Recognition of Palestine

On Sunday, September 21, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia recognized Palestine, followed by France the next day. Olmert calls this a symbolic yet consequential moment. In his view, the gesture has little immediate legal impact but carries deep political implications for Israel, marking what he calls ā€œbad days for Israel.ā€ He adds a touch of irony, noting that Britainā€™s supposed reward was an enormous demand for reparations from the Palestinian Authority.

Olmert sees the recognition as largely political signaling. He explains that the governments are responding to domestic pressure rather than to developments on the ground. Yet even symbolic acts can have real-world consequences when they alter perceptions and embolden political movements.

Is Israelā€™s popularity declining?

Olmertā€™s first major point concerns what he describes as a shift in public opinion against Israel across the West. He attributes it to changing demographics and new political coalitions, particularly in the UK. The Labour Party now appeals both to Muslim voters and to liberals who frame Palestine as an anti-colonial cause. Once firmly pro-Israel, the countryā€™s major trade union federation has also reversed its stance.

These trends complicate relations between Israel and its traditional allies. Olmert recalls that under former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, Palestinian flags outnumbered British ones at party conventions, a symbolic sign of how opinion has turned. Large street demonstrations illustrate how the issue has become a moral rallying point for many voters.

He also predicts political backlash, suggesting that Britainā€™s right-wing Reform Party might gain ground in the next election. France is facing political paralysis reminiscent of its pre-war instability. The overall trend points to growing polarization: Sympathy for Palestinians is rising, while support for Israel among mainstream parties is eroding.

Israelā€™s military actions

The second major consequence, Olmert says, lies in the potential diplomatic and operational problems recognition may cause. He expects friction if Western nations try to open consulates for a new State of Palestine that requires access through Israeli territory. Israel, he warns, could respond by limiting cooperation or restricting diplomatic access.

Olmert explains Israelā€™s diplomatic prickliness within a much older Jewish experience of persecution. External pressure, he explains, tends to reinforce the sense of isolation that has historically defined Jewish identity. He recalls an old Hebrew expression that ā€œthe more you torture them, the stronger they get.ā€ This idea, he says, reflects centuries of resilience shaped by exile and discrimination.

Outside criticism often strengthens Israelā€™s internal unity, especially during war. They agree that the charge of genocide leveled at Israel is false. Olmert emphasizes that Gazaā€™s population continues to grow and insists that wartime casualties, while tragic, do not constitute genocide. Drawing historical comparisons, he points out that civilian losses in past conflicts, such as the bombing of Tokyo in 1945, were far greater without being labeled as genocide.

Israelā€™s goals

Turning to domestic politics, Olmert is blunt about his disappointment in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. As Israelā€™s longest-serving leader, he says, he understood the countryā€™s diplomatic challenges but failed to act on them. Olmert argues that Netanyahu should have rebuilt bipartisan goodwill abroad and moderated his government but instead allowed extremists like Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir and Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich to dominate the political narrative.

Olmert attributes Israelā€™s loss of international support to three converging trends: demographic change in Western cities, the ideological evolution of Europeā€™s social democracies and a new alliance of progressives, leftists and Islamists united by hostility toward the West.

On strategy, both speakers agree that Hamas, the Sunni Islamist Palestinian nationalist political group, remains Israelā€™s chief obstacle to peace. Destroying its military infrastructure, Olmert says, is essential to prevent another crisis on par with the October 7 attacks. Yet he also urges restraint: For Israelā€™s own long-term interest, the war should end as soon as possible. He proposes that Israel declare a short ceasefire to allow the unconditional release of hostages, resuming military operations only if that demand is ignored. Olmert believes peace requires neutralizing those who violently oppose it.

Saudiā€“Pakistani defense pact

Singh and Olmert also examine regional geopolitics. The Abraham Accords, once a centerpiece of Israeli diplomacy, have stalled, while new alliances are emerging, such as the recently announced Saudiā€“Pakistan defense pact. Olmert interprets it as a diplomatic signal from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to US President Donald Trump, conveying that the Saudi capital of Riyadh ā€œmay have other options.ā€ He argues that the agreement is not directed against Israel but could, paradoxically, strengthen ties between Israel and India as both countries coordinate more closely on security.

Despite Israelā€™s current diplomatic challenges, Olmert remains cautiously hopeful. Netanyahu still holds valuable leverage and could yet restore Israelā€™s standing if he acts decisively. Israelā€™s immediate challenge is to balance its security imperatives with the need to rebuild trust abroad. Ultimately, the recognition of Palestine by the two former European imperial powers and the two former Anglo-Saxon colonies is not the end of the story but the beginning of a new, unpredictable phase in the Middle Eastā€™s evolving power dynamics.

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Fuelling a global groundswell of anti-Muslim and antimigrant sentiment, Mr. Bin Zayed, a World Economic Forum panel in 2017 that ā€œthere will come a day that we will see far more radical extremists and terrorists coming out of Europe because of lack of decision-making, trying to be politically correct or assuming that (the Europeans) know the Middle East, and they know Islam, and they know the others far better than we do ā€¦ Iā€™m sorry, but thatā€™s pure ignorance.ā€

Muslims, activists, liberals and moderate conservatives rejected Mr. Bin Zayedā€™s broad-brush definition of who is an extremist and advocacy of a crackdown on non-violent political Islam. Moreover, his prediction did not pan out.

