51吃瓜

[This piece is a continuation of a multi-part series. You can read Part 1 and Part 2 here.]

The support of the Brazilian militias and the Neo-Pentecostal churches may have guaranteed Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro鈥檚 victories as a federal deputy in Rio de Janeiro (1991鈥�2018), but they would not be enough to support him in a bid for the presidency. Even the support of the armed forces would be restricted to highly urbanized areas, only reaching as far as military families and retired personnel. So, to become president, Bolsonaro would need to extend his support base into the country.

In Brazil, of the population lives in only 6% of the cities, many of those state capitals. But the political contribution of smaller cities near rural production areas is significant; of municipalities have fewer than 50,000 inhabitants. These voters are crucial in electing representatives to state legislative chambers and both federal houses.

Before we return to Bolsonaro, let us take a look at the political development of Brazil鈥檚 countryside and small cities.

Brazil鈥檚 agriculture: powerful, unfair and built on historic slavery

Brazil has been an agricultural powerhouse for centuries. It has a unique potential of growing production, with the most arable land on the planet. It is the of 32 commodities, being the largest net exporter globally. is the main economic activity in the states of Mato Grosso, Paran谩, Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais. Goi谩s, Mato Grosso do Sul and Santa Catarina have increased their production in the last decades.

The population of these states alone reaches over . Five million rural properties occupy of the national territory, with over agricultural workers. They are responsible for almost of the country鈥檚 GDP. This powerful economic sector has always been crucial for Brazil鈥檚 political pathways.

Rural areas suffer from growing inequality. An estimated of the population is impoverished, resulting from a to amass in the hands of particular people groups. These issues are far from being solved.

Until 1850, land was not a commodity in Brazil. Settlers could toil and occupy the country, but property rights were given by monarchs 鈥� first Portuguese kings, then Brazilian emperors 鈥� to their children or godchildren, as a means of feeding the growing European mercantilist economy. Over of the production went to Europe.

To this end, those with the right of use to the land would create , enormous landed estates with primitive agriculture and labor, often in a state of partial servitude. These measured billions of square yards and were covered in monocultures. There were economic cycles based on Brazilwood, sugarcane, cotton, coffee and cattle. The workforce comprised peoples enslaved by the Portuguese. During the first economic cycle, the extractivism-based 鈥�,鈥� were captured and enslaved, sometimes traded by tribes allied to the Portuguese.

When the economy changed to a basis in agriculture, indigenous peoples lost their usefulness; they were not helpful to plantations, as they were unacquainted with cattle and plants brought from Asia and Africa. Over the next centuries, an estimated seven million people 鈥� corresponding to 70% of the whole Transatlantic slave trade 鈥� were from Portuguese strongholds in Africa, with the support of the general society and , and taken to Brazil to produce all the country鈥檚 wealth. As German educator Ina von Binzen in the 1880s, 鈥渢he white Brazilian just doesn鈥檛 work.鈥�

How the 1850 Land Law changed Brazilian farmers and politics

The vastness of Brazilian territory was too enticing to not be turned into a commodity. In 1850, Emperor Pedro II, Brazil鈥檚 last emperor, signed Law 601, or the 鈥�,鈥� which established territorial property rights to individuals and turned all uncolonized areas within the country鈥檚 borders into public land that could be purchased from the state. While had been applied in several countries since antiquity, guaranteeing the permanence of early settlers, this issue was never discussed in imperial Brazil. In fact, the 1850 Land Law resulted in the displacement of poorer early settlers and virtually property rights to recently freed African descendants.

After the abolition of slavery in 1888, 700,000 freed slaves were left to their own devices, unable to and having to to stay on their former owners鈥� land. These practices persisted until the 20th century in a phenomenon known as 鈥�.鈥� This was especially the case in Northeast Brazil, which was still one of the main of cane sugar.

