51吃瓜

A crumbling Europe consumed by nationalism, petty infighting and aggression could have an impact on the international order.

The international order is under siege in Europe. European Union (EU) and NATO nations once worked alongside the United States to expand a liberal, rules-based order across the globe. Today, those same countries struggle for the order鈥檚 survival at home. Amidst chaos in the Middle East and China鈥檚 rise in Asia, Europe 鈥� beset by Russian aggression from without and a crisis of liberalism from within 鈥� has become the bellwether for the international order. Should that order collapse in Europe under these dual strains, its prospects wane precipitously on the global stage.

Until recently, European nations were among the strongest proponents of the international order. As a collective security and economic community safely ensconced in聽鈥�,鈥澛爐he expanding European project seemed to reflect the victory of democracy and markets over the 20^th聽century鈥檚 ideological alternatives. A supposedly post-national, post-identity and post-conflict zone, the EU appeared the apogee of a liberal, rules-based system.

At the beginning of the 21^st聽century, challenges appeared to stem exclusively from locales far from the land of espressos and euros. Following the聽9/11 attacks, transatlantic attention centered on malignant non-state actors and poor governance in the Middle East, threats that eventually not only聽聽in several countries, but also exported disorder beyond the region. In the Pacific, China鈥檚 economic rise and聽聽threatened to spark renewed great power rivalry, creating perilous predictions of a聽鈥溾�澛爐hat would end in conflict.

However, amid these more remote threats to the international order, European stability proved to be fragile. Economic crisis and nationalist movements currently threaten the commitment to liberal principles that first took root聽in Western Europe after World War II. A populist wave now imperils the liberal model that spread first to Central and Eastern Europe and then across the swathes of the globe. That聽聽embedded a respect for individual rights, the rule of law and democratic institutions in domestic politics.

Today,聽democratic backsliding is already underway. Hungary鈥檚 Viktor Orban blazed a trail toward聽鈥溾�� 鈥� where the majority鈥檚 whims overrule checks on executive power or minority protections 鈥斅犅燫ussian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President聽Recep Erdo臒an. Other Central and Eastern European leaders, such as Czech聽聽and the Polish governing聽, have followed similar paths. Doubts around the future of liberal democracy throughout the continent abound.

This shift toward illiberal democracy lands a twin blow against the liberal pillar of the international system.

First, the failure of these democracies will fuel rivals who聽propose alternative arrangements聽like聽. Reformers outside Europe previously held up these countries as a guiding light. In the future, they will find both weaker moral and pragmatic cases for pursuing the European path.

Second, a wider collapse of liberalism in Europe would replace a group of countries that have ardently supported the global system with neutral actors, or even revisionists. As Robert Kagan argued in聽The World America Made, the current international order is liberal in character 鈥� promoting non-aggression, open markets and human rights 鈥� only because the strongest powers are liberal. In normal times, Europe鈥檚 removal of support, or active opposition, would cripple the international order. At a moment when the聽聽of that system, the failure of European liberalism would be a death knell for the order鈥檚 very nature.

RUSSIA AND CHINA

At Europe鈥檚 periphery, Russia compounds these challenges by subverting聽the cornerstone of a rules-based order: the prohibition on altering borders by force. The invasion of Ukraine is only the most recent example of Moscow eroding the European security order that denies it a sphere of influence.聽Following World War II, European nations pioneered norms against territorial revisionism. Signatories to the聽,聽including Russia, declared 鈥渋nviolable all one another鈥檚 frontiers as well as the frontiers of all states in Europe.鈥� These tenets, reaffirmed in the聽, are now wantonly disregarded by Russia鈥檚 actions in Georgia and Ukraine.

If unchecked, Moscow鈥檚 use of force will continue to erode this norm, which would open the gates for worldwide revisionism. Within Europe, illiberal parties already chafe at perceived territorial injustices (such as聽).

Similarly, in Asia, China is pursuing maritime claims at the expense of its neighbors that could spiral into conflict. Beijing and Moscow have聽聽vis-脿-vis the international order. Nevertheless, China is watching and learning from Russia鈥檚 efforts to reacquire a sphere of influence. Russia鈥檚 present challenges, therefore, are akin to sawing into the legs supporting a table, making it more susceptible to collapse.

Under this two-pronged assault, Europe has returned to the fore of geopolitics. While challenges in Asia and the Middle East will undoubtedly impact the international order, a crumbling Europe consumed by nationalism, petty infighting and aggression would decisively tip the global scale against the system鈥檚 immediate future. Saving a liberal, rules-based order in Europe alone is not sufficient to rescue it worldwide, but the survival of the order in Europe remains a necessary precondition. If lost there, its future is bleak everywhere.

*[Young Professionals in Foreign Policy is a partner institution of 51吃瓜.] 聽

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.

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