Shifts in counterterrorism strategies

Islamic State attacks in Europe have tapered off since Mr. Bin Zayed made his assertions, following a wave of attacks in the years immediately before he made his remarks. Mr. Bin Zayed would likely credit the fight against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and Western nationsā€™ adoption of Emirati definitions, supported by, among others, Egypt, for the stark reduction in the number of jihadist attacks on European soil.

Mr. Bin Zayed will also probably take heart from seeing the UAEā€™s long-standing no-holds-barred campaign to persuade Western and other nations to proscribe the as the source of all Islamist evil, produce results.

While the United States has designated Brotherhood offshoots and individuals as terrorists, it has stopped short of labelling the group as such. That could change with lawmakers, including Republican Ted Cruz, Representative Mario DĆ­az-Balart and Democrat Jared Moskowitz, to pass a bill in Congress that would mandate designating the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization under US law. Messrs. Diaz-Balart and Moscowitz The Friends of Egypt Caucus.

In May, French President Emmanuel Macron ordered his government to draw up proposals to the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and the spread of political Islam in France, following the release of a 75-page UAE-inspired government report that Mr. Macronā€™s office said, ā€œClearly establishes the anti-Republican and subversive nature of the Muslim Brotherhoodā€ and ā€œproposes ways to address this threat.ā€

The report estimated that at most 1,000 of Franceā€™s 5ā€“7 million Muslims were formal members of the Brotherhood. Brotherhood-affiliated groups operated 139 or 7% of Franceā€™s 2,300 mosques and 21 of the countryā€™s 74 Islamic schools. Turks, followed by Moroccans and Algerians, rank as the of individuals whom France has stripped of their nationality on charges of jihadist activity.

In April, Jordan, in the most recent decisive action, the Brotherhood and criminalized promotion of its ideology after security services arrested 16 people associated with theĀ  EzraBrotherhood on suspicion of plotting rocket and drone attacks.

The Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Action Front, the largest opposition group in the Jordanian parliament, denied involvement. The group, which was not included in the Brotherhood ban, reiterated that it ā€œremained committed to its peaceful approach.ā€ The government has accused the Front of instigating pro-Hamas demonstrations in the kingdom.

In the final analysis, the question is whether crackdowns on freedoms of expression and assembly, leaving Muslims and others with few, if any, release valves, coupled with anger at Western and Arab restrictions on expression of support for the Palestinians and a Western refusal to sanction Israel for its Gaza war conduct, creates a feeding ground for a next generation of Islamist militants.

The UAEā€™s role in shaping Western perceptions of Islam and migration

A 2019 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) warned that designating the Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization ā€œmay fuel extremismā€ and damage relations with America’s allies. The memo noted that the group has ā€œrejected violence as a matter of official policy and opposed Al-Qaeda and ISIS,ā€ an acronym for the Islamic State.

The memo acknowledged that ā€œa minority of MB (Muslim Brotherhood) members have engaged in violence, most often in response to harsh regime repression, perceived foreign occupation, or civil conflicts.ā€

Even so, Mr. Bin Zayedā€™s warning, echoed since then by Emirati surrogates, was a clarion called that fuelled anti-Muslim and antimigrant sentiment in Europe, positioned the UAE as a crucial partner in Western opposition to Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and counterterrorism, and promoted the countryā€™s autocratic concept of moderate Islam and image as one of the worldā€™s most tolerant societies.

In that vein, Emirati strategic affairs analyst Amjad Taha recently that the UAE was a beneficiary of flawed European policies. Mr. Taha singled out France and Britain.

Posting on X, Mr. Taha said, ā€œChaos doesnā€™t just arrive; it sets up a company in London or Paris and opens a bank account. Look at the UK. Look at France. Some immigrants bring talent, but the majority bring Hamas ā€¦ fatwas printed in Sudan by the Muslim Brotherhood-led army, the Hamas of Africa. And Paris? It welcomes immigrants from the Houthis in Yemen militia who treat death like a lifestyle brand.ā€

Mr. Taha asserted that 16,500 millionaires in Britain and 10,000 in France had decamped in 2023, while 9,800 had moved to the UAE in that year. ā€œThat is not migration, that is profit. London and Paris are the drain. Abu Dhabi is the magnet,ā€ Mr. Taha said.

ā€œHere in the UAE, 200 nationalities live as one: mosque, church, synagogue, all side by side. In London, they debate banning knives because stabbings are now the national pastime. In Paris, they cannot decide if the riot is over or just taking a coffee break,ā€ he added.

Navigating political Islam and regional stability

The UAEā€™s visceral opposition to political Islam was one reason that drove the country to establish diplomatic relations with Israel in 2020. It also drives the UAE’s backroom manoeuvring to secure an influential role in a post-war Gaza in which there is no place for Hamas, that, like Al-Fatah, the backbone of the West Bank-based, internationally recognised Palestine Authority, traces its roots to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Hamas its ties to the Brotherhood in 2017, as opposed to Al-Fatah, which projected itself as a secular nationalist movement from the outset.

