51吃瓜

Bolivia鈥檚 new center-right president, Rodrigo Paz, is being tested in a country where political unrest and protests have repeatedly forced three out of the last five presidents to resign. Political unrest had been building for weeks, while road blockades in early May. Since then, the blockades have strained national supply lines and increasingly cut off Santa Cruz, Bolivia鈥檚 eastern economic hub and main agricultural region, from the rest of the country.

Paz now faces more than an economic and social crisis. He faces a direct test of governability as his government accuses former president Evo Morales and groups aligned with him of fueling the blockades at a time when Morales faces an and a pending criminal case.

Who is protesting?

The protests are not one single movement. They teachers, transport workers, labor unions, the Bolivian Workers鈥� Organization (COB), Indigenous groups, rural farming communities and groups aligned with Morales. Some are protesting genuine economic pain, which the current government recognizes. Others appear to be part of a larger political effort to weaken the new government.

The road blockades have turned the protests into national paralysis. Santa Cruz matters because it is not just another department; it is Bolivia鈥檚 economic engine and one of its most important food-producing regions. When roads out of Santa Cruz are blocked, the effects are felt far away in La Paz, El Alto and the western highlands. Food, fuel, medicine and basic goods become to move. Prices rise quickly. In some markets, chicken prices have reportedly risen by as much as , reaching five times their normal price in parts of the country.

Meanwhile, Santa Cruz is excess production that cannot reach markets, forcing producers to waste part of their harvest and causing direct economic damage in the region. For families already struggling with high inflation, this is not just an inconvenience. It is a direct threat to daily survival.

This is why the crisis cannot be treated as ordinary protests. Bolivia has a long tradition of marches and road blockades. But when blockades isolate cities and threaten the supply of food and medicine, they become a test of whether the state can still function.

Why are they protesting?

The protesters have several stated complaints. One is Law 1720, which allowed small rural properties to be converted into medium properties upon the owner鈥檚 request. The government argued that this would allow rural landowners to use their property as collateral, access credit and reactivate investment. Many Indigenous and rural organizations, deeply skeptical of government land reforms, the law would turn protected communal land into a financial asset and expose poor families to losing it.

is another cause. Paz inherited a fragile economy and decided to remove fuel subsidies. That decision angered many Bolivians, especially as they questioned both the price and quality of the fuel being sold. Teachers and public workers have also protested over wages in a country still suffering from high inflation and a rising cost of living.

The question of constitutional reform is even deeper. Paz wants a of the 2009 Constitution to attract investment in sectors such as hydrocarbons and mining. His supporters see this as necessary to rescue an economy under pressure. His opponents see it as a threat to the state-centered model built under Morales, especially over natural resources.

These complaints help explain some of the anger. But they do not fully explain the organization, timing and political direction of the blockades. This is where Morales enters the crisis.

Why the government believes Evo Morales is fueling the unrest

Paz鈥檚 government Morales and groups aligned with him of fueling the blockades. Morales denies this and says the accusations against him are political persecution. But his legal and political position makes the crisis impossible to separate from his personal future.

Morales has been in rebellion after failing to appear in court in a case involving accusations of aggravated human trafficking connected to an alleged relationship with a minor while he was president. He denies wrongdoing. He remains in the Chapare, a coca-growing region that has long been his political and union stronghold, protected by loyal supporters.

For Paz鈥檚 government, this matters because Morales has a direct political interest in weakening the administration. If Paz stabilizes Bolivia, Morales becomes more isolated and more vulnerable to prosecution. If Paz collapses, Morales and his movement can argue that the government that followed nearly 14 years of rule by his political party, Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), has failed and that only their return can restore stability.

This does not mean Bolivia as a whole is rising against Paz. In many cities, citizens have marched in of democracy and against the blockades. In Santa Cruz, attempts to strategic roads have led to violent confrontations, including a police operation in San Juli谩n that left dozens injured. The crisis is not simply a national protest movement. It is also a struggle over whether organized groups can paralyze a landlocked country whose major cities depend on a limited number of access roads.

That is why the blockades have become so powerful. A relatively small but organized movement can choke supply routes, isolate cities and create shortages far beyond its actual numbers. This is the government鈥檚 central accusation: that groups loyal to Morales are using blockades, violence and supply disruption to force a political crisis.

The Paz government has also described some actors involved in the unrest as linked to 鈥�.鈥� That language should be understood as the government鈥檚 accusation, not as a label for every person protesting. Paz鈥檚 government argues that organized groups tied to Morales鈥檚 coca-growing stronghold in the Chapare are using the blockades to destabilize the country while Morales the arrest warrant and pending criminal case.

What Paz does next matters for Latin America

Paz has the door to dialogue. He has invited different sectors to negotiate, attempted to speak with groups marching from different departments and Law 1720 after it became a central source of conflict. He has also promised to complete his mandate by 2030. But the blockades have continued, and some groups still demand his resignation.

On June 20, after nearly seven weeks of unrest, Paz declared a nationwide , later ratified by more than two-thirds of the Legislative Assembly. The decree prohibits road blockades that disrupt transportation and essential supplies and allows the armed forces to provide limited support to police. By the following day, most blockades had been lifted or following agreements with protest groups, although some remained in Cochabamba and the Chapare. The measure can remain in force for up to 90 days, but may be lifted earlier if the blockades and violence end. Political analysts have that it could strengthen Paz if order is restored quickly and without excesses, but weaken his government if the measure becomes prolonged or disproportionate.

This is where the government faces its most dangerous balance. A democratic state cannot allow organized groups to starve cities into submission. But if the government uses emergency powers too broadly, it risks turning a governability crisis into a legitimacy crisis.

For Latin America, Bolivia is now a regional test. If Paz fails, the message will be that elected governments trying to move away from the old socialist-populist model can be paralyzed before they govern. If Paz succeeds, stabilizes the country and Morales is finally tried in court, Bolivia could become one of the most significant defeats of the Latin American populist-left structure built during the Ch谩vez-Morales era.

The question is no longer only whether Paz can pass reforms. The question is whether Bolivia can move from street veto power to constitutional government.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.