring vis-à-vis American businesses, however, as many of them continue to feed from the Chinese teat. Tens of thousands of American businesses continue to manufacture, import from and/or export to China despite the many hardships associated with COVID-19, the downturn in the Chinese economy and the crackdown on foreign businesses in recent years. Their voices will undoubtedly be heard at the White House as Trump attempts to tighten the noose on Beijing.

Trump’s cabinet and other nominations to date provide ample evidence that he is intent on burning the place down — so why stop at America’s borders? The foreign policy patch-up job Biden attempted to complete over the last four years — during which, many European governments, in particular, silently wondered whether an agreement with Washington was worth the paper it is printed upon — will be quickly eviscerated. An unvarnished foreign policy whose core is nationalism, protectionism and a zero-sum approach to engagement is sure to delight friend and foe alike.

Is China ready for four more years of Trump?

Beijing is certainly ready, with a list of countermeasures aimed at the American government and American businesses. US businesses in China are going to find operating there even more unpleasant for the next four years. The CCP may also be expected to attempt to strengthen its bilateral relationships around the world as America retreats and will undoubtedly find heightened levels of interest, especially in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The newly inaugurated mega-port in Peru is emblematic of how Beijing continues to use its Belt-and-Road infrastructure projects to strengthen its economic and diplomatic relationships. Trump’s re-election meshes nicely, also, with Beijing’s policy of self-reliance and the Made in China 2025 policy.

But the degree of economic, political and diplomatic malaise in China will also be impacted by Trump’s second term. The Chinese economy could be significantly smaller than official statistics suggest. It is spending more and more to produce less and less. Most of its natural resources are in decline, its workforce is shrinking, Xi’s dictatorial rule has prompted increasing domestic uneasiness, its economy is under growing pressure, and its Asian neighbors are ever ore alarmed by China’s aggressive actions in the region — and they are reacting to it. 

China is exhibiting classic signs of a peaking power. Xi’s crackdowns at home and increasing aggression abroad. The military buildup during peacetime is unprecedented. And China is much more willing to extend its security perimeter and to strengthen its alliances with some of the world’s most detestable regimes.

The Chinese word for crisis (·Éŧľ±ÂáÄ«) contains characters that signify danger (危) and opportunity (ćśş), and Trump 2.0 represents both. Xi will want to use the next four years to de-emphasize China’s many domestic challenges and re-emphasize its growing stature in the world. If one envisions a cessation of the Ukraine and Israel/Gaza/Lebanon/Iran wars in 2025, Xi will feel he has more latitude to further strengthen China’s relationships with Russia, Iran, and Israel. Similarly, he is likely to feel more emboldened to introduce new initiatives to ingratiate China with a broader array of governments in areas where progress has been less pronounced, such as regarding climate change and natural disaster relief.

It seems doubtful that Trump will choose to embrace areas of possible collaboration with China, but we can expect a heightened degree of generalized competition, with an increased potential for conflict. Trump’s presidency will coincide with 2027 — the year Xi has targeted for the Chinese military to be ready to invade Taiwan. Trump will likely be tempted to cut some sort of deal with Xi (as he is so transaction-oriented) to essentially cede Taiwan to Beijing in return for something of substance for America. One can only speculate what that might be, but what seemed impossible only a few years ago seems increasingly possible, if not likely, now.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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This state of crafted ambiguity would inevitably lead to growing instability among the Western governments united in a poorly and clearly failing designed mission, a process confirmed by recent events in France, Germany and, of course, the US. This was further confirmed by the return not only of Donald Trump to the White House, but of a Republican majority in the US Senate, the House and of course, the Supreme Court.

Whether it’s been a good year for democrats — those who believe in the resilience of democracy — is debatable. It has clearly been a good year for Republicans, even in unstable France, where President Emmanuel Macron nominated a ¸éĂ©±čłÜ˛ú±ôľ±ł¦˛ąľ±˛Ô prime minister, despite the fact that les ¸éĂ©±čłÜ˛ú±ôľ±ł¦˛ąľ±˛Ôs, formerly the dominant right wing party, were clear losers in this summer’s parliamentary elections, drawing a mere 5.7% of the vote. It was the left-wing coalition, Le Nouveau Front Populaire, that came out on top.

In the meantime, the German coalition government, in power since September 2021, has collapsed and Deutschland will hold a new general election in February 2025. It appears likely that the Christian Democrats (CDU), the party of Angela Merkel, will win that election. That may sound reassuring to some, who believe in bringing back formulas that seemed to work in the past, but Germany’s voters appear increasingly defiant of the ruling elites of the present and past. Rather, they appear attracted by solutions coming from the far-right (Alternative für Deutschland) and the far-left (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht). The sense of disillusionment and confusion related to Germany’s policies concerning the Ukraine war have been aggravated by recent events in the US and in Europe itself.

In this context, of what took place at the BRICS+ summit in October 2024 in Kazan, Russia made that event and the order it adumbrates resemble a haven of peace and mutual understanding. A major outcome was the resolution to promote “expanding the use of local currencies to Promote Economic Stability” complemented by an expanding list of countries that will be associated with BRICS.

This may explain why the US Congress decided to act with the aim of ensuring that the public does not become seduced by such a harmonious approach to global affairs.

On November 4, Alex Gloy shared this bit of news with us, as he helpfully provided the link to a piece of bearing the ominous title: H.R.1157 – Countering the PRC Malign Influence Fund Authorization Act of 2023.

“Who is paying for the music?” Alex asked. He then provided the figures.

“$1.6 billion ($325 million for 5 years each) appropriated by US Congress to be distributed to journalists to �counter the People’s Republic of China Malign Influence’ and the �malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People’s Republic of China and entities acting on their behalf globally.’”

George W. Bush launched his famous “Global War on Terror” primarily with military means in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Congress is launching what is beginning to look like a global war on malign influence. In this case the theater of war is journalism. This tells us something about how we should think about what we read in the media over the next five years.

Alex continued with these comments:

“This makes it easy to discard anything you read about China, Russia, and therefore the BRICS in traditional western media as propaganda. When you know what to look for, you see it everywhere. Western media reports on China used to be infatuated with pollution. Now that China is adding more solar capacity than the rest of the world combined – crickets. China’s success in making affordable EVs is greeted with tariffs. Western countries exporting their wares to China are �export champions.’ Chinese companies doing the same are �dumping overcapacities.’

There is a Chinese high-speed train making the 1,600 km (1,000 miles) trip from Shanghai to Hong Kong in 8 hours. It took my daughter more than that to travel from NYC to Burlington, VT (300 miles).

Every economic report paints a dire picture of the Chinese economy, despite it having grown 5.2% in 2023, and GDP having expanded 17x over the past 25 years.

A rather hilarious example: WaPo’s �China ruined caviar for us.’”

Before returning to the question of BRICS, which Congress certainly deems to be a vehicle for China’s “malign influence,” Alex notes that “$325m would have paid for 5,000 public school teachers.” Disinformation is clearly more valuable and especially more urgently required than the information schools seek to instill.