Under the Coronelist system, landed oligarchs were the behind the State 鈥� they controlled politics and the economy, and they assassinated rivals. Most 鈥淐oronels鈥� had, in fact, been part of military forces during the genocidal Paraguayan War (1864鈥�1870), the of 1889 or one of the many military coup attempts until the successful installation of the in 1930.

The 1889 of Pedro II by Marshall Deodoro da Fonseca came about largely because of the of slavery in 1888 and the lack of compensation to landed oligarchs. This was due to the intrinsic connection between the military and 濒补迟颈蹿煤苍诲颈辞蝉.

With slavery abolished, the Brazilian government decided that, instead of educating or providing land to the Afro-Brazilian population, they should 鈥渨hiten鈥� Brazil by bringing over three million European and Asian . Many of those immigrants, however, ended up manning established monocultures owned by 鈥渃offee and rubber barons.鈥� They did not have resources to buy land and thus ended up living in conditions to slavery. Over the next decades, the impoverished, landless European settlers became the campesinos (鈥減easant farmers鈥�) fighting for , especially in the south of Brazil.

The Land Law fueled land conflicts in Brazil. Land-grabbing became the norm, especially as frontiers were pushed inland. Landowners would falsify property titles by sticking brand new documents into boxes with crickets, which would give them the appearance of old titles. This practice is known as (from grilo, meaning 鈥渃ricket鈥�), and it continues to this day. In fact, businessman is currently the largest grileiro (person who illicitly owns land through false property titles) in the Amazon, with 11 extensive farms in public lands from nine states 鈥� this territory altogether is three times larger than the city of Sao Paulo.

The greed of land-grabbers led to conflicts that would be considered prolonged by the United Nations, such as that at , state of Pernambuco. With Bolsonaro in power and the retraction of policing operations in rural areas, land conflicts and involved almost one million people. Approximately of invaded territories officially belonged to indigenous peoples. Auxiliary military forces, such as the Military Police, are often involved in . They are the ostensive used by ruralistas (large landowners who now head the agribusiness in Brazil) to drive small family farmers off their desired areas.

On August 10, 2019, ruralistas supporting Bolsonaro鈥檚 caused the infamous (鈥淔ire Day鈥�), a coordinated arson effort that increased Amazon fires by 300% in just 24 hours. Despite prosecutors warning the federal government about the upcoming effort, Bolsonaro accused nongovernmental organizations of creating the disaster to 鈥渂ring the government鈥檚 .鈥� A year later, affected areas were already by cattle. The culprits are still on the .

When Brazilian President Luiz In谩cio Lula da Silva began his third term in 2023, environmental protection programs restarted. Brazil鈥檚 environmental and climate took a progressive turn, with promising . Favorable, albeit , results continued to Lula鈥檚 annual review, and he created programs to reduce deforestation caused by . The problem of 濒补迟颈蹿耻苍诲颈谩谤颈辞蝉 and land-grabbers trying to replace forests with pastures continues for one simple reason: Land is in the hands of an agrarian elite with political power that is all but the law.

The movement in Brazil, personified by Bolsonaro鈥檚 term in office, is supported by agribusiness, in the so-called 鈥溾�� movement. Some authors blame a failure of the left for the rise of neofascism in Brazil. Others recognize that the land issue is historic and to the territorial conflict that has plagued Brazil since European occupation. They remind us of the behind agribusiness and highlight the between the agrarian elite and Bolsonaro.

Bolsonaro, politics and the demand for land reform

Bolsonaro is currently banned from running for political office. However, for him began cropping up in wealthy cities in April 2024 and continues to this day, once again by the .

