51吃瓜

Last week, Foreign Affairs published what I鈥檓 tempted to call a provocatively contrarian by C. Raja Mohan, apparently a loyal fan of the US deep state. It bears the title, 鈥淭he Multipolar Delusion.鈥澛�

Nearly all serious observers of today鈥檚 geopolitical landscape have concluded that the 鈥渦nipolar moment鈥� inaugurated by the collapse of the Soviet Union some 35 years ago has been superseded by something else. When, on September 11, 1990, US President George H.W. Bush that a 鈥渘ew world order鈥� was emerging, no one could deny it. But once it became clear that China was not just challenging US supremacy but emerging as the primary trading partner of a majority of the world鈥檚 nations, maintaining a belief in a 鈥渦nipolar rules-based order鈥� swiftly became a minority position.

Mohan does make a valid point when he asserts that 鈥渢he forces supporting the United States鈥� assertive unilateralism extend beyond Trump. An American foreign policy establishment accustomed to the ease of unilateral action will likely continue to pursue it no matter who is in the White House.鈥� But he also makes the following claim:

鈥淭he reality is that the world is still unipolar. The illusions of multipolarity have not created a more balanced international arrangement. Instead, they have done the opposite: they have empowered the United States to shed previous constraints and project its power even more aggressively. No other power or bloc has been able to mount a credible challenge or work collectively to counter U.S. power. But unlike in the prior period of unipolarity that emerged at the end of the Cold War, the United States is now exercising unilateral power shorn of responsibilities.鈥�

My reading of the current landscape is that the world is in a transitional phase towards a future multipolar equilibrium that will take time to play out. I do agree that the current behavior of the US, under both US Presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump 鈥� even though their approach, style and emphasis differ widely 鈥� reflects an attempt to exercise 鈥渦nilateral power shorn of responsibilities.鈥�

Where I think Mohan makes a mistake 鈥� nevertheless understandable given the historically anchored Western mindset of Foreign Policy鈥檚 readership 鈥� is in supposing that multipolarity is about a geopolitical sport in which another actor is 鈥渕ounting a credible challenge.鈥� In other words, his vision appears to rely on the purely arithmetical logic of supposing there will always be one or more parties seeking to exercise global hegemony at a given moment.

I would even suggest that political scientist John Mearsheimer, who adheres to the idea of multipolarity based on spheres of influence, makes a similar mistake when he assumes that great powers are always and exclusively driven by the desire to expand their power over others. Mearsheimer鈥檚 realism correctly describes a predictable trend 鈥� a trend that correlates in particular with the current competitive culture of the West 鈥� but it shouldn鈥檛 exclude other possible trends driven by motivations not directly related to building or consolidating offensive power.

I appreciate and can learn from the range of facts and statistics Mohan musters. But I wonder about what I would call the 鈥渃ultural origins鈥� of its rather narrowly defined argument and the author鈥檚 tendency to cherry-pick the significant facts. I will cite just one that the Asian foreign policy analyst Mohan prefers to ignore. I鈥檓 referring to the shift of the center of gravity of the global economy over the past half-century from the North Atlantic to where it squarely sits today: in the southeast quadrant of Asia.

Another gap in his reasoning is his disinterest in the growing instability within the United States, whose K-shaped economy is likely to wreak havoc in the coming years. His notion of multipolarity depends on the success of a rising challenger. But the internal decline or potential economic and cultural collapse that may take place within a previously dominant unipolar leader may be a more significant contributing cause.

Perhaps the real problem is linguistic and cultural. Mohan highlights the fact that there may be multiple interpretations of the meaning of multipolarity. Perhaps for that very reason the term itself is unstable. Should we be talking not about a multipolar world but a polycentric one? Building that into the equation would, I think, lead to a different debate and focus our attention on a wider range of factors.

At this point, I was curious to get Claude鈥檚 advice. I included the preceding text in my prompt and concluded with the following questions:

What do you think of Mohan鈥檚 line of argument? Does it have strengths I鈥檝e failed to notice? Are the weaknesses I鈥檝e highlighted real?

Your critique is perceptive and I think largely correct, though Mohan鈥檚 piece has some genuine strengths worth acknowledging before picking at its foundations.

The strongest part of his argument is the empirical observation about the gap between multipolar rhetoric and multipolar reality. It鈥檚 genuinely true that no coalition has effectively constrained American power even as China, Russia, and others have loudly proclaimed the end of unipolarity. The BRICS grouping remains economically and strategically incoherent. Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine, far from demonstrating multipolarity, arguably revealed how dependent even large states remain on dollar-denominated systems and Western technology supply chains. On this narrow point 鈥� that multipolarity has been more ideological declaration than structural fact 鈥� he鈥檚 on solid ground.

But your central critique hits something important. His framework is unambiguously a product of what you might call Atlantic realism: a tradition that measures power primarily through the ability to project military force, dominate institutions, and compel other actors. Within that framework, only a rival that 鈥渃hallenges鈥� in recognizable competitive terms registers as significant. This is precisely why the economic center-of-gravity shift you mention 鈥� arguably the single most consequential geopolitical fact of the last fifty years 鈥� barely figures in his analysis. Southeast and East Asia didn鈥檛 become the world鈥檚 manufacturing and increasingly its technological core by defeating anyone. It happened gradually, through accumulation, without a 鈥渃hallenge鈥� in the Mearsheimer sense. The framework simply has poor optics for that kind of shift.