Alex then added the following observations:

“But back to BRICS:

• Yes, the US threw the first stone by cutting Russia off. Russia used to be in the top 20 international holders of Treasury securities ($109 billion in 2017). Russia helped finance the US budget deficit, including the US defense budget!
• From the BRICS perspective the aim to reduce dependency on the US dollar is nothing but logical – it would be stupid to continue to finance the US and run the risk of confiscation.
• As long as the US runs a trade deficit, the external sector (non-US countries), in aggregate, will be forced to accumulate US dollars AND will be forced to keep sending goods and services to the US. As the US dollar is overvalued, this benefits US consumers to the detriment of other countries’ consumers.
• From a US perspective, however, losing the ability to send digital dollars in exchange for real goods and services is, of course, a threat. Losing the status of the world’s reserve currency would go hand in hand with losing the position of global hegemon. Hence the US correctly identifies any attempts to do so as hostile.
• The official reason for the by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) from the mBridge project that aimed at creating a multi-central bank digital currency (CBDC) platform, which had been developed to the MVP stage, was the fact that it would have meant working with a sanctioned country (Russia). But it is probably safe to assume there was heavy US pressure to do so.
• The BRICS countries will have to figure it out by themselves. One solution could be a supra-national currency, pegged to gold (but at a floating rate). National currencies will also have to float against the supra-national currency used for settlements; otherwise, imbalances pile up. Maybe a managed float, like the CNH (or the ECU before introduction of the Euro), to reduce volatility.
• A floating gold peg is, in reality, not a peg, but it helps build confidence.
• If a US person wanted to exchange dollars into gold, they can do so at $2,600 per ounce today. But few people take advantage of that possibility. However, once a currency rapidly loses value, people will line up to buy gold. So, you have to make sure the currency is somewhat stable. This means you need a stable banking system, and a credible lender of last resort (central bank). And some fiscal discipline. Which is hard, even for Germany. If it’s hard for Germany, with its currency account surplus, it’s even harder for emerging economies (strong growth usually leads to strong import growth leading to current account deficits).”

Since Alex’s contribution on November 4, the BIS rescinded its announced decision to scuttle mBridge and write off the investment. It has now agreed to leave it in the hands of central banks who wish to continue developing it and ultimately deploy it. Most observers agree that the likely candidates would be China, Hong Kong, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates.

Alex has also noted an important point: that the election of Donald Trump has buried any ambition of a US CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) at least for the next four years. This offers an opportunity for other nations to leap ahead. Privately-issued Tether is filling the gap for now, but other nations might take advantage of this golden opportunity and benefit from first-mover advantage.

Concerning the BIS decision to drop mBridge, Josh Lipsky of the Atlantic Council “that while China could continue developing mBridge, Western central banks may turn their attention to alternative platforms such as Project Agorá, a similar initiative backed by central banks in Europe, Japan, Korea, and the US.”

Will this be the face of a new currency cold war? The first Cold War famously pitted God-fearing capitalism against atheistic communism. This one is more likely to become a contest between “benign influence” on one side and “malign influence” on the other. Future observers will have to decide which one is which.

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We invite all of you who have something to contribute to send us your reflections at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We will integrate your insights into the ongoing debate. We will publish them as articles or as part of the ongoing dialogue.

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Iran isn’t the only nation advancing its nuclear capabilities in recent years. In 2019, the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned intermediate-range land-based missiles, citing alleged Russian violations and China’s non-involvement. The US is also its nuclear arsenal, with to deploy nuclear weapons in more NATO states and proposals to extend its to Taiwan.

Russia, too, has intensified its nuclear posture, expanding nuclear and updating its on first use. In 2023, the nation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limited US and Russian-deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In 2024, it stationed in Belarus. Russia and China have also deepened their , setting China on a path to rapidly expand its arsenal, as nuclear security collaboration with the US has steadily over the past decade.

The breakdown of diplomacy and rising nuclear brinkmanship among major powers are heightening nuclear insecurity among themselves, but also risk spurring a new nuclear arms race. Alongside Iran, numerous countries maintain the technological infrastructure to quickly build nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear proliferation would require significant collaboration among major powers, a prospect currently out of reach.

The US detonated the first nuclear weapon in 1945, followed by the Soviet Union in , the United Kingdom in , France in and China in . It became evident that with access to uranium and enrichment technology, nations were increasingly capable of producing nuclear weapons. Though mass production and delivery capabilities were additional hurdles, it was widely expected in the early Cold War that many states would soon join the nuclear club. Israel developed nuclear capabilities in the , India detonated its first bomb in and South Africa built its first by . Other countries, including , , , , and , pursued their own programs.

However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enacted in 1968 to curb nuclear spread, led many countries to abandon or dismantle their programs. After the end of the Cold War and under Western pressure, Iraq its nuclear program in 1991. In a historic move, South Africa voluntarily its arsenal in 1994. Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine the nuclear weapons they inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1996, securing international security assurances in exchange.

Nuclear proliferation appeared to be a waning concern, but cracks soon appeared in the non-proliferation framework. Pakistan conducted its first in 1998, followed by North Korea in , bringing the count of nuclear-armed states to nine. Since then, Iran’s nuclear weapons program, initiated in the 1980s, has been a major target of Western non-proliferation efforts.

Nuclear ambitions in the Middle East, Asia and Europe

Iran has a strong reason to persist. Ukraine’s former nuclear arsenal might have deterred Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022. Elsewhere, revolutionary Muammar Gaddafi, who Libya’s nuclear program in 2003, was overthrown by a NATO-led coalition and local forces in 2011. If Iran achieves a functional nuclear weapon, it will lose the ability to leverage its nuclear program as a to extract concessions in negotiations. While a nuclear weapon will represent a new form of leverage, it would also intensify pressure from the US and Israel, both of whom have engaged in a cycle of escalating sometimes deadly confrontations with Iran and its proxies over the past few years.

An Iranian nuclear arsenal could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Its relations with Saudi Arabia remain delicate, despite the brokered by China. Saudi officials have they would obtain their own nuclear weapon if Iran acquired them. Saudi Arabia gave significant to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, with the understanding that Pakistan could extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, or even the latter with one upon request.

Turkey, which hosts US nuclear weapons through NATO’s , signaled a policy shift in 2019 when Turkish President Recep Tayyip ·ˇ°ů»ĺ´ÇÄź˛ą˛Ô foreign powers for dictating Turkey’s ability to build its own nuclear weapon. Turkey’s growing partnership with Russia in could meanwhile provide it with the enrichment expertise needed to eventually do so.

Middle Eastern tensions are not the only force threatening non-proliferation. Japan’s renewed friction with China, North Korea and Russia over the past decade has intensified Tokyo’s focus on nuclear readiness. Although Japan a nuclear program in the 1940s, it was dismantled after World War II. Japan’s , however, remains measured in months. Despite this, for nuclear weapons remains low, given the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where nuclear bombings in 1945 killed more than 200,000 people.

In contrast, around of South Koreans support developing nuclear weapons. South Korea’s nuclear program began in the 1970s but was under US pressure. However, North Korea’s successful test in 2006 and its severance of , and to the South in the past decade, coupled with the of peaceful reunification in early 2024, have again raised the issue in South Korea.

