The non-violence training to join the Freedom Flotilla Coalition’s ships to Gaza has been intense. As hundreds of us from 32 countries gathered in Istanbul, our trainers briefed us about what we might encounter on this voyage. “We have to be ready for every possibility,” they insisted. 

The best scenario, they said, is that our three ships – one carrying 5,500 tons of humanitarian aid and two carrying the passengers – will reach Gaza and accomplish the mission. Another scenario would be that the Turkish government caves to pressure from Israel, the United States and Germany and prevents the boats from even leaving Istanbul. This happened in 2011, when the Greek government buckled under pressure and our ten boats were in the country. With our boats docked in Istanbul today, we fear that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who recently suffered a crushing in local elections, is vulnerable to economic blackmail the Western powers might be threatening.

Related Reading

Latest Elections Show Turkish Democracy Is Alive and Kicking

Another possibility is that the ships take off, but the Israelis illegally hijack us in international waters, confiscate our boats and supplies, and then arrest, imprison and eventually deport us. 

This happened on several other voyages to Gaza, one of them with deadly consequences. In 2010, the Israeli military a flotilla of six boats in international waters. They boarded the biggest boat, the Mavi Marmara. According to a UN report, the Israelis with live rounds from a helicopter hovering above the ship and from commando boats along the side of the ship. In a horrific display of force, they killed nine passengers, and one more later succumbed to his wounds. 

To try to prevent another nightmare like that, potential passengers on this flotilla have to undergo rigorous training. We watched a video of what we might face — from extremely potent tear gas to ear-splitting concussion grenades — and we were told that the Israeli commandos will be armed with weapons with live rounds. Then, we divided up into small groups to discuss how best to react, non-violently, to such an attack. Do we sit, stand or lie down? Do we link arms? Do we put our hands up in the air to show we are unarmed? 

The most frightening part of the training was a simulation replete with deafening booms of gunfire and exploding percussion grenades and masked soldiers screaming at us, hitting us with simulated rifles, dragging us across the floor and arresting us. It was indeed sobering to get a glimpse of what might await us. Equally sobering are Israeli media reports indicating that the Israeli military has begun “security preparations,” including preparations for taking over the flotilla.

Who’s involved in the effort?

That’s why everyone who has signed up for this mission deserves tremendous credit. The largest group of passengers is from Turkey, and many are affiliated with the humanitarian group, , an enormous Turkish NGO with 82 offices throughout the country. It has consultative status at the UN and does charity work in 115 countries. Through IHH, millions of supporters donated money to buy and stock the ships. Israel, however, has designated this very respected charity as a terrorist group. 

The next largest group comes from Malaysia, some of them affiliated with another very large humanitarian group called . MyCARE, known for helping out in emergency situations such as floods and other natural disasters, has contributed millions of dollars in emergency aid to Gaza over the years.

From the US, there are about 35 participants. Leading the group, and key to the international coalition, is 77-year-old retired US Army colonel and State Department diplomat Ann Wright. After quitting the State Department in protest over the US invasion of Iraq, Wright has put her diplomatic skills to good use in helping to pull together a motley group of internationals. Her co-organizer from the US is Huwaida Arraf, a Palestinian American attorney who is a co-founder of the International Solidarity Movement and who ran for Congress in 2022. Arraf was key to organizing the very first flotillas that started in 2008. So far, there have been about 15 attempts to get to Gaza by boat, only five of them successful.

The incredible breadth of participants is evident in our nightly meetings, where you can hear clusters of groups chatting away in Arabic, Spanish, Portuguese, Malay, French, Italian and English in diverse accents from Australian to Welsh. The ages range from students in their 20s to an 86-year-old Argentine medical doctor.

What brings us together is our outrage that the world community is allowing this genocide in Gaza to happen and a burning desire to do more than we have been doing to stop people from being murdered, maimed and starved. The aid we are bringing is enormous — it is the equivalent of over 100 trucks — but that is not the only purpose of this trip. “This is an aid mission to bring food to hungry people,” said Huwaida Arraf, “but Palestinians do not want to live on charity. So we are also challenging Israeli policies that make them dependent on aid. We are trying to break the siege.”

Israel’s vicious attacks on the people of Gaza, its blocking of aid deliveries and its targeting of relief organizations have fueled a massive humanitarian crisis. The of seven World Central Kitchen workers by Israeli forces on April 1 highlighted the dangerous environment in which relief agencies operate, which has forced many of them to shut down their operations. 

The US government is a temporary port for aid that is supposed to be finished in early May, but this is the same government that provides weapons and diplomatic cover for the Israelis. And while US President Joe Biden expresses concern for the suffering Palestinians, he has aid to UNRWA, the main UN agency responsible for helping them, after Israel made unsubstantiated claims that 12 of its 13,000 employees in Gaza participated in the October 7 attacks.

Related Reading

The US, Complicit In Gaza Slaughter, Now Stands Isolated

Given the urgency and danger this moment presents, the Freedom Flotilla Coalition is entering rough and uncharted waters. We are calling on countries around the world to pressure Israel to allow us “free and safe passage” to Gaza. In the US, we are asking for help from our Congress, but having just approved another for Israel, it is doubtful that we can count on their support. 

And even if our governments did pressure Israel, would Israel pay attention? Their defiance of international law and world opinion during the past seven months indicates otherwise. But still, we will push forward. The people of Gaza are the wind in our sails. Freedom for Palestine is our North Star. We are determined to reach Gaza with food, medicines and, most of all, our solidarity and love.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Will the Freedom Flotilla, Now in Istanbul, Reach Gaza? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The victory of opposition candidates not only in the megalopolis of Istanbul and the capital, Ankara, but also in the third city, İzmir, as well as huge swathes of the rest of the country dominated headlines.

The message was clear: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had received a huge rebuke from his electorate only ten months after his decisive victory in the national elections. Then, he convincingly retained the presidency, fending off a concerted challenge from a broad opposition coalition named the Nation Alliance. 

You can read the above narrative pretty much anywhere. What is more useful to an interested observer is to consider what has practically changed due to these elections and what this might tell us about the Turkish political landscape going forward. 

The incumbents won

In fact, the election results were not as seismic as the international press would have the idle, skim-reading observer believe. That’s not to say they weren’t significant. But we should place these results in context. 

First and foremost, let us examine the victory of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) candidates in the mayoral elections in both Istanbul and Ankara. 

This was not a victory over Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), but rather the reelection of the incumbent mayors. Both Istanbul Mayor Ekrem ����������ğ���� and Ankara Mayor Mansur �۲�����ş first won in the 2019 local elections. Those results were seismic. ����������ğ���� took Istanbul for the opposition after 25 years of AKP rule.

����������ğ����’s victory, especially, had real resonance in 2019. Istanbul is Erdoğan’s home turf. The Turkish leader made his name nationally as the mayor of the city from 1994 to 1998 before he became prime minister and then president. The loss of Turkey and indeed Europe’s biggest city felt symbolic. Erdoğan reacted by annulling the election result, which led to a rerun. ����������ğ���� won the with an increased majority. 

Things took a darker turn a year later. In December 2020, the Court of Cassation ����������ğ���� two-year, seven-month and 15-day prison sentences and a ban from politics. Note that the ban has not been implemented to date and echoes the courts’ treatment of Erdoğan’s in .

While ����������ğ���� was convicted of insulting public officials, Erdoğan was not only convicted but also imprisoned. At the time, the CHP was in power and its secular political system found Erdoğan guilty of reciting an Islamist poem at a political rally. In Turkey, history seems to revolve in circles. Many see ����������ğ���� as a new leader in the Erdoğan mold.

Not only did the opposition impressively retain Istanbul and Ankara, but it also retained the mayoralty of İzmir. However, anyone who knows Turkey knows fully well that this is a non-story. İzmir has always been a CHP stronghold. 

Victory for incumbents is a tendency in many parts of the world. Furthermore, candidates of the ruling national party tend to do badly in local elections worldwide. In a nutshell, the results of the Turkish elections are not exceptional and certainly not historic as the BBC and others claim. 

Opposition revival?

The latest results might not be exceptional, but it is impressive that the opposition has bounced back after its humbling defeat in the 2023 national elections.

Coming on the centenary of the Turkish Republic, those elections had been billed by the coalition opposition Nation Alliance as a make-or-break moment. The opposition’s narrative was simple: If they couldn’t unseat Erdoğan, Turkish democracy would be lost forever. The coalition duly nominated Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, a longtime CHP leader, as its presidential candidate. This uncharismatic leader had already lost elections to Erdoğan earlier and was a poor choice. 

Despite an attempt to portray Kılıçdaroğlu as a humble man of the people, a mere civil servant who had come out of nowhere to attempt to unseat the “sultan,” the opposition’s campaign failed to ignite. Erdoğan won again, and the were much the same as in many previous elections. 

Such a lackluster performance could understandably have plunged the opposition into the doldrums of introspection and made it ineffective for years to come. Certainly, that would have been Erdoğan’s keen hope. The opposition’s strong performance in the local elections dashes Erdoğan’s hopes and is a significant achievement.

The CHP has fared like many opposition parties in midterm local elections in functioning democracies. Yet the key lesson for the opposition is simple: Personalities matter.

As many in the international media were also saying this week, both and are now seen as viable presidential candidates for 2028. For many political observers in Turkey, the reaction to that notion might understandably be: At last!

It was clear in the buildup to the 2023 presidential elections that other candidates were far more of a threat to Erdoğan than Kılıçdaroğlu. In particular, the charismatic ����������ğ���� had a backstory that made him the perfect heir apparent to the Erdoğan throne. His campaign could have had the ring of a timeless fairy tale.

Thankfully for Erdoğan and the AKP, ����������ğ���� was not the opposition candidate. In the last national election, the opposition did not understand what the AKP realized long ago: Personalities win elections. Erdoğan understands the power of personality. That is why he has maintained such a stranglehold over the AKP for so long and has pushed out many other major figures, such as former president Abdullah Gül and former prime minister Ahmet �ٲ����ܳٴ�ğ���� — not only from office but also from the party.

Erdoğan has demonstrated that he is a serial winner. What the opposition needed in 2023, and will need in 2028, is someone who is also a winner — or at the very least, someone who is not seen as a loser. The local election results have offered them even more evidence of who might fit that role.

The biggest success of these local elections is that they reveal Turkish politics to be still competitive. Ironically, that is good for both incumbent and opposition parties. This might seem counter-intuitive in the zero-sum majoritarianism of Turkish democracy today, but ultimately, total consolidation of power is never good for the effective functioning of any state. 

The opposition CHP has a long history of over-consolidation of power. The party could tell the ruling AKP a thing or two about where that road leads. It would be an error to imagine, as many in the international press do, that Turkish politics is simply divided between an oppressive regime and a liberal and democratic opposition. Everyone in Turkish politics has dirt on their hands. And yet democracy is still functioning if not thriving. That is good news for Turkey.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Latest Elections Show Turkish Democracy Is Alive and Kicking appeared first on 51�Թ�.

However, Ottomanism’s journey has gone through detours and complexities. Under Sultan Abdulhamid II, the ideology took on a more pronounced Islamic character. The main point was the sultan’s role as Caliph of the Islamic world. This new approach aimed to unite the empire’s Muslim population under a shared faith.

Ottomanism could not save the empire, which succumbed to internal dissent and external pressures. With the abolition of the Sultanate on November 1, 1922, and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the Ottoman state became a historical relic. The once-hopeful vision of unity faded alongside the civilization it sought to preserve.

Emerging in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, revived ideas from the original empire within the context of the Republic of Turkey. Current proponents of Neo-Ottomanism advocate for a more active Turkish foreign policy in regions that once belonged to the Ottoman Empire. They emphasize Turkey’s potential role as a leader and mediator in the Middle East and surrounding regions.

However, Neo-Ottomanism has resulted in a downgrade of Turkey’s position, both politically and economically. Its emphasis on past glories and a more interventionist foreign policy has strained relations with key countries and diverted resources from addressing crucial internal challenges.

The rise of Neo-Ottomanism

The term “Neo-Ottomanism” first in the 1970s in Greece as a response to concerns about Turkey’s interventions in Cyprus. However, until the late 1980s, Turkey’s foreign policy remained largely focused on the West. This was evident in its close relationship with the United States and its pursuit of membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor to the European Union.

The military coup of 1980 marked a turning point that led to significant changes in Turkey’s political landscape. Turgut Ö������, who became prime minister in 1983, played a pivotal role in this transformation. He implemented a neo-liberal economic model that aimed to integrate Turkey more deeply with the global market. He also recognized the growing economic importance of regions beyond Europe and the US.

Ö������ the focus towards fostering good relations and economic ties with countries like Iraq, Iran and Libya. While maintaining connections with Europe and the US remained an important aspect of his foreign policy, Ö������ emphasized Turkey’s historical and cultural connections with the Turkic world and the broader Islamic world. This newfound emphasis on these historical ties marked the incorporation of elements of Neo-Ottomanism into Turkish foreign policy. Ö������ strategically used concepts like Islam, Turkism and Ottoman history to build bridges with countries in the Middle East, Balkans and Central Asia.

Ö������’s death in 1993 marked the end of the first era of Neo-Ottomanism. The following years were characterized by internal political instability and economic problems, leading to a temporary halt in the development of this foreign policy doctrine.

A shift towards assertive regionalism

The 2002 elections marked a turning point in Turkish foreign policy with the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The AKP, rooted in a center-right Islamist ideology, promised a fresh approach to foreign policy that would depart from the previous era of coalition governments’ focus on Western alignment. This new vision drew heavily from the doctrine of “” developed by political scientist Ahmet �ٲ����ܳٴ�ğ����. Strategic Depth emphasized Turkey’s unique geopolitical position at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East. It argued that Turkey could leverage its historical and cultural legacy, particularly its Ottoman past, to become a pivotal player in a multipolar world order.

Initially, the AKP a “zero problems with neighbors” policy, prioritizing soft power tools. Turkey significantly increased its foreign aid contributions and became a major donor in the region. Cultural programs attempted to foster closer ties with neighboring countries by promoting Turkish language, music and cuisine. This approach resonated with many regional actors, particularly those wary of Western dominance.

Simultaneously, the AKP pursued EU membership with renewed vigor. They introduced domestic reforms to align with European standards, and Turkey actively participated in regional initiatives to showcase its commitment to stability and cooperation. A key example was the significant in relations with Syria, a former adversary. Diplomatic ties, increased economic cooperation and energy partnerships between the two countries flourished.

However, the EU accession process proved to be a slow and frustrating experience. The EU’s internal resistance to Turkish membership fueled a growing sense of disillusionment in Ankara. Turks perceived the whole process as foot-dragging.

Ahmet �ٲ����ܳٴ�ğ���� amplified this sentiment when he became Foreign Minister in 2009. A strong proponent of Neo-Ottomanism, �ٲ����ܳٴ�ğ���� a more assertive role for Turkey on the world stage. He argued that his country’s future lay not solely in aligning with the West, but in re-establishing its influence as a regional leader.

Several events served as catalysts for this shift. In 2009, Erdoğan delivered a scathing critique of Israel’s actions in Gaza in his speech at the World Economic Forum. Erdoğan highlighted his growing sense of divergence from traditional Western foreign policy positions. The following year, the deadly flotilla attack, where Israeli forces raided a Turkish humanitarian aid convoy headed for Gaza, further strained relations with the West. These incidents resonated deeply with Turkish public opinion, strengthening the appeal of Neo-Ottoman ideals that emphasized a more independent and assertive foreign policy.

The Arab Spring uprisings of 2010 presented a for Turkey to advance its Neo-Ottoman ambitions. Embracing a pro-Arab stance, Turkey actively supported rebellions against established governments in Egypt and Libya. Ankara hoped to cultivate close ties with these new governments, fostering economic partnerships and establishing itself as a champion of democratic reform in the region. This approach aligned with Neo-Ottomanism emphasis on fostering regional leadership and projecting Turkish influence beyond its borders.

However, the Arab Spring’s aftermath proved to be far more complex than anticipated. The rise of Islamist movements to power in Egypt and Libya initially bolstered Turkey’s foreign policy ambitions. However, the subsequent descent into instability and violence in these countries exposed the limitations of the Neo-Ottoman approach. Turkey’s ability to influence events on the ground proved to be , and its regional standing became entangled with the ideological struggles within Arab societies.

The 21st century descent into instability

Turkey openly supported the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt. When a military coup overthrew it in 2013, Turkey’s regional ties with Egypt became strained. Turkey’s condemnation of the coup and its staunch backing of the Brotherhood led to a with Egypt and its allies in the Gulf, leaving Turkey increasingly isolated in the Middle East. This isolation had significant economic consequences. Trade and investment between Turkey and the Arab states declined sharply.

Internally, Neo-Ottomanism’s emphasis on the ummah (Muslim community) fostered a sense of pan-Islamism that the core tenets of the Turkish Republic’s secular identity. The concept of ummah fueled the rise of Islamist tendencies within Turkish society, particularly among conservative segments of the population. Educational reforms introduced under the AKP placed a greater emphasis on Islamic history and culture, secular values in the public sphere. These social tensions manifested in increased polarization and a decline in religious tolerance towards minority groups.

The year 2013 marked a turning point for Turkey on multiple fronts. The Gezi Park erupted in response to a government development project that threatened a beloved public space in Istanbul. The protests morphed into a broader movement against the AKP government’s perceived authoritarian tendencies. The government propagated further emphasis on Ottoman history and identity. Grandiose infrastructure projects like the replica Ottoman barracks on the banks of the Bosphorus deliberately attempted to romanticize the Ottoman past and distract from present-day challenges.

The Syrian Civil War, which began in the same year, another layer of complexity to Turkey’s foreign policy. While Turkey initially supported the rebels fighting against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the emergence of extremist groups like ISIS and the Kurdish YPG (People’s Protection Units), by the US, posed a significant security threat on its borders. ISIS carried out a series of deadly terrorist within Turkey, targeting tourist destinations and civilian populations. The YPG (affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a Kurdish separatist group designated internationally as a terrorist group) clashed with Turkish security forces along the border and further destabilized the region.

Additionally, Russian and Iranian for the Syrian government forced Turkey into a precarious geopolitical balancing act. Turkey’s attempts to contain the Syrian conflict within its borders and prevent a mass refugee influx strained its economic resources and humanitarian capacity. Ummah-oriented propaganda aimed at Muslim countries uncontrolled migration towards Turkey. Millions of refugees fleeing the Syrian Civil War poured into Turkey, straining its social services, economy and infrastructure. The influx of refugees also contributed to rising social tensions and xenophobia within Turkish society.

Turkey’s political landscape was particularly tumultuous between 2015 and 2016. Internal within the AKP and a surge in by ISIS and Kurdish separatists exposed the potential dangers of an expansive foreign policy. The controversial of a Russian jet by the Turkish military, which resulted in the crew’s deaths, strained Russia–Turkish relations further. This put heavy on bilateral trade and tourism.

Turkey critically needed to evaluate Neo-Ottomanism costs and benefits. The pursuit of an ambitious foreign policy had diverted resources away from addressing pressing domestic issues like poverty, unemployment and social inequality.

In 2016, after a failed military coup against Erdoğan, Turkey declared a state of emergency and subsequent purge against the alleged plotters. Erdoğan began the to a presidential system which allotted him significant power. Interestingly, Neo-Ottomanism played a role in his new system. Supporters of the president appealed to Islamic pride sentiments within a segment of the population by portraying him as a strong leader akin to an Ottoman sultan.

Concerns have arisen among citizens regarding the Turkish government’s commitment to democratic principles. In response, the government on popular dissent. It arrested thousands of protesters, purged its civil service and military, and tightened its control on the media and the courts.These actions attracted for stifling free speech and weakening the system of checks and balances that underpins a well-functioning democracy.

Moreover, the government’s pursuit of a more conservative and religious agenda deviates from the secular foundations of the Turkish Republic as established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This and its attempts to augment presidential power through constitutional amendments have lost the new government the trust of a large portion of Turkish society. Secularists apprehend a reversal of Atatürk’s reforms, liberals express anxieties about curtailed freedoms, and many nationalists harbor reservations concerning the foreign policy ramifications of Neo-Ottomanism.

Neo Ottomanism is a challenge to NATO’s cohesion 

Turkey’s growing emphasis on Neo-Ottomanism presents a potential to its critical role within . Established in the aftermath of World War II to deter Soviet aggression, NATO functions on the principle of collective defense by requiring member states to come to each other’s aid in the event of an attack. Neo-Ottomanism’s prioritization of regional issues works against the principle of collective defense, potentially weakening the alliance’s ability to respond effectively to external threats.

Thus, Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian civil war and its for the Libyan government have relations with allies like the US, whose interests in these conflicts diverge significantly from Turkey’s.

Furthermore, Neo-Ottomanism focuses on reviving Islamic influence and potentially Islamic state structures that could be fundamentally at odds with NATO’s commitment to secular and democratic values. associated with Neo-Ottomanism, such as aiming to reclaim former Ottoman lands, could lead to disputes and border conflicts with neighbors, some of whom are also NATO members or partners. This raises concerns about internal strains within the alliance and the erosion of a unified front.

Military — the ability of allied forces to work together seamlessly — is essential for NATO’s effectiveness. However, Turkey’s of military equipment incompatible with NATO systems, such as the S-400 missile system from Russia, disrupts this seamlessness. The S-400 system’s incompatibility with NATO air defense architecture could endanger the ability to distinguish between friendly and hostile aircraft. This incompatibility not only hinders joint military exercises and operations but also casts doubt on Turkey’s commitment to the alliance’s collective defense strategy. The United States’ of Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program due to the S-400 deal further exemplifies this strain.

Neo-Ottomanism appeal to Turkish nationalists across the political spectrum could create divisions and factions within the Turkish military, potentially fracturing internal cohesion and undermining Turkey’s readiness to cooperate effectively with NATO allies.

Neo-Ottoman rhetoric, often critical of Western powers and their actions in the region, creates tension with some NATO members, particularly those with whom Turkey has historical or ongoing political disagreements. with Greece, a fellow NATO member, over control of the Eastern Mediterranean could escalate due to Neo-Ottoman pronouncements. These tensions hinder cooperation and trust within the alliance.

Furthermore, the on anti-Western orientation and aspirations to free Turkey from dependence on the United States could create a perception of Turkey as a rival or competitor rather than a partner among some NATO members. This erosion of trust and the perception of divergent goals significantly complicate efforts to maintain regional stability.

The current state of Turkey’s EU membership

EU membership is contingent upon fulfilling a set of core principles enshrined in the . These include robust democratic institutions, an independent judiciary and an unwavering respect for human rights. Furthermore, the EU emphasizes peaceful resolutions to international conflicts and close cooperation with member states, principles in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

Herein lies the crux of the tension between Turkey’s aspirations under Neo-Ottomanism and EU membership. Turkey’s and in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly with Greece and Cyprus, raise concerns among EU members about its commitment to peaceful conflict resolution and regional cooperation. Additionally, Turkey’s in the Libyan Civil War has further strained relations with EU countries. These escalating tensions threaten the stability and security of the Eastern Mediterranean region.

Internal developments within Turkey further complicate the picture. Growing concerns about weakening democratic institutions, notably the of the judiciary and freedom of the press, cast doubt on Turkey’s adherence to the Copenhagen criteria. Criticism from the EU and international organizations regarding crackdowns on dissent, erosion of the rule of law, and human rights violations have intensified scrutiny. Indicators rank Turkey in terms of judicial independence and .

Furthermore, Turkey’s economic and social policies increasingly from EU norms. Protectionist trade policies clash with the EU’s focus on free trade while a perceived shift towards a more conservative social agenda creates friction with the EU’s emphasis on social liberalism. Turkey’s recent economic policies, characterized by increased state intervention, nationalist rhetoric and rising public spending, further distance it from the EU’s economic model. Accusations of a growing conservatism in Turkish society raise questions about Turkey’s compatibility with the EU’s social values. Environmental and social welfare may also diverge from the EU’s established approach, creating additional obstacles to full integration.

The economic fallout of Neo-Ottomanism

The initial period of robust economic growth under the AKP party in Turkey (2002–2011) witnessed a remarkable 5.6% annual average . However, this progress has subsequently been overshadowed by a series of economic . The execution of Neo-Ottomanism has contributed to a period of economic downturn. 

A cornerstone of a healthy economy is trust in its central institutions. However, the politicization of key economic institutions under Neo-Ottomanism, such as the central bank, severely domestic and international confidence. Investors and citizens alike questioned the independence and competence of these institutions in managing economic policy, particularly regarding interest rates and inflation control. Trust in the Turkish lira’s stability has eroded, discouraging foreign investment and hindering long-term economic planning. For instance, the abrupt 2021 of Naci Agbal, the Central Bank governor by Erdogan, who advocates for low interest rates despite high inflation, sparked a sharp currency decline and raised concerns about central bank autonomy.

Neo-Ottomanism strained ties with the European Union, a major trading bloc, and the United States, a significant source of foreign direct investment. Decreased trade volumes ensued. Additionally, tensions with regional neighbors like , and the United Arab Emirates have disrupted tourism revenue and potential regional economic cooperation. Turkey’s involvement in the 2020 conflicts in Libya and , alongside its exploration for in the Eastern Mediterranean, provoked diplomatic disputes with several European and Middle Eastern countries. These disputes negatively impacted Turkey’s trade and tourism sectors, which approximately 25% of its GDP.

The Turkish economy has become heavily on foreign capital to finance growth, exposing it to external shocks. The lira’s value significantly in global currency markets can lead to significant, disrupting commerce. Import costs have increased and inflation is a growing predicament. Additionally, a high dependence on energy imports makes Turkey susceptible to global energy price fluctuations. Furthermore, a lack of sufficient domestic savings and foreign exchange reserves weakens Turkey’s ability to weather these external economic storms. The 2018 with the US over the detention of an American pastor serves as a case in point. It triggered a currency crisis that saw the lira lose 40% of its value against the US dollar. This crisis also Turkey’s large current account deficit, which reached 6.5% of GDP in 2017.

Turkey’s focus on foreign policy under Neo-Ottomanism has diverted attention away from crucial domestic economic reforms. A of investment in infrastructure, education and technological innovation still hinders long-term economic growth and competitiveness. The economy remains on low-value-added sectors such as construction, and tourism. This lack of diversification makes the Turkish economy less resilient and hinders its ability to compete in the global marketplace. In 2019, the Global Competitiveness Index Turkey poorly on indicators such as innovation capability, quality of education and macroeconomic stability, placing it 59th out of 141 countries.

Despite the economic downturn, Turkey achieved a notable recovery in 2021, with an 11% growth rate to become the fastest-growing G20 economy. This was driven by the easing of COVID-19 restrictions and expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. However, Turkey’s 2021 growth came with challenges like (reaching 21.3% in November 2021) and a widening current account deficit (reaching 7.1% of GDP in the third quarter of 2021). Moreover, February 2023 earthquakes caused significant human and material losses, further pressuring the already fragile macro-financial situation. Turkey’s current inflation at 67.07%.

The government’s new for 2023–2025 aims to achieve an average GDP growth of 5.3%. However, the success of the program will depend on the implementation of structural reforms, the diversification of trading partners and the restoration of credibility and stability in the economic environment.

Originally, Neo-Ottomanism aimed to boost Turkey’s global influence and transform it into a major regional and possibly even international player. However, Turkey has suffered in the economic, cultural and political arenas under Neo-Ottomanism.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post A Sultan’s Shadow: The Truth About Neo-Ottomanism appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The UN would typically be expected to support such a worthwhile endeavor. Indeed, when Greek Cypriots planned and built roads to Pile, the UN never criticized, restricted, or blocked them. However, when Turkish Cypriots wish to build roads or infrastructure – the UN has taken action immediately.

Suddenly, numerous new UN instruments are contravening the standard customs and processes of the TRNC. The UN has lost its impartiality in Cyprus and is applying different regarding its decisions involving Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

Inconsistent UN Actions

The TRNC has never hesitated to open up discussions with the UN and its southern neighbors, especially when the well-being of its can be improved – something that the Pile-Yiğitler road project would unquestionably achieve. Yet, at every turn, the goodwill and good faith attempts of Turkish Cypriots have not been reciprocated.

Pile is the only town in the buffer with both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, only Turkish Cypriot residents face constant checkpoints and when entering or leaving their homes. They are desperate for reasonable access into their village from the TRNC to finally have proper access to their humanitarian needs.

Since establishing the buffer zone, two new roads have been built from the Greek side into Pile. The Greek authorities even built a and theater in the buffer zone. However, when the Turkish Cypriot authorities tried to build a single road, the full of the UN’s might came down.

How can this double standard continue to be applied by the UN? Do they not see that this clearly violates their neutrality and demonstrates a clear and enduring bias? Turning a blind eye to Greek Cypriot projects and then blocking a Turkish Cypriot humanitarian endeavor is frankly outrageous.

This is a dangerous situation to be in. By minimizing Greek Cypriot restrictions and applying full restrictions to Turkish Cypriots, the UN is essentially removing any possibility of Turkish Cypriots living in Pile. Indeed, Turkish Cypriots have increasingly been forced to leave their homes as living in Pile becomes untenable without free access to healthcare, education and food.

It feels like a deliberate strategy to turn the only joint village in the buffer zone – one in a strategically important location – into a Greek Cypriot community. The UN is not to be trusted because it refuses to respect and honor its with our government.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Revealing Analysis: The UN Is Not Impartial In Cyprus appeared first on 51�Թ�.

European diplomats are now routine in their assessment that Erdoğan’s Turkey is not the kind of place — considering the state of human rights, freedoms in public life, freedom of the press, separation of the institutions of state — that can seriously expect to return to accession negotiations. Yet there is considerable shortsightedness in this “moral high ground” approach to Turkey’s long-stalled EU accession.

Certainly, to take just one example, the treatment of the country’s Kurdish minority since at least the failed of 2016 has been repressive in the extreme.

Many supporters of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) are keen to point out that the only reason the opposition lost the recent elections in May 2023 is because they pandered to terrorists, in the form of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), a political party aligned with Kurdish interests, and connected with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) separatist insurgency.

However, this narrative is a false one. If engaging with Kurdish political groups were so electorally suicidal, how is it that the same Recep Tayyip Erdoğan led a thawing in the cultural and political climate for Kurds in the late 2000s, including with jailed leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, and yet continued to win elections? This fact reveals Erdoğan as a far more opportunistic, and less dogmatic, leader than is often supposed. And why did he support this engagement with Kurdish political figures? A key driver was the reform agenda of the EU accession negotiations.

FO° Live: Making Sense of the Turkish Elections

The trouble with the EU

The truth is that the EU itself swung Turkish politics decisively in a nationalist and repressive direction. The reason lies in the fact that many in the EU — most conspicuously France and Austria — were never genuine in their promise of accession to the bloc. The strain of Islamophobia in both states, and to a lesser extent in Germany and elsewhere, made even a squeaky clean Turkey unpalatable within what many still see as an essentially Christian club. 

Brexit was, ironically, a further blow to Turkey. The year 2016 stands as the moment the EU slipped irrevocably from Turkey’s grasp. With the departure of the UK, a key supporter of Turkish accession, and the attempted coup d’etat in Turkey, the fate of the nation was sealed. It is a singular irony that, in the run-up to the Brexit vote in the UK, the Leave campaign distributed leaflets that Turkey would soon join the bloc, sending millions of poor Turks to British shores. Nothing could have been further from the truth. 

As a result of European disingenuousness, the goal of EU accession has lost its appeal. With it, the incentive to reform dissipated. The incentive provided by EU accession is an invaluable asset of the European project, as is being observed in Ukraine today. In Turkey, it was a powerful force, with membership being hugely popular not only among elites but among ordinary Turks as well. With no prospect of membership, Erdoğan’s ruling AKP turned to hardline nationalists to shore up its parliamentary majority. The result is a Turkey that looks far less palatable to the bloc than the one it quietly rejected in the late 2000s. 

This moral high ground approach to foreign policy is still counterproductive for the EU, even at this late, late stage. When Turkey set out on its quest for EU membership in the 1950s, it was far from a model democratic nation. Indeed, it went through several coups and repressive military juntas, and the treatment of vulnerable groups such as the Kurds was easily equal to the treatment administered by the current government. Accession talks were not based on what Turkey was, but what it might become. The same could easily be applied today.