Brazil has been experiencing a in Amazon forest fires since last year, with dry conditions facilitating the spread. Agribusiness frontiers like the state of Roraima have been burning for a while, with fires threatening the Indigenous Territory of the . But it wasn鈥檛 until the smoke choked , Brazil鈥檚 richest city, that the to the devastating Dia do Fogo became clear. With uncontrolled fires blazing in at least Amazon municipalities and the smoke reaching , the government deployed nearly to the region. Federal prosecutors and environmental agencies warn that the pattern of fires could only come from . Meanwhile, Tarc铆sio de Freitas, the governor of Sao Paulo state and an of Bolsonaro, insists that there was no coordinated criminal effort; the fires were the result of individual 鈥�.鈥�

The far-right movement in Brazil is gathering force with the upcoming in October 2024. Sao Paulo is, according to Lula, the stage of a 鈥淟ula-Bolsonaro .鈥� In the countryside, agribusiness-founded rural militias supporting Bolsonaro kill and use violence against land reform settlers. This movement is called 鈥�.鈥� The alliance between military and paramilitary forces with large landowners in Brazil is an . The of armed forces and land oligarchs was also at the root of the 1964 coup d鈥櫭﹖at.

Since the 1950s, rural workers had been organizing themselves into political groups, demanding and an end to rural violence. President J芒nio Quadros resigned in 1961, citing 鈥渢errible .鈥� His vice president, Jo茫o Goulart, succeeded him and took progressive steps regarding national resources, including nationalizing and discussing land distribution.

Not only was he violently ousted a mere two weeks later, but his efforts were in vain: The 1964 coup swiftly quashed the demands of rural workers and family farmers. The following two decades saw the of over 1,500 rural workers and 8,000 indigenous peoples, their lands stolen by the same wealthy families of centuries past; their descendents are now populating the and Senate. It was a against land rights.

In 1984, rural workers organized themselves into the Landless Workers鈥� Movement (), pressuring the new civilian government of Jos茅 Sarney to address land reform. Despite suffering a by the most powerful media of the country, the movement managed to converse with legislative representatives. Thus, the Land Reform was included in the 1988 Constitution. The new constitution also guaranteed for the first time in Brazilian history the of indigenous peoples to their land and sovereignty.

Nowadays, MST has over 1.5 million members and is the largest organic in Latin America, spreading agro-ecological methods of cultivation. As of Brazil鈥檚 food comes from family farms, training and legal advice offered by MST and other rural workers鈥� organizations are fundamental for the country鈥檚 food chain.

As a reaction to the Landless Workers鈥� Movement, wealthy landowners and land-grabbers founded the Democratic Rural Union (Uni茫o Democr谩tica Ruralista, or ). This group was so politically influential that it took credit for frustrating any governmental attempt to apply land reform. UDR participated in the of several environmental activists, including the leader of the rubber tappers union and renowned environmentalist . UDR leader Ronaldo Caiado became a congressman heading the ruralista caucus and was elected governor of the state of Goi谩s in 2018, during the far-right wave that swept the country.聽

In 1995, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso started initiating land reform projects. He gave property rights to around families until 2001. The following president, Lula, settled a further between 2003 and 2010. The next, Dilma Rousseff, gave property rights to families from 2011 to 2015. After the soft coup to remove Dilma, her replacement, Michel Temer, drastically land reform projects. The next president in line, Bolsonaro, would go on to these. Further, he provided only provisional , gave property rights to , legalized the grilagem practice and stopped . This strangled small farmers.

The same scenario repeats with regard to indigenous lands, although land demarcation started earlier, in Sarney鈥檚 government. Up to Dilma鈥檚 term, all presidents for hundreds of ethnicities. This stopped under Bolsonaro鈥檚 regime, as he had promised during his presidential campaign to not give 鈥溾�� of land to indigenous peoples or (Afro-Brazilian people dwelling in settlements established by escaped slaves).

Bolsonaro just implemented what powerful landowners always fought for, as Brazilian politics were increasingly taken by representatives of 濒补迟颈蹿耻苍诲颈谩谤颈辞蝉 and those sympathetic to their cause. By 2012, the Federal Congress and Senate were filled with members of evangelical religions (the 鈥溾��), (the 鈥溾��) and the militias (the 鈥溾��). Known as the 鈥�,鈥� they were a majority in the Congress when Dilma was and were responsible for the start of the of constitutional rights that peaked under Bolsonaro.聽聽

Brazil still has a long way to go before it can stop those interests from interfering with the application of constitutional rights, especially regarding the environment and the rights of workers and indigenous peoples. The are still fighting for the interests of , with the help of morality agendas and organized crime.