Taiwan pursued a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, which similarly under US pressure. Any sign of wavering US commitment to Taiwan, together with China’s growing nuclear capabilities, could prompt Taiwan to revive its efforts. Though less likely, territorial disputes in the South China Sea could also motivate countries like Vietnam and the Philippines to consider developing nuclear capabilities.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has also had significant nuclear implications. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently to the European Council that a nuclear arsenal might be Ukraine’s only deterrent if NATO membership is not offered. Zelenskyy later his comments after they ignited a firestorm of controversy. Yet if Ukraine feels betrayed by its Western partners — particularly if it is forced to concede territory to Russia — it could spur some factions within Ukraine to attempt to secure nuclear capabilities.

The war has also spurred nuclear considerations across Europe. In December 2023, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer a European nuclear deterrent. Donald Trump’s re-election in the 2024 US presidential election could amplify European concerns over US commitments to NATO, with France having increasingly an independent European nuclear force in recent years.

Nuclear collaboration

Established nuclear powers are unlikely to welcome more countries into their ranks. But while China and Russia don’t necessarily desire this outcome, they recognize the West’s concerns are greater, with Russia doing in the 1990s to prevent its unemployed nuclear scientists from aiding North Korea’s program.

The US has also previously been blindsided by its allies’ nuclear aspirations. US policymakers underestimated Australia’s determination to pursue a nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, including covert attempts to obtain a weapon from the UK. Similarly, the US was initially of France’s extensive support for Israel’s nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s.

Smaller countries are also capable of aiding one another’s nuclear ambitions. Argentina offered considerable to Israel’s program, while Israel assisted . Saudi Arabia financed Pakistan’s nuclear development and Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist is of having aided Iran, Libya and North Korea with their programs in the 1980s.

The slippery slope to nuclear conflict

Conflicts involving nuclear weapons states are not without precedent. Egypt and Syria attacked nuclear-armed Israel in 1973 and Argentina faced a nuclear-armed UK in 1982. India and China have clashed over their border on several occasions. Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression. But conflicts featuring nuclear countries invite dangerous escalation, and the risk grows if a nation with limited conventional military power gains nuclear capabilities; lacking other means of defense or retaliation, it may be more tempted to resort to nuclear weapons as its only viable option.

The costs of maintaining nuclear arsenals are already steep. In 2023, the world’s nine nuclear-armed states spent an estimated managing their programs. But what incentive do smaller countries have to abandon nuclear ambitions entirely, especially when they observe the protection nuclear weapons offer and witness the major powers intensifying their nuclear strategies?

Obtaining the world’s most powerful weapons may be a natural ambition of military and intelligence sectors, but it hinges on the political forces in power as well. In Iran, moderates could counterbalance hardliners, while continued support for Ukraine might prevent more nationalist forces from coming to power there.

Yet an additional country obtaining a nuclear weapon could set off a cascade of others. While larger powers are currently leading the nuclear posturing, smaller countries may see an opportunity amid the disorder. The limited support for the , in effect since 2021, coupled with the collapse of other international treaties, reinforces the lingering allure of nuclear arms even among non-nuclear states. With major powers in open contention, the barriers to nuclear ambitions are already weakening, making it ever harder to dissuade smaller nations from pursuing the ultimate deterrent.

[, a project of the Independent Media Institute, produced this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In the US, where industrial policies, tariffs and labor-market shifts play a pivotal role in economic competitiveness, the ongoing trade tensions with China are proving to be a significant factor in shaping the future of work. As manufacturing jobs evolve in response to technological advances and shifting global markets, the broader narrative of globalization is also changing. This shift presents new opportunities and challenges, with profound implications for economic stability, workforce development and the overall trajectory of international trade. The outcome of this complex interaction will determine the US’s ability to adapt to a new economic order while safeguarding its industrial base and global competitiveness.

The Kuznets curve and manufacturing employment

The Kuznets curve is a graphic illustration of an economic theory introduced by Simon Kuznets. It shows an inverted-U-shaped relationship between economic development and income inequality, positing that inequality rises during early industrialization but declines as economies reach advanced stages of development. The curve framework illustrates that as economies mature and technological advancements drive productivity, manufacturing’s share of employment tends to decline, nations toward service-oriented sectors. This inverted-U-shaped trajectory suggests that both income inequality and manufacturing employment follow a similar pattern in response to structural economic transformations. For developing regions such as Africa, where manufacturing plays a critical role in employment, the Kuznets curve provides a useful framework for understanding the complex dynamics of industrialization and employment as economies mature.

The transformative role of AI in manufacturing

AI and automation technologies are driving a profound transformation in the manufacturing sector, automating many tasks previously performed by human workers. This shift is enhancing productivity, enabling companies to sustain or increase output levels with a smaller workforce. Further, the growth of AI and automation is contributing to a structural shift from manufacturing toward services and knowledge-based sectors. As high-skill industries, such as software development and data science, expand, they attract educated workers, while manufacturing employment stagnates or declines. For many developing countries, the rise of automation could make it harder to maintain large-scale manufacturing jobs as advanced economies increasingly turn to robotics and AI-driven production to stay competitive.

The inverted-U-shaped relationship between manufacturing employment and GDP per capita reflects a broader transition from labor-intensive manufacturing to service-oriented economies. This shift is not solely a result of economic development but also reflects the influence of advancing technologies, which reduce the need for manufacturing labor.

While this may benefit high-income countries by reducing labor costs and boosting efficiency, it poses significant challenges for developing economies. These economies, which traditionally relied on labor-intensive manufacturing to fuel economic growth and job creation, may find that the model is no longer as feasible in a world increasingly dominated by automated production processes. As AI and automation reshape the global production landscape, policymakers face the challenge of balancing support for manufacturing with fostering innovation in service and technology sectors to ensure long-term economic resilience.

For developing nations, sustaining manufacturing as a vital employment source requires adapting industrial policies to embrace both traditional manufacturing and high-growth, technology-driven sectors. In high-income nations, on the other hand, AI and automation are essential for retaining competitiveness in high-value sectors. For example, specialized manufacturing remains vital, as seen in industries like aerospace, biotechnology and electronics in the US, Japan and Germany. Here, manufacturing is integrated with high-value services, maintaining competitiveness through constant .

The complex transformation of US manufacturing employment

As the global economy shifts, manufacturing employment in the US faces a complex transformation, intricately connected to the ongoing trade dynamics with China. Historically, US manufacturing employment surged with industrialization, but the rise of automation, coupled with shifting trade policies, has led to a gradual decline in these jobs. The US–China trade relationship has played a pivotal role in shaping this trajectory. China’s growing dominance in manufacturing, aided by low-cost production and state-driven economic policies, has led to significant outsourcing of US manufacturing jobs, exacerbating concerns over job loss and wage stagnation in key sectors.

In response, the US has increasingly turned to tariffs and industrial policies, notably during the Trump administration, to counteract China’s perceived unfair trade practices, such as intellectual property theft and subsidies to domestic industries. While these tariffs were intended to bring manufacturing jobs back to the US and reduce reliance on China, they also brought unintended consequences, such as higher costs for US consumers and disrupted supply chains. Moreover, these trade wars have highlighted the delicate balance between protecting domestic industries and fostering long-term economic growth.

Simultaneously, the rise of automation and artificial intelligence in manufacturing further complicates the issue. As advanced economies like the US embrace AI-driven production to stay competitive, manufacturing jobs are increasingly automated, reducing the number of workers needed in these sectors. The decline in manufacturing employment is not just a result of trade policy but also a structural shift driven by technological advances. This poses a significant challenge for policymakers as they seek to navigate the dual pressures of protecting employment and encouraging technological innovation. Ultimately, the future of US manufacturing employment will depend on balancing industrial policies, trade strategies and the need to foster both high-skill jobs in technology-driven sectors and resilient manufacturing industries that can adapt to the changing global landscape.