Ukrainian exceptionalism

It is striking that Ukraine, which is now seeking EU membership in earnest, is in many respects a more unpalatable prospect than Turkey would be. And yet it appears less of a stretch for the European imagination. In much the same way that Greece and Cyprus received membership despite serious shortcomings in terms of economic and political governance, Ukraine appears to find itself in a different passport lane from Turkey. The worry is that this double standard may be rooted in cultural perceptions that do not ultimately serve Europe’s best strategic interests. 

One cannot turn back the clock. And yet, if the EU at least observed where its strength actually lay and where its best interests lay, it might start to approach even the Turkey of Erdoğan with a little more of the long-term strategic vision necessary to avoid the inevitable repercussions of lost influence. For many decades, the carrot of EU accession served as a powerful tool in EU relations with Turkey and many other states. Without it, the ultimate result is likely to be long-term EU decline, while its borders become ever more insecure, its internal population more paranoid and introspective and its ability to project power abroad weaker.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post This Is Why Turkey Won’t Make It Into the EU appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Turkey frequently stages cross-border strikes on targets in the Kurdistan Region and other nearby areas, including and . It justifies these attacks as necessary to combat the PKK, but they regularly result in harm to civilians. Community Peacemaker Teams (CPT), an international human rights group that has a robust mission in the Kurdistan Region, an estimated 129 civilians have been killed and another 180 wounded in Turkish cross-border attacks since 2015. Last year was the deadliest during that period. Between 18 and 20 civilians were killed, including six children, and 57 to 58 civilians were injured in 2022, to CPT.

The recent attacks

On August 6, the Turkish military conducted an airstrike on the village of Chnartu, just south of Aghjalar in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate. The airstrike reportedly one person of disputed affiliation. Ankara had targeted the area in May 2022, killing five people. Later that day, a killed a 24-year-old civilian and wounded another. They were traveling in a car in the Duhok Governorate’s Chamanke district. They were visiting a family farmhouse, according to relatives. The area is just a few miles away from Gara Mountain, parts of which are held by the PKK and are regularly by Turkish forces.

Then, on August 9, an airstrike hit a car traveling on the Erbil–Sulaymaniyah road just northwest of the resort town of Dukan. Two civilians were initially as wounded and one of them later . Footage of the spread quickly on social media. This is an extremely important road: in the six years since Kirkuk became part of federal Iraq, the route has carried the majority of civilian traffic between Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, the Kurdistan Region’s two largest cities and has handled the bulk of commercial traffic between the zones controlled by the KDP and the PUK, respectively.

Two days later, three civilians, including a 17-year-old girl, were killed in an airstrike on their car on a busy road near Nalparez in the Sulaymaniyah Governorate’s Penjwen district. Again, of a burning car was all over Kurdish social media. As with Dukan, the attack took place on a major road full of civilian and commercial traffic. The two-lane thoroughfare connects Sulaymaniyah with the border point, one of three major crossings between the Kurdistan Region and Iran.

The Kurdistan Counterterrorism Service, which is affiliated with the KDP and closely linked with Kurdistan Region Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, posted a message on Facebook that those killed were PKK fighters, but this was quickly proved to be false. In reality, the were Arabs originally from Mosul who were living in Duhok Governorate. One was an employee of Asiacell, a major telecommunications company. He was driving his neighbor and her daughter to the border in order to meet another daughter who is currently studying in Iran.

It’s crickets from the politicians

In response to the latest barrage and the civilian deaths, the KDP, the PUK and Iraqi officials in Baghdad were conspicuously silent. The KDP, headquartered in Erbil, has close economic, political and security ties with Turkey and therefore rarely criticizes Turkish cross-border attacks. Instead, it frequently that the presence of the PKK in the Kurdistan Region is responsible for harm to civilians or issues statements that support Ankara’s narrative, as the Counterterrorism Service did following the Penjwen airstrike. The KDP and the PKK have a hostile relationship and have engaged in sporadic as recently as 2021.

The PUK, based in Sulaymaniyah, is more willing to Turkey and has a relatively neutral relationship with the PKK in which both tend to avoid interfering in each other’s affairs. However, the party maintains with Syrian Kurdish groups that Ankara views as one and the same as the main branch of the PKK. In recent months, Ankara has the PUK to engage in a public crackdown on the PKK in its zone of control, including by its airspace to flights going to and from Sulaymaniyah International Airport until at least January 2024. The airstrikes in Sulaymaniyah in recent weeks are likely a way to increase this pressure on the PUK to act.

Iraqi federal officials have also not condemned the attacks. In general, they tend not to comment on Kurdish casualties, but the fact that they have not spoken out against the deaths of the Arabs in Penjwen is notable. It stands in stark contrast to the outrage following the deaths of nine Arab tourists who were killed in at Parkhe, a village resort in the Duhok Governorate, in July 2022. Some within the Shia Coordination Framework, which forms the core of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s government, are actively to Turkish violations of Iraqi sovereignty.

The collective silence is likely related to a two-day by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan that began this Wednesday and took him to Baghdad and Erbil. There is widespread speculation that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will also visit in the near future, depending on the success of his foreign minister’s visit. Before taking up his current post on June 3, was the head of Turkey’s intelligence service and was heavily involved in the conflict with the PKK.

Fidan’s visit comes at a delicate time for Iraq–Turkey relations and talks are expected to cover an extensive agenda that includes oil, water, security and trade. In many ways, Ankara has staked out a maximalist stance on these issues in order to elicit concessions from Baghdad; the recent airstrikes are likely part of that strategy. The Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, which until March carried the Kurdistan Region’s oil exports, is currently following an arbitration ruling that favored Iraq. Turkey wants Iraq to drop a second case in return for the resumption of exports. Iraq is dealing with caused by Turkish upstream damming and has been largely unsuccessful at convincing its neighbor to release sufficient water supplies. The future of the recently Iraq Development Road, a $17 billion road and rail project, hinges on a Turkish outlet at the northern end. Indeed, these are big stakes.

While it is unsurprising that Iraqi and Kurdish officials do not want to upset Ankara ahead of these talks, it is also reprehensible. That civilians can be killed with such impunity and hardly a murmur of official outrage shows the weakness of Iraqi and Kurdish leaders who hide behind realpolitik while their people are killed from above.

[ first published this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Turkey Killed Iraqi Civilians—Where Is the Uproar? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The situation highlighted the paradox of the entire Turkish election. After a year of , historic lows for the Turkish lira and a devastating series of earthquakes, all odds seemed to favor the opposition. However, the economic difficulties faced by Turkish citizens did not dissuade a majority from voting for Erdoğan. On the night of his victory, the president spoke from the balcony of a compound that had cost north of , or about 15 billion liras at today’s exchange rate. He addressed supporters—many from —who had seen their lira savings erode and their cost of living in the last 18 months. Several observers the choice of platform and how citizens could freely elect a leader whose policies created such tangible difficulties.

Harnessing the economy as a rhetorical tool

It has that Erdoğan’s victory depends on his constituency’s willingness to ignore the state of the economy. After all, economic crises generally for incumbent governments. In Turkey this effect should hold doubly true, since Erdoğan’s unorthodox views on economics—in particular his on slashing interest rates— to inflation and the depreciation of the lira. While supporters might hope that Erdoğan’s unorthodox position on interest rates in the long run, it would make sense to avoid mentioning economic topics at a time when the pain is still so acutely felt by every family in the country.

Yet the Erdoğan campaign chose a different approach, bringing the economy to the of political rhetoric. In the leadup to the election, Erdoğan to continue slashing interest rates, encouraged citizens to take pride in the lira and even his own economic bona fides. Over the past years, these messages have been wrapped in rhetoric that’s unusually politicized for such economic topics, with the president going so far as to , “If they have their dollar, we have our Allah.” Pro-Erdoğan commentators frequently that Western governments try to the Turkish economy and devalue the lira. In Erdoğan’s words, his policy nothing short of an “economic war of ” where Turkey “fighting against the interest rate lobby” and “enemies of production and employment.”

This rhetorical approach works surprisingly well. Erdoğan can pinpoint how slashing interest rates helps Turkish citizens in direct ways, by easing access to and . Even the approval rates for loans reflect this political strategy, with small and medium-sized businesses, domestic employers, lira-heavy corporates, and export-oriented firms seeing a steep in credit approvals. Meanwhile, the second-order effects of slashing interest rates—namely the slump in demand for liras in international currency markets and the inflation caused by higher costs for importers and increased spending by domestic consumers—are too abstract for most citizens to consider. This leaves Erdoğan with a unique ability to claim credit for the benefits of low interest rates while blaming the more indirect negative consequences on foreign actors. 

A uniquely receptive audience

Turkish economic history lends tailwinds to Erdoğan’s narratives on the economy. Interest rates in Turkey have historically been by Western standards. Even in the last five years, Erdoğan occasionally made concessions that allowed the central bank to its policy rate—with the results usually proving very short-lived. Turkish citizens have witnessed a steady and seemingly inexorable weakening of their currency, regardless of different interest rate policies. This peculiarity has led some Turkish economists to infer that Turkey from developed countries in its economic policy. Considering the experience of the average household, it is easy to understand Turkish citizens’ aversion to conventional economic wisdom and their openness to strong rhetoric on economics. 

Another aspect of Turkish economic history lends credence to Erdoğan’s arguments. Historically high inflation and the unpredictability of the lira’s exchange rate in the 80s and 90s—well before the first Erdoğan government—led citizens to change domestic assets into . This “dollarization” of the Turkish economy has continued, with now held in foreign currency or gold. Such dollarization for countries since it reduces the government’s monetary control, more volatile inflation, and in the banking system due to uncovered foreign liabilities. Moreover, the concept of dollarization relates directly to the debate on interest rates. Historically high interest rates made borrowing in liras unattractive to most Turkish citizens, and the resulting preference for dollar-based loans contributed to the of the Turkish economy. The increasing preference for dollars among the domestic population further exacerbated the instability of the lira.

Clearly, dollarization cannot be blamed on foreign actors, since Turkish citizens made their own decisions to open dollar accounts and take dollar-based loans. However, viewed as a characteristic of the current economy, Turkish citizens understandably worry about the predominance of foreign currencies and the instability this causes for the lira. Erdoğan’s economic messaging astutely builds on this concern, harnessing patriotic and anti-dollar slogans to support the government has implemented over the past years. Even from a conventional economic perspective, de-dollarization efforts hold merit, although the social consensus around them is built with simplified explanations.

Naturally, the label of de-dollarization should not exempt individual policies from scrutiny. Certain measures, such as Erdoğan’s flagship policy of slashing lira-based interest rates, can cause harm even if they nominally contribute to de-dollarization. But to truly understand how these policies are received by the majority of the population, observers must acknowledge Turkey’s unique historical experience with high interest rates and an overly dollarized economy. These factors make Turkish voters more receptive to the kind of political rhetoric and economic experimentation that Erdoğan has pursued.

The dangers of raising rates

A further characteristic of Erdoğan’s economic narrative is that it constrains any attempt to change course. In the leadup to the May elections, opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu Erdoğan’s economic policies and his intention to reassert the independence of the central bank. However, he kept relatively about concrete plans to raise interest rates. His hesitation is understandable because the Turkish economy now runs on the cheap access to capital Erdoğan has enforced. With inflation still above 40%, a hypothetically victorious opposition government would have needed to raise rates drastically—potentially targeting a central bank policy rate between and —to quickly bring the real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates out of the red. 

Households would immediately feel the burden of such a dramatic rate increase, as consumer loans, credit card debt and mortgages become prohibitively costly, the equity value of real estate property , and corporate credit dries up. Meanwhile, Turkish banks would experience similar issues. Government regulations require banks to buy government bonds, which Turkish bond yields and thus artificially reduces the worth of these bonds as assets to the banks. Rapidly increasing interest rates would widen this spread and leave banks with strongly under-valued bond assets on their balance sheets. 

Coupled with currency instability and a presumably higher ratio of non-performing loans, banks would therefore be hard-hit by a steep rate increase. Their capital adequacy ratio (the portion of the bank’s outstanding loans that are covered by their assets) from 17% to an estimated 12%—risky territory by Turkish standards. Banks would respond by severely cutting back lending and imposing tougher conditions for credit approval, thus further restricting the economy’s access to capital. In such an extremely tight monetary environment, corporations would respond with layoffs, possibly putting the economy on track for a true recession. 

Given the severity of these impacts, Kılıçdaroğlu and his allies found their range of maneuver constrained. After all, it is impossible for a politician to campaign on a recession platform. Erdoğan could credibly communicate a message centered on , arguing that millions of jobs depend on him remaining in power and continuing his loose monetary policy. Meanwhile, voters the opposition and their international advocates with the prospect of recession and unemployment, which rendered the electorate more receptive to Erdoğan’s rhetoric on foreign threats to the economy.

The dangers of not raising rates

Understandably, the Erdoğan campaign neglected to highlight one fundamental fact about the economy: that recession may be inevitable even if the president stays in power. As late as last year, the government might have hoped Turkey could use its high growth— year-over-year in the second quarter of 2022, now down to a still-strong —to “” inflation. This view is made more attractive by the fact that Turkey a classic fiscal problem and avoided steep deficits in the years leading up to the election, thus eliminating one of the root causes of inflation found elsewhere in the world. But severe risks attend Turkey’s extraordinarily loose monetary policy, primarily in the form of continued currency depreciation. The lira has already since the election. Despite recent and foreign currency loans from Turkish private banks, the central bank has most of its convertible foreign exchange reserves in a bid to prop up the lira prior to the election. This leaves no ammunition to respond to future fluctuations.

This circumstance holds three distinct dangers for Turkey. First, in a country so heavily on imports, a drop in the value of the lira immediately raises costs for Turkey’s many importers, who then pass on these costs to consumers in the form of higher prices. The central bank has exhausted its tools to directly strengthen the lira, leaving Turkey more vulnerable than ever to this form of pass-through inflation.

Second, Turkey may find itself in a balance of payments crisis, where the stock of foreign currency available proves inadequate to cover the cost of imports. The influx of foreign currency during the summer tourist season can delay this crisis. However, increased demand for energy imports during the winter looms large. Turkey no longer has the resources to cover the gap, even if some natural gas from Russia can be imported . 

Third, Turkey experiences a surprising degree of balance sheet risk. Despite a historically healthy fiscal policy and low public debt, Turkey’s central bank hosts a number of “hidden” liabilities. In its search for foreign currency to support the lira, the central bank has frequently borrowed dollars from Turkish commercial banks. The result has been to the foreign currency balance sheet risks of private banks to the public sector. The central bank will need to find the foreign currency to cover eurobonds it didn’t issue, as well as the liquidity to reimburse private banks’ dollar deposits should people ever try to withdraw their money. With the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves exhausted, the only way these obligations can be met is by selling liras—thus further weakening the exchange rate.

What does the future hold for the Turkish economy?

While rate increases cannot directly regenerate foreign exchange reserves, a significant rate hike could theoretically ease the effects of these crises. Bringing inflation-adjusted interest rates above zero would dampen domestic spending by making deposits more attractive, thereby curbing inflation. Higher interest on lira deposits would also attract foreign investors to buy liras, thereby potentially ending the currency’s downward spiral while restoring foreign exchange reserves thanks to an uptick in FDI. 

In the weeks following the election, the imminence of multiple crises led many observers to believe that Erdoğan had no option but to backtrack on his long-held position and raise interest rates. Signs that Erdoğan —along with key —had begun to consider the idea. The reinstatement of former Merrill Lynch economist Mehmet Şimşek to the post of finance minister and the tapping of former First Republic executive Hafize Gaye Erkan to lead the central bank this possibility. International financial institutions watched eagerly, that the policy rate—kept at 8.5% since March—would rise drastically to somewhere between 20% and 40%.

Once in their new positions, however, Şimşek and Erkan found themselves constrained by the same problems that plagued the opposition on the campaign trail. Much of the credibility built by Erdoğan during this election hinges on his ability to stick to his economic views, , continue providing and avoid the kind of recession that voters feared from a Kılıçdaroğlu administration. Any interest rate hikes that drastically tightened the economy’s access to capital would ripple through the job market and evaporate credit. A significant change would prove especially dangerous for the ruling party as the country prepares for next March, where Erdoğan’s AK Party will seek to control of the Istanbul and Ankara mayor’s offices.

As a result, when the central bank’s Monetary Policy Committee on June 22nd finally announced an increase in its policy rate from 8.5% to 15%, . With inflation still at 40%, real interest remains squarely in the negative zone. While some analysts that further gradual hikes may follow—a position expressed by —the market shows unequivocal pessimism. Instead of the increase in value that economists expected from a rate hike, the lira fell a further 7% against the dollar. Ironically, this depreciation may further discredit conventional economists and make the Turkish population even more receptive to Erdoğan’s unorthodox views. It could also serve as a rhetorical tool to justify a return to Erdoğan’s usual interest-slashing policies.

The observers now surprised by the lackluster hike in the policy rate are ignoring the fundamental lessons of Erdoğan’s economic rhetoric over the past three years. The president’s insistence on low interest rates is more than a personal belief: it is a core tool of political communication. Instead of avoiding economic discussions, Erdoğan brought the economy to the front and center of campaign rhetoric. The president harnessed Turkish citizens’ unique openness to interest rate experimentation while shrewdly embedding economic topics in the core messages of national pride and self-reliance that increasingly motivate the electorate. Meanwhile, the opposition found itself tainted by the fact that a radical pivot on interest rates would end access to cheap capital and endanger jobs—the same dilemma that now constrains Erdoğan’s own finance minister.

It should not surprise us that Erdoğan proved willing to moderately raise rates on June 22nd. for such a move—and all have proved temporary. Much like in past rate hikes, Erdoğan is ardently that his fundamental position on interest remains unchanged, and that it is a “” to think otherwise. The counterintuitive fall of the lira after the June 22nd announcement may help cement his view. We must therefore not conclude that the Turkish government is pivoting to a conventional economic stance. Difficult times lie ahead, when the electorate’s vote of confidence in Erdoğan’s unorthodox monetary policy must be balanced with the need to fix looming economic crises. It will not be an easy task. 

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Erdoğan’s Shrewd Rhetoric on the Turkish Economy appeared first on 51�Թ�.

A disruptive, charismatic candidate

After serving a four-month sentence, Erdoğan presented himself as a leader who could successfully reconcile Islam with democracy. He founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2001 and led them to victory in the 2002 general election. Since he was ineligible to stand for elections in 2002 due to his conviction, he would have to wait to become prime minister in 2003.

The rise of the AKP was welcomed by the Turkish population, and the West viewed the progress in Turkey with optimism. As the Prime Minister, Erdoğan led the Turkish economy to be the 18th largest in the world. Erdoğan dismissed apprehensions of any anti-Western advances and pushed Turkey’s bid to join the European Union. He bolstered relations with the US and stated his to resolve the country’s territorial dispute with Cyprus.

Is a New Islamic Conservatism on the Horizon?

While Erdoğan was seen as a leader who could peacefully merge Islam and democracy, he gradually displayed a more Islamist and authoritarian side. AKP clashed with secular parties in 2007 when attempts to elect an AKP presidential candidate with an openly Islamic ideology were blocked. In 2010, the Erdoğan administration the ban on the wearing of headscarves on university campuses. This was an early warning sign of a crackdown on Turkish democracy and secularism. Following this, Erdoğan’s position started to come under scrutiny, and a constitutional court began hearing a case that called for dismantling the AKP and banning Erdoğan and other members. The AKP survived the case, and it subsequently passed that brought the military under greater control from civilian courts while simultaneously increasing the parliament’s power to appoint judges.

From democratic leader to modern sultan

Erdoğan had risen to power in 2002 as a messianic figure for Muslims in Turkey who felt repressed by the secular order. While his initial policies did not have an Islamic leaning, by 2011, Erdoğan was referring to the AKP election win as a victory for Turkey’s Ottoman heritage. In the summer of 2013, the government violently cracked down on a peaceful protest in Istanbul against an urban development plan. This was a decisive turning point, signifying the start of Erdoğan’s authoritarian rule. The incident triggered widespread protests against the government and raised concerns over the government’s interference in citizens’ lives. Further, Erdoğan took the incident as an opportunity to jettison several liberal AKP members, including then-President Abdullah Gül, who was denied the possibility to return to the party ranks after his presidential term ended.

Erdoğan subsequently took over as the first directly elected president, something made possible by a 2007 . Turkey until this point had used a parliamentary system of democracy, where the head of state was elected by the legislature and held a ceremonial position. Erdoğan appointed former foreign minister Ahmet �ٲ����ܳٴ�ğ���� as the prime minister, but later dismissed him due to his reluctance to support his ambitions to end the parliamentary system. Erdoğan replaced him with Binali Yıldırım, who was prepared to facilitate the constitutional amendments required to transform the political system into that of a presidential republic.

The Bottom Line: Kemalism Just Won’t Win

Erdoğan used the attempted military coup against him in 2016 to gain public support for a crackdown on his opponents. Erdoğan’s attack on Turkish democracy reached its apotheosis when the Turkish citizens voted on a constitutional amendment that officially transformed Turkey from a parliamentary democracy into a presidential one. Erdoğan became the first president under the new system in July 2018.

Party and presidential control erode Turkish institutions

This change in the system is worrying. The new constitution strengthens the powers of the president by granting him the power to issue presidential decrees to ensure the implementation of the law. Additionally, the president can issue a state of emergency. The president is no longer constitutionally required to remain politically neutral and can retain ties to his political party. Since the new constitution also grants the president the power to appoint and dismiss high-level public executives, including the vice president and cabinet ministers, this allows him to fill important places with members of his own political party.

The new constitution massively undermines the Grand National Assembly, Turkey’s unicameral parliament. If the president’s party controls the majority of seats in the Assembly, the president can control parliament and its agenda, rendering the governmental checks and balances redundant.

FO° Exclusive: Turkey’s Erdoğan Is Now Sultan

The government has also brought universities under direct control and ended the traditional right of state universities to appoint their own rectors, thus curbing academic freedom. The military has been severely weakened due to the post-coup crackdown by the government. Further, the government has exercised more direct control of the central bank. The previously improving Turkish economy has plummeted, and the Turkish lira has steadily in recent years.

Turkey’s assertive stance puts NATO ties in question

In foreign policy, Turkey has sought to establish itself as a regional power and has recently even played a prominent role in mediating between Russia and Ukraine. The country, historically close to the West, has been with it recently due to its increasing ties with Russia and its autocratic turn. Currently, Turkey’s future in NATO and EU membership seems uncertain as long as Erdoğan stays in power.

The election last month was arguably the most difficult test Erdoğan has ever faced. With the collapsing economy and the devastating impact of the recent earthquakes, Erdoğan’s position looked under scrutiny in the opinion polls before the election. However, Erdoğan managed to emerge as the winner, defeating the candidate of the united opposition, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

Kılıçdaroğlu had portrayed this election as a fight for democracy and promised to restore the parliamentary system of democracy. This election was the most important one for Erdoğan, as it was a test of his new political system.

Turkey’s political landscape has shifted dramatically since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan assumed power in 2003. The political structure of the country has changed, and the AKP has launched a systematic attack on the country’s secular order. Erdoğan’s reinvigoration by this electoral victory may result in further erosion of Turkish democracy and of its relations with the West. All eyes are now set on Ankara as Erdoğan’s march towards regional power status and authoritarianism continues.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post With Erdoğan’s Victory, Turkey’s Startling Slide Into Authoritarianism Continues appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Nevertheless, the turnout for the Turkish elections was high, higher than turnouts are in most Western democratic states. Turnouts in dictatorships across the region are pitifully low, caused no doubt by apathy due to the lack of any real choice—unless, of course, they are the fanciful “99.9% support” type of turnout.

Despite this, coverage of these elections has portrayed them as a contest between a dictator (as Erdogan has been described time and again) against a democrat. Opposition presidential candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu was painted as a humble civil servant who had risen to take on the strongman in a David versus Goliath political moment.

A working-class hero

It matters that Kilicdaroglu was not an emergent democratic grassroots candidate, but the predictable consensus candidate of a broad six-party opposition alliance. He has been the leader of the main opposition Peoples’ Republican Party (CHP) for 13 years. In that time, he has consistently lost at the ballot box to Erdogan. 

The now casual and commonplace description of Erdogan as a dictator in Western media also misses another key point. Unlike most real dictators, who tend to be opportunist ex-military figures, or career politicians who are often scions of influential families, Erdogan is the real deal, and his supporters know it. He rose from humble origins in Istanbul’s Kasimpasa neighborhood. He is in many ways unpolished. He is also sincere in his religious faith. His working-class roots and his understanding of how this constituency thinks—because he thinks like them—provide Erdogan an authenticity that you cannot simply manufacture.

All the onions and kitchen sinks in Turkey cannot obscure the fact that Erdogan is the figurehead for a constituency that was systemically disenfranchised for much of the modern Republic’s history. This is at the root of his enduring appeal. It is a populist appeal, but it is no less real for that.

Erdogan has made his life’s work the restoration of the dignity of a class of Turkish society that has felt marginalized and scorned by elites since at least the foundation of the modern republic, and arguably since the rise of westernizing reformist governments in the final years of the Ottoman Empire. 

In the pre-Erdogan era (and for a long time after it had begun), women who chose to wear a headscarf could not get an education or work for the public sector. Consider that fact for a moment. Women can wear headscarves to school or work in most secular Western states, and yet a state often viewed as Islamic by outsiders outlawed it.

Is a New Islamic Conservatism on the Horizon?

For his constituency, Erdogan’s tenure has been a very real revolution in their life circumstances. These core changes are important. The average voter sets them against the more recent economic pain. They weigh the two. Basic goods have become painfully expensive, but recently gained political freedoms are also precious. These are fundamental political considerations.

A popular, but not invincible, leader

Erdogan has made big mistakes. The economy is reeling from ill-judged policies and nepotism. The swing to nationalist policies and hardline confrontation with Kurds in the wake of the coup attempt of 2016 has brought with it intractable problems internally and externally for Turkey. The president’s post-coup paranoia of real or invisible enemies has made many old friends in his Justice and Development Party (AKP) lose faith with him, and his authoritarian style has alienated key Islamist figures who would make his government stronger.

When you consider all this, it is testament to the well of goodwill he is able to draw from that he still won fairly comfortably. However, it is easy to ascribe too much of the credit for Erdogan’s success to his own charisma and political know-how. Much of the cause of the result of this election was also of the opposition’s own making.

If the opposition alliance had really committed to challenging Erdogan, they should have found someone who didn’t require Erdogan’s core constituency to betray the legacy of what Erdogan has built. The leader of the CHP was never going to be that figure.

A clear majority in Turkish society does not want a return to a Western-backed secular nationalist elite, as exists in much of the Arab world and did exist for most of the history of the Turkish republic. Erdogan has made another path possible. His tenure is far from fully successful, but for him to be usurped, he needs to be beaten on his own terms.

The person to do so has not appeared, or, at any rate, not been chosen to run as a candidate against him. As has been repeated by much of the media, even a CHP candidate such as Istanbul mayor Ekrem Imamoglu would have been a much more serious challenge, given his significant appeal with voters.

But to be genuinely successful at cutting into the AKP vote, an opposition candidate would have to reflect more of the conservative opposition to Erdogan, which did exist in the six-party alliance. This alliance included Meral Aksener’s Iyi Party, Ali Babacan’s Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA) and Ahmet Davutoglu’s Future Party (GP).

In Babacan and Davutoglu, the alliance had two party leaders who were former members of the ruling AKP and former cabinet ministers. If they had led the opposition platform, that would have asked much more uncomfortable questions of the Erdogan campaign. As it was, the old lines of political and social loyalty were relatively undisrupted.

What will Erdogan leave to history?

The opposition must now reflect on the reality Erdogan has created and the need to realign their approach in the hope of denting Erdogan’s appeal. The president himself, however, has an opportunity. He is in his final term as president and has the chance to cement a legacy.

In appointing Mehmet Simsek as his new finance minister, he is making one clear signal in that direction. He knows that economic stability built AKP success in the 2000s. It nearly undid them in the 2020s. He needs to stabilize the currency to continue the prosperity that he has offered his constituency.

The other element is perhaps harder, but carries an even greater prize. It is the Kurdish question, Turkey’s eternal question.

Ironically, Erdogan’s revolution, for all its significance, has followed many of the trends long established by secular elites in Turkey. When his back was to the wall in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, Erdogan turned to the hardline nationalists of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) for support. In so doing, he undid any attempt to solve the Kurdish question through political dialogue. The resulting mess has festered within Turkey and has had high costs for the nation’s position in the region, leading to policy choices in Syria and Iraq that do not necessarily benefit Turkey in the long term.

What Is Erdogan’s Real Plan for Kurds?

In the wake of another victory, could this be the moment that an Erdogan now beyond the need for reelection takes on the role of a Father of the Nation, in much the way that Ataturk once did, and offers the ultimate magnanimous gesture? Could he find a political settlement to the Kurdish question that he might force through with his political capital?

If he did so, he could change the geopolitical dynamics of the region fundamentally, offering Turkey a vision of a foreign and domestic policy based not on anxiety and defense, but on economic and social opportunity. That might be the catalyst for an even more successful future than anyone could have imagined today.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Bottom Line: Kemalism Just Won’t Win appeared first on 51�Թ�.

A Christian in a Muslim-majority nation, Mr. Hia objected to vocational school authorities in the West Sumatran city of Padang obliging his daughter to wear a hijab. In a secretly taped video, his daughter’s teacher insisted that wearing a hijab was mandatory. The teacher demanded that Mr. Hia put his daughter’s refusal in writing, which would have been a first step to expelling her. The video went viral.

In response, Indonesian Religious Affairs Minister Yaqut Cholil Qoumas and his home affairs and education counterparts threatened to sanction state schools seeking to impose religious garb in violation of government rules and regulations. “Religions do not promote conflict, neither do they justify acting unfairly against those who are different,” said Mr. Qoumas, who is also a leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest Muslim civil society movement and foremost advocate of theological reform in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The school complied. Over the last two years, the number of Christian girls shedding the hijab has grown. But at the same time, Mr. Hia received on Facebook and WhatsApp. “I lost count,” he told Human Rights Watch. “Hundreds of them.”

Mr. Hia’s air conditioning business started to lose customers. “Some customers asked me whether I was the one who was protesting the mandatory hijab rule. And they stopped requesting my services,” Mr.Hia said. Struggling to repay a bank loan, he dismissed five employees and sold his truck and his minibus. Almost two years later, Mr. Hia and his wife decided to sell their house while waiting for their daughter to finish high school. “I cannot earn enough money now. We have to move out of West Sumatra,” he said.

Support for Political Islam on the Upswing

Mr. Hia’s experience tells the story of see-saw swings in the Muslim world between trends towards increased religious individuality, a more personal understanding of religion, and skepticism towards religious and temporal authority on the one end, and support for greater public adherence to religious norms and often state-aligned clerics on the other.

These swings may influence the public standing of Islamic scholars who align themselves with autocratic rulers like Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman who has subjugated the kingdom’s religious establishment to his will and pushed ahead with far-reaching social reforms anchored not in civil but in .

Potentially, the swings also suggest that calls by Nahdlatul Ulama for reform of Islamic law in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority country and a democracy, may encounter greater resistance beyond the group’s Javan stronghold in the archipelago state.

Furthermore, the swings point to a possible of political Islam, a decade after groups like the Muslim Brotherhood appeared to be down and out due to a Saudi and Emirati-backed public backlash that had rolled back their initial success in the wake of the 2011 Arab popular revolts.

Fascistic Tendencies in the Muslim Brotherhood

Those revolts toppled the autocratic leaders of Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya. However, the Brotherhood suffered its most significant setback just two years later as a military coup in Egypt removed Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brother and the country’s first and only democratically elected president, from office. The coup and subsequent brutal repression sent the Brotherhood into exile, where it has lingered ever since.

The story appears now to be changing, however. “Results from nationally representative public opinion surveys…strongly suggest that political Islam is making a comeback. In most countries surveyed, young and old citizens demonstrate a clear preference for giving religion a greater role in politics. This is the first time that support for political Islam has increased meaningfully…since the Arab Uprisings of 2011,” said Michael Robbins, director and co-principal investigator of Arab Barometer, a group that regularly surveys public opinion in the Middle East.

