This transformation has not emerged in isolation. This is not just the result of governance failures, but of historical grievances rooted in colonial legacies, the spread of jihadist ideology through regional conflicts, the repeated failure of external actors to adapt their strategies to local dynamics and of narrow geopolitical interests. The US, turning a blind eye to the security vacuum in Sahel, is making the same mistake it made in Afghanistan.

The colonial echoes

The Sahel region was colonized by France in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, significantly shaping its development. The French solely on resource extraction and exploitation, neglecting its governance. When they drew the borders of the Sahel, they drew them arbitrarily, dividing ethnic groups across different countries and weakening national cohesion.Ěý

After independence in 1960, frustration grew among nomadic and tribal groups as the already limited governance began to fail, marking the start of extremism and rebellion. This rebellion and violent tendencies escalated when the Sahel was hit by famine and (especially the 1968-73 drought), and escalated further in the 1980s, with issues such as banditry, kidnapping, extortion and the killing of French citizens.

The beginning of jihad in the SahelĚý

The Sahel region practiced moderate Sufi Islam, but the North African region soon saw the first signs of jihadi conflict — specifically the outbreak of the Algerian civil war in 1991, when the government out of fear that Islamist forces might gain power.Ěý

Islamist forces quickly capitalized on growing public disillusionment with the state, leading to the creation of radicalized armed groups. The military’s intervention and subsequent coup escalated the conflict into a civil war, creating a political vacuum that enabled Islamist groups to establish a foothold. 

Concurrently, in 1992, Osama Bin Laden relocated to Sudan, where he set up Al-Qaeda’s training camps and business operations. This move signaled Al-Qaeda’s growing interest in the region and its strategic potential. The of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania underscored how North and East Africa had become increasingly integrated into Al-Qaeda’s transnational agenda.

By 2007, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group had pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and rebranded itself as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (). From there, AQIM expanded southward into Mali and Niger, using smuggling and banditry to finance its terror activities. This southward shift gained further momentum after the 9/11 attacks, as the US-led war on terror displaced jihadist networks from the Middle East and South Asia, pushing them to seek new bases of operation in regions like the Sahel — where porous borders and unstable governments offered strategic opportunity.

As the mid-2000s approached, a distinct jihadist landscape had begun to take shape in the Sahel, one that would be further reinforced after the of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2011.

Expansion of the jihadi landscape

The fall of Gaddafi created a political and security vacuum that Al-Qaeda was quick to exploit, especially in Mali. With the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, significant of weapons spilled into the region.Ěý

Among those freed were Tuareg who had served as mercenaries under Gaddafi. These fighters later aligned with AQIM, strengthening Al-Qaeda. Their alliance was further shaped by the Tuaregs’ separatist desire for autonomy in Mali’s Azawad region, sparking a rebellion in 2012 that quickly took on a militant Islamist character.Ěý

By April that year, Islamist forces had seized control of key northern cities in Mali, marking a fresh surge in jihadist activity across the region.

Consolidation ofĚý the jihadist waveĚý

By 2013, Western governments began acknowledging the growing terrorist threat in the Sahel. France launched to oust jihadist groups from northern Mali. The mission succeeded in dislodging militants from major urban areas — but it pushed them deeper into the countryside and across national borders, allowing them to regroup and destabilize the region more.Ěý

France followed this with between 2014 and 2022, aimed at regional stabilization. But progress stalled. French troops encountered resistance not just from insurgents, but from local populations with deep-seated resentment linked to France’s . As these military interventions struggled to deliver long-term security, political instability, poverty and governance failures deepened, creating conditions that Islamist groups readily exploited to recruit and radicalize.

A dangerous convergence: jihadist unity and coups

ISIS made its into the Sahel in 2015, prompting a breakaway faction from AQIM to pledge allegiance and form the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Two years later, Al-Qaeda responded by consolidating its presence. AQIM merged with Ansar al-Dine and al-Mourabitoun to form Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a powerful group that is now the behind jihadist operations in the region.

The political environment further deteriorated from 2020 onwards, as swept through the Sahel, weakening already fragile governments. These conditions enabled ISGS and Al-Qaeda to entrench themselves further.Ěý

As criminal activities increased, these terror groups adopted banditry with jihadist motives, creating what is called “”, encouraging criminal groups to adopt jihadist ideologies and migrate into terrorism. This has significantly bolstered Al-Qaeda and ISIS’s presence in the Sahel in recent years.Ěý

The consequences have been staggering: in 2023, Sahel accounted for of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide, a number that grew to in 2024. Burkina Faso alone recorded fatalities in 2022, making it the world’s most terror-affected country.

Narrow geopolitics and limited attentionĚý

Africa has steadily become central to global geopolitics and geoeconomics, particularly due to its of rare earth minerals and gold. Yet, in the Sahel, these resources remain largely untapped, overshadowed by an entrenched security crisis and volatile political environment.Ěý

After France’s military withdrawal, the region saw the arrival of Russia’s , a private mercenary or paramilitary force. The Sahel’s military juntas welcomed Wagner for the short-term promise of security support and the political leverage it offered through alignment with Moscow. However, Wagner’s presence has not translated into lasting stability. Its activities have remained largely focused on securing Russian interests and gold mining operations, rather than providing a serious or coordinated response to the region’s security challenges.Ěý

Despite the presence of Russian forces and the persistence of jihadist activity, the United States has kept the Sahel at a strategic priority.

Washington has avoided deeper engagement, the absence of a direct or immediate national security threat. But a primary reason is that the US likely considers involvement in African conflicts risky, given its haunting past with the Somali crisis, where it faced one of its biggest failures: . But the operation failed due to overconfident and patterned operational planning with a lack of contingency and strong communication on the ground, none of which are unavoidable in future operations.ĚýĚý

During the 90s, Sahel did not emerge as a direct threat, and the US focus remained on security issues in East Africa and Al-Qaeda. 

However, the Sahel region has gradually become a direct threat to the US after the 2011 Libyan , and the threat increased greatly by 2017, when ISIS cadres in Africa gained strength. The 2017 Tongo Tongo in Niger, where ISGS fighters killed four US Special Forces soldiers, underscored the growing threat to US personnel in the region.Ěý

The apprehension was echoed by General , head of US Africa Command, who warned in 2024 that Sahel-based terrorist groups could develop the capacity to strike the US homeland if left unchecked.

While the US did maintain a surveillance and reconnaissance in Niger for some time, this was withdrawn in 2024, alongside France’s broader . The departure of Western forces, combined with Russia’s limited effectiveness, has left a fragile security landscape in which terror groups are once again finding space to operate.

A recurring blind spot in US counterterrorism

The United States’ counterterrorism strategy has repeatedly failed to anticipate the evolution of jihadist networks, particularly when they have emerged from outside conventional theaters of war.

The 1998 embassy bombings were orchestrated from Afghanistan, exploiting a blind spot in US regional threat assessments; the US grossly underestimated Al-Qaeda’s transnational reach. Similarly, during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s, the alignment between Algerian Islamist factions and Al-Qaeda to form a secret jihadist revolution in Africa went largely unacknowledged by US intelligence, despite clear that they were building contacts with the global terror network. In Somalia, the US once again the regional Islamist force, Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, while focusing on humanitarian operations. This misjudgment contributed to the emergence of Al-Shabaab, now a dominant Al-Qaeda affiliate in East Africa.Ěý

The list doesn’t end here; the US also failed to act when ideological convergence between jihadist groups and narcotics cartels grew in Colombia (a country with which it shares strong security cooperation on narcotics issues), which led to cartel bombings in 1998. A now sustains Al-Qaeda’s operations in the Sahel, with JNIM heavily depending on a drug smuggling network.Ěý

Yet, Washington’s strategic assessments have continued to downplay this growing narco-terror convergence.

The threat of resurgence is now common; the real danger is that terror groups are acquiring the capabilities necessary for transnational terror attacks. Without a shift in strategic posture — one that moves beyond narrow geopolitical interests and accounts for the full complexity of threats — another major wave of global jihadists may be inevitable.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Thirteen among the more than thirty countries that have formally expressed their interest in membership are now associated with BRICS+: four Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam), two Latin American countries (Cuba and Bolivia), three African countries (Algeria, Nigeria, Uganda), two Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) and two European countries (Belarus and NATO member Turkey). They were given the status of “partner states” in Kazan.

To say that the Americans are not enthusiastic about the appeal of this new global club would be an understatement. Should the success of the summit in Kazan be interpreted as a sign of the failure of their strategy to isolate Russia? Worse still, are we witnessing the beginning of the end of the American century?

In addition to the nine member states and thirteen partners, the summit was also attended by some representatives of countries whose presence was rather unexpected, such as the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister, the very Russophilic Alexander Vulin. However, it was the presence of UN Secretary-General Antonio Gutierres that caused outraged reactions, especially in Ukraine. “The UN Secretary-General declined Ukraine’s invitation to the first global peace summit in Switzerland. However, he has accepted the invitation of the war criminal Putin to Kazan,” hammered the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry.

It is true that Gutierres boycotted the BĂĽrgenstock meeting this spring. It is also legitimate to wonder whether a UN Secretary-General should shake hands with a person accused of war crimes, even if he is the president of a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin on March 17, 2023.

This juicy skewer of participants is notable for its heterogeneity. There are dictatorships and democracies, Muslim, Christian and secular countries, economic superpowers and failed nations; some have been characterized as rogue states. Are what we are witnessing merely an updated reiteration of that elastic non-aligned movement launched in the 1960s by Yugoslavia’s Prime Minister Josip Tito and Indian Jawaharlal Nehru, which encompassed two-thirds of the world but never achieved any real global influence? No, something else is happening here. In the space of sixty years, the balance of global power has clearly changed.

A motley but (almost) global group with growing influence

Antonio Gutierres is a realist. He understands how historically significant the bubbling events within the BRICS states are. He was in Kazan because it is important. To underline that point, consider a few figures. The nine countries now called BRICS+ account for more than half of the world’s population. Their combined gross national product is already greater than that of their rivals in the G7, the Western directorate comprising the US, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and the UK. The gap is likely to widen in the coming years, since the BRICS+ growth rate is around 5%, while Western economies are stagnating at 1–2% — and some, like Germany’s, are officially in a recession.

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Despite these new geo-economic realities, the international order established by the West after the World War II has been resistant to change. The UN Security Council will remain secure in the hands of its five permanent members — three Western states plus China and Russia — for a long time to come. However, the BRICS states are not seeking to change the United Nations Charter or create a parallel system to the United Nations. Rather, they are focusing on the economic and financial governance of the world.

Parallel to the founding of the United Nations, the victorious Western powers, at the Bretton Woods conference in 1945, created institutions designed to regulate world finance. The dollar became the world’s reserve currency, making every country vulnerable to US sanctions. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which provide financial assistance to countries in difficulty, are run like shareholder meetings, in which the US holds a decisive vote. Together with the other Western nations, they possess an absolute majority. It is these two pillars of Western power in the world that the BRICS states hope to compete with. But how?

It would be literally impossible to reform the international financial institutions in such a way as to reduce Western influence in them. However, they cannot prevent the creation of parallel systems of payment. The BRICS countries are thus working on three main tasks:

• A mechanism for processing international payments independent of SWIFT — from which Russia was excluded after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
• An intensification of trade that is invoiced in local currencies instead of dollars, in order to accelerate the “de-dollarization of the world.”
• A development bank that competes with the World Bank and finances infrastructure projects. There are currently 96 projects underway with a total volume of $32 billion.

Critics of the BRICS states doubt that they are able to really compete with the dollar. Despite a steady erosion, the greenback still accounts for 55% of the reserves of the national banks. And when it is replaced by other currencies, these tend to be Western currencies, with the notable exception of the Chinese renminbi. Nevertheless, the trend is clear and the potential of BRICS+ is there. The formation of alternative transportation corridors is part of the same strategy to break free from Western, i.e., American dependency.

Land routes vs. sea routes

In a globalized and interdependent world, the transport of goods represents a strategic dimension. From cars to cell phones, hardly any industrial activity exists that does not include and depend on an accumulation of natural resources and semi-finished products from all corners of the world. Over the last hundred years, goods have primarily been transported by sea. Today, sea freight accounts for 70% of world trade. You only have to look at a map of the US naval bases around the world to realize how important the sea lanes are to Washington’s power strategy. From the Sea of Japan to Malacca, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Panama, Rotterdam and New York, Washington’s ambition — sometimes supported by its British ally — to dominate the seas is obvious.

With its “Belt and Road” initiative, China has been trying for several years to develop land routes to, compete or at least complement the existing sea routes. It is therefore very revealing that one of the flagship projects highlighted in Kazan was the North–South Corridor, which will ultimately connect St. Petersburg with India, without passing through any Western-controlled areas. Is it worth remembering that India has become the largest importer of Russian oil products, despite the very audible gnashing of teeth in Washington?

What is Switzerland doing?

Between soft power and economic impact, the BRICS+ are redrawing the geopolitical map. Is Switzerland even aware of this probably irreversible development? Has it sought an invitation to Kazan?

The answer is yes, Swiss companies are well aware of the underlying forces shaping the world of tomorrow. This is why some, for example in the trade sector, are moving to Dubai. Yes, Switzerland’s State Secretariat for Economic Affairs is well aware of this. It wants to update our free trade with China. Switzerland is the only European country apart from Iceland to have concluded such an agreement. That is an advantage.

Unfortunately, the options chosen by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport have not been helpful. By running after the Americans, who have been losing all their wars for twenty years, weFO° Exclusive: Make Sense of BRICS Summit in Russia
have turned Russia against us and made China doubt our reliability. Moreover, for three quarters of the world Gaza has become a symbol of the moral bankruptcy of the West, including Switzerland. Is there still time to restore our credibility? Is this even possible with the current political cast running our affairs? These are the questions that every Swiss citizen must rightly ask themselves.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In the from 1954 to 1962, France committed unimaginable atrocities against Algerians in both Algeria and France. Algerians who cooperated with French forces were often captured and killed by their countrymen fighting for independence. Many escaped and sought asylum in France, where they were then put in camps and denied basic human rights and access to education. Those in Algeria fighting against the French were subject to horrific crimes such as systematic torture, which often resulted in deaths that were labeled as suicides.Ěý

In 1961, a year before Algeria gained independence, thousands of Algerians peacefully protested in Paris. In this event that became known as the , French police killed of the demonstrators, shooting some and throwing others into the river. The French government covered up such atrocities by censoring the media and destroying archival evidence.Ěý

On September 20, 2021, President Macron condemned the “massacre of Algerians in Paris.” He issued an apology to the Algerians who fought alongside the French forces and to the families of those whom the Algerians captured as traitors and killed during the fight for independence.  

Over the course of the conflict, the French colonization of Algeria is estimated to have cost up to Algerian lives. In 1962, an was finally reached calling for a cease-fire, and Algeria gained independence after 132 years of French rule.

The shaping of Algeria

For the last five hundred years, Algeria has had a turbulent past. Around the turn of the seventh century, first conquered the region today known as Algeria. At the time, it was home to an indigenous group called the Berbers, known for their bravery and independence. However, that conquest was short-lived, and upon a second attempt, the Arabs were defeated by a Berber warrior queen named .Ěý

In 705, the conquest finally succeeded. Arabs settled in the region and Berbers gradually became Muslims, adopting Arabic as their language. In , Berbers joined the Arabs in the conquest of , present-day Spain and Portugal.Ěý

In 742, the Muslim Berbers rebelled against Arab rule and succeeded. By 907, much of North Africa came under the control of the Fatimids, a Shia sect. Over time, local rulers began to follow Sunni Islam and from that event to the 15th century, the area lived in turmoil. 

Then, the Europeans arrived. In 1471, the colonization of Africa began with the Portuguese taking some of the Moroccan coastlines. In the early 16th century, Algeria came under the Ottoman Empire. 

Although Algeria was under the Ottomans, that did not stop colonists from attacking it. The French invaded Algeria in 1682, the Dutch in 1715, the Spanish in 1775 and the US in 1815, to name a few. In 1830, the French conquered Algeria and it eventually became a French colony. 

The colonization of Algeria

When the French invaded again in 1830, it took them nearly 20 years to conquer Algeria. The occupation was bloody and brutal, resulting in a substantial reduction in the local population. Some even consider the conquest genocide. 

As the French struggled to gain control, they deliberately killed, raped, tortured, and buried unarmed civilians alive. Out of a population of three million, French forces caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Algerians, some occurring as the result of disease and famine. Around civilians were kept in prison camps. French officer Lucien de Montagnac, who was sent to assist in the colonization effort, that the French must “annihilate all that will not crawl beneath our feet like dogs.”

The legacy of colonization in Algeria goes far beyond mass killings. The French stole religious endowments, restricted movement and confiscated fertile lands which they then gave to settlers. The French also plundered gold, iron, coal and other minerals, some of which are still in France.

Over the next century, France struggled to maintain control of Algeria. In 1911, a group of upper-class Muslims labeled themselves “” and demanded representation in the French National Assembly, which was duly declined. Not long after, when France began drafting Muslims to fight the Germans in WWI, many Algerian Muslims took up arms and resisted the law. In the following decades, tensions continued to boil over between Algerians and the French.

The Algerian War

By 1945, encouraged by the 1941 Atlantic Charter, Algerians demanded full independence. When Nazi Germany accepted defeat, Algerians gathered in large numbers to not only celebrate the fall of the Nazi regime but also to garner attention during the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. They wanted the delegates to know that Algeria existed and was ready to be an independent nation. In May, after the conference commenced, mass protests broke out in cities across Algeria.

Like all other mass protests, some violence occurred. The French reacted with aggression, and by the end of June had massacred several thousand Algerians. Many of those Algerians had fought side-by-side with France against Germany.

From their experience in 1945, Algerian patriots realized the only way to gain their freedom was through armed struggle. In 1954, unable to make progress, young Algerian patriots formed the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (). They tried to unite the Algerians to fight the French and liberate their country. The CRUA created the National Liberation Front (FLN) to direct the Algerian War of Independence, which in turn created the National Liberation Army (ALN). So began the Algerian War.Ěý

Protests continued throughout the country, and as France suppressed uprisings, violence broke out. French brutality angered more peaceful civilians to join the revolutionaries, and the movement grew. 

In 1958, France offered Algerian Muslims an opportunity to become equal with the French settlers. After so much bloodshed, it was too late, and revolutionaries rejected the offer and asked for independence. By March 1962, the French agreed to grant independence after the 132-year struggle.

Make wrongs right

Despite admitting their atrocities, the French maintain that they will not offer any “repentance or apologies.” To regain some respect, France could acknowledge, apologize and make reparations for the crimes against humanity they committed during colonial times. Importantly, reparation payments should go directly to victims and their descendants, not to the coffers of the Algerian government. To compensate for the ravages of colonization, the French could additionally allocate a sum for education and infrastructure. 

Support should also be offered by organizations like the UN. Despite its mission to support peace and security, the UN has consistently failed to stop genocide, prevent ethnic cleansing or sufficiently support victims such as those in Algeria. Consider the ongoing example of the innocent Palestinian men, women and children being butchered daily by US-backed Israel. From Cambodia to Sudan, the UN has let down countries and communities across the world. 

In the case of Algeria, the UN heard the cries but failed to provide justice. Even with denials and cover-ups, evidence of the French atrocities were overwhelming. To right these wrongs, a UN organized International Tribunal for Algeria (ITA) would be a good first start. Just as victims of the have been compensated, Algerians must also receive compensation.

While no sum of money can ever erase the suffering of Algerians, reparations are an important step. First, victims get justice. Second, poor countries and victims get valuable financial support. Third, they set an important precedent for holding colonizers accountable. France must take responsibility and action to rectify the country’s dark history in Algeria. 

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Meloni’s choice of Mattei was no accident. Many Italians, including Meloni, view North Africa as the natural place for Italy to extend its influence on the African continent. Meloni, however, is seeking to shun the legacy of colonialism in Africa. She has been of France, in particular, for pursuing policies in the continent that she characterizes as “neocolonial.”

The prime minister is attempting to open a new chapter for cross-Mediterranean relations, rejecting predatory impulses towards Africa and instead emulating Mattei, who built an alternative model based on cooperation between North Africa and Southern Europe. During the Cold War, Mattei helped to promote peace and stability between Algeria and Europe; Meloni hopes to repeat the feat.

Italians remember that in those decades, after their own experience of devastating war, it was the stability of energy supplies made the rebuilding of Italian industry possible. At the same time, they remember that the influx of Italian cash likewise helped North African countries win their own struggle for independence and establish stability afterwards.

Now, like then, Italy needs energy. Without Russia fueling its heavily gas-dependant grid, Italy must look for alternative solutions. North Africa is an obvious choice; in the first half of 2022, Algeria became Italy’s gas supplier, ousting Russia. Meloni’s visit was one of the first steps to establishing a more solid Italy–Algeria relationship.

Consequently, Meloni has launched the “,” which enlists Italian companies such as Eni, Enel, Snam and Terna to do the work of integrating with Algerian partners. Meloni hopes to transform Italy into an oil and gas hub, completely abandon Russian gas and replace it with both natural gas from Africa as well as liquefied natural gas (LNG) from sources like the United States..

How is Italy managing this era of scarcity?

Italy to phase 80% of Russian gas out by 2023 and 100% by 2024 or 2025, at the latest.

in his luminary Nuclear Commerce, Anis H. Bajrektarevic noted that “in an ever evolving and expanding world, there is a constant quest for both more energy and less external energy dependency. With the fossil fuels bound industry setting an alarming trend of negative ecological footprint, there is a clear and urgent must to predict and instruct on alternatives.” 

And indeed, after the Russian intervention in Ukraine, Europe and Italy had to change strategies. They imports of LNG by over 60% in 2022. Because of this, demand for LNG has reached colossal proportions, and prices are projected to remain steadily elevated in the coming years.