Historical perspective on tariffs and economic growth

While tariffs undeniably helped protect emerging American industries, their primary function before 1913 was as a crucial revenue source for the federal government, funding about 90% of expenditures. This revenue was essential for infrastructure and military needs in a time when other federal taxes were nearly nonexistent. Economist Yeo Joon Yoon that America’s rapid economic growth was not only a result of tariffs but also due to favorable institutional conditions, such as the absence of direct taxes on income and corporate profits, which allowed capital to be freely reinvested. This fiscal environment, combined with a growing market and resource base, offered additional momentum for economic expansion.

Early US Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton, a key advocate for industrial growth, recognized both the opportunities and constraints that tariffs imposed. While he promoted tariffs as a way to nurture US industry, he cautioned against excessively high rates that could reduce imports and, consequently, government revenue. For a young nation reliant on foreign goods and raw materials, finding the right tariff balance was vital for sustaining both government funding and industrial growth. This complex approach reflects early American economic policy’s reliance on tariffs as a flexible tool for revenue, protection and stability.

Modern protectionists often refer to 19th-century America as a model of successful industrial growth under high tariffs. Figures like former US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer argue that tariffs were key to America’s transition from an agrarian economy to an industrial powerhouse. Advocates such as Oren Cass and Michael Lind also suggest that tariffs enabled the US to pursue import-substitution policies that supported domestic industries. For them, 19th-century tariff policy exemplifies how protective measures can help build and sustain local industries, despite the associated trade-offs.

However, Hamilton’s careful approach to tariffs reflected a nuanced understanding of economic development, balancing protectionist goals with the need to keep markets open to support revenue and ensure access to imported goods. His caution underscores the complex nature of tariff policy, where protecting industries had to be weighed against the need for stable federal funding. While tariffs shielded fledgling American industries, they were vulnerable to economic cycles and international trade fluctuations that could impact revenue streams.

The introduction of the modern federal income tax, passed in 1913 on the heels of the 16th Amendment, marked a turning point in American fiscal policy. With this new source of income, the government gained financial flexibility and could pursue targeted economic policies beyond tariffs. This shift diminished the federal government’s dependence on tariffs, allowing for a more diversified fiscal strategy that could support economic development without relying solely on trade barriers. This historical evolution underscores that while tariffs can play a vital role in early industrial growth, their effectiveness is greatly enhanced when complemented by broader fiscal tools, such as income taxes, which provide the government with more stable and adaptable revenue sources.

US–China trade history

The US–China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) policy aligns with a broader historical framework of US foreign policy, beginning with President Richard Nixon’s 1972 initiative to establish diplomatic ties with China. Nixon’s decision marked a strategic pivot, recognizing China’s rising economic and military influence and the importance of constructive engagement. This vision influenced the US’s decision to grant China PNTR status in the late 1990s, rooted in the belief that integrating China into the global economy would reduce risks associated with isolating a growing power.

By normalizing trade relations, the US aimed to encourage China to adhere to international trade norms, fostering stability through economic interdependence. Advocates viewed PNTR as part of a strategy to promote gradual economic and policy alignment. While China’s rapid export-led growth and market integration reflected some successes, challenges persisted, particularly in areas like intellectual property rights, trade imbalances and China’s state-driven economic approach.

While China has adopted some global trade practices, particularly in exports and production, it continues to selectively comply with international norms, especially in areas like intellectual property protection. This selective compliance has fueled ongoing tensions with the US, particularly during the 2018–2020 trade war initiated by President Donald Trump. The trade war aimed to address perceived unfair practices through tariffs and other measures under Sections 301 and 232, targeting industries such as electronics and high-tech equipment. These tariffs were designed to reduce China’s trade imbalances and encourage greater market access, highlighting the US’s concerns over China’s protectionist policies and state-driven economic model.

Despite these tariffs, which failed to yield significant changes in Chinese behavior, the US–China trade friction underscored China’s drive for technological self-sufficiency. In response, China accelerated its efforts in innovation, placing a greater emphasis on research and development, technology transfer and fostering collaborations between industry and academia. These initiatives aim to China’s reliance on external technology and strengthen its domestic capabilities. This ongoing tension between the two nations reveals the strategic importance of high-tech sectors in a globally connected economy, where both must navigate the delicate balance between protectionism and innovation to remain competitive.

Balancing national security and economic efficiency

US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, speaking at the Stephen C. Friedheim Symposium on Global Economics hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations, outlined President Joe Biden’s administration’s strategy for aligning international economic policy with domestic priorities. Yellen emphasized the need to balance economic efficiency with national security, particularly regarding China and key industrial sectors. While acknowledging China’s low-cost production of essential goods like solar panels — which could advance climate goals if heavily relied upon — Yellen warned of the risks of over-dependence. She stressed the importance of strengthening supply-chain resilience and promoting US domestic manufacturing, even at the expense of higher costs.

Yellen also addressed China’s high savings rate, which has fueled substantial subsidies in advanced sectors like semiconductors and clean energy, contributing to global overcapacity and undermining industries in the US and other countries. She called for China to shift its focus toward increasing consumer spending and reinforcing social safety nets, though the Chinese government continues to prioritize state-backed investments. The secretary observed that the Chinese government has chosen instead to continue funneling resources into state-backed investments. She cautioned that this approach could lead to a “slippery slope,” where demands for subsidies may extend across more industries, potentially straining fiscal discipline. Also, the subsidy programs implemented by Japan, the European Union and other select groups perpetuate crony capitalism, fostering undue influence and squandering taxpayer resources. Given these dynamics, the US may wish to maintain or even strengthen trade barriers to counteract practices, particularly extensive subsidies, not only in China but also in Japan and the European Union, practices which distort global markets and undermine US competitiveness. 

Her analysis reflects the administration’s belief that targeted trade and industrial policies are vital for national security and long-term economic stability, despite the short-term challenges they may pose. In parallel, the Biosecure Act, recently passed by the US House of Representatives, seeks to restrict US pharmaceutical partnerships with certain Chinese companies due to national security concerns — an action contested by firms like WuXi AppTec. Amid rising geopolitical tensions and ongoing tariffs, US drugmakers are diversifying their supply chains to reduce reliance on Chinese suppliers. This shift is part of a broader strategy to enhance resilience, though it comes with increased costs and potential delays as companies seek high-standard alternatives. The move highlights the tradeoff between securing supply chains and managing rising production expenses, which could impact drug prices and availability in the US market.

Negotiating this crossroads

As US–China trade tensions persist, the US faces a critical balancing act between fostering economic growth, driving technological innovation and maintaining global competitiveness. The rapid evolution of automation and AI in manufacturing is reshaping the economic landscape, presenting a dual challenge: the US must preserve its industrial base while adapting to an increasingly service-oriented economy. At the same time, US trade policies — especially tariffs and industrial strategies designed to address China’s trade practices — further complicate this transition.