Mr. Hia’s experience is one more piece of anecdotal evidence of a revival of conservatism also reflected in the polling of Mr. Robbins and others, despite contradictory attitudes also revealed in these surveys.

In a conducted in 2022 by UAE-based Asda’a BCW, 41% of 3,400 young Arabs in 17 Arab countries aged 18 to 24 said religion was the most important element of their identity, with nationality, family and/or tribe, Arab heritage, and gender lagging far behind.

Arab Barometer a stark increase in the number of Muslim youth polled in several Arab countries that wanted clerics to have greater influence on government decisions. “In 2021-2022, roughly half or more in five of ten countries surveyed agreed that religious clerics should influence decisions of government,” Mr. Robbins said.

“While youth ages 18-29 have led the return to religion across MENA [the Middle East and North Africa], the rise in support for religion in politics is more widespread across society. In most countries, both older and younger members of society are shifting their views in concert,” he added.

Similarly, more than half, 56%, in the Asda’a BCW survey said their country’s legal system should be based on Shariah or Islamic law. 70% expressed concern about the loss of traditional values and culture. 65% argued that preserving their religious and cultural identity was more important than creating a globalized society.

Despite this, 73%, up from 58% in 2018, felt that religion played too much of a role in the Middle East. In addition, 77% believed Arab religious institutions should be reformed.

Erdogan Demonstrates Islamism’s Renewed Appeal

While the support for the reform of religious institutions may work in Nahdlatul Ulama’s favor and potentially threaten the autocratic grip on religion in Middle Eastern states, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s success in his country’s recent presidential and parliamentary elections offers further food for thought about the prospects of political Islam. Mr. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the May 14 parliamentary elections, and the president successfully defeated opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu to win a third term as head of state.

Nationalism may have been a major driver of the electoral outcome, but so was religious conservatism. “Erdogan has formed an unbreakable bond with Turkey’s largest sociopolitical bloc: religious conservatives. He also enchants them with a grand narrative: despite nefarious enemies and heinous conspiracies, he is making Turkey great and Muslim again,” Mustafa Akyol, a Washington-based Turkish scholar of Islam.

Islamist scholars from across the Muslim world the alliance. Their support may not have played a direct role in the electoral contest, but it indicated political Islam’s newly found assertiveness.

In a statement, the scholars called on Turks to vote for Mr. Erdogan and non-Turkish Muslims to support his campaign. They implicitly contrasted Turkey with its religious soft power rivals, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia, which have engaged with Israel to varying degrees and stress interfaith dialogue even though they differ sharply in their approaches and goals.

“Turkey has consistently defended the Prophet against Western offenses, restored the Hagia Sophia Grand Mosque [in Istanbul] to its original status, and advocated for Jerusalem and its ongoing issues,” the scholars said.

Controversially, Mr. Erdogan in 2020 returned the Hagia Sofia, a sixth-century Orthodox church-turned-mosque-turned-museum, to its former status as a Muslim house of worship.

Mr. Erdogan that the conversion was “the harbinger of the liberation of the Al-Aqsa Mosque,” Islam’s third holiest site in Jerusalem. Whether or not his words prove true, the Turkish leader may be right that his presidency is a sign of things to come.

[ first published this piece.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Is a New Islamic Conservatism on the Horizon? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Another major party is the People’s Democratic Party (). Its support base has been largely Kurdish. In the early years of Erdoğan’s rule, the HDP supported his government. Now, the party is supporting Kılıçdaroğlu. 

The first round of the presidential election will be held on May 14. According to, Kılıçdaroğlu is currently ahead of Erdoğan. Opposition party leaders are confident that they will win with Kılıçdaroğlu as their candidate. This victory is unlikely to be because of the opposition’s policies, discourse or promises. The opposition is likely to win because the economy is in a tailspin and the Erdoğan government has botched earthquake relief efforts. 

A Country in Peril

The Turkish economy has declined rapidly, especially in the last two years. One of the most important indicators of this economic regression is the depreciation of the Turkish Lira (TL). According to the central bank data from March 2021, 1 US Dollar equaled 7.5 TL, and 1 Euro was worth 8.95 TL. Today, those ratios have changed dramatically, with 1 US Dollar now worth 18.8 TL, and 1 Euro fetching 20.35 TL. The collapse of the Turkish currency has led to rampant inflation and massive difficulties for most people.

According to TURKSTAT, the official statistical institution, the annual inflation rate in 2022 was 64%. However, according to, an independent statistical institution, inflation was 112% in 2022. Besides, in the latest of the World Bank, Turkey had the fifth highest food inflation in the world.

Inflation has affected every area of the economy from the automotive to the real estate sector. One of the most concerning areas affected is the housing market, as hundreds of thousands of houses have been built in the last two decades. Despite the increase in housing supply, prices have dramatically in the last two years. In some places, housing prices have tripled. In other places, housing prices have increased eightfold. As a result, it has become exponentially more difficult for young people to buy a home.

Erdoğan’s government has been hit hard by two major earthquakes that took place in Southeastern Turkey on February 6, 2023. The first earthquake had a magnitude of 7.8, and the aftershock that accompanied it approximately 10 hours later had a magnitude of 7.5. Erdoğan lost a great deal of votes during these earthquakes. More than people died, over 160,000 were damaged or destroyed and cities turned into heaps of rubble.

The of rescue and aid activities resulted in even more deaths. A humanitarian organization called the Red Crescent (known in Turkey as Kizilay) was the subject of widespread outrage when it sold 2,050 tents to another charity organization for a 46 million TL profit. Critics condemned Kizilay for not providing the tents to the thousands of displaced Turkish citizens in need of shelter free of charge.

Erdoğan is on the ropes. Yet it is important to remember that he has more than 20 years of political experience. Erdoğan has won every election he has entered for the past few years. He is a savvy political operative and could still win the forthcoming election as well.

Since first coming to power in 2003, Erdoğan has built up a formidable political base. He has millions of loyal supporters, who blindly support him. They are primarily middle-aged, religious, conservative and nationalist voters who see Erdoğan as the leader who gave them a voice. Erdoğan also has a huge media presence. He uses news outlets to disseminate propaganda. If Erdogan makes a speech anywhere, almost all news outlets scramble to broadcast it live. 

Erdoğan’s control over the media is not total though. There are still multiple opposition outlets. They regularly call for the end of the Erdoğan era. Yet that end is not guaranteed. The opposition has been accused of complacency and many of its supporters are getting nervous. Kılıçdaroğlu is currently ahead in the polls. However, any assumption that the election is already in the bag could be a historical mistake. 

A Turning Point for Turkey

Erdoğan has historically benefitted from the fragmentation of the opposition parties. This time, however, the opposition has found a way to unite, despite differing identities and ideologies. 

Many of the opposition parties were founded by former ministers and prime ministers who once served in Erdoğan’s administration. For example, the was founded by , who served as Turkey’s economy minister for 13 years. Part of Babacan’s tenure was under Erdoğan’s premiership.  If Babacan wins the election, many believe he will be able to reform the Turkish economy and revive Turkey’s lost democratic ideals. 

Another former ally turned opposition leader is served as Erdoğan’s prime minister, before stepping down from the position in 2016. �ٲ����ܳٴ�ğ���� opposed Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian policies and went on to found the , which is also known as the Future Party. �ٲ����ܳٴ�ğ����’s party has also joined the opposition .. Many predict that the coalition of these parties will win over a significant number of voters who previously supported Erdoğan.

However, nothing is certain yet. Erdoğan could still win. If he does despite such unfavorable circumstances, the united opposition parties will have failed miserably. If Erdoğan loses, the election will prove historic. It will mark a watershed where a fragmented opposition united to unseat an authoritarian president.

Turkey will experience an intense election campaign in the coming weeks. The election has the potential to radically change Turkey’s political system. The opposition has promised to replace the current presidential form of government and return to the parliamentary one that  Erdoğan dismantled. If Erdogan is elected, the strong one-man regime he has established will continue to be riveted. Needless to say, his election is a major crossroads for the country, and will directly shape Turkey’s political, economic and social future.
[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post What You Need To Know About Turkey’s Upcoming Election appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Two elections are set to take place on 14 May—one for the presidency and another for parliament—and campaigning has become even more intense as a result of the horrendous earthquake that struck southeast Türkiye and north Syria on 6 February, killing at least 46,000 people, though the numbers are still .

Sensing the electoral tide turning against him, Erdoğan has angrily to public criticism of shoddy construction standards and claims of a slow disaster response – both of which the opposition is to capitalize on. The government has declared a three-month state of emergency in the ten impacted provinces, and speculation is rising it will try to the election if the public mood augurs an opposition victory.

Opinion polls before the quake showed the alliance between Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) still strong, which would mean that even if the six-party opposition coalition manages to take the presidency, it would fail to win control of the legislature. That would make it difficult for the opposition to bring back the previous parliamentary system that Erdoğan removed through constitutional changes approved by plebiscite.

The big question is the presidential election. Erdoğan is still the single most popular candidate in a diverse field. His problem is that if voters unite around a single personality in a run-off, he trails behind most of the potential opposition candidates in the alliance to defeat him. Following the recent from further office of popular Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu for “insulting election officials”, the road has been cleared for the Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to become that single candidate.

The opposition includes numerous figures who think they should be the anointed one to challenge Erdoğan, including Good Party leader Meral Akşener and Ankara mayor Mansur �۲�����ş, from the CHP. As the oldest among them Kılıçdaroğlu has made clear in recent months that he sees it as his right – especially since he agreed to allow the younger Muharrem Ince to run as the CHP candidate in 2018.

Born in 1948, Kılıçdaroğlu projects himself as Türkiye’s elder statesman, the adult in the room. But the opposition knows that as soon as their unity candidate is announced – likely in , when the election day is so far set for formal declaration – the government media machine will go after him ferociously. They will target him as old, weak, and out of touch, the opposite of everything the government will say Türkiye has become under Erdoğan, and whether young people come out to vote for Kılıçdaroğlu is a serious question. They will also brand him as a “soft-on-terror” risk to national security secretly wooing the pro-Kurdish Democratic People’s Party (HDP), which recently said it will run its own presidential

Finally, the government is likely to play the sectarian card. Kılıçdaroğlu is an Alevi of Kurdish origin. The AKP has made heavy use of as a political weapon in the past, especially during the Syrian civil war when Erdoğan and pro-AKP media depicted the conflict as a jihad against an Alawite regime led by deviants in faith.

A still-functioning democracy

The other big question hanging over the election is, will the government try to rig the vote in any way? The trend of recent elections has been to push the envelope as far as possible. The voting process is heavily monitored in the major urban centers. But out in the provinces, especially the southeast, it becomes difficult to follow what’s happening inside polling stations during and after voting hours. The government also has complete control of the process through its electoral commission, which has made a habit of providing immediate announcements to the state news agency that become etched in stone. And there is the wild card of not only the high numbers of undecided voters but Turks abroad, whose votes could be made to take Erdoğan over the line if things are looking dubious.

Despite all that, the AKP lost two significant elections in 2019, for the mayorships of Istanbul and Ankara. In the case of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu won even after the government convinced a court to overturn the first vote and hold it again. Türkiye’s elections still operate within the broad margins of what happens in the functioning democracies, without slipping into the kabuki theater of countries like Egypt.

Beyond that, how significant would Erdoğan’s fall be? On foreign policy, the “” that sees Türkiye throw itself back into the arms of NATO and Washington after a tense two decades seems far-fetched, as the popularity of Erdoğan’s stance over Swedish Quran-burning suggests. A whole generation of Turks have grown up used to a country that presents itself as a regional if not global power, and one that like Nasserist Egypt operates within diverse spheres of influence – in Türkiye’s case, the Muslim Middle Eastern, the Eurasian and the Western. No government can just toss that thinking out overnight. For one, was already a strong current in the military and has only gained ground under Erdoğan.

Second, fixing Türkiye’s dire economic problems via Western financial institutions will come at a price that compromises the newly won foreign policy independence. Even if the next government yanks up interest rates to rein in the spending power of ordinary people, it may well balk at a return to hot money in Turkish financial markets and the thought of IMF help to deal with debt. Membership of a Global South that wants to de-dollarize could still count for something in official thinking, although the temptation to will be real.

Thirdly, few Turks want a return to the system of military guardianship and occasional overt junta-rule that Erdoğan scored a historic success in overturning, including its fascistic rules against conservative religious values in public space. Protection of the right to be conservative remains a strong pull for the AKP base.

High stakes in centenary year

The stakes are perhaps greater than ever before. This year marks the , and enormous prestige will accrue to the government ruling at this important juncture in history. Victory would give Erdoğan and the AKP a green light to push ahead with their project to shape Erdoğan as the de facto founder of a second republic, the most important figure since Sultan Abdülhamid II – forget Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It would also consolidate the AKP as a permanent party of power, save Erdoğan from corruption trials, and prevent a purge of the Islamist movement.

The ultimate irony of Erdoğan’s remarkable longevity has been the chutzpah of itself, despite hailing from an ideological movement based on debunking much of Atatürk’s legacy. Erdoğan first opted for alliance with the ultranationalists of the MHP in 2015 when waning popularity began to threaten his own party’s electoral dominance, and it’s a marriage that has proven resilient and tough to beat. Despite frequent predictions of its demise, breaking that Islamist-nationalist nuclear bond remains the opposition’s biggest challenge.

[ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Turkey’s Timely Elections: Erdoğanism Without Erdoğan Now? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Most countries have some level of seismic activity, even if it is infrequent or of low magnitude. Even countries with low seismic activity can still experience earthquakes. If countries are located far from tectonic plate boundaries or away from zones of significant seismic activity, then they are safe. Such countries are few. Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands are the lucky ones.

How to prepare for an earthquake?

There are simple things you can do to prepare for an earthquake. These would limit the damage to life, limb and property when the ground beneath your feet literally shakes.

For a start, secure your home. This involves securing heavy objects and appliances to walls and floors, as well as securing cabinets, shelves, and bookshelves to prevent contents from falling. Similarly, knowing how to turn off utilities is important. Learning how to turn off gas, water, and electricity in your home when an earthquake strikes could save it from much damage.

Creating an emergency supply kit is important. This kid must include water, non-perishable food, first-aid supplies, a flashlight, extra batteries, and important documents. Similarly, making an evacuation plan is a good idea. Identifying potential escape routes from your home and workplace, and choosing a safe place to meet with family members is prudent.

You could also learn about earthquakes. Familiarizing yourself with the different types of earthquakes and their potential effects, as well as proper safety measures to take during an earthquake, could prove useful in a crisis. Practicing earthquake drills with family members to ensure everyone knows what to do in the event of an earthquake is important.

What to do during an earthquake?

During an earthquake, it’s important to act speedily to ensure safety. There are a few simple things to do that are most prudent. Remember to remain calm during an earthquake.

Dropping down on your hands and knees is a good idea. Ideally, take cover under a sturdy table or desk to avoid debris falling on your head. Put your arm and hand on your head and neck. Hold on to any sturdy furniture until the shaking stops. Be prepared to move with it until the shaking stops. Make sure you stay away from windows, hanging objects, mirrors, tall furniture, large appliances, and fireplaces. You do not want things to fall on you or come flying at you.

Ideally, you should evacuate if you are indoors. Being outside during an earthquake is generally safer. In case you are driving, then stop the car and stay inside. 

What to do after an earthquake?

After an earthquake, some actions help ensure safety and improve the recovery process. It is important 

Checking for injuries is the first thing to do. If someone is injured, then you must attend to that person and seek medical assistance if required. Checking damage to your home, workplace and your surrounding area comes next. Make sure to turn off gas, water and electricity if you suspect any damage.

Listening to news and updates for information, instructions and any potential dangers is also useful. In case of instructions to evacuate, do so promptly, follow known procedures and take familiar routes. Be careful to avoid damaged buildings, bridges, utility poles and other structures. In case of inclement weather, find shelter and connect with those conducting post-earthquake rescue operations.

[This article was produced with assistance from ChatGPT.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Simple Tips to Keep Safe in an Earthquake appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Yet it is Perincek, a man with a world of contacts in Russia, China, Iran, and Syria whose conspiratorial worldview identifies the United States as the core of all evil, that Erdoğan at times turns to help resolve delicate geopolitical issues.

Seven years ago, Perincek mediated a reconciliation between Russia and Turkey after relations soured following the Turkish air force’s downing of a Russian fighter.

A Peace Deal with Syria

Now, Perincek is headed for to engineer a Russian-backed rapprochement with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whose overthrow Erdoğan had encouraged for the past 11 years ever since the eruption of mass Arab Spring-era anti-government demonstrations that morphed into a bloody civil war.

Chances are that Perincek’s effort will be more successful than when he last in 2016 to patch up differences between Erdoğan and Assad but ultimately stumbled over the Turkish leader’s refusal to drop his insistence that the Syrian president must go.

Erdoğan has suggested as much in recent days, insisting that Turkey needed to maintain a with the government of Assad. He has said: “We don’t have such an issue whether to defeat Assad or not… You have to accept that you cannot cut the political dialogue and diplomacy between the states. There should always be such dialogues.” He went on to say that “we do not eye Syrian territory… The integrity of their territory is important to us. The regime must be aware of this.”

Erdoğan’s willingness to bury the war hatchet follows his failure to garner Russian and Iranian acquiescence in a renewed Turkish military operation in northern Syria. The operation was intended to ensure that US-backed Syrian Kurds, whom Turkey views as terrorists, do not create a self-ruling Kurdish region on Turkey’s border like the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq.

Turkey hoped the operation would allow it to create a 30-kilometer buffer zone controlled by its forces and its Syrian proxies on the Syrian side of the two countries’ border. Russia and Iran’s refusal to back the scheme, which would have undermined the authority of their ally, Assad, has forced Turkey to limit its operation to shelling Kurdish and Syrian military positions.

Shifting Alliances

The United States’ seeming unwillingness to offer the Kurds anything more than verbal support, and only that sparsely, has driven the Kurds closer to Damascus and, by extension, Russia and Iran as Syria quietly expands its military presence in the region. The US has long relied on the Kurds to counter the Islamic State in northern Syria.

The rejiggering of relationships and alliances in Syria is occurring on both the diplomatic and military battlefield. The Turkish attacks and responses by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) at its core appear to be as much a military as a political drawing of battlelines in anticipation of changing Turkish and Kurdish relations with the Assad government.

By targeting Syrian military forces, Turkey is signaling that it will not stand idly by if Syria supports the Kurds or provides them cover, while unprecedented Kurdish targeting of Turkish forces suggests that the Kurds have adopted new rules of engagement. Turkey is further messaging that it retains the right to target Kurdish forces at will, much like it does in northern Iraq.

Both Erdoğan and the Kurds are placing risky bets.

The Kurds hope against all odds that Assad will repay the favor of allowing the president to advance his goal of gaining control of parts of Syria held by rebel forces and forcing a withdrawal of US forces from the area by granting the Kurds a measure of autonomy.

With elections in Turkey looming in the next year, Erdoğan hopes that Assad will help him cater to nationalist anti-Kurdish and anti-migrant sentiment by taking control of Kurdish areas.

Turkey wants to start repatriating some of the four million predominantly Syrian refugees it hosts. In early August, Turkey’s interior ministry announced that it had completed the construction of more than 60,000 for returning refugees to northeastern Syria.

Concern about a potential deal with Assad and a call by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusloglu for reconciliation between opposition groups and Damascus sparked in Turkish-controlled areas of northern Syria as well as rebel-held Idlib.

Turkey also expects Assad, who is keen to regain not only territorial control but also maintain centralized power, to ultimately crack down on armed Kurdish groups and efforts to sustain autonomously governed Kurdish areas.

As a result, Perincek, alongside Turkish-Syrian intelligence contacts, has his work cut out for him. The gap between Turkish and Syrian aspirations is wide. Assad wants a complete withdrawal of Turkish forces and the return of Syrian control of Kurdish and rebel-held areas. He is unlikely willing or able to provide the kind of security guarantees that Turkey would demand. Both the Kurds and Erdoğan are caught in Catch-22s of their own that do not bode well for either.

The Kurds may be left with no options if a Turkish-Syrian rapprochement succeeds or face a Turkish onslaught if it fails. Similarly, reconciliation on terms acceptable to Erdoğan may amount to pulling a rabbit out of a hat. Whether he agrees with Assad or violence in northern Syria escalates, Erdoğan risks sparking a new wave of refugees making its way to Turkey at a time that he can economically and politically least afford another refugee crisis.

In the words of analyst Kamal Alam, Erdoğan’s problem is that the Turkish president “is running out of before the next election to solve the Gordian knot that is Syria. For his part, Assad can wait this out – because after Turkey once again fails to bomb its way out of the northeastern problem, Erdoğan will need Assad far more than the reverse.”

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Erdoğan’s Attempt to Woo Assad Could Go Horribly Wrong appeared first on 51�Թ�.

As a rising Islamist politician, the football-playing Erdoğan took on corrupt Scotch-drinking elites and a power-drunk military. He was even banned from politics for a while. Yet Erdoğan came roaring back and, unlike the recently dethroned Johnson, has emerged as the strongman of his nation.

A Truly Historic Leader

Even his critics would concede that Erdoğan has etched his name in Turkey’s history. He is the most significant leader of the country since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the general who created the modern Turkish state on the dying embers of the Ottoman Empire. Atatürk dragged the country screaming and kicking into secularism and towards Europe. In a land were the sultan was seen as the caliph by the Muslim world, Atatürk abolished the caliphate.

For all of Atatürk’s herculean efforts, much of Turkey was far too religious to turn secular like Europe. The elites of Istanbul inhaled the liberating air of Europe but, over time, lost touch with their people. The secular military managed to keep “Muslim parties in check and rebellious Kurds under control” through military coups. In 1997, the military forced an Islamist prime minister to resign. Then, Erdoğan was a young mayor of Istanbul.

The World This Week: Blood on the Bosporus as Purge Follows Failed Coup

READ MORE

To cut a long story short, the Islamist tide could not be held back by the military dam. Eventually, Erdoğan led them to power. He cut the wings of the military, initiated a rapprochement with the recalcitrant Kurds and made Islamism the new guiding principle of the country, both at home and abroad. Out went Kemalism, in came Erdoğanism. In the early days, this meant moving closer to Europe to avoid yet another military coup and fairly sound management of the economy.

As war rages between Russia and Ukraine, the early era of Erdoğan seems a lifetime away. In June, some researchers estimated in Turkey to be 160%, more than twice the official estimate of 79%. The country is also facing a currency crisis. In 2021, the Turkish lira fell by 44% against the dollar. In 2022, the lira is in , the current account deficit (imports minus exports) is rising and the budget deficit (expenditures minus revenues) has reached a . Millions of workers, young people and pensioners have fallen below the poverty line, which is set at $1,200 a month for a family of four. While much of the economic pain was inevitable given the global economic downturn, some of it is self-inflicted. By stubbornly insisting on cutting interest rates at a time of soaring inflation, Erdoğan has scored a spectacular own goal.

Elections and Revolutions Depend on the Price of Bread

The Turkish economy has struggled with its economy long before Erdoğan. With an oversized military, Turkey spent too much on defense. The country has long relied on dollar-denominated debt, which leaves it very exposed to external shocks. As a NATO member and a frontline state against the erstwhile Soviet Union, Turkey was regularly bailed out by the US and institutions like the International Monetary Fund (). Like Pakistan, Turkey extracted geopolitical rent from the West and bailouts have been par for the course. Only last year, the doled out $6.3 billion to Turkey.

The World This Week: Sultan Erdogan Tightens Grip on Turkey

READ MORE

Erdoğan has been putting a gun to the head of European leaders to wring some cash out of them. In 2016, the European Commission coughed up over $6.6 billion () for Turkey to host refugees and not disgorge them into the EU member states. Like a good bazaar merchant, Erdoğan has somehow kept the Turkish economy from falling into collapse because the US, the EU, the IMF and NATO all need Turkey for one reason or another. It is too important to fail.

Even geopolitical rent and political blackmail have limits. They do not yield infinite amounts of cash or gold. When inflation rises, central banks raise interest rates so that people keep their money in the bank instead of spending them on goods and services or assets. Inflation is a regular feature of the Turkish economy. In the 1980s and 1990s prices soared. Then, the central bank raised interest rates and brought it under control.

Erdoğan wants his central bank to keep interest rates low. Some of his key supporters have long been small businessmen who resent high interest rates. Turkish economists privately tell this author that Erdoğan thinks raising interest rates would put a spoke in the wheels of the economy. Like many politicians who want economic growth, Erdoğan wants to print money to achieve it. After all, he is doing what the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank did when they printed money through their policy of quantitative easing.

The US and European central banks have since reversed course in the face of rising inflation. Erdoğan has held the fort and pressured his central bank to instead. This means there is more money sloshing around in the Turkish economy than necessary. With oil, food and commodity prices high thanks to the Russia-Ukraine War, Erdonomics has sent prices soaring even further.

Turks are scrambling to get rid of liras as fast as they can. They are buying dollars, properties (prices are up by over the past year), cars, electronics and other consumer goods, and even high-risk volatile assets such as overpriced stocks and cryptocurrencies. Turkey might not be Sri Lanka yet but Erdonomics is causing its economy to collapse.

Over the last few years, he has become a de facto sultan. He has built Ak Saray, a pure white palace of 1,000 rooms on 50 acres of Atatürk Forest Farm, after razing Atatürk’s country lodge to the ground. Hagia Sophia is no longer a museum but a mosque. Secular Kemalist Turkey is dead. Istanbul’s elites have been defenestrated. Critics have been castrated. Furthermore Erdoğan has been able to project himself as a key leader of the Muslim world and won much popularity in places like Palestine and Pakistan. Recently, he even changed Turkey’s name to Türkiye.

In his 19 years in office, Erdoğan has accomplished a lot. He has changed the nature of the state and the arc of Turkey’s destiny. Yet he is increasingly vulnerable. Turkey may not be yet but it is in turmoil. Elections and revolutions depend on the price of bread. Erdonomics has set that on fire. At some point, the mob might turn on the sultan.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Sultan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Erdonomics is Driving Turkey to Disaster appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Addressing Climate Change Impacts on the Sporting Calendar

READ MORE

In 2011, the Turkish authorities, in the National Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan, that Turkey’s location in the Mediterranean basin made it more susceptible to arid conditions and heatwaves resulting from climate change, citing the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In its sixth report, in August this year, the IPPC concludes that climate change is already creating many extreme weather and climate events in all regions of the world and that they are intensifying in an unprecedented way.

Despite these bitter observations, Ankara has long refrained from ratifying the 2015 Paris Agreement. The legally binding international treaty was signed with the central objective of limiting global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius and continuing efforts to limit it to 1.5 degrees Celsius. But recently, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared the country’s intention to ratify the Paris accord before the UN Conference of the Parties (COP26) on climate change, which is to open in Glasgow on October 31.

The mindset of the Turkish government can help to explain its inadequate efforts to address the climate crisis. But to understand this resistance on the part of Ankara, one should look at Turkey’s problematic position in the global climate change regime.

Lack of Domestic Commitment

Climate change has never been a priority for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Its growth-oriented economic and energy policies of the past 20 years have followed a development model that prioritizes economic gains while ignoring their environmental consequences. Already realized projects such as Istanbul Airport or planned initiatives such as the Istanbul Canal are only a few examples of this vision.

Another is the priority given to the use of coal. It is still the third-largest source of primary energy in Turkey after oil and natural gas, and coal-related emissions have increased by almost 32% over the decade. Total greenhouse gas emissions increased by 137% 1990 and 2018, and the government does not currently have a target year for peaking emissions or for reducing emissions in absolute terms.

Moreover, Turkey contends, like many other less-developed countries, that it only has a negligible responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions — and hence should do less than fully industrialized countries, which have a huge historical responsibility for anthropogenic climate change.

Turkey’s Special Circumstances

In 1992, when the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted, as a of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development — and without any objection from Turkish officials at that time — Turkey was listed in both Annex I and Annex II of the UNFCCC. These countries, which are generally richer and more developed, are expected to take the lead in combating climate change. But most importantly, Annex II countries should also provide financial support to developing countries that are in the non-Annex I group and have fewer obligations.

Turkey was, therefore, theoretically obliged to reduce its emissions and help developing countries such as Brazil, South Korea and China. As a result of Turkey’s diplomatic efforts, the country was finally removed from Annex II in 2001, but it is still listed in Annex I, which means that Turkey is not obliged to contribute to climate finance, but it cannot benefit from financial support either.

As a consequence, during the Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris in 2015, Turkey said it would not sign the agreement if its demand was not taken into account. At the time, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande had to  to convince Erdogan to sign the agreement. But before ratifying the Paris Agreement, Ankara wanted to be removed from the list of developed countries of the UNFCCC and receive financial assistance for climate change mitigation. Obviously, Turkey’s behavior carries a cost in the form of ecological costs to the country and the surrounding region as well as negative impacts on the Turkish economy and global efforts against climate change.

Getting Turkey on Board

The effects of climate change will require significant changes in geo-economic at the European and global levels. The European Union is already progressively integrating climate factors into its external economic relations, which will change the way it trades with its partner.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

The EU’s planned carbon border tax, called the Border Carbon Adjustment Mechanism, would be a significant tool in this strategy and affect Turkey’s trade relations with the EU if Ankara fails to decarbonize its economy. Turkey conducts half of its trade with the EU. Decarbonization would, therefore, also be an economic and strategic requirement for Turkey in terms of its trade and other relations with the EU.

The ratification of the Paris Agreement will be the first positive step toward joining the international coalition to fight climate change, and it should also be seen as part of Turkey’s charm offensive toward the West. This effort will not be complete if Ankara does not make concrete mitigation commitments by submitting a new and more ambitious version of its nationally determined contributions.

It seems that Ankara can be motivated to take such moves and be actively involved in the fight against climate change through financial assistance. The EU can play an important role here. It should effectively use its financial and diplomatic powers to secure these outcomes.

After all, bringing Turkey on board in the global fight against climate change is also in the interest of the EU, which has the leadership role in achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement. This would not only contribute toward global mitigation efforts, but also increase Turkey’s resilience and preparedness for the ecological crises that will only worsen with climate change.

*[This was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Turkey Prepares to Ratify the Paris Agreement appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The War on Terror Was Never Turkey’s Fight

READ MORE

The largely mono-dimensional US-Turkey relationship revolves around geopolitics and security, which is also where the main crises are located. In Syria, for instance, each views the other’s local partners through the lens of terrorism. When Turkey acquired the Russian-made S-400 air defense system, Washington imposed CAATSA sanctions (under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act). Such developments have generated debate — both in the West and in Turkey — over Turkey’s place and future in Western institutions and specifically NATO.

After taking office in January, US President Joe Biden and his team initially gave Turkey the cold shoulder. Turkey responded with a charm offensive, sending a stream of positive messages. For instance, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivered an impassioned defense of the NATO alliance at its summit in June.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

Just as geopolitical decoupling drove them apart, Ankara appears to believe that a convergence and cooperation responding to a major geopolitical crisis can bring Turkey and the United States closer together again, at least to some extent. In other words, an instrumental geopolitical crisis has the potential to improve the atmosphere between the Turkish and the Americans.

Point of Interest: Kabul Airport

This explains why Turkey was so eager to stay in Afghanistan when all its NATO allies were preparing to leave. Ankara is seeking closer relations with the Taliban and still aspires to a role in running Kabul airport, which is critical for the Western diplomatic presence and Afghanistan’s connectivity with the rest of the world. Turkey, Qatar and the Taliban are in talks over this matter.

Ankara hopes that the Taliban will permit Turkey to operate the airport, very likely in  with Qatar. Ankara would like its role to include a security dimension too, but the Taliban are very wary and would want to minimize the security aspect — assuming it agrees at all.

Ankara is currently exhibiting flexibility in its endeavors to secure a role in Afghanistan. President Erdogan has that Turkey might find a bilateral deal with Afghanistan similar to those it signed in 2019 with the Libyan government of national accord on security cooperation and maritime boundaries.

Dual Identity and the Price of Recognition

The most obvious challenge is that the Taliban will tie any Turkish role at the airport to recognition of its government, while Ankara would not want to be among the first to do so. Instead, Turkey will prefer to cooperate without official recognition, operating in a gray zone. It will want to avoid antagonizing Washington and will be paying close attention to the stances adopted by the Americans and other international players. In Afghanistan, Turkey will continue to capitalize on its dual Muslim/NATO identity: the Muslim identity geared toward Afghanistan, the NATO identity Western-facing.

