At the commencement of the 2016 conflict, retired Major General Mark MacCarley received an unexpected opportunity to measure the capabilities of the Armenian/Artsakh forces responding to the Azerbaijan incursion. His observations, interviews with senior Armenian and Artsakh military and political leaders, and subsequent research resulted in the formation of the non-profit educational organization called the American Armenian National Security Institute (). Its mission is to study the country’s warfighting doctrine and tactics and give constructive input to its Army leadership. This effort helps the Army counter Russian military influence and prepares Armenian forces to prevail in future conflicts.

My trip to Armenia as a politician (2016)

I retired from the US Army in 2015 and traveled to Armenia on April 1, 2016. Accompanied by a prominent member of the American Armenian community, I went to attempt to understand the Armenian culture and economy. I come from Glendale, California, a mid-sized suburb of Los Angeles County that is home to nearly 125,000 first-generation Armenians.

Major General (Ret) Mark MacCarley, Major General (Ret) Edward F. Dorman and Colonel (Ret) James Robinette showing respects at the Armenian Genocide Monument. Photo by Appo Jabarian.

When we began our journey to the Armenian capital of Yerevan, the Armenia–Azerbaijan War had not yet started. Although armed clashes between the two sides had sporadically erupted since 1992, after Armenia successfully supported Artsakh’s war of liberation from Azerbaijan, there was a long-standing ceasefire in place. This was monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) , a non-governmental organization specifically chartered to resolve territorial and ethnic disputes between Armenia/Artsakh and Azerbaijan. This Commission consisted of representatives of the US, France and Russia. After 34 years of seemingly endless and futile negotiations, however, the Minsk Commission had not resolved any material issues separating the sparring parties.

A couple hours after I checked into our hotel in Yerevan, I received a call from the aide-de-camp to Lieutenant General Seyran Ohanyan, then-Minister of Defense of the Armenian Armed Forces. The aide-de-camp asked if I would meet with General Ohanyan as soon as possible. Literally, at that very moment, hostilities between Armenia/Artsakh and Azerbaijan had just erupted. I was initially befuddled about the identity of the caller, but after making inquiries, I agreed to the meeting. To this day, I speculate that General Ohanyan somehow became aware of my entry into Armenia that morning and erroneously assumed that I represented the “spear point” of a desired US military assistance team to Armenia.

I met with General Ohanyan at the Armenian equivalent of the Pentagon. I informed him of my recent retirement from active service with the US Army. I told him that I did not represent the US government. General Ohanyan responded that he was aware that I had twice served as one of the US Army’s senior logisticians in Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan. He then asked me if I would be willing to proceed to Artsakh and assess the Armenian/Artsakh army’s logistics capabilities, as it was now engaged in defending the homeland against Azeri invaders. I agreed at no charge to his government.

I remember his concluding statement to me: “You American generals, you always fly where you need to go. But, I apologize, General MacCarley. We just don’t have aircraft to fly you to Stepanakert, the capital of Artsakh. You will have to drive east through Armenia and then through the Southern Caucasus Mountains to reach Stepanakert before nightfall.”

I hired a vehicle and engaged a one-person security detail. I left a few hours later on what proved to be a challenging journey over a nearly impassable 125-mile pockmarked road to Artsakh, the epicenter of the conflict. I arrived just behind an OSCE delegation that sought to broker a ceasefire between the combatants but ultimately failed to do so. I went directly to meet the chief of staff of the Artsakh Army. As expected, he was fully preoccupied with directing defensive operations against the attacking Azeri forces.

We discussed the current situation on the battlefield. I addressed the mission given to me by General Ohanyan. The chief of staff agreed that this requested assessment might prove valuable to him as well. He wanted to know if his army had sufficient capability to sustain combat operations over a period longer than a week. That is, he wanted to know whether his army would have the required means and resources to provide its front-line soldiers with the necessities of war: food, water, ammunition, weapons, medical supplies, spare parts, fortification materials and major weapons systems, such as tanks and artillery pieces.

With the chief of staff’s concurrence, I headed to the field to conduct my assessment. Upon my return four days later, the war was over. Then-Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev had arrived in Stepanakert on April 4 and brokered a between the two militaries, with no loss of Artsakh to Azerbaijan. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan had been Soviet client states until 1991.

Major General (Ret) Scott L. Efflandt and Major General (Ret) Mark MacCarley looking out of an Armenian Army bunker at the border with Azerbaijan. Photo by Appo Jabarian.

When I came back, I assured the chief of staff that from what I saw, the Artsakh and Armenian soldiers were the most valorous, committed, dedicated and selfless fighters one could want in an army. But as a military logistician, some things concerned me: There was an insufficient number of ground transportation vehicles and significant problems with ammunition, fuel and spare parts resupply. I had also seen remnants of drones — far less sophisticated than those employed in the subsequent 2020 conflict — that the Azeris were using advantageously against Armenian/Artsakh forces in this 2016 war.

The army even had challenges with such simple things as “field feeding.” Battlefield catering doesn’t sound significant to a war effort, unless you’re a soldier who has fought for hours without access to food or water. I saw homemade meals being delivered to the front lines by women from the local villages. While this is commendable and patriotic, it is not the most efficient and expedient way to feed hungry soldiers in combat.

Upon my return to Yerevan from Artsakh, I met with General Ohanyan and the chief of staff for the President of the Republic of Armenia. I opined that the Armenia/Artsakh Army had resorted to a Soviet Russian model of static positional defense in lieu of emphasizing maneuver, breakout and penetration. This long-standing tactic had worked extraordinarily well for the Soviets in World War II but needed to be upgraded to meet current threats and emerging military technologies. I also commented that neither Armenia nor Artsakh had developed a robust defense industrial base to produce weapons organically. Almost all armaments were imported. I observed that neither the Armenian nor the Artsakh Armies had prepositioned the necessary logistical support in sufficient quantities to sustain any long-term, high-intensity conflict.

Mother Armenia, Yerevan’s symbol of Armenian perseverance. Photo by Appo Jabarian.

To successfully wage war in the 21st century, an army has to be able to fight in all domains: land, sea, air, space and the cyber environment. It needs the capability to supply and resupply its forces at any moment under the contested conditions of intense combat. The Armenian Artsakh Army could not expect victory if the majority of its forces fought in fixed positions, resembling World War I trench lines. I suggested the military leaders of Artsakh and Armenia consider contacting NATO and the US militaries and asking for advisors to teach the Armenians Western tactics, techniques and logistics procedures. I concluded that warfare had changed over the last seven decades and Armenia/Artsakh should seek to adopt these advances in tactics and armament.

When I returned home to the US, I made a few speeches about my 2016 trip to Veterans’ posts and local Armenian American outreach organizations. I did not focus any more energy on the Armenian Artsakh problem at that time.

My return trip as a journalist (2021)

In September 2020, Azerbaijan again attacked Artsakh in the , reclaiming for itself most of Artsakh, including its Armenian enclaves. I attempted to return to Armenia and Artsakh in October to assess what went wrong for their armies. However, I was unable to enter the country due to a shortage of flights, COVID-19 and the Armenian government’s decision to bar foreigners from transiting into Artsakh, which was once again the epicenter of the conflict.

I couldn’t help but speculate that the Armenia/Artsakh forces had not learned from the tactical and strategic issues I had identified in 2016. This 2020 war was characterized by Azerbaijan’s adroit use of drones and tactical missiles against Armenian static positions, while simultaneously waging a cyber campaign to disrupt Armenian/Artsakh’s communications and network operations. Neither Armenia nor Artsakh had established a robust combat logistics supply chain to sustain the fight.

Armenian soldiers defending against possible border incursions. Photo by Appo Jabarian.

A few months later, I found a way to return to Armenia and Artsakh by securing press credentials. I was accompanied by Armenian American investigative reporter Appo Jabarian, publisher of USA Armenian Life .