Foreign exploitation and interference

Brazil started as a cash cow for the European mercantilist economy from the 1500s, and the sentiment of the most powerful Brazilians 鈥� all of European descent 鈥� was always one of detachment from the country. In his seminal , The Brazilian People: The Formation and Meaning of Brazil, anthropologist and sociologist Darcy Ribeiro explains how this alienation from their own country created a cruel, perverted, fascistic, racist and misogynistic elite that Brazil and its poor inhabitants. The Brazilian elite is deeply , with a visceral hatred for the general population. In Ribeiro鈥檚 words, the elite sees the populace as nothing more than 鈥渃oal to be 鈥� for its own growth.

This hatred resulted in a peculiar modus operandi for the Brazilian wealthy: They exploit workers, extract as much wealth as possible from Brazil and send their money and children . Using some perverted logic, Brazilian elites also interfere as much as they can to keep Brazil poor and ; any effort by the people to end this situation faces ferocious resistance and threats of . This was revealed by the , which listed millions of dollars owned by right-wing politicians.

In his , A Elite do Atraso: Da Escravid茫o A Bolsonaro (which loosely translates to 鈥�The Backward Elite: From Slavery to Bolsonaro鈥�), sociologist Jess茅 Souza says that a significant portion of Brazilian elite is proto-fascist. It uses its technical knowledge to serve international capitalist systems at the expense of the population鈥檚 poor majority. Simultaneously, it shamelessly uses racist, misogynistic and oppressive discourse. This is the part of society that has been in power in Brazil since 2016; its highest manifestation is in Bolsonaro.

Political analyst Tales Ab鈥橲谩ber goes further by affirming that Brazilian elites are so disgusted by the lower classes that they prefer to keep an authoritarian, aporophobic while losing money than allow for an increase in equality. This sentiment is clear in declarations such as those by Bolsonaro鈥檚 Minister of Finance, Paulo Guedes 鈥� he in 2020 that the high prices of American dollars in relation to the Brazilian real were excellent because, during Lula鈥檚 terms, 鈥淸It was] everyone going to Disneyland, maids going to Disneyland, a hell of a party.鈥� For the Brazilian elites, traveling abroad was and always will be a luxury exclusive to the higher classes.

The elites鈥� detachment from the country and hatred of its population made them prone to accept or even ask for international interference in Brazilian economics and politics. Being such a resource-rich country, Brazil attracts the interest of transnational corporations and nations that seek to exploit those resources and take the profits , leaving behind . Such a mechanism became clearer during the Covid-19 pandemic, when wealth out of developing nations to the developed world, deepening the crisis in the former and leading to record profits in the latter.

International interference in Brazil with the ultimate goal of controlling its resources was not restricted to , and this has not stopped after , despite how it violates human rights. From of vast expanses of land to the country鈥檚 water through grain exports, transnational corporations have been Brazil鈥檚 industrialization, resilience and independence, while paying to Brazilian companies and . Bribery has long been rampant among Brazilian companies, with key examples being construction leader and meatpacking giant . However, the judiciary did not have many obstacles to arrest and fine those responsible, and some of what was lost could be recovered. The problem is more insidious for Brazil when , which cannot be prosecuted in the country, are involved.

The most unfair expression of this trend is the political interference by international actors to force regime changes in Brazil. It鈥檚 at its worst when democratically-elected governments do not allow to the developed world to continue, or the of a developed, industrialized country is threatened.

The 1964 coup d鈥櫭﹖at to oust Goulart is to have been part of , with the excuse to eradicate communism in Latin America. However, scholars now believe that Goulart鈥檚 determination to the country, using nationalized oil royalties to cover costs and land reform to ensure food production for the workforce, may have been what actually triggered America鈥檚 will to depose the president. The organized the 1953 deposition of Iranian Prime Minister , after all, because he nationalized oil production there.