While tariffs on Chinese goods may offer short-term protection to certain US industries, they have also exposed deeper structural challenges. The risk is that these trade measures could inadvertently stifle the very innovation that is essential for the US to maintain long-term global competitiveness. As policymakers grapple with these issues, it’s clear that a nuanced trade approach, focused not only on protecting domestic industries but also on cultivating a highly skilled workforce for emerging sectors, will be crucial for ensuring the nation’s economic resilience.

This evolving dynamic emphasizes the urgent need for a more refined global trade framework, particularly within the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO must adapt to the rising importance of industrial policy globally, ensuring that trade rules remain relevant in an era of technological transformation. Equipped with an updated toolkit, the WTO can help nations navigate the delicate balance between pursuing national industrial strategies and fostering global cooperation. How the US responds to these shifts in manufacturing employment and trade policy will ultimately define its ability to thrive in a rapidly changing global economic order.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The BRICS countries argue that the US and its allies have weaponized the global financial system. The dominance of the dollar, and to a lesser extent the euro, in international trade and finance allows the West to impose sanctions that impact countries’ economies deeply. For instance, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the US and its allies froze $282 billion of Russian assets held overseas and cut Russian banks off from SWIFT, a global system for cross-border payments. America also warned other countries’ banks of potential “secondary sanctions” if they supported Russia.

These actions have led several countries to reevaluate their reliance on the US dollar. Central banks around the world, especially in countries at odds with the US, are stockpiling gold and exploring alternatives to dollar-based transactions. BRICS members see this dependency on Western-controlled systems as risky and are eager to reduce it. China, in particular, views reliance on the dollar as a major security vulnerability.

The proposed solution: BRICS Bridge

To reduce dependency on Western financial systems, Russia proposed a new payment system called “BRICS Bridge.” This digital platform would allow BRICS countries to conduct cross-border payments through their central banks without relying on US-controlled networks like SWIFT. The concept borrows elements from a similar system, mBridge, which is partly overseen by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Switzerland, a prominent institution in the Western-led financial order. However, BRICS Bridge aims to challenge that order, offering a financial lifeline to countries facing Western sanctions and creating a more multipolar financial system.

Different visions of global influence

Russia and China are the main drivers behind the push for BRICS reforms, but their motivations differ. Russia seeks to create a sphere of influence that protects its interests and supports its allies through a flexible, transactional approach to international relations. This approach would allow countries to engage with Russia based on mutual benefits without subscribing to Western “normative” values, which Russia sees as biased.

China’s ambitions go further. Rather than just establishing an independent sphere, China wants to rewrite international rules, shaping a world order where multiple centers of power coexist, with China as a central authority. This would give China greater control over global trade, finance, and diplomacy, gradually replacing the US as the primary rulemaker.

Many countries in the Global South support BRICS because they see it as a pathway to a more flexible international environment where they can negotiate deals that directly benefit their economic growth. For example, India has reaped significant benefits from purchasing discounted Russian oil, prioritizing these economic gains despite the moral conflict posed by the ongoing war in Ukraine. In a multipolar world, countries in the Global South could avoid being tied down by Western rules and make independent decisions in their best interests.

However, this freedom comes with risks. Without a dominant Western power like the US to counterbalance rising powers, these smaller countries could find themselves vulnerable to regional giants, such as China, who may impose their will on them by force in the future.

The BRICS alliance reflects a growing dissatisfaction with the current global order. Critics argue that the US-led international system has become ineffective and no longer serves the interests of many countries, leading them to seek alternatives. However, BRICS itself has limitations. Despite its symbolic appeal, it has not achieved substantial progress on key issues like creating a global currency to rival the dollar or liberalizing global trade. The dollar remains dominant, and the influence of Western-led institutions persists.

Even if BRICS doesn’t have the power to immediately reshape the world, its existence signals a significant shift. Countries are increasingly interested in alternatives, showing that faith in the US-led system is waning. The BRICS alliance may lack the cohesion and power to fully realize its vision, but its popularity underscores a global desire for change.

[Anton Schauble wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: Make Sense of BRICS Summit in Russia appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The war’s impact on Europe has been significant. Heightened energy prices have affected countries heavily reliant on Russian gas, such as Germany. European nations have also diverted resources and attention toward Ukraine and away from other crucial areas like social spending and healthcare. Most fundamentally, the war has shattered the last remnants of trust between the East and West, leading many European nations to up their defense budgets in anticipation of a potential direct conflict with Russia.

Switzerland in the middle of an increasingly anxious Europe

Reflecting this defensive attitude, EU High Representative Josep Borrell that Europe is a garden and the rest of the world is a jungle. Germany has closed its borders, apparently to avoid the jungle taking over the garden. Switzerland takes a more moderate approach. While acknowledging migration and integration challenges, the country emphasizes the need for proactive and inclusive migration policies.

Right-wing leaders are in charge in many parts of Europe, like Robert Fico in Slovakia and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party is on the rise, and in France, the National Rally party made a decent dent in the latest parliamentary elections. Switzerland finds the rise of right-wing, anti-immigrant populist movements across Europe to be a cause for concern. Unlike other European countries, though, Switzerland is a decentralized confederation. This offers a degree of resilience against nationalist trends that would seek to dominate politics at the countrywide level. Yet Switzerland remains uneasy about the deeper political and social crises of which the rise of the far right is a manifestation.

Switzerland the investor

In lighter news, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway a free trade agreement with India in March. Swiss diplomat Ralf Heckner has received the credit for achieving what the EU, the UK and the US failed to do. The secret of Swiss success is the country’s independent position. As a non-member of major trade blocs, Switzerland has greater flexibility in forging agreements with emerging markets. Additionally, India’s status as a rapidly growing economy and Switzerland’s political commitment to strengthening economic ties played crucial roles in the successful negotiations.

Switzerland is looking east for economic growth, with China and India among its top export markets. However, the country has adopted a cautious approach toward China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy, economic slowdown and challenges faced by private actors. 

Switzerland the peacemaker

As a famously neutral territory for peace talks, Switzerland hosted a summit to resolve Sudan’s ongoing civil war. Yet Sudanese General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces, to sit the talks out. Despite his absence from recent negotiations, Switzerland remains committed to facilitating dialogue and humanitarian access.

Switzerland has faced more than one setback in Africa in recent times. The cocoa crop in CĂ´te d’Ivoire and Ghana is facing its third tough year in a row. Chocolate-loving and chocolate-producing Switzerland may need to diversify its cocoa supply chain and include more suppliers from Latin America, with which it maintains cordial relations.

Finally, remaining in the Western Hemisphere, Switzerland views the current state of American democracy with concern, particularly regarding the deep political polarization and potential challenges to the peaceful transfer of power. The US is the preeminent global superpower, and uncertainty about its future direction adds to instability everywhere.

To manage these risks, Switzerland has adopted a flexible and open-minded approach, maintaining communication channels with both major political parties in the US. This proactive strategy ensures continued cooperation and stability in its relationship with the global superpower, regardless of the election outcome.

[Peter Choi edited this podcast and wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post A Swiss Perspective on World Affairs Today appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Recent events illustrate the rising tensions of the new Cold War in the Pacific. From June to September of this year, the Chinese and Russian militaries conducted joint maneuvers that ranged from live-fire in the South China Sea to air patrols circling Japan and even US airspace in . To respond to what Moscow “rising geopolitical tension around the world,” such actions culminated last month in a joint Chinese–Russian that mobilized 400 ships, 120 aircraft and 90,000 troops in a vast arc from the Baltic Sea across the Arctic to the northern Pacific Ocean. While kicking off such monumental maneuvers with China, Russian President Vladimir Putin accused the US of “trying to maintain its global military and political dominance at any cost” by “increasing [its] military presence… in the Asia-Pacific region.”