As the name suggests, the 44-Day War after 44 days of intense fighting, when Russian President Vladimir Putin stepped in and directed the two sides to put down their weapons. Putin forced Armenia/Artsakh to cede four-fifths of Artsakh to Azerbaijan. In exchange, the hostilities would be terminated and the Russian forces would be deployed in Armenia and Artsakh to keep the peace with Azerbaijan.

Russia also committed to policing the vehicular corridor, called the , between Armenia and Stepanakert. This two-lane road constituted the sole lifeline for transporting all goods, including food, fuel, weapons and medical supplies, to the over 150,000 Armenians inhabiting Artsakh. Artsakh’s airport had long been closed due to Azeri threats to shoot down any incoming or outgoing aircraft. There was no railroad network nor any navigable waterway to support the transit of people and goods to this contested region.

I recruited some help to accompany me on this new trip. Jabarian came, of course. Retired Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, PhD, a professor of Defense and Foreign Policy at Wesleyan College, joined me. And my son Aaron MacCarley, a documentary filmmaker, came as well. Together, we embarked on an investigative and educational journey to see what remained of Artsakh and how its armed forces had fared in the fight.

We arrived in Armenia in August 2021. As journalists, we were afforded access to some civilian and military representatives of the Armenian government. At my request, a senior member of the Armenian Army met me and agreed to discreetly help my team and me enter Artsakh over the Lachin Corridor. He said that we would be the first Western journalists to transit the Corridor since the end of the 44-Day War.

Indeed, we pushed off to Stepanakert the next day. Our journey was uneventful as we were escorted by the chief of staff to the President of Artsakh. Upon arriving in Stepanakert, we had the opportunity to interview Artsakh President Arayik Harutyunyan. After some casual conversation, he described his own recent experiences leading the Artsakh Army in the field against Azerbaijan. He criticized the US and France, both signatories to the Minsk Convention, for their collective failure to take any direct action or provide any material support to Artsakh and Armenia during the war. He said such support might have positively influenced the outcome of the war for the Armenian people.

From left to right: Colonel (Ret) Robert M. Cassidy, Appo Jabarian, Major General (Ret) Mark MacCarley, Artsakh President Arayik Harutyunyan and Artsakh President Chief of Staff General Hyusnunts. Photo by Appo Jabarian.

We did not respond to such criticisms about the alleged failure of the US and its NATO allies to send military and humanitarian aid to Armenia and Artsakh. We were journalists, not diplomats. At the president’s invitation, however, we did take the opportunity to visit the accessible sites of several vicious battles between his forces and those of Azerbaijan. We sat down with a good number of veterans of the 44-Day War and heard their stories and their opinions about why this 2020 War was lost.

After two days in Artsakh, we began our return journey to Yerevan, but not without incident. When we first entered Artsakh via the Lachin Corridor, we had received an official escort from the Artsakh chief of staff who maintained a cooperative relationship with the Russian security forces there. On exit, however, we were all by ourselves, notwithstanding the chief of staff’s promise to contact Russian border officials to allow us safe passage.

For a trip that was supposed to take no more than two hours, it took us over seven to travel the 24 miles back to Armenia from Artsakh. We were confronted and challenged by Russian border guards at every checkpoint. They insisted on detaining us, sometimes for up to an hour, to determine whether we had committed immigration violations — entering Artsakh without papers.  The engagements with the Russian guards ultimately proved benign. But I will never forget how the young Russian soldiers stationed at several of the checkpoints would rest their Kalashnikov assault rifles on the side door window frame of our vehicle, muzzles aimed at our driver’s torso.

My reflection as a writer (2024)

Our journalistic mission to Artsakh resulted in some articles we penned and a YouTube that we produced for our Western subscribers. But we made something of a splash in Armenia. The story of our transit through the Lachin Corridor checkpoints and meeting with President Harutyunyan circulated in local newspapers. I repeatedly stressed that it was an honor for me to execute this mission, which might improve the Armenian armed forces. If that is the outcome of my two journeys to Artsakh, then my efforts in the face of some risk and mildly difficult conditions were justified.

Jabarian’s photos capture the culture and excitement we experienced. Armenia and Artsakh are fascinating places. Sadly, Azerbaijan overran Artsakh in 2023, although a still exists. I hope that Armenia develops greater defensive strategies so it can endure against future Azeri threats.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post I Made Two Journeys to Artsakh in Response to Azerbaijan’s Invasion of Armenia’s Ancestral Homeland appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The geopolitical tug-of-war in the South Caucasus

The collapse of the USSR in 1991 triggered a scramble for solutions to anticipated economic hardship and instability among the newly independent republics. Thus, the former Soviet states rushed to establish regional cooperation initiatives. Some of the most prominent are:

— (CSTO), established in 1992 as the Collective Security Treaty.

— (EAEU), proposed in 1994.

— (GUAM), founded in 1997.

— (CIS), formed immediately after the USSR’s dissolution in 1991.

Russia, which styles itself as the USSR’s heir, scrambled to maintain influence over the scattered republics. It exerted control through Moscow-dominated organizations like the EAEU and CSTO. However, Russia’s approach, prioritizing its own interests over those of member states, created tension. The recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh exemplifies this perfectly.

Related Reading

How Azerbaijan Found Victory, and Armenia Defeat, in Nagorno-Karabakh

Armenia attempted a balancing act for years. It participated in most Russian initiatives and fostered Armenia–Russia ties while simultaneously courting the West, the EU and France. This tightrope walk inevitably led to friction with Russia and strained their diplomatic relationship. The consequence has been a closer Russia–Azerbaijan bond. The episode also pushed Azerbaijan away from the West, who sided with Armenia (possibly calculating it would be easier to separate Armenia from Russia’s influence).

Armenia’s persistent efforts to escape Russia’s influence seem to have triggered a proxy punishment. Russia’s peacekeeping force deliberately remained inert during Azerbaijan’s capture of the disputed territory. Armenia Russia for the deterioration of the situation and consequently its participation in the CSTO. Armenian officials, disillusioned by Russia’s response to the conflict, are actively considering a full withdrawal from the treaty. They now recognize the need to their security options.

In 2006, Georgia’s parliament unanimously for NATO membership. Russia responded with a 2008 supporting the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The attack froze Russia–Georgia relations and made Georgia a haven for Russian dissidents. It was a punishment for Georgia’s westward tilt or Russia’s last resort to control its former CIS partner.

The West’s gambit in weakening Russia’s grip

All the countries in the South Caucasus, Russia’s southern bulwark due to geography and politics, were once firmly within Moscow’s sphere of influence. The US and Europe are trying to chip away at Russia’s alliance system. History reveals the more successful strategist so far. The Ukraine invasion, dividing the world for similar reasons, has further weakened Russia’s grip. Republics uncomfortable with Russia’s course, or fearing they’re next, are ripe for the picking.

The 2019 RAND advocated for the US to exploit existing tensions in the South Caucasus to weaken Russia’s influence. The report proposed two options: pushing Georgia and Azerbaijan towards NATO or persuading Armenia to break ties with Russia. The US partially pursued the first option, and Armenia’s disillusionment with Russia suggests progress on the second. RAND predicted this would force Russia to withdraw military forces. However, Armenia’s signed agreements the unilateral removal of peacekeepers until 2044.

The West, beyond offering moral support — which doesn’t win back lost territory — couldn’t and didn’t provide tangible military aid to Armenia. The West is eager for the South Caucasus to break free from Russia. However, centuries-old ties don’t vanish overnight. Direct involvement by the US or EU risks escalating tensions with Russia, especially considering the already volatile situation in Ukraine.

Instead, Azerbaijan’s continued pressure, seizing more Armenian land, achieves the West’s goals indirectly. With Russia’s security guarantees unreliable, a weakened Armenia is forced to seek alternative solutions. Ironically, these options may lie with Russia’s ideological rivals, despite the unlikelihood of such an alliance.