LNG needs to be processed back into a gaseous state in order to be used. Italy, which has not traditionally used a large amount of LNG, needs to build the infrastructure to make this possible. in In addition to the few preexisting regasification facilities Panigaglia, Livorno and Rovigo, new plants are being constructed. Snam has built one in with a total processing capacity of 5 billion cubic meters per year, equal to 7% of Italy’s requirements. It plans to open another in Ravenna in the third quarter of 2024. The Italian strategy is undoubtedly on track. These two LNG terminals will increase the country’s energetic flexibility.

After the cut in Russian natural gas supplies, Italy can count on supplies from Azerbaijan via Turkey thanks to the Trans-Adriatic pipeline. Azerbaijan currently supplies about 10% of Italy’s needs and could supply up to . And Italy can rely on Transmed, better known as the “Mattei pipeline,” too, which already connects Algeria to Italy and has a capacity of around cubic meters of gas.

Eni and Enel in Africa

Eni and Enel are both formerly public companies. After privatization, they continue to work closely with the Italian state. They have always guaranteed strategic continuity in relations with African countries and are the key to giving substance to the Mattei Plan.”

Eni has been present in since the mid-1950s and has projects in as many as 14 countries. It is a key player in the diversification of gas supplies, first and foremost thanks to its long-time relationship with Algeria’s Sonatrach.

But it’s not just Algeria. Another country Eni has an established relationship with is , where Eni has been present since 1954 through its subsidiary, Ieoc. In 2022, Eni produced almost of the gas produced in Egypt. From its plant in Damietta, it exports much of that gas — in the form of LNG — to Europe. Eni and Egypt are working together to exploit deposits in new areas such as the Nile Delta. Eni has also promoted new investments and projects intending to diversify gas source countries. A significant case in point is , a floating natural gas liquefaction plant off the coast of Mozambique. The plant has a capacity of 3.4 million tonnes of LNG.

Enel has been developing projects in Africa, too. It already operates , both wind and solar, from Morocco to Zambia and South Africa. It is building new green energy capacities in other countries, too, such as Ethiopia, where Enel has planned a photovoltaic plant in Metehara.

After the great chaos

The balance of the Mediterranean was disrupted in 2011, the year of the “Arab Spring” that upset many ruling classes. The movements took inspiration from Arab nationalism, the same tendency with which Mattei had worked in Algeria. After more than ten years, things have settled down, and a new phase can start. The relaunch of Italian action in the region is a positive step, but we must consider some pitfalls.

There are new players: China, Russia and Turkey all have footholds in the Arab Mediterranean as well. China, especially, has been money into the region. France too, of course, still holds substantial sway in Africa. In spite of this competition, Italy can still draw upon its tradition of friendly cooperation and move forward with its North African partners.

[ first published this piece.]

[ and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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What is the Backstory of Western Sahara?

Western Sahara is a stretch of desert territory along the Atlantic coast. It borders Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. From 1884 to 1976, Spain was the colonial ruler of Western Sahara, which was then known as Spanish Sahara. During the great wave of decolonization in the second half of the 20th century, the —a Sahrawi nationalist liberation movement—waged guerrilla war against Spain.

Following the campaign of pressure that the UN, Morocco, and the Polisario Front launched against Spain in the late 1960s Madrid to consider withdrawing from the region, given that it no longer anticipated a future in the area. Subsequently, in 1974, Spain signaled its withdrawal by plans for a referendum in which the Sahrawi people could determine the future of the territory, whether to be a part of Morocco or Mauritania or to obtain their independence. Morocco and Mauritania welcomed Spain’s decision. However, the UNSG Resolution 3292 suspending the referendum until a formal process for this could be determined. 

On October 16, 1975, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague that while there were legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and certain tribes in Western Sahara during the time of Spanish colonization, and there were rights connecting the Mauritanian entity to the territory of Western Sahara, there was no evidence of a territorial sovereignty link between the territory of Western Sahara and either the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. In response to the ruling, in 1975 King Hassan II of Morocco  for a peaceful mass demonstration in the form of a march into Western Sahara. The King sought to reaffirm Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the territory and called upon the Moroccan people to participate in the march. He emphasized that the march was the only way to regain control of Western Sahara.

Western Sahara is important for Morocco not only for sovereignty reasons but also for economic ones. It is rich in , a valuable fertilizer that secures the world’s food supply. This mineral is Morocco’s third largest export and brought the country $850 million in 2021. As a region along the Atlantic coast, Western Sahara is important for fishing, providing 75% of Morocco’s catches. Clearly, this region is of paramount to Rabat.

What Is Going on Now with Spain, Morocco and Algeria?

Therefore, Moroccan-Spanish ties turned when Spain admitted Polisario leader Brahim Ghali in April 2021 for medical treatment without officially telling Rabat. In 2022, Madrid agreed to support Rabat’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara, ending a year-long diplomatic crisis.

Spain’s change in policy has with Morocco after a year-long diplomatic spat. However, this move has infuriated Algeria, which an economic blockade on Spain in June 2022. This resulted in significant losses estimated at around $1 billion (€930 million) in the following seven months alone. Spanish Secretary of State for Trade Xiana Méndez Bértolo recently that, between June and November 2022, Spain’s exports were a mere $189.1 million (€176.2 million) to Algeria. In December 2022, Spanish exports to Algeria amounted to $11.81 million (€10.8 million), a fall of 84%. Spain’s position as an exporter to Algeria fell from second in 2021 to ninth in 2022.

This has hurt Spanish companies and businesses exporting to Algeria, especially in Valencia and Catalonia. These regions account for over 50% of to Algeria. In terms of sectors, enamelers and ceramic machinery manufacturers are facing significant negative impacts.The economic pain of this blockade has led the Spanish Ministry of Trade to the support of the European Commission. It has come up with a financial plan to support Spanish companies suffering from the blockade. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell to Algeria in March to resolve this crisis but the visit was .

Algeria Is Still Supplying Gas to Spain

Spain depends on Algeria for gas. Therefore, it is important for Madrid to maintain good relations with Algiers. Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune commented that “among all the Algerian statements, what matters to the Spanish state is the full guarantee of Spain’s supply of Algerian gas and the strict respect of the international contracts.” Algeria has assured Spain that it will continue to supply gas under any circumstances.

Spain gets much of its gas through the Medgaz pipeline from Algeria. According to Spanish reports, Madrid has recently turned to the US for gas. Many analysts speculate that Spain might be moving away from Algerian gas. Hence, Algeria decided not to escalate matters with Spain when it comes to supply of gas. Losing a lucrative export market would not be in Algerian economic interest.

Tensions between Spain and Algeria have occurred in the past but the two countries have always been able to achieve an accommodation. This time, things are different. Spain’s change of policy has touched a raw nerve and only a change in government might lead to the calming of the waters.

Algeria Strengthens Ties with Other Countries

As Spanish exports to Algeria have crashed, other countries such as Portugal and Italy have stepped in. In 2021, Portugal exports to Algeria totaled $241 million. The main products were uncoated paper, heating machinery, and acrylic hydrocarbons. Between February 2022 and February 2023, Portugal’s exports have increased by $384.6 million. The top exports to Algeria in February 2023 were vegetables, wood pulp, paper products, plastics and plastic goods, machinery, mechanical appliances and parts. 

Before the rupture in relations, Algeria preferred Spanish products. Sociedad Española Automóviles de Turismo (SEAT), a Spanish car manufacturer was active in Algeria. In 2018, SEAT strategic operations in Algeria. Now, Italian car company FIAT seems to be replacing SEAT. In March 2023, six carlines were launched in Algeria. In contrast, SEAT’s growth has suffered.

Italy and Algeria have good neighborly agreements. They are now deepening their strategic partnership. In January 2023, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni Algeria to launch her new Mediterranean policy in Algiers. It is well known that Italy wants to become an energy hub between Europe and the southern Mediterranean. The Russia-Ukraine War is causing an energy crisis in Europe, which is looking for alternative sources. This offers a great economic opportunity for both Italy and Algeria.

Both countries also signed  agreements relating to aerospace and pharmaceutical sectors. These agreements were not only about economics but also geopolitics. Italy sees Algeria as a vital actor in the Mediterranean region that can underpin regional stability. Algeria’s neighbors are facing turmoil. Libya is going through a civil war. Al Jazeera has Tunisia a “ticking time bomb.” The unsettled situation in North Africa makes Algeria critically important not only for Italy but also the European Union.

Is Morocco a Springboard for Spain Into Africa?

Spain has a growing interest in the Moroccan market. In 2022, Spanish exports to Morocco amounted to $12.9 billion (€11.748 billion) while Moroccan imports to Spain were $9.4 million (€8.6 million). Morocco lies just across the Strait of Gibraltar to the south of Spain. It is Spain’s closest neighbor in North Africa. Morocco is a natural trading partner where demand for Spanish goods and services is growing. Therefore, it makes sense for Spain to invest in closer relations with its southern neighbor.

Spanish President Pedro Sánchez Morocco in February. The two governments reached agreements on migration, tourism, trade and investment. Just as Italy is developing a strategic relationship with Algeria, Spain is betting on Morocco. Spanish companies are looking to expand in North Africa. Morocco could be a good base of operations for Spain. Given the fact that Spain’s relations with Algeria have taken a hit and other European rivals are stepping in, it makes sense for Madrid to cultivate Rabat. A closer relationship with Morocco makes both economic and geopolitical sense for Spain.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Algeria will enjoy a from oil and gas exports in 2022 despite not being able to offer some of its key customers such as France, Spain and Türkiye greater volumes than last year. Growing domestic consumption, encouraged by the Algeria’s domestic users of energy pay for electricity, is a key reason. Another reason is the lack of development of new gas fields over the past decade.

Algeria has a big opportunity

This is a time of opportunity for Algeria. Russia provided of Europe’s imports before President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24 this year. Since then, Europe has been scrambling to find new sources of gas after the drastic cut in supplies from Russia. Sadly, Algeria is not grabbing the opportunity to help reduce most of its northern neighbors’ dependence on Russian gas.

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A stated that if North African gas producers – Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia – were able to reduce gas from flaring, venting and leaking, Europe could, “within 12-24 months, start to substitute up to 15% of Russian gas via highly underutilized pipelines and liquefied Natural gas (LNG) terminals in the region.” Algerian officials have contested the statistics contained in a World Bank on which this report is based. It is also worth noting that the July-August of a respected energy publication notes that “Algeria delivered significant decreases in overall flaring per barrel of oil equivalent (BOE). The estimated reduction totalled 3 million tonnes of CO2 (which) marks a significant shift for a country where the norm has been a steady increase in flaring over the last decade.”

Further reducing flaring will certainly allow more gas to be produced in the future. For now, however, the more promising route is the fast track approach taken in the signed by Algeria’s state-owned oil company, Sonatrach, and Italy’s national oil company, ENI,. Italian technical teams have been flying in to work in existing gas fields where production can be increased within 12-24 months. Italy is the only European country benefiting from increases in gas deliveries from Algeria in 2022 thanks to the strengthening of relations between the two countries.

Gas production in Algeria has great potential. Many areas of this vast country have either not been explored or need re-exploration using more modern techniques. Developing a new gas field however takes between three to five years. So, it will take investment and time for Algeria to plug in the gap left by Russia.

Europe paying the price for bad energy policy

For the past two decades, Europe has pursued an energy policy which helps explain the current lack of gas worldwide. EU buyers fought hard to reduce the long-term gas contracts that had prevailed until then. Previously, Europeans signed contracts for 15-20 years with Sonatrach. Those long-term contracts offered security of supply and allowed the strategic development of new gas fields, both of which Europe now needs most urgently.

Another fact is worth recalling. Four decades ago, US President Ronald Regan Europe in general, and Germany in particular, to reduce dependence on Soviet gas. He argued in favor of alternative sources, notably Norway and Algeria. Europeans developed Norwegian resources but they argued that sources such as Algeria were no more reliable than Soviet gas. To be fair, Algeria mismanaged its energy sector under the 20-year presidency of Abdelaziz Bouteflika who was in charge from 1999 to 2019). Yet not all blame rests with Algeria. Europe played a part to ensure the current low levels of gas production.

Shift away from the dollar and North African geopolitics

According to well-informed sources in Algeria, Sonatrach has introduced a new clause into gas contracts with its foreign customers since last summer. It allows for a change in currency denomination in each contract, which both parties can alter every six months. The clause gives Algeria much greater control over its foreign policy, notably vis-Ă -vis the US dollar in which most oil and gas contracts are traditionally denominated.

This change reflects the growing wariness in Algeria and many other countries about the manner in which the US uses sanctions. Many believe that the US is too political in its use of sanctions. Algerian hard currency reached $46.5 billion in July and are expected to rise to $80 billion given rising gas prices.  Furthermore, Algeria’s already insignificant external debt has steadily since July 2020. 

Government finances might have improved but it continues to spend heavily on weapons purchases. It is the sixth largest importer of arms in the world and the largest in Africa. About 70% of Algeria’s weapons are sourced from . The rest come from Italy, France, Germany and China. Historically, Algeria has practiced a policy of non-alignment internationally. This might have been out of fashion for a generation but is part of the country’s DNA.

The geopolitics of gas have shifted significantly in the Western and Central Mediterranean over the past year. Escalating rivalry between Algeria and Morocco closed the Maghreb-Europe, which runs through Morocco and under the Straights of Gibraltar on November 1, 2021. It is in keeping with the acrimonious tit for tat actions that have characterized relations between the two North African countries for much of the past 50 years. 

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Fortunately, bad relations between the two neighbors are not likely to escalate into anything more serious. Morocco has its own economic and political difficulties and an Moroccan king is unlikely to want to deal with a serious crisis with his eastern neighbor. Similarly, Said Chengriha, the chief of staff of the Algerian army,  is a safe pair of hands whose main goal is to modernize the military while avoiding direct confrontations.

Spain’s diplomatic towards Morocco on the Western Sahara issue in March 2022 has soured political relations between Madrid and Algiers. However, it has not seriously impacted Spanish imports of Algerian gas. Flows of gas through the Medgas pipeline, which links Algeria directly with Spain, are currently running at an estimated 10.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas (bcm). Also, , Spain’s key importer, has reached an agreement with Sonatrach after tough negotiations. In fact, Spanish buyers of Algerian gas have settled a backlog of payments estimated at $7.5 billion with Sonatrach.

Italy becomes Europe’s new energy hub

North African energy links with Europe were somewhat redrawn when Italy signed a major contract with Algeria in November 2021. This redirected some Algerian gas exports to Italy. This contract envisages the throughput of Algerian gas via the TransMed pipeline increasing from 21 bcm in 2021 to 30 bcm in 2023. Current flows suggest the 30 bcm figure could be reached much sooner. ENI has become a privileged of Sonatrach. The $1.5 billion contract signed between the two companies includes projects to explore and develop new sources of gas as well as to produce hydrogen and electricity from renewable sources. 

Italy’s growing links with Algeria are turning the former into the Mediterranean’s new gas hub. Pipelines feed gas from Azerbaijan, Libya and Algeria to Italy’s southern shores and it is also importing growing volumes of LNG gas from Egypt. For Algeria to profit from its proximity to Italy, it needs to modernize the management of its energy sector, revise its industrial policy and reform its Jurassic age banking system. In other words, Algeria must welcome foreign investors and allow private Algerian companies to participate in the global economy.

[ first published this article and is a partner of 51łÔąĎ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The Unthinkable: War Returns to Europe

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The immediate answer is there are very few today outside of Russia itself, hence the large rise in gas prices witnessed lately. Over the medium term, however, Libya and Algeria have ample opportunity to increase their supplies to the EU.

Supplies From Libya and Algeria

Libya boasts proven gas reserves of 1,500 billion cubic meters (bcm). Its production is a modest 16 bcm. Algeria has 4,500 bcm of proven reserves and 20-25 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of unconventional gas reserves, the third-largest in the world after the United States and China (and Argentina whose proven reserves tie with Algeria). How much gas that could produce is anyone’s guess, but we are speaking of a figure in the tens of bcm.

Algeria today produces 90 bcm, of which 50 bcm were exported. Another feature of Algeria is the huge storage capacity — 60 bcm — of the Hassi R’Mel gas field, its oldest and largest compared with the EU’s storage capacity of 115 bcm.

Pierre Terzian, the founder of the French energy think-tank Petrostrategies, out that four underwater gas pipelines link these two producers directly to the European mainland: the first links Libyan gas fields with Italy; the second Algerian gas fields to Italy via Tunisia; the third Algerian gas fields to southern Spain; and the fourth the same gas fields to southern Spain via Morocco.

The latter has been closed since November 1, 2021, due to deteriorating relations between Algeria and Morocco, but this has not affected the supply of gas to the Iberian Peninsula. Algeria also has two major liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals, which adds flexibility to its export policy. Its exports to France and the United Kingdom are in LNG ships.

The leading cause of the current crisis is structural as, according to Terzian, EU domestic gas production has declined by 23% over the last 10 years and now covers only 42% of consumption, as compared with 53% in 2010. That decline is the result, in particular, of the closing of the giant Groningen gas field, which is well underway and will be completed by 2030.

Europe has done a lot to expand the gas transmission grid among EU countries, but some major gas peninsulas remain. In 2018, it was suggested that connections between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe needed developing. Spain boasts one-third of Europe’s LNG import capacity, much of it unused, and is connected to Algeria by two major pipelines that could be extended.

As Alan Riley and I four years ago, the “main barrier to opening up the Iberian energy market’s supply routes to the rest of the EU is the restricted route over the Franco-Spanish border. Only one 7-bcm gas line is available to carry gas northwards … The main blocking factor has been the political power of Electricité de France, which is seeking to protect the interests of the French nuclear industry.” An Iberian solution, we added, would not only “benefit France and Spain, but also Algeria, creating additional incentives to explore for new gas fields and maybe kick start a domestic renewables revolution,” which would encourage a switch in consumption from gas to solar in Algeria.

Germany, the Netherlands and Italy

Germany, for its part, has never put its money where its mouth is with regard to Algeria. In 1978, Ruhrgas (now absorbed in E.ON) signed a major contract to supply LNG to Germany. Germany never built the LNG terminal needed to get that contract off the ground. So far, it is the only major European country to have no LNG import terminals, although it can rely on existing facilities in the Netherlands and Belgium.

In 1978, the Netherlands also contracted to buy Algerian gas. Algeria dropped the contract in the early 1980s because of Germany’s refusal to go ahead. Later in the 1980s, Ruhrgas again expressed its interest in buying Algerian gas, but the price offered was too low and because Ruhrgas wanted to root the gas through France, which insisted on very high transit fees. By discarding Algerian gas, Germany has tied itself to Russian goodwill.

Italy, like Germany, a big importer of Russian gas, has positioned itself much more adroitly. In December 2021, Sonatrach, Algeria’s state oil and gas monopoly, increased the amount of gas pumped through the TransMed pipeline, which links Algeria to Italy via Tunisia and the Strait of Sicily at the request of its Italian customers. This followed a very successful state  by Italian President Sergio Mattarella to Algeria in early November. On February 27, Sonatrach  it could pump additional gas to Europe, but contingent on meeting current contractual commitments.

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Relations between the Italian energy company ENI and Sonatrach are historically close because of the important role played by the Italian company’s founder, Enrico Mattei, in advising the provisional government of the Republic of Algeria in its negotiations with France, which resulted in the independence of Algeria in July 1962.

The pursuit of very liberal energy policies since the turn of the century by the European Commission overturned the policies of long-term gas and LNG purchase contracts, which were the norm in internationally traded gas until then. Yet security of supply does not rest on such misguided liberalism. New gas reserves cannot be found, let alone gas fields brought into production if producers and European customers are, as Terzian points out, “at the mercy of prices determined by exchange platforms which have dubious liquidity (and can be influenced by major players).” This is an attitude, he adds, “that borders on the irresponsible.”

German energy policy has mightily contributed to the present crisis. It has blithely continued to shut down the country’s nuclear plants, increased its reliance on coal in the electricity sector and with that a consequent increase in carbon emissions.

Serious Dialogue

When considering Caspian gas as an alternative to Russian gas, I would add another country, Turkey, which has a very aggressive and independent policy as a key transit for gas. However, few observers would argue that such a solution would increase Europe’s security.

Engaging in serious long-term strategic dialogue with Algeria would provide Spain and the EU with leverage. This could help to build better relations between Algeria, Morocco and also the troubled area of the Sahel. When trying to understand the politics of different nations, following the money often offers a good guide. One might also follow the gas.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner organization of 51łÔąĎ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Not All Quiet on the Western Sahara Front

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The latest episode in this tense relationship between the North African nations took place in August when Algeria severed diplomatic with Morocco. The move came after a series of wildfires swept through the Amazigh-speaking Kabylie region in what Algeria claims was a covert Moroccan operation to bolster the MAK.

For Algeria, this was a delicate time for the government due to an economic crisis exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, political unrest since 2020, and the ill health and subsequent death of the country’s former leader, Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

Tension in the Maghreb

Algeria and Morocco have been antagonistic neighbors since their respective independence from the French. Border discord gave rise to a tenacious rivalry that worsened with the Western Sahara when Algeria became the main supporter of the Polisario Front. This unfinished conflict and the decades-long of the land border between Algeria and Morocco are the most tangible examples of the enmity that keeps the Maghreb divided.

Diplomatic spats and mutual accusations of instigating internal turmoil have been frequent. One area where the tense calm in bilateral relations has been the military. The two countries have engaged in a rapid arms fueled, in Algeria‘s case, by generous hydrocarbon revenues in the first decade of the century. Despite its efforts, Morocco’s military budget has been outstripped since 2006. Only as a result of Algeria‘s economic fragility has Morocco been able to make a significant .

Recent years have been characterized by Morocco’s impetuous diplomatic activity, particularly in the Gulf and throughout Africa. In the face of Morocco’s increased international projection, the Algerians have tried to respond despite the country’s poor economic situation.

In particular, the Algerians have sought to build closer relations with African nations. Algeria has strengthened ties with its traditional ally Nigeria, restarting talks on the construction of the trans-Saharan gas . It has also reinforced cooperation with countries such as Mali and Libya.

Implications for Spain

Europe overlooks North Africa and is separated by mere miles from Morocco. As a result, the Europeans have a direct stake in the tension south of the Mediterranean. The European country most affected by the recent escalation between Morocco and Algeria is Spain.

