A Herculean Dilemma

Thomas Bach is, I believe, a virtuous man, but he’s learning that it doesn’t pay to be too pious when running an international sport. As President of the International Olympic Committee () he faces a Herculean dilemma. He recently entertained the possibility that, in spite of widespread bans on Russian and Belarusian athletes across the spectrum of sports, he may allow competitors from those countries to appear at next year’s Olympics, in Paris. Even airing the prospect has forced him into a tight spot: “We [IOC] have been by the Russian side of being agents of the US, and we have been accused by the Ukrainian side of being promoters of war,” he despairs.

Like any right minded head of a global sporting organization, Bach is prioritizing the interests of sport over geopolitics—though he must be painfully aware that the two are inseparable. He should, in my opinion, be praised for designating human athletes as of paramount importance and creating the conditions under which over 400 highly trained, motivated and committed individuals are given the chance to compete. (At the Covid-delayed Tokyo 2020 Olympics, the Belarusian team was 96-strong. 335 Russian athletes were obliged to compete under the rubric “Russia Olympic Committee” due to doping violations.) Chances are he will leave no stone unturned in his effort to incorporate Russian and Belarussian in the games, under a neutral flag or no flag at all. .

But Ukraine is understandably angry at Bach’s softening position on Russian and Belarusian athletes and threatens to the Paris Olympics, complicating Bach’s situation and raising doubts about the impartiality of the IOC and its ability to make a decision that will satisfy all parties. Countries that align or support Ukraine will feel the pressure to express their solidarity. The USA and Canada would be—perhaps already have been—encouraged to join a boycott. Several, if not all, western European nations would feature, as well Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In addition to NATO countries, both Australia and New Zealand have condemned Russia and provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine. There are 206 National Olympic Committees affiliated with the IOC and it’s conceivable that an Olympic boycott could include over 30 nations. Individual athletes may be free to compete as neutrals (i.e. not representative of their countries).

Quite apart from the removal of some of the most powerful nations in sport, the IOC would almost certainly face the wrath of broadcasters, several of which will refuse to screen the tournament if their home nation is not involved. The most important of these is, which in 2014, acquired the exclusive broadcast rights to the Olympic Games from 2022 through 2032 for a total cost of $7.75 billion. This agreement includes the broadcast rights to next year’s games, as well as the 2028 Olympic Games in Los Angeles.

Sports Boycotts in History

Sports boycotts are not uncommon. Over 60 countries, including the USA, China and the then West Germany  refused to participate in the 1980 summer Olympics in Moscow in protest at the Soviet Union’s incursions in Afghanistan. The boycott didn’t lead to an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, though its proponents argued that it heightened international attention and put pressure on the Soviet government. In retaliation, the Soviet Union led a boycott of the next Olympics, held in Los Angeles. Cuba, North Korea and East Germany (as it was) joined the Soviets, though only 13 nations in total abstained. The retaliatory boycott served to present the USA with a showcase for its athletic talent and American competitors dominated the tournament.

The boycott of South Africa during apartheid, beginning in the 1960s, is usually offered as an example of how politically effective boycotts can be. The argument is that the boycott helped to isolate South Africa and increase international pressure on the apartheid government to end discriminatory policies. The boycotts are widely credited with playing a significant role in bringing about the end of apartheid in the early 1990s. It’s an appealing justification,  but there is no evidence that the boycott had any tangible effect: Its impact was largely symbolic. (The South Africa boycott was not maintained by all. For example, New Zealand’s rugby team continued to play South Africa, as did the Australian cricket team. Several other countries, including England, Ireland and Italy, sent teams to South Africa.)

Workable Solution?

Bach can gauge the pushback to the admittance of Russians and Belarusians from the reaction to the recent decision of the International Fencing Federation () to allow fencers from Russia and Belarus to return to international competitions. Over 300 fencers, including 9 medalists from the last Olympics in Tokyo, signed insisting that the FIE and the IOC should not allow Russian and Belarusian fencers to compete while the Ukraine conflict persists. Olga Kharlan, the Ukrainian Olympic gold medalist, was especially forceful: “I want to perform at the Olympics. But as a citizen of Ukraine, I can’t even imagine how to stand next to representatives of the Russian Federation.”

Wimbledon will also be of interest. The tournament has reversed its ban on Russian and Belarusian athletes, who may now compete as neutrals in the tennis tournament. The WTA and ATP organizations, which run the women’s and men’s professional tours and which calculates the rankings to determine qualification for the Olympics, described the Wimbledon decision as “a which protects the fairness of the game.”

The position of Russia in football is unclear: It retains its membership of UEFA, the European governing organization, despite being banned from playing. There is talk that Russia could relinquish its membership and join the Asian Football Confederation. This may encourage UEFA to review its position. Russian football brings with it lucrative broadcasting contracts.

Bach’s Crapshoot

But the Olympics is like no other sports event and Bach will need to gamble. The easy choice is to maintain the status quo though this will jar with Bach’s ideals. My guess is that Bach will opt for the crapshoot and welcome Russians and Belarusians back, but with the kind of provisos he has recently outlined (see below). Then what? Ukraine will bail out for sure. It will also urge the other  30 countries that are members of NATO to follow suit. Poland, a member of NATO since 1999 and strong supporter of Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity, will be first to follow, then other NATO members will be wringing their hands. 206 countries sent teams to the Tokyo Olympics, so losing the 31 NATO countries would be damaging but perhaps not terminally.

What about France? A founder member of NATO, along with the USA, Canada and 9 other nations in 1949, France withdrew from NATO’s military command structure and pursued an independent defense policy in 1966. The 2024 Olympics are scheduled to take place in Paris from July 26 to August 11. The Paralympic Games will follow from August 28 to September 8, also in Paris. Unthinkable as it is, a NATO boycott would lead France into the impossible and unprecedented position of boycotting its own Olympics.

Such a perverse prospect will not be in Bach’s calculations at the moment, but it will loom larger as we approach next July. Bach has made it signally clear that, while he doesn’t favor the expulsion of Russia and Belarus, he will accept the decisions of the IOC’s member sports on whether or not to allow competitors from these countries. Ultimately though the IOC has the final say on whether a qualifying athlete can enter the Olympics and that means Bach will have to wrestle with his conscience. My guess is that he will allow Russians and Belarussians but respect bans if individual sports, like track and field, insist on exclusion (there is no chance will allow Russians or Belarusians, as Lord Coe recently made clear).