The West’s inaction towards Armenia might be deliberate. Pre-conflict, the US grappled with solutions that wouldn’t antagonize any party. Now, the situation thrusts a choice upon it. Without intervention, Armenia inches closer to the West, further complicating relations with Russia; Armenia suffers, but politics is a ruthless game.

EU for Georgia and Armenia is a long shot. The EU is already overstreched to incorporte the nearer-by Moldova and Montenegro. Concrete promises, beyond cooperation networks, are unlikely. The potential costs of expansion outweigh the benefits, especially for a troubled Armenia squeezed between regional powers. The US strategy, on the other hand, seems effective: Armenia distances itself from Russia. Diplomatic support and expressions of concern position it as an ally without heavy resource investment, beyond Blinken’s . Perhaps only Azerbaijani overreach, grabbing more than it can handle, would force intervention from Russia or the West.

The US wants to incentivize Georgia to fully return to its NATO aspirations and to encourage Armenia to close down the Russian on its territory. This would force Russia to shift significant resources and troops to its Southern Military District.

Finally, Turkey plays a critical role. Without it, the West can’t pull these countries away from Russia. Turkey offers the only access point to the West for the South Caucasus. This gives it a powerful position with a lot of leverage.

Secondary benefits exist as well. Azerbaijan was initially the most promising nation in the region. It could have provided intelligence (against Iran) and access to Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves. However, Azerbaijan’s strong ties to Turkey make it uninterested in closer cooperation with the US.

Russia’s waning power in the South Caucasus

Historically, Armenia and Georgia served as crucial strongholds for Russia. They still maintain close economic and other ties. Russia is actively working to retain influence in the region. Georgian Airways’ of direct flights to Russia in May 2023 exemplifies it. Additionally, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has the US of backing revolution attempts in Georgia (2020 and 2023) and Ukrainization as a threat to his country.

Last month, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin boasted of growing trade relations and predicted even stronger ties. While the Russian public remained skeptical, Armenia’s historical dependence on Russian trade, coupled with its weakened position after the conflict and lack of Western support, left Pashinyan with few options. The security portion of their meeting, however, remained shrouded in secrecy.

By defying Russia, Georgia and Armenia have become like fortified towers facing inward: the closer to the West, the more threatened Russia feels. Russia’s heavy-handed and master-slave approach only exacerbates the situation. Forced to find new allies, it struggles to replace the economic and geographic importance of its former friends.

The simmering Ukrainian conflict fuels a full-blown diplomatic war in the South Caucasus. Clinging to aggression instead of compromise is a dead end, considering Russia’s historical context of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Pashinyan’s meeting with Putin could be a temporary olive branch to regain Armenia’s loyalty, or a cynical exploitation of its weakness. Armenia’s lack of alternatives makes it vulnerable.

Western officials are also courting other countries, particularly Kazakhstan. However, Kazakhstan’s stronger ties and fewer tensions with Russia make it a tougher target. So, the West is on weaker, dependent countries like Kyrgyzstan and those already distancing themselves from Russia, like Georgia and Armenia. This confirms analysts’ predictions: The Soviet Union shell is crumbling around Russia, leaving the strength of its sphere of influence uncertain. Relentless Western pressure combined with Russia’s hardline approach and outdated dominance will require a significant change if Moscow is to hold on.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Breaking Free From the Bear’s Grip in the Caucasus appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Kazakhstan is pushing for peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This two-pronged effort aims to solidify Kazakhstan’s position as a regional leader while unlocking economic benefits. A peace deal would not only boost trade between the warring nations, but also pave the way for the trade route — a strategic path that conveniently runs through Kazakhstan. By facilitating peace, Kazakhstan hopes to loosen Russia’s grip on the region and forge stronger ties with other nations.

Astana and Yerevan turn a new page in south Caucasus relations

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers in Almaty for talks aimed at a lasting peace between the longtime South Caucasus rivals. Tokayev offered to mediate after his first official to Armenia on April 15. However, these negotiations occur amidst growing street in Yerevan against a demarcation deal, with Baku aiming to solidify gains from last year’s swift offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Astana and Yerevan, partners in various regional organizations, haven’t had a presidential visit in five years. Tokayev’s trip to Armenia a turning point. Relations soured in recent years because Astana backed Baku in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This harsh protests in Armenia against then-Kazakh President Nazarbayev in 2016, forcing him to his planned visit. With the region’s situation changing, the current leaders are seeking a fresh start.

Economic cooperation and investment took center stage during the discussions. Both leaders pushed to expand trade. Tokayev pledged to significantly increase Kazakh exports to Armenia, for $350 million — a huge jump from the reported $33.4 million this year. Road transport boomed in 2023, with a in volume compared to 2022 (6,936 tons vs. 5,748 tons). To smooth operations between Astana, Almaty, Shymkent and Yerevan, the leaders amended and ratified a 2006 on international road transport. Tokayev further praised Armenia’s efforts to restore transit connections in the South Caucasus and endorsed Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s initiative, which aims to improve communication channels between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey.

Armenia is actively distancing itself from past alliances. Pashinyan’s recent of the (CSTO) and the of the Eurasian Economic Union under Russia’s leadership signal a clear shift in Armenia’s foreign policy. Furthermore, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine significantly impacted Armenia’s recalibration. With the Kremlin preoccupied with Ukraine, Armenia sees a window of opportunity to pursue new alliances without immediate Russian pressure. Kazakhstan’s of Russia, alongside its ties to Baku and Ankara, shows a strategic move for its own interests in the shifting region.This situation offers mutual benefits for both Armenia and Kazakhstan.

The EU and Central Asia forge a new trade route

On April 15, Tokayev and Pashinyan vowed to deepen Caspian ties and fast-track the Middle Corridor. This is critical. Before the Ukraine war, 86% of Europe-China land went through Russia’s Northern Route. Western sanctions its appeal. The EU greenlit the construction of a . This cable will carry energy from Azerbaijan and Georgia all the way to Hungary, Romania and the rest of Europe. Moreover, the EU seeks to break free from Russian dependence and champions the Middle Corridor, a new Central Asian route.

Kazakhstan positions itself as a key player on the Middle Corridor, mirroring the ancient route from China to Europe. Astana recognizes the abundant opportunities this presents and numerous EU leaders have to the capital with high-profile visits..

The EU is pushing for stronger ties between the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s oil and uranium exports are a boon to the EU. Kazakhstan as the world’s leading producer and exporter of raw uranium, supplying over 21% of the EU’s nuclear energy needs. Central Asia aligns perfectly with the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative, a major project focused on improving port and rail infrastructure. The EU strategically itself in the region and views the Middle Corridor as a crucial route for infrastructure development.

The South Caucasus and Central Asia, sharing a two-century history, have the potential to form a formidable regional bloc to address contemporary uncertainties. South Caucasus and Central Asian nations are forging their own foreign policy paths, independent of external powers. While regional differences exist, a trend towards regional cooperation is emerging. Brawley Benson that Azerbaijan’s President, Ilham Aliyev, has actively strengthened ties with Central Asia’s Turkic states, indicating a strategy to diversify foreign partnerships. Kazakhstan holds a special place within the Turkic world for Aliyev, akin to a favored cousin. 

The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) twelve global middle powers, with Kazakhstan standing out. A central player in Central Asia, Kazakhstan leverages its abundant resources and serves as a vital link in the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan pursues a multi-vector foreign policy, strengthening partnerships for mutual cooperation. However, the region faces instability and external shocks. The Black Sea-Kazakhstan corridor risks disruption from escalating West-China competition. The Ukraine conflict adds another layer of uncertainty, as a Russian victory could hinder development of a rival economic corridor.

Divided rather than united, the eight states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia risk becoming entangled in rivalries. This vulnerability empowers assertive global powers. To counter this, the region must prioritize cooperation over competition. Embracing reconciliation can foster unity and strengthen their position in the face of global challenges.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Why Is Kazakhstan Making Forays in the Caucasus? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

In 1991, the Soviet Union fell as well. Since then, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been at odds with each other over Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan. Until two months ago, Armenians lived in Nagorno-Karabakh, an area within Azerbaijan. Azeris still live in Nakhichevan, an area within Armenia that borders Iran and Turkey. Yes, this sounds complicated but so are most imperial hangovers.