Taking a position in favor of one party could have on either the security of Spain’s southern border that is close to northern Morocco or the supply of natural gas that it receives from Algeria. This comes at a time when the flow of migrants across the Mediterranean is increasing and the price of gas, coal and electricity is rising.

The of the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline on November 1 has direct implications for Spain since the route was a major source of supply for over two decades. The pipeline also passes through Morocco, which retained part of the gas in exchange for allowing the line to operate via its territory. Morocco used the gas to produce around 12% of the country’s electricity. The Medgaz pipeline is seen as a replacement, which would allow Algeria to get rid of intermediaries and also strike a blow against Morocco.

Yet this will not spare Spain, which has no voice in regional disputes despite its desire to present itself as a strong European country. It is unclear how long this new episode of tension in the Maghreb will play out, but it could have serious implications for Europe.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Macron’s Campaign to Reveal France’s Historical Sins

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Out of frustration with Algeria’s lack of cooperation in repatriating its citizens illegally residing in France, Macron’s government decided to reduce the number of authorized visas for Algeria and Morocco by 50% and Tunisia by 30%. To justify this move, Macron accused the Algerian government of mental games. As by Le Monde, “Macron considers that since its independence in 1962, Algeria has based its development on a ‘memorial rent’ fostered by its politico-military system.”

Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Memorial rent:

The only possible English equivalent of an untranslatable term invented by the French historian Benjamin Stora and hijacked by Emmanuel Macron, who believes that his 2017 election as president of the republic made him the nation’s and the world’s historian-in-chief

Contextual Note

In July 2020, seeking to resolve the conundrum of tense French-Algerian relations, Emmanuel Macron commissioned historian Benjamin Stora to prepare a report on “the memories of colonization and the Algerian war.”

In January, Stora delivered his copy. Eschewing the interpretation of specific events and facts, which will always remain controversial and painful to consider, the historian chose to focus on the cultural and psychological effects left by the memory of those events on both sides of the Mediterranean. Those whose lives were affected by the long war of independence, according to Stora, have remained constrained within a permanent state of mutual misunderstanding. 

Stora proposed the metaphor of “memorial rent” to characterize how the different groups have mobilized a set of recriminations concerning the injustice done to them in the past. They cite this as the psychological “rent” due to them by their adversaries. 

On the French side, there are those who can be either nostalgic or ashamed of their colonial adventure and France’s self-proclaimed . This includes officials and soldiers, but also the Harkis — Algerian Muslims who fought alongside the French army — and the pieds-noirs or the Europeans settled in Algeria but repatriated after the war.

On the Algerian side, there are those who identified with the struggle for independence as a political cause and a less politically motivated majority, who appreciated independence without actively embracing the cause. Many Algerians were alienated by the political and ideological infighting that the revolution fatally produced.

After long decades of official hostility between France and Algeria, people in both countries welcomed Macron’s declared intention to resolve the inherited problems and define a new relationship. The task could never be easy since France, even when excluded in the most absolute terms from Algeria’s internal politics, has always been lurking in the background. Numerous economic, linguistic and cultural links have maintained a necessary but distant relationship between the nations and their peoples.

Anyone who lives and works in the business world in France realizes that generations of North Africans have found their permanent place within French culture, even if their presence in the social structure is subjected to a curiously ambiguous dynamic. North Africans have simultaneously been encouraged (and accepted) and discouraged (and rejected) from being fully integrated into the French social fabric.

Stora insisted on the notion of memorial rent as a way of accounting for the mentalities that still inhabit the two populations and their governments. The Algerians cannot forget the reality of colonization. Having definitively renounced its colonial mission, France seeks to live up to its ideals of “liberté, égalité, fraternité,” in the name of modern Western liberalism.

Macron, the maverick, wished to distinguish himself from his predecessors by finding some common ground and opening a new horizon of cooperation. He hoped that by honestly acknowledging what was reprehensible in France’s past in Algeria, the two nations could begin a fraternal dialogue that had been shattered by the revolution.

Macron now feels his act of good faith has not been reciprocated. He nevertheless insists that he maintains excellent relations with the current Algerian president, Abdelmadjid Tebboune. Perhaps he sees a kinship to Donald Trump’s account of his relationship with Kim Jung-un. It contains the idea that a sentiment of personal friendship — even if totally imaginary in Trump’s case — accompanied by a willingness to dialogue on a person-to-person basis, could lead to long-term understanding.

Macron is not alone in noting that Algeria’s system of government appears seriously sclerotic. A majority of Algerians appear to share his analysis. Massive protests last year by the pro-democratic popular movement known as Hirak permitted the destitution of the doddering, despotic and now deceased President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Last week, Macron dared to express his sentiment that Tebboune, for all his good intentions, was the prisoner of a system that he described as “very hard.” Though diplomatically delicate, it was a point worth making.

But after insisting that resolving the question of historical memory as described by Stora was the key to progress, Macron made a major mistake. Playing the amateur historian, he questioned whether Algeria had ever existed “as a nation” before French colonization, a period in which the region of Algeria was a precinct of the Ottoman Empire.

In other words, Macron implicitly called into question the historical legitimacy of Algeria as a nation-state. For Algerians, and other observers as well, that stands as a clear example of European political hubris.

To be fair, Macron cited a valid historical fact. But it implied a message not dissimilar to President Nicolas Sarkozy’s contention in a 2007 in Dakar that “the African has not fully entered into history.” In Sarkozy’s passably racist mind, Europe alone defined the drift and logic of history. At the time, Senegalese writer Boris Diop, remarked: “Maybe he does not realise to what extent we felt insulted.”

Many ordinary Algerians today feel the same way about Macron’s reflection on the status of Algeria. It clearly signifies that Macron thinks of Algeria as a second-class nation at best, lacking the dignity of European nation-states.

Historical Note

Le Monde’s editorial board that “Emmanuel Macron was right to make reconciliation between the painful experiences on both sides the axis of his �memorial policy.’” An outside observer might note that the idea a “memorial policy” would be unimaginable in most other cultures and historical contexts. The only significant precedents concerning national policies intended to produce an official account of the collective memory may be Israel’s remembrance of the Holocaust and South Africa’s truth and reconciliation commission.

But these three cases — Israel, South Africa and France — are all very different. In the Israeli case, there was no nation to reconcile with, Germany having been totally transformed after the war, followed by the subsequent creation of Israel. In South Africa, the formerly oppressed and their oppressors had to find a way of changing places by allowing a black majority to exercise its prerogatives.

Macron’s historicist approach, seeking to identify an entire people’s memorial content, may be seen, like so much else in French culture, as typically Cartesian. It transforms Descartes’ celebrated axiom, “I think, therefore I am” into “I remember, therefore I was.” This is as dangerous as it is potentially helpful because, while it seeks to reconcile, it creates false equations. Macron’s own discourse, when he invokes history to delegitimize Algeria as a nation, reveals the risk.

The president went even further when he of failing to recognize its own past as a colonial power. The mention of Turkey, whose president last year not only criticized Macron but called into question his “,” would seem to indicate that for all his supposed Cartesian rationality, Macron can at times become unhinged, especially in the months before a presidential election.

Apparently aware of his mistake, Macron now is seeking to lower the tensions. But as political scientist Hasni Abidi observes, in the , Macron’s “mea culpa would be denounced by the parties of the right.” At the same time, Abidi believes the French may see Macron as a serial troublemaker adept at “creating multiple conflicts with Turkey, Mali, Australia or the US.” The election takes place in April. 

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on 51łÔąĎ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Algeria

In an interesting analogy to how a person’s health status may determine their ability to resist the coronavirus, Sarah Feuer : “For Algeria and its 43 million inhabitants, a weak medical infrastructure, a year-long political crisis, and a stalled reorientation of an economy that has been overly dependent on hydrocarbons for decades have all made the North African country particularly vulnerable to repercussions from the virus.”

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Feuer, an associate fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is not alone in this assessment as the government has been perhaps the slowest to put in place the necessary tools to detect and combat COVID-19. She points out that the “2019 Global Health Security Index, which measures various health-sector capacities in countries around the world—including preparedness to manage pandemicsâ€Ŕą˛ą˛Ô°ě±đ»ĺ Algeria 173rd out of 195 countries and 17th out of 21 Arab states (surpassing only Djibouti, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia).” This is clearly not a healthy picture.

Algeria’s ally and largest trade partner, China, is doing its part, sending medical supplies, equipment and professionals, along with the construction of a hospital to treat patients. One of the most notable effects of the COVID-19 pandemic has been the cessation of its biweekly demonstrations by the Hirak, a movement that is opposed to the current government. Now, off the streets, protesters have moved online, raising money for food and medical supplies to hard-hit areas and pointing out the government’s shortcomings in addressing the crisis. This has not slowed down the government’s push against its opponents as journalists, activists and opposition figures continue to be arrested.

With the plunge in demand for gas and oil worldwide, Algeria is especially vulnerable to economic shocks that disrupt its ability to provide subsidies and services. Announced national budget cuts of 30% may only delay the inevitable drain on foreign reserves, forcing the government to seek external assistance, which may prove quite onerous if it upsets existing arrangements between big business, military and government officials.

Morocco

In Morocco, King Mohammed VI has received near-unanimous approval for his leadership, yet there are concerns that continued restrictions on the country’s media and activists portend challenges that may signal a more restrictive regime after the pandemic is over. As an energy importer, Morocco has benefited from low energy prices, but remittances, tourism, transportation and hospitality services are all suffering as a result of global restrictions and weaknesses in supply chains. The Moroccan economy can hardly afford to suffer a prolonged shutdown, and many small businesses have already disappeared. The government has few resources to sustain small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and larger companies, and its social and health services networks are strained.

Moroccans have taken up the challenges of social distancing and lack of contact fairly well for the moment and, in some ways, the Islamic month of Ramadan has helped. However, closing mosques and the inconsistent availability of food items and medicines are generating dissent. With more testing being carried out and greater outreach into the rural areas, the number of cases may well beyond the capacity of the public health system. With the nationwide lockdown extended until May 20, right before the Eid al-Fitr holiday, the government is hoping that its early interventions, along with increased testing and treatment protocols, will absorb most of the new cases and take Morocco through any spikes in infections.

As with other countries in the region, the government has released thousands of prisoners from jail to reduce the threat of spreading the virus in confined facilities. Yet since March 20, authorities have arrested thousands of individuals for violating the state of emergency or for spreading false information. Most of these have resulted in fines rather than incarceration.

Morocco, along with the rest of the world, faces a great deal of economic uncertainty. Official figures show that 700,000 workers lost their jobs and some 113,000 businesses closed from March 20 to April 1. This has severely depleted the state’s safety net, despite funds from international donors to support SMEs in this difficult transition. Questions are being asked not only about Morocco’s recovery, but its supply chain and customer links — largely in Europe — which are also under duress with no bright prospects on the horizon.

Tunisia

Like neighboring Morocco, Tunisia mobilized its rich human resources to help in the fight against the coronavirus. Engineering and health students and technology innovators are working on a variety of equipment and IT programs to boost the country’s anti-virus capacity. For example, as in Morocco, Tunisians now have locally ventilators, personal protective equipment (PPE) and other critical resources for protection and treatment. The Pasteur Institute in Tunis has already decoded the local strain of COVID-19, which is critical to developing a vaccine, and technicians are pushing ahead with applying artificial intelligence to the identification of early signs of the virus through X-rays.

While the number of confirmed infections is currently low in Tunisia, reporting is now coming in on the rural and interior areas where the infrastructure and professional staff are limited. The biggest hit, however, is to the economy as tourism, remittances, hospitality, transportation and services are suffering from lockdowns in Europe and restricted movement across borders. This has forced the Tunisian government, which has been in deficit spending and slow growth for the last five years, to adopt a support for the poor, SMEs and various sectors of the economy.

The economic stimulus includes some 450 million dinars ($155 million) in aid to poor families or those who have lost their jobs due to the coronavirus outbreak. In addition to a postponement on taxes on SMEs, repayments on low-income employee loans are being delayed as well. The International Monetary Fund is providing a $745 million loan, the European Union has pledged a grant of $273 million, Italy a $55 million grant and a loan of $280 million from the Islamic Development Bank.

Politics Not as Usual

How these countries emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic will shape their economic, social and political futures, with little assurances that the social contracts — which have been strained in the past decade — will survive without key alterations. As Intissar Fakir in an article on Carnegie Middle East, “As the aftereffects of the Covid-19 pandemic become clearer, they are likely to bring to the fore the policy failures that made the North African nations so fragile and susceptible to the virus in the first place. Economic mismanagement and underinvestment in infrastructure and human development have resulted in systems characterized by inequality and social precariousness. The governments of the three countries might be able to reinvent themselves in the short term, but beyond that the consequences of their errors are potentially destabilizing.”

While Morocco may seem to be the most stable based on its more diverse economic foundations and the leadership of the king, it has a weak political system, large wealth disparities, too many unfulfilled pledges from the government and a large youth population in need of jobs. These conditions are true in Tunisia as well, except that it lacks a unifying national authority and suffers from a continued dysfunctional political system and a faltering economy. Algeria, the most repressive regime, will certainly have to with the Hirak once the number of new infections has gone down and demonstrators return to the streets. Their demands, like the others, for an open, effective, transparent government and significant efforts to create jobs and diversify the economy may be beyond the scope of the traditional political leadership.

What lies ahead for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia will very much be determined by the level of trust governments are able to build with their constituents based on how they combat the coronavirus, protect the needy, develop more comprehensive health sectors and work transparently to promote economic recovery. This is a global phenomenon but especially critical in countries struggling to survive.

*[Updated: May 1, 2020.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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As one person mentioned, “There is no care here in Morocco for the population. It�s the lack of care that makes people migrate.” The data reflects this observation. Almost half of Moroccans are considering emigrating. The proportion is up sharply after a decade of decline, the survey indicated. The BBC reports: “About 45% of the population is under 24 and on most issues the country is riven by a generational split. Some 70% of adults under 30 want to emigrate versus 22% of people in their forties. While half of over 60-year-olds have a positive view of the government, the figure for those aged 18-29 is 18%.”

Does this mean that protest marches to overthrow the current government are coming in the near future? A more likely scenario is the article’s conclusion that “Morocco is at a crossroads.” It can reduce corruption, realign its development priorities to focus on building worthwhile jobs and public services, and to open the political space for greater citizen participation. Or it can muddle along, disabling dreams of a better life that reaches into the interior of the country as well as the urban coastal areas, and see if crises threaten the status quo.

Morocco is no stranger to protests. They occur frequently, focused either on specific sectors such as public health workers or teachers, or regional grievances such as those in the Rif region that continue to simmer as the government is still dragging in efforts to promote prosperity and upgrade services in the north. Facing a slower growth rate and a government, including parliament, that prefers to follow than to lead development and reform efforts, prospects for real constructive change are unlikely without a jolt to the body politic.

Moroccan Ministries

Adding to the discontent in Morocco is the bickering among ministries about the transparency and reliability of government data.  Morocco World News ran an excellent  in which the president of the High Commission for Planning (HCP), Ahmed Lahlimi Alami, called out several ministers and high-ranking government officials for not sharing “data on the performance of their respective departments’ performances.”

HCP data is always seen to be credible and reliable, so this charge merits close attention. Tamba François Koundouno writes: “As the main provider of economic, demographic, and statistical data on Morocco, HCP prides itself on its independence and the fact that all departments of Morocco’s public administration have the obligation to share their data with the institution.”

There is a disparity between figures released by the HCP and the trade and investment ministry concerning job creation. “In that particular case, HCP’s data on employment in Morocco, which offered a grim reading of the Moroccan labor market, was the exact opposite of the government’s �lofty’ figures and its insistence on delivering a target number of employments HCP rightly predicted it could not attain,” Koundouno mentions.

Without a reliable source of data inside the government that makes its information available widely, the country lacks credibility with analysts, investors, researchers and others who rely on HCP data for their reports, predictions and analyses. If the HCP’s mission is to develop updated and accurate data on “Morocco’s economic and political trajectories,” a lack of transparency will only undermine the country’s ability to attract investors and build partnerships to promote its economic and political goals. What’s equally important is that by having up-to-date and reliable data, the HCP can provide international financial institutions and rating agencies with critical data for making accurate log projections and rankings.

This relates back to the first article in that the scope of the challenges to Morocco’s development cannot be a “feel-good” exercise so that the government can pat itself on the back. Morocco faces serious economic challenges that will not disappear through a lack of accurate reporting.

The rainy season is coming in Morocco and with it an uptick in the agricultural sector. Yet there are signs of public frustration, including political chanting at football matches and popular rap songs that recently landed one rapper in jail for a year. Lahlimi Alami out that, “More than poverty, social disparities create frustrations that may trigger protests. These disparities are often viewed as a result of an illegitimate accumulation of wealth.”

Since a quarter of Moroccans are either poor or at risk of poverty, according to a recent World Bank report, and the kingdom ranks 123rd in the UN’s Human Development Index, the government needs to seriously recommit to support economic, social and political development.

Algeria’s New President

Looking at Algeria, there is a different challenge: installing a regime that has little or no legitimacy with the people, through elections that lack transparency, credibility and popular support. While the army was content to push ahead with the presidential election on December 12 that was at odds with the demands of anti-government demonstrators, the consequences of this faux election mirror the simplistic view of the West when fingers with ink-stains somehow represent democracy. Voting does not make a government legitimate, but the army and elites seem to be willing to continue with the charade to force a sense of normalcy on the political life of Algeria.

As an article by Dalia Ghanem on  opined, “Algeria will end up with a president who will suffer from a lack of legitimacy. This will put him under enormous pressure, caught between citizens who have increased their demands and changed their perception of the institutions and elites governing them and the military that brought him to power. With such a lack of legitimacy, the president will not be able to meet the political and socioeconomic challenges lying ahead.”

The fact that there is not a “central committee” or other mechanism representing the agenda of the demonstrators — who have protested weekly for nearly a year — has given the Algerian army a breathing spell to impose its will. But that does not mean that President Abdelmadjid Tebboune will automatically achieve legitimacy with the people. More likely, the new president “will need to negotiate with the popular movement immediately after the election.”

How this will play out is still a crystal ball exercise. Given that the popular movement reflects a variety of concerns from wanting more resources for local economic and social development, to empowering civil and human rights, expanding opportunities for political participation, and dealing with corruption and an unbalanced set of national economic initiatives, Tebboune will not be able to reach agreements on priorities and actions quickly, thus feeding popular discontent. What this means for the largest country in Africa by size is a challenge of major proportions.

*[A version of this article was published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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King Mohammed VI has managed to provide an overall vision for the country’s development that has raised the standard of living, increased high-value jobs in manufacturing and technology, brought order to the national development strategy, and opened up a society that still manifests lingering symptoms of wasta (connections) as a gateway to success despite one’s educational and social achievements.

But the king is no magician, and the number of young people dissatisfied with the country reflects his own impatience with government ministers who are unable to “fix” issues like youth unemployment, a weak educational sector, inefficiencies in public services and blatant abuses by the security services.

Morocco has its flaws. Parliament has never risen to its potential as an equal partner in policy leadership in the country. Its institutions still reflect a culture of deference to the royal palace that leave it lacking an independent judiciary, full protections of civil liberties and robust employment opportunities. Its handling of civil disobedience can be rough, as in responses to the 2016 Hirak Rif movement in the north and the pro-Polisario — a separatist group — demonstrations in the south.

Yet Morocco does not have overcrowded correctional facilities with political prisoners, its media is relatively open and it is creating jobs in new industrial centers, but not at a pace sufficient to meet the demand — a common problem throughout the Arab world.

Morocco has its own internal logic, quite different from Sudan and Algeria. Religious authority rests with the king and its parliament is led by an Islamic party. It has an unofficial Islamic opposition, Al Adl wa Al Ihsane (Justice and Spirituality), that eschews the monarchy and participating in government. And the country has religious training centers that prepare imams and others to promote moderate, Sufi-influenced Maliki Islam in Africa and Europe.

Of course, many of its young people want to leave. This is the reality of the region. Too many young people with mismatched education to job skills would rather test their options elsewhere than take jobs that require vocational and technical skills, again not unlike most of their peers in the Middle East and North Africa.

There are many initiatives to build job opportunities, but even the most optimistic know that the public sector cannot absorb more entrants, the private sector is unable to generate jobs at the same pace as graduates, and emphasizing enterprise and entrepreneurship to fill the gap requires more than words. Enabling new business means systematic, comprehensive, sustainable approaches. And it would help if securing business licenses, loans, permits and services was less arbitrary and more transparent.

So, the BBC has got it wrong about Morocco. While demonstrations are not uncommon, and while young people are frustrated with their options, there is still a strong sense of loyalty to the country, even with its shortcomings.

As a Moroccan friend noted: “The loyalty here is to the king and his vision, to the history that connects the people to the monarchy. But on a social level, I think that Moroccans are conflicted between all the hopeful signs that show we are actually doing much better than others in the region, and between the unmistakable déjà vu of the struggles of the 80s that marked the re-emergence of the social classes and the balance tipping in favor of the palace.”

Where these frustrations lead in the coming years will test the Moroccans’ commitment to the current political order — one that demands more robust and sustainable initiatives that enable youth to fully engage in the country’s future.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Describing the situation in Algeria, where President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has now Ěýafter he initially promised to leave by the end of the month,ĚýLe Monde : “[T]he formation of the government … gives an appearance of movement whereas the regime, contested for the past six weeks by protests on an unparalleled scale, is paralyzed by the struggle opposing the head of the army and the presidential clan.”

Here is today’s 3D definition:

Appearance of movement:

An optical illusion that is part of the basic skillset of all establishment politicians permitting them to react to deep crises with superficial actions intended to demonstrate — but not to effectuate — their commitment to changeĚý

Contextual note

For 20 years, Algerians were resigned to submissively accepting and obeying a regime that offered a minimum of stability. The generation that had grown up without the ever-present fear of terrorist incidents in their towns and villages began to imagine what a society might be like that could effectively profit and grow its economy thanks to its natural riches — oil and gas — rather than simply trust the governmental clan to keep things on an even, immobile keel. Al Jazeera describes the who want “a new generation of leaders to replace a ruling elite seen by many ordinary Algerians as out of touch and unable to jump-start a faltering economy hampered by cronyism.”