If my suspicion is right, we will witness the most controversial preamble to an Olympics in history—and I am not neglecting those politically-charged tournaments I mentioned earlier. Boycotts have a self-perpetuating quality, each withdrawal adding pressure on others to pull out.  NATO countries who have supported Ukraine will be taxed with making one of two equally unpopular decisions: ignore Ukraine’s requests or join a boycott that will be deeply unpopular among their own populations.

The by the IOC Executive Board are:

1. Athletes with a Russian or a Belarusian passport must compete only as individual neutral athletes.
2. Teams of athletes with a Russian or Belarusian passport cannot be considered.
3. Athletes who actively support the war cannot compete. Support personnel who actively support the war cannot be entered.
4. Athletes contracted to the Russian or Belarusian military or national security agencies cannot compete. Support personnel contracted to the Russian or Belarusian military or national security agencies cannot be entered.
5. Any such individual neutral athlete, like all the other participating athletes, must meet all anti-doping requirements applicable to them and particularly those set out in the anti-doping rules of the international federations.
6. The sanctions against those responsible for the war, the Russian and Belarusian states and governments, must remain in place, meaning no international sports events organized or supported by an international federation or national Olympic committee in Russia or Belarus. No flag, anthem, colors or any other identifications whatsoever of these countries displayed at any sports event or meeting, including the entire venue.

[Ellis Cashmore’s latest book is.]

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A country transformed into an NGO 

In the first month following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Warsaw’s population has grown by , whereas Poland has become a country with the second-largest refugee population in the world. Approximately out of 4.6 million people fleeing Ukraine in the first two months of the war found shelter in Poland; currently, 1.5 million remain there. 

This sudden influx of refugees caught Polish authorities by surprise even though since 2015, they had rejected relocation of refugees from the Middle East under the claim that Poland had to be ready to escalate the war in Ukraine. Despite the unpreparedness, the Polish government quickly lent a helping hand to Ukrainians by simplifying border crossing procedures, offering free transportation, and enabling them to receive a Polish personal identification number (PESEL) which provided access to education, health care, labor market, and financial assistance. 

However, the secret of why Poland stood up to the challenge has much more to do with the exceptional commitment of civil society and grassroots activism. Poles from all over Poland picked up refugees from the border, provided them with rooms in their own houses, helped with bureaucracy, organized crowdfunding, cooked meals, and opened free “shops.” According to Karolina Jeznach and Steffen Lüdke: “The feeling that Poland might be the next victim of Russian imperialism has transformed the country into something like a .”

Good will may not be enough 

So far, Poland seems to have passed the “solidarity test.” Still, there have been fears that even the best intentions and open doors might not be enough to assist Ukrainian refugees in the long term perspective and considering that Russian disinformation on Polish social media has not said the last word yet, Ukrainians arriving in Poland belong to particularly vulnerable groups: they are predominantly women, children and the elderly. 

The need for assistance is enormous, but among volunteers, there might also be people with ill intentions. Therefore, they should be verified to exclude those sentenced for various forms of abuse. This is one of the cases where state coordination is crucial. 

Many refugees express interest in staying and working in Poland due to its geographical, cultural, and linguistic proximity to Ukraine. But although the country has one of the lowest unemployment rates in the EU, the market can absorb only every willing to work.

The Polish government does not consider relocation of refugees to other EU countries, but it expects EU financial aid in return. NGOs that more funding should be transferred to the local actors and organizations on the front lines rather than the government.

There is also a risk that populists could exploit challenges stemming from a sudden wave of refugees (and some groups already do) to stir up hatred since Poland is facing some critical burning issues: galloping inflation, underfinanced public services, the lowest number of in the EU and the on health care, soaring rents and flat shortage. The grievances about the “privileges” of Ukrainians seem relatively isolated, but the support has decreased. 

Whereas of Poles felt optimistic about Ukrainian refugees in April 2022, favored taking up refugees in Poland. Some paint a gloomier picture: they show that although the Poles support the Ukrainian cause, they harbor grievances against Ukrainian refugees for – amongst others – the reasons mentioned above.  Therefore this issue should be addressed timely to avoid social tensions and being turned into a political weapon in the parliamentary elections in 2023.

Refugees welcome 

The underlying reasons for the warm welcome of Ukrainians are manifold. As neighboring Slavic countries, Ukraine and Poland share many cultural, linguistic, and historical ties (although history often proved to be the bone of contention). 

On the eve of the war Ukrainian diaspora in Poland amounted to about a , and Ukrainians also constituted more than of international students.  Therefore, the first wave of refugees fled predominantly to their relatives and friends. Many Poles know someone from Ukraine. This does not mean that the relationship was free of discrimination: cases of abusing Ukrainian workers or politically incorrect remarks were many.

Another factor that unites both countries is the common enemy. Unlike Hungary, Poland has been strongly resenting Russian political elites for decades, if not centuries. Poles fear that their country could become the next target of Russian aggression and identify themselves strongly with the plight of Ukraine. In the days following the Russian attack, shelves in many shops in eastern Poland turned empty, and long lines were built in front of ATMs and petrol stations.

People all over Poland applied for new passports in masses. Most Poles know of war from history, but the memory of World War II is still very vivid in the collective memory. To many, the unjustified Russian aggression against Ukraine echoes Poland’s fate: the attack by Nazi Germany and the subsequent charge of the Soviet Union under the guise of “brotherly help” against the Nazis.

Last but not least, refugees from Ukraine fit well in the “romantic” perception: they are predominantly women and children, in the eyes of many, “the proper refugees.” This is mainly because Ukrainian men between 18 and 60 are not allowed to leave Ukraine.  

Refugees unwelcome 

The warm welcome of Ukrainians is in stark contrast with the treatment of refugees on the Poland-Belarus border, where many people are still trapped. Polish Border Security Guard regularly informs about push backs and “illegal crossings to Poland” on the Poland-Belarus border by people from Yemen, Ethiopia, Syria, and Afghanistan – countries torn by conflicts or in dire humanitarian situations. 

From the beginning of 2021 until Dec. 19, approximately people tried to enter Polish territory over the Poland-Belarus border. For many, deportations would equal death. Their plight did not go unnoticed among Ukrainian organizations, which wrote an to the Polish government and Border Security Guard pledging equal treatment of all refugees.

A decisive factor differentiating the treatment of refugees is the intervention of authorities and politicization of the issue. On the border with Ukraine, the government did not erect walls or penalize any attempt to help by the locals, media, doctors, or volunteers. NGOs were not banned from the border area. But this has been common practice just a hundred kilometers up north. 