Erdogan’s gambit appears to be paying off. The tone of exchanges between Ankara and Washington is warming and the frequency of discussions is increasing. During his Senate Foreign Relations Committee  hearing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken  Turkey as a “so-called strategic partner.” Now, he and other US officials call Turkey “” and “”. Whether this change in tone represents a real thaw in relations remains to be seen. Afghanistan certainly has the potential to break the ice, even it is unlikely to usher in any deep transformation.

Domestic Pushback

President Erdogan’s push for the vital role of airport security provider faces domestic political hostility. As growing numbers of Afghan refugees enter Turkey through Iran, virulent anti-refugee sentiment places increasing pressures on the government and erodes public support for Ankara’s plans in Afghanistan. The opposition also flags the risks to Turkish military personnel.

Ankara might instrumentalize solidarity with the Turkic people of Afghanistan and Central Asia — Uzbeks, Turkmens and other Turkic populations — to cultivate domestic political support and situate Afghanistan within the wider geopolitics of Central Asia and the Turkic world. Such nationalist language may backfire.

As a predominantly Pashtun organization, the Taliban will dislike that narrative — as will China and Russia. In fact, until very recently Turkey was supporting the Northern Alliance and figures like Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum in Afghanistan. Such a policy of ethnic solidarity would be hard to reconcile with overtures to the Taliban.

*[This  was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post An Afghan Thaw in the Turkey-US Relationship? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

It was on this day that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) was founded. One of its founding members was a man named Recep Tayyip Erdogan. It was the latest in a long list of parties catering to a religiously devout and socially conservative constituency in Turkey. All the previous ones had been banned.

360˚ Context: How 9/11 and the War on Terror Shaped the World

READ MORE

What makes August 14, 2001, so significant is the simple fact that the AKP was never banned. Despite the party’s daring to tread on secularist principles that few others had dared, this time, the country, with strong European Union support, had no appetite for military-backed bans.

Turkey Says No

Just as September 11 didn’t really come out of a clear blue sky for anyone observing the tide of Islamist militancy, so too the success of the AKP in Turkey did not come unannounced. It was a long time in the making, but its assumption of power, so soon after 9/11, has been defining for the country.

By 2003, when George W. Bush’s war on terror was swinging into action in Iraq, the AKP took control of Turkey‘s government. Despite repeated attempts to shutter the party and even a failed 2016 coup, the AKP remains in power. As perhaps the most successful Islamist party in the Middle East, its relationship to both the events of 9/11 and the ensuing war on terror has always been a strained one. The Turkey of the 20^th century would have been an unquestioning supporter of US policy. The new Turkey was not.

I was in Turkey on 9/11 and I saw the immediate reaction of ordinary people to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In the hours after the towers fell, there were wild, yet in retrospect on-the-mark rumors that the US was about to bomb Afghanistan. The mood among ordinary Turks was not one of support.

Visceral anger and anti-American sentiment were clearly palpable. While not outright cheering al-Qaeda, it was obvious that most people wouldn’t take the US side in a fight. This mood was reflected when Washington eventually went to war with Iraq and hoped to use the airbase at Incirlik in southeastern Turkey.

The parliamentary vote that vetoed the use of the base for flights into Iraq was a pivotal one. It was the first strong sign of demonstrable national action in reflection of a national mood. In the post-Cold War world, Turkey’s Islamist government was ready to plow its own furrow.

Who Defines Terrorism?

The years that have followed have seen an ambiguous and often highly contorted relationship with the war on terror. Sometimes, Turkey has used the anti-terrorism concept to its own ends, as have many other US allies. At other times, it has turned a blind eye to activity that surely fell under the banner of terrorism.

The Arab Spring of 2010 offered Islamists across the Middle East their big moment. Secular autocrats, long propped up by the West, tottered. Turkey’s Islamist government was one of the most vocal and active in attempting to ride this wave that they hoped would bring Islamist governments to a swathe of countries.

Initially, the signs were good. The Muslim Brotherhood won the first free and fair elections in Egypt. Meanwhile, in neighboring Syria, the long-suppressed Islamist movement threatened to overwhelm the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad. For a time, Turkey became a beacon of hope and a model for how the rest of the Middle East might evolve.

Turkish flags were being waved by demonstrators in Syria, and President Erdogan became the most popular leader in the region, loved by people far beyond his own nation. Then the Egyptian coup destroyed the Brotherhood, and Russia and Iran stepped in to save Assad’s regime in Syria. The mood soured for Turkey.

In an attempt to rescue something in the Syrian conflict and in response to the collapse of domestic peace talks between the government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Turkey’s border became a very porous route for jihadists entering into Syria. In time, these jihadists named themselves the Islamic State and declared a caliphate. This audacious move severely upped the stakes on al-Qaeda’s attempts of 2001, with an even more brutal brand of terrorism. Turkey’s ambiguous attitude to these developments was hardly a war on terror.

Yet by this stage, the concept behind the war on terror had become so nebulous and the AKP’s relations to the US so strained by Washington’s support for the Kurds in Syria, that it was a case of realpolitik all the way. To any accusation of soft-handedness toward terrorists, Turkey pointed to US attitudes vis-à-vis Kurdish militants.

President Erdogan has, over time, began to carve a space for himself as an anti-Western champion, a leader of some kind of latter-day non-aligned movement, a spokesman for Muslim rights worldwide. This political and cultural position has made Turkey’s place in a liberal, democratic world order highly questionable.

What seems clear in retrospect is that both 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror were never Turkey’s fights. Due to the longstanding Turkish alliance with the US and NATO, these have been constantly recurring themes in Turkish politics. But the events that have been so central to US policymaking for the past two decades have generally been used to advance Ankara’s own strategic goals in light of the assumption of power and entrenched hegemony of the Islamist movement in Turkey’s contemporary politics.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The War on Terror Was Never Turkey’s Fight appeared first on 51�Թ�.

How Western Media Misunderstand Chinese Culture

READ MORE

Many readers would see Turkey’s condemnation as a simple case of an Islamist regime railing against Western suppression of Islam. Indeed, the government’s statement was full of accusations of Islamophobia in Europe. Yet such statements, coming out of Turkey, are not as simple as that.

Those same readers might be surprised to discover that Turkey itself had banned headscarves in state institutions until very recently. This might make a governmental condemnation of a ban in Europe seem nonsensical. The reality helps to give context to the Turkish reaction.

Wear Western Hats

Condemnations of headscarf bans might ordinarily be expected to emanate from regimes such as the Iranian theocracy or the Saudi conservative monarchy. Coming out of the secular republic of Turkey, they might appear more curious, if it wasn’t for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s global image as a religious conservative.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

His government’s sensitivity to headscarf bans is very personal indeed. In 2006, his own and other politicians’ wives were not invited to an official event by the then-Turkish president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, due to their wearing of headscarves. In 2007, there was an attempt by the military — a traditional guardian of Turkey’s ruling secular elite — to deny the presidency to Abdullah Gul of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) because his wife wore a headscarf.

Such attitudes, which might appear highly intolerant in countries such as the United Kingdom, make more sense in places like France where the separation of church and state is a foundation of the republic. When modern Turkey was created in 1920, France became the model for how to build a modern state. A key element in the imitation of the French was the desire of Turkey’s first military rulers to suppress Islam.

The Ottoman Empire, of which Turkey was the successor state, was an Islamic empire. Indeed, it was ruled by a caliph, the Islamic equivalent of the pope in Rome. The caliph was the leader of the Muslim world. Turning Turkey into a modern secular republic was akin to removing the pope from the Vatican and banning the wearing of the Christian cross in Catholic Europe. Needless to say, it has created cultural fault lines in Turkey that persist to this day.

To drive home his cultural revolution in the 1920s and 1930s, modern Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, instituted a ban on the fez — that most famously Turkish of hats — and the turban. He insisted on men wearing the Western brimmed hat, traditionally rejected since it doesn’t allow the wearer to bow their head to the floor in Muslim prayer whilst wearing it.

The veil and headscarf were also discouraged, though the state’s ability to enforce changes in female clothing was slower to be realized than with men’s. The persistence of female cultural clothing as opposed to male could be the subject of an entire essay of its own.

Alongside many other measures, such as the banning of the Sufi Muslim brotherhoods, the closure of mosques, a ban on the call to prayer in Arabic and the removal of the Arabic script, the Turkish authorities attempted to forcibly Westernize Turks.

The Illiberal 1980s

Yet it was not until the military coup d’état of 1980 that Turkey finally outlawed the headscarf officially. It was then that it was banned across all state institutions, including schools, universities, the judiciary, the police and the military. In effect, this meant that girls from religious backgrounds had to choose either to remove their headscarves or not get an education. Only with the rise of the AKP to power in the 2000s did official attitudes begin to shift.

In 2010, Turkish universities finally admitted women who wore headscarves. This was followed a few years later by state bureaucratic institutions, except the judiciary, military and police. In 2016, policewomen were allowed to wear headscarves beneath their caps, and finally in 2017, the military was the last institution to lift the ban.

This is the backdrop against which the Turkish government condemns a headscarf ban — in certain circumstances — decreed by the ECJ. It is a backdrop in which the religiously conservative in Turkey read a narrative of European coercion running back to the founding of the modern state and even earlier.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51�Թ�. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

The ideas that inspired the military officers who won the Turkish War of Independence — the war with Allied powers that followed the conclusion of the First World War — were imported from Western Europe. Having carved out an almost entirely religiously homogenous Muslim state, they set out to utterly secularize it.

The banning of the headscarf is therefore seen by religiously conservative Turks as an idea imported from Europe and, in some sense, an idea dictated to Muslims by secularized Christian nations. Given the last century of experience in Turkey, it is clear how this view is generated.

Ultimately, the question is one of whether people who like the use of headscarves should tolerate those who don’t wear them, and whether those who dislike the use of headscarves should tolerate those who do wear them. Examples of intolerance abound on either side. A lack of understanding will bring no peace to Turkey or to countries across Europe and the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Why Headscarves Matter So Much to Turkey appeared first on 51�Թ�.

At the summits, the allies discussed rules for various policy areas, including economy, trade, climate, security and defense, while seeking a common stance against autocracies, particularly Russia and China. If US President Joe Biden and his European allies are serious about standing up to undemocratic regimes, the place to start is Turkey, which the European Council should shift its focus to right away.

The US Must Commit to Protecting Central Americans

READ MORE

Turkey’s relations with its Western allies have been deteriorating for years. European decision-makers blame this on Ankara’s democratic backsliding and its unilateral foreign policy, which increasingly runs counter to European interests. Developments in Syria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean and Nagorno-Karabakh, however, have shifted almost the entire focus to foreign policy.

The EU’s desire to reduce tensions in its neighborhood has eclipsed questions of democracy and rule of law. That is what is behind its for a “positive agenda” with Turkey that is “progressive, proportional and reversible.” It is thus conditional on Turkey’s external actions — good regional relations in line with international law — but not clearly linked to the state of democracy. While the European Parliament flagged this in its recent , a firm stance by the European Council is missing.

Commitment to Democracy, Everywhere

In March, concerns mounted in the EU when President Recep Tayyip Erdogan withdrew Turkey from the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention on preventing violence against women. This was clearly the continuation of a long-term trend limiting basic rights and freedoms. The new presidential system in Turkey has eliminated most of the checks and balances. Civil society is under immense pressure. Democratically elected representatives have been removed and prosecuted. Last but not least, the state prosecutor has applied to the constitutional court to ban the opposition Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). According to , Turkey is “not free,” just like Russia and China.

This situation threatens the credibility of the transatlantic allies’ commitment to democracy, rule of law, and basic rights and freedoms. According to the summit’s , the G7 is committed to upholding a rules-based international system and defending values. That is also the promise of NATO and the transatlantic allies.

Selective application would undermine that commitment: The rules apply to a rising China challenging Western economies, but not if you can get a bargain with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. Those who prioritize geopolitics over principles might argue that Turkey receives less criticism as a NATO ally and strategically important accession candidate on the EU’s doorstep. Yet even if the European Union dropped the entire democratic conditionality framework, it would still risk being affected negatively by democratic backsliding and erosion of rule of law. Recent examples include Turkey’s unlawful detention of EU and US citizens and arbitrary decisions to move refugees to its borders with Greece in 2020. Not to speak of the future risks to European investments.

European leaders may think that criticizing domestic repression in Turkey would put positive foreign policy developments at risk. There are no guarantees, however, that advances in the Eastern Mediterranean or relations with Greece, Cyprus or other member states will not be suddenly reversed, for example, to rally nationalists behind the current government.

EU leaders must know that there can be no guarantees for the union as long as instability prevails in Turkey. The situation in the country has been exacerbated by deficits in democracy and rule of law. If European leaders choose to settle for a fragile status quo rather than promoting core values, they may still end up at odds with Turkey, while undermining the values they keep vowing to defend.

Serious About Democracy? Time to Speak Up

European leaders will try to buy time again, as they did at the European Council meetings in October and December 2020 and March 2021. But there is a window of opportunity. Ankara is on a charm offensive with its Western allies, needing an economic boost and trying to avoid European and American sanctions. While the government is determined to stay in charge, power struggles are emerging within the state apparatus. This is definitely the right time to set the tone, one that focuses on democracy.

Action on Turkey is also needed to show the broader world that the G7, European Union and NATO mean what they said at the recent summits. Democracy will be an important component of external action. If the European Union cannot apply this principle to such a close neighbor, ally and EU accession candidate, what does that say about the democracy agenda?

*[This was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post To Embrace Biden’s Democracy Agenda, Start With Turkey appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Nostalgia has been around for ages. The first one to recognize its significance was a Swiss doctor, Johannes Hofer. In 1688, Hofer coined the word — a compound derived from the Greek nostro, meaning “home,” and algos, meaning “pain” — to describe what he considered to be a medical malaise he detected among Swiss mercenary soldiers, expressed as a profound yearning for their home (what in German is called Heimweh — homesickness).

Hofer might have drawn inspiration from Homer’s Odyssey. Its hero, after spending seven years in the company of the sea nymph Calypso, felt compelled to return home. The longing to see his home was so overwhelming that he rejected Calypso’s offer to make him immortal if he stayed.

The Meaning of Nostalgia

Since Hofer’s times, the meaning of nostalgia has both substantially changed and significantly broadened. It is no longer associated with homesickness. Instead, in today’s parlance, stands for “a sentimental longing for one’s past.” More specifically, nostalgia stands for a yearning for an idealized, lost past, a past more often than not seen through rose-tinted glasses. For a long time, nostalgia was seen as a pathology, reflecting the refusal to confront an unpleasant present and an even worse future.

In this , the yearning for “an irretrievable past becomes a narcissistic illusion,” a “deflection from current unpleasant circumstances.” More recently, however, nostalgia is predominantly seen as a positive emotion, an effective coping mechanism in times of turmoil and crisis. In this , nostalgia serves as “an important resource that helps people find meaning in life and regulate meaning-related distress.” In the face of tectonic demographic, technological and geopolitical changes, seeking comfort in a past where life was arguably simpler and easier to navigate is human, all too human. As Edoardo Campanella and Marta Dassu , nostalgia “offers relief from socio-economic angst. Yesterday is associated with progress; tomorrow with stasis or regression.”  

This type of nostalgia — because nostalgia comes in different guises — “an affective yearning for a community with a collective memory, a longing for continuity in a fragmented world.” In this context, as Matthias Stephan has recently , nostalgia represents “both a look back to an idealized past (whether real or imagined) and a hope that the romanticized past will become our future.”

The Politics of Recognition vs. Redistribution

READ MORE

Here, nostalgia “inevitably reappears as a defense mechanism in a time of accelerated rhythms of life and historical upheavals.” The author of these lines, Svetlana Boym, characterized this iteration as “restorative nostalgia.” Against this, Boym sets what she called “reflective nostalgia.” Reflective nostalgia accepts the fact that the past is past, that it cannot be retrieved. As , “This acknowledgment of the irretrievability of our autobiographical past provides an aesthetic distance that allows us to enjoy a memory in the same way that we enjoy a movie or a good book.”

At the same time, it engenders a realistic, and perhaps even critical, view of the past. It is this constellation that makes nostalgia extremely political. In fact, because of its inherently binary nature, nostalgia is ideally suited to inform both progressive and reactionary politics.

Today, nostalgia is primarily evoked on the nationalist right. More often than not, this is a type of nostalgia that depends on the “disparagement of the present,” which once considered the “hallmark of the nostalgic attitude.” Feeling discombobulated by and disenchanted with the present, as well as uneasy about the future, a growing number of people feel tempted to go down the memory lane and retreat to the past where, as the German expression goes, the world was presumably still in order.

When the World Was in Order

On the nationalist right, it is particularly radical right-wing populist parties and actors that have drawn the greatest political benefit from the appeal to nostalgia. Donald’s Trump is a prominent case in point. His campaign slogan “Make America Great Again” implies that there was a time when the United States was still great, that today it no longer is, but that tomorrow it will be great again — as long as the people follow The Donald.

The promoters of Brexit played a similar tune. Nigel Farage, the former leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), holding up his new and triumphantly exclaiming, “We got our passports back!,” evoked a time when Great Britain still maintained the pretense to be a great power rather than one among 28 EU member states where it was not even primus inter pares. Once freed from the shackles of the EU, a once again completely sovereign Great Britain would regain its lost glory. Or, as Britain’s Secretary of Defense Gavin Williamson in late 2018, once Britain was out of the European Union, it would become a “true global player,” establishing new military bases all over the world. As an in the Financial Times from early 2016 put it, “Brexiters are Nostalgics in Search of a Lost Empire.”

Public opinion polls conducted a few months prior to the referendum provided ample evidence of the extent to which the British public glorified the country’s past. In early 2016, a found more than 40% of British respondents expressing pride in Britain’s colonial history; about the same number thought the British Empire had been a good thing. Only a fifth of respondents had a negative view. In a similar survey, two years earlier, around 50% of respondents that Britain’s former colonies were better off today because they had been part of the British Empire, while a third thought that it would be a good thing if Britain still had an empire. At the same, there were strong sentiments that Britain was in decline. In fact, some 80% of “leavers” that view in 2016.

Hardly surprising that, in the wake of the referendum, one of Britain’s leading tabloids, The Daily Star, on its readers to “Make Britain Great Again!” Nostalgia, paired with mass delusion and a portion of righteous resentment, obviously paid handsome political dividends — at least for Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson and their comrades in arms.

Similarly in the United States, Trump’s main slogan “Make America Great Again” appealed to widespread nostalgia, particularly among the country’s white majority. In September 2016, for instance, half of the respondents in the annual agreed with the statement that their country’s best days were “behind us.” A few months earlier, a found more than 45% of respondents agreeing with the statement that compared to 50 years earlier, life for people like them had gotten worse.

Among Trump supporters, three out of four agreed with that statement. In a similar vein, one year earlier, around half of US respondents in a thought that “America’s best days” were in the past. At the same time, in 2016, more than 60% of Americans their children would be worse off than they were. This is also reflected in surveys that seek to gauge what Americans think about, for instance, the American dream — the notion that hard work will allow them to get ahead.

Most notably, these sentiments were among America’s white population, far more than , Hispanics and other minorities. Donald Trump, ever so tuned in to the grievances of white America, stoked the fire of white resentment, , at a town hall meeting in the fall of 2015, that “the American dream is in trouble,” only to add the promise that with him in the White House, “we will get it back.” To be sure, this was hardly original. Four years earlier, the already committed to “Restoring the American Dream.”

The Good Old Days

Conjuring up idealized images of the good old days is a crucial tool in the ideational repertoire of nativist and national-populist parties and actors. And for good reasons. For one, the evocation of nostalgic fantasies creates a sense of collective identity, community and a common purpose, all of them of central concern on the radical populist right. At the same time, in the hands of radical right-wing populists, nostalgia serves as an indirect indictment of the present, linked to an appeal to the notion that the best of the past could somehow the current situation.

Here, nostalgia represents what S. D. Chrostowska has a “malaise of dissatisfaction with the present and the direction that present” has taken. The more profound and widespread collective disenchantment with the present happens to be, the more pronounced is the appeal of the past. An exemplary case in point is a from 2016 in Poland, whose authors explored the extent to which nostalgia for the communist period was prevalent among current-day Poles. The results were striking. They showed that people who felt they had been better off during that period than at present were much more nostalgic and had a significantly better opinion about the communist government than other respondents.

Poland is hardly unique. The arguably best-known case of post-communist nostalgia is what in German is known as Ostalgie. Ostalgie entails a revaluation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) — former East Germany — on the part of a substantial part of its population following reunification. To a large extent, this was in to “the perceived threat of a West German depreciation of their life experiences.” Substantial numbers of citizens in the east had the feeling that they and their past were treated with condescension, if not outright disdain. Even 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the sentiment that easterners are second-class citizens finds widespread resonance in what once was the GDR. Ostalgie is all about a demand for recognition, dignity and respect rather than crude material interests. As sociologist Cecilia Ridgeway has noted, we tend to forget “how much people care about public acknowledgement of their worth.”

Yet they tend to “care about status quite as intensely as they do [about] money and power.” They want “to be someone.” Ostalgie is also informed by the sentiment that in the GDR, ordinary workers were valued — they were someone. Not for nothing, the GDR prided itself on being an Arbeiter und Bauernstaat — the state of workers and farmers.

Nostalgia in post-communist societies might be somewhat puzzling to outside observers, yet politically it is of no consequences. There is no craving for a return of what in German was known as Realsozialismus — loosely translated as “actually existing socialism.” A regime that imprisoned its citizens behind walls, barbed wires and minefields in order to prevent them from fleeing the country has nothing in common with the radical humanist spirit of socialism, reflected, for instance, in Karl Marx’s “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” and the writings of leading exponents of the Frankfurt School.

Radical Reconstruction

Matters are entirely different when populist leaders use nostalgia for the dismantling and radical (from the roots) reconstitution of a society’s collective identity. This is what has happened with two of the most important contemporary populist regimes: Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey and Narendra Modi’s India. At first sight, the two cases could not be more different. Here, a representative of political Islam, there, of political Hinduism. Yet below the surface, the similarities are quite striking.

These similarities are seen, in particular, in the place nostalgia — and the appeal to nostalgia — has in the rhetoric of both leaders. In the Turkish case, nostalgia is reflected in what Turkish observers have called neo-Ottomanism. Erdogan, as , has been seeking “to remold Turkey in the form of an imagined, ahistorical conceptualization of the former Ottoman Empire.” The ultimate objective is “to resurrect a powerful Muslim state in the ancestral mold of the former Ottoman Empire.”

At the same time, Erdogan’s political project represents a frontal assault on and complete disavowal of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s foundation of the modern “Kemalist” Turkish state. This project was based on a progressive, secular vision of equality adopted from the French Revolution. Here, citizenship and identity derive from a common adherence to civic principles; in the case of Erdogan’s project, citizenship and identity derive from adherence to a common ethno-religious community, which bodes ill for Turkey’s minorities such as Kurds and Armenians.

In the Indian case, Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party, BJP), has never made a secret of the fact that it seeks to eradicate the legacy of Nehruvian secularism and replace it with Hindutva. Long before Modi became prime minister, the BJP mobilized against what it called Nehru’s “pseudo-secularism.” In reality, the BJP charged, secularism discriminated against Hindus while according concessions to India’s sizeable Muslim minority. In fact, in 2018, that the BJP had managed to convince a sizeable portion of the Indian public that the Indian National Congress was a pro-Muslim and, implicitly, anti-Hindu party.

Central to the BJP’s ideology is the , exemplified, in particular, by the reign of the mythical Ram, largely seen as the epitome of India’s golden age. This golden age came to an abrupt end with the Muslim invasion and conquest, which ushered in what as “1,200 years of slavery.” This is the central trope of Hindu nationalist historiography and victimology — the of “a glorious Hindu golden age followed by an era of Muslim oppression.”

In order to bolster their case of that golden age, Hindu nationalists have gone to great lengths, in some cases transcending into the ridiculous. A case in point is the that in ancient times, India already achieved stunning scientific and technological accomplishments, from advanced reproductive technologies to stem cell research, “spacecraft, the internet, and nuclear weapons — long before Western science come on the scene.” More often than not, these claims were advanced not by crackpots but by respected scientists fallen under the sway of Hindu nationalist nostalgia.

In both cases, the combination of nostalgia and populism serves to mobilize the “true” people against a Westernized elite, from — but not of — the people. At the same time, it serves as a means to eradicate national humiliations: in the case of India, centuries of being subjugated to Islamic rulers; in the Turkish case, the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, symbolized by the Treaty of Sèvres which, had it ever been implemented, would have left only a small area around Ankara under Turkish rule.  

Erdogan’s recent decision to reclassify the — once the “ultimate icon of Christian civilization” — as a mosque, constitutes a reversal of Kemalist “secularist suppression.” Similarly, laying the foundations of a Ram temple on the site of an ancient mosque, known as Babri Masjid, in the city of Ayodhya in northern India, serves as highly visible expressions of the will to reverse — and perhaps even avenge — the past.

Resurrecting Grievances

The arguably most successful populist resort to this combination of grievance-based nostalgia and the exploitation of national humiliation is epitomized by Hungary’s Victor Orban. To be sure, Hungarians have good reasons for historically-grounded grief — the bloody suppression of the Hungarian people’s 1956 uprising against the communist regime and the Soviets is a prominent case in point. The most important episode, however, which continues to haunt Hungarian collective national consciousness until today, dates back to 1920, when the victorious powers imposed on Hungary the Trianon Treaty. The treaty deprived Hungary of two-thirds of its prewar territory and three-fifths of its prewar population, which turned Hungary into what “the most nationally aggrieved state in all of Europe.”

Victor Orban has been particularly adroit not only in manipulating diffuse sentiments of humiliation and resentment but also in evoking nostalgia for Hungary’s golden age. This was the period spanning from the formation of the dual monarchy following Vienna’s defeat in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, which put the Hungarians on par with the Austrians until the end of the First World War — a period which saw all ethnic Hungarians united in the same state. Together, these two ideational elements constitute the core of Orban’s national-populist project, which over the past decade or so has progressively gained cultural hegemony in Hungary.

Orban, Modi and Erdogan are prominent examples of how nationalist-populist actors have weaponized nostalgia for political gain the same way they have weaponized other emotions such as anxiety, anger and empathy. As Yale professor Paul Bloom has recently in his indictment of emotional empathy, “unscrupulous politicians use our empathy for victims of certain crimes to motivate anger and hatred toward other, marginalized, groups.” Emblematic of this strategy is Donald Trump’s of “our empathic feelings toward victims of rape and assault to build hatred toward undocumented immigrants.”

Here, Trump instinctively exploited a central characteristic of this emotion, namely its intrinsic in-group bias. Neuropsychological studies that more often than not, empathy extends significantly more to those we feel close to rather than out-groups, “potentially making them likely targets for prejudice and discrimination.”

The same is true for nostalgia. Experiments in social psychology have shown that collective nostalgia — the type of nostalgia routinely evoked by national populist actors — tends to confer “sociability benefits,” such as support and loyalty, to the in-group while tending to evoke exclusionary sentiments toward out-groups. have argued that “Collective nostalgia’s sociality is amenable to exploitation and can have controversial ramifications.” A recent on the effect of national nostalgia on out-group perceptions in the context of the 2016 US presidential election shows that national nostalgia “significantly predicted racial prejudice and this relationship was mediated by perceived outgroup threat.”

This also holds true for Europe. A from 2018 found that more than three-quarters of European respondents classified as nostalgics (two-thirds of the sample) agreed with the statement that recent immigrants did not want to integrate into the host society; more than half thought they were taking jobs away from the natives. Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that radical right-wing populist parties have found fertile ground for their nativist politics of exclusion.

A case in point is the adoption of the concept of the by the Sweden Democrats, the country’s radical populist right. The folkhemmet (people’s home) stands for the heydays of Sweden’s Social Democratic welfare state, a golden age that spanned four decades, from the 1930s to the 1970s. This was a time of ethnocultural homogeneity, civic egalitarianism and social solidarity. The Sweden Democrats’ adoption of the sentimental notion of the folkhemmet appeals to nostalgic sentiments while, at the same time, serving as a justification for the exclusion of non-ethnic minorities such as refugees from social benefits.

The Sweden Democrats’ manipulation of nostalgia in the service of their politics of welfare chauvinism is exemplary of the flexible and polyvalent possibilities of applying this emotion. It is for this reason that nostalgia lends itself ideally to national populist mobilization. One of the central ideational tropes informing populism is the notion of the united people, a unity derived from a shared past and a common destiny, confronting a common adversary, if not an enemy. The evocation of a glorious past is a great way to make people feel good about themselves at a time when there is little to be cheerful or optimistic about.

These days, the glorious past is not far away, not more than two years, the time before social distancing, lockdowns and vaccination jitters. Under the circumstances, nostalgia is likely to persist, ready to be exploited by populist entrepreneurs for political gain. Those who still think that the pandemic will substantially weaken support for the radical populist right might take a look at Spain. There, Vox, whose rhetoric is replete with nostalgia, is the that has substantially increased its support base over the past several months.

*[51�Թ� is a  partner of the .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Good Old Days: Nostalgia’s Political Appeal appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Discovery of Natural Gas Exposes Turkey’s Political Rifts

READ MORE

The UAE views Turkey as a threat for two reasons. First, Ankara supports the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Emiratis have designated as a terrorist organization. Second, Turkey has been active both militarily and economically in North Africa, Syria and the Horn of Africa. In 2019 and 2020, competition between Abu Dhabi and Ankara flared, with both powers directly funneling mercenaries and money to , stepping up competition in and castigating each other in diplomatic statements. The UAE also aligned with Greek Cyprus, Greece, France and Egypt against Turkey while providing financial and possibly military support in the form of mercenaries to anti-Turkish actors in the region.

Energy Games

During Biden’s first months in office, however, the UAE has undertaken two major actions that indicate a softer approach toward Ankara. First, on January 29, Abu Dhabi declared that it was ready to with the UN on Libya. Second, the UAE began dismantling its base in , in Eritrea. Although this move comes largely in an attempt to extricate itself from the war in Yemen, it also means losing a critical power-projection site that has acted as a counterbalance to Turkey’s and Qatar’s presence in Suakin, in . This does not mean that Abu Dhabi considers Turkey to be any less of a threat. On the contrary, recent UAE actions portend a refocusing on investment in pipelines and infrastructure in the eastern Mediterranean to blunt Ankara’s energy ambitions, especially concerning Turkey’s role in Europe’s energy security.

�ѴDz����Ƿ�’s influence on Europe’s energy markets has emerged as a concern for the European Union and the US, with Russian supplies for 40% of European gas consumption. Turkey is commonly floated as a solution because it can connect alternative pipelines from the Caspian and Central Asia. Turkey becoming an important energy transportation hub would give it leverage over the EU and allow it to better play the US, Western Europe and Russia against each other.

However, the UAE’s attempts to lock Turkey out of the eastern Mediterranean energy pipelines threaten Ankara’s goals of becoming a larger player in the EU’s energy market. The UAE is attempting to do this by joining the (EMGF) — comprised of Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Jordan and Palestine — as an observer. Although the EMGF claims to be open to anyone, its ostensible purpose is to lock Turkey out of the Mediterranean hydrocarbons market, especially with the pipeline project. This pipeline would transfer gas from Cyprus and Israel to Greece and then further on to Europe; it is a major reason for Turkey’s involvement in Libya. The EastMed faces certain financial and political struggles, and the UAE’s endorsement of the project could galvanize initiative and create a breakthrough in rallying a coalition to circumvent Turkey on the energy market.

Moreover, Abu Dhabi’s improving relations with Israel provide it more alternatives in convening an anti-Turkish coalition. The Abraham Accords also augment the UAE’s ability to constrain Turkey by allowing Abu Dhabi to collaborate with Israel on joint pipeline projects. If the UAE manages to connect itself to the EastMed, or any other, pipeline, Turkey’s status as an energy alternative to Russia would diminish in the eyes of Europe and the US. It appears as if the UAE has already taken initiative in this regard: On October 22, 2020, Israeli state-owned Europe Asia Pipeline Company a binding memorandum of understanding with MED-RED Land Bridge, a company that has both Israeli and Emirati owners, to transport oil from the UAE to Europe.

