51吃瓜

The US conducts drone strikes worldwide with relative impunity. But when the first strike hits America, the real blowback will begin.

The targeted assassination of Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour last weekend wasn鈥檛 just another drone strike.

First of all, it was聽, not the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which has orchestrated nearly all drone strikes in Pakistan.

Second, it didn鈥檛 take place in Afghanistan or in the so-called lawless tribal region of Pakistan known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA. The guided missile turned a聽聽into a fireball on a well-traveled highway in Balochistan, in southwest Pakistan.

Prior to this particular drone strike, Pakistan allowed the United States to patrol the skies over the northwest region of FATA, a Taliban stronghold. But President Barack Obama decided to cross this 鈥渞ed line鈥� to take out Mansour (and聽, who had the misfortune to be with the wrong passenger at the wrong time).

Pakistani leaders have registered their disapproval.聽, 鈥淭he drone strike is different from all others because it has not only resumed a genre of kinetic action that is unilateral, but also illegal and expansionary in its geographical theater of targeted operation.鈥�

In other words, if the US is sending drones after targets in Balochistan, what will prevent it from taking out a suspected terrorist on the crowded streets of Karachi or Islamabad?

The Obama administration is congratulating itself on removing a bad guy who was targeting US military personnel in Afghanistan. But the strike itself may not produce any greater willingness on the part of the Taliban to enter into negotiations with the Afghan government. Mansour, according to the administration, opposed such negotiations, and the Taliban have indeed聽聽with the Quadrilateral Coordination Group鈥擯akistan, Afghanistan, China the US鈥攗nless foreign troops are first removed from Afghanistan.

This 鈥渒ill for peace鈥� strategy of the Obama administration may backfire.

, Mansour鈥檚 death will help the fractious organization unify around a new leader. Conversely, despite such rosy insider predictions, the Taliban could splinter and enable even more extremist organizations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State聽. In a third scenario, the drone strike will have no impact on the ground in Afghanistan at all, since the聽聽is already underway and the Taliban want to strengthen their bargaining position before entering talks.

In other words, the United States cannot possibly know whether Mansour鈥檚 death will advance or complicate US strategic goals in the region. The drone strike is, basically, a crapshoot.

The strike also comes at a time when US drone policy is coming under greater scrutiny within America. After a number of independent assessments of drone casualties, the Obama administration will soon release聽聽of the death toll for combatants and non-combatants outside of active war zones. A new independent assessment of drone strikes in FATA argues that the long-anticipated 鈥渂lowback鈥� has not in fact taken place. And the Obama administration is desperately trying to salvage a policy in Afghanistan that鈥檚 failed to draw down US troop levels as promised, fully turn over the responsibility for military operations to the Afghan government, or stop the Taliban from making significant battlefield gains.

Mansour鈥檚 death is the latest example of the United States dispensing death at a distance in an attempt to micromanage a conflict that it鈥檚 long since lost control over. The precision of the strikes belies the imprecision of US policy and the virtual impossibility of achieving US goals as currently stated.

The Question of Blowback

The term 鈥渂lowback鈥� was originally a CIA term for the unintended鈥攁nd negative鈥攃onsequences of clandestine operations. One of the most famous examples was the US funneling of arms and supplies to the mujahedeen fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. Some of these fighters, including Osama bin Laden, would eventually turn their weapons against US targets once the Soviets were long gone from the country.

The US drone campaign isn鈥檛 exactly a covert operation, though the CIA has generally refused to acknowledge its role in the attacks (the Pentagon is more open about its use of drones for strikes on more conventional military targets). But critics of drone attacks鈥攎yself included鈥攈ave long argued that all the civilian casualties caused by drone attacks will produce blowback. Drone strikes and the anger they generate effectively serve to recruit people into the Taliban and other extremist organizations.

Even those involved in the program have come to the same conclusion.

Consider, for instance, this impassioned plea to President Obama from four Air Force veterans who piloted drones. 鈥淭he innocent civilians we were killing only fueled the feelings of hatred that ignited terrorism and groups like ISIS [Islamic State], while also serving as a fundamental recruitment tool,鈥澛犅爄n a letter last November. 鈥淭he administration and its predecessors have built a drone program that is one of the most devastating driving forces for terrorism and destabilization around the world.鈥�

In other words, if the US is sending drones after targets in Balochistan, what will prevent it from taking out a suspected terrorist on the crowded streets of Karachi or Islamabad?

But now along comes Aqil Shah, a professor at the University of Oklahoma, who has just 聽attempting to debunk this claim.