The government and the public broadcaster quickly labeled refugees from the Global South as “dangerous,” “illegal,” or “economic” migrants sent by the much-scorned Belarussian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to destabilize Poland. The last argument is true, which is why many EU countries supported Poland. Still, less attention was given to the fact that those people were deceived and involuntarily turned into pawns in Lukashenko’s vendetta.   

Many helped refugees despite legal consequences and the“criminalization of solidarity.” Some fed or allowed them in their homes, volunteers from all over Poland searched for them in forests close to the special emergency zone to help them apply for asylum and offer warm clothing and food, and some also cut the barbed wire on the border. 

Numerous demonstrations in large Polish cities and small towns close to the special emergency zone took place. Polls published in early January 2022 indicated that of Poles supported the “illegal” assistance to refugees. 

This is not to say that the hostile policies of the Polish government do not enjoy the support of some groups in Polish society. Poland is one of the most ethnically and religiously homogeneous countries in Europe. Few people know a Muslim or someone from a Middle Eastern country. All information they receive comes from media and history textbooks. 

In this overwhelmingly Catholic country, one of the most commemorated historical events is the Battle of Vienna 1683 against the Ottoman Empire, which perpetuates the self-perception of many Polish nationalists as Antemurale Christianitatis (Bulwark of Christendom). Even if widely reported, wars in Syria, Yemen, or Afghanistan are distant and incomprehensible to an average Pole. 

However, it might be worth noting that in previous decades Poland accepted many Chechen refugees who were Muslims, and religion did not play a significant role in public discourse back then. It has become politicized in the last decade.   

Poland as an immigration country

In the past decades, Poland used to be a country that people would migrate from or through rather than to. The last few years have shown that this trend has changed. However, the authorities and society might not be aware of and ready to embrace the ongoing changes. 

Poland’s ethnic, cultural, and religious homogeneity is not necessarily an advantage. Unfortunately, the topic of refugees has too often been weaponized for political gains, affecting societal attitudes. 

This can be illustrated by the year 2015 when most Poles initially stood behind the idea of supporting refugees but changed their approach radically when the issue became a leitmotif of the electoral campaign of the Law and Justice Party. Let us hope that the Polish parliamentary elections in 2023 will not follow the same pattern.

[ edited this piece.]

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Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin are also fueling this war rhetoric. Both countries are feigning concern about a perceived NATO troop concentration on the border with Belarus. According to reports, nuclear-capable Russian bombers have recently patrolled the Belarusian airspace. German policy should not fall into this trap of conjured-up militarization.

The Migrant Crisis on Poland-Belarus Border Is Lukashenko’s Revenge

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The frequent use of the term “hybrid warfare” fits in with a development that is increasingly shaping the discourse on security and defense policy in Germany and other EU and NATO states. It has become a commonplace belief that the boundaries between war and peace are becoming blurred.

War seems to be everywhere: There is talk not only of hybrid wars but also of information wars, cyberwars and economic wars. Almost every international dispute is interpreted in light of the ubiquitous paradigm of a “great power conflict,” with the potential for military escalation.

Not all of this is necessarily wrong, and much of it is not really new. But war is and remains at its core the organized use of military force for political ends. In the process, states and non-state actors have always used non-military means as a flanking measure to win the propaganda battle or to weaken the will of the opponent to divide their societies.

The technological and societal developments of the past decades have facilitated this enormously. Economic instruments such as sanctions and boycotts can also be threatened or used to augment military means. However, the basic definition of hybrid warfare is that it is the integrated use of military and non-military means or tactics within the framework of an overarching goal or plan.

The current situation on the Polish-Belarusian border does not meet this criterion. Even if this crisis was orchestrated by the Kremlin, it is far-fetched to speak of an integrated “deployment” of migrants in Belarus and of pro-Russian separatists and Russian troops in eastern Ukraine as part of an overall plan.

Calling the situation a hybrid war has concrete consequences because war justifies politically and legally different rules and means than peace. Using the term “war” increases the danger that it will be used to justify the mistreatment of refugees in violation of human rights. War creates a great urgency to act, while at the same time the political room for maneuver dwindles.

The question also arises as to who is waging war against whom. Is it Belarus against Poland, so that there is a NATO Article V case for collective defense? Or is it Russia against NATO? The expansion of the concept of war also dilutes the respective areas of responsibility of internal security forces and armed forces. Shouldn’t the Bundeswehr then also be deployed on the German-Polish border, and shouldn’t NATO send its rapid reaction force to the Polish-Belarusian border?

The fact that the boundaries between war and peace are becoming increasingly blurred is not only due to abstract security policy developments and structural international changes, but it is also very much the result of the language and actions of political actors, including in the West. Politicians, therefore, have a responsibility to continue to define the boundaries between war and peace.

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The migrant crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border is not yet a war. It cannot safely be ruled out that it will not escalate militarily. However, politicians in Germany and the EU should not rhetorically pave the way for such a development and should not respond to corresponding provocations from Minsk and Moscow.

They should meet the challenge posed by migration and refugees with political means — also and especially when a state uses them as a means of pressure. In addition to further economic sanctions by the EU against Belarus, the establishment of a functioning asylum policy in the European Union would be an essential step in this direction.

*[This  was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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This is a from the border between Belarus and Poland, the EU’s eastern frontier, on November 8. People who are trapped between security forces pushing them back and forth had been flying from the Middle East to Belarus in the past weeks, unaware that they were being used by President Alexander Lukashenko for his personal vendetta against the European Union.

One Step Further

The current crisis has its roots in the aftermath of a highly contested election in August 2020 when Lukashenko was proclaimed president of Belarus for the sixth consecutive time since 1994. Neither the EU nor the US recognized the result because the vote, like almost all preceding ones, was assessed as neither free nor fair by the . Electoral fraud triggered widespread demonstrations across the country that were brutally suppressed by the regime. By November, some 25,000 have been , including 477 , with widespread allegations of torture in detention.

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In response, the EU imposed that include a travel ban and an asset freeze against those associated with the regime and which, as of June this year, extend to 166 individuals and 15 entities. Relations became further strained in May when Belarus used a false pretext to a plane flying from Greece to Lithuania and arrested a dissident journalist who was onboard.

Consequently, sanctions were tightened, and an infuriated Lukashenko with reprisal: “We were stopping drugs and migrants on our Western border. Now you will eat drugs and chase people. … Because of your sanctions, we have no money to take care of this.”

