51吃瓜

India made a giant leap in its nuclear energy program as its Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) attained on April 6. The indigenously developed nuclear reactor can generate 500 megawatts of electricity for commercial use. This milestone marks India鈥檚 entry into the of its three-stage nuclear power program, originally designed in the 1950s. The reactor is expected to electricity to the national energy grid in September 2026, making India the country, after Russia, to operate a commercial Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR).聽

The (IAEA) has India鈥檚 nuclear breakthrough as a significant milestone in the future of nuclear energy and advancing fuel sustainability. However, India鈥檚 nuclear progress has drawn sharp from across the border, with Pakistani strategic analysts warning that the reactor could widen the nuclear imbalance in South Asia and increase India鈥檚 capacity to produce weapons-usable plutonium.

Former Pakistani diplomat Qazi M. Khalilullah IAEA鈥檚 praise for India’s PFBR, describing it as an example of India鈥檚 鈥渋rresponsible nuclear behavior鈥� and warning that an unsafeguarded fast-breeder reactor could encourage vertical proliferation and undermine strategic stability. Zahir Kazmi, an arms control adviser for Pakistan, it to be a plutonium bomb push operating outside the surveillance of IAEA safeguards, describing India as a major destabilizing force in the world.

While Pakistan鈥檚 fears about the PFBR鈥檚 latent weapons capability are not entirely unfounded, it is Pakistan鈥檚 history of nuclear irresponsibility and nuclear brinkmanship 鈥� not India鈥檚 civilian nuclear program 鈥� that should be of greater concern to the international community.

Nuclear oversight in India and Pakistan聽

The IAEA Safeguards system is a critical component of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty () to deter the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology. Although not an NPT signatory, India鈥檚 impeccable non-proliferation record prompted the US to consider a broad nuclear partnership with India. In 2008, US President and Indian Prime Minister signed the US鈥揑ndia Civil Nuclear Cooperation under which India agreed to allow oversight of its civilian nuclear facilities.聽

Pakistan followed a similar path, though under very different circumstances. International outrage followed the revelations that Islamabad had been engaging in covert nuclear proliferation involving states under international scrutiny. To avert the threat of crippling economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, Pakistan civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards.

Pakistan鈥檚 dangerous legacy of nuclear proliferation

Pakistan moved to develop a nuclear bomb in the mid-1970s after 鈥� hailed in Pakistan as the 鈥渇ather of Pakistan鈥檚 nuclear bomb鈥� 鈥� classified information, sensitive centrifuge technology and nuclear blueprints while working as a subcontractor for URENCO in the Netherlands. Internationally, Abdul Qadeer Khan as the world鈥檚 best-known nuclear proliferator.

He established a clandestine network of private suppliers and intermediaries to supply nuclear and missile-related technologies. While his tactics were long associated with organized and financial crime, analysts say the Khan network marked one of the first of these methods in global nuclear proliferation. By the 1990s, Khan had operationalized the world鈥檚 most dangerous , fueling the secret ambitions of Iran, North Korea and Libya while even making overtures to Iraq.聽

His network provided Tehran with critical P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, along with the designs, and traded enrichment hardware and centrifuges with Pyongyang. In Libya, Khan鈥檚 network attempted to export a turnkey nuclear program involving weapons designs and over a .

Additionally, he provided weapons-related blueprints to Libya, and possibly Iran, reportedly derived from a bomb design China had earlier to Pakistan in the 1960s. This unprecedented proliferation scheme, described by experts as a 鈥溾�� for the bomb, effectively decades of international safeguards to arm some of the world鈥檚 most volatile regimes.

In February 2004, Khan issued a televised confession admitting to the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Pakistani President acted swiftly to grant him a pardon and refused to make Khan available for interrogation by the US or the IAEA 鈥� a move critics viewed as a strategic shield to the military establishment from international scrutiny.

Multiple international analysts and non-proliferation experts have argued that Khan鈥檚 global nuclear trafficking network could not have operated for decades without at least tacit or knowledge from elements within Pakistan鈥檚 military and intelligence establishment. Studies by US and German institutions, along with arms control analysts, have cited the scale of the transfers, overseas logistics and repeated ignored warnings as indicators of possible state or deliberate inaction.

One such report claimed that many Pakistanis Khan had taken the blame to shield the wider establishment, particularly the military. Even former Pakistani Prime Minister reportedly suggested that more powerful figures may have made Khan, who led a nuclear proliferation network, a to deflect attention. In his personal diaries, Khan maintained that he acted only with the full of the Pakistani government.

India鈥檚 nuclear restraint and Pakistan鈥檚 offensive posture

India initially opposed nuclear weaponization, treating atomic energy as a tool for development and global disarmament under Prime Minister , who was a prominent international voice against the nuclear arms race. His successor, , maintained this stance even after China鈥檚 first nuclear test, though India later its nuclear program and explored 鈥減eaceful nuclear explosion鈥� capabilities amid growing strategic pressures and demands for technological parity.

Although India built Asia鈥檚 nuclear reactor, its advanced nuclear program was dedicated exclusively to civilian purposes. Its shift toward nuclear armament was a direct response to Chinese aggression and its growing nuclear capabilities. India鈥檚 crushing defeat in 1962, which resulted in China seizing Jammu and Kashmir鈥檚 Aksai Chin in a surprise offensive, created a permanent security deficit that deepened significantly after Beijing鈥檚 first nuclear test in 1964 and a series of subsequent tests.