The UAE, arguably Israelā€™s closest Arab partner, is the only Arab state to have publicly it may contribute troops to a post-war Arab or multinational peacekeeping force and participate in a transitional administration of Gaza, albeit conditionally.

The UAE said it would only participate if an end to the war was linked to a credible US-led pathway to the creation of an independent Palestinian state. In addition, the UAE insisted that a reformed Palestine Authority would have to invite it. The UAE and other Arab states, in line with Israel, have any future Hamas governance role in post-war Gaza and demanded that the group disarm.

For its part, Egypt has begun several hundred members of the Palestine Authorityā€™s security forces and Al-Fatah for participation in a peacekeeping force, despite Israelā€™s refusal to involve the Authority.

The UAE offer and the Egyptian training may be exercises in futility as long as Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu rejects a complete withdrawal from Gaza and a role for the Palestine Authority.

ā€œThere willā€¦be no ā€˜Arab forceā€™ willing to stabilize or govern Gaza for Israel, without the Palestinian Authority, or after Israel withdraws to whatever ā€˜security perimeterā€™ Netanyahu has in mind,ā€ said Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGISW) senior resident scholar Hussein Ibish.

As a result, ā€œIsrael is ā€¦ left with the fundamental choice it has had since the war began almost two years ago: reestablish an open-ended occupation throughout Gaza (thereby providing Hamas with ample targets for an insurgency that will only intensify over time), or withdraw and watch Hamas crawl out of the rubble and declare ā€˜divine victory,ā€™ā€ Mr. Ibish said. AGISW was established in 2015 with Emirati and Saudi seed money.

The Israeli military , barely 24 hours after Mr. Ibish made his prediction, that an improvised explosive device in Gaza City had wounded seven Israeli soldiers. That didnā€™t stop Colonel Avichay Adraee, the Israeli militaryā€™s Arabic language spokesman, from the ā€œbankrupt Muslim Brotherhood mediaā€ of publishing ā€œfalse news.ā€

[The Turbulent World first published this piece.]

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51³Ō¹Ļ Founder, CEO & Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch, a veteran of the Turkish capital of Ankara and the Middle East, explore Syriaā€™s dramatic upheaval and its regional consequences. The conversation highlights the fall of the Assad dynasty, the ascent of new Sunni leadership and the recalibration of regional power involving Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Strategic shifts in the region

Ruch opens by stressing that Syria is undergoing profound strategic changes. He recalls predicting a decade ago that the old Syrian order would collapse, though he did not foresee such rapid change. He lists key developments: the collapse of Iranā€™s land corridor to the Lebanese Shiite military group Hezbollah, Turkeyā€™s renewed influence, Russian and American hesitation and the re-emergence of energy projects such as a long-discussed Qatari pipeline through Turkey to Europe. These shifts, he argues, will shape not only the Middle East but also West Asia and Europe, especially regarding refugees.

The fall of the Assad regime

Singh summarizes the dramatic recent events: former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow, ending 54 years of Baā€™athist rule. The Alawite minority, dominant since 1970, has lost power, while Sunnis, led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the head of the former Islamist military group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), seized Damascus in a lightning ten-day offensive. Turkeyā€™s intelligence chief prayed with Julani in the Umayyad Mosque, underscoring Ankaraā€™s backing. Celebrations erupted across Sunni communities, from Pakistan to Bangladesh, marking the symbolic return of the Umayyad Mosque from Shia to Sunni hands.

Historical burdens and Turkish ambitions

Singh asks about Syriaā€™s troubled past. Ruch traces its modern shape to the Sykesā€“Picot agreement and subsequent French mandate. He notes that outside powers have long dictated order in the region, from the Cold War to the Arab Spring. He emphasizes Turkeyā€™s central role today, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, intelligence head Ä°brahim Kalın and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan projecting power rooted in Ottoman legacy. Turkeyā€™s ambitions rest on military strength, economic reach and religious conviction. However, Ruch notes Arab mistrust persists, recalling how Egyptian women during the Arab Spring dismissed Turkish claims of returning.

New balances and fragile alliances

Ruch argues that Julaniā€™s victory is significant but unstable. The challenge lies in power-sharing among Sunnis, Arabs, Kurds, Druze and Alawites, with mediation from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar. He cites the risk of fragmentation: Lebanon may split, Druze may seek Israeli protection, Kurds resist HTS and Alawites retreat to Russian-backed enclaves. Regional powers must negotiate a new balance, while outside actors such as Russia seek to preserve bases in Tartus and Latakia. The 2012 Geneva CommuniquĆ©, Ruch believes, still offers a guiding roadmap.

Turkish grooming of HTS and Western involvement

Ruch attributes Julaniā€™s success to Turkish grooming over at least four years, with HTS supplied and trained through Turkey. He estimates HTS commands around 30,000 fighters and speculates that Gulf or even Western funding contributed to the groupā€™s rise. Turkey also relies on the Syrian National Army, effectively an extension of its military, to pressure Kurdish forces.

Ankaraā€™s strategic aim is to establish a 30-kilometer buffer zone free of Kurdish fighters, possibly with US President Donald Trumpā€™s backing. Singh adds reports that Assadā€™s army collapsed partly because soldiers were unpaid, while Julani benefited from foreign funding. Ruch notes Western efforts to rebrand Julani, once hunted with a $10 million US bounty, into a suit-wearing political leader named Ahmed al-Sharaa, raising doubts over whether this transformation is cosmetic or substantive.

