51吃瓜

[Disclaimer: This piece is a scenario, not a prediction. By imagining how Venezuela might respond to a devastating natural disaster during a fragile political transition, I seek to illuminate structural weaknesses that already exist today.]

When Venezuela鈥檚 contemporary history is eventually written, the 26 years of an era that once promised sweeping change 鈥� not only for the country, but the world 鈥� may well be remembered as the darkest period since the Captaincy General of Venezuela declared its from Spain. They may even eclipse the traumatic decade between 1811 and 1821, which began with the of Independence, was followed less than a year later by an strikingly similar to those that devastated the country only days ago, and descended into a brutal War of Independence that claimed countless lives and destroyed immense wealth before culminating in the of Carabobo. By remarkable coincidence, that decisive battle took place on June 24 鈥� exactly 205 years before this year鈥檚 earthquakes.

Since then, Venezuela has endured many difficult chapters: the of the 19th century, successive during much of the 20th, and, in contrast, periods of genuine progress, including the discovery of at the dawn of the 20th century and four decades of between 1958 and 1998.

The twin earthquakes that struck several Venezuelan cities on that ill-fated Wednesday on June 24 appear to have altered the country鈥檚 trajectory as profoundly as the earthquake of 1812. Until then, Venezuela had been living in a peculiar 鈥� and in many respects artificial 鈥� political reality. Under the patronage of the United States, the country seemed poised not only for a fundamental economic reorientation through foreign investment, debt restructuring and long-overdue reforms, but also for an orderly political transition leading to the restoration of democracy.

The earthquakes away those expectations overnight. They shattered not only the assumptions held by Venezuelan President Delcy Rodr铆guez鈥檚 transitional government, but also those of the Trump administration and even Venezuela鈥檚 democratic opposition. Perhaps the only people who never fully embraced this optimism were ordinary Venezuelans themselves, whose daily lives have long served as a painful reminder of the enormous gap between official promises and reality.

A difficult reconstruction

Rebuilding after a disaster of the magnitude that struck Caracas and other cities is always an immense undertaking. Saving lives, treating the injured, housing displaced families and designing an effective reconstruction strategy would challenge even the strongest state. In Venezuela, however, these tasks are proving far more difficult 鈥� and are likely to be considerably less successful.

The earthquakes have become the ultimate stress test for a regime that has spent years not merely colonizing society but systematically dismantling the state鈥檚 operational capacity. Unsurprisingly, its response has been weak, ineffective and in many cases counterproductive.

International and domestic media alike, no longer subject to the level of censorship seen in previous years, have documented the unfolding rescue effort in remarkable detail. Social media has done the same, offering minute-by-minute accounts that reveal an unmistakable reality: the Chavista state 鈥� a state shaped by the political and economic system of former Venezuelan President Hugo Ch谩vez 鈥� has been largely absent from coordinating the thousands of volunteers, foreign rescue specialists, medical teams and humanitarian organizations working tirelessly to save lives and provide shelter. Even more striking has been the absence of Venezuela鈥檚 armed forces, whose various branches have played only a marginal role in the emergency response.

There exists a striking contrast with previous disasters. Following the 1967 Caracas , the Venezuelan state responded with competent institutions and effective coordination. The same was largely true after the devastating of 1999 that ravaged the central coast, less than a year after Ch谩vez assumed the presidency. In both cases, governments possessed functioning institutions, trained personnel and, above all, the political will to act. Today, with only a few notable exceptions, particularly parts of the public hospital system, that institutional DNA appears to have largely disappeared.

This failure carries profound political consequences. It exposes the uncomfortable truth that the emperor has no clothes. The official narrative portraying Venezuela as a country on the verge of recovery has been revealed for what it is: sheer rhetoric.

Likewise, the mythology surrounding the supposed invincibility of Chavismo (the leftwing movement based on Ch谩vez鈥檚 principles) 鈥� which is already badly damaged after former Venezuelan President Nicol谩s Maduro鈥檚 鈥� has suffered another severe blow. Rodr铆guez鈥檚 provisional government now appears to have entered a potentially irreversible downward spiral.

