51吃瓜

When we look back, it is likely that President Trump will be seen as having given a tottering system that necessary push.

In its own inside-out, upside-down way, it鈥檚 almost wondrous to behold. As befits our president鈥檚 wildest dreams, it may even prove to be a record for the ages, one for the history books. He was, after all, the candidate who sensed it first. When those he was running against, like the听rest听of , were still insisting that the United States remained at the top of its game, not an but听the听鈥�,鈥� the only truly 鈥溾�� one on the face of the Earth, he said nothing of the sort. He campaigned on America鈥檚 decline, on this country鈥檚 increasing lack of exceptionality, its potential dispensability. He ran on the single word 鈥渁gain鈥� 鈥� as in 鈥淢ake America Great Again鈥� 鈥� because, the implication was it just isn鈥檛 anymore. And he swore that he and he alone was the best shot Americans, or at least non-immigrant white Americans, had at ever seeing the best of days again.

In that sense, he was our听听for president, and if that didn鈥檛 tell you something during the election season, it should have. No question about it, he hit a chord, rang a bell, because out in the heartland it was possible to sense a deepening reality that wasn鈥檛 evident in Washington. The wealthiest country on the planet, the most militarily powerful in the history of … well, anybody, anywhere, anytime, or so we were听,听couldn鈥檛 win a war, not even with the investment of听听of taxpayer dollars, couldn鈥檛 do anything but spread chaos by force of arms.

Meanwhile, at home, despite all that wealth, despite听, including the one running for president, despite the transnational corporate heaven inhabited by Google and Facebook and Apple and the rest of the crew, parts of this country and its infrastructure were starting to feel distinctly, to use a word from another universe, Third Worldish. He sensed that, too. He regularly听听things like this: 鈥淲e spent six trillion dollars in the Middle East, we got nothing. 鈥� And we have an obsolete plane system. We have obsolete airports. We have obsolete trains. We have bad roads. Airports.鈥� And听: 鈥淥ur airports are like from a third-world country.鈥� And on the nation鈥檚听, he couldn鈥檛 have been more on the mark.

Not Our Future

In parts of the US, white working-class and听听Americans could sense that the future was no longer theirs, that their children would not have a shot at what they had had, that they themselves increasingly didn鈥檛 have a shot at what they had had. The American Dream seemed to be gaining an almost nightmarish sheen, given that the real value of the average wage of a worker听听since the 1970s; that the听 had gone through the roof and the educational听听for children with dreams of getting ahead was now staggering; that unions were听; that income inequality was at a听; and 鈥� well, you know the story 鈥� really you do. In essence, for them the famed American Dream seemed ever more like someone else鈥檚 trademarked property.

Indispensable? Exceptional? This country? Not anymore. Not as they were experiencing it.

And because of that, Donald Trump won the lottery. He answered the听. (If you鈥檙e not of a certain age, Google it, but believe me it鈥檚 a reference in our president鈥檚 memory book.) He entered the Oval Office with听听of the vote and a fervent base of support for his promised program of doing it all over again,听.

It had been one hell of a pitch from the businessman billionaire. He had promised a future of stratospheric听, of greatness on an historic scale. He promised to keep the evil ones 鈥� the听, job thieves and terrorists 鈥� away, to听听them off听or听听them out or听听them from ever traveling here. He also promised to set incredible records, as only a mega-businessman like him could conceivably do, the sort of all-American records this country hadn鈥檛 seen in a long, long time. And early as it is in the Trump era, it seems as if, on one score at least, he could deliver something for the record books going back to the times when those recording the acts of rulers were still scratching them out in听.

At this point, there鈥檚 at least a chance that Donald Trump might preside over the most precipitous decline of a truly dominant power in history, one only recently considered at the height of its glory. It could prove to be a fall for the ages. Admittedly, that other superpower of the Cold War era, the Soviet Union, imploded in 1991, which was about the fastest way imaginable to leave the global stage. Still, despite the 鈥溾�� talk of that era, the USSR was always the secondary, the weaker of the two superpowers. It was never Rome, or Spain or Great Britain.

When it comes to the United States, we鈥檙e talking about a country that not so long ago saw itself as the only great power left on planet Earth, 鈥渢he lone superpower.鈥� It was the one still standing, triumphant, at the end of a history of great power rivalry that went back to a time when the wooden warships of various European states first broke out into a larger world and began to conquer it. It stood by itself at, as its proponents liked to claim at the time, the听.

Hard Power for听a Failing World

As we watch, it seems almost possible to see President Trump, in real time, tweet by听, speech by听, sword dance by听, intervention by intervention, act by act, in the process of dismantling the system of global power 鈥� of 鈥渟oft power鈥� in particular and of alliances of every sort 鈥� by which the US made its will felt, made itself a truly global hegemon. Whether his 鈥淎merica First鈥� policies are aimed at creating a future order of听, or听, or are nothing more than the expression of his libidinous urges and secret hatreds, he may already be succeeding in taking down that world order in record fashion.

Despite the mainstream pieties of the moment about the nature of the system Donald Trump appears to be dismantling in Europe and elsewhere, it was anything but either terribly 鈥渓iberal鈥� or particularly peaceable. Wars, invasions, occupations, the undermining or overthrow of governments, brutal acts and conflicts of every sort succeeded one another in the years of American glory. Past administrations in Washington had a notorious weakness for autocrats, just as Donald Trump does today. They regularly had less than听听for democracy if, from Iran to Guatemala to Chile, the will of the people seemed to stand in Washington鈥檚 way.