The joint venture would rely on the , built by Israel and Iran in the 1960s, that would send Emirati hydrocarbons from Eilat, on Israel’s Red Sea coast, to Ashkelon, on the Mediterranean. Though this is an oil pipeline, this portends future initiatives that could see Emirati gas transported through Israel to Greece, via a connection to the EastMed. Furthermore, Emirati oil tankers disembarking in Eilat would come with an increased security presence in the area. Though not a military base, the venture could make up for the power projection loss from the now defunct base at Assab.  

Economic Foothold

An Emirati bid to manage an Israeli port at represents another Emirati attempt to cement an economic foothold in the eastern Mediterranean. The port at Haifa is also close in proximity to Lebanon and Israel’s disputed oil blocs, some of whose drilling licenses have been awarded to France’s Total. As by Amos Hochstein, the former coordinator for international energy affairs at the US State Department, the UAE could adopt a larger role in resolving this dispute, which would free up more gas reserves that could be exported around Turkey. UAE mediation would also draw it economically closer to France, which has, for the most part, confronted Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean. If Total receives new oil blocs, a French economic dimension could also align against Turkey in the region, bolstering the UAE’s initiatives.

The Emirati bid for Haifa’s port comes after DP World, Abu Dhabi’s shipping and operations company, completed the in Cyprus in 2018. Both actions represent the UAE’s push to bolster its infrastructure in the region, which would complement future pipeline initiatives. The UAE then signed a with Cyprus on January 12, which signified a deepening of this relationship. It followed an Emirati-Greek military partnership and a trilateral meeting between the UAE, Greece and Greek Cyprus, evidencing that Abu Dhabi is trying to complement military measures with diplomatic coalitions.

Cyprus proves critical to the UAE’s energy ambitions. Not only is the island a vital connecting point for the EastMed pipeline, but it also recently discovered gas, both of which provide Europe with an alternative to Turkey’s energy supply. This gas will flow to Cairo via a agreed upon in 2018, where it will be liquified and exported to Europe. These pipelines may not decisively change Turkey’s role in Europe’s energy security, but they nevertheless threaten Ankara’s energy ambitions and indicate that the UAE is undertaking a multifaceted strategy to undermine its rival.

Though both Turkey and the UAE would prefer to see each other’s geopolitical significance diminished in the eyes of Western Europe and the US, it would be best for Europe if the two actors worked together. Europe would face a crisis if a jingoistic Russia cuts off the gas deliveries to the continent. Moscow has already threatened Ukraine’s . As many have argued, Emirati-Turkish competition erupted because of a power vacuum left by incremental US withdrawal from the region. However, if the US and other disinterested states could attempt to broker a détente following the lifting of the blockade on Qatar, collaboration between Ankara and Abu Dhabi could prove a viable supplement for Europe’s energy security.

*[51�Թ� is a  partner of .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post What the UAE-Turkey Rivalry Means for Europe’s Energy Security appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Narratives About Turkish Military Interventions

READ MORE

The Bashiqa attack, however, is yet to be claimed. According to a by the deputy governor of Mosul, Rafet Simo, the rocket launchpads targeting the base were found in the area controlled by the 30^th brigade of Hashd al-Shaabi, indicating a link. Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who places emphasis on sovereignty as essential for national recovery, wants to develop relations with regional actors and curb Iran’s influence in the country. In this context, as Turkey and Iran try to expand their economic and political footprint in Iraq, they also face various security issues.

Tensions Over Sinjar

Ankara has been conducting drone attacks in Sinjar, in northern Iraq, against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the US, the UK and Turkey designate as a terrorist organization. In its support for the Sinjar agreement signed in October 2020 between Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with the aim to remove the PKK and Hashd al-Shaabi from the area, Turkey has repeatedly stated that it will not allow Sinjar to become a second Qandil, referring to the PKK’s strongholds in the northern Iraqi mountains.

On February 10, Turkey’s military operation on Gare mountain, northeast of Duhok in Iraqi Kurdistan, against the PKK was considered to be a warning of a potential operation in Sinjar. Following the events in Gare, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan , “We may come there overnight, all of a sudden,” referring to Sinjar.

Considering the fact that Hashd al-Shaabi has employed local PKK militias within its cadres, any threat coming from Turkey to the PKK’s existence in the region closely affects the intense relationship the two groups have forged in Sinjar. The Gare operation is thus a concern both for the PKK and Iran-backed militias. After Turkey escalated its warnings of a potential operation in Sinjar, Iran-backed militia groups also have adopted a more threatening tone toward Ankara. Qais al-Ghazali, the leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, stated that a Turkish deployment in Iraq would be more threatening than a continued US presence, adding that if Ankara intervenes in Sinjar, the group would pick up arms.

The threats from Iran-backed militant groups against Turkey match Tehran’s stance on the issue. Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Iraj Masjedi, strongly Turkey’s military presence in Iraq and its policy in Sinjar, and has demanded that Ankara withdraw troops from the country.

Less than a week after the attack, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu Hashd al-Shaabi for the Bashiqa attack but without mentioning the PMF directly: “We know who is behind those who carried out these attacks. Those who carried out these attacks are the militias supporting the PKK, which cooperates with the PKK in the Sinjar region.” The attack indicates that Shia militias have augmented their verbal threats against Turkey to concrete actions. This may be a way to force Ankara into a military conflict with official Iraqi forces in an attempt to further complicate Turkish military existence in Iraq.

In addition, the Bashiqa attack is a warning that if Turkey attempted to gain control of any region below the KRG-controlled area, such as Sinjar, this would be a red line for the militias. The attack also coincided with the upcoming reopening of Turkey’s Mosul consulate. It would not be far-fetched to say that Iranian-backed militias might have indicated to Ankara that Mosul would not be a safe place for its geopolitical ambitions.

Common Message

The timing of the Bashiqa and Erbil attacks may indicate the militias’ dissatisfaction with the growing understanding between Ankara and the KRG, given that the two sides are demanding the implementation of the Sinjar agreement by urging the PKK and Hasd-al Shaabi to leave the region. In addition, the latest diplomatic developments in the Middle East have seemingly made Iran feel left out in the region. It is no secret that Iran is concerned about the normalization steps between its two long-standing rivals, Israel and the Gulf monarchies, as well as Iraq’s increasing diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Jordan.

Also of concern for Tehran is the rapprochement between Turkey, , Saudi Arabia, the UAE and alongside the allegations that Turkey is helping the Saudi war against the Iran-backed Ansar Allah (Houthis) in .

A day before the twin attacks, news circulated in the Iranian media that a base in Erbil belonging to Israeli intelligence was targeted, without mentioning who the attackers were. Both the attack and the existence of an Israeli base in Erbil were firmly rejected by Kurdish officials; Israel has not commented on the allegations. However, Iran-backed militias in Iraq have several times the government of Iraqi Kurdistan for its relationship with Tel Aviv and for hosting Israeli bases within its borders, particularly after the 2017 independence referendum that was . The attack on an alleged Israeli base came after the strike against Iran’s on April 12 that Tehran blamed on Tel Aviv.

In January, with explosives-laden drones from Iraqi territory against the Saudi royal palace in Riyadh. The latest attacks on the airport in Erbil, which hosts US coalition forces, the Turkish military base in Bashiqa and a possible attack on a suspected Israeli base suggests that militia groups will target any actor who they think operates against Iran’s interests in Iraq. Instrumentalized by Iran, Iraqi militias’ increasing attacks on foreign actors will no doubt negatively influence relations between Iran and the countries being targeted, drawing them closer together in an anti-Iran bond.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Iraq’s Militias Send a Warning to Turkey appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The withdrawal prompted widespread protests from women’s groups and an uproar on social media, criticizing that it signals a huge setback for women’s rights in a country with high rates of gender-based violence and femicides. Just in 2020, at least  women were murdered in Turkey.

Turkey Doubles Down on Hard Power

READ MORE

Following the public outrage over the withdrawal, government representatives unconvincingly  that women’s rights are guaranteed in national laws and that there is no need for international laws. The Directorate of Communications defended the decision with the  that the convention was “hijacked by a group of people attempting to normalize homosexuality,” and that this is incompatible with the country’s social and family values.

Turkey was the first state to ratify the Istanbul Convention and became the first to pull out. What lies behind the withdrawal?

Erdogan’s Rationale: To Remain in Power at All Costs

In August 2020, officials in the Justice and Development Party (AKP) signaled that Turkey was considering withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention after religious conservatives began an intense lobbying effort against the convention, lambasting it for damaging “traditional Turkish family values.”&�Բ�����;Although they claimed that the treaty destroys families and promotes homosexuality, conservative women’s groups supporting the AKP defended it. The row even reached Erdogan’s own family, with two of his  becoming involved in groups on either side of the debate. Due to these internal tensions within the AKP and the symbolic achievement with the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia into a mosque in 2020, the debate was postponed.

Although  had shown that 84% of Turks opposed withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention and a majority of conservative women were in favor of it, Erdogan decided to pull out of the treaty, thereby disregarding not only the international law anchored in the constitution, but also the legislative power of parliament. This move comes amid significantly eroding  for the president and his informal alliance with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The withdrawal from the convention gives Erdogan three political advantages that will help him retain power.

First, Erdogan and his AKP aim to reenergize their conservative voter base, which has been dissatisfied with the economic downturn — a reality that has only been exacerbated by the coronavirus pandemic. The ruling AKP government cannot curb the high level of inflation, and unemployment and poverty rates remain high. Leaving the convention is a symbolic gesture to his base, but it will bring short-term relief, as did the reconversion of the Hagia Sophia.

Second, with a potential electoral defeat in mind, Erdogan is looking for new allies. He thus made an overture in January to the Islamist Felicity Party (SP), which is in an oppositional alliance with secularist, nationalist and conservative parties. With its 2.5% of the vote in the 2018 parliamentary elections, the SP shares the same Islamist roots as the AKP and is popular among ultraconservative voters, who enthusiastically back the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention.

In his meeting with the SP, Erdogan used the withdrawal as a bargaining chip for a possible electoral alliance in the future. He is not only aiming to strengthen his own voting bloc, but also to break the oppositional alliance, which has increasingly gained confidence since its success in the 2019 local elections and been effective in challenging Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian rule.

Third, to bolster his image as a willful leader, the Turkish president has intensified the level of repression by suppressing democratic civil society organizations that dare to challenge his rule. This time, he has targeted women’s rights advocates, who frequently criticize the government for not strictly implementing the protective measures of the Istanbul Convention.

Political Conditionality as a Necessary European Reaction

While increasing the level of repression in domestic politics, Turkey intensified its diplomatic charm offensive to reset Turkish relations with the European Union. Against this background, Brussels should not only condemn the decision, but also revise its  by imposing political conditions regarding human rights and the rule of law, which have once again been breached with Ankara’s withdrawal from the convention.

This approach is necessary for two reasons. First, the EU can send a motivating message to democratic segments of civil society and the opposition by underlining that the Istanbul Convention is an issue of human rights and that its sole purpose is protecting women from violence rather than undermining Turkey’s national values and traditions. Second, calling Ankara out is also in Europe’s own interest. The withdrawal can have spillover effects on other member states of the Council of Europe.

Considering the latest attempts by the Polish  to replace the Istanbul Convention with an alternative “family-based” treaty that also finds support in other Central European governments, the backlash against women’s rights in Europe is not a myth, but rather a reality.

*[This was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post What Lies Behind Turkey’s Withdrawal From the Istanbul Convention? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The ICC Has Stepped on a Political Minefield in Palestine

READ MORE

Yet with the waning of such architecture and the changing internal dynamics of Turkish politics, Turkey has engaged in a number of foreign military interventions in recent years — in Iraq, Syria, Libya and, most recently, in Azerbaijan’s conflict with Armenia over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region.

The prevailing assumption is that Turkey won a strategic battle in this war that has shifted the balance of power in the region. But this ignores a deeper malaise in Turkey’s foreign policy direction. It may be winning hot fights today, but the wider cold war it is entering with a ring of neighboring states will damage Turkey’s ability to project power in the longer term.

Unfriendly Neighbors

Only a decade ago, under the guidance of then-Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s “zero problems with neighbors” doctrine, Ankara was on historically good terms with Armenia. At the time, there was a sense that Turkey was leaving behind the traditional republican mindset of being beset on all sides by threats.

This mindset, rooted in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the war of independence that thwarted Great Power designs on the partition of Anatolia among the victors in World War I, persisted throughout much of the 20^th century. However, by 2014, Ankara had signed bilateral High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council agreements with Iran (2014), Iraq (2009), Lebanon (2010) and even, strange though it may now seem, Syria (2010).

Even Greece and Armenia, traditionally viewed as the most ardent foes due to the religious divide, had become amicable neighbors. In April 2014, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan even offered condolences to the grandchildren of Armenians killed in 1915, in a major shift in official Turkish rhetoric. This was perhaps the zenith of Turkish soft power in its neighborhood. All that has changed since Erdogan moved his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) decisively in a nationalist direction.

It is often observed that Erdogan is a leader in the mold of Russian President Vladimir Putin. His increasing use of opportunistic hard power to meet strategic foreign policy objectives is seen as part of the classic Putin playbook. Yet this analysis overlooks some important facts.

At the most fundamental level, Turkey is not Russia. The two states have some striking similarities — such as an imperial legacy on the periphery of Europe that has tended to reinforce a sense of ethnic and cultural isolation and exceptionalism. However, they are simultaneously very different.

Russia only lost its empire in 1991, while Turkey’s vanished 70 years earlier. Despite the loss of empire, Russia maintains considerable de facto power in the ex-Soviet space. Not only that, but Russia can be said to still be a significant empire, given that Moscow controls what are effectively non-Russian republics within the Russian Federation.    

The same is not true of Turkey. For half a century, the Turkish republic largely ignored the Ottoman Empire’s former imperial possessions. In the 20^th century, ethnic outreach toward Turkic or co-religious communities in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East and North Africa has increased, but never with the same level of hard power control Russia wields in its former imperial space. Further, the only significant non-Turkish population under Ankara’s direct control is the Kurds of southeastern Turkey.

The result is that the projection of purely hard power can have useful results for Russia in its former imperial space in a way that is more complicated for Turkey. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be said to occur in both Russian and Turkish former imperial space, but this is much more immediately true of Russia. Armenia is dependent on Russia as a client state in a way that Azerbaijan is not dependent on Turkey.

What’s more, for Turkey, conflict with the states encircling it leads to far greater problems. Russia is difficult to encircle. It is geographically too extensive. There is always room to maneuver. Turkey currently has very difficult relations with Armenia, Iraq, Syria, Cyprus and Greece. This leaves precious little goodwill to help project soft power. Everything must be won by hard power.

A High Price on Everything

There is no question that in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey’s backing of Azerbaijan was pivotal, leading to a strategic success akin to that achieved shortly beforehand in Libya. Turkish hard power had been decisive and influence dramatically increased in Baku, as it was in Tripoli.

Yet it came at the price of establishing Armenia as an even more implacable enemy than it already was, just as the success in Libya established Egypt, Greece and the United Arab Emirates as even more implacable enemies than they already were. In the context of the eastern Mediterranean, it could be argued that the action in Libya was non-negotiable for Turkey. It had to act. But in Azerbaijan, it was much more nuanced.

The Turkey of the Davutoglu era might well have acted as a go-between, defusing tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, all the while quietly increasing Turkish influence across the entire region. Instead, the result is hostile battle lines. Turkey may have the upper hand today, but newly embittered enemies will await any opportunity to inflict harm. This does not build a sustainable, peaceful, long-term strategic vision for Turkey within its neighborhood.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Turkey Doubles Down on Hard Power appeared first on 51�Թ�.

How did we reach this point? The story begins on May 29, 1453, a Tuesday, with the moon in its final crescent quarter. Constantinople had been under siege for months, and tens of thousands of Turks were outside its massive impregnable walls. Inside were just 50,000 remaining Greeks, including the last Roman Emperor Constantine XI, or Constantine Paleologos. There were only 7,000 armed men, outnumbered at least 10 to one by the Turks. The Greeks had fresh water and could grow enough food within the walls to feed themselves. They could hold out. However, in the early hours of that morning, a Greek raiding party left the city to harry the sleeping Turks.

Navigating the Minefield of Arab Politics

READ MORE

On the way back into the city through a narrow entrance, the Kerkoporta, the last Greek in forgot to lock the door. The Turks followed them, opened the main gates, and Mehmet II’s Janissaries poured in. The Byzantine empire was no more.

Two days of looting, rape and blood-letting followed. According to custom, three days were allowed, but it was so awful that Mehmet stopped it after two. To commemorate the conquest, Mehmet added the crescent moon to the Ottoman flag, and since then, Tuesday remains the unluckiest day of the week for the Greeks. No Greek gets married on a Tuesday, and any Greek looking at the Turkish flag with the crescent moon is reminded of that calamity.

Consent to Be Ruled

The intervening 469 years were not of uninterrupted peace and stability, but the Ottomans did provide an overarching continuity of rule over the region. The legitimacy of the sultan and the caliph was accepted by all of the Sunni Muslim world. Ottoman rule over Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq and what is now Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states provided stability and a common rule of law. The Turks were not loved — they were authoritarian and brutal — but there was some consent to be ruled.

On November 17, 1922, the last sultan, Mehmet VI, was loaded onto a British warship, HMS Malaya, and sent off to exile in Malta and later Italy, never to return. He was allowed to take his four official wives with him, all of them Turkish. However, there were still about 400 concubines from all over the world in the Topkapi hareem. A young British officer was dispatched to the palace with a sack of gold sovereigns to pay the women off. Each got one sovereign for every year of service. 

The Ottoman defeat and collapse of the empire after the First World War created a vacuum in the Middle East that the British and the French in particular wanted to exploit. The infamous negotiated in 1916 was the plan to carve up the carcass of the Ottoman lands between Britain, France and Russia. Russia, as party to the treaty, was to get Constantinople and surrounding lands, all of Armenia and parts of the Black Sea, but lost its place at the table after the 1917 revolution ended its participation in the war.   

Vladimir Lenin’s new Soviet government found the Russian copy of the treaty and it. A century before WikiLeaks, this was deeply embarrassing to the British who were telling the leaders of the Arab revolt that they were fighting the Turks for Arab independence. The Turks lost no time in giving as much publicity to the treaty as possible and telling the Arabs that they had been deceived into fighting with Christians against their own Muslim caliph. Although this had some effect, causing some Arab tribes to change sides, it was too late, and the Turks were expelled. The Arabs were indeed betrayed and, instead of the Arab kingdom they had been promised, they were divided into British and French protectorates. 

The First War of Succession

The Brits and the French may have carved up the Ottoman Empire, but they soon came to regret it. Although they installed their own or client regimes in all the Ottoman provinces, there was little peace and certainly no profit for the Europeans. Enver Pasha, an Ottoman general and hero of the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the future first president of modern Turkey, led the nationalist war to expel the British and other allied powers from Turkey proper. The British and their allies had intended to carve up mainland Turkey itself as well as the Ottoman Arab possessions. When Enver Pasha prevailed, the Treaty of Sevres was torn up and the Treaty of Lausanne, negotiated in 1922-23, established present-day Turkey as the successor to the Ottoman state. It also forced Turkey to renounce all claims to former Ottoman lands. 

The Arabs in all the new colonial possessions of the British and French were restless. This was particularly true in Palestine, where the British ruled. In 1917, the British government had issued the Balfour Declaration expressing support for a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. That year, the British were losing the war because German U-boats were sinking a large number of ships bringing food and supplies from America. Britain was being strangled. The one area where the British — with Arab help — were winning was in Palestine. Former UK Prime Minister Arthur Balfour saw an opportunity to leverage the Jewish American vote to bring the United States into the war. It worked.

But with the British now in control of Palestine, the Zionists insisted that the UK live up to its promise. Large numbers of Jews began to arrive in Palestine. This caused conflict between newly arrived Jews, the indigenous Arabs and the hapless British, who were supposed to keep the peace. Ethnic unrest and independence movements grew in the other provinces. The British and French rule did not last: Both powers gave up or were forced out by a series of nationalist uprisings in the 1940s and 1950s.

In the period between 1920 and 1925, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud led a successful series of wars to establish the new Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In 1945, the Saudi king held a with US President Franklin D. Roosevelt on board the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal that marked the beginning of the ambitions of the latest would-be successor to the Ottomans — the United States. At the same time, the Soviet Union was also eyeing the spoils, and while neither great power was able to take control of the Ottoman lands, their division between the two great rivals provided some stability, but not a permanent solution. 

The Second War of Succession

The Russians had missed an opportunity both before and after the Sykes-Picot affair but have not lost their interest. The leftist revolutions in Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Algeria gave them an entrée, as did the sharpening Arab-Israeli conflict that put the US on the wrong side as far as the front-line Arab states were concerned. Russian arms sales, economic assistance, trade deals and leftist solidarity were all employed in what would become one of the theaters of the Cold War. At stake was control of the oil fields and trade routes through the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal. If the USSR gained total control, it would have given it a stranglehold on the West.

While the Cold War rivalry lasted, there was some stability — or at least an absence of an all-out conflict, though the Yom Kippur War of 1973 tested this fragile equilibrium almost to destruction. The origins of the Yom Kippur War were not in great-power rivalry but local feuding — in this case, the struggle for land between Arabs and Israelis — but it was super-power hegemony that stopped the war. At one point, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger moved America’s military stance to DEFCON3 — ready for nuclear war.

The USSR backed down, and a truce was agreed. While the balance of power between the USSR and the West held, in the Middle East, as elsewhere, low-intensity cold conflicts ensued, with no one winning overall control. The continuing retreat of British and French interests accelerated, and the US and the USSR competed for successor rights.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was a shock. Iran had been America’s main proxy in the region. The Arabs opposed its ambitions, but Iran had been favored by the US as a bulwark against Soviet encroachment. The Sunni nations with sizable Shia populations saw the revolution as a major threat. They feared, rightly, that the Iranians would want to export not just the ideas of their revolution but also the facts. Iran agitated among the Shia in Iraq, Bahrein and Saudi Arabia, and sought to expel US influence from the region by launching terrorist attacks on US installations.

Saddam Hussein particularly feared the Shia majority in Iraq and, with encouragement from the Sunni Arabs and the US, invaded Iran in 1980. But his war aims were thwarted. The revolutionary Iranian regime survived; in fact; the country unified behind it. The war lasted until 1988 and ended with Iraq’s defeat. The Iraqis had been supported financially by all the Arab states as well as provided with logistics and intelligence by the United States and its allies. The US was reluctant to become directly involved, and so were the Russians. It had been a local war, held within bounds.

The Iran-Iraq War was an example of the instability resulting from the absence of an overall peace settlement in the region. It did have one remarkable result: All the petrodollar surpluses built up by the Arab and Iranian oil exports since the quintupling of oil prices in 1975 flowed back into the West. By the time the war was over, all of the Middle Eastern oil exporting nations’ foreign exchange reserves were exhausted while Western economies were booming.

The Third War of Succession

The fall of empires continued. The USSR collapsed in December 1991 after rotting from economic failure and internal rivalries for years. The Soviet contraction and internal focus also meant a retreat from its overseas interests and the Middle East in particular. In Europe, NATO and then the EU lost no time moving into what had been the Warsaw Pact, a number of former Russian satellites and USSR republics to be part of the alliance, taking membership from 19 to 26 in its eastward expansion.

In the Middle East, none of this happened — a missed opportunity. The partial order the Cold War had imposed on the region was gone, and, once again, local rivalries erupted without the moderating influence of either one of the two global superpowers to temper them. 

In 1990, Saddam Hussein attempted to extort billions of dollars from Kuwait to replenish his reserves that had been exhausted by the war with Iran. When Kuwait refused, Iraq invaded, without the international community trying to restrain the aggression, and the First Gulf War began. Kuwait had allies that eventually came to its defense. But as soon as Iraqi forces had been expelled, they departed, leaving a regional vacuum still unfilled, with no general peace settlement.

The defeat of Saddam Hussein gave the Iranians a golden opportunity to meddle in Iraqi Shia politics. The situation in Iraq festered, and the absence of any stabilizing force eventually led to the second US intervention in 2003. The chaos that this fateful invasion produced was again an enabler for the Iranians to fill the vacuum that emerged after Iraq’s dictator was overthrown. By now, Iran’s focus has shifted from its zeal to export the revolution toward more realist politics. The rise of Iranian nationalism since the Iran-Iraq War had replaced revolutionary idealism with national interests — an overriding policy that prevails to this day. Here, yet again, Washington failed to seize the initiative and establish a general peace settlement or a Pax Americana. 

The Fourth War of Succession

The Arab Spring, a series of revolutions and counterrevolutions that first ignited in Tunisia in 2010 before spreading throughout the region, set off a cycle of civil wars that are still with us. These conflicts flourished in the vacuum left by the collapse of regimes such as in Libya or Yemen, inviting intervention of regional players.

The current situation is typical. We have civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen, and in each case, local powers are interfering in order to win a supposed tactical advantage. Russia is in the category of a local player; it no longer has the overall superpower or imperial advantage it had but, like Turkey, it wields enough military force to make a nuisance.

Joe Biden Will Face a Much-Changed and Skeptical World

READ MORE

The civil war in Libya may worsen if Turkey and the UAE on one side, and Russia on the other, escalate their involvement. Syria, still engulfed in a decade-long civil war, has been carved up into Turkish, Russian, Syrian government and Iranian zones. Iraq appears to have slipped even more into the Iranian orbit. The slow US exit from Iraq and Afghanistan — the latter to the evident satisfaction of the undefeated Taliban — will further encourage struggles for a share of power. 

The decline of US interest in the region is driven by the decreasing importance of oil and gas. In addition, the threat of regional domination by the USSR, or now Russia, has vanished. Public fatigue with the appalling loss of life, money and prestige the US has endured over the last 20 years has soured any appetite for further overseas wars. Arms deals and attractive opportunities for investment are declining, highlighted by the anxiety the Saudis are showing in trying to drum up disinterested foreign direct investment. The only motivators for continued US involvement are the security of Israel and the possibility that Iran, unchecked, may emerge as the local superpower.

More War or Peace?

Former US President Donald Trump’s policy was to try to force regime change in Iran. The campaign of maximum pressure to drive oil exports to zero, foment unrest and impose hardship was promoted as a way to push the Iranians back to the negotiating table and make more concessions in order to resuscitate the nuclear deal. The reality was that Trump sought the destruction of the regime. Despite enormous hardship, Iran did not buckle. It has a structural advantage: an educated and innovative population with well-balanced demographics, a diversified economy, fertile and productive agriculture, mineral resources and, of course, abundant hydrocarbons. It is a sleeping giant of an economy.

Moreover, in almost every other sphere, from historical legacy, self-sufficient industry, military prowess, agriculture, architecture, food, to art, poetry and literature, Iran has been the dominant cultural influence in the region since the Seljuk empire — the same empire that brought the Ottomans, a Seljuk offshoot, to Turkey. History may again be moving in Tehran’s direction.

The failed US, Israeli, Saudi and Emirati policy of pressure on Iran was tactical, not strategic. It had a short-term objective of regime change which, if reached, would actually accelerate the loss of US interest in the region and further underline the retreat of the most recent would-be successor to the Ottomans. Another vacuum is developing and, unchecked by binding treaties, Iran could regain its position as the major power in the region. Before Iran attempts to become the Ottoman successor, it is in the interest of all the other countries in the region to reach a general settlement. 

Instead of examining short-term tactics based only on hatred or fear of the current Iranian regime, there is a need for a strategic view. Since the collapse of the Ottomans, the Middle East has seen continuous fighting, on and off, among international powers and regional players for the remnants of empire. The British and the French have come and gone, the US and Russia have come and are retreating — although they do intervene on a tactical basis here and there, usually leaving a worse situation than the one they found.

The Americans are clearly in the final stages of disengagement, driven, in part, by that declining need to keep the region and its oil in the Western camp. The power vacuum is growing, and if the sanctions are lifted, Iran will be back in business. The unity of Iraq and Syria is in question, Lebanon is a failed state and the future of the Saudi regime is not secure given the failure of the Vision 2030 initiative and the outlook for oil in a decarbonizing world economy. Turkey is eyeing the opportunities, as is Russia. Both have historical claims to Ottoman lands.

But there is very little likelihood that any big power might be willing or able to assert sovereign rule over the Middle East. Even thinking about this is to court accusations of neo-colonialism. The solution lies in a different direction, not in more confrontation and threats of military conquest. A better vision is for an economic, political and security dialogue among all the parties in the region must be conceived. All parties are suffering in one way or another from the current disorder, whether it is the Iranians, Syrians, Iraqis, Yemenis or Saudis. The current situation is unsustainable, and any idea that any sort of victory is possible is an illusion. On the other hand, all the countries around the Gulf, including Iran, have much to gain from a cessation of hostilities, economic cooperation and the settlement of disputes through negotiation.

The model of what the Europeans were able to achieve after the Second World War is a good one, and this time no Marshall Plan will be needed as the wealth and resources of the regional players are already enormous. Every country has something to gain. But there will be losers. They will be the autocratic dictators who currently stand in the way of such a general settlement.

A human rights and a democratic track will be essential parts of any such dialogue in order to ensure sustainability and continuity. This will require the Iranian regime and other authoritarian rulers to surrender power — perhaps not all of it right away — but over time, enough to give their citizens confidence in their own personal security and investment in the governance of their own countries and their neighbors. A good start would be a regional security dialogue and some confidence-building measures. This is where the Biden administration must begin its work.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Will Iran Take Over the Ottoman Mantle in the Middle East? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Condemnation was not limited to the government: On February 7, Alaattin Cakıcı, an organized-crime boss and a former member of the ultranationalist Grey Wolves,  a hand-written note stating the protests aimed to “harm the state and the People’s Alliance [AKP/MHP], which is the guarantor of our state.”

The US Will Need Turkey to Counter Russia

READ MORE

This episode of interference in the university’s administration is not an isolated incident. Under the state of emergency decree of October 2016, all rectors at public universities are now selected directly or indirectly by the president’s office, in conjunction with the Turkish Higher Education Council. The extensive purges that followed the 2016 coup attempt have created opportunities for the president to distribute academic posts to his supporters. Erdogan also regards the universities as central pillars of the “.”

Ramping Up Repression

The attack goes beyond the universities, however. Ankara is determined to suppress all opposition. About  outlets are linked to the AKP through personal and/or financial ties. Prosecution of social media users for insulting the president is common. A new law from 2020 permits , aiming to create an institutional wedge between pro-government and opposition lawyers. Ankara has also expanded its over civil society organizations and worked to rein in local governments by replacing elected mayors in Kurdish municipalities with , cutting funding for . It also works to contain civil society through prosecution, police violence, propaganda and, recently, even open support from mafia figures. The aim is to create a political community of supporters operating as agents of regime control.

In reality, the AKP is far from achieving cultural hegemony, as Erdogan himself  last year. In fact, popular discontent is growing. The pandemic has exacerbated Turkey’s already mounting economic woes and limited the AKP’s ability to redistribute resources to its supporters. Big business is complaining, while many small and micro-businesses are in debt. The official figure for youth unemployment reached 25.4% last November. Even  are not immune to discontent over the rising cost of living.

The unexpected success of opposition parties in the 2019 local elections and their united front against the presidential system further complicate the picture. The government’s divide-and-rule tactics have so far failed to bring opposition actors fully into line. Moreover, tensions and cracks within the ruling alliance are increasingly visible. For all these reasons, Ankara is in attack mode and on the defensive at the same time, which explains its disproportionate reaction to the Bogazici protests. It is no coincidence that government officials and pro-government journalists have consistently compared them to the Gezi protests of 2013 to which the AKP responded with similar criminalization, vilification and repression.

The ghosts of the Gezi protests continue to haunt Ankara. One stark manifestation of this is the Kafkaesque trial of Osman Kavala, a Turkish businessman and human rights defender who was detained in 2017. The charges included “attempting to change the constitutional order and to overthrow the government” by leading and financing the Gezi protests. A second wave of arrests followed in 2018 for alleged links to Kavala. While the Gezi defendants were acquitted in February 2020, an appeals court  the acquittals of nine in January 2021. On February 5, the court rejected a request for Kavala’s release and merged the cases against him. On the same day, Erdoğan  Ayse Bugra, a retired faculty member of Bogazici University who happens to be married to Osman Kavala, of being “among the provocateurs” of the student protests.