On September 19, Azerbaijan a large-scale military offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh. This autonomous ethnic Armenian enclave called itself the Republic of Artsakh. Within 24 hours, this so-called republic ceased to exist. Now, Azerbaijani military forces control Nagorno-Karabakh. The Artsakh Defense Army stands disbanded and people who lived here for centuries, if not millennia, have to Armenia.

David J. Scheffer of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) that Armenians are “experiencing ethnic cleansing at warp speed.” Others defend Azerbaijan and argue that its troops are only restoring sovereignty to territory that is rightfully theirs. Armenia had controlled Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding areas, all legally Azerbaijani territory, until a few years ago.

Azerbaijanis claim that this Armenian is voluntary. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev promised to protect Armenian civil rights in Nagorno-Karabakh, but fleeing Armenians persecution and massacre “after years of mutual distrust and open hatred between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”

A complicated history that goes back centuries

Over time, various empires have conquered and controlled the South Caucasus. Generals like Cyrus, Alexander and Pompey swept through this mountainous region. In antiquity, winning in the South Caucasus was essential if you wanted to be called “the Great.”

Why is the South Caucasus so important for the likes of Cyrus or Alexander the Great? Geography provides us the answer.

The South Caucasus lies at the crossroads of empires. To its west, lies the Mediterranean Sea which was the locus of the Macedonian, Roman and Ottoman empires. To its north and east (beyond the Caspian Sea), lie the great Eurasian grasslands that were once dominated by the Mongols and now by the Russians. To the south of the South Caucasus lie the Tigris and Euphrates rivers — historically known as Mesopotamia — and the Iranian plateau that was the power base of the Persian Empire.

This mountainous region has been the meeting place for great empires and the battleground for great powers. Romans and Persians traded Armenia back and forth. Over the past five centuries, Safavid Persia, Ottoman Turkey and the Russian Empire have controlled different parts of this territory at different times. Their successor states still jostle over the South Caucasus today.

World War I was critical in forging modern South Caucasus. Tsarist Russia faced disastrous defeat. In 1917, a revolution erupted and Russian control of this region evaporated. Idealists forged the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, which disintegrated into Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia within five weeks. In this age of ethnic nationalism, a multiethnic state proved a bridge too far, especially for the fractious South Caucasus.

Like the Russians, the Ottomans fared poorly in World War I. Armenia took advantage of Ottoman weakness to take control over Nakhchivan. Rebellions by the local Muslim population followed but Armenia managed to retain control. In the case of Zangezur and Karabakh, Azerbaijan stood in Armenia’s way and both these young countries fought inconclusively. 

When World War I ended, the Ottoman Empire collapsed as well. Mustafa Kemal AtatĂĽrk set out to create a modern Turkish nation state. Out went a multiethnic empire, in came a more ethnically homogeneous nation. The Turks expelled the Greeks and the Armenians from this new state. Modern Turkey was built through ethnic cleansing, although the Ottomans had set the ball rolling with the Armenian Genocide in 1915.

Atatürk was rebelling against the peace settlement imposed by the victorious allies in 1920. The Treaty of Sèvres wrested the Arab and Greek portions of the Ottoman empire from Turkish control. The British and the French divvied up the Arab lands between themselves. Along with Italy, they also carved Turkey into spheres of influence. Atatürk defeated the occupying forces, scrapped the old treaty and negotiated the far more favorable 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.

The now largely forgotten Treaty of Sèvres provided for an independent Armenia. The idealistic Woodrow Wilson proposed that the US be the protector of this new Armenia. The 1920 treaty envisioned an Armenia larger than the one today. Sadly for Wilson and Armenia, the US turned isolationist at the end of the war. The US Senate withdrew from the League of Nations and torpedoed Wilson’s plans for Armenia.

While the US turned inward, the newly formed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), now better known as the Soviet Union, went back to its expansionist imperial Russian roots. As one of the authors explained in his earlier piece, the Soviet 11th Army took over the South Caucasus, including Armenia and Azerbaijan, in 1920 itself. The Treaty of Sèvres was stillborn.

For the next seven decades, Armenia and Azerbaijan were Soviet republics. Moscow drew their borders largely on ethnic lines. The USSR granted Zangezur to Armenia, Nakhchivan became an Azerbaijani exclave and Karabakh became an autonomous province within Azerbaijan. The Soviets dubbed Karabakh the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) because Nagorny Karabakh in Russian simply means the highlands of Karabakh.

The dormant Nagorno-Karabakh volcano explodes

By the late 1980s, the Soviet empire began disintegrating. The Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989. On December 31, 1991, the Soviet Union itself dissolved. Ethnic tensions held in check by communist repression erupted like a dormant volcano. 

In 1988, ethnic Armenians living in the NKAO their region be transferred from Soviet Azerbaijan to Soviet Armenia. Conflict exploded into all-out war when the Soviet Union collapsed. Fighting only ceased in 1994 and Armenia emerged as the winner. Armenian troops took control over Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent districts. Armenia now 20% of Azerbaijan. An estimated one million Azerbaijanis became refugees and internally displaced persons. Armenia did not have it all its own way though. About 300,000–500,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhchivan made their way to Armenia.

The end to war in 1994 did not lead to peace. Deadly incidents continued. Both sides used troops, special operations forces, artillery, other heavy weaponry and, more recently, drones. In April 2016, fighting broke out but stopped after just four days. Yet hundreds died on both sides. On the whole, an uneasy peace persisted until 2020.

During this uneasy peace, Armenia forged a security partnership with Russia while Azerbaijan developed a close relationship with Turkey. A shared Muslim faith and a common Turkic ethnic identity helped. Even though Armenia and Russia are part of the Oriental Orthodox Christian traditions, Moscow still sold weapons to Azerbaijan and played both sides.

Starting 2007, things changed dramatically. BP gas at “a Caspian-record depth of more than 7,300 meters” about 70 kilometers southeast of Baku. Flush with gas wealth, the balance of power began to shift in Azerbaijan’s favor in the 2010s. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey rejected Atatürk’s secular European identity and embraced a neo-Ottoman foreign policy. Erdoğan’s political Islam led to greater military support for Azerbaijan and Baku’s geostrategic position improved. More gas money and Turkish military support gave Azerbaijan the edge over Armenia in the latest edition of South Caucasus geopolitical chess.

In late 2020, Azerbaijan made its decisive move and succeeded in reclaiming much of the territory Armenia had occupied since 1994. The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War 44 days and left at least 6,500 dead. Azerbaijan was unable to break through the defenses of Artsakh and Russia brokered an uneasy truce. Nearly 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were to enforce the peace. These troops were deployed along the three-mile-wide Lachin corridor, the sole overland route connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.

The ceasefire agreement granted Azerbaijan control of Nagorno-Karabakh’s cultural capital, Shusha, which Armenians refer to as Shushi, and several other towns. Azerbaijan also gained surrounding Azeri territories that Armenians had held since 1994. Local Armenians got to retain control of the northern half of the region, along with Stepanakert, the capital of Artsakh. Future peace talks were to decide the final political status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijan grabs a historic opportunity with both hands

Needless to say, the peace did not hold. In December 2022, Azerbaijan closed off the Lachin corridor. The Russia-Ukraine War had broken out on February 24, 2022. The 2018 Velvet Revolution had ousted the Russia-friendly Republican Party that had been in power since 1999. After the revolution, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan took charge. Armenia began to extricate itself from the arms of Russia and started flirting with the US. This the Russian bear and earned Pashinyan’s Putin’s ire.

Azerbaijan had a once-in-many-generations opportunity and Baku seized it with glee. In December 2022, Azerbaijan violated the 2020 ceasefire agreement and closed off the Lachin corridor. This ten-month blockade denied 120,000 Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh food, fuel and medicine. Putin’s peacekeepers stood idly by and Artsakh’s fate hung in the balance.