Eventually, mounting strategic concerns New Delhi towards an indigenous weapons capability, culminating in India鈥檚 first successful nuclear test in 1974. In 1988, Prime Minister proposed a comprehensive, time-bound for complete disarmament, insisting that all nuclear powers participate in the process. With no response from the major nuclear states, India later the lack of progress toward universal disarmament as a key factor leading to its 1998 nuclear tests.

Pakistan鈥檚 nuclear armament developed within a markedly different strategic framework. From its inception to its present-day expansion, Pakistan鈥檚 nuclear program 鈥� and indeed much of its broader military establishment 鈥� has remained India-centric. , Pakistan鈥檚 Prime Minister, infamously in 1965, 鈥淚f India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves 鈥� even go hungry 鈥� but we will get one of our own.鈥�

Pakistan ramped up its military program, which had been built on espionage and China鈥檚 covert assistance, to conduct its first series of in 1998, immediately following India鈥檚 nuclear tests. After India conducted five nuclear tests, Pakistan by detonating six devices, a move with the intention of gaining parity with India.聽

For decades, Pakistan has consistently employed aggressive nuclear signaling and saber-rattling as a primary instrument of its strategic posture toward India. The rhetoric resurfaced recently when Pakistan鈥檚 military chief, , during a visit to the US in August 2025, that as a nuclear power, the country could take 鈥渉alf the world down鈥� in the event of a conflict with India. Again, in May 2026, a Pakistani senator speaking in New York openly India with annihilation.聽

Even Pakistan鈥檚 missile naming strategy is deliberately . While India has largely named its missiles after the five elements of nature and other Sanskrit terms, such as , , , Pakistan has chosen names associated with medieval Islamic invaders 鈥� including , , , and 鈥� who launched brutal campaigns into the Indian subcontinent, leaving behind a legacy of bloody conquests, plunder and massacres.

It is a remarkable irony that Pakistan鈥檚 leadership glorifies medieval invaders as symbols of national pride, seemingly forgetting that the populations of present-day Pakistan were among the first victims of those invasions when the region belonged to the broader Indic civilization, centuries before the emergence of the Pakistani state. Naming missiles after such conquerors reflects a unique brand of selective amnesia, given that these campaigns had swept through today鈥檚 Pakistani territory with violence and plunder before advancing deeper into the subcontinent.

Contrasting nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan聽

India adheres to two key nuclear doctrines underscoring New Delhi鈥檚 position that its nuclear arsenal is intended primarily for deterrence rather than warfighting.

India鈥檚 no first use () doctrine states that it will not use nuclear weapons unless first attacked by nuclear means. This principle underscores India鈥檚 position that nuclear forces are intended solely for deterrence and retaliatory defense.

India鈥檚 second doctrine is credible , which entails maintaining nuclear capability deemed sufficient to deter adversaries without entering an open-ended arms race. The stockpile is calibrated to meet perceived threats while ensuring the capability to deliver the required deterrent effect.

The to order nuclear retaliation lies with the civilian political leadership. The decision will be taken in cooperation with the Nuclear Authority of India, which has a two-tier structure: the Political Council, led by the prime minister, and the Executive Council, led by the national security advisor.聽

India鈥檚 strategy eschews tactical nuclear weapons (), which are low-yield, short-range systems designed for use on the battlefield even against advancing conventional forces. It remains with its doctrines of NFU and credible minimum deterrence, with the arsenal geared primarily towards deterrence and assured second-strike capability.

Unlike India, Pakistan an NFU doctrine, leaving open the possibility that Islamabad could be the first to launch a nuclear strike in a conflict scenario. A former senior military official that the country鈥檚 nuclear arsenal is intended to respond to all forms of perceived threats from an adversary.聽

Its strategy is guided by , explicitly aimed at countering India across every level of conflict 鈥� strategic, operational and tactical. Former Pakistani military strategist Khalid Ahmed Kidwai said the doctrine was designed to ensure full coverage of the Indian landmass and 鈥淸India would have] no place to hide.鈥�

Pakistan鈥檚 nuclear operations control lies with the Chief of Defense Forces under the Constitutional Amendment of 2025, which consolidates of the army, navy and air force and dramatically expands military power. This reform makes Pakistan the only nuclear-armed state where authority over nuclear use is entrusted to one military officer.

Pakistan has even engaged in the development of TNWs, sparking international concern for lowering the nuclear threshold. Analysts warn that their deployment in conventional military conflicts significantly the risk of a 鈥渦se it or lose it鈥� dilemma and launch by lower-level commanders, raising the likelihood of a nuclear war.聽

The divergence between the two nuclear doctrines extends far beyond military strategy, with India maintaining restraint and prioritizing a stabilizing deterrent over aggressive nuclear signaling. Pakistan remains a deeply volatile nuclear power whose 鈥淔irst Use鈥� doctrine and military-dominated command structure contribute to an increasingly precarious security environment.

The country continues to with entrenched extremist and jihadist groups, some of which have openly turned against the state, fueling longstanding international concerns over the security of nuclear assets and the risk of sensitive technology into militant hands. While Islamabad frequently portrays India as a destabilizing force, the reality is that Pakistan鈥檚 murky record of nuclear proliferation, aggressive posturing, de facto military-civilian regime, and internal pose serious threats to regional and global security.

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The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.