51吃瓜

The New York Times鈥� Julian Barnes specializes in disseminating intelligence community propaganda focused on blaming Russia for every political dysfunction and social ailment felt in the US. His Havana Syndrome campaign lasted even beyond the moment early in 2022 when CIA鈥檚 Director, William Burns, officially admitted that neither Russia nor any other foreign power was behind the supposed attacks.

Barnes has not abandoned his noble cause. His latest bears the title 鈥淧utin鈥檚 Next Target: U.S. Support for Ukraine, Officials Say鈥� and the subtitle: 鈥淩ussian spy agencies and new technologies could be used to push conspiracy theories, U.S. officials say.鈥�

罢辞诲补测鈥檚 Weekly Devil鈥檚 Dictionary definition:

Could:

An auxiliary verb in English particularly useful to journalists specialized in propaganda who understand that by placing it before an untrue assertion it gives the appearance that, despite the absence of evidence in the subsequent body of the article, the assertion may be true.

Contextual note

What does 鈥渃ould鈥� mean? For most people, it has no concrete meaning and therefore merits no consideration. We spontaneously assume that if someone mentions something that 鈥渃ould鈥� happen, they are doing it because it is an object of real concern. It belongs to the world of interested speculation. For NYT journalists and propagandists, 鈥渃ould鈥� in a headline falls into the category of 鈥渃reatively evocative.鈥� The evocative can, of course, embrace the provocative.

Ever since put his mind to it four centuries ago, the question of probability moved beyond mere speculation; it became a science. Probability theory is a noble branch of mathematics, the basic toolbox of most serious science. It focuses on the likelihood of something being true. Most people never give probability a serious thought or are even aware of the science. Although it would be a salutary thing to do, we rarely invoke probability theory when reading a newspaper article.

The problem with Barnes鈥檚 use of 鈥渃ould鈥� is that it deceptively exploits the complete range of possibilities and gives no weight to probability. For journalists like Barnes, that opens a space that puts them on par with a writer of science fiction. If the story they write requires describing conditions that are possible and even remotely credible, and if those conditions help to establish a suggested belief, they have accomplished a propagandistic purpose.

To be fair, Barnes is objectively truthful when he quotes U.S. officials who say, 鈥淩ussian spy agencies and new technologies could be used to push conspiracy theories.鈥� He is truthful because the officials he quotes have certainly said that. He is truthfully reporting their words, irrespective of the facts. The officials themselves are truthful because their use of 鈥渃ould鈥� allows them to say anything that is in the realm of the possible.

Barnes is counting on the reader鈥檚 respect for the authority of 鈥淯S officials鈥� and 狈驰罢鈥檚 reputation for seriousness to imply that there is a high degree of probability to what they evoke. It doesn鈥檛 have to be true, merely 鈥減ossible to imagine.鈥� But he presents zero evidence to support the specific claim concerning the spreading of conspiracy theories.

The article continues repetitively in the same vein. Barnes tells us that 鈥淎merican officials said they are convinced that Mr. Putin intends to try to end U.S. and European support for Ukraine.鈥� Again we learn what the officials say, not what they know to be true. He does tell us that they are 鈥渃onvinced,鈥� presumably on the basis of some unmentioned piece of evidence. But Barnes shows no interest in understanding or investigating the evidence.

Probability theory tells us that an assertion can either refer to certain knowledge, uncertain knowledge or a lie. It is theoretically possible to build a statistical scale to determine the probability or truth value of a statement on a certain topic made by a certain type of person at a certain time. According to probability theory, any unsupported assertion is as likely to be a lie as an expression of truth. We react according to our trust in the speaker. In this case, we must trust the speaker鈥檚 reporting of another (unidentified) speaker鈥檚 assertions.

Barnes claims the officials are 鈥渃onvinced鈥� of what 鈥淧utin intends.鈥� What is the possible truth value of that? Do the officials have access to Putin鈥檚 intentions? And should the fact that they say they are convinced convince us?

Then we get the assertion that 鈥淭he Russia disinformation aims to increase support for candidates opposing Ukraine.鈥� People have aims. But can an abstraction such as 鈥淩ussian disinformation鈥� possess aims? Assuming it does have aims, what evidence do we have that those aims exist?

But we don鈥檛 even need to ask those questions. The assertion is a truism. It needs no evidence because it is equally true to say that 鈥淩ussian information aims to increase support for candidates opposing Ukraine.鈥� We know Russia鈥檚 position with regard to Ukraine. Barnes simply wants us to think of Russian information as disinformation. What we brand as disinformation is simply information that we don鈥檛 want to hear. What this rhetorical ploy amounts to is journalistic non-information.

The article continues with a series of similar assertions, such as 鈥淢r. Putin believes he can influence American politics to weaken support for Ukraine.鈥� Does Barnes really know what Putin believes? Of course not. But, like the previous assertion, this is also a truism. Putin  鈥渃an鈥� influence American politics. In fact. everyone in the world can, but not to the same degree. This too is non-information.

Historical note

Barnes never tells us the names of the officials who provided him with his copy. But he has always shown an alacrity for playing the role of CIA stenographer. Probability theory tells us the Agency is his most likely source. But let鈥檚 push the theorizing further. Forget about Barnes. What credit should we give to anything the CIA delivers gift-wrapped to The New York Times?

The CIA is to have consistently lied to Congress about many things, including torture, or what they prefer to call 鈥渆nhanced interrogation.鈥� The Senate鈥檚 report on torture in 2014 proved the agency was lying to its Congressional masters when it 鈥渞epeatedly asserted that torture was necessary because it allowed the agency to disrupt terrorist plots and capture additional terrorists, thereby saving lives.鈥�

Who can forget that wonderful moment when Mike Pompeo, Donald Trump鈥檚 Secretary of State and former CIA Director, laughingly that 鈥渨e lied, cheated and stole.鈥� It is unlikely that today鈥檚 CIA under Joe Biden has changed its habits. Are we ready to believe that, in its concern for the public鈥檚 taste for truth, it would refrain from sharing its lies with The New York Times?

Lying is one thing. It appears to be required to accomplish its mission. But what about failing to collect crucial intelligence? That has just happened spectacularly and embarrassingly in Israel, where neither Israel鈥檚 vaunted Mossad nor the CIA, both focused on the defense of Israel, had an inkling of what Hamas was preparing in Gaza. The CIA has not yet explained that lapse, but when they do, how much of it will be a lie?

There was another recent example of this recurrent to access the truth, let alone tell the truth. This concerned the unexpected coup in Niger this summer. Spytalk tells us that on July 25. at an embassy briefing, 鈥淎merican diplomats told NBC鈥檚 Courtney Kube that despite the Nigerien government鈥檚 reputation for corruption, it was still far more stable than others in West Africa. That wishful assessment of Niger鈥檚 political stability fell apart just a few hours later when the country鈥檚 military leaders overthrew the democratically elected president, Mohamed Bazoum.鈥�

In short, the CIA produces and NYT dutifully reports lies, 鈥渨ishful assessments鈥� and especially the evocative and provocative speculation 鈥� or non-information 鈥� that populated Barnes鈥檚 article.

Does anyone seriously believe the current 鈥渨ar on misinformation鈥� being waged in Washington will eradicate any of this? The situation could be compared to Richard Nixon鈥檚 鈥淲ar on Drugs鈥� that continues to this day. The consumption of what we might call illicit substances 鈥� in this case, the non-information and innuendo skewed to reinforce existing biases 鈥� will continue to grow apace.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil鈥檚 Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51吃瓜 Devil鈥檚 Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author鈥檚 own and do not necessarily reflect 51吃瓜鈥檚 editorial policy.