According to a set of 147 interviews he conducted in North Waziristan, an area in Pakistan鈥檚 FATA that has sustained the largest number of drone strikes, 79% of respondents support the campaign. A majority believes that the strikes rarely kill non-combatants. Further, according to experts cited by Shah, 鈥渕ost locals prefer drones to the Pakistan military鈥檚 ground and aerial offensives that cause more extensive damage to civilian life and property.鈥�

I don鈥檛 doubt these findings. Most people in Pakistan have no sympathy for the Taliban. According to a聽, 72% of respondents in Pakistan had an unfavorable view of the Taliban (with聽聽suggesting that this lack of support extends to FATA). Drones are no doubt better than Pakistan鈥檚 military operations, just as they represent an improvement over the scorched-earth policies used by the United States in the Vietnam War to destroy large sections of Southeast Asia.

Shah鈥檚 research was not exactly scientific. He admits that his interviews were 鈥渘ot statistically representative鈥濃�攁nd then goes on to draw conclusions about the entire population of FATA. It鈥檚 also true that聽聽suggest that Pakistanis throughout the country oppose the drone program and believe that it encourages militancy, but these polls have generally not included FATA.

But Shah鈥檚 most controversial conclusion is that the high level of support for the drone program means that no blowback has taken place. Even if his interviews were statistically representative, I don鈥檛 understand this analytical leap.

Blowback doesn鈥檛 require universal opposition. Only a small percentage of the mujahedeen went on to fight with bin Laden. Only a certain number of Contras were involved in operations that pumped drugs into the US.

It鈥檚 not as if the entire population of FATA is going to join the Taliban. If only a couple thousand young men join the Taliban out of anger over drone strikes, that counts as blowback. There are over 4 million people living in the FATA. A fighting force of 4,000 people is one-tenth of 1% of the population鈥攁nd that easily falls within the 21% of respondents who disapproved of drones in Shah鈥檚 findings.

And what of the suicide bomber who embarks on his path of extremism because a drone strike took out his brother? The Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, was聽聽at least in part by drone strikes in Pakistan, even though they hadn鈥檛 killed anyone in his family.

Ultimately, blowback can be just one angry and determined person who makes his mark on history without first showing up in a survey.

Other Drone Problems

The blowback issue is only one of the many problems with US drone policy. The proponents of drones have always argued that the strikes are responsible for far fewer civilian casualties than aerial bombardment. 鈥淲hat I can say with great certainty is that the rate of civilian casualties in any drone operation are far lower than the rate of civilian casualties that occur in conventional war,鈥� President Obama聽.

Although that may be true for indiscriminate carpet bombing, it turns out not to be true for the kind of air campaign the United States has conducted in Syria and Afghanistan.

鈥淪ince Obama entered office, 462 drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have killed an estimated 289 civilians, or one civilian per 1.6 strikes,鈥澛犅爄n a recent聽Foreign Policy聽piece. In comparison, the civilian casualty rate in Afghanistan since Obama took office has been one civilian per 21 bombs dropped. In the war against the Islamic State, the rate was one civilian per 72 bombs dropped.

Then there鈥檚 the question of international law. The United States has been conducting drone strikes outside of combat zones. It鈥檚 even killed US citizens. And it鈥檚 done so without going through any legal process. The president signs off on the kill orders, and then the CIA carries out these extrajudicial murders.

Not surprisingly, the US government argues that the strikes are legal because they target combatants in an international war against terrorists. Under that definition, however, the United States can kill anyone it considers a terrorist anywhere in the world. Several reports by the United Nations have聽. At the very least, drones represent a聽聽to international law.

Then there鈥檚 the controversial concept of signature strikes. These attacks target not specific people, but anyone who fits the general profile of a terrorist in what鈥檚 deemed a terrorist-rich territory. They do not require presidential approval. These strikes have resulted in some huge mistakes, including the killing of 12 Yemeni civilians in December 2013 that required a million dollars in 鈥渃ondolence payments.鈥� The Obama administration shows no sign of聽.

Finally, there鈥檚 the issue of drone proliferation. It used to be that only the United States possessed the new technology. But those days are long gone.

鈥淓ighty-six countries have some drone capability, with 19 either possessing armed drones or acquiring the technology,鈥澛�. 鈥淎t least six countries other than America聽have used drones in combat, and in 2015, defense consulting firm Teal Group estimated that drone production would total $93 billion over the next decade 鈥� reaching more than three times the current market value.鈥�

Right now, the United States blithely conducts drone strikes worldwide with relative impunity. But when the first drone strike is conducted against the US鈥攐r by terrorist organizations against US citizens in other countries鈥攖he real blowback will begin.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.

Photo Credit: 听/听

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your聽donation聽is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a聽sponsor.