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Despite a myth to the contrary, the Caucasus Emirate has extensive links to global jihadist听networks, including al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

For nearly two decades, many Washington DC think-tanks and US mainstream media maintained the myth that the Caucasus Emirate (CE) mujahedeen and their predecessors had little or no relation to the global jihadist听revolutionary movement. Since its inception in October 2007, the CE has carried out thousands of attacks in Russia and has been involved in and inspired seven foreign plots in Europe and Azerbaijan. The CE also inspired the Tsarnaev brothers鈥� April 2013 attack on the Boston Marathon and several other assaults听abroad; the elder brother, Tamerlan, was planning to join the CE mujahedeen during his 2012 trip to Dagestan.

Moreover, there are CE groups operating in Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq听补苍诲 Syria. Yet in September 2014, writing for The Jamestown Foundation, Mairbek Vatchagaev, the former spokesman of the late Aslan Maskhadov 鈥� president (1995-2005) of the CE鈥檚 predecessor organization, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya (ChRI) 鈥斕�:听鈥淸T]he North Caucasus resistance remains a separate movement that has not developed solidarity networks with the Middle Eastern radicals.鈥�

Decade-Old Ties

In fact, the CE has been deeply integrated into the global jihad for about a decade, with ties going back for two. On December 19, an听 by Abu Muhammad al-Kadarskii (born Rustam Asildarov), the emir of the so-called Dagestan Vilayat (DV) 鈥� the听CE鈥檚 largest network 鈥� that he had taken the Islamic loyalty oath or “bayat” to the Islamic State (IS) and its “caliph,” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is just the final stage of that integration, institutionalizing what had already been developed over many years. Refusal to recognize such facts led to the Boston Marathon attack and even 9/11.

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As by this author in The Caucasus Emirate Mujahedin: Global Jihadism in Russia鈥檚 North Caucasus and Beyond, Defense Intelligence Agency and US court documents, as well as statements and historical accounts offered by the CE and the ChRI, testify to ties dating back as far as 1995 when al-Qaeda听补苍诲 other Islamist elements began infiltrating the ChRI. Moreover, the so-called 21st bomber of 9/11, Zacarias Moussaoui, was left untouched because his only tie to al-Qaeda was through Ibn al-Khattab. An associate of Osama bin Laden who worked in the ChRI for years and led the July 1999 invasion of Dagestan by jihadists from the then semi-independent Chechnya, Khattab was thought not to be part of al-Qaeda or the global jihad. ChRI was mistakenly thought to be a purely nationalist separatist movement of “freedom-fighters.” However, it was deeply involved in an ultimately aborted 2000 al-Qaeda听 to hijack a civilian airliner flying out of Frankfurt.

By 2002, ChRI鈥檚 jihadist wing had become as least as powerful as its nationalist wing. Then in October 2007, the jihadist wing seized complete control of the ChRI, ejected the ChRI nationalists, rejected their goal of an independent Chechnya and the Caucasus Emirate and jihad against all infidel countries fighting Muslims across the globe.

CE-orchestrated attacks

Since its founding, the CE has carried out nearly 3,000 in Russia, including 55 suicide bombings; undertaken failed plots in Belgium (2010), Azerbaijan (2012) and elsewhere; inspired several more; and published on its websites nothing but global jihadist propaganda from the likes of bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri听补苍诲 Anwar al-Awlaki. In a 2011 video, its present emir, Ali Abu Muhammad al-Dagistani (born Aliaskhab Kebekov) stated explicitly: 鈥淲e are doing everything within our power to create the Caliphate.鈥�

The global jihad鈥檚 perhaps leading philosopher, Abu Muhammad Asem al-Maqdisi, called on Muslims to support the CE as it is jihad鈥檚 鈥渄oorway to Europe.鈥� Chechen-born Eldar Magomedov led a 2012 al-Qaeda plot to attack targets in Spain and possibly听France during the London Summer Olympic Games and was by a Spanish court and police as al-Qaeda鈥檚 top operative in Europe.