Algerians reacted to Bouteflika’s offer to resign by April 28 by calling it — in the words of one female undergraduate student at Algiers School of Architecture — a “small victory.” Nothing will have been achieved “if Bouteflika resigns while the old guard remains after April 28,” she told Al Jazeera. The protesters intend to continue the peaceful demonstrations until the entire ruling clan is replaced.

Historical note

Stirrings of revolt against a fifth term for President Bouteflika had begun even before the beginning of the year. The first major demonstration took place in February, though the date of the election had not yet been announced. When, on March 3, the government indicated that the totally incapacitated Bouteflika would run for a fifth term, student protesters began to organize in earnest. Within weeks, they were gaining force and attracting a wider range of participants than those who had initiated the movement. As the pressure increased, the Algerian government decided to move the dates of the spring vacation forward in the hope of dispersing the students. By that time, not only were the students committed to seeing the protest through, but more and more older citizens and professionals joined the movement.

Bouteflika had already called for the postponement of the election initially scheduled for April 18. But while promising not to run again, he indicated his intention to remain in power during the transition period, which had no time limit, indicating that it would likely take a year to consult on a new constitution.

None of the moves or promises had the impact intended of calming the almost uniformly peaceful revolt. Everyone understood that the responsibility for some at the beginning of March, in which seven people were injured and the son of Algeria’s first prime minister after independence died, belonged Ěýwith “the ruling gang and its thugs.”

When every attempt to appease the movement failed, the government finally decided to offer what the protesters were clamoring for: Bouteflika’s resignation. Which is where we stand today as the protesters digest their “small victory” and prepare for the next phase of the showdown.

Some observers have noticed a curious parallel between the Algerian situation and the drama of the in France. In both cases, the crowd has demanded the resignation of the president. In both cases, there is no clear proposal for a future mode of government. In both cases, there is a political class that has the habit of running the operations of government, though French President came in by ousting the discredited parties that had alternately shared power for 60 years. Still, he was clearly a product of the system and knew its workings, which encouraged him to feel he had the ability to centralize control in his own hands, unencumbered by the traditional right and left.

There’s another curious parallel in the current situation, this time with the United Kingdom. Both Algeria and the UK, through their immobility and incapacity to make decisions, have painted themselves into a corner of history. Nobody knows where either will end up and, whereas in the case of Algeria it may be a mirage in the desert and of the UK a pea-soup fog on the Thames, some believe they can see a cliff edge.

In the UK, something has to give by April 12 with . In Algeria, Abdelkader Bensalah, the current speaker of the upper house of parliament, will, according to the constitution, become the interim leader for a maximum of 90 days. What happens after those two dates is anyone’s guess. But after 20 years of immobility in Algeria (if not 60) and nearly three years of immobility and indecision in the UK, something is going to have to give.

As for France, it’s a waiting game, as the yellow vests have discovered the most powerful arm to disturb a well-entrenched government: patience. It has already begun to seriously get on Macron’s nerves.

[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book,, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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As the situation in Algeria continues to evolve and accelerate, that “Algeria’s army chief Ahmed Gaid Salah has called for President to be declared unfit to rule the country, following weeks of protests against the ailing head of state’s decision to seek a fifth term. ”

In the US, Hayley Miller in the the fallout from the conclusion of the Mueller report that has delighted the White House but dashed establishment Democrats’ hopes by failing to find President Donald Trump guilty of collusion with Russia in the manipulation of the 2016 election. Miller posts an indignant tweet by Republican Representative Kevin McCarthy calling for Democratic Representative Adam Schiff’s public humiliation: “It’s also time for @RepAdamSchiff to apologize for deceiving the American people. He has proven himself unfit to chair the House Intelligence Committee.”

At the same time, satirical late night , who has built his brand around making jokes based on the idea that Trump is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s puppet, swallowed his embarrassed disappointment and “brought out a large whiteboard full of reasons why Trump is “unfit” to be president.”

In the UK, the number of people in recent days to affirm that British Prime Minister Theresa May is unfit to manage includes any number of and , as well as Brexiteer , some Ěýministers and a for the BBC’s Question Time.

Here is today’s 3D definition:

Unfit:

In Darwinian terms, unable to compete in the race with other individuals to reproduce and generate a population in one’s image; lacking in fecundity. In political terms, unable to credibly play the role of a leader who can shape the public’s values in the leader’s own image and perpetuate that image as an ideal.

Contextual note

All these examples show the variety of ways in which a leader can be judged unfit. One clear fact emerges: There will never be a lack of judges.

The case of Bouteflika in Algeria is the most extreme. Since “fit” is a synonym of healthy, some seem surprised it has taken six years for the Algerian body politic to notice and make a point of the obvious and radical failure of health in their president’s body and mind. But, of course, a regime controlled by the military gave its people few opportunities to exercise their skills of medical diagnosis, and fewer again to express them. Now that at least one military leader has chimed in with the people, the political transformation — if not impending revolution — they have been calling for has begun looking like a real possibility.

All the other cases appear to be far more ambiguous, but they share with the Algerian situation an atmosphere of existential crisis. Trump has been an ongoing psychodrama for the American people since well before his election. That his own party and his opponents have been drawn into the psychodrama without knowing how to respond tells us a lot about US political culture today and even more about US culture in general.

Many forget that it was David Cameron who created the situation for Theresa May being unfit to manage Brexit. They find it harder to forgive her persistent belief that she is managing it and can bring it to a positive outcome.

Historical note

At the end of the day (if that hour ever actually comes), all three nations — Algeria, the US and the UK — are undergoing a historical drama of major importance that will have repercussions beyond their own borders.

That would surprise no one in the case of the US, which decades ago established itself (at least in its own mind) as what it believed was a kind and loving empire. It needed Trump’s narcissism to help the “exceptional” nation to begin to understand that that very belief was a symptom of its own narcissism. Trump has insisted on “America First” as a slogan to guide foreign policy. But that is precisely what almost all Americans, whatever their political allegiance, believed without having to shout it in unison at aggressive political rallies. Hearing the shouts and seeing the result of Trump’s application of the principle have made people — though certainly not his base — aware of the tragic absurdity of the well-established meme of America’s benevolent leadership of a world hankering to be just like the US.

Is Trump “fit” to be president? He proved himself fit, in the social Darwinian sense of the word, to win elections and to get people, including the liberal media, to kowtow to him where it counted. For it is the media that continues to promote the idea of America First, though they believe that their version is more human than Trump’s. And the profoundly disappointing denouement of the Mueller report, contradicting what the Democrats thought was proof that Trump was committed to “Russia first,” has opened a new path to the re-election of a president deemed to be deeply unworthy as well as unfit.

As for May, as the seconds tick off toward the closing bell of the final round of the Brexit bout, most of her own party as well as the entire opposition, to say nothing of the negotiators from the European Union, are “fit to be tied.” Whatever happens, it is likely, at best, to be a split decision; at worst, a double knockout. But even with a split decision, the future looks grim, not just because the economic forecasts have for the first time made it clear to the British people that it will cost them dearly at a very personal level, but because any vestige of trust in the political system and the people who populate it appears to have vanished beyond any hope for redemption.

So these three stories — of Algeria, the US and the UK — though completely independent of each other, according to an internal logic particular to each one, “fit” together in an odd way during what will certainly be seen in the future as an odd moment of history. Similar phenomena are coming to the fore in Emmanuel Macron’s France, in Matteo Salvini’s (or perhaps Giuseppe Conte’s) Italy, Narendra Modi’s India and Nursultan Nazarbayev’s , to say nothing of Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia, which in many ways is the most extreme example but paradoxically the most stable over time.

None of them have worked out what “fitness to govern” might actually look like.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book,, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post History Is Having a Fit over National Leadership across the Globe appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

When the media questioned a young militant in Bejaia, Algeria, about how the movement represented by the protests that have shaken the regime to the core should be structured, : “Pour le moment, la structuration n’est pas nécessaire. C’est un mouvement horizontal.” This translates literally as “for the moment, its structuration isn’t necessary. It’s a horizontal movement.” In a more idiomatic translation, we would probably say, “It doesn’t need to be structured since it’s a horizontal movement.”

Here is today’s 3D definition:

Structuration:

Imposing a strictly defined hierarchy of authority on a popular movement to ensure that it functions in the same way as traditional parties, in the expectation that it will succumb to the forces of corruption that infect all strictly defined hierarchies of authority

Contextual note

Following President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s stroke in 2013 that turned him into a vegetable but didn’t prevent him from being re-elected in 2016, the Algerian political machine has functioned for the past six years largely in a state of artificial equilibrium and suspended animation. Bouteflika’s credibility derived from his distant past, as one of the prominent members of the revolutionary generation that won Algeria’s independence in the 1960s, and his welcome role in stabilizing the nation after the murderously chaotic decade of the 1990s. The one-party system focused above all on containing the never-completely-throttled internal terrorist threat ensured that Bouteflika could be accepted by Algerians as the figurehead of a darkly-administered ship of state. The largely anonymous crew of political and economic managers channeling the profits from oil, seconded by the army, handled all the tasks required to keep the vessel afloat.

The Algerian economy and political system thus owed its stability to a radically vertical, authoritarian structure supported by oil revenues that provided a sufficient cushion to weather most storms. But as with all structures, even the most solid beams and buttresses weaken, bend and eventually crack. The continued decline of both oil prices and the people’s respect for an aging ruling class that had consistently failed to act on the reforms it had previously promised brought things to a breaking point, provoked by the announcement of an election that would be nothing more than a ratification of the status quo.

This was the straw that not only broke the camel’s back, but metaphorically strained the backs of every camel across the Algerian Sahara, provoking a growing revolt of the formerly disciplined and well-aligned camel train that the Algerian population had become. As often, especially in former colonies, the younger generations and especially students sparked the revolt. Unlike their elders, they had no objective reason to show reverence to the historical relics who consistently neglected the needs of the people in favor of satisfying the interests of the ruling elite.

Historical note

So far, the revolt has been at least superficially but increasingly successful as even some of the dominos of the power structure begin to wobble and fall. In their commitment to a lack of “structuration,” the students have managed to steer clear of being perceived as an impudent enemy. As other Algerians joined their peaceful demonstrations, the students drifted discreetly back into the wings.

Important segments of the power structure itself have now begun openly embracing their cause and appear ready to act on it. A top military figure, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaed Salah, has the “noble aims and pure intentions” of the demonstrators. Reuters : “The National Rally for Democracy (RND), a member of the ruling coalition, has joined ruling party officials, unions and business tycoons who have abandoned Bouteflika in recent days.”

Algeria may appear to be an example of a more general historical trend, signaling a mutation in the way all democracies work (or fail to work). It applies equally to autocratic democracies — ones in which there is a unique dominant party — and the most open, presumably competitive democracies, such as the UK or the US.

The system of parties as the pillars of power structures is being seriously challenged across the globe, with key examples not only in the UK and the US, but also in France, Italy, Germany and now Algeria and Kazakhstan. There can be little doubt that traditional parties are in a state of growing confusion in all of these nations. That has of course happened in the past. But instead of seeing new organized movements arise, capable of taking control when the weakened establishment parties begin to implode and eventually replacing them, we are beginning to observe the power of unstructured movements that gain momentum that appear less focused on running the government than producing a potentially radical effect over time.

The gilets jaunes (yellow vests) in France have been criticized for their inability to put in place a structure, which many feel would be the prelude to a program of government and at least to putting in place the means of containing spontaneous violence. French journalist , writing in The Guardian, reminds the world of a point we made recently: “Every week, commentators claim the movement is fading. And yet, the following weekend, the yellow wave washes over France again. The attendance numbers may fluctuate, but the anger remains.”

The Brexit fiasco and Donald Trump’s election in 2016, followed by Emmanuel Macron’s successful attempt to divide the partisan waters in France in 2017 all combined to provide dramatic evidence of the breakdown of the role and prestige of traditional parties. That may mark the end of a period in history where democracy was defined by the action of rival parties. What we see today is perhaps the beginning of a period in which movements define democracy, movements that refuse the traditional party structure, that eschew the urgency of political organization, but find a way of reorienting the political vision of their nations.

For the moment, the pundits are still thinking in the mode of the previous phase of history. They ask a series of questions: Who will effectively get their hands on power? How will they organize it and what action will they take? The same pundits assume that, in some cases, the existing power structure will crush the threatening movements, whereas in others the movements will mostly ape those they replace and spend most of their energy organizing their own privileges. That’s always what happens when leaders and parties are in a rush to consolidate power.

But what happens when they stop being in a rush, as we’re seeing now? At a time when the planet itself requires urgent attention, a certain form of patience and resolve may be the only way of preserving the future of our nations and of humanity itself.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, , in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Algeria’s Horizontal Assault on the Political Status Quo appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The people of Algeria, whose convincingly brought together a wide diversity of age groups and socio-professional profiles, have now won a victory they hope will not be merely pyrrhic. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced on March 11 that he will not run for a fifth term. He has canceled the April 18 election that provoked the protests.

Al Jazeera : “Demonstrators who took to the streets en masse against President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s rule reacted in jubilation to his withdrawal from elections but said he now must step down.”

Bouteflika’s proposal amounts to nearly the same thing he was promising when he called the election: to remain president long enough to reform the constitution and ensure, in his words,Ěý“the foundation of a new Republic” under his own supervision.

Here is today’s 3D definition:

Withdrawal:

Removal from an existing context. In Algerian politics: a strategy for remaining in place as long as possible.

Contextual noteĚý

Although in failing health at 82 and incapable of conducting a conversation, Bouteflika is a “man with a plan.” Al Jazeera describes its contours: “According to Bouteflika’s message, an inclusive and independent conference will oversee the transition of power, drafting new constitutional law and setting the date for new presidential elections. The conference, due to finish its work by the end of 2019, will submit a new constitution to voters in a referendum.”

This recapitulates the confused proposal Bouteflika had made concerning his eventual fifth term. He claimed that he would use limited time — less than a full term — to organize a national debate and reform the constitution, as a prelude to a new presidential election for which he would not be a candidate.

The demonstrators, who saw this as an insult to their intelligence and a travesty of democracy epitomizing the vices of an autocratic system whose corruption has deepened over 20 years, may initially be relieved to know that at least they are not expected to elect a man incapable of executing even the basic duties of his office. But they have called for Bouteflika’s resignation and can’t be satisfied with his proposed plan. One opponent summed it up: “Bouteflika’s measures are not consistent with the people’s will.”

Historical note

Not since 99.7% of the Algerian population from in 1962 has “the people’s will” been taken into account in any serious way in Algeria. To the extent that it exists, the will of the people has consistently taken a back seat to the power games of those who have fought amongst themselves for control of the unique party itself, the National Liberation Front (FLN), and the government. The worst example concerns the 1991 legislative elections, whose result in favor of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was overturned by the military, urged on in the background by the US and France, who had collaborated on the first Gulf War against .

In the unfolding of those events, there were some parallels with the current situation. According to one : “As the oil price fell and Algeria’s economy went into crisis mode, the country’s disenchanted youth in 1988 took to the streets in protest against rising unemployment and poverty levels. This in addition to a widely shared belief that the country’s immense gas and oil riches never reached the pockets of the common man.”

The “people’s will” has always focused on making the best of the oil riches for the benefit of the entire population. Every government has tried in its way to respond, but the level of corruption has meant that, instead of using the wealth to diversify the economy, what the people received were the crumbs, while the government managed for its own purposes and consumed according to its tastes the substance of that wealth.

Consistent with a trend seen throughout the Middle East and North Africa, the FIS, before seeing the election results canceled and then finding itself banned, consisted of both a moderate wing and a more radical religious wing, neither of which preached violence. But following its victory in the December 1991 election, “Washington and Paris gave the green light for the Algerian military on 11 January 1992 to cancel the parliamentary elections’ second round and declare a state of emergency. Two months later, the FIS was banned altogether.”

With its leaders either imprisoned or exiled, the party attempted to survive under more moderate leadership. This inevitably led to the splitting off of the radicals who founded the marauding, ultra-violent Groupe Islamique Armé, which launched a traumatizing civil war that killed more than 120,000 people, mostly civilians, over a span of 10 years.

The “people’s will” today once again focuses on the growing disparity between an elite who monopolize the wealth and the people. Islamism is not playing a significant role. The trend of rejecting the oligarchies that prosper while neglecting the common people is spreading with increasing intensity in many countries. Reforms proposed by the elite satisfy no one, as President has discovered in France. One Algerian critic cited by Al Jazeera stated: “We want the current regime to collapse. I don’t trust the old guard to oversee a democratic and independent transition. They will use this conference as an opportunity to find a way to remain in power.”

The jubilation that followed Bouteflika’s withdrawal has already begun to fade. The battle is not over. “This is a strategy to divide us, we should not stop now. We need to keep on fighting against his rule and the regime.”

Algeria played an important role in the symbolism of decolonization that followed World War II and helped define the era of protest in the West associated with the 1960s. Its drama of independence inspired , Yasser Arafat and Angela Davis, while at the same time it that defenders of the established order such as the FBI in the US and Ariel Sharon in used to refine their strategies for repressing revolutionary movements.

Algeria may be setting a new example. The existing power structure will do what it can to defend its privileges, but the generation of the war of independence is losing its grip. Bouteflika and his circle acknowledge the necessary transition but will obviously not encourage it. Whether they resist with violence or not remains to be seen. We should all find encouraging the fact that the popular uprising has been resolutely peaceful and focused on attaining its fundamental objective of respecting and indeed developing democracy.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, , in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Bouteflika Concedes Round 1, But Cancels the Fight appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Algeria narrowly avoided being swept up in the in 2011. In its aftermath, every country to the east of Algeria was subject to wrenching, ongoing, unresolvable drama while Algeria managed to continue with business as usual, steering clear of the news headlines.

That doesn’t mean life has been a bed of roses in the former French colony. The iron-fisted security system put in place by the current regime and the fear felt by most Algerians of a possible return to the murderous chaos of the 1990s combined to ensure a certain level of stability and inertia.

With the approach of a presidential election and the announcement that the severely incapacitated President Abdelaziz Bouteflika — first elected in 1999 — will seek a fifth term, Algerians are massively demonstrating in the street. The fireworks of popular protest against a strongarm regime that has, in the past, stifled all forms of dissent have put the nation’s political situation and its deep contradictions back on the front page of international news.

Communicating apparently from his hospital bed in Geneva, Bouteflika praised the population for conducting peaceful protests. To reassure Algerians, he promised that, if elected for a fifth time, he would serve a shortened term and engage a “national dialogue” to prepare constitutional reform, a promise he had already hinted at in 2008 and 2012, but never carried out. It sounded conciliatory but convinced no one.

Then to be clear about how the government would react if the protests continued and threatened the planned election, he evoked his invisible and : “These circles, which envy our liberty, independence of our decisions and our just positions, have never ceased to conspire against our country.”

Here is today’s 3D definition:Ěý

Conspire:

To take a position that is not identical to that of the group in power, applied when there are at least two people to take that position

Contextual note

Algeria has been spared thanks to its oil revenues that have kept enough money in the government’s coffers to minimally ensure the peace in recent years, though the falling price of oil has been slowly exacerbating the tensions that have always been present. Journalist Abdou Semmar of the growing state of incoherency at the heart of the very opaque power structure: “Bouteflika’s decision to stay in power in Algeria since 1999 has brought the regime’s institutions to a collapse through inter-clan fighting for his estate.”

Every commentator mentions the reigning greed and corruption of the “circle” Bouteflika doesn’t mention: his own circle of power. The situation is in some ways similar to Venezuela, but as journalist Akram Belkaïd and historian Malika Rahal , Algeria has at least managed to escape threats of external invasion and manipulation.

The rest of world will allow the Algerians themselves to unravel the conflict internally, in strong contrast with Venezuela, where the US is spearheading yet another complex regime change operation in an oil-producing country, not just by applying crippling sanctions and traditional CIA subterfuge, but also by arbitrarily “electing” an unelected challenger to the incumbent president.

BelkaĂŻd and Rahal agree that the demonstrations now taking place in Algeria are having an impact unlike anything seen before. One factor they identify is the diversity of the population participating in the protests. Although it began with students, the crowds have now brought together citizens from every age group and professional class. Furthermore, they share the conviction that a major change must take place transferring power to a younger generation, which makes sense in a country in which under 35 represent 70% of the population and suffer the most from unemployment.

That may explain why the latest move of the government has been to bring forward the by 10 days in the hope that the dispersed students will be less likely to mobilize and the rest of the population will have no one to follow. Bouteflika’s threats against imaginary “circles,” however, indicate that if the demonstrations gain momentum, the government will resort to using force to neutralize the influence of “internal and external” enemies of the regime. The internal opposition is obvious, But by adding “external,” it implies that the “internal” opponents — the Algerian people — are being manipulated by foreign adversaries, which in current political parlance implies “terrorists,” from whom Bouteflika must protect the nation.

Historical note

Algeria once symbolized not just the struggle to end the French colonial system, but also the will to break free from the permanent political and economic political culture that European nations were devising to prolong their economic control of former colonies. That culture still exists across the African continent, as the former colonial powers have found various ways to maintain their economic and political influence.

None has done so more than , with its notorious ąó°ů˛ą˛Ô粹´Ú°ůľ±±çłÜ±đ, a system of “special relationships” between France and its former colonies. It still includes a monetary system, the franc CFA, entirely managed by the Banque de France. Algeria, in contrast, has its own money, the dinar and its own source of wealth: oil.

Its petroleum industry, its fiercely defended independence achieved during its “revolution” and the sense of pride shared by the majority of Algerians have combined in recent times to keep the country stable, though at least one commentator, Professor Kader Abderrahim, it not as “stability, but immobilism.”

At the time of the Arab Spring in early February 2011, in a private conversation this author had with a friend — an Algerian senator who happened to be visiting Paris for a conference — the author asked him whether Algeria risked seeing an uprising similar to what was occurring at that very moment in . He said he hadn’t excluded the idea of not being able to return the following week, but that, with $154 billion and counting in reserve (at the time), the Algerian government would weather the storm.

