51吃瓜

Saudi Arabia’s puzzling effort to blacklist its tiny neighbor Qatar begs the question of who’s really isolated in the Gulf.

The splintering of the powerful Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) into warring camps 鈥� with Qatar, supported by Turkey and Iran, on one side, and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, supported by Egypt, on the other 鈥� has less to do with disagreements over foreign policy and religion than with internal political and economic developments in the Middle East.

The ostensible rationale the GCC gave on June 4 for breaking relations with Qatar and placing the tiny country under a blockade is that Doha is aiding 鈥渢errorist鈥� organizations. The real reasons are considerably more complex, particularly among the major players.

Middle East journalist once described the Syrian Civil War as a three-dimensional chess game with five players and no rules. In the case of the Qatar crisis, the players have doubled and abandoned the symmetry of the chessboard for go, mahjong and bridge.

Saudi Insecurities

Tensions among members of the GCC are longstanding. In the case of Qatar, they date back to 1995, when the father of the current emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, shoved his own father out of power. According聽聽of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Saudi Arabia and the UAE 鈥渞egarded the family coup as a dangerous precedent to Gulf ruling families鈥� and tried to organize a counter coup. The coup was exposed, however, and called off.

Riyadh is demanding that Qatar sever relations with Iran 鈥� an improbable outcome given that the two countries share a natural gas field in the Persian Gulf 鈥� and end Doha鈥檚 cozy ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, if there鈥檚 any entity in the Middle East that the Saudis hate and fear more than Iran, it鈥檚 the Brotherhood. Riyadh was instrumental in the 2013 overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt and has allied itself with聽聽to marginalize Hamas, the Palestinian offshoot of the Brotherhood that dominates Gaza.

But fault lines in the GCC don鈥檛 run only between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar.聽, at the Gulf鈥檚 mouth, has always marched to its own drummer, maintaining close ties with Saudi Arabia鈥檚 regional nemesis, Iran, and refusing to go along with Riyadh鈥檚 war against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Kuwait has also balked at Saudi dominance of the GCC, has refused to join the blockade against Doha, and is trying to play mediator in the current crisis.

The siege of Qatar was launched shortly after Donald Trump鈥檚 visit to Saudi Arabia, when the Saudis put on a show for the US president that was over the top even by the monarchy鈥檚 standards. Wooed with massive billboards and garish sword dances, Trump soaked up the Saudi view of the Middle East, attacked Iran as a supporter of terrorism, and apparently green-lighted the blockade of Qatar. He even tried to take聽聽for it.

Saudi Arabia, backed by Bahrain, Egypt and the UAE, along with a cast of minor players, made 13 demands on Doha that it could only meet by abandoning its sovereignty. They range from the impossible (end all contacts with Iran) to the improbable () to the unlikely (dismantle the popular and lucrative media giant, Al Jazeera). The 鈥渢errorists鈥� Doha is accused of supporting are the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Saudis and the Egyptians consider a terrorist organization, an opinion not shared by the United States or the European Union.

On the surface, this is about Sunni Saudi Arabia versus Shia Iran. But while religious differences do play an important role in recruiting and motivating some of the players, this isn鈥檛 a battle over a schism in Islam. Most importantly, it鈥檚 not about 鈥渢errorism,鈥� since many of the countries involved are up to their elbows in supporting extremist organizations. Indeed, Saudi Arabia鈥檚 reactionary Wahhabi interpretation of Islam is the root ideology for groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, and all the parties are backing a variety of extremists in Syria and Libya鈥檚 civil wars.

The attack on Qatar is part of Saudi Arabia鈥檚 aggressive new foreign policy that is being led by Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman. As Saudi Arabia鈥檚 鈥渕onarch in waiting,鈥� Prince Mohammed has launched a disastrous war in Yemen that鈥檚 killed more than 10,000 civilians and sparked a country-wide cholera epidemic there 鈥� and which is draining at least聽聽a month from Saudi Arabia鈥檚 treasury. Given the depressed price for oil and a growing population 鈥� 70% of which is under 30 and much of it聽聽鈥� it鈥檚 not a cost the monarchy can continue to sustain, especially with the Saudi economy falling into recession.

Underlying the Saudis鈥� newfound aggression is fear. First, fear that the kind of Islamic governance modeled by the Muslim Brotherhood, which has elsewhere embraced elections and the democratic process, poses a threat to the absolutism of the Gulf monarchs. Fear that Iran鈥檚 nuclear pact with the US, the EU and the United Nations is allowing Tehran to break out of its economic isolation and turn itself into a rival power center in the Middle East. And fear that anything but a united front by the GCC 鈥� led by Riyadh 鈥� will encourage the House of Saud鈥檚 internal and external critics.

Who鈥檚 Really Isolated?

So far, the attempt to blockade Qatar has been more an annoyance than a serious threat to Doha. Turkey and Iran are pouring supplies into Qatar, and the Turks are deploying up to 1,000 troops at a base near the capital. There are also some 10,000 US troops at Qatar鈥檚 Al Udeid Air Base, Washington鈥檚 largest base in the Middle East and one central to the war on the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Any invasion aimed at overthrowing the Qatari regime risks a聽聽with Turkey and the US.

While Egypt is part of the anti-Qatari alliance 鈥� the Egyptians are angry at Doha for not supporting Cairo鈥檚 side in the Libyan Civil War, and the Egyptian regime also hates the Brotherhood 鈥� it is hardly an enthusiastic ally. Saudi Arabia keeps Egypt鈥檚 economy afloat, and so long as Riyadh keeps writing checks, Cairo is on board. But Egypt is keeping the Yemen war at arm鈥檚 length: It flat out refused to contribute troops and is not comfortable with Saudi Arabia鈥檚 version of Islam. Cairo is currently in a nasty fight with its own Wahhabi-inspired extremists. Egypt also maintains diplomatic relations with Iran.