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In late 2011 or early 2012, the CE鈥檚 founding emir, Dokku Umarov, financed and dispatched several emirs to Syria. Among them was Tarkhan Batirashvili, better known as Umar al-Shishani, the emir of IS鈥� northern or Syrian front. Some indicate he masterminded IS鈥� offensive in Iraq鈥檚 Anbar Province that led to Baghdadi鈥檚 declaration of a听caliphate. Batirashvili’s brother, Tamaz, may have a more important if clandestine role in IS. At least seven other CE-tied emirs now head smaller groups in IS, Jabhat al-Nusra听补苍诲 other jihadist umbrella groups. Many of them, including Batirashvili, say they plan to return to the Caucasus and CE to strengthen jihad at some future date, while several of them maintained their bayat to the CE emir.

Since Emir Dagistani replaced Umarov this year as the CE’s leader (after Russian intelligence succeeded in poisoning him in September 2013), he has been preoccupied with stemming the emigration of mujahedeen to fight in the Levant and justifying a neutral, though transparently pro-al-Qaeda, position in the conflict between IS and al-Qaeda over leadership of the global jihad. In September, he, along with Maqdisi and several other prominent jihadist “scholars,” issued a statement calling on IS to be more moderate and patch up the split with al-Qaeda. This exacerbated what was already a tense verbal war between the CE and IS.

Defection to IS

In November 2014, a small DV cell or 鈥�jamaat鈥� from Aukhovskii village took the bayat to IS鈥� Baghdadi. The DV鈥檚 Shariah Court judge听补苍诲 its Mountain Sector emir, Abu Usman al-Gimravii, condemned the Aukhovskii jamaat for risking dissension (fitna) and division within the CE and noted that the CE takes no side in the IS-al-Qaeda听dispute. However, he implicitly criticized Baghdadi鈥檚 declaration of the caliphate and himself caliph by asking how CE mujahedeen could commit such treachery and destruction in regard to the CE by听declaring allegiance to an 鈥渦nknown entity,鈥� which 鈥� not been recognized by scholars, hides out of sight, lacks the strength to defend Muslims, and does not see or know Muslims.鈥�

On December 19, a more damaging defection occurred when the DV鈥檚 top emir, Abu Muhammad al-Kadarskii, and the leader of a key DV sector covering Dagestan鈥檚 capital declared the bayat to Baghdadi. This likely resulted in them 鈥渢aking鈥� several hundred mujahedeen; though it remains unclear whether they plan to go to the Levant. Only days later, the emir of one of only two fronts in the CE鈥檚 Chechnya network, the Nokchicho Vilayat (NV), followed suit, perhaps taking half the NV mujahedeen with him. These defections were a severe blow to the CE, which has seen its capacity diminish since 2011, especially following the surge in emigration to Syria since 2013.

The first response to these major splits came from Gimravii, who referred to Asildarov as the DV鈥檚 鈥渇ormer emir鈥� and condemned his action as 鈥渢reachery鈥� and a 鈥渧iolation of the bayat鈥� to CE Emir Dagistani. Fearing many DV emirs and mujahedeen would follow Asildarov, he that violating the oath听is a 鈥渟erious offense鈥� that carries with it 鈥済rave consequences鈥� for everyone committing it. On December 28, CE Emir Dagistani displayed an equally harsh and announced the appointment of a new DV leader.

The DV and NV (IS-CE) emirs could take with them more than half of the CE鈥檚 forces. If the now IS-loyal CE emirs and their mujahedeen depart for the Levant, the CE鈥檚 capacity would be devastated. In that case, Umarov鈥檚 gamble of sending mujahedeen to Syria so that they could network and gain experience with the global jihad in the Levant and later to strengthen the CE will have failed miserably. If, on the other hand, the IS-CE remains in the Caucasus and draws back some of the CE mujahedeen in the Levant, then a strong resurgence of jihad in Russia is almost certain.

Either way, the above developments confirm once again 鈥斕齠or those still in denial 鈥斕齮hat the CE is part and parcel of the global jihadist revolutionary alliance. Former or active CE mujahedeen plotting terrorist attacks should be expected in the West fairly soon. From here onward, unlike the pre-Boston Marathon period, Western capitals would do well to ignore those in Washington and mainstream media downplaying jihadism in Russia, and this time take heed of the warnings that Moscow issued to the CIA and FBI regarding the Boston bomber.

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The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.

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