By April, Armenians found themselves in a dire situation. Pashinyan dramatically Armenia’s claim to Nagorno-Karabakh in an effort to stop the long-running conflict. This failed to bring peace. On April 23, set up a checkpoint on the Lachin corridor, which was called “the road of life” for Artsakh. Neither Russian peacekeepers nor Western powers did much to help. By September, it was all over. Azerbaijan controlled all of Nagorno-Karabakh, Artsakh evaporated and Armenians fled to Armenia.

A little more than two weeks before Azerbaijan’s decisive move, Pashinyan had that “solely relying on Russia to guarantee its security was a strategic mistake.” History may judge his ill-judged statement as a historic blunder. Pashinyan turned to the West in general and the US in particular to guarantee Armenia’s safety. However, to paraphrase a Chinese proverb, the mountains were high and the emperor was faraway. The US had far too many pots on the boil to worry about Armenia.

Pashinyan forgot one simple fact: realpolitik is a rough game. The EU needs Azerbaijani gas after putting sanctions on Russia. In 2021, Europe imported 8 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas from Azerbaijan. This year, gas imports are expected to be 12 bcm and are on track to by next year. Clearly, gas supplies trump the unity of Christendom for the EU. Post-Brexit UK is in the money because of BP. So, Armenia can expect little help from a land that was once the realm of Richard the Lionheart.

Azerbaijan has also been able to win over Israel to its side. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 13% of Israel’s arms exports were for Azerbaijan in the 2017-2021 period. They comprised more than 60% of Azerbaijani arms imports and included drones, missiles, and mortars. Furthermore, the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) that 65% of Israel’s 2021 crude oil imports came from Azerbaijan.

Much more discreet than SIPRI and OEC figures are the close strategic collaboration between Israel and Azerbaijan for realpolitik reasons. Intelligence Online that Israeli military and intelligence contributed to Azerbaijan’s victory in Nagorno-Karabakh. Naturally, Israel has an ax to grind. Azeris comprise 16% of Iran’s population, three times the population of Azerbaijan. Although they have yet to rebel against Tehran, Azeris widespread discrimination despite being largely Shias. By backing Azerbaijan, Israel is winning over Azeris and could foment trouble in the future against Iran. More importantly, Israel’s elite organizations — Unit 8200, Mossad and Sayeret Matkal — reportedly use Azerbaijan as a base of operations against Iran. For Israel, Armenia is eminently expendable in the pursuit of its national security goals.

For the US, Azerbaijan is of vital national interest because it borders both Russia and Iran, two key enemies. Washington cannot displease Baku too much and push it into the arms of Russia. Despite a powerful Armenian American diaspora that has historically backed the Democrats, the Biden administration turned the Nelson’s eye to Azerbaijan’s actions and did not back Armenia.

In contrast, Turkey is backing Azerbaijan to the hilt. Less than a week after Azerbaijan’s victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, Aliyev Erdoğan in Nakhchivan. The two this victory and signed a deal for a gas pipeline. Erdoğan was “very pleased” to “connect Nakhchivan with the Turkish world.” Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan paralyzes NATO, which cannot support Armenia. Most Muslim countries in the nearby to the more distant , support Azerbaijan.

Poor Pashinyan is isolated. He has found himself with two not-very-useful friends: neighboring Iran and faraway India. Both are not powerful enough to stave off disaster for landlocked Armenia. Besides, the Israel-Hamas war raging has cast Armenia further into the shadows. No one is likely to act against further Azerbaijani aggression.

What happens next?

ErdoÄźan and Aliyev have clearly signaled that Nakhchivan is next on the menu. They fear that Armenia could do this 460,000 strong Azeri enclave what Azerbaijan did to the Armenian enclave in Nagorno-Karabakh. Ethnic cleansing is a game two can play and Azerbaijan must press home its advantage before the tide turns.

Therefore, Baku seeks the Zangezur corridor, a transport link through Armenia’s southernmost province Syunik to Nakhchivan. This landlocked Azerbaijani territory has a small border with Turkey and a much larger one with Iran. The former backs the Zangezur corridor while the latter opposes it. The descendants of the Ottomans and Safavids are clashing again in the South Caucasus. 

Under Erdoğan, Turkey aims to fire into the Organization of Turkic States, an attempt to bring together Turkic peoples all the way till Kazakhstan. Once Turkish horsemen dominated Central Asia. Today, Erdoğan is looking east and south, not west and north, to expand Turkey’s influence. Therefore, the Zangezur corridor is an opportunity to create a new trade route between Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and China.

Despite academics like Anna Ohanyan the Zangezur corridor a violation of Armenian sovereignty and a challenge to the global rules-based order, Yerevan and Baku are engaged in peace talks. On December 7, they agreed to exchange prisoners of war. After failed mediation by the EU, the US and Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are engaged in direct bilateral discussions. Yet mutual distrust is high and both sides are unlikely to come up with a lasting peace deal.

So far, Armenia has played a weak hand badly. Pashinyan has lost much of the goodwill he gained during the Velvet Revolution. Even before Azerbaijan’s conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh, Pashinyan’s popularity was precipitously. Now, many Armenians revile him as a weak and ineffective leader who has led the country to disastrous defeat.

Pashinyan has continued to offend Moscow by refusing to allow Russian troops to conduct military exercises and declining to attend an alliance summit. Armenia has also the Treaty of Rome that established the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC has issued an arrest warrant for Putin. By joining such an organization, Pashinyan is spitting in the tsar’s face and inviting further Russian wrath.

Notably, Armenia is economically on Russia. The country’s landlocked geography does not make things easy. Turkey lies west, Azerbaijan east, Georgia north and Iran south. Therefore, about 40% of Armenian exports make their way to Russia. Armenia depends on Russian grain, oil, gas and basic goods almost completely. Gazprom owns all of Armenia’s gas distribution infrastructure. The country depends on remittances from Armenians working in Russia. In 2022, $3.6 billion out of the total remittances of $5.1 billion came from Russia.

Armenia still remains a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, Commonwealth of Independent States and Eurasian Economic Union. Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War, the Armenian economy has become even more dependent on its Russian counterpart. Currently, Pashinyan is Russia, promising greater economic bloc cooperation but Putin is unlikely to give his rebellious satrap much of a break. Russia is grinding down Armenia into submission and will only relent when Pashinyan is no longer prime minister.

With little external support or internal legitimacy, Pashinyan is in no position to make peace. With Turkey’s help, Azerbaijan will put Armenia under duress and drive a hard bargain. If Pashinyan does not capitulate, Azerbaijani troops can drive home their advantage. This time, the conflict might draw Turkey and Iran into the fight. Russia will wait and watch but eventually intervene. Israel, NATO, the UK and the US might also find themselves sucked into this conflict. Yet again, the South Caucasus has become a powder keg but few are paying this region the attention it deserves.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post How Azerbaijan Found Victory, and Armenia Defeat, in Nagorno-Karabakh appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

On October 20, an author published a piece in 51łÔąĎ accusing Azerbaijan of “ethnic cleansing” in Karabakh. He achieves this by lifting Azerbaijan’s measures out of all historical context.

Related Reading

New Armenian Ethnic Cleansing Is Bad for the World

The author misses the mark repeatedly referring to damage to the norms and principles of international law without explaining exactly what rights and principles have been violated, and his groundless arguments attempt to conceal Armenia’s well-known breaches of international law.

This piece attempts to contextualize the history behind the conflict. Claims that Azerbaijan is committed to “ethnic cleansing” are not supported by the decades of past conflict in the region. 

Recognizing the history of Armenia’s illegal occupation of Azerbaijan

Between 1988 and 1994, during the first war, it was Armenia that illegally initiated the invasion of a significant portion of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized sovereign territory.