Europe Should Not Turn a Blind Eye

Europe should voice stronger criticism of Ankara’s repression of its citizens. While first and foremost a matter of principle, calling Ankara out is also in the EU’s own interests. While European policymakers have often enough prioritized stability over democracy in relations with authoritarian states, in Turkey’s case, that logic is associated with two problems. For one, it is unclear whether an authoritarian but stable Turkey would cooperate harmoniously with the EU. Even more importantly, the stability of authoritarianism in Turkey is uncertain for several reasons.

Firstly, Turkey’s economic capacity depends heavily on popular consent, in particular because the country lacks the kind of natural resources that can be exploited through coercion. Secondly, the country’s sociopolitical diversity makes it difficult for the AKP to thoroughly penetrate the civil sphere, making future protests highly likely. Finally, the personalization of power and the tensions within the ruling alliance make the government vulnerable. While the EU certainly cannot force Turkey to democratize, it can and should hold Ankara more accountable, especially at a time when it is turning to the EU for economic support.

*[This  was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Is Turkey’s Ruling Alliance on the Attack or the Defensive? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

To make things worse for bilateral relations, in December 2020, Ankara was slapped with the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act for the procurement of the Russian S-400 high-altitude defense system. However, there are mounting signs that the Biden administration will be reluctant to tighten its grip on Turkey, which would compel Washington to find ways to work with Ankara.   

As Europe Weakens, Turkey Is on the Rise

READ MORE

Denouncing President Donald Trump’s denigration of the transatlantic alliance, Biden  NATO’s critical role in US national security,  in Foreign Affairs last year: “To counter Russian aggression, we must keep the alliance’s military capabilities sharp. We must impose real costs on Russia for its violations of international norms.” The reality for the next administration is that Russia cannot be countered without Turkey being on board, given that its combat-proven military is to be a valuable  and its unique geopolitical location has historically acted as a bulwark against Russia’s expansionist instincts.

There is the perception that Turkey had drifted into the Russian orbit after the procurement of the S-400 system. However, due to having to frequently work with Moscow, Ankara has single-handedly developed capabilities and has taken steps in the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus and Syria that have proven to be effective in limiting Russian influence.  

The Black Sea 

The 2015 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation clearly prioritizes the Black Sea as a pillar of �ѴDz����Ƿ�’s power projection. In the last two decades, Russia has consolidated its Black Sea presence by annexing Georgia’s breakaway Abkhazia region in 2008 and Ukraine’s Crimea, home to the Sevastopol naval base, in 2014. Other strategic locations include the  and the  region of the North Pacific, where American and Russian militaries frequently come dangerously close to physically clashing.

Last August, two Russian Su-27s intercepted a US Air Force B-52 strategic bomber over the Black Sea, about which General Jeff Harrigan, commander of US Air Forces in Europe and Africa,  of possible future mid-air collisions. All things considered, Turkey has the means to limit Russian influence and has displayed resoluteness to not let the Black Sea be turned into “.”&�Բ�����;

In case of Russian aggression, Turkey’s support would be critical to any NATO or US response because of  and responsibility for the straits under the Montreux Convention. The RAND Corporation’s 2018 Black Sea  suggests that effective deterrence will require a NATO Black Sea Center of Excellence to be established in Turkey alongside an active use of the Turkish straits. As Sweden’s former Prime Minister succinctly puts it, “What happens on the Bosporus affects us all.”&�Բ�����;

Turkey has made moves in the Black Sea by establishing robust political and military cooperation with Ukraine. This particularly drew �ѴDz����Ƿ�’s ire given the ongoing conflict between Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Last year, Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar Makina and the Ukrainian defense company Ukrspecexport  an agreement involving the development and production of “sensitive technologies in defense and aerospace.” Furthermore, Ukraine is poised to  50 Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 UAVs, which have a proven record of destroying sophisticated Russian-made arms such as ,  and .

The success of the Turkish defense industry in the recent conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has experts to float the idea that the Ankara-Kyiv military cooperation may very well tip the balance in  and  in favor of Ukraine. Despite the potential of straining relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Erdogan has conveyed Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s , a rare area of mutual agreement between  and Ankara. Erdogan went so far as to  the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in its row against the Moscow Patriarchate. Finally, Ankara has  its full support for the admission in NATO of the Black Sea nation of Georgia, Turkey’s neighbor, a move Putin has declared as a “.”&�Բ�����;

Caucasus and Syria 

Turkey’s explicit military and political support for Azerbaijan in its decisive victory against Armenia over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh at the end of last year has propelled Turkey to major-player status in the South Caucasus, traditionally . For the first time in more than a century — the last time being the Battle of Baku of 1918 — Turkish military is to be  to the South Caucasus after Ankara and Moscow agreed to monitor the . The uncomfortable reality for Russia here is, at the end of the day, that soldiers from a NATO member country will be present in its “near abroad.” If Russia had been as strong in the region as it was once believed, it could have singlehandedly navigated the Azeri-Armenian conflict without having to concede to Turkey’s demands.  

Even more disturbing for Moscow is Turkey’s acquisition of a physical route via Armenian territories to Azerbaijan, which is being dubbed as the Pan-Turkic superhighway, referring to Turkey’s uninterrupted physical link to its ethnic brethren in Azerbaijan and the Turkestan region in Central Asia —  another one of Russia’s post-Soviet satellites. Turkey has, since the fall of the Soviet Union,  to establish itself as the leader of the Turkic world. The last thing Moscow would want is to deal with is an ascendant Turkey in Turkestan. As the recent  in Kyrgyzstan has shown, Russia may be losing influence there.

Turkey’s rising influence in the South Caucasus has also raised  in Iran, home to some 30 million Azeri Turks whose secessionist feelings are now stronger than ever after Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh victory. With Turkey’s permanent presence in the South Caucasus, Russia and Iran will have to take Ankara more seriously in their regional calculations, particularly in Syria. All things considered, President Putin appears to have accepted Turkey’s broader role in the Caucasus. When asked about the topic on Russian television, he : “What can I tell you. It’s a geopolitical fallout from the downfall of the Soviet Union.”&�Բ�����;

In Syria, as in the Caucasus, Russia has found itself having to work with Ankara. Through a series of accords like the Sochi Agreements of 2018 and 2019, as well as the ongoing launched in 2017, Moscow has had to agree (to a certain extent) to concede to Ankara’s demands. Most importantly, Ankara has been able to  Russia from employing destruction of Idlib province, the last rebel stronghold along Turkey’s border that is home to some 4 million civilians. When 33 Turkish soldiers were killed in an assault by the forces of President Bashar al-Assad last February, Turkey did not hesitate to  by killing hundreds of Russian-backed Syrian army soldiers and destroying countless Syrian tanks and weaponry, which  Putin’s plea for a ceasefire agreement with Turkey. 

If President Biden is serious about containing Russia through reinvigorating NATO, he will need Turkey’s geopolitical standing as well as its military and political clout, both of which have grown exponentially in recent years. The Biden administration will soon have to decide whether US national interests dictate a perpetual punitive approach toward the second-largest NATO member or a better understanding of Turkey’s concerns, particularly when it comes to the Syrian YPG (the Kurdish People’s Protection Units) and the need for a high-altitude missile defense system.  

Turkey under President Erdogan has grown to be more self-confident. Pushing Ankara away may result in the complete loss of a valuable NATO ally. As , the former US envoy to Syria, stated, “We really can’t do the Middle East, the Caucuses, or the Black Sea without Turkey.  And, Turkey is a natural opponent of Russia and Iran.” Losing Iran in 1979 cost the United States a strategic foothold in the region. Losing Turkey altogether may cost it Eurasia, where Russia — in tandem with China — has already been steadily building up its standing in defiance of American hegemony.  

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The US Will Need Turkey to Counter Russia appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Navigating the Minefield of Arab Politics

READ MORE

The current “solidarity and stability” deal between Qatar and the GCC plus Egypt makes no mention of the 13  of 2017, which included closing the Turkish military base and halting military cooperation with Ankara. While full clarification of the deal’s terms and impact will have to wait, it clearly does not resolve all the problems between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors. There are challenges ahead, with three plausible consequences for Turkey.

Three Scenarios

First is the continuation of the status quo, where relations between Qatar and Turkey carry on largely unchanged. Although Doha’s relations with Riyadh improve, the rivalry between the United Arab Emirates and Egypt remains, and Qatar will not necessarily change its foreign policy. Saudi Arabia and its Arab quartet allies — the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt — cannot achieve with carrots what they failed to accomplish with sticks.

Continuation of the status quo would not, however, make Qatar Turkey’s unconditional ally; Ankara never had absolute influence over Doha. While Qatar did  to endorse an Arab League condemnation of Turkish military operations in Syria and Iraq in 2016, it chose not to block a later communique reflecting the same sentiment. Qatar Petroleum also  ExxonMobil in signing exploration and production-sharing contracts with Cyprus in 2017, which contradicts Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean policy. In this scenario, Turkey’s proactive, militaristic foreign policy will continue unchanged, from Syria to Libya. But Ankara will need to spend more effort on maintaining its relationship with a more independent Qatar.

The second scenario is regional isolation. If Turkey loses its influence over Qatar as the latter’s relations with its neighbors revive, this will leave Ankara further isolated in the region. The Arab quartet had hoped that blockading Qatar would draw Doha away from Turkish and Iranian influence and squash its independent foreign policy. The plan failed and brought about the opposite effect: Qatar increased its cooperation with Turkey and deepened its ties with Iran.

Following reconciliation, Saudi Arabia and its allies might pursue a more realistic, limited set of goals such as curbing rather than eradicating Turkish presence and influence in Qatar. This approach has a better chance of achieving results and would be a challenge to Turkey. Following the GCC summit, UAE Foreign Minister Anwar Gargash  that some issues would take longer to fix than others: “One of the big things will be the geostrategic dimensions, how do we see regional threats, how do we see the Turkish presence? Is Turkey’s presence in the Gulf going to be permanent?”

Finally, there is the option of reconciliation with the Gulf region. Turkey’s disputes with Saudi Arabia and the UAE did not start with the Qatar blockade and will not end with its lifting. However, by agreeing to end the blockade without asking Qatar to concede any of their original main demands, Saudi Arabia and its allies have acknowledged a new power balance in the Gulf. That might give Qatar the leverage to mediate between Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Turkey would then benefit from the thaw.

Separate reconciliation processes are already underway between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt.  to Mithat Rende, former Turkish ambassador to Qatar, at the same time as communication was reestablished between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, another channel was opened between Istanbul and Riyadh. Ankara has also engaged in backdoor diplomacy and intelligence cooperation with Israel and Egypt.

A Truce

There can be no reconciliation without an agreement to seek common ground regarding geostrategic approaches in the region. The price for Ankara could be to moderate its approaches across the Arab world and exercising restraint in Libya, Syria and Iraq. The fact that the Saudis are currently more focused on potential threats from Iran rather than on Turkish intervention in the Middle East provides a promising context for negotiations. Reconciliation between Turkey and Saudi Arabia would also constrain the Emiratis and the Egyptians, for whom stopping Turkey’s activities is more urgent than Qatar downgrading its ties with Iran.

Turkish-Saudi efforts to find a compromise may receive a boost from Qatar. In Doha, Turkey now has a well-connected ally in the Gulf that could serve Ankara’s ends, which are also in its own interests. Although it is unlikely that Ankara will change its geostrategic direction in order to gain friendlier relations with the Gulf states, it will still benefit from Doha restoring relations with Riyadh and its allies.

To use an analogy from war, the GCC deal is a truce rather than a peace agreement. And it is still work in progress. If rapprochement within the GCC facilitates reconciliation with Turkey, this could lead to a broader process potentially including Israel, which is itself in a parallel process of normalizing relations with Arab countries such as Bahrain, the UAE, Sudan and Morocco. If, on the other hand, the GCC and Egypt manage to gradually detach Qatar from Turkey, this will have negative repercussions for Turkey’s militaristic policies in Syria and Libya, at least financially — as Qatar funds Turkey’s partners and proxies — and politically.

Greater regional isolation and reconciliation with the Gulf would both constrain Turkey’s activities in conflicts such as Syria and Libya. European engagement, in the form of pressure on all sides to achieve resolution, would be useful. By contributing to stability in the region such efforts could ameliorate the associated security and migration challenges.

*[This was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Is GCC-Qatar Rapprochement Good or Bad News for Turkey? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In 2013, Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, a card-carrying member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was overthrown by a coup that reinstated the military junta. In the days that followed, Egypt saw a bloody purge of the Muslim Brotherhood, with thousands of its members killed. Today, tens of thousands continue to languish in jail without trial.

The West’s Middle Eastern Playbook

READ MORE

In 2015, the United Arab Emirates declared the Brotherhood a terrorist organization, jailing without trial anyone suspected of membership or having sympathies with the Muslim Brothers. According to , Frances Fragos Townsend, assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, reported that during a 2006 meeting, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed “claimed that if elections were held in Dubai ‘tomorrow’ he thought the Muslim Brotherhood would win.”

Accusing Doha of giving asylum to and funding the Muslim Brotherhood, in 2017, Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, together with Bahrain, broke diplomatic relations. The so-called quartet then imposed a blockade on Qatar and even attempted a military invasion, which was only halted when Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan rapidly deployed a military force to Qatar. 

Incoherence of the Incoherent

The Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1928, is older than all of the regimes fighting over it. It had reached power in Tunis, Egypt and elsewhere only through the ballot box. Like most political parties that mix their political ideology with religion, it has lost the support, if not the respect, of those who, like this author, believe the two don’t mix.

But here is the mother of all Arab political ironies. For example, in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been carrying out brutal airstrikes for the past six years that have more than 200,000 people, ostensibly to reinstate the “internationally recognized” president overthrown by Ansar Allah (Partisans of God, as the Houthi rebels are officially known). The Muslim Brotherhood is not only an active member of the Saudi-UAE military campaign, but also part of the internationally recognized Yemeni government that the Saudi and UAE alliance is bombing Yemen in order to reinstate. Did you get that? Ibn Rushd (or Averroes, as he is known by his Latin name) would have called this murkiness the “incoherence of the incoherent.”

If that is not bizarre enough for you, here is another one. The Muslim Brothers, recently outlawed as terrorists in Saudi Arabia, are still given political asylum, protection and funding by Riyadh as allies in the war in Yemen. Many of their leaders live in Saudi Arabia. You couldn’t make this up if you were the greatest fiction writer.

But the anti-Muslim Brotherhood, anti-Qatar and anti-Turkey brigade is crumbling. The Arab quartet is losing its American ally in the face of President Donald Trump and is not sure what to expect from the incoming Biden administration. Meanwhile, Iran continues to be as formidable and as unyielding as ever. And so, in true Arab form, alliances must change — again.

The UAE and Bahrain recently formalized and made public their long-standing secret relations with Israel, seeking to create a protective buffer against Iran and any potential challenges from the new administration in Washington. Alas, Saudi Arabia, a self-proclaimed custodian of the Muslim holy sites, cannot be so open about its own secret relations with Israel and is even less confident about the changes afoot the United States. Instead, it called for reconciliation with the other side, Qatar, and made similar moves toward Turkey — both supporters of the Muslim Brothers and vehemently at odds with the UAE, Saudi Arabia’s ally against the Brothers.

Hasty Reconciliation

In a recent hastily-called reconciliation summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), under the watchful eyes of President Trump’s trusted son-in-law Jared Kushner (in typical monarchial style), the anti-Qatar coalition signed an that said, “let bygones be bygones.” The Saudi foreign minister the reconciliation as “due to the wisdom of the GCC rulers and Egypt, it is a complete turn of the page on all points of dispute.” So, the brought against Qatar as non-negotiable conditions for reconciliation have been turned.

In fact, to indicate the uncompromising nature of the quartet’s demands, the UAE’s foreign minister, Anwar Mohammed Gargash, on May 1, 2018, tweeted: “A sincere advice intended to bring Qatar out of her crisis. There will be no gulf mediation. No pressures will be beneficial. And your media will not change your status. Go back to your wisdom, for your crisis continues. Manage your affairs from today with wisdom. And negotiate within the perimeters of your neighbors who express real concerns.” No wonder that, commenting on the reconciliation agreement, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was quick to Qatar for “the success of its brave resistance to  pressure & extortion.”

Despite the dramatic welcome that Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman gave to the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim ibn Hamad Al Thani, followed by a tour of the desert driven by the crown prince himself, the summit spoke more of divergence than unity. It left no doubt about its real purpose, at least from the Saudi and American perspectives. Bin Salman lost no time bringing to focus the elephant in the room, Iran. His message was clear: This is a reconciliation between brothers to wage war on a neighbor. The summit’s fault lines have been widened.

Saudi-Qatar Reconciliation Provides New Opportunities for the Biden Administration

READ MORE

Qatar still maintains strong relations with Iran. While it seems highly unlikely that even the Trump administration, with all its faults, will be crazy enough to attack Iran and start a regional war that will make the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq pale by comparison, the fear is that Israel might do so and force Washington’s hand. Should that happen, any future US attack on Iran using its Qatar-based Al Udeid Air Base will result in destructive retaliation on Qatar. Iran had strongly warned all its neighbors that attacks carried out from their soil will be retaliated against (on their soil). The Iranian foreign minister it as “an all-out war.”

Qatar’s vulnerability is made worse by its break with its neighbors, leaving it to face any possible Iranian retaliation alone. Whether the reconciliation summit is intended to assure or to fool Qatar into breaking away from Tehran, despite Iran’s support during the quartet’s blockade, is an open question. Whether Qatar will fall for that is also an open question. The Prophet Muhammad had warned that “A faithful is not stung twice from the same burrow.”

On a visit to Doha during the blockade, a Qatari official told me that in his view, reconciliation will ultimately happen. Pointing out the foolishness of the ongoing blockade, he insisted that Doha will not be imprudent enough to trust the quartet with its fate. Having opened new pathways beyond the GCC, he saw this crisis as an important lesson — never again.

Old Rivalries

The above view is supported by regional history, of which the Qataris are mindful. In ancient times, the desert tribes of Arabia fought over water wells. While water scarcity will continue to be a cause of wars in the region, the GCC has now moved on to geopolitical fights reflecting the skyscraper nation-states mushrooming out of the desert oil wealth.

However, despite modern geopolitical realities, changing alliances and desert reconciliation summits, the real underlying reasons for the dispute between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain — old tribal rivalries — have not yet been resolved. In fact, these are virtually impossible to resolve without dismantling the monarchies. The Nahyans of Abu Dhabi, now led by Mohammed bin Zayed, see mainly Qatar, but also Bahrain, as mini-states that escaped the UAE federation and must be brought in, willingly or by force. As far back as 1867, Bahrain’s Al Khalifa rulers and the Abu Dhabi Nahyan tribe allied to attack Qatar’s Al Thani tribe to undo its newly formed state.

Even the GCC, which was created as an organization of independent sovereign states, has not removed the old tribal mentalities among its members. The Al Khalifas of Bahrain — from whom the Saudis forcefully took the whole of its oil-rich Shia-populated eastern region, historically part of Greater Bahrain — reject Qatar’s legitimacy. The Al Khalifas ruled Qatar before the Al Thani tribe broke away from the territory that is now Saudi Arabia and created its own state. The Saudis see Qatar as a wayward artificial state that should have never existed in the first place. They consider it part of Saudi Arabia. These underlying tribal rivalries endure and play a major role in how current relations are managed, becoming even more prominent since the Arab Spring.

Qatar, together with Turkey, supported the uprisings against the military dictatorships that ruled Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria. Qatar’s very vocal Al Jazeera news network was the voice of Arab Street during the uprisings. Qatar funded a lot of the youth programs, many of which were either led or at least infiltrated by the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, fearing that a successful Arab Spring revolution that brings an accountable transparent political process will infect their own populations, took the opposing side, spending billions to arm and support the military dictatorships against the uprising.

Having given up on the UAE and bin Zayed personally (who is seen in the West as an Arab visionary despite the failures of all his costly foreign adventures), Saudi Arabia and Egypt have started to make overtures to Turkey, the regional power that has defeated Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE — plus Russia and France — in Libya and then also defeated the latter two in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh at the end of last year.

Reconciling with Qatar leaves the UAE and Bahrain isolated. However, the extent to which Mohammed bin Zayed can rely on Bahrain, effectively ruled and kept alive by the Saudis, is highly debatable. Debatable too is how useful Bahrain can be for the crown prince, beyond sharing a table to sign a “normalization” deal with Israel.

In Yemen, the UAE escaped Ansar Allah’s retaliatory missiles that hit Saudi Arabia, mainly as a result of shaky deals it has made with the rebels. A live-and-let-live policy accompanied by ransom payments has enabled the UAE-Israeli alliance to focus attention on Yemen’s southern ports. There’s virtually no military confrontation between Sanaa and Abu Dhabi. A similar shaky deal exists with Iran, Dubai’s major trading partner. However, if indeed there is a regional war, all bets are off. The shaky friendships in Yemen will transform into deadly hostilities in the Persian Gulf. No amount of double or triple play will save Mohammed bin Zayed. 

Meanwhile, Iran continues to observe the changing loyalties across the waters. Iran knows how it starts among us Arabs, how it proceeds and where it ends. It’s all déjà vu. The GCC is made up of the same Arabs who first financed Saddam Hussein’s attack on Iran, then opened the gates for the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq itself. And all that smoke you see above Arab skies — in Yemen, in Syria, in Iraq, in Egypt, in Libya — comes from the guns with GCC petrodollars signs all over them.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Navigating the Minefield of Arab Politics appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Why Populists at the Helm Are Bad for the Economy

READ MORE

As reported by , “The sanctions target Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries, the country’s military procurement agency, its chief Ismail Demir and three other senior officials. The penalties block any assets the four officials may have in U.S. jurisdictions and bar their entry into the U.S. They also include a ban on most export licenses, loans and credits to the agency.”

Long Anticipated

The decision, long anticipated — and long resisted by President Donald Trump — came about because of Ankara’s refusal to back down from the purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense system. Turkey announced back in 2017 it was going ahead with the deal, after feeling it had been rebuffed in its efforts to acquire the US Patriot system at what it considered a fair price and by the  to allow for a transfer of the system’s technology.

Tied into the politics swirling around the S-400 is the F-35, the stealth fighter jet the sale of which to the United Arab Emirates has caused ripples of anxiety in Israel. And given the ambitions of and mutual animosities between Mohammed bin Zayed, the Abu Dhabi crown prince and de facto UAE ruler, and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, there are, without doubt, similar feelings of anxiety in Ankara, though for different reasons.

The Americans took the sale of 100 F-35s to Turkey off the table because of concerns that the presence of the S-400 would potentially enable the Russians to acquire in-depth knowledge of the stealth fighter. In July last year, the White House released a statement that said, in part, that “Turkey’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 air defense systems renders its continued involvement with the F-35 impossible. The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence-collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities.”

It was a decision that President Trump, eyeing the half a billion dollars the deal was worth, only . “It’s not fair,” he said. And he groused: “Turkey is very good with us, very good, and we are now telling Turkey that because you have really been forced to buy another missile system, we’re not going to sell you the F-35 fighter jets. It’s a very tough situation that they’re in, and it’s a very tough situation that we’ve been placed in, the United States.”

Trump, it hardly needs to be said, blamed the Obama administration, claiming his predecessor had blocked the sale. As ever with this president, that’s not true. (For readers who are interested in the actual story, the defense and security site War on the Rocks provides a blow by blow account which can be found )

More in Sorrow

Though Erdoğan and Trump have had a good relationship, the US president has no time now for anything other than his increasingly pathetic and forlorn crusade to stay in the White House. He couldn’t be bothered to veto the bipartisan decision to invoke sanctions on Turkey. It was left to the outgoing Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to try to paper over the cracks. In a  couched in a tone of “more in sorrow, than in anger,” Pompeo said: “Turkey is a valued ally and an important regional security partner for the United States,” adding that “we seek to continue our decades-long history of productive defense-sector co-operation by removing the obstacle of Turkey’s S-400 possession as soon as possible.”

The Turks were having none of it. And from them, there was plenty of anger and no sorrow. Calling the decision “inexplicable,” the Turkish Foreign Ministry delivered a blunt : “We call on the United States to revise the unjust sanctions (and) to turn back from this grave mistake as soon as possible. Turkey is ready to tackle the issue through dialogue and diplomacy in a manner worthy of the spirit of alliance. (The sanctions) will inevitably negatively impact our relations, and (Turkey) will retaliate in a manner and time it sees appropriate.”

Purring like the proverbial Cheshire cat was Vladimir Putin. The sanctions, though  than might have been anticipated, play well to his strategy of pulling a NATO member, one with the second-largest standing army in the pact, closer to Moscow. Building on initiatives in Syria where Russian and Turkish forces are jointly policing a shaky ceasefire and on the deal the two countries  in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Russian president has further strengthened his hand.

Faced with an already challenging Middle East portfolio, it is yet another Trumpian mess that the incoming president, Joe Biden, and his pick as secretary of state Antony Blinken, will have to contend with.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Washington’s Sanctions on Turkey Are Another Gift to Putin appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Around the World, Femicide Is on the Rise

READ MORE

It is astonishing that every day that goes by, women are killed the world over in the ordinariness of daily life — not in times of war, internal conflicts or gang violence, but by the people closest to them. These women are not mere statistical data: When you know their names, once you have seen their photographs, watched their videos or read their stories, the individual tragedies become haunting nightmares.

Drivers of Violence

To put matters in context, it is important to point out that violence is widespread around the world, especially in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. For example, in , with a population of 130 million, 3,752 women were killed in 2018 compared to 32,765 men. There is a similar picture in , with a population of 210 million. A total of 41,634 murders were committed in 2019, of which 1,314 were women and nearly 40,000 were men. In , with a population of 60 million, another country where violence is common, 20,336 murders were committed in 2017; of these, 2,930 of the victims were women and 16,421 were adult males.

It should be noted that the countries with the highest total number of murders are also the ones with the highest rates of income inequality in the world. According to the that measures income inequality, South Africa is in first place, with a score of 63.1, while Brazil is at high at the top with 54.7 and Mexico with 47.2. These can well be understood as meaningless, technical statistics. However, they describe the current social inequalities that translate into unemployment, poverty, hunger, homelessness — drivers of crime and, inevitably, of violence.

Due to social inequality, almost all buildings in rich districts in Brazil are fenced up and equipped with cameras. Because of this distorted social structure, the number of private security guards employed in the wealthy districts of South Africa far exceeds the in the country. Again, due to social inequality, the drug trade has been one of Mexico’s main problems for decades and is one of the main causes of violence.

Violence is an inequality-driven social problem and must inevitably be addressed together with other social phenomena. However, the experiences of women who continue to be killed every day should be described as a distinct social problem that requires a unique approach and understanding. First, femicide is global in scale. Some countries see lower rates of femicide, others higher, but, ultimately, it happens in every country in the world. The main factor that distinguishes femicide from other types of murders is that it is the murder of women by their husbands, ex-boyfriends, fiancées, lovers — those with whom they shared their lives together and even had children.

According to UN , women are killed mostly because they wanted a divorce or to break up the relationship, or because they did not accept the man’s proposal. Even if they manage to get a divorce, their lives are often taken by the ex-husbands. If a woman is married, she shares the same house with the murderer. If she wants to escape, she is obliged to find another place to shelter. If she lives separately, she has interactions with the father of the children. If there are no children, her home or workplace addresses are known to the potential perpetrator.

I Love You to Death

All this makes women easy targets. The limited number of measures that women can take to protect themselves, such as taking shelter with relatives or getting a restraining order, don’t always work. Women can be stabbed or shot on the street, in front of their homes or offices, in cafes, in broad daylight. Headlines such as “He Killed His Wife After Meeting Her to Make Peace” that frequently appear in the back pages of local newspapers reflect how easily women are killed like sacrificial sheep.

This precarious situation women find themselves in is related to their status in the patriarchal structure and the cultural values of the societies ​​in which they live. Factors such as women’s education, participation in the labor force, participation in the public sphere and in politics determine their levels of safety. Some cultures ​​allow the man to see his wife as a piece of property rather than as an individual with whom he has a marriage contract. Such values ​​imply that the woman’s desire to end the relationship or divorce constitutes a sufficient reason for her death or that the man has the right to kill the woman because she does not return his “love.”

These values ​​are rooted in tradition and history and are often reproduced in everyday life. Pop music provides a perfect example. Lyrics like “You are either mine or nobody’s,” “I love you to death,” “I will sacrifice myself for you,” “I will die but I will not leave you, my dear” settle into the collective consciousness of a society and gain legitimacy in a latent way. Such nuances point to the motives behind the human actions expressed by Wilhelm Dilthey and are critical for understanding social actions.

This patriarchal social structure, which allows men to have power over women, also oppresses the man. It expects him to behave like a “real man,” demands of him to “avenge his honor” and stigmatizes him for not being able to “control his woman.” This structural pressure, either directly or indirectly, pushes men toward violence.

Looking at Turkey

However, femicide cannot be blamed on the patriarchal social structure alone. There is a need to analyze the social change in society on the basis of gender. In other words, it is necessary to look at the changing status and roles of men and women over time.

Turkey provides a good case study. Over the past three decades, the status of Turkish women has changed significantly. First of all, due to the urbanization of the country that social pressure on women has decreased. Of course, this does not mean that Turkish women are completely emancipated. However, the communal social structures specific to the countryside have been broken as a result of migration to the cities, and this has provided women with a limited amount of ​​freedom. Part of it is the increase in the . established in the 1990s that fight against violations of women’s rights have also played a role.

Perhaps the most emblematic development in relation to the changing status of women in Turkey is the . It is the most current internationally recognized legal text for combating discrimination against women and granting protection from violence. Turkey was the first to ratify the convention, which has since been signed by 45 countries and the European Union.

On the other hand, the disadvantaged situation of women in society still continues. According to the World Economic Forum’s , Turkey ranks 130 among 153 countries. (This index should not be used as a sole indicator of the social status of women. For example, , one of the countries with the highest femicide rate and where female labor force participation is 47%, is ranked 25, while Japan, where female labor force participation reaches 70%, is 121.) Again, women are far behind men in terms of participation in the labor force. According to TURKSTAT data, the in Turkey was 29.4% as of 2019. In addition, women’s participation and representation in politics are low. As of 2019, the rate of female deputies remained at 17.3%.

Due to these and other factors, the status of women in Turkey is still fraught with disadvantages. It is such disadvantages that make women vulnerable to violence. This summer, the country was rocked by protests following a brutal murder of a 27-year-old student by an ex-boyfriend, just one of the hundreds of others; in 2019, at least , a grim record of the decade. But, ultimately, a woman in Turkey today is not a woman of 30 years ago. Social change, in which globalization, urbanization, communication technologies, women’s social movements and many other factors can be included, has also changed the status of women. This situation, of course, brought about a psychological transformation. For example, the weakening of social pressures allows women to develop a new awareness about divorce. The idea that being divorced is not shameful for a woman constitutes one of these mental shifts. This change in perceptions has led more women to seek divorces, and more women found the strength to say no to the violence they experienced.

All this means that Turkish women are challenging the established structures more often. This situation, of course, has taken shape as an attitude that challenges the traditional status of men as holders of power. From this point of view, the increasing number of murders of women committed by an intimate partner — up nearly six times since 2008 — can be explained, in part, by the conflict between this changing status and mentality of women and men. Amendments to criminal law that increase penalties for violence against women even if applied without compromise will alone not solve the problem.

Prevention of femicide, the scope of which exceeds this article, can be achieved with long-term and multidimensional reforms, programs and projects. We can start by developing an approach based on understanding this problem in its sociological, anthropological and psychological dimensions. Ultimately, we need to understand both men and women, and what drives the dynamics of the relationships between them.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post What Makes Women Such Easy Targets for Violence? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The are a non-Muslim, Kurdish-speaking religious minority native to Syria and Iraq. The existence of the Syrian community, numbering roughly 10,000 members mostly along the Turkish border and the city of Afrin, is severely endangered by Turkey and its allies. According to , author of “Yezidis in Syria,” “although there is an Afrin community that goes back to almost thousands of years, this is now erased with the removal of all Yazidis from Afrin” due to Turkey’s attack of the city in 2018.