“China is not a future threat,” US Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall in September. “China is a threat today.” Over the past 15 years, Beijing’s ability to project power in the Western Pacific, he claimed, had risen to alarming levels. He said the likelihood of war was “increasing” and, he predicted, it will only “continue to do so.” An anonymous senior Pentagon official that China “continues to be the only U.S. competitor with the intent and… the capability to overturn the rules-based infrastructure that has kept peace in the Indo-Pacific since the end of the Second World War.”

Indeed, regional tensions in the Pacific have profound global implications. For the past 80 years, an island chain of military bastions running from Japan to Australia has served as a crucial fulcrum for US global power. To ensure that it will be able to continue to anchor its “defense” on that strategic shoal, Washington has recently added new overlapping alliances while encouraging a massive militarization of the Indo–Pacific region. Though bristling with armaments and seemingly strong, this ad hoc Western coalition may yet prove, like NATO in Europe, vulnerable to sudden setbacks from rising partisan pressures, both in the US and among its allies.

Building a Pacific bastion

For well over a century, the US has struggled to secure its vulnerable western frontier from Pacific threats. During the early decades of the 20th century, Washington maneuvered against a rising Japanese presence in the region. These actions produced geopolitical tensions that led to Tokyo’s attack on the US naval bastion at Pearl Harbor that began World War II in the Pacific. After fighting for four years and suffering nearly 300,000 casualties, the US defeated Japan and won unchallenged control of the entire region.

Aware that the advent of the long-range bomber and the future possibility of atomic warfare had rendered the historic concept of coastal defense irrelevant, in the post-war years Washington extended its North American “defenses” deep into the Western Pacific. Starting with the expropriation of 100 Japanese military bases, the US built its initial postwar Pacific naval bastions at Okinawa and, thanks to a 1947 agreement, at Subic Bay in the Philippines. As the Cold War engulfed Asia in 1950 with the beginning of the Korean conflict, the US extended those bases for 5,000 miles along the entire Pacific littoral through mutual-defense agreements with five Asia–Pacific allies: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Australia.

For the next 40 years to the very end of the Cold War, the Pacific littoral remained the geopolitical fulcrum of US global power, allowing it to defend North America and dominate Eurasia. In many ways, the US geopolitical position astride the axial ends of Eurasia would prove the key to its ultimate victory in the Cold War.

After the Cold War

Once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and the Cold War ended, Washington cashed in its peace dividend, weakening that once-strong island chain. Between 1998 and 2014, the US Navy from 333 ships to 271. That 20% reduction, combined with a shift to long-term deployments in the Middle East, degraded the Navy’s position in the Pacific. Even so, for the 20 years following the Cold War, the US would enjoy what the Pentagon “uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, operate how we wanted.”

After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US, Washington turned from heavy-metal strategic forces to mobile infantry readily deployed for counterterror operations against lightly armed guerrillas. After a decade of fighting misbegotten wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington was stunned when a rising China began to turn its economic gains into a serious bid for global power. As its opening gambit, Beijing started in the South China Sea, where oil and natural gas deposits are . It also began expanding its navy, an unexpected challenge that the once-all-powerful US Pacific command was remarkably ill-prepared to meet.

In response, in 2011, President Barack Obama a strategic “pivot to Asia” before the Australian parliament and began rebuilding the US military position on the Pacific littoral. After withdrawing some forces from Iraq in 2012 and refusing to commit significant numbers of troops for regime change in Syria, the Obama White House a battalion of Marines to Darwin in northern Australia in 2014. In quick succession, Washington gained access to five near the South China Sea and a new South Korean naval base at on the Yellow Sea. According to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, to operate those installations, the Pentagon to “forward base 60 percent of our naval assets in the Pacific by 2020.” Nonetheless, the unending insurgency in Iraq continued to slow the pace of that strategic pivot to the Pacific.

Despite such setbacks, senior diplomatic and military officials, working under three different administrations, launched a long-term effort to slowly rebuild the US military posture in the Asia–Pacific region. After “a return to great power competition” in 2016, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson that China’s “growing and modernized fleet” was “shrinking” the traditional US advantage in the region. “The competition is on,” the admiral warned, adding, “We must shake off any vestiges of comfort or complacency.”

Responding to such pressure, the administration of President Donald Trump added the construction of 46 new ships to the Pentagon , which was to raise the total fleet to 326 vessels by 2023. Support ships aside, when it came to an actual “fighting force,” by 2024 China had the world’s with 234 “warships.” The US deployed only 219, with Chinese combat capacity, according to US Naval Intelligence, “increasingly of comparable quality to U.S. ships.”

Paralleling the military build-up, the State Department reinforced the US position on the Pacific littoral by negotiating three relatively new diplomatic agreements with Asia–Pacific allies Australia, Britain, India and the Philippines. Though those ententes added some depth and resilience to the US posture, the truth is that this Pacific network may ultimately prove more susceptible to political rupture than a formal multilateral alliance like NATO.

Military cooperation with the Philippines

After nearly a century as close allies through decades of colonial rule, two world wars and the Cold War, US relations with the Philippines suffered a severe setback in 1991. That country’s senate refused to renew a long-term military bases agreement, forcing the US 7th Fleet out of its massive naval base at Subic Bay.

After just three years, however, China occupied some shoals also claimed by the Philippines in the South China Sea during a raging typhoon. Within a decade, the Chinese had started transforming them into a network of military bases, while pressing their claims to most of the rest of the South China Sea. Manila’s only response was to a rusting World War II naval vessel on Ayungin shoal in the Spratly Islands, where Filipino soldiers had to fish for their supper. With its external defense in tatters, in April 2014 the Philippines an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with Washington. This allowed the US military quasi-permanent facilities at five Filipino bases, including two on the shores of the South China Sea.

Although Manila won a from the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague that Beijing’s claims to the South China Sea were “,” China dismissed that decision and continued to build its bases there. And when Rodrigo Duterte became president of the Philippines in 2016, he revealed a new policy that included a “separation” from the US and a toward China. That country rewarded the policy with promises of massive developmental aid. By 2018, however, China’s army was anti-aircraft missiles, mobile missile launchers and military radar on five artificial “islands” in the Spratly archipelago that it had built from sand its dredgers sucked from the seabed.

Once Duterte left office, as China’s Coast Guard harassed Filipino fishermen and blasted Philippine naval vessels with water cannons in their own territory, Manila once again started calling on Washington for help. Soon, US Navy vessels were conducting “freedom of navigation” patrols in Philippine waters and the two nations had staged their biggest ever. In the April 2024 edition of that exercise, the US deployed its mobile Typhon Mid-Range capable of hitting China’s coast, sparking a bitter from Beijing that such weaponry “intensifies geopolitical confrontation.”

Manila has matched its new commitment to the US alliance with an unprecedented rearmament program of its own. Just last spring, it signed a $400 million deal with Tokyo to five new Coast Guard cutters, started receiving Brahmos from India under a $375 million contract and continued a billion-dollar deal with South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries that will produce ten new naval vessels. After the government a $35 billion military modernization plan, Manila has been negotiating with Korean to procure modern jet fighters. This is a far cry from a decade earlier when it had no operational .