The wider geopolitical picture

The conversation turns to broader dynamics. Ruch highlights Christian minoritiesā€™ anxiety, Alawite resentment and the risk of revenge killings. He stresses that justice mechanisms will be essential to avoid cycles of violence. Regionally, he underscores rivalry among Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt for Sunni leadership. Iraq, he suggests, could mediate despite its limitations, recalling its role in the 2023 Iranā€“Saudi rapprochement. Israel, meanwhile, destroyed Syrian air defenses and sought to prevent a hostile Sunni coalition.

While normalization with Gulf states advanced under the Abraham Accords, Ruch doubts lasting peace without a Palestinian state. He warns that, absent such a resolution, hostility will fester and could erupt in future crises as severe as the infamous October 7 attack on Israelis in 2023.

The broken map

Singh and Ruch agree that Syria, as once defined, will not return. The Humpty Dumpty metaphor looms over their discussion: the old order is shattered and cannot be rebuilt. Whether Julani and his Turkish patrons can forge an inclusive and durable framework remains uncertain. Regional rivalries, sectarian divides and unresolved grievances threaten renewed instability. Yet the stakes are immense: the future of Syria will ripple across West Asia, Europe and the balance of global power.

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The Twelve-Day War: a managed clash with lasting risks

Ruch describes the recent conflict as an ā€œacute phaseā€ in an ongoing geopolitical struggle ā€” one that may see similar flare-ups in the coming months. Both sides declared victory, but the outcome is ambiguous, with limited public evidence of damage. He argues the confrontation was ā€œchoreographedā€ to avoid mass casualties, with prior signaling and removal of sensitive materials from targeted facilities. While US President Donald Trump had promised to avoid new wars, Ruch views this as a calculated one-off strike, not an opening salvo. Still, he warns that a return to snapback sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action could push Iran toward leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, escalating the risk of wider conflict.

Ruch is skeptical of claims that Israelā€™s nuclear-related bombing raids dealt decisive blows. In his view, much of the official Israeli narrative exaggerates successes and downplays the degree of Iranian resilience. He notes that Iranā€™s retaliatory strike on an ā€œempty baseā€ signaled an intent to save face without triggering uncontrolled escalation. The pause following the war serves both sidesā€™ logistical needs ā€” to resupply, regroup and plan for what could be a renewed confrontation within three to five months.

Netanyahuā€™s strategy and Israeli objectives

For Ruch, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahuā€™s political survival hinges on prolonging two ā€œforever warsā€ ā€” one in Gaza and one with Iran. He argues that Netanyahu has long sought direct strikes on Iran and that current policy leaves little room for compromise, especially on ceasefires that might satisfy the Hamas terror groupā€™s demands. Accepting such terms would fracture Netanyahuā€™s coalition as extremist ministers abandon the government. Ruch is sharply critical of reported Israeli plans for mass displacement of Gazaā€™s population, calling them war crimes and possibly evidence of genocidal intent.

Strategically, Ruch sees Israel aiming to weaken Iran to the point of state failure, breaking it into several parts as occurred with Syria. But the Twelve-Day War, he contends, achieved the opposite ā€” strengthening Iranian nationalism, uniting the population behind the regime and boosting hardliners opposed to any US-brokered nuclear agreement. He also points to covert operations inside Iran, allegedly involving the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, but considers them rare, high-preparation events unlikely to be repeated soon.

Europeā€™s role and strategic blind spots

Ruch warns that European moves toward snapback sanctions would mark a dangerous ā€œfirst step [on] the escalation ladder,ā€ providing hardliners in Tehran, Iran, justification to pursue nuclear weapons. He questions why Europe would join a USā€“Israeli confrontation with Iran while simultaneously managing the war in Ukraine. In his view, Europeā€™s genuine strategic interests lie in ending conflict with Russia, restoring affordable energy and reopening trade corridors to Asia. Yet leadership in Brussels, Paris, London and Berlin appears aligned with US and Israeli policy goals, often without robust parliamentary debate.

He notes that despite high energy costs and inflation, European publics have not mounted large-scale protests to shift foreign policy. Current political elites remain entrenched even when their popularity is low, as seen in European Commission President Ursula von der Leyenā€™s easy reelection despite her ā€œless than optimalā€ record.

Former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin emerges in his account as a rare establishment figure advocating true European strategic autonomy based on international law. However, Ruch doubts de Villepinā€™s chances, citing weak political machinery and a media environment that largely reinforces pro-NATO, pro-US positions.

Geopolitical corridors and competing agendas

The conversation broadens to the global contest over trade and transit routes. Ruch links Western pressure on Iran to efforts to block BRICS-aligned projects like the Northā€“South corridor and Chinaā€™s Belt and Road routes. Shifting freight from Western-controlled sea lanes to land corridors threatens US maritime dominance. Western powers are promoting alternatives via Israel, Syria and Turkey under the Abraham Accords framework. In the Caucasus, projects like the Zangezur corridor could bypass Iran entirely, connecting energy-rich Azerbaijan directly to European markets.