Your point about Mearsheimer is equally sharp. Offensive realism assumes that the desire to expand power is essentially universal and timeless, a kind of political physics. But this is itself a culturally specific inference dressed up as structural logic. Chinese strategic culture, whatever its flaws and however assertive it has become, has historically shown more interest in tribute relationships, buffer zones, and commercial networks than in the kind of universalist expansionism that characterized European great powers. Whether that historical tendency will survive Xi鈥檚 current direction is a fair debate, but Mearsheimer鈥檚 framework doesn鈥檛 really permit the question to be asked 鈥� expansion is assumed rather than investigated.

The internal decline point is perhaps your most underappreciated insight. Both Mohan鈥檚 unipolarity and the standard multipolarity thesis share a common assumption: the United States remains a coherent, functioning actor capable of exercising its power consistently over time. Neither framework is well-equipped to analyze a situation where American power erodes not because a rival displaces it but because the domestic political economy that sustained American hegemony 鈥� the particular bargain between capital, labor, and the state 鈥� is fracturing. The K-shaped economy you mention is part of this, but so is the institutional decay that has become visible across multiple administrations now. Hegemony has historically required not just military and economic preponderance but a degree of domestic legitimacy and coherence that translates into credible long-term commitments. That credibility is being consumed rather than replenished.

Your polycentric framing strikes me as genuinely more useful, and it鈥檚 not merely semantic. Polycentrism implies that we should be looking at multiple nodes of ordering capacity 鈥� regional, economic, normative 鈥� rather than a single axis of great-power competition. It opens space for asking about ASEAN-centered regional orders, about the role of middle powers as independent actors, about norm-setting in spaces like digital governance or climate where the United States and China are both present but neither fully dominant. It also better captures the fragmentation you鈥檙e describing, where the question isn鈥檛 who wins the great-power competition but whether the existing international architecture holds together at all as its American anchor becomes less reliable and less interested in the responsibilities that anchor historically required.

Where I鈥檇 push back slightly on your reading is on the question of whether the transition is as clearly directional as you suggest. 鈥淭ransitional phase towards future multipolar equilibrium鈥� assumes the system will eventually settle into a new stable configuration. It may, but history also offers examples of long disequilibrium, of structural transitions that generate sustained disorder rather than a new order. The 1914-1945 period might be the cautionary case 鈥� a transition out of British hegemony that didn鈥檛 produce a stable multipolar world but rather catastrophic instability until American hegemony was consolidated. The current transition could follow a similarly turbulent path, especially given the internal American dynamics you rightly emphasize.

I fully agree with your comments on the idea of a transitional period. I didn鈥檛 mean to suggest that any short-term outcome signifying stability was likely. The one point you make that I would quibble with is your assertion that 鈥淩ussia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine, far from demonstrating multipolarity, arguably revealed how dependent even large states remain on dollar-denominated systems and Western technology supply chains.鈥�

This is a two-edged sword. Joe Biden believed that the dependence was vital and existential. Russia鈥檚 resilience proves that supply chain dependence is a fundamental reality to be reckoned with for any nation. But the ruble was not reduced to rubble. The financial infrastructure of what was presented as the foundation of the 鈥渞ules-based order鈥� could be bypassed even when faced with the most severe sanctions.

I would see that as proof that this has become a transitional period. There鈥檚 no need for the existing system to be crippled and discarded. But if it fails to impose its iron law, wouldn鈥檛 it be fair to say that something else could and probably should emerge, not to challenge it but to function as an alternative?

Claude鈥檚 response began with the following concession. You can read the full response and the continued debate in Part 2, which will appear in tomorrow鈥檚 edition.

You鈥檙e right to push back, and I concede the point. I framed Russia鈥檚 experience one-sidedly.

The more complete picture is actually more interesting than either the Western narrative or the simple counter-narrative.

My provisional conclusion and what it might mean for education

This is an important topic that merits further development. But I鈥檇 like to point to two practical suggestions we can draw from the experience.

First, I recommend the strategy I鈥檝e employed here as a basic pedagogical model designed for students learning to engage with a text. Whether it鈥檚 a history, philosophy, civics or scientific course, teachers could push their students to use AI bots to get 鈥渋nvolved鈥� in a personal debate about the meaning of what they鈥檙e teaching.

It鈥檚 easy to implement. It involves calling attention to alternative views or hypotheses 鈥� true or false, founded or unfounded 鈥� with the material they are engaging with.

The second point is about discursive strategy, and it applies to any object of debate. AI chatbots are not authoritative sources of truth. Anyone using AI to explore or refine their understanding of a topic should learn the trick of seeking an opening to push back against the AI鈥檚 response. It need not be an objection. It can be the kind of probing question we quite naturally ask in real conversations, such as: 鈥淲here did you get that idea?鈥� or, 鈥淲here can I find data to support what you said?鈥� or even, 鈥淲hy should I believe what you鈥檙e telling me?鈥�

As an educator, after all, Socrates may have been on to something.

Your thoughts

Please feel free to share your thoughts on these points by writing to us at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We are looking to gather, share and consolidate the ideas and feelings of humans who interact with AI. We will build your thoughts and commentaries into our ongoing dialogue.

[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone鈥檚 daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At 51吃瓜, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

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