Lukashenko had seen how the migration crisis of 2015 polarized EU member states, with Visegrad Group countries — Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland — opposing non-EU migration and refusing relocation of asylum seekers. From Turkey, the Belarusian president may have learned how to use refugees to put pressure on the EU. But Lukashenko, whose authoritarian rule earned him the moniker “the last dictator of Europe,” went one step further, intentionally flying in thousands of people to Belarus to use them in his game against the EU.

Already in June, Lithuanian border guards observed a sudden surge in illegal crossings by people from Africa and the Middle East. Until early July, tried to enter Lithuania’s territory illegally — 12 times as many as in the whole of 2020. Soon it became obvious that it was no coincidence: The number of flights from Middle Eastern countries to Minsk, the capital of Belarus, had intensified. Passengers were taken by buses and taxis to the border and assisted by Belarusian border guards; local travel agencies were also apparently involved.

It is estimated that at the moment, between 800 and 1,000 people from the Middle East every day, with German media reporting up to 40 flights a week from Istanbul, Damascus and Dubai planned by March next year.

Lukashenko’s regime targeted people from fragile countries and lured them with a prospect of easy and legal entry to the EU. This was a endeavor. Depending on the port of departure and destination, the price per person amounted from $6,000 to $15,000. Many migrants seem to have believed that Minsk was just a layover and that they would soon board a plane to Germany. They traveled with their entire families.

Hybrid Threat

As the number of attempts to cross the border illegally was increasing disproportionally fast, Lithuania declared a on July 2. Lithuania and neighboring Latvia, with populations of 2.8 million and 1.9 million respectively, feared that they would not be able to cope with a sudden influx of migrants. In mid-July, Lithuania’s foreign minister asked the EU to take more decisive steps against Lukashenko, a “hybrid threat” and suggesting refugees being used as a “political weapon.”

Latvia declared a state of emergency on August 10; Poland, with a population of 38 million, on September 2. All three states began building fences along their borders.

But all these measures did not halt the pace of illegal crossings. The statistics published by the Polish Border Guard Office show that in August, nearly 2,900 people tried to ; between early August and November 4, the numbered 30,000.

On November 8, as the situation at the Poland-Belarus border escalated, an 3,000-4,000 people were in the vicinity of the border. A column of hundreds of people marched toward an official border crossing in , but most were diverted by Belarusian forces to the nearby forest.

Polish forces used tear gas to stop some of the migrants from cutting the fence. As passing was impossible, hundreds set up makeshift camps along the border. Polish official sources that there may currently be as many as 15,000 migrants in Belarus — the same as the of Polish troops to protect the border.  

No Media, No Frontex

Although all affected countries implemented similar measures, Lithuania and Latvia allowed the media to enter emergency zones, under certain restrictions. Poland barred non-resident civilians, including journalists, from the zone and restricted access to public information, a move by Reporters Without Borders and other press freedom organizations.

All information from the Polish state of emergency zone (SEZ) is provided by the authorities, local residents or, perhaps ironically, the Belarusian regime. Considering that journalists are almost always present in most active war zones and conflict areas, this is quite an unusual situation.

From the outset of the crisis, Poland has been carrying out pushbacks, a practice of forcing migrants to return to Belarus. According to UNHCR, pushbacks are a of international law, but the Polish parliament them in October. Lithuania initially placed migrants in detention centers but soon then followed Poland’s example. In mid-August, more than 4,000 people were in , with 1,500 people were in in early October in Poland.

The affected countries differ in their cooperation with Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency headquartered in the Polish capital Warsaw, which controls borders in the Schengen Area. Frontex deployed its personnel to Lithuania and Latvia, but Poland repeatedly refused help because, as it claims, it had enough troops to protect the border. Polish officials that Frontex Director Fabrice Leggeri was “impressed by the means deployed to secure the border” in Poland.

But Frontex does more than protect borders. It has developed a special code of conduct to protect human rights and created the role of a fundamental rights officer, who monitors border guards to reduce the potential for violations of the rights of migrants.

In their attempt to reach Poland, migrants often have to cross swamps and forests, facing adversarial weather conditions; temperatures in November drop below 0˚ Celsius (32˚ Fahrenheit). Most of them wander for days or weeks, pushed back and forth repeatedly. They cannot expect assistance from humanitarian organizations, NGOs or doctors because they are barred from the SEZ. Local residents are also prohibited from helping, but many that they do so regardless.

In order to offer assistance to the migrants, 14 Polish NGOs formed — Border Group — to monitor the situation close to the SEZ. They have documented many pushbacks, with in particular resonating with the public. The incident involved a group of 20 migrants, among them eight children, who in late September managed to reach Michałowo, a small town outside of SEZ. They claimed that they wanted to seek asylum in Poland. Nevertheless, they were driven off to Belarus as the entire interaction was recorded by activists and journalists.

This led to protests in Warsaw and Michałowo, supported by three former Polish first ladies. The protesters chanted, “Where are the children?” and “The place for children is not in the forest.”

More Sanctions to Come

The EU unanimously Belarus for “deliberately putting people’s lives and wellbeing in danger” and “.” President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen that in response to the “hybrid conflict” sanctions on Belarus will be widened. However, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov stated that the EU should for stopping migrants.

Nevertheless, the EU is not open to such negotiation and relies on diplomatic international pressure and sanctions. Current attempts are directed at convincing the countries of origin to warn migrants against traveling to Belarus or to sanction the airlines who fly them. Turkish airlines already agreed to to Belarus while Iraqi authorities offered to fly back people who .

Demands for harsher sanctions and complete closure of borders can also be heard. Such a move would paralyze international trade routes and have an impact on Russia and China — Belarus lies on China’s New Silk Road — that use Belarus for . But sanctions are a double-edged sword, having a detrimental impact on those who impose them.

Lukashenko seems to have fewer ways out of the crisis, and many point out that he will have to surrender as the cost of his political gambling is becoming too high. There are also concerns that, in desperation and given his unpredictability, the Belarusian president may start an .

If Lukashenko wanted to divert attention from ����������ܲ�’ domestic affairs, he succeeded. In the past weeks, reports on the crackdown against the opposition have disappeared from international debate. If sanctions are tightened and borders closed completely, not only the regime but also civil society will pay the price as Belarus becomes even more isolated.