Withering oil revenues have contributed to current situation, but withering politicians have turned it into a major crisis. Even with depressed oil prices, Algeria has the means to be prosperous. The energy and increasing awareness and educational level of its youth could be mobilized to diversify the economy, something Bouteflika has long promised but never acted on.

Now that it’s back in the headlines, smart observers will continue to follow the events in Algeria in the weeks and months to come.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, , in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post In Algeria, It’s Not Just Bouteflika Who’s Sick appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Dust may have settled since the Paris attacks of January 7-9, but the debate over freedom of expression goes on. In the aftermath of the horrific murders, one key issue remains: freedom of expression vs religious conservatism. The attacks were not the first time that extremists have taken innocent lives in the name of blasphemy. But is at odds with Western liberalism?

The objective of a dogmatic religion, including Judaism, Christianity and Islam, is primarily to bind a society in a moral fabric. When a religious thought or ideology attains the intellectual underpinning of binding a society through moral thread, it develops an authority to dictate a law over its ruled people. Any idea that rules over people naturally becomes political. A religion that rules over its believers behaves like a concept with a political motive of conquering another territory to expand its influence. As a political entity sees any other organization with the same motive as its threat, a dogmatic religion guards its sovereignty very fiercely vis-Ă -vis any other religious faction. Thus, religion is a political idea that does not like to be subjugated by any other rival thought and wants to conquer other territories as well.

The strength and resilience of religion is beyond imagination: Nation-states can rise and fall, but religion remains unaltered and unharmed with its perpetual existence. But modern societies are governed through a model of nation-state.

Especially in the West, this concept has matured with democracy. It does not mean that during the Middle Ages religion was not an influencing force in Western society. In fact, the significance of religion in the West continued to be vilified by many political and social movements. Western civilization became enriched by movements, revolutions and ideologies like Italian renaissance, French enlightenment and British Magna Carta. It took the West centuries to prepare a ground where an individual was considered the center of all imagination rather than the church.

If you analyze the political and economic history of Europe, it will lead you to think that two human geniuses, Karl Marx and Adam Smith, changed Western thought forever when it came to dealing with the influence of religion on the human mind. Marx unequivocally criticized religion as unaccountable authority interfering in society. Smith relied on individual power for wealth creation as opposed to a centralized state. In both ways, the logic of democracy coupled with socialism or capitalism convinced Westerners that, in order to lead a happy and meaningful life, one does not need to make an appointment with a priest to seek any divine intervention.

But, after all, the West is not the only part of the world. In Muslim-majority countries, Islam as a faith plays a huge role in society. Islam is probably the only religion that has the ability to resist democracy. What makes Islam so powerful is that it can stand as an antagonistic force vis-Ă -vis the idea of democracy, which rests on values like tolerance and freedom of expression.

© Shutterstock

Political Islam Refuses democracy

Historical analysis of Islam tells that Prophet Muhammad was not just a spiritual teacher, but also a ruler of his tribal community, which means he acted as a head of state as well. In Christianity, Jesus was only a preacher, while in Buddhism, Gautam Buddha was a teacher and philosopher enlightening society with the theory of “nothingness.” Not even that, if we look at Islamic history, we find that only in Islam the founder himself conquered territory and set out to convert neighboring communities. History tells that all that converting other communities into Islam was through sheer bloodshed, not peaceful preaching — particularly in northern India.

Observers that Islam sees itself as the only pure faith that exists. Anything that is not Islamic is considered impure. Not even that, it is the duty of Muslims to convert others of impure faith into Islam. From the early phase of its birth, Islam developed a unipolar, prejudiced view of seeing the world — in other words, you’re either with us or against us.

Although there are differences across the globe, Muslim countries often have an old habit of flirting with the theocratic nature of the state. On one hand, Saudi Arabia is the representative state of theocracy. On the other, there are several countries across the Middle East, North Africa and Asia where religion runs the show of power under the veil of farcical democracy or even so-called secularism.

In such states, the religious heads get the legitimate right to rule. Sharia, or Islamic law, becomes the pivot of all political and social institutions. As per sharia, it is Allah who is the supreme sovereign rather than the people. Whether in public or private, Islamic law encompasses all aspects of life: from politics and finance to health and hygiene.

So, a religious tradition of this nature will stand firmly antagonistic to democracy. After all, in democracy, the citizen is made the custodian of power, not any “divine” agency represented by a priest, rabbi or sheikh.

These two antagonistic ideas — democracy and Islam — have been in closer contact since the 20^th century. With mass immigration following due to a labor deficit, the staging ground of this became . The aim of multiculturalism tested the established value system of secularism of those developed democracies. Among other Western countries, France presents a curious example of democracy with non-reformist Islam.

Is France in a Conflict With Islam?

holds its democratic values of liberty, equality and fraternity close to its heart. But when it comes to the interaction of religion with society, the uniqueness of France appears evident from its European neighbors. France is not just any other country of western Europe when it comes to interaction with religion; it is not like where Catholicism plays an important role due to the pope, nor is it like where the Church of England enjoys an affiliation with the crown.

Since Enlightenment, French thinkers advocated for a total separation of state from church, which went on to form French secularism known as laïcité. In secular France, religion was considered an obstacle in building a modern society. Thus, faith was reduced to a personal matter. The French consider the quasi extinction of religion from their society as a symbol of the triumph of individualism and modernity.

Christianity was accommodated and pacified within French society over the years. The attribute for this assimilation goes to the intellectual enlightenment, industrialization and colonization. The politics of Christianity became mollified by the politics of European nationalism, socialism and capitalism.

But Islam, which traveled to France though the people of former colonies, could not create a place of peaceful cohabitation for three reasons. First, it came from foreign land external to Europe. Second, France’s rigid culture of secularism sees Islam under negative sheds. And third, whether people like it or not, the seed of France’s turbulent relations with Islam lies in its colonial past.

According to Michel Tribalat, a researcher at INED, people of North African (Maghreb) descent in France 82% of the Muslim population. That means the majority of French Muslims living in France are of Algerian origin.

French history is scarred with the Algerian War of 1954-62. The wounds of that infamous conflict may have healed, but the distrust and hatred still remain in the minds of French Algerians toward the state. In fact, despite living in France for many years, citizens of Algerian origin often identify themselves as Muslims first and then Algerian. The French identity does not offer any emotional connection to them.

Let’s remind ourselves that in the case of the Paris attacks, two out of the three terrorists were French citizens of Algerian origin. Relations between France and Algeria still remain strained. Surprisingly, not many efforts have been made to mend ties between the former colonizer and the colonized.

It is true that the presence of Islam challenges the fundamentals of democracy. This challenge could become a crisis as the Charlie Hebdo case shows. If French democracy wants to win, then it has to show flexibility, accommodation and inclusion of those who were left behind on the path of progress. French intellectuals should realize that the republican form of the state has failed to make France a truly multicultural society.

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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With the backing of Algeria’s powerful state institutions, incumbent President Abdelaziz Bouteflika is overwhelmingly expected to win the April 17 presidential election.

After three terms in office, starting in 1999, it seems that neither popular protests nor the political opposition’s statements could prevent the 77-year-old Bouteflika — who has difficulty with his movement and speech following a stroke in 2013 — from running for president once again. In fact, the Algerian president’s wish is to die while still in office. This was confirmed by his current campaign director and former prime minister, Abdelmalek Sellal, who stated: “Bouteflika wants to die as a mujahid (martyr) for Algeria.”

Since early March, the country’s security personnel used force in three incidents to disperse protestors, mainly supporters of the newly-born “Barakat” (Enough) Movement, which is opposed to having Bouteflika run for another five-year term.

The movement has seen its membership grow lately as the election campaign proceeds. Today, the Barakat Movement has its own “collegial organization” composed of 15 people.

No More Repression

On March 15, in what they called “a national meeting to sensitize young people to vote,” supporters of President Bouteflika held a large meeting in Algiers, gathering more than 5,000 people from various places around the country. During this popular meeting — organized by student organizations — officials from different groups announced they were ready to gather more than 1 million votes for Bouteflika on polling day.

At the same time in downtown Algiers, as usual, approximately 100 opponents of Bouteflika’s decision to run for a fourth term held their weekly demonstration without being disturbed by the police, in contrast to the state’s response to previously held protests.

“Enough of this election masquerade,” is the slogan used by opponents, whose numbers keep increasing on a daily basis across Algeria — especially in Berber-speaking regions such as Kabylie, Chaoui and Touareg.

Evoking this situation, an Algerian political analyst at the University of Algiers, , told Associated Press: “[The movement] is an alternative to the classic political parties that have failed and it makes us think of the youth behind the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt.” He added: “The movement’s rough treatment by authorities [has] showed the system’s insecurity. [The government] is afraid that this movement could be a catalyst for a wider conflagration because all the ingredients for an explosion are there.”

Due to the decade-long civil war against an Islamist insurgency in the 1990s, Algeria’s population is no longer ready, nor able to accept falling back to those dark years of shedding blood. This partially explains why the Arab Spring did not manage to affect Algeria in the same way as it did in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa.

The fact now is that Bouteflika’s opponents (those against his reelection) seem to be more determined than ever, promising to strengthen their actions in the form of well-organized street protests.

The presidential election campaign that started on March 23 seems to be a race where the six candidates — just like Algerians have seen in previous election campaigns — promise the moon to the population. Algerians, however, do not seem to show real interest in those candidates’ electoral programs, as they strongly believe the polls will not be free, fair and transparent. For Algerians, the result has already been decided.

After Election Day

Another term for Bouteflika is likely to mean the status quo will be maintained. However, there is an imminent risk of implosion as Algerian society will no longer be as patient as they have in the past, according to analysts.

On this point, former Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche told two local newspapers, El Khabar and , in a recent interview: “The problem does not arise in terms of being for or against a fourth mandate. There are serious problems that will arise immediately after the presidential election, with or without a fourth term.”

Hamrouche highlighted fears that are affecting Algeria, saying: “These threats come from the risk that the system collapses.” He argued that the “system which has reached its limits and can renew itself no more, can no longer govern with coherence nor cohesion” because it ignores the national project. The former prime minister recently called on the army to “intervene and save Algeria from the impasse.”

Bouteflika’s successor, if there is one in the near future, will have to deal with many issues relating not just to politics, but also to Algeria’s social and economic environment. This involves an overwhelming system of corruption that plagues all institutions, including state companies; unemployment; a growing housing demand; and the urge to establish a non-hydrocarbon economy on which the state’s whole expenditures and programs are currently based upon, not to mention many other social problems.

For the young generation in Algeria, harm has already been done and the country has experienced social and economic failures under President Bouteflika. It remains unclear over whether election day will bring answers regarding Algeria’s future, as the real intentions of political actors remain a mystery.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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"Is the revolution like those trees / whose branches will grow if we water them? / I have lived with this obsession for 10 years / I have come among brothers / My friends, what do you think? These men have been living with oppression / since the day of their birth / They cannot make the trees grow with their water" ().

Music is made for the mind, body and soul. But what about using it to fight for peace, unity and change?

In recent years, the Tuareg have used their soulful beats and rhythmic blues as a platform to express their strife and constant struggle which is prevalent in their homelands. International appearances by Tuareg musicians offer an in-depth insight to existing anthropological issues, notions of identity, and diasporic traditions.

The Tuareg are a loose union of collectives, made up of ancient pastoral nomads, who have inhabited the world’s hottest desert: the Sahara. They refer to themselves as Kel Tamasheq (people who speak Tamasheq) or Kel Tagelmust (people of the veil).

Tuareg cover themselves not only for practical reasons, so as to avoid the inhalation of wind borne sand, but also for more humble reasons. The men are known to find exposing their mouth and nose to strangers, or people of a higher position, as a shameful act. As one visualizes scenes of them gallantly riding their white camels through routes traversing the Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa, with their indigo veils flapping through the Saharan wind, this image of sheer majesty, grandeur and Oriental beauty has become a subject of fascination for academics and adventurists alike.

Prior to the colonial interventions of the 19th century, the Tuareg people were practicing their ancient traditions uninterrupted. However, colonial structures have divided this ancient Tuareg territory, to now span across several countries — inevitably causing significant transformations in the social, political and economic climate, which has somewhat tainted this romanticized image.

The Tuareg are nominally Muslim, and they currently account for of the world’s population. They are primarily grouped into four sovereign federations, crossing Algeria, Niger, Libya and Mali; and to a lesser extent Nigeria and Burkina Faso. Whilst the Tuareg community have been deprived of a homeland, and often constitute the "minority" label in the countries they reside in, their artistic unity and culture has traveled with them, spreading widely across the globe.

Culture and Identity

A prominent part of the Tuareg culture is their musical history. To Tuaregs, music is a well-developed art form: it is their life, their identity, and their voice. Through the harmonic sounds, many stories of achievement and collapse, tales of their century-long resistance against French colonialists and the political regimes that followed, have been shared. Music is a channel in which artists can “” — it has become a means of resistance and a strong artistic expression for the Tuareg community.

With hypnotic vocals and haunting rhythmic blues which draw similarities to Arabic melodies intertwined with Berber instruments, Tuareg women have become infamous for their use of high-pitched cries. This marks their strong presence and it highlights that Tuareg music is the domain of women; where women hold a prominent element of agency.

This artistic expression provides a nuanced understanding of traditions which comprise the hybrid, Tuareg identity. Due to the onslaught by the oppressive governments of Mali and Niger, many band members of prominent Tuareg music groups, including Tinariwen, were brought up in Libyan refugee camps. This resulted in them being under the rule of the Muammar Qadaffi regime, which consequently led to their songs underlying themes of regret for not having a conventional pattern of life, and their personal objection to injustice.

Due to the sheer number of refugee camps traversing Libya, Algeria, Niger and Burkina Faso, it has allowed Tuareg musicians who come from these areas to bring a subjective voice and channel their eclectic experiences into the songs they project to the rest of the world. These songs are aimed at highlighting the importance of sustaining traditions, which have preserved Tuareg identity despite enduring conflict.

The Tuareg of Mali recently gained media interest due to the civil war which erupted in 2012; a war which displaced more than . The conflict was an adverse result of Qadaffi's ouster in Libya. Through this recent war, Tuareg musicians were subject to disdain because of their fight for an independent state, and additional reasons such as their contribution to the musical world; an issue which is in opposition to the beliefs of Islam. This has been widely expressed in the pentatonic rhythms of Amanar — a northeastern, Malian band — in their song, Alghafiat (Peace), where sings:

"My brother, be careful, because one morning we could find ourselves locked in a pen / With racist threats and finger-pointing / The world nowadays is so tiring, with wars all the time."

Tuareg Music Labels

There are numerous, current record labels and music collectives who have documented the journeys of various Tuareg groups, ranging from Amanar, a group that has embraced the modernization of Tuareg sound by utilizing drums and an electric piano, to Etran Finatawa, a Niger-based band who incorporate sounds from nomadic Wodaabe. 

Field recordings, videos and cellphone data collection have allowed Sahel Sounds, a project which emerged in 2009, to record the musical spectacle of the Sahel. Christopher Kirkley, the esteemed founder of Sahel Sounds, has aptly declared the correlation between Tuareg music and the identity of its artists: “The Tuareg guitar is a music that was born in exile. It is music of marginalized groups, distributed via clandestine underground networks, [and] maybe the sound of the diaspora comes across in the music.” These promising music ventures enable a platform for archiving and examining the struggles of Tuareg artists in current global media.

An additional record label that has dedicated its time in revealing the obscure tales and sounds our world harbors, is Sublime Frequencies, a Seattle-based label. In an interview, the co-founder of Sublime Frequencies, Hisham Mayet, highlighted the significant importance that Tuareg music has had in the global sphere:

“Within the last ten years, in the wake of Tinariwen's worldwide success, Tuareg music has become a viable and important message for the rest of the world to hear and appreciate. It has brought to light the struggles that the Tuareg community has faced, for recognition of their rights to live and govern themselves in the vast Sahara desert.”

Music for Change

It is evident that over time, musicians and artists have become advocates for peace and unity in their fight for justice. As a result of his early 1960s protest music, many civil rights workers were rapt by Bob Dylan’s delve into politics and his increasing involvement with the civil rights movement, channeled through his second studio album, The Freewheelin’ Bob Dylan. This demonstrates that music can be used to spread the voice of the silenced, while it can act as a symbol of division or unity.

Through various international performances, Tuaregs have gained recognition in the global music world. This has enabled an intriguing memory formation, which has consequently led to a cultural depiction in the form of lyrics. These lyrics have assigned multi-faceted ethnographies of history, personal exile and refugee flight. 

Tinariwen, one of the most recognized Tuareg bands, has gained international acknowledgment due to its numerous global festival appearances and the winning of a Grammy award for the group's fifth album, Tassili.

However, recently, more obscure artists, including Imarhan N'Tinezraf, have emerged from refugee camps traversing the Sahel. Their heart-rending lyrics covering a composite of demands — from calling for the need of education in Tuareg society to demanding an independent state — illustrates how music has enabled bands to express their wistful woes.

If artistic expressions in refugee camps can be used as a tool for survival in the face of the economic, social and political adversities, one can look to use music as a possible solution in diminishing crime and violence — a result of the continuous ennui in current, global refugee camps.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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I recently returned from Dakhla, in the south of Morocco, where the sounds of the Atlantic Ocean reminded me that there is an undeniable link that is becoming increasingly stronger between Africa and the Americas. 

Earlier, in October, that was the theme of the , a joint project of the and the  that explores the growing vitality of commerce, diplomacy, and common interests in the environment, human development, and economic growth on both sides of the ocean.

Throughout my stay in Morocco, including most recently in Dakhla, the theme of the country's future in Africa was a recurring issue. South-south ties are highlighted, along with outreach to the US, as an alternative to Morocco’s traditional trading partners in Europe, which have experienced a decline in their interactions with Morocco. Dakhla, we were told, is Morocco’s “Door to Africa” — much as Tangier is Morocco’s “Door to Europe.”

Morocco’s Role in Regional Security

At a recent roundtable organized by the focusing on Morocco’s security relations in Africa and their intersection with US interests in the region, Dr. J. stated his belief that Morocco is sometimes taken for granted by US policy makers, despite, or perhaps because of, our long and valued ties.

He believes that in a region where the US does not have many reliable allies, it should do more to build a strong security relationship with Morocco. While the country has a very robust counterterrorism strategy, Pham noted that greater international cooperation will certainly expand the effectiveness of the region’s efforts to maintain security and promote stability.

Morocco and the US have held joint military exercises since 1999, and building these into a program of regional joint operations would contribute to the interoperability of forces in West and North Africa and the Sahel, and improve the professional behavior of militaries in participating countries. Pham pointed out that Algeria’s reluctance to include Morocco in regional counterterrorism coordination makes it necessary to have overlapping regional security agreements, which does not serve US interests for a broader, more effective approach to regional security.

Pham also strongly supports a holistic approach to security, which means enhancing stability by including programs that promote economic development, respect for minorities, enhanced rule of law, and better governance. At the core of the recommendations in his paper, later expanded on by the experts, is the view that the US has much to gain by broadening and deepening its security programs with Morocco as a regional player.

While some may argue that Algeria is the dominant counterterrorism player in the region, there is much to be said for comparing the effectiveness of Morocco’s “soft” power results over time to the overpowering use of the “hard” power security force by Algeria, which has largely resulted in displacing extremists from Algeria to its neighbors. It is logical to argue that the best of both may be the best option, if it were available. The inability of the two neighbors to face a common enemy weakens the region’s capacity for integrated security arrangements and exacerbates the weaknesses in combating extremism.

Despite the obstacles inherent in dealing with Morocco-Algeria tensions over the Western Sahara, and the ensuing competition for regional leadership, it was clear, from the consensus at the roundtable, that American and regional interests are not well served by the lack of robust military and security ties between Morocco and Algeria.

Knocking on the “Door to Africa”

Analyzing Morocco’s position on the African continent, , deputy director of the , made a strong case for the country's strategic pivot to the south, arguing that the decline of trade, investment, tourism, and remittances from the EU makes that shift an imperative. Another important point that may seem counterintuitive is that Morocco’s business outreach to the US has been limited, due to the lack of competitiveness and “fit” of Moroccan products with the US market.

With the prospects for North African regional economic integration at a stalemate due to the conflict in relations with Algeria, the Moroccan strategy to expand and deepen its economic ties to sub-Saharan Africa is sensible and can be immensely profitable. Malka’s recommendation is that the US work to enhance Morocco’s strategy to more deeply engage economically throughout Africa, beyond its traditional ties to Francophone Africa.

His basic concern is the need for Morocco to become more competitive in terms of its domestic economy, so that it can enhance its capacity to export manufacturing products to Africa. While Morocco has a strong base in financial, transportation, and IT services, it needs to greatly improve its manufacturing base if it is to succeed in the Africa marketplace.

Among his other recommendations is for the US to work with Morocco by re-allocating US funding through triangular aid programs that utilize Morocco’s expertise in Africa in delivering social, health, and community development projects. He also makes a strong recommendation that Morocco decouple its economic strategy from its Western Sahara policy, as some of the biggest markets in Africa do not agree with Morocco’s position on that issue.

While it is hard to imagine how Morocco could adopt this approach of “agreeing to disagree” with its southern neighbors that support the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), it is not an option to be ignored. There are benefits to all of the parties, not just Morocco, to move the Western Sahara to the side when exploring greater economic and commercial ties critical to their growth targets. Africa would benefit from more efficient markets for commodities, manufactured products, specialty goods, and services; otherwise, external players such as China and India will continue to dominate local economies and deprive the continent of sustainable advancements.

Increasing the Competitive Edge

The experts noted that Morocco already has a strong footprint in Africa and must focus on increasing its competitive edge, in order to expand existing market opportunities and open new ones. This is where business interests can subsume political concerns, in that the private sector has more freedom to operate below the political radar, and therefore, more flexibility and opportunities to promote ties across Africa.