Showing the scope of the country’s reintegration into the Western alliance, just last month Manila hosted joint freedom of navigation in the South China Sea with ships from five allied nations: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines and the US.

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the AUKUS alliance

While the Philippine Defense Agreement renewed US relations with an old Pacific ally, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue involving Australia, India, Japan and the US, first launched in 2007, has now extended US military power into the Indian Ocean. At the 2017 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Manila, four conservative national leaders led by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump decided to the “Quad” entente (after a decade-long hiatus while Australia’s Labour Party governments cozied up to China).

Just last month, President Joe Biden hosted a “” where the four leaders agreed to expand joint air operations. In a hot-mike moment, Biden bluntly : “China continues to behave aggressively, testing us all across the region. It is true in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, South Asia, and the Taiwan Straits.” China’s Foreign Ministry : “The U.S. is lying through its teeth” and needs to “get rid of its obsession with perpetuating its supremacy and containing China.”

Since 2020, however, the Quad has made the annual Malabar in India into an elaborate four-power drill in which aircraft carrier battle groups maneuver in waters ranging from the Arabian Sea to the East China Sea. To contest “China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region,” India that the latest exercise this October would feature live-fire maneuvers in the Bay of Bengal, led by its flagship aircraft carrier and a complement of MiG-29K all-weather jet fighters. Clearly, as Modi it, the Quad is “here to stay.”

While the Trump administration revived the Quad, the Biden White House has promoted a complementary and controversial AUKUS defense compact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the US (part of what Michael Klare has called the “” of US foreign and military policy). After months of secret negotiations, their leaders that agreement in September 2021 as a way to fulfill “a shared ambition to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy.”

Such a goal sparked howls of diplomatic protests. Angry over the sudden loss of a $90 billion contract to supply 12 French submarines to Australia, France the decision “a stab in the back” and immediately its ambassadors from both Canberra and Washington. With equal speed, China’s Foreign Ministry the new alliance for “severely damaging regional peace… and intensifying the arms race.” In a pointed remark, Beijing’s official Global Times newspaper said Australia had now “turned itself into an adversary of China.”

To achieve extraordinary prosperity, thanks in significant part to its iron ore and other exports to China, Australia had exited the Quad entente for nearly a decade. Through this single defense decision, Australia has allied itself firmly with the US. It will to British submarine designs and top-secret US nuclear propulsion, joining the elite ranks of just six powers with such complex technology.

Australia will spend a monumental to build eight nuclear submarines at its Adelaide shipyards over a decade. Additionally, it will host four US Virginia-class nuclear subs at a naval base in Western Australia and buy as many as five of those stealthy submarines from the US in the early 2030s. Under the tripartite alliance with the US and Britain, Canberra will also face additional costs for the joint development of undersea drones, hypersonic missiles and quantum sensing. Through that stealthy arms deal, Washington has seemingly won a major geopolitical and military ally in any future conflict with China.

Stand-off along the Pacific littoral

Just as Russia’s aggression in Ukraine strengthened the NATO alliance, so China’s challenge in the fossil-fuel-rich South China Sea and elsewhere has helped the US rebuild its island bastions along the Pacific littoral. Through a sedulous courtship under three successive administrations, Washington has won back two wayward allies: Australia and the Philippines. They are once again anchors for an island chain that remains the geopolitical fulcrum for US global power in the Pacific.

Still, with more than 200 times the ship-building capacity of the US, China’s in warships will almost certainly continue to grow. In compensating for such a future deficit, the US’s four active allies along the Pacific littoral will likely play a critical role. (Japan’s navy has more than 50 warships and South Korea’s 30 more.)

Despite such renewed strength in what is distinctly becoming a new cold war, the US’s Asia–Pacific alliances face both immediate challenges and a fraught future. Beijing is already putting relentless pressure on Taiwan’s sovereignty, breaching that island’s airspace and crossing the median line in the Taiwan Straits monthly. If Beijing turns those breaches into a crippling embargo of Taiwan, the US Navy will face a hard choice between losing a carrier or two in a confrontation with China or backing off. Either way, the loss of Taiwan would sever the US’s island chain in the Pacific littoral, pushing it back to a “second island chain” in the mid-Pacific.

As for that fraught future, the maintenance of such alliances requires a kind of national political will that is by no means assured in an age of populist nationalism. In the Philippines, the anti-US nationalism that Duterte personified retains its appeal and may well be adopted by some future leader. More immediately in Australia, the current has already faced strong dissent from members blasting the AUKUS entente as a dangerous transgression of their country’s sovereignty. And in the US, Republican populism, whether Trump’s or that of a future leader like J.D. Vance could curtail cooperation with such Asia–Pacific allies, simply walk away from a costly conflict over Taiwan or deal directly with China in a way that would undercut that web of hard-won alliances.

And that, of course, might be the good news given the possibility that growing Chinese aggressiveness in the region and a US urge to strengthen a military alliance ominously encircling that country could threaten to turn the latest Cold War ever hotter. This would transform the Pacific into a genuine powder keg and could lead to a war that would, in our present world, be almost unimaginably destructive.

[ first published this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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China is facing its largest economic crisis in 40 years, a period over which the West experienced multiple crises and learned how to forecast and navigate them a little better each time. Lacking experience, the Chinese government and people are uncertain how they may resolve the underlying economic issues. The present actions, even if clumsily executed at times, are better than the inaction of the past eight months.

China makes moves in equity and financial markets

In concert with real-estate sector initiatives, Chinese financial regulators triggered a 30% stock market rally last month by encouraging banks to lend to listed companies so they could buy back stocks and allowing qualified institutions to secure low-interest loans from the People’s Bank of China to purchase shares. Retail investors also borrowed heavily to buy shares, and there are rumors of some even selling their apartments in the hope they would reap the windfall of a lifetime. The rally has been fragile, but more reforms and stimulus are to come.

If the China Securities Regulatory Commission committed to improving the quality of initial public offerings (IPOs) and the accuracy of earnings reporting, governing bourses more rigorously and cracking down on corruption, China’s capital markets would expand swiftly and supply much-needed capital to businesses and investment options for citizens. It was fine to use state-owned enterprises to trigger recovery, but Beijing must give private investors more confidence to invest in capital markets for the present trend to turn into a bull run.

The Chinese government can adapt to the role of capital markets regulator, rely less on intervention and allow companies representing China’s present and future growth — such as privately owned technology and service firms — to list. They must disincentivize those who see IPOs as one-off capital-raising events without long-term obligations to investors and others who bribe listing authorities and accounting firms to help create illusions of value while obscuring risks and liabilities.

Beijing must reform its capital markets to augment the strength of its manufacturing sector, which in itself cannot compensate for the role real estate fulfilled in the past of driving domestic growth and retail investment. China’s recent stimulus focus indicates Beijing does recognize it must reform its financial systems, especially its capital markets, and China may be on the cusp of a capital markets revolution.