The situation at the Poland-Belarus border is very dynamic and, in some respects, resembles a proxy war. It is where the EU and NATO encounter ��ܲ�������’s sphere of influence, with Polish politicians openly accusing Russia of the crisis.

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Whether legal or illegal, migrants should not be used as pawns or human shields in a geopolitical game. As desperate migrants look for other routes to enter the EU, the crisis may soon spill over into Ukraine, ����������ܲ�’ southern neighbor. Poland, Lithuania and Latvia have already joined Alexander Lukashenko as he plays with innocent lives.

But while the often-ridiculed Lukashenko managed to unsettle the EU, he has not so far succeeded in further polarizing it. Despite the breach of international law at its border, the EU stands firmly together behind Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Time will tell if this unity remains as the crisis evolves.

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Authoritarianism, like war, makes headlines. It’s hard for democracy to compete against political crackdowns, military coups and unhinged pronouncements. Sure, democracies engage in periodic elections and produce landmark pieces of legislation. But what makes democracy, like peace, successful is not the unexpected rupture, such as the election of Barack Obama, but the boring quotidian. Citizens express their opinions in public meetings. Lawmakers receive constituents in their offices. Potholes get fixed. That’s not exactly clickbait.

Because the absence of war doesn’t make headlines, as Stephen Pinker has , the news media amplifies the impression that violence is omnipresent and constantly escalating when it splashes mass murder, genocide and war crimes on the front page. Peace may well be prevalent, but it isn’t newsworthy.

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The same can be said about democracy, which has been suffering for some time from bad press. Democracies have been dragged down by corruption, hijacked by authoritarian politicians, associated with unpopular economic reforms and proven incapable (so far) of addressing major global problems like the climate crisis. After a brief surge in popularity in the immediate post-Cold War period, democracy according to the general consensus has been in retreat.

Judging from recent quantitative assessments, the retreat has become a rout. The title of the latest Freedom House , for instance, is “Democracy Under Siege.” The report details how freedom around the world has eroded for the last 15 years, with 2020 featuring the greatest decline yet. The Economist Intelligence Unit, which produces a Democracy Index every year, promoted its 2020 report with the headline, “Global Democracy Has a Very Bad Year.” The authoritarian responses to the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to the worst so far for the model, with the average global score plummeting from the previous year. Meanwhile, the Rule of Law Index for 2020 also  a drop for the third year in a row.

If we extrapolate from the current trend lines, democracy will be gone in a couple of decades, melted away like the polar ice. But it’s always dangerous to make such extrapolations given history’s tendency to move in cycles not straight lines. So, let’s look at some reasons why democracy might be in for a comeback.

The Pandemic Recedes in America

Much of the reason for democracy’s dismal record in 2020 was the expansion of executive power and state controls in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. Some of those power grabs, such as Vladimir Putin’s  changes in Russia, are still in place. Some countries, like India and Brazil, are still struggling with both COVID-19 and powerful authoritarian leaders.

But even with the continued high rate of infection in a number of countries, the overall trajectory of the disease is downward. Since peaking in late April, the reported number of global cases has dropped nearly by half. So, two trend lines are now intersecting: the lifting of pandemic restrictions and the backlash against hapless authoritarians.

Americans, for instance, are coming to terms with both the retreat of COVID and the removal of Donald Trump from the White House, Facebook and Twitter. The Biden administration is undoing many of Trump’s undemocratic moves, including those imposed during the pandemic around immigration and refugees. The attempts by the Republican Party to tamp down voter turnout proved spectacularly unsuccessful in 2020, which despite the pandemic featured the largest-ever  in votes from one election to the next. In terms of the voting-age population, you have to go back to 1960 to find an election with a higher percentage turnout than the 62% rate in 2020.

This surge in voters helped put Joe Biden over the top. It has also motivated the Republican Party to redouble its efforts, this time at the state level, to suppress the vote. It is doing so under the false narrative that electoral fraud is widespread and that President Biden’s victory is somehow illegitimate. And it is setting the stage to orchestrate an authentic election  in 2024.

The backlash against these anti-democratic moves has been encouraging, however. When the state of Georgia passed its voting restrictions in April, pressure from voting rights advocates forced prominent Georgia corporations like Coca-Cola and Delta to reverse  and come out against the bill (though only after the bill had already passed). Major League Baseball  its all-star game from Atlanta, and Hollywood has also threatened a boycott.

These moves motivated Texas-based companies to  that state’s version of voting restrictions before the legislature scheduled a vote. None of that stopped Texas Republicans from pushing ahead with the bill. So, last weekend, Texas Democrats had to deploy the nuclear option of  out of the chamber to stop the vote suppression bill from passing. These courageous Texans, up against a powerful and determined state Republican Party, are now  to the federal government to safeguard voting rights.

At the federal level, the Democrats have put forward for the second time a comprehensive voting reform bill, the For the People Act, to expand access, reduce corruption and limit the impact of money on politics. The House approved a version of this bill in 2019, but it died in the Republican-controlled Senate. The House passed the  in March, but it again faces a difficult road to passage in the Senate because filibuster rules require at least 60 votes to pass and Democrats can muster only 50 (plus the vice-president’s).

A failure to find “10 good Republicans” for this bill, the cadre that Senator Joe Manchin naively expected to step forward to pass legislation creating a commission to investigate the January 6 insurrection on Capitol Hill, may  the Democrats to scrap or at least significantly modify the filibuster rules, which were  to block further enfranchisement of African-Americans in the 20^th century.

High voter turnout and efforts to secure voting rights are not the only signs of a healthy US democracy. Last year, the largest civic protests in US history took place as tens of millions of Americans expressed their disgust with police violence in the wake of the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. Civic organizations stepped forward to fight the pandemic and ensure more equitable access to vaccines. Young people, in particular, are engaged in large numbers on the climate crisis, gun control and reproductive health. After a long winter of discontent under Trump, perhaps it’s time for an “American Spring.”

Mixed Record Elsewhere for Democracy

Europe, meanwhile, is coming out of the pandemic in slightly stronger shape politically. The budget compromise that took place at the end of 2020, which ended up providing considerable relief to the economically disadvantaged countries of the southern tier, effectively  the European Union from disintegrating out of a lack of solidarity. Alas, the compromise also watered down the EU’s criticism of its easternmost members, particularly Poland and Hungary, for their violations of the bloc’s commitments to human rights and rule of law.