This outcome of enabling accelerated business ties to contribute to regional stability can be a core strategy for US regional interests in stability, employment, and economic growth. And Morocco can be a catalyst in this regard.  

Africa’s rapidly growing consumer markets, the need for more efficient use of agricultural land, power generation requirements, and banking and financial services, all provide immense opportunities for Morocco in Africa. The basic requirement, at this point, is for Morocco to undertake a comprehensive analysis of where it has competitive advantages in the emerging African economy, and build a strategy to target and support its exports to those markets.

While Morocco does not compare with China, India, and even South Africa in terms of size of impact on African markets, it has the agility and private sector capabilities to carve out a prosperous and effective presence in Africa, serving its regional and national economic growth goals, and US interests for greater stability and development on the continent.

*[This article was published in collaboration with .]

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After more than two years, economic issues raised during the Arab Uprisings are still lingering on government agendas. Along with governance and transparency concerns, the most obdurate legacy for most countries is the demand for meaningful employment — a nettlesome priority that bedevils governments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), including the wealthy Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members.

A Complex and Interconnected Challenge

Current governments are burdened with trying to fix education and training regimes that did not prepare local management and workforces for competitive global markets. The lack of a qualified labor force is part of a web of symptoms that result in weak economic growth policies. In addition, opaque regulations are an obstacle to open and competitive markets, as well as restrictive financial regimes that continue to block attempts to broadly facilitate entrepreneurship and greater domestic and foreign investment. While there are some glimmers of improvement, after decades of neglect, the prospects for short-term solutions are limited.

Improving education and training requires an organic strategy that incorporates stakeholders across the employment spectrum, from labor and management to the labor pool, government ministries, the private sector, and all intermediary groups and institutions, including NGOs and civil society focused on concerns ranging from gender to healthy environments.

A core economic issue is the plight of youth, usually defined as those under 30, with little schooling through university education, who are marginally employed usually in the informal economy, unemployed, or seeking employment. The priority of youth employment was in the spotlight of the in Amman, Jordan where experts in employment and education and advocates such as of Jordan were quite explicit about the challenges confronting the region. According to the , some 40 percent of men and 62 percent of women in the MENA are engaged in non-wage employment (farming and self-employment).

The (ILO) put youth unemployment at 28.3 percent in 2012 and says it will not reverse course for the next five years, despite a global economic recovery the ILO projects at 30 percent by 2018. In his remarks at the WEF, Majid Jaafar, CEO of Crescent Petroleum, noted that on  percent of the region's youth are currently unemployed and the figure is rising — expected to exceed 30 percent within five years, and already exceeding 50 percent in some countries.

Challenges to Accelerating Youth Employment

While there is universal agreement on the centrality of improving job opportunities for youth in the MENA, realistic programs and goal-setting are constrained by four fundamental factors:

1.   Availability of jobs: Throughout the region, from Mauritania and Morocco to Qatar and , there is a jobs deficit due either to a lack of opportunities, a mismatch between the job skills and those of the labor pool, gender restrictions, or perceptions of young people concerning available jobs.

2.   Lack of investment in projects that create jobs for nationals: Either there is not enough local and foreign investment to drive job creation, or projects are capital (energy) or (construction, infrastructure), limiting opportunities for inexperienced local hires.

3.   Inefficient ecosystem supporting new business development: Onerous local labor regulations, lack of reasonable access to financing for start-ups and business expansion that inhibits entrepreneurship, perceived threats to existing unions and industries, and insufficient resources for targeted training and education combine to stifle growth.

4.   Need to coordinate and target international and national economic and technical assistance programs: Too often, well-meaning efforts are in silos within government ministries or agencies, and do not benefit from a broader perspective on closing the gap between education and employment and applying value chain analysis and similar tools to better utilize human investment dollars.

Agencies look to addressing their specific objectives rather than seeing how their efforts impact other agencies. For example, entrepreneurship, technical, and vocational training will benefit from closer coordination and sharing of resources to align programs to provide skills for trainees that enable them to make choices, rather than limit their options to certain trades.

Given the wealth and demographic differences among the MENA countries, there are few cookie-cutter approaches or “lessons learned” that can be applied across the region. Rather, a series of principles need to be defined in each case, informed by similar efforts in other parts of the world. points out:

“North African economies face significant challenges related to labour-market efficiency and institutions. More labour-market flexibility and more efficient allocation of talent, as well as a fundamental overhaul of the institutional framework, will be crucial for creating growth and employment in these countries [Libya, Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria].”

While the required reforms may be conceptually and technically straightforward, the political, social, and economic stakeholders in each country will inevitably shape the policy outcomes.

Take the issue of facilitating skills acquisition by youth. With the majority of the populations in MENA between the ages of 15-35, there are few prognosticators who are willing to divine how that demographic surge is to be absorbed, particularly if greater female employment is an objective.

*[Read the on September 19.]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The 2011 fall of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi and the subsequent breakdown in order in Libya, has been a major contributor to the instability plaguing large swaths of the Sahel region and Northwest Africa. In particular, the flow of weapons, such as a multitude of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and explosives, from liberated Libyan military stockpiles into the surrounding countries has galvanized existing political opposition currents, separatist movements, and transnational militant groups.

Much of the concern regarding the impact of weapons proliferation out of Libya emphasizes the potential threat of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) falling into the hands of radical Islamist militant groups, such as al-Qaeda or one of its regional or international affiliates. In light of the persistent threat of international terrorism as it relates to commercial air travel, such concerns remain valid. Yet it has been the residual impact of the proliferation of SALW and explosives on regional stability and security, that has posed the most immediate threats to what is an already precarious political and security environment.

Mali, which has experienced severe unrest since January 2012 – including ethnic Tuareg-led insurrections, radical Islamist insurgency, and a military-led coup d’état – has been the most dramatic example of the region’s post-Qaddafi volatility; Chad and Niger have also been forced to deal with fallout from the Libyan revolt. Algeria has experienced a noticeable uptick of violence, including the January 2013 attack against the Tigantourine natural gas facility in Amenas in eastern Algeria along the Algerian-Libyan border. The attack at Amenas was orchestrated by militants associated with an offshoot of al-Qaeda’s North African affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), known as al-Mulathameen (The Masked Ones). Nigeria believes that radical Islamist militants affiliated with Boko Haram have also been emboldened by their access to Libyan arms. While lying outside of the geographic space that is the subject of this analysis, the increase in violence in Egypt’s Sinai region is also being partially attributed to the influx of smuggled Libyan arms into Egyptian territory.

To date, the proliferation of Libyan weapons has further militarized numerous existing political opposition and radical movements and afforded opportunities for other violent and irregular actors to pursue their own objectives. Qaddafi’s fall was followed by a troubled political transition that remains marred by violence between rival factions and militias, resulting in a power vacuum in one of the region’s most militarized states. As Libya struggles to consolidate its domestic political institutions and establish some semblance of law and order, SALW and explosives proliferation stemming from within its borders will continue unabated. Consequently, the countries lying within the Sahel and Northwest Africa will continue to have their security undermined by developments in Libya. 

Libyan Weapons: Galvanizing Violence

Despite the concerns surrounding the disposition of Libya’s arsenal of MANPADS, there is no concrete evidence that any militants present in the region – radical Islamist or otherwise – have procured the weapons systems. Nevertheless, the potential threats associated with MANPADS continue to attract much of the attention in regards to proliferation. These worries were exacerbated by documents discovered in Libya in September 2011, indicating that Russia had provided Qaddafi with several hundred advanced – and unaccounted for – SA-24 “Grinch” surface-to-air missiles. In March 2011, Chad’s President Idriss Deby claimed that Libyan MANPADS had entered Chad and Niger. Malian officials echoed Deby’s claims. A number of unconfirmed reports circulated in regional media outlets claimed that various North African regional militant groups had acquired MANPADS in 2012 and 2013. Algerian officials reported in February 2013 that they confiscated numerous Russian surface-to-air missile systems in Algeria’s southern regions.

But it is the proliferation of more prosaic weapons systems – essentially a diverse array of SALW and explosives – that have most actively contributed to the recent wave of unrest and instability in the Sahel and Northwest Africa. An assortment of Libyan weapons started entering neighboring countries soon after the outbreak of civil war in Libya. In early 2011, assault rifles, ammunition, mortars, mines, and plastic explosives began crossing Libya’s borders into Algeria, Egypt, Niger, and Mali. In April 2011, regional media reports claimed that pickup trucks carrying arms, ammunition, and explosives from eastern Libya had crossed into Mali via Chad and Niger.

Since 2011, concerned officials have repeatedly claimed that Libyan weapons and stockpiles of plastic explosives are being distributed to militants in Niger, Algeria, Nigeria, and elsewhere. Established organized criminal and illicit trafficking networks traversing the Sahel’s ancient East-West trade routes, and associated networks that link the north to the south, are facilitating this trend. The porous borders throughout the territories in question also help ensure that the relative free flow of illicit trade continues unimpeded. The increasing availability of arms has also provided aspiring militants with the opportunity to establish their own fringe factions. Weapons traffickers are also benefiting from the additional sources of supply and increasingly diverse selections of arms.

Mali, Chad, and Niger

This is most evident in Mali. The political leadership in Bamako has long disenfranchised Mali’s Tuaregs, a nomadic population that is related to the indigenous Berber peoples of North Africa and the Sahel region. Qaddafi employed thousands of Tuareg mercenaries from Mail, Niger, and Chad to bolster the Libyan military while fortifying his own power base within the Libyan security apparatus. Following the collapse of his regime, the repatriation of these generally well trained, heavily armed, often battle hardened, and politicized Tuaregs remains a major challenge. In January 2012, a separatist Tuareg rebellion broke out in northern Mali. In March 2012, Malian military officers launched a coup against the government of President Amadou Toumani, in response to what they claimed was the mismanagement of the military with the rebellion. By April 2012, Tuareg rebels, allied with a variety of Islamist militants, had gained control of most of northern Mali, prompting a joint French-Malian military campaign to recapture the north in January 2013.

Despite French and Malian efforts, northern Mali remains a militant stronghold. Tuareg separatist groups such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), and the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA) exist alongside – and increasingly clash with – regional Islamist extremist groups such as AQIM, the AQIM-affiliated Movement of Jihad and Oneness in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar al-Dine (AAD), among others. For instance, MIA is a splinter group of AAD. The MIA broke from AAD in January 2013 and subsequently renounced its tactics and ties to AQIM. Similarly, MAA was formed as a secular alternative to the more Islamist-oriented MNLA. These groups – all of whom have benefitted from the influx of weapons from liberated Libyan caches – have created an atmosphere of ongoing violence in Mali, complicating the region’s prospects for stability.

The specter of anti-government violence also haunts Chad. The Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) threatened in March to renew its militant campaign against the Deby regime despite having agreed to lay down its arms in 2010. There has been speculation that arms from Libya have encouraged the UFR’s saber rattling, and Deby – who has survived multiple coups, including an alleged attempt by two generals and two legislators to take over the country this past May – has accused Libya of harboring UFR rebels.

Niger also faces an uncertain future in the wake of the Libyan collapse. In May, MUJAO militants launched a suicide bombing – the first attack of its kind in Niger – against a Nigerien army base and French uranium mine operated by Areva in northern Niger. The group claimed that the operation was designed to punish Niamey for deploying a contingent of peacekeepers to Mali. The attacks, which Niger claimed were launched from Libya, raised concerns in both Niger and Europe about the safety of Niger’s uranium deposits; France, which derives the majority of its electricity from nuclear power, receives about 40 percent of its uranium from Niger. Niger is also reported to possess significant oil deposits, and has a history of rebel-led violence directed at its uranium and oil sector. Since 2007, the Tuareg-based Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ) has threatened to attack oil and uranium operations in the country, unless Niamey provides the MNJ with a greater share of national energy revenues. MNJ has kidnapped Chinese and French workers at oil and uranium facilities, and many fear that the instability in Libya will provide the MNJ with additional resources and an increased operational capacity.

Organized Crime and Regional Smuggling Networks

As the number of militant groups in the region grows, the demand for weapons increases, bolstering the illicit trade networks that have existed alongside legitimate trade relationships in the region for years. The Sahel and Northwest Africa are focal points of arms trafficking since the 1990s, and since the early 2000s, narcotics trafficking – especially of cocaine and cannabis resin – has been on the rise. The region in question is widely touted as a global hub of narcotics trafficking that encompasses links to Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Europe. Organized criminal networks, which often incorporate networks of underpaid and corrupt government officials and regional security personnel, have exploited the growing instability to expand their operations, assisted by the flood of Libyan weapons into the region.

Risks

The current Tuareg separatist and radical Islamist-led violence in the Sahel and Northwest Africa is unlikely to recede in the near-term. The desperate poverty of the region, where drought and expanding desertification have ravaged the agrarian economy and frequent kidnappings have decimated the foreign tourist trade, provides few legitimate and viable employment opportunities to Tuareg mercenaries returning from years of service – and employment – in Libya. These populations have been ignored and marginalized by their governments for decades, resulting in extreme resentment and a steady process of politicization.

Qaddafi was in power for over 40 years, and his absence is being felt on many levels. Despite his government’s isolation from the larger Arab and Western worlds, the former Libyan army colonel actively cultivated close ties with his African neighbors to the south, using Libya’s considerable oil wealth to promote infrastructure development projects, broker peace deals, and provide employment to impoverished and disenfranchised minority groups. Libya’s new provisional government is unlikely – and largely unable – to continue Qaddafi’s policies towards Libya’s African neighbors, policies on which many of those neighbors had come to depend economically, politically, and socially. This, combined with the influx of Libyan SALW and explosives into the region and the subsequent strengthening of numerous anti-government and separatist militant groups, clouds the security, political, and economic outlook for the Sahel and Northwest Africa.

*[This article, originally published with the title, "," has been reproduced with the permission of .  Copyright 2013 Helios Global, Inc.]

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The Greatest Challenges for the Government

Repairing a tarnished image: Even under the spell of decades of corruption, and two military coups following a war almost lost, and given its current status as an interim unity administration, the government of Mali has invested heavily in repairing its image and credibility in the international arena with extraordinary efficiency. Capitalizing on the previous benefits and fruits of its long tradition of democracy, the current representatives of the state, both domestically but especially so internationally, have managed to restore confidence on Mali in the international community. This have led them to pledge extraordinary resources for restoring the integrity of Mali, sometimes as if the Asawad affair was only a bad dream, or as if the issue of democracy is simply a matter of time.

To reach this point, Mali has led itself through strong and brave reforms in pursuing the return of democracy: They have declared elections, while checking the military back to its traditional role of protecting the nation from internal and external enemies; they have taken the initiative in establishing a dialogue for reconciliation committee, opened up to nongovernmental and international governmental organizations; and are feverishly collaborating openly with their allies, to demonstrate accountability and commitment to contemporary democratic principles.

Mali has undertaken the impossible role of fighting two or even up to four different types of insurgencies and waves of terrorism from domestic to international. It has become the playground of geopolitical confrontations far and beyond its traditional size and scope, and yet it has come out, instead of a victim, as a potential winner in reasserting itself on the international stage, this time as a critical strategic player.

Sticking With One Last Critical Issue

The Malian government questioned quite effectively the credibility of the MNLA's claim for an independent north, and managed to come out almost unscathed from a war which raised, and still raises, many questions over the human rights situation in the country and in regards to the strength of influence of the retreating military regime.

To this effect, Mali worked hard in utilizing every potential source and diplomacy, from hiring lobbyist companies in the US to using disarming honesty in press conferences and public exchange opportunities. Through diplomatic missions such as the one in Washington DC, Mali has extended their hand for assistance and collaboration to nongovernmental organizations and associations, to the academia, to religious global entities such as Mali has done everything practically possible to develop its “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA)” And yet, it still has to pass the test of negotiating with the MNLA successfully. It is not the last test left for Mali but it is certainly absolutely critical.

The Issue of Sovereignty

Treated as black and white, the issue of sovereignty is not a brainer for any modern state. The answer is simply “no” to any attempt to question this most vital source of legitimacy of the authority on a nation state’s owned physical and legal space. Yet, the issue of sovereignty does come along with legitimacy, and effective governance is the supreme judge in deciding who is entitled to which.

Due to chronic corruption and mismanagement, the seemingly stable democracy of Mali was, in fact, a boiling cauldron ready to explode especially in the north. And even though the war begun with the return of Qaddafi’s Tuareg soldiers from Libya, that alone does not explain the limited resistance of the Northern Malian population — or even the army in some cases — against the MNLA. Nor does it explain the persistence and resilience of the MNLA, fighting since October 2011 in a "foreign land" without an outside available life line. Nationalist separatist insurgencies, such as this, are heavily dependent on local resources to remain active.

A Vacuum of State Legitimacy

As in many other cases — including in Colombia, Kosovo, Northern Ireland, Nepal, Sri Lanka, India, Mexico, and others — when the state neglects a territory under its jurisdiction, for one reason or another, citizens grow marginalized and eventually revolt or become vulnerable to joining outside forces in challenging the state's authority on the basis of legitimacy. When that tendency is combined with historically existent identity issues, such as ethnic strife, religious competition, ideology, and other ingredients, then follows the incipient formation of insurgencies which now openly and by force challenge the state’s legitimacy.

In the case of Mali, the chronic situation of deprivation in the north, mounted by an extensive and disastrous drought, prepared the gates for an insurgency to arrive in the shape of returning Tuaregs from Libya as MNLA. The great challenge for Mali is not dealing with the MNLA's aspirations for independence. This issue can be addressed effectively, as mentioned earlier, with constitutional and political arrangements. The greatest challenge for Mali will be to establish its presence and administrative credibility in the north in order to regain its legitimacy. Given the resources made available for after elections, this task might become easier now than it was before the war started. The return of the refugees in a stable and growing North will resolve the MNLA problem in the long run, just as it did in Niger.

Disentangling Disarmament from National Sovereignty

In dealing with issues such as disarmament, there is plenty of space to address the concerns of MNLA fighters over their own safety. Framing the armed MNLA  as “two armies in one Mali,” and contrasting Malian sovereignty with them being armed, is a treacherous path to follow. The French or the oncoming UN-AU ECOWAS peacekeeping force may provide mechanisms which will increase security, including for MNLA fighters, allowing for a much more orderly and conclusive disarmament.

However, this might be too much to expect to happen before the elections. Seeking the cooperation, if not collaboration, of the MNLA with a thoroughly chosen Malian, as well as French, and a UN contingent in providing security together in Kidal for fair elections might provide a better option; all this of course in exchange of the promise of the MNLA to disarm after elections — given an agreed sequence of steps, similar to the IRA disarmament process in Northern Ireland.

The Temptation to Spend More on Another War

Given the abundance of resources provided to the Malian Army, and in spite of their short training and rushed mobilization towards Kidal, the temptation of many in the government and the military to take the city with an assault is enormous and maybe justified. Yet, besides the risk of winning a Pyrrhic victory, taking the path of war once again may determine where the priorities of Mali will be overspending most of the money pledged by its friends in Brussels and elsewhere.

If the country finds itself trapped in a chronic counterinsurgency quagmire, whatever was to be spent towards building infrastructure, schools, providing incentives to youth to distant themselves from militants or those involved to disarm, and assisting the refugees for a successful return, most instead will go towards supporting the counterinsurgency effort. Especially if Tuareg nationalism overlap as narrative with international Jihadism, then the pattern will be replicated along sub-Saharan Africa in a much larger scale.

To put things in perspective, the total amount of money pledged recently by the international community to rebuild Mali was more or less the same with the amount spent by the US for the war in Afghanistan in 2009. Furthermore, in counterinsurgency over-investing on the military option while neglecting the other, socioeconomic parameters usually fuels the given insurgency even further. The consequences will be lasting. Mali’s profile for the next fifty years may depend on the effort invested in avoiding the war with the MNLA today.

Easy Ones for the Government

A commitment to constitutional amendments and/or a Malian Bill of Rights: It is in accordance to the democratic traditions of Mali and the spirit of tolerance for the other — part of a combined heritage as a Muslim and a multi-ethnic society — to maintain and improve institutions that will consolidate such traditions.

Considering the long history of rebellion in Mali, it may be time to contemplate over new political and constitutional instruments which will address those challenges once and for all. There are examples of successes and failures in that domain and I will recite Spain as a failure in addressing the Basque issue via constitutional amendments vs. the far more successful French constitutional reforms in addressing the exact same Basque minority within its own borders.

A Bill of Rights may provide more confidence to state institutions in avoiding a clientele culture of party favoritism and potential retribution rising from the grievances caused by the war in the new Mali. Many Tuareg including returning refugees will fall victims of retribution, unless there is a strong solid framework of protection in  place.

Strengthening the Mandate 

Even though the commitment to the absolute application of law and punishment of those who committed crimes during the war is totally understandable, when it comes to peacebuilding and reconciliation dialogues, in particular, things get more complicated. The Reconciliation Committee must acquire a mandate to include the powers of impunity (especially when it serves progress on the truth front); executive powers in regards to victims, including surviving victims and families of victims; returning refugees and resettled IDPs; mechanisms to absorb and adopt orphan children of rape victims or parentless youth; and in dealing with other specific and circumstantial cases of victimhood.

It will be impossible for the state to provide such services and creative solutions to move forward the reconciliation process from within its staggering, red tape infested monolithic apparatus — as any state would. By extending the mandate of the dialogue for reconciliation committee to include executive powers, given the right structures of measuring progress, and grinding accountability, things will move much faster and much more efficiently on the ground.

The Equal Distribution of Development Aid

It is already a common understanding between most members of the interim administration and those who have pledged money for Mali’s reconstruction, that the benefits will be distributed equally to all regions and people in the country. The attitude of treating Mali as one big family expressed by many Malian public officials is a noble one, but even in families there are favorites and those considered outcasts, and in the case of a state dealing with minorities, the law makes all the difference.

The distribution of development assistance has to be accompanied by legislative and constitutional reforms. Laws regarding policing, taxes, citizenship, land ownership, and their aspects of Malian life, will have to come to life by the newly elected government as a guarantee for a successful post-war transformation.