This invasion forcibly displaced the better part of a million people in Azerbaijan, about a quarter of whom were Azeris who left Armenia for Azerbaijan as a result of the war. The Azeri population there had inhabited the region for centuries.

Armenian forces committed atrocities and numerous war crimes against Azerbaijanis. This has been by third-party international organizations. Among the massive killings of Azerbaijanis by Armenian armed forces, the committed by Armenia stands as the largest single massacre throughout the entire conflict. On February 26, 1992, 613 Khojaly town residents, including 106 women, 63 children and 70 old men, were ambushed and brutally killed by Armenian forces. 

In 1993, the UN Security Council unequivocally condemned Armenia’s illegal military occupation and ethnic cleansing in four resolutions (numbers , , and ). These resolutions expressed full support for Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders. They demanded the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territories.

Armenia undermines Azerbaijan’s peace efforts

Unfortunately, for three decades Armenia continually ignored the rules-based international order. Armenia participated in negotiations in bad faith, its aim being only to maintain the status quo. Armenia intensified its aggressive military-political provocations, and Armenians even began to speak of claiming more territories under the of “new wars for new territories.”

This ultimately jeopardized the peace process and led to a new war in 2020. This time, Azerbaijan was victorious. As a result of the war, known to Azerbaijanis as the , Azerbaijan liberated its occupied lands and ensured the norms and principles of international law.

Despite three decades of devastation experienced by the people of Azerbaijan, the country launched the peace initiative immediately after the trilateral of November 10, 2020. Azerbaijan actively promoted the idea of normalization of relations between the two countries and the peace process.

Azerbaijan has taken measures to carry out large-scale restoration and construction work in the liberated territories as well as facilitated the reintegration of Armenian residents living in the Karabakh region into our society.

Throughout the past three years, Armenia did not fulfill the obligation it took in the trilateral statement to remove more than illegal armed forces. Azerbaijan also had reason to suspect Armenia of continuing to violate the agreement by providing funds and weapons to these armed forces. In one case, Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General’s Office put several alleged criminals on a for smuggling firearms, ammunition, explosives and other military equipment from Armenia into Karabakh.

Ignoring the warnings of Azerbaijan at various levels and platforms, the illegal Armenian armed forces in the sovereign territories of Azerbaijan increased their provocations. This came to a head when a landmine killed 4 police officers and two civilians in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan continues to urge stabilization in the Karabakh area

In response to military instigations and subversive acts by illegally present armed Armenian forces, the armed forces of Azerbaijan launched local counter-terror measures on September 19–20. These measures were aimed exclusively at neutralizing the imminent threat posed to the safety and security of Azerbaijani civilian and military personnel. This act fully aligned with Azerbaijan’s sovereign right to self-defense as enshrined in the UN Charter. 

Despite the groundless “ethnic cleansing” and “mass displacement” narratives of the Armenian side, no facts have been revealed to prove the existence of losses among the civilian population. Reports of the UN that visited Karabakh noted “no damage to civilian public infrastructure, including hospitals, schools and housing, or to cultural and religious structures” in the areas it witnessed and “did not come across any reports – neither from the local population interviewed nor from the interlocutors – of incidences of violence against civilians following the latest local anti-terrorism measures.” So, the ethnic Armenians of Karabakh left on their own accord.

Unlike monoethnic Armenia, Azerbaijan is a multiethnic and multi-religious country. It ensures that all its citizens enjoy their rights as safeguarded by applicable international law. Azerbaijan has declared on multiple occasions that the ethnic Armenians residing in the Karabakh region are welcome to be part of this multicultural model. Therefore, the accusation that Azerbaijan had carried out “ethnic cleansing” is baseless.

Azerbaijan is committed to the normalization of relations between the two countries, as well as the reintegration of Armenian residents of the Karabakh region. Against the backdrop of these promising conditions, Azerbaijan calls upon Armenia to demonstrate a constructive position in the peace process, and to understand the realities in the region properly.

Armenia must finally recognize that there is no alternative to peace and cooperation in the region.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Azerbaijan Fought for Security, not Ethnicity, in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

In Slovakia, the Russia-leaning Robert Fico has bounced back in the most recent elections to form a coalition government. In contrast to the previous Slovak government, which was a generous supporter of Kyiv, Fico has not to send a single bullet to Ukraine.

On the other side of the Atlantic, in a last-minute bill to avert a US government shutdown, assistance to Ukraine was pointedly axed. The Biden administration insists that it will follow through on its promises of military assistance. But critics of this aid see the stopgap funding bill as a sign that Congress will no longer authorize blank-check assistance to Kyiv.

Meanwhile, on the ground, Russia has managed to thwart any major Ukrainian military breakthrough in the south of the country. Although Ukraine has made some incremental progress in regaining territory, especially in the Zaporizhzhia region, Russian fortifications have so far prevented a dramatic surge to the sea that would split occupation forces down the middle. Winter is not far off, and with it comes a pause in any offensives involving hardware like tanks, along with an intensification of Russian efforts, via aerial bombing, to take out Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

It might seem odd at this moment to discuss Russia’s declining geopolitical power. But in the larger context, regardless of political vicissitudes and something approximating stalemate on the ground in Ukraine, Russia is losing influence and position. Even if it ultimately prevails in Ukraine — in the sense of holding on to the territory it currently occupies — it will have done so at the expense of its global power.

To use a chess analogy, Russia is attempting to protect a few pawns while putting its queen at risk.

Nagorno-Karabakh

Shortly before the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, voters in the Armenian-majority enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh passed a referendum calling for independence. Given that Nagorno-Karabakh was completely surrounded by Azerbaijan, the newly proclaimed Republic of Artsakh enjoyed a de facto but fragile existence. The break-up of the Soviet Union and subsequent wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan did little to boost Artsakh’s legitimacy. Although it received considerable support from Armenia, Artsakh obtained diplomatic recognition from only three states, none of them UN members: South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria.

These three entities resulted from Russia’s other frozen conflicts — in Georgia and Moldova — and they survive largely because of Kremlin support. So, too, has Russia sided with the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh and its primary backer, Armenia. Russian peacekeeping in the region focused until recently on maintaining the status quo of a largely Armenian island in the sea of Azerbaijan.

What might look like a religious standoff — with Muslim Azerbaijan and Turkey on one side, Christian Armenia and Russia on the other — is more about the geopolitical ambitions of the principal parties to the conflict. From the Kremlin’s point of view, frozen conflicts keep its neighbors preoccupied, unlikely to merit too much attention from the European Union and dependent on Russian peacekeeping services.

But this frozen conflict is no more.

In 2020, Azerbaijan launched a successful effort to push back Armenian forces in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s use of proved highly effective in the 44-day conflict. Russia brokered a ceasefire with unfavorable terms for Armenia, but the deal at least preserved some measure of autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh.

Then, last month, in a lightning attack that lasted only 24 hours, Azerbaijan took complete control of Nagorno-Karabakh. The president of the Republic of Artsakh that all state institutions will cease to exist at the beginning of next year. Over 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled the enclave rather than come under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan.

New Armenian Ethnic Cleansing Is Bad for the World

Two Russian peacekeepers were killed accidentally in the most recent fighting. Otherwise, Russia was noticeably absent from the conflict, which marked a significant departure from previous outbreaks of violence in the region. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan went so far as to complain about Russia’s failure to come to the defense of Nagorno-Karabakh. Disillusioned about Russia’s non-actions, Armenia from the Russian-led CSTO military alliance and invited US soldiers to participate in joint drills in the country.

But even before the latest turn of events, Armenia had been distancing itself from Russia. “We are not Russia’s ally in the war with Ukraine,” Pashinyan this summer. The Armenian leader could see the writing on the wall in terms of Russia’s waning commitment to its allies in the region. The Kremlin, meanwhile, saw less value in assisting a wavering ally.

