51吃瓜

On February 3, Prime Minister Boris Johnson laid bare his long-awaited  of a 鈥済lobal Britain鈥� in a world after Brexit. Speaking amidst the imperial grandeur of Old Royal Naval College in Greenwich, Johnson鈥檚 message was that the United Kingdom, liberated from the straitjacket of EU membership, would be free to carve out a confident, dynamic and outward-looking role on the world stage in a post-Brexit era 鈥� even as the first handful of COVID-19 infections took root on British soil.

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Six months and a global pandemic later, Britain faces the unique and unprecedented challenge of redefining its place in a world that is in the midst of a historic watershed moment. The COVID-19 pandemic has served as a catalyst for deep-rooted trends that have long been evident to politicians, policymakers and analysts alike 鈥� none more so than the tectonic shift in the globe鈥檚 geopolitical center of gravity from West to East.

Whether it be China鈥檚 much-publicized 鈥溾�� diplomacy against states criticizing its initial response to the outbreak, or the initial success of East Asian states in  the pandemic using artificial intelligence and digital surveillance, COVID-19 has shown that the much-hyped 鈥�Asian century鈥� is not merely a future prognosis but a present-day reality.

Brexit Britain on the World Stage

If the pandemic has served to boost Asia鈥檚 image on the world stage, the opposite is true for Brexit Britain. The UK鈥檚 bumbling response to the COVID-19 crisis has confirmed many of the suspicions of ill-placed grandeur held in foreign capitals since the referendum to leave the European Union in 2016.

Despite Johnson鈥檚 boastful  in Britain鈥檚 鈥渨orld-beating鈥� response to the novel coronavirus (which causes the COVID-19 disease), fatal early errors by the government 鈥� notably the initial refusal to enforce a lockdown in a forlorn effort to preserve the economy 鈥� have resulted in Britain suffering the worst of both worlds. Not only is the UK facing one of the highest per-capita death rates and the worst economic fallout as a result of COVID-19 in the developed world, but the situation has been exacerbated by the looming threat of no post-Brexit trade deal being agreed with the EU by the end of 2020.

In this context, a global Britain鈥檚 success in navigating the increasingly volatile 鈥渘ew normal鈥� of the post-pandemic geopolitical order will hinge more than ever on the government鈥檚 ability to leverage ties with partners old and new across the Asian continent.

Johnson鈥檚 vision of a buccaneering global Britain on the world stage is fundamentally predicated upon two core pillars: trade and security. Whitehall is acutely aware that Britain鈥檚 ability to harness the ascendance of Asia鈥檚 emerging powerhouses hinges upon striking a fragile balance between these two, often inconsistent, objectives.

On one hand, Britain鈥檚 strategic planners look hungrily toward contemporary geopolitical hotspots like the South China Sea as testing grounds for a new  security footprint in the Indo-Pacific region. Britain鈥檚 armed forces already possess a string of strategic outposts, from the Brunei-based Gurkha garrison to Royal Naval logistical hubs in Singapore and Diego Garcia. The recently formed UK Defence Staff (Asia Pacific) has outlined plans for a further base in Southeast Asia in a bid to affirm Britain鈥檚 commitment to upholding the regional security architecture.

In a symbolic gesture, the scheduled deployment of the Royal Navy鈥檚 brand new state-of-the-art aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, to conduct 鈥渇reedom of navigation鈥� patrols in the disputed South China Sea during 2021 is indicative of a wholesale rejection of the strategic retrenchment from east of Suez that has typified British security policy in the Indo-Pacific since the 1960s.

Beijing鈥檚 Sphere of Influence

Nevertheless, such grandiose ambitions of a more assertive military and diplomatic footprint in Asia do not come without their costs. Given China鈥檚 increasingly assertive posture on the international stage since the outbreak of COVID-19, it is not unreasonable to expect the diplomatic blowback from Britain鈥檚 perceived meddling within Beijing鈥檚 sphere of influence to grow stronger in the post-COVID era.

In July, after the UK offered citizenship to almost 3 million Hong Kong residents following Beijing鈥檚 implementation of a controversial new security law in Britain鈥檚 ex-colony, China issued a strongly-worded yet ambiguous  of 鈥渞etaliation.鈥� China鈥檚 response is illustrative of the fact that Brexit Britain鈥檚 ability to fully harness the Asian century is dependent upon London playing second fiddle to the preferences of Tokyo, Beijing and New Delhi.  

Despite Johnson鈥檚 lofty  hailing Britain鈥檚 post-Brexit transformation into a 鈥済reat, global trading nation,鈥� such a vision is not exactly conducive to geopolitical maneuvers that can all too readily be perceived as antagonistic by prospective partners. For instance, Whitehall鈥檚  over the contracting of Huawei, a Chinese technology company, to construct large tracts of Britain鈥檚 5G infrastructure over national security concerns does not bode well for a future UK–China free trade deal. Similarly, efforts to introduce restrictions on immigration via the adoption of an Australia-style points-based system have proved to be a sticking point in post-Brexit trade negotiations with India, the former 鈥渏ewel of the empire鈥� with whom Britain shares extensive historical, cultural and linguistic ties.