Ruch sees Turkey, Iran and Israel as the regionā€™s most influential actors, often rivals but occasionally aligned ā€” especially in containing Iranian influence in Syria. He also laments missed diplomatic opportunities, such as a Saudiā€“Egyptian plan for Gazaā€™s reconstruction that was ignored by Israel and overlooked by Western powers.

Decline of diplomacy and rise of security networks

Ruch laments that diplomacy has been sidelined in favor of intelligence networks and the militaryā€“industrial complex. He argues the latter now shapes Western foreign policy more than elected leaders do. He warns that this entrenched ā€œwarmongering machineryā€ channels funding and political will toward militarization while marginalizing arms control or peace initiatives. Unlike the Cold War era, he sees little appetite for negotiated security frameworks.

A call for an independent strategic culture

Ruch concludes by urging citizens to cultivate independence, impartiality and mutual respect while holding all violators of international law accountable. Only by rejecting permanent confrontation can the world address shared existential challenges, from climate change to artificial intelligence, and build a truly cooperative global order.

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The trend of Arabā€“Israeli normalization pushed both Palestine and Iran to the sidelines. Hamas, backed by Iran, sought to change that. Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, 2023. The attack and the subsequent war not only brought the Palestinian issue to the front and center of discourse once again but also re-injected Iran into the fight for regional power.

The Israelā€“Hamas war created a crack in regional power dynamics

Iran now has an opening where it didnā€™t have one before. Of course, it is as they say in the business world: Never invest with your own money. Iran used Hamas to break into the fight for regional power, and it will continue with that tactic. Terrorist groups such as the Houthis and Hezbollah offer Iran the chance to upend the fragile regional dynamics. Not only this, but Iran can also threaten increasingly brittle global trade.

It is no secret that non-geographically centered power wins over geographically-centered states. Iran can strike from many places at once, stretching the US capacity to respond thin. As in the USā€“Vietnam War, asymmetric warfare has proven to be wildly successful in upsetting what seemed to be a one-sided power dynamic.  In backing and funding groups such as Hamas and the Houthis, Iran is now broading the focus of attention. No longer is the world only focused on the Israelā€“Hamas war; the focus is increasingly on Iran as a player with growing influence.

The big powers of the Middle East find themselves, much like Odysseusā€™ crew, caught between Scylla and Charybdis. Saudi Arabia in particular is feeling the strain. On one hand, war with Israel is the last thing Saudi Arabia wants. But on the other, its majority Sunni Muslim population views Saudi leaders as ignoring the sentiments of their citizens. The hearts of the Arab street, of course, are with their fellow Muslims in Palestine. Thus, regional leaders risk being viewed as either spineless or corrupt. Iran has thus thrown a wrench in the Arab monarchyā€™s plans. 

The ripples Iran is making spread far beyond the geographical confines of the Middle East, too. The Iran-sponsored Houthis are attacking shipping vessels in the Red Sea from their base in Yemen. Through them, Iran is doing damage to intercontinental trade and thus to the entire global economy.

The US is beginning to feel the strain. Iran and its allies are carrying out strikes in the Red Sea, Syria, Iraq and Pakistan. Russia and China may seize the opportunity to move into the area as the US has its back turned. Even India has sensed the rising tension. While it knows it must maintain connections with Iran, it must also uphold the principle of free trade on the high seas that Iran is attacking. So, India and other nations outside the region are beginning to stress.

From a unipolar world to multiple spheres of influence

The Israelā€“Hamas war may have lasting consequences globally. Ukraine, in particular, has lost much from the aftermath of October 7. As the US diverts its aid to Israel and the Red Sea, aid cannot make its way to Ukraine. The Biden administration is finding it harder and harder to divide its support between Israel and Ukraine. 

The unrest in the Middle East affects the US domestically too. The US public is divided between supporting Israel or Palestine. The Left criticizes the administration for refusing to call a ceasefire. The Right accuses the administration of being complicit with Hamas. Once again, the two-party divide seems to have weakened US coherence, actions and influence. 

Weakened influence isnā€™t the only danger that comes with a divided US public. The public struggles to understand why the US should be involved in any conflicts in the Middle East. This raises the temptation for US leaders to disengage from the region or even from the world at large. Disengagement will guarantee chaos. De facto spheres of influence will shape international transactions rather than a Western-backed, unipolar system.

In other words, what we know of the normative order is collapsing right in front of our eyes. 

This impending chaos will change everything from the price of pencils to how a war is waged. The Israel-Hamas war is a chip off the world order. We will no longer be facing a unipolar world order with the US on top. Rather, we face a multipolar one. 

Decentralization of power has already begun. US influence in the Middle East, which is the successor to European colonialism in the region, is losing its rationale in the eyes of American citizens and of the world. The Israelā€“Hamas war is the straw that broke the camelā€™s back. The domino effect has now cascaded from the region onto the global stage.

The normative system is now being replaced, and no one knows what the coming multipolar order will be like.

[ wrote the first draft of this piece.]

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A crisis, as we know, provides both dangers and opportunities. To refer to Israelā€™s situation after October 7 as a ā€œcrisisā€ is to belittle a reality that the English language is unable to express. We talk here about a collective national trauma that Israel and the Jewish people have not experienced since the Holocaust.