What Others Can Do

The French are looking for a way out of Mali, even though their limited presence in dealing with counterterrorism is now considered a given. But for the immediate situation, so far, they have invested into keeping the MNLA separate from the Malian government forces, while at the same time balancing the scale enough against the MNLA to push them specifically into negotiating their future within a Malian sovereign state. It is tedious work, and so far they have excelled even though they are gradually staying out of time. If the MNLA gets desperate enough to join the Jihadists, all of their efforts in resolving the Tuareg nationalist issue separate from the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb will go to shambles. Maintaining access into Kidal and other Tuareg controlled territories, gives the French an advantage in playing a leading role in the MNLA’s pre-election or post-election disarmament.

The US has so far invested in helping the French and the intervention coalition with logistical support and especially refueling, while at the same time prudently emphasizing both the need for the return of democracy in Mali and a peaceful resolution on the MNLA question. It is now providing aid for elections preparation, as well as for strictly humanitarian purposes. The US is fully aware of the geostrategic significance of Mali and will invest heavily in assisting on reconstruction, security and stabilization in the region. The British, French, Irish, German, and other European countries are currently training the Malian army and will do so until there is a standing force able to repel any further threats.

In spite of intentions, the UN, AU, and ECOWAS peacekeeping force may become a major threat to progress in restoring peace in Mali, unless they are well prepared, ready and trained to dealing with a variety of eventualities, and disciplined enough to stay away from causing trouble, similar to those in Bosnia, Somalia, and DRCongo ("Mon-useless"), such as in promoting sex slavery, human trafficking, and committing other crimes and or by abusing their power. The Malian people are far too vulnerable right now to resist the potential misdeeds of a force as overwhelming as 12,000 troops from more than a dozen different nationalities.

In regards to the MNLA, it might be even preferable that the current negotiations are concluded before the UN peacekeepers arrive en masse, adding one more variable to the already highly complex conflict system. They should, however, be considered as part of any other solution in providing security to returning refugees, delivering humanitarian aid, assisting in decommissioning processes, and actively repelling Jihadist attacks, if necessary.

Ending a War

Theoretically, for as long as the MNLA controls Malian territory alone, the war in Mali is still ongoing. Overcoming issues such as disarmament, and impunity, and restoring peace and stability in the country sustainably, will take much more than the current negotiations between the MNLA and the government. Yet, by closing this painful chapter in time, the interim government may give the oncoming elected government a chance to to a clean start.

Ending the war in Mali will be a strategic victory for all Malians, as well as their neighbors and beyond. A traditionally moderate Muslim state, post-war Mali, while healing, may provide an even better example of itself as a nation which can successfully combine democracy and freedom of expression, along with ancient traditions, living heritage, in an ultra-diverse ethnic setup. To that end, building peace with the MNLA via negotiations will be a decisive step for the future of Mali.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Fragile Coexistence of Anti-Malian Government Forces in Kidal

from the ground suggests that currently, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) may be in control of Kidal but had been unsuccessful in asserting their full authority. Many other elements are present in the region including MIA and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Attacks against MNLA checkpoints by the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) , and the latest full scale engagement that allegedly prompted a brief French Air Force intervention, indicate that the MNLA provides a very fragile stability in the areas under their control, which over time will come to resolve itself. The French involvement seems to provide a marginal advantage for the MNLA but not enough to allow them to reassert their earlier ambitions of cutting off from Bamako. Yet, if pushed too hard, the MNLA might join forces or even partially melt into the Islamist militant ranks with all the adverse regional implications mentioned earlier.

Should the Parties Negotiate Now?

A better solution might be to invest in the negotiations option heavily. But are the MNLA and the Malian government ready to negotiate? The current state of affairs suggests a string compliance with the principles of "ripeness and mutually hurting stalemate" form negotiations theory. According to Zartman: "The concept is based on the notion that when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), they seek an alternative policy or way out." The concept is "optimally associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe," which Zartman sees as providing "a deadline or a lesson indicating that pain can be sharply increased if something is not done about it now." In terms of the timing for negotiations between the MNLA and the Malian government, nothing could describe the situation better than this axiomatic principle.

Hurting Stalemate for the Government

If the Malian government engages into a long military adventure by removing the MNLA forcefully from Kidal, it will risk prolonging – or even losing – the war. That will mean missing the historic opportunity to properly use the enormous funds currently available for post-war development pledged by the international community. It may most likely secure condemnation instead, for whatever crimes of retribution will be committed by the troops and militias against the Tuareg in the north. On top of all this it will have to chronically deal with a million refugees and IDPs being used as fertile ground for recruitment by nationalist separatists and Islamic militants — destabilizing Mali and the region for decades to follow.

Hurting Stalemate for the MNLA

On the other hand as, time goes by, the MNLA itself may be strengthening their hold on the limited region of Kidal, but they are risking losing gradually every support from tribal leaders who are already nervous about the Tuareg being associated with an ineffective and political damaging armed rebellion. Aside from their internal challenges, the MNLA has to deal with the AQIM and the openly hostile MOJWA on a daily basis, with potentially explosive face offs at the best, and deadly full-scale engagements at the worst. In time, and as the French will gradually withdraw the carrot of their support, the MNLA will be defeated once more in the hands of the Islamist militants or, even worse, it may melt-in with them. Furthermore, these Tuareg nationalists are risking being excluded by the aid bonanza secured by the government of Mali for development including the north. If this money fails to reach Azawad due to the MNLA's unwillingness to negotiate, and considering that they cannot at the present time alone maintain an independent state, hundreds of thousands if not millions of Tuareg will blame them for poverty, underdevelopment, hunger, and other similar calamities for generations to come.

There is no doubt that the two parties should and have to negotiate now, and also that failure is simply not an option.

The Greatest Challenges for the MNLA

Disarmament: Given the current icy coexistence of the MNLA with AQIM and other militant groups in Kidal, and their close dependence on French air support to maintain dominance against them, disarming overnight in order to accommodate the government’s demands for a peaceful resolution is simply against the rules of survival and common sense. The most likely scenario in such an unstable balance is that the weakest party falls prey to the strongest. In a paradoxical manner it is even against the government's own interest that the MNLA disarms immediately, considering that most MNLA fighters will choose to join the Islamist militants simply so that they save their lives.

Malians or Foreigners? Government officials never miss an opportunity to remind the media that the MNLA is a “foreign force,” and to some degree this is true. Back in 2011, Qaddafi of Libya was recruiting hundreds of Tuareg youth through a well-established network including offices in Kidal. Most of the MNLA fighters who started the war by invading Mali in 2012, after the collapse of Qaddafi’s regime, were previously from those lining up to join Libya. Many had started families there and their status in Mali is not very clear to determine. Even though the Malian government has reached to them as “returning children of Mali,” there are still many holes to fill in regarding the legality of their transition into Malian citizens or that of their foreign family members. If the negotiations fail, and the war is lost, these Tuareg will have nowhere to go, literally. They will either fight it out to death or will join whoever offers a shelter for them.  

How much of reconciliation and how much of justice? Another serious bump on the road to a peaceful settlement is that of impunity. Even though the government established a they have also made clear that justice will be served by the Malian state, to the fullest, on crimes committed during the war. War crimes such as rape and the killing of innocent civilians in the context of war, as much as in peace, are deplorable. However, a certain degree of impunity has applied in almost every previous case of truth and reconciliation process — especially as a reward to the truth aspect of the process, and in helping move easier away from contentious matters and enter into the actual healing process. Studies are still inconclusive over the degree of impunity for crimes against civilians in making reconciliation processes more effective than less. But to shut down the path of impunity altogether is a recipe for some very serious trouble in the near future; an open fire ready to reignite the conflict at any moment.

Given the mistrust of the MNLA towards the Malian government, it is unlikely that they will regards it as an impartial process, and more guarantees and third parties might be needed to help with the investigations. The United Nations may provide processes previously applied elsewhere effectively, and which will not question Malian sovereignty in assisting an impartial investigation. It is a long shot nevertheless.

Easy Ones for the MNLA

In terms of the MNLA accommodating Malian sovereignty, a future disarmament when security is guaranteed, and their transformation into main-stream Malian politics, these are all textbook negotiations issues and they should not cause concern. Independent statehood is not the only way towards asserting a people’s national identity. There are many variations of co-existence with a nation state from within; either this is by strategic necessity or as a matter of survival. Those include the Basque example in France, the devolved state of Wales, and other forms and grades of self-governance and autonomy. Disarmament has been dealt with in many ways, from full integration into armed forces, as in South Africa, to fully disarmament and dismantling through a well-established process guided by committees including interest parties and independent observers such as in Northern Ireland.

The transformation of the Azawad nationalists into a political force added to the Malian parliament depends on the degree to which the party or parties are willing to collaborate with the state from within. It is a very common theme for ethnic minorities to represent themselves in national assemblies as political parties, and even though it might be considered distasteful by many, that parties are drawn along sectarian lines, the system seems to be working at least in providing vital breathing space for the end of violence and in preparing the ground for post war development A successful integration into politics, however, will require capacities which the Tuareg tribes and clans supporting the MNLA might or might not possess, and it is imperative that they begin working with existing parties and the international community in securing a substantial representation in the political arena instead of being swiftly liquidated into the party labyrinth of Bamako.

Return from politics back to violence, when the process has failed a group, has also its historic precedence, such as in the Patriotic Union during the 1980s in Colombia. Thousands of party members were assassinated and the FARC ran back in the mountains to resume their guerrilla operations against the Colombian governments. Every attempt that followed since, to negotiate a transformation of the FARC back again into politics has been haunted by that lost opportunity.

*[Note: Read the final part of on June 14, 2013. This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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that talks were about to resume between the Government  of National Unity of the Republic of Mali and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). They are a part of the commitment of the interim government to restore democracy via elections in the totality of the republic, including those areas currently controlled by the MNLA. Given that elections are scheduled for the end of July, this is one of the most ambitious enterprises in the history of peace negotiations.

A Fragile Balance in Kidal

After the successful intervention of the French, working along with both the Malian Government and the MNLA — as well as Chadian and other neighboring troops — in sweeping the Islamist groups of Ansar Dine, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), Ansar al-Sharia of Mali, and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a fragile balance has been established in several areas in the north and especially in the district of Kidal in the north east. The city of Kidal is actually controlled and administered by the MNLA including policing, tax collection and whatever else an autonomous region requires.

The French Intervention and the MNLA Dilemma

When the French entered Mali, they faced a very strong dilemma. On one hand, they could strike simultaneously against Ansar Dine, AQIM, MOJWA, MIA, and the nationalist/separatist predominately Tuareg driven MNLA. On the other hand, they could capitalize on the hostility between  Ansar Dine and the MNLA, and bring the latter on their side for the duration of their operations in the north. They chose the second. After all, the terrain did require a strong local support, and furthermore, the French needed an ally in locating enemies as well as French hostages. They found that ally in the MNLA.

The MNLA and the Malian Government

The government of Mali protested strongly against what seemed to them an opportunistic and adventurous course set by the French. They argued that since the MNLA had been defeated by the Islamist militants anyway, all the French would have to do was to force the MNLA to complete submission to the Malian Army. It is possible that this might have been the initial plan, but as the Malian Army was advancing to the north, reports of extensive violence of retribution against those who had supported the MNLA, and the Tuareg in general, may have driven the French into keeping the two adversaries apart. They they entrusted the MNLA with the territory they had some control of, including Kidal and the border zones across from Algeria, Niger, and on the other side west, with Mauritania. This tactical decision of the French might have actually saved the whole Opération Serval, for the last thing the French desired was becoming entangled into a war in Mali that originates back to 1916. The French have asserted repeatedly that this is a temporary situation and that they are working on the disarmament of the MNLA . Today, the Malian national unity government, controls all of Mali with the exception of Kidal, enacting pressure on the French, the US and the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), to force the MNLA to put down their weapons, recognize the sovereignty of the state of Mali and surrender the areas that they control to the Malian Army and security forces.

Returning Back to Democracy

Another factor that may have played a role in the decision of the French to separate the MNLA and protect the Tuareg from retributions, was that at the time of their intervention they found themselves dealing with not only one but two belligerents. Mali itself was ruled by a military regime; the result of two consecutive coups. Since then, the international community applied strong pressure on the military, which led among others to the formation of an interim administration — the Malian Government of National Unity — and also the scheduling of national elections including  and then parliamentary elections a few months later, in September. Many remain skeptical over whether these elections are taking place so early considering the open question of Kidal and the lack of benchmarks that would guarantee a fair and peaceful polling. In spite of this skepticism, the government maintains that the elections will proceed as scheduled, with companies hired to organize them, and money flowing from the international community and neighboring countries

Elections in Mali

Elections are a key step towards rebuilding post-war Mali as most governments outside the country, including the US, have denied providing any aid to a non-elected administration. The people of Mali, including the political elite and the military, are being rewarded by the international community for their determination to end military rule and rebuild the country with  and smaller amounts coming from individual states and organizations. Money is already pouring into Mali spent; so far mostly on training and military equipment, and much is to be directed towards preparing for the elections so that the bulk of aid will follow next.

Yet, between now and the promised land of development and prosperity, there is a serious obstacle which Mali has to surmount, and it comes with a very tight deadline. For elections to be fair and meaningful at this crucial point in Malian history, the north, as well as the 300,000 refugees and internally displaced, will have to be included both as candidates and in casting the ballot. For areas such as Kidal — and for security to be restored in order for the refugees and IDPs to return — the issue of the MNLA must first be addressed. In addition to security, and putting an end to the refugee and IDP ordeal, business will find it hard to return to Mali considering the .

Negotiating Peace While Preparing for War

Options for the government of Mali, at this point, include a military assault for removing the MNLA from Kidal or negotiations with the rebels over restoring Mali's full sovereignty — without the use of force before elections time. These two options are currently being developed in parallel. The Malian military has recently engaged in an extensive combination of maneuvers meant to isolate and encircle Kidal, . Even though reports suggest that it is the French who stopped the Malian Army “” nevertheless, the fact that they have stopped against their self-imposed deadline shows prudence and a commitment to a peaceful resolution. At the same time, the government has declared its readiness and determination to negotiate with the MNLA for a mutually accepted solution. This strategy, as wise as it may be, involves risks and obstacles in both tracks — military and negotiations that are worth a closer look.

Preparing for a Pyrrhic Victory?

Without substantial and fully committed and determined support by the French, the African Union, the US, and other allies, even a victorious campaign against the MNLA in Kidal might bring disaster in the long term. To begin with, a . Beefing up the ranks without backing it with soldering experience makes a dangerous recipe for cultivating a potentially disastrous overconfidence of the Bamako government over the capabilities of its own army. The plan to an assault against the MNLA in Kidal will bring the newly trained Malian army face to face with a well-seasoned, well equipped rebel force which is absolutely familiarized with the peculiarities of the Kidal terrain. Such an assault will very likely attract the attention and hostile action by whatever elements of the Ansar Dine, MIA, MOJWA, and AQIM are still hiding in the area, refueling the war and generating another massive wave of refugees and IDPs for post-war Mali to have to deal with.

The Paradox of Overwhelming Force in Counterinsurgency

Even if the assault is successful, it will come short from bringing an end to the MNLA question, even if every MNLA rebel is killed or captured. At this point, the situation in Kidal in regards to loyalties and alliances is to say the least, murky. Most likely at their breaking point, the rebels will retreat, leaving behind theTuareg population of Kidal to fall prey and offer an easy scapegoat for the Malian military’s wrath. With another half a million refugees and IDPs added to the existent pool of the desolate, the MNLA will have no problem in identifying new recruits for the next rebellion. Even worse, one million people will be an ideal ground for recruitment, not only by the MNLA but more so by the AQIM which will most likely, at that point, surpass the MNLA in availability of logistical and military resources. The recent attacks in Niger by Mali based MOJWA demonstrates a sample flavor of is to fall via the military option.

*[Note: Read part two of  on June 9, 2013. This article was originally published by the .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Belatedly, the gas-rich state of Qatar has been assuming a geopolitical role and interventionist policy in the Middle East and the North Africa, one befitting of a superpower, thanks to the tiny Gulf emirate’s disproportionate wealth and largess.

Regional Firefighter

For a while, Qatar, with a population of only a few hundred thousand Qatari nationals, appeared to play the constructive role of a firefighter, sponsoring mediation initiatives to quell local strife and conflicts among vying militant factions in certain hot spots of the Arab world; Darfur being a case in point. The same can be said of Qatar’s generous funds for the redevelopment of southern Lebanon in the aftermath of the Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006 — celebrated in great fanfare during a visit to the region by the Qatari emir for the inauguration of the reconstructed infrastructure.

Qatari money and largess, at the time, were positive developments that welcomed and enhanced the tiny Gulf emirate’s prestige and status vis-à-vis the Arab people. The state’s soft-power and status were further elevated with the successes of the Qatari-owned Al-Jazeera in reaching millions of Arab viewers and presenting, for the first time in the Arab annals, a nongovernment-controlled version of the news and sophisticated TV programs airing across the Middle East and North Africa.

Involvement in Syria

Somehow — and this is where the anomaly of getting caught in a spell of the arrogance of power — Qatar’s strong involvement in the destructive Syrian Civil War is threatening the security and stability of the Levant. Today, Qatar's influence is going against what originally started as the welcomed role of a firefighter and an agent for socioeconomic development in the region.

The stale, brutal, and corrupt political system in Syria — as true of many countries touched by the winds of the Arab Spring — needs total revamping. The country needs the introduction of a democratic system, an accountable government, transparency, and the end of rampant corruption.

However, genuine and local civil protests, which found expression in peaceful demonstrations and civil disobedience that took place at the start of the Syrian crisis, should not have developed into the current armed conflict that now appears to be serving ulterior external political agendas. These agendas are not necessarily in the long-term interest of Syria or the Syrian people. The application of disproportionate brutal force, the heavy-hand of the state, arrogance of power, and shortsightedness of the ruling Syrian regime, along with the Syrian uprising which has developed into an endless armed conflict, has rendered the Syrian situation susceptible to all kinds of foreign intervention. The plan of external powers for a long time was to undermine the defense capabilities of the country due to the Syrian regime’s rejectionist posture vis-à-vis western-sponsored peace initiatives.

Qatar, in part because of a weak and malleable secretary-general of the Arab League, succeeded in taking the Syrian crisis outside the appropriate confines of the Arab world and placing it into the realm of the United Nations and western powers, who tended to internationalize the Syrian conflict and gave room for external players to advance their agendas. Qatar’s overt funding of NATO’s assault on Libya appeared to normalize what would have formerly been regarded as a breach of the joint Arab Defense Pact, observed by members of the Arab League for many decades. By reaching this internationalization of the Syrian crisis, Qatar abandoned its former positive role as a regional firefighter and a constructive agent of stabilization and socioeconomic development.

The escalating armed struggle in Syria is inviting the monster of dormant sectarian tensions, whose tentacles are reaching beyond the Syrian boundaries to the Middle East at large. The stirring of sectarian tensions cannot be completely dismissed as a calculated factor which was consciously deployed at the start of the conflict by the Syrian regime. However, several foreign countries backing the Syrian opposition also used sectarianism as a strategy to render the Syrian crisis open-ended: as a grinding civil war with no decisive outcome in sight.

Flawed Peace Initiative

The recent Qatari proposal to sponsor a further truncated peace initiative in the Arab-Israeli conflict – reducing the Palestinian cause and Israeli apartheid into an issue of a land swap – which was rejected by the Palestinian movements, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, is reflective of a bankrupt Arab polity. This is especially the case as the new Qatari approach is a watered down version of the Arab Peace Initiative that was already insufficient and below the Palestinians’ expectations for a just peace. The apparent single-handed Qatari peace plan is a reflection of an exaggerated sense of importance by the Qataris. It also demonstrates a significantly diminished status of the Arab League by virtue of a weak secretary-general, and the total absence of a truly representative body of Palestinians to decide and veto the uncalled-for initiative by the Qatari Government.

It is high times that Qatar takes a back seat. With the absence of a decisive military outcome to the current conflict in Syria, calls for neutral Arab intermediaries will become louder. Algeria, Egypt and Sudan — individually or in unison — can step in to play this intermediary role. This could be carried out within the framework of the Arab League, thus restoring the credibility of the organization and leading to an early peaceful resolution to the Syrian crisis.

Qatar has caused immeasurable damage with regards to the Syrian Civil War, and has dealt a potential setback to a truly genuine peace effort in the Middle East by trying to cut corners. Its bold initiatives cannot be justified by the country’s small size. The stage now seems set for a more neutral and credible Arab intermediary to step in and put an end to what is becoming a senseless and all-destructive war in Syria, whose flames threaten to spread into the wider Levant.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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"At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it has no historical part in the world; …Historical movements in it – that is in its northern part – belong to the Asiatic or European World." Few would now agree with the Hegel’s sweeping dismissal of the greater part of the African continent. Africa is not, as he said, ahistorical. Yet, it would be equally wrong to assume that Africa is fully mistress of her history. History is still something that seems to happen to Africa that is imported from abroad and initiated by others. All too often, in fact, it is granted only a supporting role in its own melodrama, a bit part in a play written for it by others.

Labels From the Past

This much would seem to be confirmed by the on-going debates about the so-called African Spring. First, there is the name: a straight-forward adaptation of the label applied to the wide range of political upheavals and social happenings that have marked, to a greater or lesser extent, various North African and Middle Eastern countries over the past two and a half years. This term is itself a reworking of the Prague Spring, which was coined to describe the Czechoslovakian government’s ill-fated efforts to enhance its citizens’ political and civil rights in early 1968. The African Spring, then, is a hand-me-down term, which casts the continent in the role of camp follower. History has been written elsewhere and Africa is now playing catch-up.

Then there is the smoothing and homogenising effect of this label. Originally, it was devised for Czechoslovakia — such was the significance attached to what took place there. Then it was applied to the 22 states of the Arab world, a trans-continental sub-region with a population of some . And now it describes the collective experiences of sub-Saharan Africa’s 47 countries and their nearly . In this way, this shared term establishes a ratio of import between these regions that still broadly mirrors Hegel’s hierarchy. Moreover, and inevitably, the vital differences in experience between Kenya and Nigeria, Cameroon and Ethiopia, and Guinea and Madagascar, are either lost or ignored. Not for the first time, profound local and sub-regional complexities are simply subsumed by banner headlines.

