51吃瓜

Anyone who thinks military rule bends toward democracy in Egypt has misread the country’s history.

Many Egyptians and Western critics of the Muslim Brotherhood welcomed the military coup that recently toppled the country鈥檚 elected Brotherhood-led government, praising the military for safeguarding secularism and 鈥渄emocracy.鈥� This betrays a gross misreading of the country鈥檚 history.

The Egyptian coup of 2013, after all, was by no means its first. Military dominance has been a fact of Egyptian political life since at least 1952, when Gamal Abdel Nasser led a coup against Egypt鈥檚 British-backed monarchy. In comparing these two instances, the number of similarities suggests that there is nothing inevitable about the military relinquishing its hold on the country.

During the early to mid 20^th聽century, the monarch King Farouk was the formal ruler of Egypt. However, most Egyptians understood that Farouk was a puppet of the British, who held true control over the state and its government. British control of the military in particular did not sit well with many officers, nine of whom began to covertly recruit a broad array of officers sympathetic to their idea for a movement of 鈥淔ree Officers.鈥�

This foreign presence also led to protests spearheaded by the youth and the parliament鈥檚 largest opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood. Drawing on these grievances and others, the Nasser-led Free Officer Movement was able to craft a unifying nationalist narrative. When the time was right, they struck, successfully overthrowing King Farouk in July 1952. Egyptians of all stripes gathered in the streets in celebration.

Sounds familiar, doesn鈥檛 it?

A Familiar Script

This time around, it was President Mohammed Morsi鈥檚 attempts to consolidate power for the Muslim Brotherhood 鈥� and take it away from the military 鈥� that did not sit right. The widespread youth- and opposition-led anti-Morsi protests that gripped Egypt at the end of June provided the perfect opportunity for the military to step in and forcefully depose the nuisance leader. However, this time that leader was democratically elected, demonstrating the institution鈥檚聽聽when it does not operate in the military鈥檚 interests.

But that is not where the similarities end.

After the Free Officers鈥� 1952 coup, military officers dissolved parliament and the constitution, appointed an interim head of government, and instructed him to form a cabinet. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), mostly made up of the nine original Free Officers and under Nasser鈥檚 leadership, proceeded to dictate interim policy to the new civilian cabinet.

Following the formal Free-Officerization of Egypt鈥檚 new government, the RCC government launched a campaign to eliminate any threat to its power. This included an increase in the number of Free Officers appointed to ministerial positions, a ban on all political parties, a specific crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, and the trial, conviction, and disenfranchisement of many of the previous regime鈥檚 public servants on the allegation that they had 鈥渁bused the public trust to their own advantage.鈥� The junta encountered much popular resistance, but it was acquiring too much power for the opposition to stop it.

Today, something similar has taken place. After the military deposed Morsi, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) 鈥� reprising a role it played after the earlier ouster of Mubarak 鈥� suspended the constitution, disbanded parliament, appointed Mubarak-era jurist Adly Mansour as the interim head of government, and instructed him to put together his cabinet. Not only must these new leaders answer to SCAF, but coup leader General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi right off the bat secured a聽聽in that cabinet as the first deputy prime minister and minister of defense, entrenching the military more deeply and formally in Egypt鈥檚 fluctuating political system.

A spokesperson for Sisi said: 鈥淎lthough the general was not聽, there was nothing to prevent him from so doing if he retired from the military.鈥� This information is alarming, although frankly Sisi has enough power already that he does not need to run for president. It is also worth noting that in his thesis, written in 2006 while studying at US Army War College in Pennsylvania, Sisi stated that establishing caliphate-style leadership 鈥渋s widely recognized as the goal for any new form of government鈥� in the Middle East 鈥� an insight, perhaps, into the general鈥檚 abiding distrust of democracy in the region.

While political parties have not been formally banned, the military is engaging in a brutal crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood 鈥� those 鈥渁busers of the public trust鈥� 鈥� by accusing members of inciting violence, excluding Islamists from the interim cabinet, and shutting down all anti-military, pro-Morsi, and Brotherhood-sympathetic TV channels. Add to this, of course, the horrendous massacres of pro-Morsi demonstrators in the streets.

A Missed Opportunity

If there was one force that stood a chance of reducing the military鈥檚 power after Egypt鈥檚 long years of authoritarian rule, it was the Brotherhood. Underground for decades, the Brotherhood had plenty of time to fume against the military and organize ways of pushing back against it, particularly in a democratic framework. But overtaken by political blunders of its own, it fell short. Though deeply divisive, the military鈥檚 actions have been met not with resistance but with overwhelming support from much of Egypt鈥檚 population.

But come the day when the military鈥檚 interests do not coincide with the people鈥檚, Egyptians will regret that all that power was concentrated in one place. And that goes not only for political power, but also for economic power and military power.

All this is exacerbated by continued US aid to Egypt鈥檚 military 鈥� aid that it may use as it pleases, as it enjoys full autonomy from any form of oversight 鈥� and Washington鈥檚 failure to hold the military accountable for what it does with that money. One can only wonder if the civilian government might have fared better if Washington had聽聽to deliver development assistance.

In light of the recent聽聽鈥� as well as the US prohibition against providing aid to coup governments, which the Obama administration has聽聽鈥� that aid should be suspended. The United States must not finance an increasingly brutal regime, a regime whose actions also create the added danger of possibly radicalizing moderate Islamists. The reinstitution of aid must be contingent on a peaceful transition to a civilian, democratic government; free, fair, inclusive elections; and respect for human rights. Even then, distribution of aid must be reevaluated: more for economic and political stability, and less for the military.

It is important that Egyptians 鈥� including members of the Muslim Brotherhood 鈥� take action now and during the redrafting of the constitution to check, reduce, and redistribute the military鈥檚 power. They must establish some form of civilian oversight over military activities, including its economic enterprises. Otherwise they will risk never achieving a legitimate democracy for the people and by the people, not the military.

[Note: This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.