Those who know something about Israel can appreciate the significance of the comparison made between the massacre of October 7 and the slaughter of six million Jews in the Holocaust. It is not about the numbers. It is about the very fact that the very state responsible for preventing massacres of Jews failed to do so on its own territory. This fact alone makes it clear that the current war will become a turning point.

The implosion of Netanyahuā€™s plans

The turning point has to do with the handling of the Palestinian question and Israelā€™s overall situation in the Middle East. For more than 13 out of the past 15 years, Israel has had the same prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu made very clear that he had two big missions; One was to show that resolving the Palestinian issue was not the key to peace between Israel and the Arab world; the second was, that Iran was the existential danger, not only to Israel, but also to the moderate Sunni Muslim Arab countries.

In Netanyahuā€™s mind, these two were intertwined. Go after Iran and on the basis of the old rule, ā€œthe enemy of my enemy is my friend,ā€ try to expand Israelā€™s reach in the Middle East beyond Egypt and Jordan. Once that is achieved, the Palestinian question would be finally demoted to a local problem between Israel and 5 million disaffected Arabs, something that will be resolved ā€œsomehow,ā€ while Israel and the Arab states deal with the Iranians together.

The attainment of all that depended on maintaining security relations with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and keeping Hamas in control of Gaza. Yes ā€” although Netanyahu liked to present himself as Mr. Security, he worked diligently to keep Hamas in power in Gaza. The explanation he gave to his own supporters was that Hamas in Gaza meant no Palestinian state. At the same time, he told the moderate Arab states of the Gulf as well as Morocco and Sudan that, in the absence of any full-fledged Israeliā€“Palestinian conflict, they have no problem uniting with Israel against Iran.

All of the above seemed logical, achievable and plausible. Then came the Abraham Accords, which seemed to give the seal over all of it. Alas, it did not last. October 7 happened, and ever since then it has seemed that the pendulum is about to swing back to the pre-Abraham Accords, perhaps even all the way to the pre-Camp David Accords situation. The Palestinian question is not going to disappear, Iran is not isolated and the entire Netanyahu strategy is collapsing like a house of cards. And with that, we come to the big Israeli dilemma.

How can Israel fight Hamas without blowing up its international situation?

Israel considers Hamas to be the reincarnation of Nazism. They are right. Hamas’s actions and ideology are Nazi-type; they are genocidal with a Jihadist envelope.

This leaves Israel no choice. When you are an Israeli leader, then the comparison to Nazis leaves you with only one possible course of action ā€” go to the very end and make sure that Hamas is no more. That is what the Israeli leadership has been saying. This is where 2023 is not 1942. The Jews are not going to be slaughtered without a battle; in fact, they are strong enough to finish off the modern-day Nazis ā€” not all the Palestinians, but one murderous faction. Hamas are Nazis in all but their capabilities.

Israel can do the job, and the photos coming out of Gaza say it so vividly. But can Israel really pull it off, considering the potential prices to pay? The longer the war goes on, the more kidnapped Israelis, among them babies and the elderly, will die. Beyond this, the war has become a public relations disaster with piles of Palestinian bodies in the streets, rising global antisemitism, receding diplomatic support, a rift with the US and above all the reversal of the Israeliā€“Arab normalization process. Suspension or complete rupture of relations with a few of the Arab states may result, a major victory for Iran. This is now the dilemma of Israel.

Israel can go all the way. Hamas never anticipated, never expected the firepower of the Israeli Defense Forces when unleashed as ferociously as now. They misread the internal situation in Israel prior to October 7, the strength of Jewish nationalism and of Israeli civic society. They are paying a huge and mounting price for it. Israel, however, needs to decide. Do they take all the above risks and lose a lot in the short term? Or do they have the stamina to sustain the immediate losses in order to gain for the longer term?

Here is what Israel can win in the longer term ā€” the respect and support of none other than all the Arab participants of the Abraham Accords. Why? Because all these countries are afraid of a Hamas victory, or a perceived Hamas victory, which will be an Iranian victory. They know it could undermine their own domestic stability. If Israel does not finish the job against Hamas, Middle East stability will be jeopardized, very likely irreversibly. If Israel can present a real victory, the forces of instability will be defeated, hopefully for some time to come.

Israel should do everything it can to minimize civilian casualties as much as operationally possible, but do what it takes to defeat the enemies of stability and peace.

Does Netanyahu have it in him as the last great effort of his career? A big question, but he is no longer the all-mighty Netanyahu of the past. There are others in his emergency cabinet, in the Israeli Defense Forces and above all in the Israeli public who want this campaign to be the decisive one.

Easier said and done, and easy for me to say from the relative comfort of Columbia, South Carolina. There is nothing comfortable, though, writing about war ā€” but October 7 is a transformative event, and so are its implications.

[ edited this piece.]

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This strategic imperative has always been confronted with the hostility of nearly all the states of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden basin. Only Ethiopia and Eritrea have maintained relations with the Jewish state in the past decades, though with some setbacks.

Not All Arab States Will Normalize Ties With Israel

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Now, even relations with Israel might see a significant change in the Horn of Africa. The Abraham Accords, signed in September by Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates to normalize bilateral relations with Israel, have caused a diplomatic earthquake in the and beyond. On the one hand, the treaty turned Abu Dhabi into a broker facilitating dialogue between its regional partners and Israel. On the other, the accords showed the friends and foes of the United States that there is a file rouge between their ties with Washington and their relationship with Tel Aviv.