It is, as Vladimir Putin has been only too happy to point out of late, an irony of our moment that the country that has undermined or overthrown or meddled in听听than any other is in a total snit over the possibility that one of its own elections was meddled with. To enforce their global system, Americans never shied away from听,听,听,听听and other grim practices. In those years, the US planted its military on close to听, garrisoning the planet as no other country ever had.

Nonetheless, the cancelling of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal, the withdrawal from the Paris climate accord, threats against NAFTA, the undermining of NATO, the promise of听听on foreign goods (and the possible trade wars that might go with them) could go a long way toward dismantling the American global system of soft power and economic dominance as it has existed in these last decades. If such acts and others like them prove effective in the months and years to come, they will leave only one kind of power in the American global quiver: hard military power, and its handmaiden, the kind of covert power Washington, through the CIA in particular, has long specialized in.

If America鈥檚 alliances crack open and its soft power becomes too angry or edgy to pass for dominant power anymore, its massive machinery of destruction will still be left, including its vast听. While in the Trump era a drive to cut domestic spending of every sort is evident,听听is still slated to go to the military, already funded at levels not reached by听听of other major powers.

Given the last 15 years of听, it鈥檚 not hard to imagine what鈥檚 likely to result from the further elevation of military power: disaster. This is especially true because Donald Trump has appointed to key positions in his administration a听听who spent the last decade and a half fighting America鈥檚 catastrophic wars across the Greater Middle East. They are not only notoriously incapable of thinking outside the box about the application of military power, but faced with the crisis of failed wars and听, of spreading terror movements and a growing听听across that crucial region, they can evidently only imagine one solution to just about any problem: more of the same. More听, more听, more military trainers and advisers, more听, more听听…听.

After a decade and a half of such thinking, we already know perfectly well where this ends 鈥斕齣n further failure, more chaos and suffering, but above all in an inability of the US to effectively apply its hard power anywhere in any way that doesn鈥檛 make matters worse. Since, in addition, the Trump administration is filled with Iranophobes, including a president who has only recently fused himself to the Saudi royal family in an attempt to further isolate and undermine Iran, the possibility that a military-first version of American foreign policy will spread further is only听.

Such 鈥渕ore鈥� thinking is typical as well of much of the rest of the cast of characters now in key positions in the Trump administration. Take the CIA, for instance. Under its new director, Mike Pompeo (distinctly a 鈥渕ore鈥� kind of guy and an听听of the first order), two key positions have reportedly been filled: a new chief of counterterrorism and a new head of Iran operations (recently identified as Michael D鈥橝ndrea, an agency hardliner with the nickname 鈥渢he Dark Prince鈥�). Here鈥檚 how 听recently described听their similar approaches to their jobs (my emphasis added): 鈥淢r. D鈥橝ndrea鈥檚 new role is one of a number of moves inside the spy agency that signal a听more muscular approach听to covert operations under the leadership of Mike Pompeo, the conservative Republican and former congressman, the officials said. The agency also recently named a new chief of counterterrorism, who has begun pushing for听greater latitude to strike militants.鈥�

In other words, more!

Rest assured of one thing, whatever Donald Trump accomplishes in the way of dismantling America鈥檚 version of soft power, 鈥渉is鈥� generals and intelligence operatives will handle the hard-power part of the equation just as 鈥渁bly.鈥�

The First American Laster?

If a Trump presidency achieves a record for the ages when it comes to the precipitous decline of the American global system, little as The Donald ever cares to share credit for anything, he will undoubtedly have to share it for such an achievement. It鈥檚 true that kings, emperors and autocrats, the top dogs of any moment, prefer to take all the credit for the 鈥渞ecords鈥� set in their time. When we look back, however, it鈥檚 likely that President Trump will be seen as having given a tottering system that necessary push. It will undoubtedly be clear enough by then that the US, seemingly at the height of any power鈥檚 power in 1991 when the Soviet Union disappeared, began heading for the exits soon thereafter, still enwreathed in self-congratulation and triumphalism.

Had this not been so, Donald Trump would never have won the 2016 election. It wasn鈥檛 he, after all, who gave the US heartland an increasingly Third-World feel. It wasn鈥檛 he who spent those trillions of dollars so disastrously on invasions and occupations, dead-end wars, drone strikes and special ops raids, reconstruction and听听in a never-ending war on terror that today looks more like a war for the spread of terror. It wasn鈥檛 he who created the growing inequality gap in this country or produced all those billionaires amid a population that increasingly felt left in the lurch. It wasn鈥檛 he who hiked college tuitions or increased the debt levels of the young or set roads and bridges to crumbling and created the conditions for Third World-style airports.

If both the American global and domestic systems hadn鈥檛 been rotting out before Donald Trump arrived on the scene, that 鈥渁gain鈥� of his wouldn鈥檛 have worked. Thought of another way, when the US was truly at the height of its economic clout and power, American leaders felt no need to speak incessantly of how 鈥渋ndispensable鈥� or 鈥渆xceptional鈥� the country was. It seemed too self-evident to mention. Someday, some historian may use those very words in the mouths of American presidents and other politicians (and their听, for instance, that the US military was 鈥渢he finest fighting force that the world has ever known鈥�) as a set of increasingly defensive markers for measuring the decline of American power.

So here鈥檚 the question: When the Trump years (months?) come to an end, will the US be not the planet鈥檚 most exceptional land, but a pariah nation? Will that 鈥渁gain鈥� still be the story of the year, the decade, the century? Will the last American Firster turn out to have been the first American Laster? Will it truly be one for the record books?

*[This article was originally published on .]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.

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