Kurdish Novelist Tackles Taboo Crimes Against Yazidis

READ MORE

Those who have not been fortunate enough to escape the Turkish occupational zone have suffered by the Turkish military and its Islamist allies, including rape and in some cases even enslavement. While the 2014 in Iraq brought attention to the group and spurred a US military intervention, Syrian Yazidis remain ignored.

Although the Yazidi community of Syria is small, the horrific abuses that it has suffered under Turkish occupation are a microcosm of a larger story of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s increasing tendency to use military force to achieve his nationalist — all while abusing his relationship with NATO, Europe and the United States by openly contesting, sometimes , the will of other member states in Libya, Iraq and the eastern Mediterranean.

Yet while Europe and the Trump administration have a habit of Erdogan, allowing near-total impunity for Turkish military operations in Syria, European leaders have begun to act against the rising threat that Ankara’s leadership poses to regional peace. In April, Germany its first trial to bring the charge of genocide against a former Islamic State (IS) member who took part in the trafficking and abuse of Yazidi women for crimes against the Yazidis. In May, the European Union’s Genocide Network, established to coordinate member state action against perpetrators, began all EU members to prosecute former IS members within their borders as war criminals. This offers one possible model for how Turkish and Syrian abusers of the Yazidi population of northern Syria can be brought to justice.

In September, the Netherlands that it would hold the Syrian government of Bashar Al-Assad accountable for a wide range of human rights abuses, applying the standards of the UN Convention Against Torture in an ongoing effort to bring the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). If the Netherlands’ attempt to hold the Assad regime accountable succeeds, it would open the way for litigation against Turkish abuses of the Yazidis in Syria. The ICJ route is important because neither Syria nor Turkey is a state party to the International Criminal Court, which can exercise jurisdiction over crimes only when the persons or location involved pertain to a state party.

The plight of Yazidis in Syria has not received as much attention as those of Iraq, but the UN report shows that the UNHRC is monitoring Turkey and its local allies. It may be that if the conflict dies down, abusers and their ringleaders will attempt to relocate to Europe and reinvent themselves — as many who fought in Syria have already done. Europe must not let this happen.

While the prosecution of war crimes that occurred in Iraq offers a possible blueprint to use against Turkey’s local Syrian allies, holding accountable the ringleaders, particularly those high up in the Turkish government, may prove to be trickier due to Turkey’s NATO membership. America’s use of earlier this year against Chinese officials responsible for the abuses against the  Muslim Uighur minority in Xinjiang offers one possible framework that Washington and Europe can use to hold Turkish officials accountable.

The Magnitsky sanctions against China served two purposes. First, they punished individual human rights abusers (as opposed to an entire country). Second, and perhaps more importantly, they drew international attention to the specific individuals and organizations that commit human rights abuses against Uighurs, helping to turn the Uighur struggle from a relatively obscure issue to a pressing moral question at the forefront of the global public’s attention. The Magnitsky sanctions could help achieve similar results for Syria’s Yazidis.

The time has long passed for Erdogan and his allies to receive any benefit of the doubt. The United States and Europe should impose Magnitsky sanctions on Turkish officials and consider moving to hold them accountable at the ICJ. Failure to act will only further embolden Erdogan and his allies, and send a signal to religious extremists that they can oppress vulnerable minority communities with impunity so long as they have powerful friends like Erdogan on their side.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Turkey Must Be Held Accountable for Its Abuse of Syria’s Yazidis appeared first on 51�Թ�.

As defined by the , femicide is the “intentional murder of women because they are women.” According to the UN, die at the hands of intimate partners and family members, mainly through domestic abuse or “honor killings.” Unfortunately, as with many forms of domestic violence, COVID-19 — and the subsequent isolation and economic pressures — has increased rates of femicide across the globe. Many countries including , and the have seen increases in femicide rates.

How to Fight Domestic Violence During a Global Pandemic

READ MORE

Even before the pandemic, there was an upward global trend in terms of femicide rates over the last several years. Approximately 87,000 women died by femicide in 2017, and the UN has recorded an average in reporting of domestic violence in 2020 due to the pandemic. In total, the of violence against women and girls is estimated to be around $1.5 trillion, or 2% of the global GDP on a yearly basis. Femicide has damaging effects on all levels of society, but, first and foremost, action needs to be taken against femicide to prevent further victimization of women and girls.

Mitigating Femicide

In order to effectively mitigate femicide, three main policies have been endorsed by international organizations. These include laws and legal frameworks that specifically forbid femicide and allocate resources toward domestic violence prevention; education and community outreach that is inclusive of women but also engages men and boys; and support, including law enforcement and other social service agencies, that women can safely report violence to in order to prevent further aggression.

However, the problem remains that while many countries do have legislation on the books and are signatories of agreements that call for an end to violence against women, these laws are simply not enforced. Thus, the reality is that women are vulnerable to violence with few protections, and those they have are at risk of being eroded. Because of the public outrage over Pinar Gültekin’s death, Turkey is one of the most notable examples of femicide in 2020.

Turkey was the first country to ratify the in 2012. The convention is intended to promote gender equality and reduction of violence against women through a series of prevention, protection and persecution strategies aimed at both victims and perpetrators. However, despite the fact that many elements of the convention now exist in national legislation, Ankara announced that it would from the convention, citing “harm to the family institution and promotion of homosexuality.”

Many feminist advocates see the problem as emerging long before this potential withdrawal because, contrary to the laws in place, the government admitted to not keeping records of women killed by femicide. The feminist platform began record-keeping after this announcement, and reported that 474 women were killed in Turkey in 2019, the highest in a decade during which murder rates of women have increased year on year.

In light of this disparity between law and practice, community action is one of the most visible methods to force public recognition of women’s issues that can lead to further policy implementation. A pivotal moment in second wave feminism was Iceland’s 1975 “,” where women forwent work and household labor to join in mass protests against unequal pay. This widespread movement ultimately led to the restructuring of many gendered laws in Iceland and offered other women’s rights activists an effective example on which to draw.

More recently, many activists have organized mass protests against femicide. Many of these occur on International Women’s Day, March 8. One particularly active region of anti-violence protest is Latin America, which is home to some of the highest femicide rates in the world. In response to President Sebastian Pinera’s nonchalant reaction to over reporting sexual abuse per year in Chile, feminist activists staged protests that led to global popularization of the , “A Rapist in Your Path.”

Similarly, women across Mexico participated in a 24-hour strike to protest the increasingly graphic murders of women around the country. While Mexican authorities reported in 2019, feminist advocacy groups say that the number of women killed is underrepresented.

Social Activism Alongside Policy

Social movements are critical for garnering attention and support but can be easily co-opted without meaningful change. The hashtag was originally used by Turkish women as a way to honor Pinar Gültekin and prevent future femicides, but after its adaptation by Western celebrities, the original intention dissolved into one of female friendships and “sisterhood.” Similar to the media campaign, when the #BlackLivesMatter feed was overrun with black squares that quashed the voices of those it was intended to uplift, the degeneration of #ChallengedAccepted undermined its ability to promote meaningful change and address femicide.

Therefore, social activism needs to occur alongside policy reform. When the voices of the people are included in legislation, the framework to implement anti-violence campaigns becomes more tangible and effective. In addressing femicide at government level, the short, mid and long-term expectations must be defined.

In the short term, countries must ensure that women and children have adequate support to report and escape abuse, especially in the midst of an ongoing pandemic. The effects of the pandemic will only continue to increase that include unemployment, problematic alcohol use, mental health problems and reductions in government social spending in areas such as health and education. Having more responders available and ensuring more temporary safe spaces are accessible is key to reducing violence and femicide in the immediate future.

Within the next six months, countries should have drafted updated long-term anti-violence plans that incorporate the effects of COVID-19 into existing legislation and propose methods to fully implement it. If the country has gaps in existing protections, it would be beneficial to work in tandem with local women’s organizations as well as with the chapters of international organizations that can report back on the state of women’s affairs and offer improvements to legal protections. In the case of Turkey, it is vital that existing protections and legislation for women are not removed. The removal of protective legislation can create immediate backlash and unrest among women and perpetrators.

In the long-term, women should have access to regular, streamlined services to turn to in cases of abuse, with particular support provided to vulnerable groups including transgender women and women in low-income brackets. Governments should maintain standardized records on violence against women. Additionally, there should be educational campaigns to inform women about access to resources, as well as initiatives to encourage gender equality, particularly those aimed at boys and men.

For perpetrators with low-level offenses, rehabilitation programs should be put in place to prevent repeat or more serious offenses. Most critically, perpetrators of femicide should be prosecuted in ways that stop the spread of violence. Removing repeat and high-level sexual violence perpetrators from the public sphere will diminish incentives for others to commit honor killings and sexual assault.  

The rise of femicide is a public health hazard like any other and affects not only victims’ families but their communities, countries and the wellbeing of women across the world. At a time when preventative measures to combat femicide are obscured and governments remain passive in the face of mounting crimes against women, it is necessary for the public to speak out in unison against gendered violence and hold governments accountable for their actions.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Around the World, Femicide Is on the Rise appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Will Bosnia and Herzegovina Ever Rise Above Its Ethnic Divisions?

READ MORE

Tanovic’s movie also depicts the disheartened departure of a curious TV crew, hungry for breaking news. Unlike the UN peacekeepers, reporters were oblivious to the fate of the soldier left behind in a ditch. In a non-fiction plot, Bosnia and Herzegovina is kept equally alive and motionless with the real ticking time bomb that can explode and blow everything in the vicinity.

Two Paths

For a dozen years now, the Balkan state has been plodding along two gloomy paths, heading for a dangerous collision. On one hand, Russia’s collusion with local proxies is destabilizing the liberal vision of collective security within the context of future Euro-Atlantic integration. Russia also continues to be the only state opposing the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its steering board’s , including the last from June 3 this year.

On the other hand, the Bosnian Serb-majority entity, Republika Srpska, is reversing the peace process while simultaneously Russia as an ally. Its nationalism, kept away like a genie in a bottle due to pressure from the European Union and American unipolar dominance, has managed to free itself from captivity. Thus, the Serb member of the rotating Bosnian presidency, Milorad Dodik, once as a “breath of fresh air” by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, has held at least 10 official consultations with Vladimir Putin over the last several years.

During his consecutive meeting with the Russian president in the midst of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Dodik shared his unequivocal affiliation with Moscow: “Naturally, there is no question that we support Russia. We may be a small and modest community, but our voice is loud.”

This trajectory with opposing power dyads within the Bosnian state is often lamented as a nightmare for the Dayton Peace Agreement that put an end to the bloody Yugoslav War in 1995 and kept the country in one piece. ; Bosnia and Herzegovina is “” into another Balkan crisis; it is on the ; its president wants to his own country; Bosnia and Herzegovina, welcome Republika Srpska’s exit — these are just some grim headlines that suggest nightmare scenarios.

However, most experts on the subject rarely discuss wider security dilemmas of this critical geopolitical divergence, namely the Bosnian Serbs’ effective breakaway from both Bosnia and Herzegovina and the West. Unlike the two times Russia played a limited hand effectively — and, as some would argue, defensively — in Georgia and Ukraine, the Kremlin’s of Europe’s soft underbelly is essentially an offensive posture that possibly inflicts fatal damage on the already shaken Euro-Atlantic pillars: liberal order, Euro-Atlantic integrity and European security.

Should the EU fail to protect its mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ensuing turmoil will eventually turn into a great-power rivalry. If the perilous trajectory in Bosnia and Herzegovina is allowed to proceed unrestricted, the West needs to fasten its seatbelts and brace for impact.

Slippery Slope

The Bosnian Serbs’ secessionist direction is not a given, but the slope is a slippery one. A unilateral breakaway would effectively tear apart Bosnia’s postwar constitutional order of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, and other political and institutional arrangements that have gradually restored peace and security over the last 25 years. The Serb secession would also signal an existential threat to the survival of a multiethnic state and the Bosnian people in particular.

Similar past attempts to impose Serb hegemony over Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s had disastrous consequences and resulted in more than 100,000 deaths, 2.2 million refugees and displaced persons, culminating with genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995. Since pro-Bosnian authorities in Sarajevo want to protect the liberal multicultural order and see the EU and the US as preferred allies, it is only natural for them to expect appropriate reactions from the Euro-Atlantic community.

On the other hand, a secessionist party would also face a critical struggle. Its immediate insecurity stems from the NATO-trained Bosnian army across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) that currently subdivides Bosnia and Herzegovina into two administrative units. As Republika Srpska’s political leadership largely opposes the liberal multicultural order and looks to Russia as a preferred ally, it would also rely on Moscow for political and military support.

Republika Srpska’s collision with a Bosnian-led government would probably escalate from threats and barricades along IEBL to larger-scale clashes that a small number of UN-mandated EUFOR troops will hardly deter. In a vicious cycle, Bosnia could eventually end up in pre-Dayton chaos that, in the early 1990s, also included the Bosnian Croat component and its own secessionist aspirations. 

Serbia, which shares a long border with Bosnia and Herzegovina and nationalist sentiments with the secessionist movement, is probably the first contender to be caught in the Bosnian fire for both internal and external reasons. In its substance, patronizing Bosnian Serbs has continued since the time when Slobodan Milosevic was at the pinnacle of his power in the early 1990s. Patriarch Irinej of the Serbian Orthodox Church, for example, proclaims that borders between Serbia and Republika Srpska . Serbia’s academics also view Serbia’s national borders as .

As Serbia’s confidence grew over time, emboldened by the return of Russia to the Balkan theater and by China’s global rise, Belgrade became more assertive in its behavior. Within months of the joint Serbian-Russian military display in October 2019, Serbia’s defense minister, Alexander Vulin, announced, among other strategic objectives, the intent to the Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia’s new national defense thus transcends national boundaries, marking a shift from defensive sovereignty to a more offensive approach.

At the same time, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic is the only politician from the region, if not the whole of Europe, who has held more bilateral consultations with President Putin than Dodik. The Kremlin’s from the last meeting between Vucic and Putin on June 23 exposes Russia’s views that two countries were developing “pragmatic but still very special and very good allied relations.”

Structural Realities

What Serbia does in Bosnia and Herzegovina pales in comparison with a much larger geopolitical dilemma. For Belgrade, now is a turning point to choose a side between the liberal West and the authoritarian East. Its official policy of neutrality and simultaneous flirting with NATO on one hand, and Russia and China on the other, may no longer be sustainable. As the rationale goes, other powers besides the United States, primarily Russia and possibly China (to a lesser extent), will enlarge their soft-power or military footprints in the regional subsystem sooner rather than later.

Other structural realities also encourage a more aggressive trajectory from Belgrade. First, Serbia has accelerated its military build-up at a faster rate than its neighbors. According to , its current defense budget is almost twice that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo combined.

Second, Serbia’s reliance on the Russian and Chinese military to balance neighboring NATO members such as Croatia, Bulgaria or Romania has also been reinforced. In 2019, Serbia Russian donations of MIG-29 fighter jets, T-72 tanks and BRDM-2MS armored vehicles. A short of the S-400 air defense system on Serbian soil also raised American eyebrows. This year, Serbia purchased, at , the Pantsir S-1 air defense system. It also bought and surface-to-air missiles from China and kept talking about new arms.

Third, Serbia can hardly benefit from the liberal European order in the Balkans except through EU membership, which seems to be a third-rate priority at the moment according to some academic voices in Belgrade. By siding with Russia and the Slavic Shield, however, Belgrade still aspires to redefine its borders, reclaim Kosovo (or at least part of it), possibly reestablish preponderance in Montenegro, Northern Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, eventually, become a Balkan hegemon.

Turkey would also become entangled in the nightmare of a new Bosnian disorder. On one level, the foreign policy objectives of Turkey and other NATO allies are compatible with almost all critical issues in the western Balkans. Turkey maintains its policy that international borders of the newly independent states in the region, following declarations of independence by Montenegro in 2006 and Kosovo in 2008, have become . In Bosnia in particular, Turkey is among 20 contributing countries of EUFOR, providing deterrence and contributing to a safe and secure environment. Ankara is also on the same page with the US and EU members in the PIC and its steering board’s that Russia usually opposes.

On another level, Turkey projects its soft power throughout the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, relying on historical, cultural and personal ties. This year, it €30 million ($36 million) to revamp and modernize the Bosnian armed forces. Turkey can also leverage its strategic partnership with Serbia to deter the latter from taking a more belligerent stance.

However, in the event of a collision in Bosnia, having military spending 10 times that of Serbia, Turkey would probably oppose Serbian offensive behavior in the region. Ankara also represents an important geopolitical substitute for the Bosnian people should the EU, EUFOR and NATO decide to abandon their commitments to safeguarding peace, security and liberal order in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their immediate and complete withdrawal from Bosnia, which is less probable, would also invite other extra-regional actors to fill the vacuum, in which case power relations would inevitably become subject to reconfiguration and different visions for both Bosnia and Herzegovina and southeastern Europe would have to emerge.

This scenario could set Turkey and Russia on a collision course because Vladimir Putin perceives Republika Srpska and Serbia as natural, historic and strategic allies. At a minimum, the Turkish double track toward Russia would have to pass an additional test. At the same time, these two countries possess formidable mediation capacity with confronting parties in the Bosnian theater that some European powers would oppose on geopolitical — and the more liberal ones on ideological — grounds.

Our European Home

As Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov this summer, “Our common European home needs serious reconstruction if we want all of its residents to live in prosperity.” The Kremlin, so the perception goes, seeks to reshape the liberal Euro-Atlantic order in Russia’s image and for its own benefit. Second, Moscow is also interested in replacing the US-mandated hierarchic order in Europe with an unknown, but certainly more anarchic, multipolar structure. But Bosnia and Herzegovina is not on the Russian border, and its inclusion in the NATO structure does not pose any meaningful threat to Moscow.

However, Republika Srpska’s secession from a country that lacks NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense guarantee presents yet another opportunity for Russia to become more influential on the European stage at the cost of the Euro-Atlantic order.

At first sight, a local collision in Bosnia and Herzegovina would bear a striking resemblance to what transpired in Ukraine in 2013-14. Ukraine was forcefully divided along similar geopolitical and domestic lines between pro-European aspirations in Kyiv on one hand, and secessionist tendencies by the pro-Russian minority in the east on the other. However, Bosnia’s instability is far more dangerous than the crisis in Ukraine for two structural reasons, largely ignored so far. First, in Republika Srpska, Putin’s prospects are of the highest geopolitical value, namely having a loyal proxy ready to do Moscow’s bidding, not in Russia’s near abroad like Ukraine, but deep within the EU’s external borders.

No Credible Alternative to the US Grand Strategy in Europe

READ MORE

Second, Russia’s penetration within NATO’s eastern borders also challenges Pax Americana and a 70-year-old alliance system in Europe. The latter represents a deep incursion into the system protected and deeply rooted in American and European liberal values. In that context, the nature of Russia’s disruptive behavior in Bosnia no longer remains defensive but becomes an offensive act against the West.

Some may argue that Russia’s aims are less relevant. What matters is �ѴDz����Ƿ�’s capability to project soft and hard power. In this regard, skeptical analysts largely question Russia’s ability to challenge the United States in the Balkans. Their typical reference is domestic weakness and Russia’s stagnating economy, with an annual GDP that is smaller than Italy’s. However, other great power credentials such as its sheer size, nuclear weapons capability, vast natural resources and an impressive cyber weapons arsenal enable Russia to punch above its weight on the world arena, keeping Europe and NATO vigilant.

As Russia has shown with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, it won’t shy away from using its extraordinary military readiness for limited ends without fear of unintended consequences. Eventually, it was effective at projecting military power in areas where the Euro-Atlantic community was reluctant to do so. Bosnia and Herzegovina, vulnerable as it may be, provides an easy target for Russia, offering Moscow the best chance to keep the West in retreat.

Opposing Power Dyads

This trajectory with opposing power dyads within the Bosnian state brings challenging dynamics for the European Union too. From the inside, the EU’s multitasking operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina would have to pass their stress test. From the outside, likely incursions of other illiberal powers in Brussels’ backyard would ostensibly place the two opposing sides on a collision course.

A major dilemma for the EU lies between a strong multilateral reaction to protect a collective peace-building legacy and unilateral moves by individual member states to pursue their national interests. The EU’s first viable option would be to increase EUFOR’s symbolic military mission to protect order and address the grievances of local communities. As Kurt Bassuener in Foreign Affairs last year, the current mission can’t defend itself against any growing uncertainty with “an institutional fig leaf of 600 troops,” “much less fulfill the mandate of the Dayton accords.”

Should the EUFOR contributing states strengthen their capacity and act decisively within NATO’s interoperability mechanisms, the Bosnian crisis would probably not escalate. In this regard, EUFOR’s annual military exercises — which airlift reserve forces and combine them with EUFOR’s permanent troops, armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and local law enforcement agencies — are of critical importance.

An alternative scenario with dire consequences would be to evacuate EUFOR troops from Bosnia altogether. This is what happened when the Dutch battalion, under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Protection Force, pulled out from Srebrenica in July 1995, mocking the UN resolutions on safe heavens and allowing Serb extremists — today convicted war criminals — to proceed unabashedly with genocide. Such a reaction would deprive Bosnia of European military presence and set in motion a rapid geopolitical change, allowing regional and extra-regional actors to take advantage and fill the vacuum.

If that happens, the ability of Brussels to extend stability and project soft power in the region would be severely weakened, if not completely diminished. This prospect, before long, compels particular EU member states that simultaneously live in two parallel worlds — one liberal and one increasingly illiberal — to make their final ideational preference. It also provokes complex and dangerous dynamics given opposing threat perceptions between those member states that border Russia and a few others that explore interest-based partnerships with Moscow.

Undercurrents of this anxiety might have already surfaced when French President Emmanuel Macron of the necessity to reopen “a strategic dialogue” with Russia, that Russia was a “threat” but “no longer an enemy” and “also a partner on certain topics.” Things may get extremely complicated if populist EU leaders choose to decouple from the US and the transatlantic security umbrella. Hungary’s to permit the transit of Russian military equipment to Serbia last year signaled an early warning that some member states are ready to circumvent common rules and jeopardize common security.

Hence, a powerful trigger such as a new Bosnian crisis would elevate Europe’s threat perceptions to such proportions that the United States would have to rescue the alliance and its central position within it. This resonates with the poor historical record of the EU in conflict management in ex-Yugoslavia, despite much more favorable geopolitical realities in the early 1990s. With an exception of a short war in Slovenia, the EU demonstrated neither effectiveness nor capacity in preempting the bloodshed in 1991.

Eventually, European leaders failed miserably in Bosnia, prompting a peace treaty to be negotiated and drafted in the US rather than Europe. Should this failure be repeated, the third consequential choice for the EU will be to pass the buck on to Washington, in which case this regional small-nation turmoil would transform into a great-power rivalry.

Most Dangerous of All Moods

Addressing the US Senate on the American mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of 1995, then-Senator Joe Biden made a powerful “Europe cannot stay united without United States. There is no moral center in Europe. When in the last two centuries had the French, or the British or the Germans … moved in a way to unify that continent to stand up to this kind of genocide?” He went on: “I am not here to tell you if we do not act, it will spread tomorrow and cause a war in Europe or next year, but I am here to tell you within the decade, it will cause a spread of war and a cancer and the collapse of Western alliance.”

Human agency aside, structural forces would also be at play and would likely determine Washington’s preferred move. First, the US is still — by all realist and neorealist accounts, such as , , and — more powerful, wealthier and more influential relative to any potential competitor in the international system. Even by the of those who support a more restrained foreign policy, with US primacy still intact in Europe, American policymakers would continue to be attracted to liberal hegemony and more so to the existing grand strategy in the European subsystem where the US is not only unchallenged but is largely accepted as benevolent.

The US is also a rational actor that makes calculations regarding its position in a changing regional and international order. Washington understands well that Russia’s unchecked incursion so close to NATO’s eastern border would damage American-led liberal order and alliance structure and, at the same time, change the regional — and possibly even the European — balance of power to the detriment of the United States.

This brings us to what the historian Michael Howard “the most dangerous of all moods,” in which the US would not accept a relegation “to the second rank” in the European subsystem. So far, no US administration has shown any intention to leave Europe as a vital area of America’s global footprint in which it had invested a vast amount of blood and money over the past century. In reality, US military presence has essentially in Europe in recent years, bringing in more troops, investment and exercises.

The US military also supports the peace-building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On this 25^th anniversary of the Dayton Accords, it conducted a air support exercise with Bosnian military forces using two F-16 fighter planes. So, locking, loading and bombing the party that disrupts American-led order in southeastern Europe on Russia’s behalf is not only possible, but could even become probable.

Great powers usually do not show much interest in fighting over the squabbles of small nations. However, history is full of exceptions, when minor disputes over isolated issues have dragged great powers into quagmires. Interestingly enough, such regrettable dynamics are best illustrated in the Balkans. A minor dispute in 435 BC between the city-state of Corinth, allied with Sparta, and the city-state Corcyra, allied with Athens, soon led to a larger conflict, eventually trapping the great powers of Athens and Sparta into the Peloponnesian Wars that devastated the Athenian empire, exhausted Sparta and shattered the cultural landscape of Ancient Greece.

What took place in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, was another striking incident that triggered a chain of adverse reactions that set the whole of Europe, and then the world, on fire. Bosnia and Herzegovina is again a danger zone on the European geopolitical map where competing opponents face the pressures of being bogged down in protracted rivalries due to rapidly shifting power dynamics. Such settings create a space for a modern-day Gavrilo Princip to fire his bullet and trigger a chain of regrettable events.

Hence, not stemming the Serb breakaway from the Dayton mandate, from both Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider Western liberal order, would be tantamount to allowing a ticking time bomb to go off. Paradoxically, this threat comes at a time when the Balkan region has a good chance to institute a viable order, secure lasting peace and fulfill its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The decision is there for the taking.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post 25 Years On, The Dayton Peace Agreement Is a Ticking Time Bomb appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Members of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Government of National Accord (GNA) met in September in , Egypt, to discuss a ceasefire for the first time since the early months of 2020, culminating in the October 23 agreement on a . This deal included provisions calling for the departure of all foreign fighters from Libya within three months, a freeze on military agreements with foreign parties, the demilitarization of the conflict’s frontlines (Sirte and Jufra districts) and the establishment of a joint policing force to monitor and secure the demilitarized frontlines.

Europe Is Divided in Libya

READ MORE

Military talks have advanced alongside parallel political dialogue, which has also seen progress over recent months. Political talks have been held between members of the GNA and the Tripoli-based consultative body, the High Council of State, on one side, and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, which is aligned with the LNA, on the other side. Meetings between these actors — which have taken place on September 6 in , September 7-9 in and October 11-13 in — are focusing on reaching an agreement on creating a new presidential council to govern Libya, setting a date for parliamentary elections and more broadly reunifying the country.

The aim of the ongoing political dialogue, under the auspices of the UN, is to reach an agreement on these issues at the summit in Tunisia that began on November 9. However, the prospects of the conflict ending and the reunification of the country taking place in the coming year remain unlikely.

Less Fighting, More Talking

The progress of the political and military negotiations has been bolstered by the September 18 agreement between GNA Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Maiteeq and LNA interlocutors to ease the that the LNA had imposed since January this year. This agreement has been slowly implemented in Libya since the end of September, and has risen from a low of approximately 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 1 million bpd on November 7. The blockade had been a major grievance for the GNA since oil exports account for more than 90% of Libya’s . The blockade had the state at least $9 billion in revenue.

These political and military talks are a positive step forward for the country, which had been in the midst of intense fighting just a few months ago. However, a comprehensive peace deal is not just over the horizon. This ceasefire is only the latest attempt to stop the fighting; the most recent of January 11 collapsed within weeks of being signed. Moreover, efforts to build trust between the LNA and GNA will be difficult, and neither party is currently willing to sever their lifelines to key foreign backers or force them to leave the country.

The GNA was only able to win the Tripoli battle because of the military support it received from Turkey, including the thousands of deployed by Ankara. Just days after the ceasefire was agreed, the GNA signed a on security cooperation with Qatar in a move that undermines the spirit, if not the letter, of the ceasefire agreement. The GNA remains weary of the LNA and its leader Khalifa Haftar after the general launched the attack on Tripoli in April 2019 before a planned UN peace conference. There are also constituencies among the militia groups that make up the GNA’s armed forces that are and broader military negotiations with the LNA.

Meanwhile, the LNA has its own reasons to resist adhering to certain aspects of the ceasefire agreement. The LNA’s dependence on and military, financial and political support has increased over the past year, and aligned with the LNA are also present in the country. The LNA will not want to remove foreign forces, which provide important military support, from the country. Moreover, it is likely that Haftar is merely biding his time with this ceasefire, de-escalating tensions while allowing oil revenues to flow back into the system to appease the growing number of Libyans who are exasperated by the country’s sharp .

General Haftar maintains the intent to rule Libya. However, he does not currently have the ability to impose his will by force, especially while the GNA has strong Turkish backing. Haftar will thus present a major obstacle to a comprehensive end to the conflict — unless he is effectively sidelined. This remains unlikely over the coming months since Haftar retains significant support of key tribal constituencies and because his interests remain aligned with those of his international backers.

Back in Business

While a total end to the conflict very likely remains out of reach in the coming months, the de-escalation in fighting has opened opportunities for business. The country, and particularly the state-owned General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL), is in significant need of upgrades and repairs to power infrastructure. At the moment, GECOL is producing around 4,500 MW, but peak demand stands at around 7,000 MW. The end of the battle for Tripoli in June and the limited progress in military and political talks have created conditions that are allowing international firms to power projects. Moreover, the resumption of oil exports will generate government revenues that will make it possible to start .

Business confidence in the oil and gas sector is also rising as operations are beginning to ramp up. Nuri Esaid, chairman of Tripoli-based Akakus Oil Operations, on October 31 that the Sharara oilfield in Libya’s southwest will pump 300,000 bpd by the end of 2020, following the by Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) to lift force majeure at the field on October 11. The NOC also lifted force majeure at oil export terminals on October 23, removing the final barriers to ramping up oil production nationwide. Businesses with operations in the country will cautiously seek to restart projects that have been regularly disrupted over the past years.

Nevertheless, the operating environment remains fraught with risk. Companies must balance their relationships with both the LNA, which has physical control over most of the country’s oil and gas installations, and the GNA, which nominally controls all key state institutions, such as Libya’s central bank and the NOC. There are also security challenges arising from the presence of local Petroleum Facilities Guards that often have their own interests. In December 2018, for example, the worked with members of the guards to shutdown the Sharara oilfield to demand greater government economic support for southern Libya.

Local grievances in the southwest over lack of economic opportunity and government support, as well as tribal divisions, especially between local Tebu and Tuareg groups, in the area will sustain threats of unrest and communal violence. Moreover, the Islamic State is still present, if diminished, in central Libya and capable of launching small-scale attacks. Sustained political fragmentation will contribute to the continuation of longstanding security deficiencies as the country’s rival authorities will fail to adopt a unified, cooperative approach to country-wide security. As progress toward a more comprehensive political settlement stalls, the prospect that Khalifa Haftar will reimpose an oil blockade — and reignite the conflict — will grow.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post For Libya, Peace Remains Unlikely appeared first on 51�Թ�.

President Erdogan is but the most recent and arguably most egregious expression of Turkish nationalism that seeks to restore past glory by gathering all Turkish peoples under one roof, similar to what once was known as pan-Slavism. This explains why Erdogan has been adamant in his support for Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Ironically enough, Erdogan has been amazingly with respect to the oppression of Muslim Uighurs in China’s Xinjiang province. As so often, money trumps convictions while hypocrisy .

In an Era of Strongman Politics, Turkey Is Hard to Call

READ MORE

This is deplorable, but, as US President Donald Trump has put is so eloquently, albeit in a different , “It is what it is.” In any case, the topic here isn’t Erdogan’s attempt to establish himself as the champion of pan-Turkish nationalism or his attempt to affirm his claim to champion the cause of Islam, exemplified in his recent attacks against French President Emmanuel Macron. Instead, the focus is on Erdogan as a typical exponent of contemporary authoritarian populism.

Claim to Legitimacy

Populists base their claim to legitimacy on the notion that they promote the interests of “ordinary citizens” against an aloof elite far removed from everyday life, an elite that could care less about people’s concerns and worries. Against that, populists maintain that if elected, they will make the concerns and wellbeing of ordinary citizens their main priority. This is how Erdogan, Trump, India’s Narendra Modi and Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro swept into office. This is what has been their claim to legitimacy.