But there’s hope on the horizon here as well. Eastern Europe appears to be on the verge of a political sea change. Voters brought down Bulgaria’s right-wing populist leader Boyko Borissov in elections in April, and the new caretaker government has  to dismantle his political system of cronyism. In Slovenia, tens of thousands of protesters have massed in the capital of Ljubljana, the largest demonstration in years, to demand the resignation of the Trump-like prime minister Janez Jansa. The near-total ban on abortion orchestrated by the right-wing government in Poland has motivated mass  by women throughout the country, and even “Polish grannies” have  in support of a free press and the rule of law. A finally united opposition in Hungary, meanwhile, is  in the polls to Prime Minister Viktor Orban ahead of elections next year.

The far right, with their contempt for human rights, free media, rule of law and political checks and balances, are the greatest threat to democracy within democracies. Fortunately, they are not doing very well in Western Europe either. The anti-immigrant Alternative für Deutschland has witnessed a significant  in support in Germany, while Lega in Italy has also  in popularity. Golden Dawn has  from the scene in Greece. Vox is still the third most popular party in Spain, but it hasn’t managed to rise much 15% in the polls, which is the same story for the Sweden Democrats (stuck at 19%). Only in France and Finland are the far-right parties continuing to prosper. Marine Le Pen  leads the polls against French President Emmanuel Macron ahead of next year’s election, while the Finns Party  by a couple of percentage points in the polls but with elections not likely before 2023.

Elsewhere in the world, the pandemic may result in more political casualties for far-right populists, as they get caught in the ebbing of the Trump wave. Brazilians are  throughout the country under the banner of impeaching Jair Bolsonaro, a president who, like Trump, has compiled a spectacularly poor record in dealing with COVID-19. Bolsonaro’s approval rating has to a new low under 25%. The still-popular former leader Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, recently cleared by the courts to run again for office,  to be assembling a broad political coalition to oust Bolsonaro in the elections set for next year.

Hard-right leader Ivan Duque has achieved the distinction of being the least popular  in Colombian history. Politically, it doesn’t matter so much, since he can’t run again for president in next year’s election. But the public’s disgust with the violence in Colombia and the economic inequality exacerbated by the pandemic will likely apply as well to any of his would-be hard-right successors.

The extraordinary mishandling of the pandemic in India has had a similar effect on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s popularity, which has also recently fallen to a new low. However, after seven years in office, he remains quite popular, with a 63%  rating.

Modi’s Teflon reputation speaks to the fragility of democracy in many parts of the world. Many voters are attracted to right-wing nationalists like Modi —  in Turkey, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador — who promise to “get the job done” regardless of the political and economic costs. Such leaders can rapidly turn a democratic country into a putatively democratic one, which makes the step into authentic authoritarianism that much easier.

The coups in Mali and Myanmar, China’s crackdown in Hong Kong, the enduring miseries in North Korea, Venezuela and Eritrea — these are all reminders that, however fragile democracy might be in formally democratic states, politics can always get a lot worse.

Lukashenko: Strong or Weak?

Take the example of Belarus, where Alexander Lukashenko has ruled supreme since 1994. Thanks to his own ruthlessness and the patronage of neighboring Russia, Lukashenko has weathered mass protests that would have ousted leaders of weaker disposition.

His latest outrage was to order the grounding of a Ryanair flight from Greece to Lithuania as it was flying over Belarus — just so that he could apprehend a young dissident, Roman Protasevich, and his Russian girlfriend, Sofia Sapega. Virtually everyone has decried this blatant violation of international laws and norms with the exception, of course, of Putin and others in the Russian president’s orbit. The editor of the Russian media conglomerate RT, Margarita Simonyan, , “Never did I think I would envy Belarus. But now I do. [Lukashenko] performed beautifully.”

Lukashenko indeed came across as all-powerful in this episode. But this is an illusion. Putin has not hesitated to assassinate his critics, even when they are living outside Russia. Lukashenko doesn’t have that kind of reach or audacity, so he has to wait until dissidents are within his own airspace to strike. I’d like to believe that the opposition in Belarus takes heart from this desperate move — is Lukashenko really so scared of a single dissident? —  and doubles down on its efforts to oust the tyrant.

Outside of Putin and his toadies, Lukashenko doesn’t have many defenders. This elaborate effort to capture a dissident only further isolates the Belarussian strongman. Even putatively democratic states, like  and , have unequivocally denounced Lukashenko.

Anti-democratic actions like the Ryanair stunt capture headlines in ways that pro-democratic efforts rarely do. Honestly, had you even heard of Roman Protasevich before this affair? Along with all the other depressing news of the day, from Texas to Mali, this brazen move suggests that democracy is teetering on the edge of an abyss.

But all the patient organizing against the strongmen that doesn’t make it into the news will ultimately prove the fragility of tyranny. When it comes to anti-democrats like Lukashenko, they will one day discover that the military, the police and the party have abandoned them. And it will be they who teeter at the abyss, their hands scrabbling for a secure hold, when along comes democracy to give them a firm pat on the back.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The post In Conversation With Belarus Opposition Candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya appeared first on 51�Թ�.

President Lukashenko can rely on the state apparatus and the security forces, whose loyalty stems in part from fear of prosecution under a new leader. Lukashenko himself is determined to avoid the fate of leaders like Kurmanbek Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan and Viktor Yanukovych of Ukraine, who were driven into exile following “color revolutions.”

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This stalemate is replicated at the international level. While the European Union refuses to recognize the result of the presidential election, the Kremlin regards Lukashenko as the legitimately elected leader. Moscow refuses to talk with the Coordination Council founded by the opposition presidential candidate, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. The EU, for its part, interacts mainly with representatives of the protest movement because Minsk flatly rejects mediation initiatives from the West.

Currently, only Russia regards Lukashenko’s announcement of constitutional reform and early elections as a path out of the political crisis. All other actors dismiss his constitutional initiative as merely an attempt to gain time.

Constitutional Reform as a Starting Point

In fact, a constitutional reform could offer a solution. But it would have to be flanked by confidence-building measures and guarantees. The following aspects should be considered:

• An end to all forms of violence and repression against peaceful demonstrators; no prosecutions for protest-related offenses
• Release of all political prisoners, give an option of return for all exiles and deportees; reinstatement of persons dismissed from state employment
• Convocation of a constitutional assembly integrating all relevant political and social groups
• Constitutional reform to be completed within a maximum of 12 months
• Parallel reform of the electoral code to ensure a transparent election process and appointment of a new Central Election Commission
• Free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in accordance with criteria set by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The specific details of such a roadmap would have to be clarified in dialogue between the current state leadership and the Coordination Council, with the possibility of both sides agreeing to involve additional societal actors. Mechanisms would be needed to ensure observance.