The Abraham Accords were undoubtedly part of an effort of the US administration to garner a foreign policy success ahead of the November presidential elections. Yet this policy might stay in place longer, even with a Democrat at the White House. The Horn of Africa mirrors the Middle East in many aspects, and the recognition of Israel might be yet another one.

Perspective Allies in the Horn

On October 23, US President Donald Trump made a about Sudan. He first revealed Khartoum’s intention to normalize ties with Israel. Then he removed Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in exchange for the payment of compensation for two terrorist attacks against American embassies in which the regime of erstwhile Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir was involved. The recognition of Israel clearly came down as an additional request for the delisting of Sudan ā€” an indispensable, long-awaited that will allow international aid to flow into the country and help Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok to address the deepest economic crisis in decades.

But the issue of normalization with Israel is a highly contentious one for Sudan. The two countries have a conflicting history. The Jewish state has financed and trained South Sudanese guerrilla groups in the past, while the Arab country has long served as an operational base to ship weapons and aid to Hamas in Gaza. Not surprisingly, the of the normalization sparked protests in Khartoum and led the Islamist National Umma Party to declare its withdrawal from the government coalition. Against this backdrop, the agreement does not seem under immediate threat since the levers of power ultimately remain in the hands of General Mohamed Hamdan ā€œHemedti” Dagolo and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who chair the Sovereign Council. The benefitted from the UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s military and financial support, with Abu Dhabi especially keen to see Sudan build stronger relations with its new ally, Israel.

Eritrea is another country set to move closer to Tel Aviv. Eritreans received crucial military assistance from Israel during the liberation war against Ethiopia. After obtaining independence in 1991 after 30 years of conflict, Asmara went beyond establishing diplomatic relations and reportedly offered Israel a concession to open a on the island of Daklah, strategically located in the Red Sea. However, Eritrea’s growing isolation in the mid-2000s pushed President Isaias Afwerki more into and, subsequently, on a collision course with Israel. The Asmara-Tehran alignment then became a key strategic concern for Saudi Arabia and the UAE since Iran allegedly used Eritrean soil as a logistics base to smuggle weapons to the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

This concern prompted the Saudi and Emirati in Eritrea, with Asmara ultimately realigning with the two Gulf states as signaled by the port concessions offered to the Emirati DP World and Eritrea’s membership in the Saudi-sponsored Council of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Now, with mediation by Abu Dhabi, even relations with Israel might be back on the table if President Afwerki decides to soften his country’s international isolation through a rapprochement with the United States.

The third actor on the list might be Somaliland. The Somali breakaway republic, which emerged from the collapse of the state back in 1991, is probably holding talks with Tel Aviv, as the chief of Israelā€™s intelligence agency, the Mossad, Eli Cohen, suggested in a recent . Here again, the UAE seems to play a crucial role. Somaliland has become a strong Emirati partner in recent years because of its strategic location looking out to the Gulf of Aden and southern Yemen. The alliance between Abu Dhabi and Hargeisa took shape around the concession of the to DP World and the construction of an Emirati airbase nearby.

Inching Closer

The UAE is very well positioned to bring Somaliland and Israel closer. Besides gaining a useful security partner in the fight against al-Shabaab, Hargeisa might see a rapprochement with the Jewish state as valuable political capital to sell to Washington in exchange for advancement in the process of recognition of its independence from Mogadishu. But Somaliland is not the only Somali state to enjoy strong ties with the UAE. Puntland in the north and Jubaland in the south are ruled by state governments similarly aligned to Abu Dhabi that could also require Israeli assistance against terrorism or even the Somali federal government in the future.

Last but not least, there is Ethiopia. Addis Ababa and Tel Aviv resumed bilateral diplomacy in 1989, when the Derg military regime was toppled in Ethiopia. After years of clement relations, in September 2019, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took a successful visit to Israel. On that occasion, he signed a joint declaration with Benjamin Netanyahu that underlined their intention to foster , particularly in terms of bilateral trade, as well as military, economic and technological assistance. In this specific situation, it might be Israel that pulls the brakes on cooperation in order to avoid any steps that might antagonize Egypt, currently at loggerheads with Addis Ababa over the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project on the Blue Nile.

Finally, the two remaining states in the Horn of Africa, Somalia and Djibouti, do not seem willing to reproach Israel. The reason for that can be found in the relations that these countries enjoy with Turkey and Qatar as well as in the lack of incentives from the United States to move in that direction.

Given Israel’s new posture in the Middle East and Africa, more states might be willing to open to Israel ā€” or be pressed to do so ā€” in order to improve their relations with the US and the UAE. Yet the Palestinian issue is still a contentious topic in the vast majority of the Muslim and the post-colonial world. This makes bilateral relations with Israel a divisive issue, both in domestic and regional politics. At the domestic level, recognition of Israel is often perceived as a betrayal of the Palestinian people, especially in those countries where the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamist movements are active, such as Sudan.

At the regional level, the Turkey-Qatar axis firmly opposes any opening to Israel and has deep political, economic and security ties with many state and non-state actors across the Horn of Africa. Consequently, any agreement with Israel is likely to fuel internal dissent and entrench regional polarization at the same time. While new bilateral relations are always good news for the international system, normalization with Israel should be handled more carefully than other rapprochements.