And finally, there is the framing and chronology of the recent growth in international interest in sub-Saharan politics. For a start, democracy and social stability in the region are viewed ever more through the prisms of the Arab and African Springs. That is, there is growing concern about the knock-on effects of what happened in the north on the rest of the continent. Many of the changes and developments that are taking place in the south are set within the narrative framework and taken as evidence of an African Spring.

Trickle Down and Environmental Effects

Explanations of the Islamist-led violence in Mali and Nigeria, for example, pay careful attention to the roles played by, and influence of, North African actors and events. Algerian terrorists, jobless mercenaries recruited and armed by Muammar Gaddafi, and the collapse of his regime, feature prominently in explanations of the causes of the Malian Civil War and rise of Boko Haram.

Of course, connections do exist. Boko Haram is linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Islamist militants undoubtedly exploited the political instability in Libya to make a grab for power in neighbouring Mali. But Nigeria and Mali’s recent histories, and those of the region as a whole, cannot be explained by the Arab Spring alone. Boko Haram is a resolutely Nigerian phenomenon: a product of domestic pressures and developments. And its armed campaign was gathering momentum long before Mohammed Bouazizi set himself alight. Moreover, the recent presidential election in Kenya proceeded in ways entirely consistent with earlier, pre-Spring votes. Indeed, political life in sub-Saharan Africa continues to be played out in pretty much the same ways that it did before the term "African Spring" was invented.

Significantly, there are hazards attached to using this label. One of the most notable is its implication of pre-destination: its suggestion that Africa is now committed to the same trail recently blazed by North African and Middle Eastern countries and will, as a consequence, undergo the same democratising seizures they did. As a result, the region’s experiences are increasingly shoehorned into an explanatory narrative that masks and obfuscates as much as it explains and clarifies. Rather than cater for local specificities, the term "African Spring" actually hides them.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Algeria is competing to be the next Arab nation to witness a popular revolt. That is assuming soccer is a barometer of rising discontent in a region experiencing a wave of mass protests that have already toppled the leaders of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen, and sparked civil war in Syria.

In fact, there is increasingly  little doubt that soccer, a historic nucleus of protest in Algeria, is signaling that popular discontent could again spill into the streets of Algiers and other major cities. Two years ago, protesters inspired by events in Egypt and Tunisia, ultimately pulled back from the brink despite the toppling of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.

Now, in circumstances similar to Saudi Arabia, protests are mounting amid uncertainty about the future as Algeria’s aging leadership struggles with a series of natural deaths and the effects of health problems among its key remaining members.

Soccer fans earlier this month demonstrated their disdain for the fate of 76-year-old President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who is recovering from a stroke in a Paris hospital, by cheering their team for days in the streets of Algiers in advance of an upcoming championship. Similarly, fans interrupted a moment of silence in a stadium to commemorate the death of a former leader by chanting: “Bouteflika is next.”

Bouteflika’s illness follows the death in the past year of two former presidents, Ahmed Ben Bella and Chadli Benjedid, as well as Ali Kafi, who served as a transition leader in the early 1990s while the military fought Islamist forces who had won elections in a brutal war that left some 100,000 people dead.

The memory of that war and the military-dominated regime’s liberal social spending, temporarily took the wind out of the demonstrators’ sails and persuaded them in 2011 to shy away from staging a full-fledged revolt.

Bouteflika’s stroke threatens to change that.

"If there is not real democratic transition, there will be an uprising…we will return to the violence of the 1990s," warned Chafiq Mesbah, a former member of Algeria's intelligence service and now a political analyst, in an interview with the Associated Press.

The most recent protests are part of an upsurge in soccer-related violence in Algeria; an indicator that increased wages and government social spending is failing to compensate for frustration with the failure of the country’s gerontocracy — in control since independence — to share power with a younger generation, create jobs, and address housing problems.

Dozens of people, including a player, were injured six months ago when supporters of Jeunesse Sportive de la Saoura (JSS) stormed the pitch during a premier league match in their home stadium in Meridja in the eastern province of Bechar against Algiers-based Union Sportive de la Médina d'El Harrach (USM). The incident followed a massive brawl between players and fans after a Libya-Algeria Africa Cup of Nations qualifier. 

Relations between the two countries have been strained since Algeria refused to support the NATO-backed popular revolt that overthrew Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. Algeria has since granted refuge to Colonel Qaddafi’s wife, Safiya, and his daughter, Aisha. One of his sons, Hannibal, is also believed to be in Algeria. Libya apologized in November after hundreds of Libyan fans surrounded the Algerian embassy in Tripoli, ripped the Algerian emblem from the building, and burnt an Algerian flag.

The protesters’ retreat into the stadiums amounted to a tacit understanding between Algerian soccer fans and security forces, whereby football supporters could express their grievances as long as they did so within the confines of the stadiums. “Bouteflika is in love with his throne, he wants another term," is a popular anti-government chant in stadiums.

Stadiums have long been an incubator of protest in soccer-crazy Algeria. A 2007 diplomatic cable sent by the US embassy in Algiers and disclosed by Wikileaks, linked a soccer protest in the desert city of Boussaada to demonstrations in the western port city of Oran, which was sparked by the publication of a highly contentious list of government housing recipients. The cable warned that "this kind of disturbance has become commonplace, and appears likely to remain so unless the government offers diversions other than soccer and improves the quality of life of its citizens."

Seven fans were killed in the last five years in soccer-related violence and more than 2,700 wounded, according to Algerian statistics.

Algeria’s domestic fragility is highlighted by almost daily smaller protests in towns across the country sparked by discontent over lack of water, housing, electricity, jobs and salaries. Protests have led to suspension of soccer matches. Soccer was also suspended during last year’s legislative elections.

A sense that the government may revert to strong arm tactics rather than reform if protests swell, was reinforced when General Bachir Tartag was recalled from retirement in 2012 to head the Directorate for Internal Security (DSI). Tartag, who is believed to be in his sixties, made a name for himself during the civil war against the Islamists as one of Algeria’s most notorious hardliners and a brutal military commander.

The appointment positions him as a potential successor to aging Algerian spy chief General Mohamed ‘Tewfik’ Mediene, widely viewed as the number two within the Algerian regime, should he eventually take over from Bouteflika.

James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture, and the author of  blog.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Broad political consensus in the domestic political sphere, support from the international community, and the urgency of the situation due to the rapid advance of Islamist militias—together, at first glance, these factors seem to justify French military intervention in Mali. Behind the alleged legitimacy of "Operation Serval,” however, France’s role is ridden with gray areas and contradictions due to the inconsistency of objectives and the potentially disastrous consequences for the entire Sahel zone as a result of such military engagement.

The Malian “Demand for Intervention”

The first justification for French military intervention in Mali, launched on 11 January, was the request for military aid against the onslaught of the Islamist group Ansar Eddine led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, with elements of support from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). The attack was launched against the town of Konna in the southern half of the country.

Undoubtedly, it is impossible to accuse France of having acted solely on its own initiative, as it responded directly to a request from the acting President of Mali, Dioncounda Traoré. The request was formulated ​​in a letter addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, and French President, François Hollande. 

This argument, however, assumes Traoré’s legitimacy and evades any questioning of the representativeness and actual political weight of the interim president in the context of troubled democratic transition. A significant portion of the Malian civil society and political class considers Traoré illegitimate, insofar as he remains a "hostage" of the military. 

During the days leading up to the first French air strikes, Bamako was at a boiling point and Malian institutions were on the brink of another upheaval. Political groups supporting the former junta of Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo had launched a series of demonstrations with a strong following that were in favor of organizing a national dialogue aiming to challenge the interim authority. They also reaffirmed their opposition to foreign military intervention, calling for the recovery of the North exclusively by the Malian army. 

As noted in French newspaper, Le Monde’s, special envoy in Bamako, official power seemed on the verge of falling. "The toppling of the fragile local authorities who where led by Dioncounda Traoré seemed “practically inevitable” (pratiquement programmé) said a close associate of the President. According to the same source, the military would have even considered stopping it on the night of January 9 to 10, the eve of the Islamist coalition’s taking of Konna,” writes . These elements, if confirmed, would support the interpretation of the French intervention as a means of preserving a contested regime in extremis, yet nevertheless, favorable to an external military force.

Supporters of France’s war also tend to elide the fact that despite the resistance and hostility against "bandits" and "terrorists," it could be, as in northern Mali, that "popular support for Islamists is deeper than we imagine." Relationships between people and the different Islamist groups are generally viewed through the lens of religious oppression, atrocities, torture, and other human rights violations. Nevertheless, the political and religious forms of organization introduced by the jihadist groups, as well as the economic redistribution of resources coming from contraband and trafficking, could be perceived by the populations of the North as an element of order, justice, and stability in areas neglected by the central government of Mali. 

A Questionable Interpretation of the United Nation Security Council’s Resolution

In terms of international law, the justification of French intervention stems from an interpretation of United Nations resolution 2085, adopted on 22 December 2012. The resolution authorizes the deployment of a multilateral military force, the International Support Mission to Mali (MISMA), mobilized under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 

Despite the support of the international community and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), two discrepancies can be observed between France’s actions and the original spirit of the UN resolution. On the one hand, resolution 2085 initially stipulated, , that the operation "will be conducted exclusively with African combat troops and strong mobilization of the European Union with regard to finances and logistics." However, France’s premature initiation of the operation implies that currently, only French troops are involved in the fighting, arriving to support the Malian army who had faced repeated advances from Islamist fighters. The terms of the French intervention continue to depart from the strict framework of resolution 2085, as the multilateral ECOWAS force has not been deployed on the ground. 

On the other hand, it is important to remember that resolution 2085 focused primarily on advancing political negotiations and establishing a process of dialogue and reconciliation, in addition to military deployment. It is clear that the French operation, justified as an "emergency situation," gives de facto priority to the management of the crisis by force, and relegates the prospects of a politically negotiated solution to the background. The complexity of the situation in northern Mali, and the imbrication of various interests tied to claims of Tuareg and Islamist groups have been reduced to a simple opposition between France and the "terrorists," with whom no negotiation is possible.

What Political Legitimacy?

During the French Army's launch of "Serval Operation," a consensus emerged on the French domestic political stage. The representatives of the left-wing majority party (PS) and the right-wing opposition (UMP), as well as the center (MoDem) and the far right (FN), have mostly supported François Hollande’s initiative. Most French media have also taken a position in favour of the intervention, which was notably qualified as a by the daily Le Monde. 

within the Left and the Green parties have gone against the decision of the Head of State, condemning the launching of a military engagement of France in Mali, which François Hollande had not brought before the Government or Parliament for discussion. In an , the former Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, also expressed his reservations about the "apparent haste" of the operation and his concerns about the re-use of the "war against terror” rhetoric.

Beyond the criticism of the decision-making process that led to the French military engagement and the questionable legitimacy of an intervention conducted in the name of the “war against terror,” there are also contradictions between Hollande’s alleged desire to break from the neo-colonial politics, as claimed during his election campaign, and the reality of his recent actions.

More specifically, François Hollande had declared: that he did not want to behave as "Africa’s policeman,” that he sought to abandon troubled relations related to "Françafrique,"  and that he would privilege multilateral action under the aegis of the United Nations, letting African countries take responsibility for their own security.  For the Head of State to commit an isolated France to an intervention in Mali directly contradicts his previous commitments, and inevitably forces him to adopt an interventionist posture. The Algerian press particularly denounced this attitude, which many voices in Algeria have argued can be likened to a form of neo-colonialism.

For example, of the Algerian daily Liberté denounces this France that has "decided to ignore UN resolutions to go to war against terrorism in the Sahel. It did not resist the epidermal temptation to return to its former domain to show everyone that it is the only one who knows what is best for Malians, their former colonized peoples.” 

Of course, President Hollande denies these charges. "France liberates. France has not a single interest in Mali, it has no economic interest in Mali to defend, it serves for peace," he vowed to the press on 16 January. There are nearly fifty subsidiaries and majority-owned French companies, mostly based in Bamako, employing approximately two thousand employees. The demographic links between France and its former colony also remain significant. Mali has about five thousand French nationals, while one hundred thousand Malians live in France. But more importantly, northern Mali borders Niger and Mauritania, two former French colonies who have closer economic relations with France, and are also vulnerable in the face of the jihadists’ actions.

Objectives and Means 

Since the operation’s launch, France’s goals for the war have seemed uncertain.  After proclaiming the need to ensure the security of French citizens residing in Mali, the government turned towards a hawkish discourse, invoking its response to “aggression,” and the need to halt the progression of armed Islamist groups suspected of proceeding towards Bamako.  Then, in reference to the jihadist groups, François Hollande announced that it was a question of “destroying them, imprisoning them if possible, and making sure that they could cause no more harm.” At the same time, he underscored the principle of re-establishing Malian sovereignty “over the entirety of its territory.” 

Similarly, no precise definition of the military targets and objectives has been suggested. The columns of Islamist combatants who had crossed the line of demarcation between the North and South were initially targeted. The French air raids were then extended to the jihadists’ lower bases and to urban zones, situated several hundred kilometers from the Konna region, where they launched their first offensive.  Now, we are witnessing a massive deployment of ground troops.

The terms of the French intervention have surpassed all the initial limits and frames that had been set. Although that France would not go into combat and that a “European contingent of four hundred men” would compose the Malian army, whereas ECOWAS would lead the military combat, exactly the opposite has happened. The airstrikes were followed by the deployment of French troops, which have been continuously reinforced and expected to reach 2,500 men.

The Creation of a “Sahelistan,” or the Risk of a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 

France finds itself heavily engaged in a military operation of unclear dimensions, “which will last as long as necessary,” according to President Hollande. This inevitably calls to mind the intervention in Afghanistan, where France has only just withdrawn its armed forces, and where the results were mixed, to say the least.

“We have had Afghanistan, there should not be a Sahelistan,” Ironically enough, by getting involved in a long asymmetric war, France risks adding to the instability of the countries in the Sahel and of inciting jihadist militancy, as well as anti-imperial sentiment. Experience has already shown that since 2001, military operations in the name of a “war against terror” have actually worsened the problems they were fighting against, as opposed to eradicating them.   

, in part confirmed by the International Federation on Human Rights (FIDH,) expose the violent acts committed in northern Mali by soldiers in Mali’s regular army – supported by France. These acts, committed against people suspected of collaborating with the armed Islamist groups, could lead to increased support for jihadist groups and exacerbate existing ethnic tensions.

We should also remember that the current crisis in Mali is one of the direct consequences of French intervention in Libya in 2011. Several thousand Tuareg militants recruited as mercenaries in Gaddafi’s army returned to Mali after the fall of the Libyan regime, looting and circulating stocks of arms across the Sahel. They are now one of the factors destabilizing the region and contributing to the strength of the militias. 

While cautioning against the risk of the creation of a “Sahelistan” and the disastrous consequences for the entire region, France is paradoxically engaged in an operation in the Sahel.  Without a profound reorientation in strategy, this will likely provoke a new military mobilization and strengthen the force of a militant jihadism that is fueled by the actions of the ex-colonial power.

A version of this article was originally featured by . The piece was originally published in French and translated to English  and .

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Although the jihadists in northern Mali share the same radical Islamist substrate, we were expecting to see Iyad Ag Ghaly’s Ansar Eddine (AD) movement cloak itself in a more moderate attitude in return for having obtained a respectable status in the Azawad conflict. This was the wish expressed by several international mediators—namely Algeria and Burkina Faso—given the different meetings held in Algiers and Ouagadougou. But some visible signs demonstrate an accord among the different jihadist groups that is too broad to avoid a collision with the international community.

In the start of the negotiation process, Iyad Ag Ghaly appeared to be the right interlocutor—someone who only had local demands, had never taken part in international terrorism, and promised to fight against drug traffickers and organized crime. There was, until now, a thin line that separated him from terrorists like Abu Zeid, the head of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM), Katiba Ibn Ziad, or veteran , a recent AQIM dissident who founded a new katiba named "Signatories by Blood.”

We are dealing with a three-faced jihadism: one that provides essential public services to dominated populations (the main one being the safety of people and property), one that is the face of brutality—including the terror of summary justice and violence  in the name of sharia. The third and final face is that of collusion with organized crime and drug trafficking.

While some countries did not want to launch a foreign military offensive without exhausting all possibilities for peaceful resolution (see: “”), large portions of the international community insisted that the two Malian adversaries first explore all paths of discussion. But neither Bamako, AD, nor the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) seem to have been sincere in their efforts to make compromises.

With the situation being dynamic and volatile, the events of the previous weeks also paint a new configuration where the chances of peace are dwindling. This is a situation where the two protagonists—Bamako and AD—seem to have applied Carl von Clausewitz’ saying, "War is a continuation of politics by other means."

Summary of Recent Events

For the next round of talks in Ouagadougou, originally scheduled for 10 January 2013, the transitional government in Bamako, as well as the AD movement, have publicly demonstrated firm and distant positions. On 31 December 2012, in an with Jeune Afrique magazine, the Malian government’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tieman Coulibaly, used language that can hardly be considered diplomatic. He prioritized a military intervention in the near future. Elections were postponed until after forces regained the North. He also held a radical position toward the rebels with whom he was about to enter into discussion:

Kidal is a region of Mali and it will be governed according to the laws and principles of the Malian constitution. Ansar Eddine does not represent the population of Kidal. It cannot enact Sharia or other laws that are inconsistent with the Malian Law. As long as Kidal remains in Mali, this will be the case.

In short, Bamako says there is nothing to discuss except the surrender of the armed Islamist groups. Is the Malian army reinvigorated to the point of launching a campaign of re-conquest immediately? Contrary to articles emanating from a blindly chauvinistic press and the exacerbated speeches from southern Mali, nothing seems less certain.

The immediate reaction of AD was to suspend the agreement to cease all hostility with Bamako, an agreement the MNLA co-signed on 21 December in Algiers. As a result, jihadists are mobilizing their troops. From its part, the diplomatic delegation of AD sent a "" on 1 January to the Burkinabé President, Blaise Compaore. This seventeen page document calls for the end of secularism in Mali and a new constitution proclaiming the "Islamic character" of Mali. It asks primarily for "broad autonomy" of Northern Mali with the "strict" application of sharia.

But unlike the static posture of Malian army units, jihadist troops and militants have previously made ​​a number of military and political maneuvers, leading to a restructuring and strengthening of their forces on the ground. In mid-November, the jihadists of Gao, (those of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa with elements of the katiba “Signatories by the Blood” of Mokhtar Belmokhtar (MUJAO-SPS)) entered Menaka, East of Gao, after heavy fighting. To the West of Timbuktu, units of MNLA integrated with AD and others took refuge in Mauritania after giving their vehicles and weapons at the border to the Mauritanian authorities. On the Algerian border, jihadists disarmed and confiscated the vehicles of an Arab tribal militia, the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA).

On 31 December, the MUJAO-SPS took control of Al-Khalil, a few kilometers from the location of Bordj Badji Mokhtar in Algeria and a very short distance from an important Algerian military base. On one hand, this suggests the  influx of Malian refugees into Algeria and other neighboring countries. On the other hand, this recent situation risks disrupting contraband circuits, which could be felt through the lack of necessary products in Azawad (see: ). The MNLA now control only the region of Tinzaoutine on the Algerian border. Without the help of the Algerian authorities, Tinzaoutine would not not be able to resist a jihadist assault for very long. With a sense of urgency, the MNLA organized a three-day congress there, starting 7 January. The MNLA is gradually sliding from an active player in the Azawad conflict to the role of a spectator with no influence on the ground. Moreover, Ansar Eddine sent a delegation to Tinzaoutine to demand that the last military units of the MNLA either integrate into Iyad Ag Ghaly’s movement or give up combat and abandon their armaments. Additionally, during a tour in the west of Azawad, Iyad Ag Ghaly received the support and This tour was preceded by similar tours in the east and north.

Thus, the jihadi movements, Ansar Eddine, MUJAO-SPS, and AQIM seem to have collaborated to control the territory of Azawad through different military and political approaches. The alternative forces of MNLA, MAA, and probably National Liberation Front of Azawad (FNLA) are now marginalized. At the same time, the jihadists have created new katibas oriented along ethnic lines, such as the Songhais, Moors (Ansar Sharia), and others.

An Offensive Geared Towards Mopti to Influence Negotiations

During the last few days, dozens of vehicles and around three hundred of Ansar Eddine’s combatants have been spotted moving towards the south. They have entered into a village called , on the national route RN 15. This strategic route, with multiple villages, may be at stake during combats these next days; whoever holds the route effectively controls this territory.

Heavily armed combats and exchanges with the Malian army have taken place on 7 January in as well as . In this last location, the objective was to disrupt the Mopti airport’s function as a strategic base for reinforcements, arms, munitions and rations. The strategy of the jihadists may be to harass the Malian military on a broadened front and to exhaust the Malian forces by cutting their access routes and by interrupting the commercial flow on the Niger River. This way, they could hold a partial siege of the city of Mopti. It must also be noted that if the jihadists know how to utilize guerrilla tactics, the Malian army has not yet been able to prove its efficiency in using mobile armed units in pursuit of rebels.

It is hardly likely that jihadists will attack the city of Mopti head on, given its population of 120,000 and the several military quarters. The primary purpose is to allow for the movement, led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, to come to the negotiating table in a strong position. The head of their delegation at Ouagadougou, Alghabass Ag Intallah, of discussion until 18 January–enough time to obtain a political success (a rally of the last forces of MNLA at Tinzaoutine) or a military success (the fall of a location like Konna).

As Carl von Clausewitz said, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means,” yet it would be necessary for Bamako to have the means to implement this policy. It is the moment of truth for the new Malian army. Is it capable of reacting and recapturing the area around Mopti? Any static or defensive attitude would amount to nothing less than defeat at the level of diplomacy. 

A version of this article was originally featured by . The piece was originally published in French on  It was translated to English by and .

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James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore and the author of the blog, .

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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