As a global Britain seeks to navigate a post-pandemic order characterized by increased great power antagonism, retreating globalization and resurgent authoritarianism, Whitehall鈥檚 strategic planners must be prepared to make hard-headed compromises between geopolitical and economic objectives in Asia in a manner that has been sorely lacking from Brexit negotiations with Britain鈥檚 European partners. Cut adrift from Europe at a time when the global order is becoming increasingly fragmented into competing regional blocs, a rudderless Britain lacking a coherent, sustainable vision of how it seeks to engage with Asia鈥檚 emerging superpowers risks becoming caught in the middle of an escalating cold war between the US and China.

Reason for Optimism

Despite the gloomy prognosis for a global Britain standing at the dawn of the Asian century, there remains reason for optimism once the short-term shockwaves of the pandemic have receded. Britain鈥檚 elite universities retain a mystical allure for ambitious young Asians seeking a world-class education. China, India, Hong Kong and Malaysia  for four of the top five countries of origin for international students in the UK. In addition, with two leading vaccine candidates in development at Oxford and Imperial, a British breakthrough in the fight against COVID-19 would further bolster Britain鈥檚 reputation as a global hub of research and innovation.

Such cutting-edge academic expertise 鈥� combined with London鈥檚 enduring status as a global financial center, post-2021 visa and immigration reforms  highly-skilled professionals, and the cultural imprint of large Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Chinese diasporas 鈥� ensures that even post-Brexit Britain possesses the latent potential not only to attract top-class Asian talent, but also to emerge as one of the Asian century鈥檚 biggest winners outside of the Indo-Pacific. Whilst Brexit has undercut the Blairite vision of Britain as a 鈥減ivotal power鈥� bridging the gap between the US and Europe, the United Kingdom鈥檚 deep-rooted historical, cultural, linguistic and economic ties with Asia鈥檚 rising powers provide ample scope for recasting Britain as a pivot on a grander scale: as a global hub bridging East and West.

However, such aspirations remain little more than wishful thinking unless British policymakers can formulate a coherent approach toward the Asian century, which has so far been absent. Nevertheless, tentative steps have been taken in such a direction over recent months. Whitehall鈥檚  of the Department for International Development with the Foreign Office is likely to deal a blow to British influence in less-developed corners of Asia, at least in the short term. Yet Johnson鈥檚 renewed commitment to spend 0.7% of GDP on foreign aid enables a more cohesive, long-term approach with developmental issues, allowing funding to be streamlined toward teams of world-class specialists, such as the UK Climate Change Unit in Indonesia or the Stabilisation Unit supporting post-conflict reconstruction in fragile states like Pakistan and Myanmar.

Similarly, the Foreign Office鈥檚 recent  of an 鈥淎ll of Asia鈥� strategy is indicative of a more comprehensive approach to forging partnerships across the continent, balancing conflicting security, diplomatic, trade, developmental priorities, as illustrated through the establishment of the UK鈥檚 first permanent mission to Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc in January 2020.

Before It Sets Sail

As the nature of post-pandemic global order emerges over the coming months and years, a global Britain will find itself navigating a turbulent geopolitical environment made infinitely more challenging by the aftershocks of the coronavirus. This includes a worldwide economic crisis, decreased globalization, declining faith in multilateral institutions and rising great power tension, all of which threaten to derail Johnson鈥檚 post-Brexit voyage into the unknown before it has even set sail.

Whilst Britain and its Western allies have bungled their response to the public health crisis, Asia鈥檚 dynamic rising powers are already bouncing back from the pandemic and laying the building blocks to ensure that the 21st century truly is Asian. From Beijing鈥檚 鈥淏elt and Road Initiative鈥� to New Delhi鈥檚 鈥淢ake in India鈥� to ambitious future vision projects such as Saudi Arabia鈥檚 Vision 2030, Vision of Indonesia 2045 or Kazakhstan 2050, Asia鈥檚 emerging powerhouses all champion integrated strategic frameworks to harness the unprecedented shift in global wealth and power eastward, which the COVID-19 pandemic has catalyzed.

A global Britain鈥檚 greatest mistake would be to supplement such a long-term calculated strategy with the half-baked geopolitical gambits that have so far typified Brexit Britain鈥檚 approach to the world鈥檚 largest continent. Indeed, for the UK to truly unleash its full potential in the dawning Asian century, it must look to Asia itself for inspiration.

*[Will Marshall is an intern at , which is a media partner of 51吃瓜.]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.