This downward spiral of waning Russian interest and wavering Russian allies is visible elsewhere in the former Soviet space. Back in January 2022, before it invaded Ukraine proper, Russia helped the Kazakh government suppress an outbreak of protests over the cost of living. A mere six months later, Kazakhstan was also distancing itself from the Kremlin as it began to to the West and welcome Russians fleeing forced conscription. And when clashes last year between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, two close allies of the Kremlin, Russia didn’t step in to mediate the conflict.

All is not lost for Russia in its relations with its neighbors. Its ties with Georgia have , and the bond between Putin and Belarus strongman Alexander Lukashenko remains tight, with the latter even proposing three-way cooperation with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

However, prior to last year’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia had much greater influence in its “near abroad,” from the Caucasus to Central Asia. Putin thought that he could “kill the chicken to scare the monkey” by invading Ukraine and putting the fear of intervention into all the other neighboring countries. Instead, with the exception of Belarus and maybe Georgia, the former Soviet republics can easily see that not only has Russia failed to kill the chicken but it has sustained some significant scratches in return.

Worse, from the Kremlin perspective, Russia might have lost even more influence further from home.

The far abroad

To continue its fight in Ukraine, Russia doesn’t have a lot of places to turn for the military hardware it needs. It has some drones and surface-to-surface missiles from Iran. China gear like hundreds of thousands of bullet-proof vests and helmets, which are non-lethal but obviously useful on the battlefield. The Kremlin has approached countries like Myanmar and India to military exports that it now needs for its occupation army. It is even military hardware from the Wagner Group now that the private security service is being absorbed into the official military.

The need for basic supplies like has forced Russia to bring its tin can to Pyongyang’s door. Ordinarily, it’s North Korea that relies on Russian military supplies. The reversal of this relationship speaks volumes about Russia’s vulnerability. It also suggests that Russia just doesn’t have a lot of other places to go for what it needs.

Under Putin, Russia made a bid in the 2000s to become a great power that could, like China, compete against and also cooperate with the West. As part of that “great power” strategy, Putin strengthened relations with China to become part of the Belt and Road Initiative, expand regional military cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and build up institutions in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) pact. He sought to divide NATO against itself by forging working relationships with Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He solidified ties with key Middle East allies like Syria and Egypt. Numerous countries in Africa have relied on Russia for military assistance and, through the services of the Wagner Group, security personnel as well. In Latin America, Putin relied on allies in Cuba and Nicaragua while in Asia, North Korea and Myanmar could be counted on in a pinch.

What remains of this robust geopolitical position? The most authoritarian of Russia’s supporters have certainly closed ranks with the Kremlin, as Kim Jong Un’s eagerness to supply weaponry suggests. Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega has on his support of Russia and its war in Ukraine. Myanmar has from the Kremlin for its next elections (!). Bashar al-Assad has Russian talking points about the fight against “Nazis” in Ukraine.

But the consolidation of this authoritarian axis comes as Russian influence has declined among more powerful countries. Saudi Arabia pointedly Russia to a meeting organized with Ukraine on finding solutions to the conflict. India’s Narendra Modi Putin about the war, and Russian-Indian relations over the last year. African leaders have been over rising food and energy prices as a result of Russian actions in Ukraine, not to mention the that Putin delivered to a visiting delegation led by South Africa in June. The death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the break-up of the Wagner Group is also the more informal ties that Russia has forged with several African countries.

Obviously, too, Russia has lost whatever fringe influence it once had in Europe through its alliances with far-right political parties in Italy, Austria, and other countries. Today Russia is toxic, even for Putin’s former allies. In Italy, for instance, far-right leader Georgia Meloni has on Putin to move closer to Ukraine, NATO and the United States. Elections in Austria next year might bring the far-right Freedom Party to power again. Although it remains to the Kremlin, the party might very well pull a Meloni and jettison its ties to Putin once in power. Putin and Russia more generally are held in almost universal throughout Europe.

Economic sanctions have Russia’s participation in the global economy. The invasion of Ukraine nipped in the bud Putin’s to reduce Russia’s carbon footprint and play some kind of role in climate negotiations. Russia withdrew from the International Criminal Court in 2016 after the ICC criticized the annexation of Crimea, and Putin himself must now be careful when he travels abroad because of the outstanding ICC warrant for his arrest on charges of war crimes.

Instead of being more like China, a powerful global actor despite some conflicts with the United States and Europe, Russia is increasingly like North Korea: an isolated, inward-looking nuclear power with little influence beyond its borders.

Will the ripples spread inward?

The big question is whether Putin’s obsession with Ukraine will put at risk not just his country’s global power but the very territorial integrity of Russia itself. Ukraine has launched attacks on Russian cities and military installations. But they don’t pose much of a long-term risk, for Ukraine doesn’t covet any territory in Russia proper.

More destabilizing would be a campaign by a restive province to seek greater autonomy or even independence. The apparent popularity of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny in the southern realms around Rostov suggests that the greatest threat to Putin’s position comes not from within the Kremlin but from the provinces.

The most obvious threat comes from Chechnya. Current leader Ramzan Kadyrov is a close Putin loyalist who has sent thousands of his countrymen to fight in Ukraine. Despite this loyalty — or perhaps because of it — Chechnya operates like an autonomous state, with its own laws. In a recent video, Kadyrov praised his son for beating up a Russian prisoner accused of burning a Koran. Even a majority of Chechens, according to one , condemned the beating. The deal with Kadyrov keeps Chechnya within the Russian Federation but with such a degree of autonomy that It’s practically an independent state.

It’s a potentially volatile situation. Kadyrov could die (by natural causes or assassination). He could abruptly change his mind about his allegiance to Putin. It’s hard to gauge the popularity of independence in Chechnya, but even many of the soldiers fighting on Russia’s behalf in Ukraine for their next battle, a third war against the Kremlin. In the event of a political vacuum in the country, an exiled warlord , in an echo of Lenin’s arrival via sealed train car in St. Petersburg on the eve of the Russian revolution, and lead a third attempt at independence in 30-plus years.

Last September, broke out in another Muslim-majority area of Russia — Dagestan — where residents were furious at the disproportionate number of their children being recruited to fight in Ukraine. Like Chechnya, Dagestan has a history of separatist struggles. So do Ingushetia, Tatarstan, Mordovia, Kalmykia and Bashkiria. Putin attempted to quash these movements by replacing the federalism that Yeltsin instituted when Russia became independent from the Soviet Union with a centralized structure that has in turn created a great deal of in the regions.

What precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union was not so much the failures of economic reform or the opening up of debate within the intelligentsia via glasnost. It was the surge of nationalism in all the Soviet republics, as one after another challenged the federal center. Even the Russian republic, led by Boris Yeltsin, ultimately broke from the Soviet federation.

It would be a supreme irony if Vladimir Putin, who the dissolution of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” were to preside over a similar unraveling of Russia — and all because he tried to recolonize Ukraine.

[ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Outside Ukraine, Russia Is Now Losing Its Grip appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

While the history of the conflict goes back for centuries, its relevance for the West begins in 1994 following the collapse of the Soviet Union what is now known as the ended in April 1994 with a negotiated ceasefire between the Azeris and the indigenous ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh.  The ceasefire was followed by commitment from all parties to a mediated settlement under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The terms of that ceasefire were to freeze the line of contact that would leave just under 20% of what was Soviet Azerbaijan’s territory under control of the local Armenians who were supported by the Republic of Armenia, pending a negotiated settlement on self-governance status, resettlement of refugees, and any exchange of territories.

Make Sense of the Old and New Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict

From frozen conflict to ethnic cleansing

Within the OSCE framework, Azerbaijan and Armenia along with three mediators composed of the United States, France, and Russia, proceeded to conduct many rounds of negotiations over the next 27 years. The lack of substantive progress led the conflict to take on the ominous status of a “frozen conflict”, with occasional clashes along the line of contact.  In September 2020 the situation changed.  On September 27,2020 Azerbaijan launched a war in what became known as the or the second Karabakh war.  