In this regard, granting all state actors an amnesty would be key. At the same time, acts of violence and repression occurring in the past weeks would need to be documented by an independent body. On the model of the truth and reconciliation commissions employed elsewhere, a reappraisal of recent history could lay the groundwork for a moderated process — also involving the churches — to overcome the divisions in society. It would also preserve the possibility of later prosecution if the roadmap was not followed.

What the EU Could Do

The European Union could support such a process by suspending the implementation of sanctions as long as the implementation of the roadmap is proceeding. It should also prepare a phased plan to support reforms, the economy and civil society; certain aspects would be implemented immediately, with full implementation following the conclusion of the constitutional reform and new elections.

But the Belarusian actors must be fully in charge of preparing and realizing such a roadmap. International institutions should restrict themselves to advising, upon request, on procedural matters. Such a function could for example be assumed by members of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.

Russia might potentially see benefits in such a scenario. The Kremlin’s backing for Lukashenko risks fostering anti-Russian sentiment in ����������ܲ�’ traditionally pro-Russian society. In the current situation, an extensive integration agreement would be a risky venture for Moscow. Massive Russian subsidies would be needed to cushion the deep economic crisis emerging in Belarus.

Moreover, parts of Russian society could respond negatively if Moscow were to intervene politically, economically and possibly even militarily in Belarus. Conversely, an orderly transformation would allow Moscow to minimize such costs. But that would presuppose the Kremlin factoring societies into its calculations.

This approach would demand substantial concessions from all sides. But the alternative — in the absence of dialogue and compromise — is long-term political instability with a growing risk of violent escalation.

The European Union should therefore use all available channels of communication to encourage a negotiated solution. It should refrain from supporting Baltic and Polish initiatives to treat Tsikhanouskaya as the legitimately elected president of Belarus. That would contradict its approach of not recognizing the election result. It would also exacerbate the risk of transforming a genuinely domestic crisis into a geopolitical conflict.

*[This article was originally  by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Belarus: Is There a Way Out of the Crisis? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In formal terms, the two countries form a “union state” and an economic and defense community. Belarus is Moscow’s closest ally and a linchpin for Russian neighborhood policy. For two decades, Russia has funded and subsidized ����������ܲ�’ state and economy. This has become a high price for a complicated relationship, as Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko consistently — and successfully — spurns Russian attempts to deepen integration.

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Heading a joint state in Moscow had been raised as an option for keeping Russian President Vladimir Putin in power after 2024. Lukashenko was less than enthusiastic and turned, as always in moments of tension with Moscow, to the European Union. That variant is off the table, now that the amended Russian Constitution permits Putin two more terms in the Kremlin.

A Lack of Distance

Despite growing political differences, Moscow continues to support Lukashenko through his latest domestic political travails. Official figures put his share of the presidential vote at 80%. The candidate of the united opposition, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, had just 10%, according to the Central Election Commission. Opposition exit polls paint a very different picture, with some showing the proportions exactly inverted.

Since the announcement of the results on August 9, the country has seen ongoing mass demonstrations, to which the security forces have responded with brutality. Nevertheless, President Putin congratulated Lukashenko on his “victory” as expected.

The Russian political discourse pays very close attention to developments in Belarus, reflecting a persistent post-imperial lack of distance to its sovereign neighbors. Looking at the Russian discussion, one might forget that there actually is a border between Russia and Belarus, much as was the case following the Ukrainian presidential election in 2019.

Another reason for this closeness lies in the similarity of the political systems. Both are aging autocracies that are out of touch with the societies they rule and suffer rapidly evaporating legitimacy. The economic crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic is tangibly accelerating these processes in both states.

The Russian state media tend to play down the significance of the events and push a geopolitical interpretation in which the protesters are a minority controlled by hostile Western actors. They would not exist without Western support, it is asserted. The objective of Western policy is said to be reducing Russian influence in the region and, ultimately, “regime change” in Moscow. In other words, the issue is not liberty but geopolitical rivalry.

In this understanding, the trouble in Minsk is just the latest in a long series of Western plots against Russia — following the 2014 Euromaidan in Ukraine and the “color revolutions” of the early 2000s. The needs of Belarusian society are completely ignored.

��ܲ�������’s independent media, on the other hand, seek to present a realistic picture, concentrating on developments within Belarus and Lukashenko’s loss of public legitimacy. Belarus is also treated as a template for ��ܲ�������’s own political future. Comparisons are frequently drawn with the ongoing protests in Khabarovsk, with speculation whether Minsk 2020 might be Moscow 2024.

Russian Intervention?

Foreign policy analysts in Moscow do not believe that Tsikhanouskaya can expect Western support. The European Union is divided, they note, weakened by COVID-19 and preoccupied with internal matters, while the United States is generally incapable of coherent foreign policy action. The regime will weather the storm, they believe, but emerge from it weakened.

This, in turn, will increase Lukashenko’s dependency on Moscow. Regime-loyal and more critical foreign policy experts alike concur that Russia will ultimately profit from the situation in Minsk without itself having to intervene politically or militarily.

The coming days will tell whether that assumption is correct. The regime in Minsk may have lost touch with the realities of Belarusian society, but it has good prospects of survival as long as the state apparatus backs Lukashenko and Russia maintains its support.

But if the unrest grows to paralyze the country, a Russian intervention cannot be excluded. The costs would be enormous, in view of the pandemic and the economic crisis. And an intervention could also harm the Kremlin domestically, where it has its own legitimacy problems. On the other hand, it would not be the first time Moscow chose geopolitics and great power bravado over economic and political reason. And ��ܲ�������’s rulers are still happy to ride roughshod over society, both at home and in Belarus.

The EU cannot overlook the massive election fraud and the brutality of the security forces against unarmed demonstrators. It should back the demand for new elections, offer mediation and impose additional sanctions if the regime refuses to alter its current stance. But in the process, it should do everything it can to preserve contacts within Belarusian society. Clear communication with Moscow is vital, both to float possible solutions and to lay out the costs of intervention. There is no need to fear a quarrel — the EU has been in a conflict with Russia for a long time already.

