51吃瓜

A month after 滨苍诲辞苍别蝉颈补鈥檚 2024 , then-President-elect Prabowo Subianto sent a fresh signal on the country鈥檚 foreign policy. It was potentially different from that of former President Joko Widodo (properly known as Jokowi) and dispelled the of Bebas dan Aktif 鈥� 鈥渋ndependent and active.鈥� How has Prabowo redirected 滨苍诲辞苍别蝉颈补鈥檚 foreign policy, and how significantly could it impact Indonesia?

Prabowo has been keen on global issues since he was a minister of defense. In 2019, he actively engaged in various international , such as the Shangri-La Dialogue. He led Indonesian delegations in negotiations with multiple countries and has consistently demonstrated 滨苍诲辞苍别蝉颈补鈥檚 commitment to supporting Palestine. During his tenure, Prabowo visited , most of which are strategic partners of Indonesia. He aims to convey that his presidency will prioritize multilateralism while simultaneously fostering strong and cooperative relations with those countries.

In early November 2024, Prabowo started his first international to China, followed by the , United Kingdom, Middle East and South America for the meeting and G20 Summits. In his debut, Prabowo succeeded in dealing with these countries, including economic cooperation. With China, for example, Prabowo brought over in investment after meeting with President Xi Jinping and others.

However, Prabowo鈥檚 visit raises questions about 滨苍诲辞苍别蝉颈补鈥檚 stance toward China and the US. Some feel that Prabowo lacks the vision to maintain these rivals.

During his campaign, Prabowo pledged to implement a 鈥済ood neighbor 鈥� guided by the principle that a thousand friends are too few and one enemy is too many. He wants Indonesia to foster good relations with many countries and promote peace across various regions. This policy objective is primarily driven by economic interests, with the aim to attract substantial investments.

Breaking from Jokowi鈥檚 practices

Prabowo has been in office for over four months now. In that time, his foreign policy has undermined traditional practices. His approach is quite different from Jokowi鈥檚.

First, Prabowo chose Sugiono as 滨苍诲辞苍别蝉颈补鈥檚 foreign minister, replacing his predecessor, Retno Marsudi. Sugiono is viewed as a minister on foreign agendas 鈥� Indonesia has a foreign minister without a diplomatic career since former President Alwi Shihab in 1999. Some are concerned about Sugiono鈥檚 view on responding to global issues.

Additionally, this indicates that Sugiono merely acts as an 鈥溾�� of Prabowo. Prabowo seems to be a 鈥�.鈥� For him, everything must proceed according to his framework, even if it leads to future disasters.

Second, under Prabowo鈥檚 administration in Kazan, Russia, Sugiono argued that Indonesia would join BRICS+ 鈥� which it this January 鈥� and participate in every forum. He that the inclusion does not reflect 滨苍诲辞苍别蝉颈补鈥檚 stance on a particular bloc but rather kindles the principle of Bebas dan Aktif. Additionally, Sugiono declared Prabowo鈥檚 message that Indonesia wishes to 鈥�,鈥� and that it Palestine and Lebanon.

In the Jokowi era, instead of joining BRICS+ as Prabowo desired, Indonesia decided to join the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (). While still in office, Jokowi attended a BRICS high-level summit in South Africa on August 23, 2024. There he argued that Indonesia did not reject joining BRICS+ but instead it. Although BRICS+ represents more than of global trade and covers over 40% of oil, Indonesia pondered being a member of G20 and 鈥� the alliance of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia. However, BRICS+ has problems, such as the continuous dispute between China and India.

滨苍诲辞苍别蝉颈补鈥檚 to join BRICS+ broke Jokowi鈥檚 habit. Some argue that it could omit the principle of Bebas dan Aktif and attract the US鈥檚 attention. 滨苍诲辞苍别蝉颈补鈥檚 potential accession to BRICS+ poses economic risks, as US President Donald Trump鈥檚 new administration plans to impose on the organization due to its perceived opposition to using the US dollar.

Prabowo should recognize that BRICS+ is a 鈥溾�� group strategically designed to serve the interests of China and Russia.

Joint development with China

Prabowo should understand that Indonesia still requires the support of the US to effectively address China鈥檚 actions in the North Natuna .

The 鈥渏oint development鈥� between Indonesia and China in the North Natuna Sea began on November 9, 2024. In this area, China鈥檚 claim of 鈥� nine dotted map lines that mark China鈥檚 claimed portion of the South China Sea 鈥� violates the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (). Indonesia argued that it could not be interpreted as recognizing China鈥檚 claim. Simultaneously, Indonesia and China reached an 鈥渋mportant common 鈥� and agreed to establish an Inter-Governmental Joint Steering to operate relevant cooperation.

However, some are still concerned about the response. There is no bold statement or guarantee that Indonesia will not rely on China鈥檚 claim. Furthermore, Indonesia must negotiate maritime boundaries with China. As the proverb states, 鈥淭he homeowner will not negotiate with the thief who has ransacked his house.鈥�

Prabowo鈥檚 foreign policy is deeply concerning. As the world stands at a crossroads due to prolonged conflicts, Prabowo should place Indonesia on the right path, aligned with national interests. This can only happen if he dares to reconsider his foreign minister, reassess the plan to join BRICS+ and review the joint development of the North Natuna Sea with China.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial聽policy.