Russia negotiated a ceasefire in November 2020, which was followed by nearly three years of clashes and blockades and an ineffective Russian peace-keeping mission. Azerbaijan justified the war as a resolution to the frozen conflict. It completed its conquest to take over Karabakh with a week-long campaign beginning on this year. At the conclusion of this crusade, Azerbaijan had established total control of the region of Karabakh and the expulsion of the entire Armenian population of 120,000 people.

The immediate consequence of the failure to respond to Azerbaijan’s rejection of its international commitments with the support of, a NATO member, and, a NATO partner, have been earth shattering. First, it is the complete eviction of all 120,000 remaining Armenians in the region that has been populated by ethnic Armenians for more than two millennia. Azerbaijan committed an ethnic cleansing within essentially one week. The speed of the events was such that the Western powers did not have time to issue reactions through their bureaucratic processes before the ethnic cleansing was complete. 

Moreover, the very public support of a NATO state and NATO partner made any Western intervention a minefield.  With Turkish troops directly involved and Israeli weapons on the front line, both of those states had the power to block most any coordinated effort from Western powers to react.  For the first time, Western-aligned states were explicitly on the side of undermining an international conflict resolution process. 

A terrible precedent for the future

The consequences of this profound failure to protect the rules-based international order will reverberate in generations to come. The September 2020 Azerbaijani military offensive against ethnic Armenians was executed summarily. Azerbaijan made no effort to seek international legitimation or had any concern that an international reaction would follow. The lack of Western response emboldened Russia to leverage the same pseudo-legalistic language used by Azerbaijan to legitimize its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. 

Russia did not drum up support for Armenians through the UN. It did not activate Russia’s own alliance structure under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This alliance of six post-Soviet states — Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan — formed in 2002 proved to be useless for Armenians. Russia did not even make a serious propaganda effort focused on the international community to identify a clear. In essence, Russia did not bother with a single step to legitimize its invasion. Even in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was done under the auspices of an intervention in a civil war, like the justification used by the United States for its engagement in.

Every setback to the legitimacy of the institutions the West relies upon to provide peace and order increases danger.  The biggest danger is that state actors start bypassing the international system to pursue their goals.  Rules-based orders give us predictability. They create a sandbox, which limits the realm of the possible. If things cannot be confined within that sandbox, then we are increasing volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). This VUCA world is dangerous in the age of nuclear weapons. 

The rise of VUCA at a time globalized economies upon which billions depend for food, water, fuel and basic goods, such unpredictability is frightening. The ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh is a humanitarian disaster. The fact that it has gone completely unopposed is a terrible precedent. Azerbaijan’s decision to wage war to resolve the frozen conflict sets an example for others that it will be nearly impossible to walk back without a unified front from the West. This precedent will continually be used to embolden the use of violence to resolve conflict, without regard to international norms and will make the entire world worse off in the process.

[The views expressed in this article are the authors and do not represent the views of the US Government or any company.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In August 2012, the convicted Azeri axe- murderer Ramil Safarov was transferred from Hungary to Azerbaijan. Despite Baku’s assurances of enforcing Safarov’s sentence, he immediately was pardoned upon his arrival. In 2004 senior lieutenant Safarov was participating in a NATO English course in Budapest and hacked an Armenian lieutenant Gurgen Margaryan with an axe to death while Margaryan was asleep. Safarov was jailed and sentenced to life imprisonment in Budapest in 2006.

It didn’t take long for the Azerbaijani government to support Safarov’s deed simply because he murdered an Armenian officer. He was rewarded and in return for his heroic action was freed, promoted to Major, granted an apartment in Baku, received a back pay for all eight and half years spent in jail in Budapest and was declared as a national hero.

Shortly after President Ilham Aliyev pardoned Ramil Safarov Armenia cut diplomatic relations with Hungary over Safarov’s affair. The Armenians in Armenia and across the world have protested against Safarov’s release condemning the Hungarian government’s decision and calling for justice.  European and American authorities sharply condemned Aliyev’s decision to pardon the murder and demanded a valid explanation from the Hungarian Government for the extradition. 

The pardon shocked the international community. In Azerbaijan the picture was just the opposite: it was a long-waited day of national celebration. The barbaric murderer was met and praised like a hero. Azerbaijan with its poor records of human rights didn’t choose the right path to promote the country’s image at international level. Understandably, each war results in increasing bilateral tensions and mutual hatred between nations. However, the means to foster hatred against Armenians have reached the top in Azerbaijan. Nationalism is set on daily agenda in this country. The hate based strategy operates efficiently and Safarov’s case is yet another manifestation of it. After all, it is an official policy in Azerbaijan that people with Armenian last names regardless of their citizenship are denied entry to Azerbaijan as a state policy. No Armenian is allowed to enter Azerbaijan.

In the capital city of Baku where thousands of Armenians used to live before the violent war culminations still the abandoned Armenian church stands, locked and without the dome cross. The cross was removed from the dome by the Azerbaijani authorities and the church became state property. Nothing is shared between Armenians and Azerbaijanis not even sports: some years ago Azerbaijan denied entry of Armenian soccer team with the pretext that ‘’Armenian national anthem should not be played on Azerbaijani soil’’.

Recently, the President of Azerbaijan announced that the world Armenians are Azerbaijan’s enemies and that current Armenian Republic lies on ‘’Azeri soil’’.  The fact that history order and geography is taught and presented differently in Azerbaijan is not news but perhaps some serious scientific books and ancient world maps should be considered while educating a whole nation, an entire country, Azerbaijan which only appeared on the World map in 1918. The country’s first face, President Ilham Aliyev should be accurate and deliberate while addressing his speech to his nation: hate speech and imaginary history will only delude and lead Azerbaijani nation to deadlock.

Towards pending road of peace

Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a bloody war over historically Armenian territory of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). Stalin’s plan to detach this territory from Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic and unify it with Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic aimed at advancing respective relations with Azerbaijan’s ethnically related powerful neighbor, Turkey.  The war broke out between two USSR members, Armenian SSR and Azerbaijani SSR, when the parliament of Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) voted in favor of reintegrating Nagorno-Karabakh back into Armenian SSR. This caused severe inter-ethnic clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis and the undeclared war started in 1988 which gained a new impetus after the fall of Soviet Union. The ceasefire was signed by both sides only after 6 years in 1994.  Presently, de-facto Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is under care of Republic of Armenia.

Little progress has been made on peace building process as there is no room left for mutual understanding and cooperation. All the international proposals of ‘’Confidence Building’’ UN program have been turned down by the Azerbaijani side. More importantly Azerbaijan has rejected withdrawal of snipers from frontlines. Finally, it refused to participate and provide its assistance in investigating border incidents.

The unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict is a sensitive one and the international community is in favor of giving peaceful solution to the land disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan as it bears a crucial geopolitical significance: this territory is an anchor for precious resources, strategic oil and gas pipelines and a hot zone of periodic ceasefire violations which can change the course of security dynamics and trigger regional instability with the possibility of engaging other ally actors such as Russia, Iran and Israel.

 With this step of spreading hatred and xenophobia against Armenians the Azerbaijani government shows that Azerbaijan is not ready for further peace talks but quite the reverse it is only interested in promoting ethnic hostility and calling for warfare in the region. Promoting hate and brutality against a particular nation happened to be one of the political tools utilized by Aliyev’s authoritarian regime to take away Azerbaijani people’s attention off domestic affairs and politics. Twenty one years gone by since Nagorno Karabakh declared it's independence from Azerbaijan. Distorted media news, controlled by the government that constantly spreads anti-Armenian propaganda undoubtedly generates anger and frustration among Azerbaijanis, thus helping the government conceal its imperfections and blame Armenians for their country’s poor socio-economic conditions, although oil-rich Azerbaijan could have offered far better life for its citizens.

The brutal axe-killer’s extradition and pardon will not assist in peace building process between two neighboring countries, Armenia and Azerbaijan; it will not only limit the possibilities of peace dialogue but also might raise the risk of a new war after the ceasefire of 1994.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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