The fundamentals are compelling. China has more banking assets and foreign exchange reserves than any other country. Its bond, stock and insurance markets are second only to the US. Despite quality and governance issues in its capital markets, Chinese equities do not reflect the strength of an economy whose factories contribute more than 30% to global manufacturing. Chinese equities are arguably the most undervalued in the world, and with Chinese households holding less than 8% of their assets in shares (as opposed to the US average of 48%), retail investors will be a crucial spur in any expansion of capital markets. The Chinese government values social stability above all else, and as only radical capital market reforms can ensure Chinese households’ share portfolios are not exposed to inordinate risks, it is likely to undertake such reforms, which in turn will attract foreign portfolio investment.

It is a misconception that one man makes all economic decisions in China and that the state acts as a monolith, deaf to the masses. There appears to be an intense debate in Beijing on how to best restore confidence and growth, and if an initiative from one part of the government fails, another will launch an alternative. In the West, governments change swiftly while policies are usually slow to change. In China, administrations change slowly, yet policies may change swiftly once the government understands an issue.

Targeted stimulus can help

On the other hand, Western politicians and regulators frequently announce policy changes by speaking directly to the public, explaining the reasons and benefits. In China, the government tends to reveal initiatives incrementally as it instructs its own numerous, far-flung institutions regarding new policies’ functions and how cadres should implement them. Now, more than ever, the leadership needs to talk directly to the people and explain how the multiple new and upcoming stimulus packages will benefit individual citizens.

Recent stimulus measures applied in individual cities may be harbingers of national policies to come. The Beijing city government, for example, is offering to reimburse money spent by lower-income households and retirees on apartment renovations, particularly to accommodate those with diminished mobility and disability needs. Many in the wider population share the anathema under which the government holds direct cash handouts, seeing them as a weakness of developed economies causing low productivity and competitiveness. Yet the state needs to offer reimbursements for extra health and education costs until it has reformed these sectors and lowered their cost to citizens.

If the Chinese government issued time-constrained, non-transferable vouchers to its citizens to help them pay for essential services, it would boost consumption significantly and release some of the money householders now hoard for future welfare needs. Basic medical care and education are free or at least inexpensive in China, and these have been extended to even the most remote regions and are better than those offered by most developing countries. But the costs of more complex medical treatments increase exponentially and are out of reach of the majority of Chinese people.

The Chinese government has begun reviewing the status of the 170 million domestic migrant workers and should begin allowing those employed gainfully to transfer their hukou (residency permits) to the towns where they presently work beyond the few recent experiments in selected cities. In becoming residents, these former migrants would benefit from local health and education services, motivating them to buy homes and generally consume more. Domestic migrant workers save more than city residents because they must pay for the social services local residents receive gratis. Such a move would add at least 1 trillion renminbi ($140 billion) annually to the national GDP.

Over 900 million Chinese people earn less than $300 per month. With some coastal cities possessing an annual per-capital GDP of over $35,000, the income disparity is striking. On the other hand, China’s developmental potential is considerable. Perhaps the current administration needs to reflect on the capacity for political and social risk of their predecessors and apply some of their radical thinking to today. There are a few signs the leadership is at least trying to do so: The slogan for the current slew of stimulus measures is “bold and steady,” a phrase used by Deng Xiaoping in the early years of economic reform.

China’s geoeconomic position is precarious

The air of geopolitical insecurity among ordinary people will take more than a recovering economy to change. Foreign direct investment is 7% of what it was pre-pandemic, and foreign business travelers and tourists are few. Throughout the lead-up to the US elections in November, Republicans and Democrats have threatened even more punitive tariffs and strategic containment when referring to China. Chinese people are beginning to understand how politically isolated they have become from a West that once treated their country with respect or at least curiosity and whose businesses were keen to realize the economic opportunities it offered.

Hope that the European Union will not follow the US in trying to block China’s economic growth is also waning. Chinese people think the EU’s choice to place tariffs on Chinese EVs is unjust, revealing to them the harsh reality that Europe is as much, if not more, a trade fortress as a source of global partnerships and prosperity. They point to the fact that European automobile companies have been dominant in China until recently and that three foreign companies — Volkswagen, Tesla and Toyota — remain in the top ten domestic sedan manufacturers. It is reasonable to hope, however, that as the Chinese economy recovers, foreign investors will return and more companies will come to take advantage of China’s growing consumer market.

Some early signs of economic recovery are encouraging. At 1 trillion renminbi (6% of GDP) the stimulus to date is the largest in China’s economic history and is just the beginning. The government is likely to do more, now that it seems to know it has no choice but to fuel confidence and consumption wherever it can. It understands this is needed to prevent a deeper downturn this year and avert a full-blown economic crisis in the near future.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post China Watch: Beijing’s New “Bold and Steady” Economic Stimulus appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

At the heart of the conflict is the , a hydroelectric project on the . Ethiopia’s dam construction has angered Egypt, which sees it as a threat to its water supply. The Nile is crucial for Egypt, providing nearly all its water resources. While Ethiopia argues that the dam is solely for electricity generation and won’t significantly impact water flow, Egypt still needs to be convinced. This dispute has deep historical roots, reflecting long-standing power dynamics between the two nations.

The region’s history is marked by conflicts and shifting alliances. In the 1970s, Cold War dynamics played out in the Horn of Africa, with the United States and Soviet Union supporting opposing sides. The between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977–1978 was a significant event, resulting in a Somali defeat that still resonates today. These historical conflicts have shaped current relationships and tensions between countries in the region.

Countries of the Horn of Africa. Via Zeremariam Fre (CC BY-SA 4.0).

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister has ambitious plans for his country, including rebuilding the capital and reestablishing Ethiopia’s access to the sea. This vision includes developing a port in a move that has angered Somalia. Ethiopia’s potential recognition of Somaliland has further complicated regional dynamics. Meanwhile, Eritrea’s relationship with Ethiopia has cooled.

Involving outside powers adds complexity to the situation. Egypt has begun providing military support to Somalia, potentially countering Ethiopia. The United Arab Emirates plays a significant financial backer in the region, though its exact strategy remains unclear. Other external powers, such as Turkey, India, China and the United States, also have interests in the area, further complicating the geopolitical landscape.

Precarious stability and the global implications of African tensions

The ongoing civil war in Sudan and the instability in South Sudan contribute to the region’s overall volatility. These conflicts have drawn in various international actors, each with their own agendas. The situation in Sudan, in particular, has the potential to impact the broader regional dynamics, especially given its strategic location and historical ties to both Egypt and Ethiopia.

Despite having a significant military presence in Djibouti, the United States is currently preoccupied with other global issues. This relative disengagement from the Horn of Africa’s tensions could allow other actors to fill the power vacuum. A solid mediating force is necessary to avoid escalating regional conflicts.

The situation in the Horn of Africa resembles the complex alliances and tensions that preceded World War I. The interconnected nature of the conflicts, the involvement of multiple regional and global powers and the potential for rapid escalation are concerning parallels. The region’s strategic importance, particularly in maritime trade and geopolitical influence, makes these tensions globally significant.

Looking forward, the stability of the Horn of Africa remains precarious. The combination of historical grievances, current political ambitions and resource disputes creates a volatile mix. The role of external powers, particularly China and the United Arab Emirates, will be crucial in shaping future developments. As global attention remains focused on other crises, the risk of overlooking the simmering tensions in this critical region could have far-reaching consequences for regional and global stability.

[Peter Choi edited this podcast and wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Making Sense of Rising Tensions in the Horn of Africa appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.