*[This article was originally by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post How Russia Views the Election Aftermath in Belarus appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Here is today’s 3D definition:

Invincible:

A quality that includes the idea of untouchable, invulnerable, immune and applied for long periods of time to despots, powerful oligarchs, blackmailers and more generally the very rich, who while theoretically accountable before the law can afford legal teams capable of parrying all threats

Contextual Note

The case of Belarus stands out in an international landscape at a moment of history in which the populations of many nations are now prone to protest every government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Times describes Lukashenko as “fighting for his political life, besieged by protests across his country and a tsunami of international criticism.”&�Բ�����;

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No leader is truly invincible. But no recognized means exist for wresting power from a leader who controls the military, especially in a nation such as Belarus whose population has never had any serious expectations of democratic elections being anything more than a public ritual to confirm the existing power structure.

Anna Romandash, writing for 51�Թ�, described the depth of a crisis that goes far deeper than protests over election results or the government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. “However, the events leading up to the election demonstrated that some big changes were taking place in Belarus,” Romandash writes. The Ukrainian journalist adds that “the level of popular dissatisfaction has reached its all-time high, with people becoming increasingly disillusioned with the regime and its handling of the many crises facing Belarus.”&�Բ�����;

The author’s pessimistic conclusion that “with the resources at his disposal, Lukashenko can remain in power unless both domestic and external pressure are applied equally strongly and consistently” is sadly but undoubtedly true. In particular, it is difficult to imagine what kind of external pressure — from the West, Russia or both combined — might unseat Lukashenko.

In more ways than one, this illustrates the dilemma facing almost all nations across the globe, one brought into focus by the pandemic. The presence of an unprecedented, uncontrollable threat to public health has highlighted other often more local contradictions the populations of many nations are faced with. The frustration with increasing levels of economic and sanitary uncertainty has provoked multiple reactions among those who feel themselves the victims of forces that appear devoid of accountability. This inevitably leads to the discrediting and destabilizing of all forms of existing authority.

In some places — the US, France, the UK, for example — the deeper issue may be racial inequality and police brutality. In many nations across the globe, the growing inequality of wealth and income associated with the manifest arrogance of the ruling classes on every continent may be close to reaching a breaking point. In other places, it may be the visibly growing threat to the climate itself provoking ever-increasing numbers of natural disasters in many regions. 

This year has proved special. With all the other trends augmenting the tensions within national borders, the local mishandling of a global pandemic by so many different governments represents the straw that is breaking multiple camels’ backs.

The reasons not just for contesting authority but for professing a deep lack of belief in its pretension to govern have been present for some time. The yellow vest movement in France, whose effects have not been erased though circumstances have halted its dynamics, represents one obvious indicator. Four years of deep political uncertainty in the UK over Brexit is another. And Donald Trump’s imposed cultural chaos is yet another. 

The global crisis is real and profound because it entails a growing disaffection with the ideals associated with democracy and representation. Disorder will only grow, which means that the response to disorder will become more and more violent, as we are seeing today. Thanks to technology and massive investment in military equipment, governments have the means to repress practically any amount of uprising. But at some point, they run the risk of discovering the populations they supposedly govern are themselves ungovernable. What that tipping point will look like nobody knows.

In Belarus, the that “the level of brutality is shocking and new. Protesters and often passers-by have been targeted by people clad in black, wearing balaclavas and with no insignia or uniform.” These are the same tactics President Trump deployed in Portland to control peaceful demonstrations. Short of the utter collapse of the global economy, this may indicate what much of urban life will be like in the next few years.

Historical Note

The Guardian to the historical specificity of Belarus among the nations of Eastern Europe formerly controlled by the Soviet Union. The British journal describes ����������ܲ�’ system of government as an “idiosyncratic form of autocracy” and alludes to the very real “vulnerability of Lukashenko’s hold over a country seen by neighbouring Russia as a strategic buffer against Nato and the European Union.”&�Բ�����;

Predictably, Russia supported Alexander Lukashenko’s claim that the protests are due to foreign meddling. But Russia’s support of an ally in the resistance to European incursion may be far from absolute. According to The Moscow Times, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed his commitment to “retaining a stable domestic political situation in Belarus.” 

Russian readers will have to decide whether “stable” means defending the existing regime or seeking an original political solution to a problem that has become seriously unstable. Russian news outlets have reported on the clashes but mostly avoided showing sympathy for one side or the other.

This contrasts with the attitude expressed by Komsomolskaya Pravda. The pro-Kremlin tabloid recognized that the official election results probable fraud. It went further, accusing Lukashenko of insulting the people. And far from comforting the president’s right to hold onto power, it acknowledged his vulnerability. “The president of Belarus, guarding his ‘80%’ with bayonets, will face difficulties. He has to find a way to explain what happened on Aug. 9,” the Russian newspaper reports.

The Wall Street Journal wasted no time by directly Putin of seizing “an opportunity to reestablish [��ܲ�������’s] influence in Belarus by shoring up Mr. Lukashenko after an unprecedented wave of protests following Sunday’s vote.” This is undoubtedly true, but the historical context is far from simple. In the very recent past, as Mitch Prothero in an article for Business Insider, Lukashenko has demonstrated an attitude of defiance with regard to Russia. He accused Putin of interfering in the elections and even of sending 33 mercenaries to Minsk, who were arrested only days before the vote.

Prothero explains that “Lukashenko’s long-standing ability to play the European Union to its west and Russia to its east off one another to bring in international assistance has increasingly irritated Putin.” Contradicting The Wall Street Journal, which wants its readers to believe it has a hotline to Putin’s mind, Porthero quotes these thoughts of a NATO official: “It’s not a great situation in general but doubly dangerous because nobody can say for sure what Putin will do.” The official added this pertinent remark: “This is a normal crisis for a dictator like him. What’s unusual is Russia’s confused position.”

In many ways, this typifies the problem the West has with Eastern Europe, whether the bone of contention is Ukraine, Crimea, Belarus or even the nations such as Hungary and Slovakia that are now part of the European Union. Westerners simply lack the psychological insight required to understand the complex experience and worldview of the people who formerly lived under governments that were part of the Soviet bloc. 

Even in the absence of the political and ideological conditions that defined the Cold War, the West insists on maintaining what amounts to a cold war reading of history. It wants everything to be reduced to a simple choice between good and evil, freedom and authoritarian control, the supposed ideals of the capitalist West and the cynicism of the authoritarian (even if no longer communist) East. But even the authority of that hitherto comfortable and well-defended ideological position has now become destabilized.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Belarus Is Not a Unique Case appeared first on 51�Թ�.