Similarly, America backed the 1961 of Patrice Lumumba, the first democratically-elected Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo, because of the nation鈥檚 economic independence through resource nationalization. Indeed, the CIA began violently removing developing nations鈥� leaders when they began to foment true independence. This practice started in 1945 and only became less conspicuous after an American Senate in 1970, though more sophisticated actions continued to be used to force on all continents.

Brazil seemed to be juggling national and international interests well under Lula鈥檚 first two terms. That changed in 2005, when the Petrobras oil company confirmed significant natural gas and oil deposits in the within Brazil鈥檚 territorial waters. Exploring these reserves no less than 2,000 m (over 6,500 ft) below the seafloor was expensive and complex, until Petrobras developed new technologies that cheapened the process and allowed profitable oil extraction in 2006. In 2009, Lula, with support from Congress, approved laws to give Petrobras priority for exploration. The laws also government shares of royalties coming from the fields, in case a private company won the bid to explore.

Although oil companies said they agreed with the move, oil giant Chevron promptly contacted Jos茅 Serra, Dilma鈥檚 opponent in the 2014 presidential elections, to urge the opposition to change the rules in their favor. Serra promised to do so if he won, as shown in cables from the US Embassy. Dilma won the election and, by 2014, Petrobras was able to reach an even larger pre-salt oil deposit at 6,000 m (over 19,600 ft). This increased its yield fourfold, to over per day.

The 2014 elections saw Dilma re-elected to a second term. It also saw the most Congress and Senate since re-democratization, including the of Bolsonaro with almost 500,000 votes 鈥� a 鈥渄isquieting鈥� record in that house. The massive success of right-wing and far-right candidates came after a series of protests in late 2012 and early 2013; these started as a student movement against high bus fare and were quickly co-opted by elite organizations such as patronal unions, bankers, religious media and agribusinessmen. A crucial element was the creation of , a multimedia campaign sponsored by the economic elite and international interests, which dealt the final blow to progressive politicians in all levels of government.

Scholars now discuss if the of anti-politics and far-right parties was gestated in these movements, which culminated with Dilma鈥檚 impeachment, a loss of labor rights under Temer and Bolsonaro鈥檚 election in 2018. Documents leaked by revealed that heavy American was taking place during Dilma鈥檚 term in 2013, and that America considered Brazil to be at risk of 鈥渋nstability.鈥� In fact, American were adamant to secure pre-salt oil deposits for themselves. Furthermore, Dilma鈥檚 term in office became unsustainable in February 2014, when she declared that royalties from those reserves would be in Brazilian education and health projects. With Temer at the wheel, the country was set to reclaim its role as a source of international wealth.

Interference from foreign interests did not stop there, however. Land-grabbing by foreign powers, using caveats of the law that prohibit the of rural areas for investment by international agents, has affected land value and distribution. It has also influenced for centuries, to the of smallholders and family farmers who feed the country. With the help of friendly lawmakers, continue their deforestation to produce exports. The financialization of Brazilian agribusiness has become to secure foreign . The incompatibility of the Brazilian , foreign and is clear.

The historical formula that joins foreign interests, armed forces, religious leaders and land-grabbers has been established in Brazil for time enough to create a dangerous movement. They will use coordinated acts of violence to prevail. A strong movement for and redistribution is necessary to create the conditions to sort out territorial disputes and wealth evasion, and to curb against family farmers and indigenous peoples. Protecting the Amazon could be to Brazil in the long run, but agrarian elites and their do not seem to share the idea.

As with other issues Brazil has faced over its history, the country will perhaps need the initiative of the international market to stop these practices, as happened with the of slavery. The forces behind this rise of neofascism and the destruction it creates cannot be controlled by 1,500 firemen or 530 Brazilian lawmakers. It will need the cessation of international funding to its most notorious actors.
[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.