Besides the UAE, the other Saudi allies don鈥檛 count for much in this fight. Sudan will send troops, if Riyadh pays for them, but not very many. Bahrain is on board, but only because the Saudi and Emirati armies are sitting on local Shia opposition in the tiny Gulf island. Yemen and Libya are part of the anti-Qatar alliance, but both are essentially failed states. And while the Maldives, another member, is a nice place to vacation, it doesn鈥檛 have a lot of weight to throw around.

On the other hand, long-time Saudi ally聽聽has made it clear it鈥檚 not part of this blockade, nor will it break with Qatar or downgrade relations with Iran. When Riyadh asked for Pakistani troops in Yemen, the national parliament voted unanimously to have nothing to do with Riyadh鈥檚 jihad on the poorest country in the Middle East.

The largely Muslim nations of聽聽are also maintaining relations with Qatar, and Saudi ally聽聽offered to send food to Doha. In brief, it鈥檚 not clear who鈥檚 more isolated here.

While President Trump supports the Saudis, his Defense Department and聽 are working to resolve the crisis. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently finished a trip to the Gulf in an effort to end the blockade, and the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee has threatened to hold up聽聽to Riyadh unless the dispute is resolved. The latter is no minor threat. Saudi Arabia would have serious difficulties carrying out the war in Yemen without US weaponry.

In Qatar鈥檚 Corner

And the reverse of the coin? Doha鈥檚 allies have a variety of agendas, not all of which mesh.

Iran has working, but hardly warm, relations with Qatar. Both countries need to cooperate to exploit the South Pars gas field, and Tehran appreciated that Doha was always a reluctant member of the anti-Iran coalition, telling the US it could not use聽聽to attack Iran.

Iran is certainly interested in anything that divides the GCC. The Iranians would also like Qatar to invest in upgrading Iran鈥檚 energy industry, and maybe cutting them in on the $177 billion in construction projects that Doha is lining up in preparation for hosting the 2022 World Cup Games. Also, some 30,000 Iranians live in Qatar.

Figuring out Turkey these days can reduce one to reading tea leaves.

On one hand, Ankara鈥檚 support for Qatar seems obvious. Qatar backs the Muslim Brotherhood, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan鈥檚 Justice and Development Party is a Turkish variety of the Brotherhood, albeit one focused more on power than ideology. Erdogan was a strong supporter of the Egyptian Brotherhood, and relations between Cairo and Ankara went into a deep freeze when Egypt鈥檚 military overthrew the Islamist organization鈥檚 elected Egyptian president.

Qatar is also an important source of finances for Ankara, whose聽聽needs every bit of help it can get. Turkey鈥檚 large construction industry would like to land some of the multibillion construction contracts the World Cup games will generate. Turkish聽聽in Qatar already amount to $13.7 billion.

On the other hand, Turkey is also trying to woo Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies for their investments. Erdogan even joined in the GCC鈥檚 attacks on Iran in spring, accusing Tehran of聽鈥�,鈥澛燼 comment that distressed Turkey鈥檚 business community. As the sanctions on Iran ease, Turkish firms see that country鈥檚 big, well-educated population as a potential gold mine.

The Turkish president has since turned down the anti-Iran rhetoric, and Ankara and Tehran have been consulting over the Qatar crisis. The first supportive phone call Erdogan took during the attempted coup in 2016 was from聽, and the prickly Turkish president hasn鈥檛 forgotten that some other GCC members were silent for several days. Erdogan recently suggested that the UAE had a hand in the coup.

Is this personal for Turkey鈥檚 president? No, but Erdogan is the Middle East leader who most resembles Donald Trump: He shoots from the hip and holds grudges. The difference is that he鈥檚 far smarter and better informed than the US president and knows when to cut his losses.

His apology to the Russians after shooting down one of their fighter bombers is a case in point. Erdogan first threatened Moscow with war, but eventually trotted off to St. Petersburg, hat in hand, to make nice with Russian President Vladimir Putin. And after hinting that the Americans were behind the 2016 coup, he聽聽with Tillerson in Istanbul to smooth things out. Turkey recognizes that it will need Moscow and Washington to settle the war in Syria.

The Russians have been聽, consulted with Turkey and Iran, and have called on all parties to peacefully resolve their differences.

The Risks of Doubling Down

There isn鈥檛 likely to be a quick end to the Qatar crisis, because Saudi Arabia keeps doubling down on one disastrous foreign policy decision after another, including breaking up the Arab world鈥檚 only viable economic bloc. But there are developments in the region that may eventually force Riyadh to back off.

The Syrian War looks like it鈥檚 headed for a solution, although the outcome is anything but certain. The Yemen conflict has reached crisis proportions 鈥� the UN describes it as the number-one human emergency on the globe 鈥� and pressure is growing for the US and Britain to wind down their support for the Saudi-led alliance. And Iran is slowly but steadily reclaiming its role as a leading force in the Middle East and Central Asia.

There is much that could go wrong. There could be a disastrous聽, currently being pushed by Saudi Arabia, Israel and neoconservatives in the US. Or Russia, the US and Turkey could fall out over Syria. The Middle East is an easy place to get into trouble. But if there are dangers, so too are there possibilities 鈥� and from those spring hope.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.

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