Trump鈥檚 three-stage strategy begins to unravel

The earthquakes have not only shaken Venezuela鈥檚 provisional authorities; they have also severely disrupted the Trump administration鈥檚 strategy toward the country.

What had been presented as a carefully sequenced three-stage plan 鈥� stabilization, recovery and democratic transition 鈥� has suddenly been reduced to a single overriding objective: survival and reconstruction.

The optimistic repeatedly voiced by US President Donald Trump 鈥� that everything was proceeding smoothly, that cooperation with the provisional government was complete and that Venezuelans were 鈥渄ancing in the streets鈥� 鈥� now rings increasingly hollow. Public opinion surveys that had reported improving expectations and even unusually high levels of support for Trump are almost certainly no longer relevant.

The human alone is staggering: over 2,000 fatalities, a figure that may rise substantially; roughly 11,000 injured; and nearly 30,000 people housed in hospitals or emergency shelters as of July 1. Material destruction has been equally devastating. The quakes collapsed approximately buildings and severely damaged the structures of many more, including a long list of large and small businesses. Much of what remains of Venezuela鈥檚 already diminished middle class has suddenly lost its principal assets, with little prospect of replacing them anytime soon.

The economic consequences are equally severe. Economists expect GDP to by between 6% and 9%, effectively erasing the ambitious growth projections associated with what had become known as the Trump Plan. Reconstruction will necessarily take precedence over virtually every other policy objective.

This does not mean that planned investment in Venezuela鈥檚 oil sector will come to a complete halt. Most production facilities lie outside the hardest-hit areas, although the El Palito refinery in the country鈥檚 central region represents an important exception. Nevertheless, the positive impact of renewed energy investment on the broader economy will inevitably be diluted by the enormous losses inflicted by the disaster.

Administration officials have reiterated that Venezuela enjoys Washington鈥檚 full support during the reconstruction phase. Yet history offers reasons for caution. The mixed 鈥� and often deeply disappointing 鈥� record of American reconstruction efforts in and suggests that expectations should remain modest. Ultimately, Venezuela will have to rely primarily on its own resources and its own society to rebuild.

The administration鈥檚 relationship with Rodr铆guez鈥檚 provisional government may also evolve. Thus far, Washington has offered it unwavering support. But if the government increasingly appears incapable of managing the crisis 鈥� or worse, becomes an obstacle to relief efforts, as numerous rescue have already suggested 鈥� the Trump administration, whose overriding concern is political success (or at least the appearance of success), may eventually begin to view the provisional government less as a partner than a liability.

The democratic opposition: the least damaged political actor

At the time of writing, among Venezuela鈥檚 three principal political actors, the democratic opposition appears to have emerged in the strongest relative position.

It bears no direct responsibility for the state鈥檚 inadequate response to the disaster. Instead, opposition organizations quickly mobilized to coordinate rescue efforts, establish international contacts, expose governmental shortcomings and deploy volunteers to assist victims while largely avoiding overt political exploitation of the tragedy.

Even opposition leader Mar铆a Corina Machado, despite the Trump administration consistently her, expressed her willingness to to Venezuela to assist with coordination efforts. She offered a message of compassion and national solidarity at a moment when both are desperately needed.

The opposition鈥檚 longstanding for free and genuinely competitive elections will almost certainly be postponed by the immediate demands of reconstruction. Yet it is entirely possible that, faced with the overwhelming burden of rebuilding the country, the Trump administration may seek to reduce its own political responsibility for Venezuela鈥檚 future. Likewise, the outcome of the upcoming US midterm elections could reshape Washington鈥檚 domestic political landscape and accelerate pressure for a democratic resolution to Venezuela鈥檚 crisis.

Whatever path events ultimately take, Venezuela鈥檚 democratic forces must be prepared to govern sooner rather than later. As the old Spanish saying goes, dawn will come 鈥� and then we shall see.

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The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.