*[51³Ō¹Ļ is a  partner of .]

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However, in Europe, the agreement is often downplayed as being yet another PR stunt designed for the mutual electoral interests of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump. Others dismiss this step as symbolic ā€” a mere formalization of the relations that have existed below the surface between the parties for years now.  

The UAEā€™s Deal With Israel Is a Sham

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Improving Netanyahuā€™s declining approval ratings and boosting Trumpā€™s image as a statesman before the US election on November 3 are among the main motivations behind this initiative. Nevertheless, they do not reduce the potential impact of the accords as a challenge to the status quo.

The Abraham Accords set in motion new regional dynamics at a time of new regional needs. The lesson learned from previous rounds of conflict and peace in the Middle East ā€” from Egyptian President Anwar Sadatā€™s visit to Jerusalem in 1977 to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharonā€™s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000 ā€” is that when the timing is right, symbolic steps can become the catalyst for major political developments.

The accords break a long-standing taboo in the Arab world. The prevailing formula ā€” as outlined by the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 ā€” was that normalization would be granted to Israel in return for making meaningful political compromises vis-Ć -vis the Palestinians.

The accords have shattered this formula, as they replace the equation of ā€œpeace for landā€ with the Netanyahu-coined ā€œpeace for peaceā€ approach, in which normalization is given almost unconditionally. Moreover, the accords reframe the role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the framework of Arab-Israeli relations.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been downgraded to yet another topic alongside other standing issues. The need to counter Iranā€™s regional ambitions or utilize economic opportunities have all become alternative frames of reference to Israeli-Arab relations. Prevention of annexation notwithstanding, Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian Territories have hardly served as main motives for the UAE and Bahrain to normalize relations with Israel. This process of disassociating Arab-Israeli relations from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may create a domino effect, in which other Arab nations that are not involved in direct confrontation with Israel will follow suit.

Shifting Regional Priorities

The potential of the Abraham Accords to change regional realities relies on its extraordinary timing. As the COVID-19 crisis takes its toll, national priorities ā€” from Khartoum to Kuwait City ā€” are partially shifting from traditional political considerations to urgent economic needs. The decline in oil prices and the  in growth of more than 7% in Gulf Cooperation Council countries in 2020 have turned general goals such as diversifying the Gulf economies and utilizing new global business opportunities into immediate necessities.

In this nexus, normalization with Israel provides an undeniable opportunity. Israelā€™s status as a leading hi-tech hub presents a viable platform for joint cooperation in multiple fields, from agriculture to health. For other regional actors, such as Sudan, US endorsement of the normalization process offers the opportunity to mend relations in the hope of lifting sanctions and receiving financial aid.

From an international perspective, the potential of the accords to influence the Israeli–Palestinian political stalemate remains a key question. On the one hand, the accords serve as yet another disincentive for Israel to reengage with the Palestinian issue. They demonstrate that Israelā€™s acceptance in the region does not necessitate paying the price of tough compromises on the Palestinian front.

The Israeli publicā€™s sense of urgency for dealing with topics such as the Israeli occupation or Jewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian Territories will decrease even further, as the accords enhance the comfortable illusion that the events shaping Israelā€™s future in the Middle East are taking place in Abu Dhabi and Muscat instead of in Gaza and Kalandia.

Nevertheless, the accords reintroduced the terms ā€œpeaceā€ and ā€œnormalizationā€ into Israeli public discourse after a decade of absence. The violence affiliated with the Arab Spring in 2011 enhanced the Israelisā€™ self-perception of their as a ā€œvilla in the jungle.ā€ These events had turned their perception of normalization with the Arab world from a token concern into an outdated distraction. Now, and for the first time in decades, public polls indicate a change in the Israeli public mindset regarding normalization, both on the political and economic levels, reinstating it as a matter of value.

Reengage With the Palestinian Issue

The Abraham Accords invite European leaders to rethink their policy approach regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the last two decades, the European Unionā€™s approach has been to compartmentalize the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians from the regional context and focus on bilateral relations. The accords offer new opportunities to leverage the broader regional context as a basis to reengage with the core Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Europeā€™s involvement in enhancing Israelā€™s regional normalization is not a withdrawal from the two-state solution. On the contrary, it should become a factor in reconnecting the normalization process with efforts to influence Israeli policies in the occupied Palestinian Territories and Gaza. The converging interests between the moderate regional forces and Europe have already been demonstrated in the campaign against annexation.

At present, leveraging the accords to constructively influence the Israeli-Palestinian conflict sounds highly unlikely, as the actors involved either aim to cement the separation between the topics (Netanyahu) or under-prioritize the need to engage with it (Trump). Nevertheless, possible changes to the political leadership in the near future in Israel, the United States and the Palestinian Authority ā€” combined with growing Arab public pressure on the normalizing countries to address the Palestinian issue ā€” might present an opportunity to harness regional influence to impact Israeli policies.

Instead of observing from afar, Europe should be at the forefront of the effort to promote this regional dynamic as a conciliatory vector. After all, who can speak better for regionalism as a basis for peace than the EU?

*[This was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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