51吃瓜

With the economy in free fall and battling a rising tide of protest, Zimbabwe’s ruling party is in crisis.

Zimbabwe is facing a transition, but the outcome remains unclear. For months, the state has been battling a rising tide of听听and听鈥渟tay-aways鈥澨齪rompted by economic collapse and poor management of the budget. The once-formidable opposition has finally found its听听following a decade of fractiousness, while the ruling ZANU-PF descends into factionalism and rivalry around the battle to succeed nonagenarian President Robert Mugabe at the helm of the kleptocratic state.

Balancing on the verge of economic collapse for over a decade, the Zimbabwean economy faltered in the early 2000s, recovered briefly (albeit from a low base) following dollarization in 2009 and has again hit the skids as it faces a biting liquidity crisis and foreign currency shortfall, leaving the country unable to pay its foreign and domestic debts. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the African Development Bank (ADB) have been poised to intervene, but in June Zimbabwe failed to make its own deadline for paying back $1.8 billion in arrears鈥攁 debt that must be cleared before the country can access crucial funds to restart its economy.

Liquidity Crunch

听补谤别听听to be significantly over 90%, with the vast majority of the country鈥檚 citizens engaged in work in the informal sector鈥攑redominantly small-scale cross-border trade鈥攐r reliant on听听from family members working in South Africa, the United States or the United Kingdom. In spite of the low levels of employment, 96.8% of the country鈥檚 budget is听鈥攁 massively inflated public sector wage bill that is believed to be filled with听听whose salaries form an important source of patronage for state insiders.

The liquidity crunch was prompted by a decline in foreign direct investment, disappearing diamond revenues, collapse of domestic production, externalization of funds by political elites and a growing trade deficit for the import-dependent country. As the government struggled to address these challenges, the population became ever more desperate, caught in the midst of the in听35 years.

In early 2016, the Reserve Bank governor announced the introduction of bond notes鈥攁 replacement currency to be pegged at 1:1 to the US dollar and paid out in lieu of dollars. Fearing the return of the hyperinflation experienced during the mid-2000s crisis, the announcement prompted a small wave of protests and skirmishes as well as a run on the banks as citizens tried to withdraw their funds to prevent their life savings being converted into a currency that isn鈥檛 recognized outside of Zimbabwe.

Anger and Desperation

The frustration, anger and desperation caused by an economic crisis exacerbated by government inaction has led to the most sustained period of protest seen in the country for 20 years. The protests have been a long time coming, beginning with the one-man protest by , who has since gone missing in March 2015 after being forced into an unmarked vehicle. In April 2016, a听 with the hashtag prompted a Twitter and Facebook storm, pushing social media into direct confrontation with the state.

But rather than driving the protests, the social media campaign merely capitalized on existing frustration, broadening and extending the narrative. On July 1, protests erupted at the border between Zimbabwe and South Africa after the government banned the importation of a number of key goods in a bid to听听the trade deficit.听Three听days later, in downtown Harare as minibus operators protested against police harassment and the imposition of hefty new fines that would negatively affect public transport operators. Police responded with teargas and beatings, prompting outrage from civil society and the media.

On July 6, the听first听of three events occurred, as workers across the country stayed away, businesses remained shut and the streets deserted. The protest was initiated by unpaid civil servants, backed by the infamous and publicized by civil society bodies. The Zimbabwean government shut down the internet as it tried to undermine communication between groups of activists.

Videos and images of beatings of citizens by police circulated soon after the event. Since July 6, there have been weekly protests by various groups which have been met with increased hostility and violence by an ever more desperate government. The state has imprisoned hundreds of activists, with more than 70 currently still in custody, including prominent activist from the #Tajamuka movement,听.

Violence and Bribes

Having once been lauded as one of the most effective and widely-supported opposition parties on the continent, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) suffered a series of public spats and splits in 2013 that left it听, and many of its leaders discredited.

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However, in light of the MDC president鈥檚 failing听听and a sense of possibility engendered by ruling party听听and mass discontent, Zimbabwe鈥檚 opposition politicians appear to have papered over their differences. The country鈥檚 fractured opposition and former ZANU-PF heavyweights have coalesced, creating a听听called NERA鈥攖he National Election Reform Agenda鈥攃omprised of听,听whose mass march on August 26 was听听despite a court ruling that it could go ahead.

Members of civil society, the academic community and opposition groups have called for a transitional authority to take power from the faltering ZANU-PF elite, as a听听to rebuild the state ahead of fresh elections.

The Zimbabwean government is on the back foot. Fighting battles on all sides, the ruling party has been unable to secure the necessary funds to buy its way out of the crisis. Instead, they have resorted to violence and听听to try to quell the rising tide of the disaffected.

In addition, ZANU-PF is riven by internal factionalism as the听听of 92-year-old President Mugabe, and听听injects a sense of urgency into the realignment of factions. 鈥淭eam Lacoste,鈥� the faction backing donor-favorite Emmerson Mnangagwa, has suffered significant purges in both government and the party, making it difficult for him to inherit Mugabe鈥檚 mantle. G40鈥攐r Generation 40鈥攖he faction behind President Mugabe鈥檚 wife, Grace Mugabe, is seen to be able to control the purges, as it has a majority in the ruling party鈥檚 national disciplinary committee.

Personal Loyalties

Historically, Mnangagwa has been able to count on support from sections of the country鈥檚 security forces, but that support isn鈥檛 guaranteed. Although personal loyalties may remain at the upper levels, there are rumblings of dissent from the lower ranks. Though their salaries have always been prioritized, the state has found it increasingly difficult to pay the military.

In late August, there were听听by South African media outlets that members of the police and military have joined the protests in response to unpaid salaries and the deepening economic crisis. State media听听to this by alleging that opposition parties were responsible for having fake uniforms imported into the country in order to cause confusion.

On September 1, the day before a scheduled NERA rally, the government issues an听听听on all protests in Harare for a two-week period. In response, state media reported that the ruling party was听听amending the 2013 constitution to prevent future protest action.

It鈥檚 uncertain what impact these moves by the state might have, but it seems unlikely that they will be able to quell the wave of popular protest through legislation alone. For now, Zimbabwe is at a crossroads and the state has too little money to be able to either repress dissenters or buy supporters. This presents an opportunity for the opposition, but it鈥檚听听as to whether or not they have a workable strategy for a post-Mugabe political dispensation. For the average Zimbabwean, it is clear that there are difficult times ahead and the road to economic recovery is likely to be long and arduous.

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.

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