51吃瓜

Whatever pundits might have said, the recent NATO summit in Brussels has not ushered in a new era for the alliance.

Shaken by US President Donald Trump鈥檚 statements, ranging from accusing America鈥檚 European allies of their NATO membership to alleging , the Brussels summit was mostly focused on EU-NATO cooperation. Although Trump has labeled the European Union a听, mostly because of his vision of world trade as a zero-sum-game, his tirade against the low level of commitment by European allies is nothing new.

Indeed, though expressed in a characteristically bombastic way, Trump has again highlighted听狈础罢翱’蝉听main problem following the demise of the USSR 鈥� the lack of a common view on the scope of the alliance and the subsequent loss of centrality. If up until 1989 NATO was considered a collective security system aimed at deterring the threat of a Soviet invasion, ever since its collapse in 1991, the alliance has been struggling to recast its role in a way.

In regard to this, Trump鈥檚 words on the reluctance of European allies to bear the financial burden of NATO have uprooted long-standing concerns.

First is the issue of US military commitment to Europe. The reopening of the burden of sharing the cost was one of the flagship topics during Trump鈥檚 campaign over the last few years; rebuilding America from its foundation at home, with the implementation of tariffs and barriers on foreign-made products, and the improvement of the trade balance toward the allies (known as the ), goes hand in hand with the demand for stronger commitment on defense spending for NATO by the Europeans.

In Trump鈥檚 view, the US no longer needs to carry the lion鈥檚 share of EU defense, especially in light of the of security and defense procedures within the European Union. The , while most European countries within NATO do not live up to their commitment of 2% of GDP. Nevertheless, the idea of shifting US military posture in Europe is rooted in the past; other presidents, from Dwight Eisenhower to , have raised the issue of burden sharing.

Second, even though Russia鈥檚 annexation of Crimea in 2014 has breathed new life into the alliance, it has also become a bone of contention among member states. Yes, the听2014 and 2016 summits were aimed at reiterating the centrality of Article 5 (which states that an attack on a NATO member is an attack on all) and to establish the deployment of troops on the eastern and southern flank 鈥� the upon which the rotation of combat infantry brigades should counter any 鈥渙ffensive鈥� Russian move. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that the build-up of Russian conventional forces is comparatively higher than NATO鈥檚, which is years away from ensuring strategic parity in case of a Russian invasion along the eastern flank.

This reflects the idea that within NATO not all members share the same concern over Russia. Thus, France, Germany and Italy do not seem to look at Russia as a direct threat and are keen on engaging Moscow both with commercial relations and deterrence. For these countries, Russia is a significant economic partner both for imports of energy products and exports of mainly machinery and manufactured goods. By contrast, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia鈥檚 view on Moscow is .

To sum up, while Trump鈥檚 bombastic request to increase overall defense spending to 4% has sparked a debate among the allies, it has focused the attention on the varying degrees of military commitment. At the end of the meeting, Trump reaffirmed听. However, as Obama began the withdrawal of from Germany, Trump will most likely . In regard to this, it seems that the US will continue the pivot to Asia and use its strategic forces to contain China, while maintaining a smaller presence of conventional forces (with high firepower capability) in Europe in order to hedge against Russia.

Thus, Europe must come to terms with it. This means that European countries have to continue to pursue their structural integration at the armed forces level in terms of harmonization of equipment procurement, research, funding and logistics. Aside of the Permanent Structured Cooperation framework, which is听part of the European Union鈥檚 Security and Defense Policy, nine European states have signed off on establishing a European military force for rapid deployment in times of crisis, a project aimed at strengthening and reinforcing readiness of forces.

However, European countries are far from having political will to pursue this path. In security and defense matters, cooperation between states is and could put national interests at stake. With regard to this, who could rule out that a complete withdrawal of US forces may not trigger an arms race and, in the worst case scenario, enhance nuclear proliferation among major states, especially France and Germany? Nobody, except the United States. That is why allies remain bound to a vision where US armed forces are hosted on their soil, which ultimately means that Washington听听and will thus intervene in the worst case scenario.

What is likely to happen is that the alliance is not going to be dismantled anytime soon. On the one hand, European countries will struggle to form a real European army with good results in terms of operational capability, while they will modestly increase their defense expenditures to accommodate US requests. On the other hand, Trump will follow through on Obama鈥檚 policy of disengagement from Europe while, at the same time, he will maintain fewer conventional forces on European soil aimed at continuing to carry out operations in closer proximity, such as the Middle East and North Africa.

*[Updated: July 19, 2018, at 17:48 GMT.]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.

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