Unfortunately, hard reality is a far cry from lofty promises. Decades of experience with populist regimes shows that populists in power have a disastrous economic track record. To make things worse, populists appear to be particularly resistant to taking advice from those who have studied populist economics or learning from the glaring mistakes made by populist regimes in the past.

There is, by now, a substantial record of serious analysis of populist economics, largely based on the experience of Latin American populism. Take, for instance, Jeffrey Sachs, who certainly is above any suspicion of harboring right-wing proclivities. In a paper from 1989, he analyzed what he called the “populist policy cycle”: Overly “expansionary macroeconomic policies,” , “lead to high inflation and severe balance of payments crises.”

In a similar vein, Rüdiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards in 1991, “Again and again, and in country after country, policymakers have embraced economic programs that rely heavily on the use of expansive fiscal and credit policies and overvalued currency to accelerate growth and redistribute income.” After a short-lived economic boom, , engendering “unsustainable macroeconomic pressures that, at the end, result in the plummeting of real wages and severe balance of payment difficulties. The final outcome of these experiments has generally been galloping inflation, crisis, and the collapse of the economic system.” Ultimately, those supposed to benefit most from populist economic policies, i.e., the poor, end up worse off than they had been before the populists came to power.

Recent developments in Turkey suggest that Erdogan’s regime might be heading in the same direction. Take, for instance, the evolution of the country’s currency, the lira. Over the past nine months, the lira has lost almost 25% of its value the US dollar and the euro. This reflects investor worries about rising inflation, depleting currency reserves and the fact that Turks appear to be into foreign currencies.

Same Direction

The concerns are hardly unfounded. In late September, the Turkish central bank by 200 basis points, from 8.25% to 10.25%, in an attempt to counter rising inflation. This marked a drastic reversal of previous policy. Starting in December 2019, it had successively slashed the interest rate, which at the time stood at 14%. The move was not entirely of the bank’s own making. In July, Erdogan, unhappy about the bank’s slow pace in cutting interest rates, its chief for not having “follow[ed] instruction.” His replacement dutifully embarked on a course of monetary easing, based on official projections that the inflation rate would fall to around 8% by the end of 2020.

Monetary easing provoked a massive “credit binge” by both businesses and households, which, in turn, stoked the flames of inflation, far surpassing the projected 8% mark. In reality, inflation rose to around 12% in 2020. In response to monetary easing, private debt increased substantially, with often disastrous consequences. A prominent case in point is Turkey’s professional football clubs. The four most prominent ones — Besiktas, Galatasaray, Fenerbahce and Trabzonspor — have accumulated around €1.5 billion ($1.8 billion) worth of debt.

The reason? In line with Erdogan’s goal to turn Turkey into a major global power, the country’s top football clubs endeavored to move into the Gotha of European football, on par with the likes of Real Madrid, Bayern München and Manchester City. In order to reach this goal, they borrowed heavily in euros and dollars in order to be able to attract international star players. The partial collapse of the Turkish lira, together with the drying up of revenues in the wake of COVID-19, has pushed to the abyss of financial ruin.

It would be going too far to suggest that this might be a preview of things to come for Turkey as a whole. In fact, the regime’s economic track record has been relatively successful in performing a balancing act between sane economic policy and populist inclinations. This has been due, to a significant extent, to the central bank’s relative independence, even if this has noticeably eroded over the past several years, constantly under pressure from the president to support the regime’s . The recent rate hike might suggest, or so one might hope, that realism has once again gained the upper hand.

This would certainly be a departure from business as usual as far as populist regimes are concerned. A recent extensive study by economists from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy and the University of Bonn in Germany provides an extensive and detailed account of the populist regimes have demonstrated when it comes to the basics of economics. Silvio Berlusconi’s tenure, for instance, did little to advance the life chances of ordinary Italians.

On the contrary, the upsurge in voter discontent and disenchantment that, for a short period of time, propelled the Five Star Movement to the top of Italian politics, reflects the opportunities wasted during Berlusconi’s reign. This has been particularly pronounced in Latin America, but not only there. In the medium and long run, as the study’s authors conclude, “virtually all countries governed by populists witness subpar economic outcomes evidenced by a substantial decline in real GDP and consumption.” It would be easy to dismiss these outcomes as the result of misguided policies, informed by good intentions but with disastrous consequences. My guess is, however, that this is only part of the story, and the less important one at that. Not for nothing those who have studied populism have emphasized the importance of the “common sense of common people” as a central trope in populist rhetoric, targeting expert “elites.”

Unfortunately, more often than not, the common sense of the common people is completely wrong. Even more unfortunately, ignoring expert advice more often than not has disastrous consequences — in economics, as well as with regard to the coronavirus pandemic.

Once again, Erdogan is a prominent example. Despite an upsurge in COVID-19 infections, the president has been more than reluctant to follow advice to impose stringent measures to contain the virus. At the same time, his political allies have Turkish medical experts of “treason,” reminiscent of in the United States. To make matters worse, Erdogan’s shameful attack on President Macron in the wake of Islamicist-inspired terrorist attacks in France is hardly conducive to improving Turkey’s economic relations with Western Europe, a vital market for . So much for common sense.

*[51�Թ� is a  partner of the .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Why Populists at the Helm Are Bad for the Economy appeared first on 51�Թ�.

�ʲ��ٲ�’s , Abdullakh Anzorov, is an 18-year-old of Chechen origin. He arrived in France at the age of 6 as a refugee and was granted asylum. In an audio message in Russian, Anzorov claimed to have “avenged the prophet” whom Paty had portrayed “in an insulting way.” Before he was murdered, Paty was the victim of an online hate campaign orchestrated by the father of a student who reportedly might not even have been in the class.

As Agnès Poirier wrote in , since the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, the French seem to be “living [their] lives between terrorist assaults.” Since then, she writes, “Islamists in France have targeted and murdered journalists, cartoonists, policemen and women, soldiers, Jews, young people at a concert, football fans, families at a Bastille Day fireworks show, an 86-year-old priest celebrating mass in his little Normandy church, tourists at a Christmas market… the list goes on.”

Emmanuel Macron, France’s Islamophobe-in-Chief

READ MORE

Yet �ʲ��ٲ�’s killing has touched a chord. Arguably, no country venerates its history teachers more than France. After defeat against Prince Otto von Bismarck’s Prussia in 1870, the Third Republic emerged. In the 1880s, it took away education from the Catholic Church, making it free, mandatory and secular. Poirier observes that the “peaceful infantry of teachers” has since “been the bedrock of the French republic.”

She poignantly points out that the first generations of teachers were nicknamed “the Black Hussars of the Republic” because they had to battle the local priest for influence. Thanks to these teachers, as per Poirier, “religion was eventually relegated to the spiritual realm.” More than others, history teachers are the keepers of the revolutionary and republican flame, exposing young minds to Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot et al and emancipating their thinking.

French President Emmanuel Macron called the brutal beheading an “Islamist terrorist attack.” At a ceremony at Sorbonne University, he conferred the on Paty. Macron awarded France’s highest honor posthumously to the late history teacher because he died for trying to explain freedom of speech.

Macron has since defended the right of French citizens to publish anything, howsoever offensive others might find that to be. Earlier this month, he , “Islam is a religion that is in crisis all over the world today, we are not just seeing this in our country.” His comments enraged many Muslims inside and outside France.

�ʲ��ٲ�’s killing has shaken France to the core. After more than a century, religion is back to the forefront in the country. This time, it is not Catholicism but Islam.

A History of Blood and Gore

At the heart of the matter is a simple question: Does Islam lead to violence and terrorism? Many Islamic scholars and political analysts argue in the negative. After all, the Catholic Church burned and launched the Inquisition. Jews fled Spain to find refuge in lands. These authors take the contrarian view that Islam can only be a religion of peace after it conquers the world and establishes a supremacy of sharia.

Writing about Islam’s links to violence and terrorism is sensitive and controversial. There are nuances to be sure. However, most scholars know fully well that Islam has a . It rests on the assumption that justice would not be served unless the will of Allah is established all over the world. As per this theory, non-believers in Islam have three choices.

First, they can convert to Islam and become part of the , the global community of Muslims who recognize there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his final messenger. Second, they can refuse to submit to Allah, but they must then flee their homes or face the sword. Third, they can surrender to Muslims and pay jizya, a poll tox for non-Muslims in a state run according to Islamic principles.

Both Sunnis and Shias prize jihad, which denotes both personal struggle and just war. Both Sunnis and Shias believe that jihad is the duty of an Islamic state, should certain conditions arise. There is little daylight between Sunnis and Shias on their ideas of jihad against non-believers. Many Muslim jurists considered the non-acceptance of Islam by non-Muslims an act of aggression that had to be countered through jihad. Like Christianity, Islam lays claim to universality and jihad is its version of a crusade.

Arguably, the most interesting reform of Islamic law occurred when Arabs conquered Sindh in the eighth century. For the first time, Islam encountered Hindus, Buddhists and Jains. A puritanical Abrahamic faith encountered much older spiritual traditions of the Indus and Gangetic river basins. These pagan polytheists were not covered by the Quran. Its verses recognized Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians and the imprecisely defined Sabians. These religions are based on divine revelations and came to be known as , the People of the Book.

The Indo-Gangetic spiritual traditions were clearly not the People of the Book. When Muhammad bin Qasim conquered Sindh, he approached the then-caliph in Damascus for how to deal with Indian polytheists. The fuqaha (Islamic jurists) and the ulema (clergy) in Damascus ruled that these new religions ultimately believed in the very same god as Muslims and the People of the Book. Therefore, through the exercise of qiyas — analogical reasoning as applied to the deduction of Islamic juridical principles — these non-Muslim Sindhis were to be treated as protected minorities if they paid the jizya.

As waves of Muslim invaders came to the Indian subcontinent, conversion took place both through peaceful and violent means. Lower-caste Hindus turned to Islam because it offered a greater sense of community, charity for the poor and egalitarianism. Yet violence was par for the course too. Idols were smashed, temples desecrated and local communities slaughtered.

Muslims who claim that theirs is a religion of peace could do well to remember that even the golden age of Islam is full of blood. The first three caliphs were assassinated. and were brave generals who led aggressive armies and did not hesitate to spill blood.

The exemplifies the violence that has accompanied Islam from its early days. In 680, Umayyad Caliph Yazid I’s troops massacred the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and son of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth caliph. For Shias, it remains an annual holy day of public mourning. This was a bloodthirsty struggle for succession and has led to a Shia-Sunni divide that runs deep to this day.

The Umayyad Empire’s extravagance and decadence led to a successful Abbasid rebellion in 750. The victors invited over 80 Umayyad family members to a grand feast on the pretext of reconciliation. In reality, this feat was the infamous in which the Umayyads were killed in cold blood. was the only Umayyad who escaped, and he fled all the way to Spain to set up the kingdom of al-Andalus.

Violence in Modern Times

Over time, Arab rule became benign. There is a strong argument to be made that Muslim rule was more tolerant than Christian rule in many matters. Minorities who paid jizya carried on with their business and way of life. The Ottomans, the Safavids and the Mughals governed multi-ethnic empires even as Europe imploded into religious wars.

Once Europe took to technological, industrial and military innovation, the rest of the world fell under its sway. Tottering Muslim empires were no exception. This defeat still rankles among many Muslims. Many have turned inward and hark back to a glory period of Islamic dominance. They dream of the days when Muslim armies swept all before them, including Jerusalem in 1187 or Constantinople in 1453.

After World War II, European colonial rule has been replaced by American economic domination. Oil was discovered in key parts of the Muslim world, including Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, it was Western companies that took much of the profits. Till today, the price of oil is denominated in dollars. The formation and domination of Israel in the Middle East added to this Muslim angst. In 1979, a millenarian revolution succeeded in Iran. In the same year, militants seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca, and it took two weeks of pitched battles for Saudi forces to regain control. The militants might have lost, but Saudi Arabia emulated Iran in hardening sharia and giving more power to the ulema.

In Iran, the new regime killed thousands who did not agree with it. They included liberals and leftists. Led by hardline clerics, the Iranian regime liquidated the minority Bahai sect in Iran. It set out to export its Islamic revolution. In response, the Saudis began to export their own puritanical Wahhabi Islam. Saudi money poured all the way from and India to and Chechnya.

This took place at the height of the Cold War. This was a time when the West in general and Washington in particular were terrified of the Soviet Union. The fear of communism led Americans to intervene in Iran, Vietnam and elsewhere. They made a Faustian pact with militant Islam. The CIA worked with god-fearing Islamists to fight godless communists. These Islamists went on to become a trusty sword arm for the US against the communist menace of the Soviet Union. Nowhere was this best exemplified than the jihad Americans funded in Afghanistan against the Soviets. As is hilariously captured in , the Saudis matched the Americans dollar for dollar.

Eventually, the Soviet Union fell and the West won. As nationalism, socialism and pan-Arabism stood discredited, the battle-hardened jihadis stood ready to take their place. Conservative, fundamentalist, extreme and radical Islamists soon found their spot in the sun. The Molotov cocktail of violence and terrorism spread throughout Muslim societies. Disgruntled young Muslim men in the West found this cocktail particularly irresistible. In the post-9/11 world, there is a mountain of literature that chronicles all this and more.

American action after the attacks on September 11, 2001, have strengthened rather than weakened this culture of violence and terrorism. George W. Bush’s war on terror has proved an unmitigated disaster. In 2003, the Americans unleashed chaos in Iraq by dismantling the Baathist regime and leaving nothing in its place. A Shia-Sunni civil war followed. Iran became a touch too powerful in Iraq. Sunnis who had been dominant during the Baathist era under Saddam Hussein were left leaderless and felt marginalized. In the aftermath, the Islamic State emerged in the vacuum. Syria imploded as well and the Sykes-Picot construct collapsed. The Islamic State’s messianic message of violence and terrorism not only garnered local support, but it also drew in recruits from Europe, South Asia and elsewhere.

Eventually, Syria, Iran and Russia allied together even as the UK and the US collaborated quietly to crush the Islamic State. They were able to destroy it militarily, but radical Islamist ideology lives on. It is the same ideology that powered the Iranian Revolution, the Afghan jihad and Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. Now, it is inspiring Anzorovs to behead Patys.

A Clash of Cultures

In the aftermath of �ʲ��ٲ�’s beheading, France and Turkey have . Macron has championed freedom of expression, which includes the liberty of publishing cartoons of Prophet Muhammad. Like many of his countrymen, Macron sees freedom of expression as an essential part of France’s secular values. ����ï������é, the French version of secularism, is enshrined in the very first article of the constitution. It declares, “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic.” Macron has pledged to “to defend secular values and fight radical Islam.”

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan takes objection to Macron’s position. He believes that there must be limits to freedom of expression. With millions of Muslims in France and over a billion around the world, the French should desist from insulting Prophet Muhammad. Erdogan sees Macron as having a problem with Islam and Muslims. In a speech, the Turkish leader declared, “Macron needs treatment on a mental level.” In response, France has said Erdogan’s comments are unacceptable and recalled its ambassador to Turkey.

A new kind of Islamism has now entered the scene. Unlike clerics in Iran or royals in Saudi Arabia, Erdogan is a democratically elected leader. Ironically, he rose to power in Turkey thanks to the country’s growing democratization, which in turn was fueled by its quest to join the European Union. In Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s secular Turkey, the Islamist Erdogan seized power and brought in a very different vision for the future.

Erdogan jettisoned Ataturk’s Europeanization of Turkey. Instead, he decided to become the popular, democratic voice for Islam. He has championed causes like Palestine, Kashmir and Xinjiang that resonate with Muslims worldwide. Even as the Turkish economy stumbles, Erdogan is taking on Macron as a defender of Islam. Erdogan gains inspiration from the Ottoman Empire. Until a century ago, the Ottoman sultan was also the caliph, the spiritual leader of the Sunni world. In fact, Mahatma Gandhi’s first mass movement in 1919 demanded the restoration of the Ottoman caliphate.

President Erdogan wants to bring back Ottoman cultural glory to Turkey. One by one, he is smashing up the symbols of secular Turkey. A few years ago, Erdogan built a 1,000-room white palace on 50 acres of Ataturk Forest Farm, breaking environmental codes and contravening court orders. On July 10, 2020, he reversed the 1934 decision to convert Hagia Sophia into a museum. Now, this architectural marvel is a mosque again.

France is a land of joie de vivre, which favors bikinis over burkinis. ����ï������é emerged after a bitter struggle with the Catholic Church, is central to the republic and is an article of faith. In contrast, Turkey is rolling back Ataturk’s version of ����ï������é. Erdogan is striving to emerge as the popular Islamic leader who takes on the West, India and even China. He has thus thrown the gauntlet to Macron.

Erdogan has geopolitical reasons to rile Macron. Turkey and France are on opposing sides in Libya’s civil war as well as the ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. France has deployed jets and frigates to counter Turkish oil and gas exploration in disputed waters in the eastern Mediterranean. Now, the two countries are squaring off on religion.

The Turkish president is not alone in Macron. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has also accused Macron of “attacking Islam.” Erdogan is urging a boycott of French goods. Many others in the Muslim are also calling for such a boycott. Some shops in Kuwait, Jordan and Qatar have already removed French products. Protests have broken out in Libya, Syria and Gaza.

Secularism vs. Faith

Erdogan’s actions and the support they have garnered raise uncomfortable questions. In the Westphalian system of nation-states, what right does he have to tell Macron how to run his country? More importantly, his rhetoric raises a key question about the world. Who decides what is offensive? Can a popularly elected leader of a former imperial power speak up for co-religionists to another former imperial power or anyone else? If so, are we seeing a drift toward Samuel Huntington’s famous proposition about a clash of civilizations?

This question assumes importance in the light of the past. When Spanish conquistadores took over Latin America, they did not just rape, torture and kill. They killed the local gods and ensured the triumph of the Christian one. In “Things Fall Apart,” the great Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe chronicles how Christianity went hand in hand with colonization in Africa. In India, Muslim invaders sacked temples. In Iran, Safavids destroyed Sunni mosques and converted them into Shia ones. In recent years, many have seen secularism as a way out of this maze of centuries-old religious conflict.

Intellectually, secularism is the legacy of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. It involves the shrinking of religion from the public to the private sphere. After all, religious wars tore apart Europe for more than a century and a half. Today, France is thankfully not ruled according to l’ancien regime’s of “un roi, une foi, une loi” (one king, one faith, one law). Unlike Huguenots, Muslims have not been subjected to St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre. ����ï������é may not be perfect, but it is much better than the alternative.

Unfortunately, Muslim societies have failed to embrace secularism. From Indonesia and Pakistan to Iran and Turkey, there is a disturbing intolerance afoot. Of course, the West fanned the flames, but now this conflagration inspired by religion is singeing societies, states and even the international order. Earlier this year, the Islamic State group Sikhs in Kabul. By September, most of the Hindus and Sikhs Afghanistan. It is important to note that these communities had lived in Afghanistan for centuries and even stayed on during the heydays of the Taliban.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the failure of American-style capitalism to provide prosperity or opportunity, people are turning again to religion. On October 22, a Polish court banned almost all . In Eastern Europe and Russia, the influence of the church has been increasing. Even benign Buddhists have turned malign and are targeting minorities in Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Yet the scale of what is going on in the Muslim world is different. There are tectonic shifts underway from Islamabad to Istanbul that are disturbing. Minorities are fleeing Muslim countries and radical Islamists like Anzorov are taking to the sword.

Does Macron have a point? Is Islam truly in crisis?

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Macron Claims Islam Is in “Crisis.” Erdogan Disagrees appeared first on 51�Թ�.

360° Context: The 2020 US Election Explained

READ MORE

Of course, it says more about the moral fault lines at the heart of US politics than it does about US-Turkish relations. These fault lines are being given the scorched earth treatment once more as the election season draws to a close. But what does the future hold for US-Turkish relations, once so unshakable and now so fractious, despite President Trump’s personal warmth toward Recep Tayyip Erdogan? Will it make any difference if the old man at the helm is Joe Biden instead?

Let the Old Men Talk

As the above quote reveals, much about US-Turkish relations today is being driven by personalities. Individuals always matter in international relations, but their importance is accentuated by the rise of figures who command strong populist appeal, who are firmly embedded in positions of power and who espouse an essentially patriarchal and conservative vision of the exercise of that power. It means relations are not the smooth ride they were during the Cold War era. Today, these populist figures thrive on being bullish and awkward leaders.

In Donald Trump, Turkey’s leader, like many others, has found a man with whom they can engage. Indeed, President Erdogan is said to have a regular hotline to the White House. The US president is openly admiring of strong and often autocratic leadership. It’s a style he clearly feels he epitomized in the business world and which he has brought to his presidency. That his tenure as the president of the United States may be briefer than that of many of the populist and autocratic leaders he admires is the one spoiler.

It may also be a spoiler for the US more broadly. In the past few years, such world leaders have grown self-confident in the global order lead by Donald Trump. A Biden administration that chastises them for their faults on human rights, conflict resolution or democratic norms might well receive a hostile response. This poses a conundrum for the United States. A president who set out specifically to put America first may have made it far harder for a successor who wants to begin collaborating again.

What Would Biden Do?

The signs are that as president, Joe Biden would not have as easy a relationship with Erdogan as Trump has had. Given that getting on with Turkey has increasingly come to mean getting on with its president, this matters a great deal. Almost a year ago, Biden said in an interview with The New York Times that he regarded Erdogan as an “autocrat.” He also expressed misgivings about Turkey’s actions in Syria, confrontations in the eastern Mediterranean about energy resources, and the stationing of NATO nuclear weapons on Turkish soil.

Though these comments went unacknowledged at the time, the Turkish government has since raised heated objections as Biden’s presidential bid has gathered steam. There will also be real concerns in Ankara about Biden’s longstanding support for Kurdish rights, including his belief that President Trump has dealt shoddily with his nation’s Kurdish allies in Syria after they helped to subdue the Islamic State group. Such a position would bring back some of the tensions of the Obama presidency.

Clearly, upon gaining the presidency, one would expect a measure of realignment from the Biden White House. The former vice president’s strong stance against Erdogan would have to become more nuanced as occurs for all those who gain actual power. President Erdogan is not an autocrat. He may have authoritarian instincts, but autocrats do not allow elections with credible results, nor do they allow their opponents to win the mayoralty in their largest cities. 

The complex and competing tensions of the region in which Turkey lies will necessitate the US working with Turkey to a large degree. That requires finding common ground and mutual interest. But necessity can only get you so far. To generate any real warmth to his relationship with President Erdogan, Joe Biden will have to reveal some dissatisfaction with the global status quo or at least some sympathy with those, such as the Turkish president, who are driven by this belief.  That such concern genuinely motivates Biden might be a hard sell.  

No Smooth Rides

Nothing about the past few years of US-Turkish relations has been smooth, from the furor over the jailing of American pastor Andrew Brunson to the simmering Turkish anger at US refusal to extradite Fethullah Gulen, the head of the movement held responsible in Turkey for the failed 2016 coup attempt. That incident, which has defined the trajectory of the country over the past five years, was a pivotal one not only internally but also externally.

Russian President Vladimir Putin was quick and decisive in backing Erdogan at a point when the success of the coup was still unclear. The US, on the other hand, was less wholehearted, and there was the sense that it hesitated and that US personnel might even have been complicit at the Incirlik airbase in southeastern Turkey. In moments of crisis, you learn whom you can really trust. In the personality politics of today, President Erdogan learned much from that episode. It fed into his already established worldview in which the West was inherently predatory and untrustworthy.

None of this means that Turkey or its president are wedded to deep friendships with US opponents such as Russia, Iran or China. Indeed, Turkey’s relations with Russia over the past five years have been exceptionally turbulent. But it does mean that Turkey has, in President Erdogan, a pugnaciously nationalist leader who is unafraid of picking fights. It means he has picked several with the US itself, and yet, with President Trump at the helm, you always feel that, however unsavory things get, the Turkish president is always half-admired for his obstinate aggression.

If there is a new president in the Oval Office come 2021, it will pose many more challenges for both sides. The relationship will not be easy, and without the bromance that occasionally surfaces between the current leaders, it could be a more dangerous one. US-Turkish strategic goals have been diverging for years. This causes systemic strain to the relationship. The Trump presidency may, inadvertently, have eased some of that strain, but it will not go away. A president less in tune with the current administration in Ankara could tear it further apart. For bilateral relations, for NATO and for the whole Middle East and Mediterranean region that could be a very destabilizing prospect.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post What Would a Biden Victory Spell for US-Turkish Relations? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Around the same time, reports emerged of forces shelling opposition frontlines, while has brought military hardware across the border to bolster anti-Assad forces in the Idlib countryside. Local observers relate that both Russian and Turkish have been active over the city of Idlib and the surrounding areas. Syrian forces, backed by Russian airpower, now appear to be positions with more intensity.

Entangled International Interests

Idlib may prove to be the final chapter of the Syrian Civil War. But here, Turkey and Russia are the main players. Turkey has long propped up anti-Assad factions and has maintained a military presence in Syria’s north for several years. Meanwhile, it was the of Russia in 2015 that turned the war in Assad’s favor. Russian airpower has been a key factor in Syrian government forces’ advance toward Idlib and the regime’s ability to reclaim rebel-held territory.

Is Assad Gearing Up for a Final Push in Syria?

READ MORE

In our into the impacts of proxy actors in Middle Eastern conflicts, we interviewed a range of Syrian activists. All of them noted a tangle of relationships and alliances between a plethora of Syrian organizations and international sponsors. In particular, they highlighted the roles of Turkey and Russia, both in the conflict and in the humanitarian crisis Syria faces. One opposition figure expressed his gratitude to Turkey for accommodating Syrian refugees. Yet at the same time, he felt that Turkey’s military involvement had made a complex conflict environment more difficult to resolve. Another activist who had participated in ceasefire negotiations in 2015 noted the dominant role that Russia played in securing agreements.

In general, Syrian figures we spoke with expressed concern at the intentions foreign powers may harbor for Syria. The prevalent feeling among our interviewees was that the challenges that Syria faces are ultimately for Syrians to solve and that foreign interventions made solutions even harder to find. Major powers jockeying for an advantage over regional rivals have clear geopolitical goals, the pursuit of which generally overrides the interests of local people.

Local Impacts

Even after the Russia-Turkey accord reached in 2018, Idlib has not been spared hostilities. As elsewhere in the Syrian conflict, civilians have borne the brunt of the violence. A recorded “rampant human rights violations” in Idlib and western Aleppo in late 2019 and early 2020 as Assad’s forces pushed to retake the province despite the de-escalation agreement. Up to a million civilians were uprooted, the largest single displacement of people during the entire war. UN investigators detailed numerous instances where pro-regime forces bombarded schools, markets and hospitals. Investigators also accused HTS of indiscriminately targeting civilian areas.

In February, were killed in a Syrian airstrike spurring Turkey to undertake a spate of retaliatory attacks. In the wake of this flare-up, Ankara and Moscow reached to curtail hostilities. This latest agreement demonstrates once more that the fates of Syria and its hapless people are largely in the hands of external powers. It seems that the conflict is only in abeyance while powerful actors maneuver for advantage across the chessboard that Syria has become.

In Idlib, the interests of the are clear. Ankara wants to maintain a foothold in Syria. Long calling for the removal of Assad and championing anti-regime forces, it plays the role of protector to Idlib’s militias and civilians fleeing the regime’s advance. Should Idlib fall, a new wave of refugees would surge toward Turkey, something that Ankara can ill afford. Russia, meanwhile, retains access to its only thanks to its relationship with Assad, and thus Moscow wants to ensure the Syrian president’s longevity.

Linking Damascus and the northern city of Aleppo, Idlib is a central piece of the strategic jigsaw for Assad. Retaking the province, which has been an opposition stronghold since , would be highly symbolic, drastically weakening rebel groups and being another step toward the regime’s final victory.

Machinations in Moscow and Ankara

Domestic concerns in Turkey and Russia also come into play in what happens on the ground in Syria. Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin have both used international adventures to further their own agenda. Erdogan’s approval surged after authorizing forays into Syria against Kurdish-led forces in Afrin in early 2018 and in the northeast in late 2019. More recently he has intervened in Libya in support of the Government of National Accord. For his part, Putin rose to prominence at the turn of the millennium insurgents and underlined his tough-guy credentials by strutting into in 2008 in a conflict over the breakaway region of South Ossetia.

Both leaders are currently under pressure, Erdogan as Turkey’s economy falters, and Putin facing criticism after the poisoning of Russia’s prominent opposition figure, Alexei Navalny. Creating a distraction by upping the ante in Idlib would be a convenient way of rallying domestic support. Heightened tensions between Russia and Turkey, each of which backs different sides both in Libya and in the in Nagorno-Karabakh, further complicate matters.

Significantly, other international interventions by Russia and Turkey have been against considerably weaker opponents. Do Eurasia’s two military heavyweights really want to directly face off in Idlib? Turkey and Russia maintain outwardly amicable relations, but they have different goals in Syria. Decisions made in Moscow and Ankara will determine whether the tenuous peace in Idlib endures. Should it fracture, it will be the long-suffering people of Syria, yet again, who will bear the greatest cost.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

[*Dr William Gourlay and Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh are based in the Middle East Studies Forum at Deakin University, Australia. This research was facilitated by Carnegie Corporation of New York (Grant number: G-18-55949): “Assessing the impact of external actors in the Syrian and Afghan proxy wars.”]

The post Will Idlib Be the Final Move on Syria’s Chessboard? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

A decade of civil war against the Syrian regime, a regional war against IS and a recent Turkish have turned half of Syria’s prewar population into refugees. More than 6 million Syrians are displaced internally, and 5.6 million are in refugee camps in neighboring countries. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria governs the seven cantons of the northeast. Its alliance of paramilitary groups, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is led by the Kurdish majority People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Ankara considers a terrorist organization. Of the 3 million residents of this region, 700,000 are refugees living in numerous refugee and displaced persons camps, with 65,000 in the Al-Hol refugee camp alone. 

Trump Is Giving Syria the “Iran Treatment”

READ MORE

Humanitarian aid shipments were all but cut off to northeastern Syria in January 2020, when the United Nations ordered the closure of the Yarubiya border crossing between Syria and Iraq. As the only port of entry with sufficient capacity to handle the requisite shipments of aid and equipment, Yarubiya was the carotid artery bringing humanitarian aid into northeastern Syria. The border between Turkey and northeastern Syria is effectively closed. The Syrian regime allows minimal, if any, aid to cross from its territory into this part of the country, and it controls the Qamishli airport. The remaining border crossing at Samalka, between northeastern Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, is a river crossing over pontoon boats, which heavy rains regularly wash away; it is shut on most days.

By closing the Yarubiya crossing, the UN was acceding to concerted from Russia, officially to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State, but in reality to choke off aid to anti-Assad regime forces, primarily the SDF. To make matters worse, in August, Turkey cut off the flow of water through the Alouk pumping station, thereby water by severing northeastern Syria’s main freshwater source. Aside from leaving hundreds of thousands water for drinking, cooking and bathing, not to mention hampering the generation of electricity by hydroelectric plants dependent on it, this manmade political crisis has made the medical response to the region’s COVID-19 crisis all the more helpless. 

Lack of Interest and Resolve

The squeezing of the ethnically diverse residents of northeastern Syria is the result of political jostling by Turkey, Iran and Russia to increase their respective regional influence at American and Kurdish expense. For Iran and Russia, who are working to rearm their pro-Assad proxy forces, the SDF stands in the way of the Assad regime reasserting control over the country. Although Turkey does not support Assad, it considers the YPG to be a mortal enemy and has even been the Islamic State against it. 

The Trump administration’s imposition of the — US sanctions targeting Bashar al-Assad’s government and its backers — may create obstacles for regime officials to transfer assets, but their benefactors will find a way to put their money where they want. Regardless, this policy will have no effect on the ongoing loss of American regional influence to Iran, Russia and Turkey. 

Despite the recurring crises related to Syria over the last four years, it has not received consistent attention from the Trump administration, whose characteristic lack of interest and resolve to carry out complex foreign policy goals has allowed the crisis to escalate. This can be exemplified by the administration’s inconsistent messaging. For example, the US position to justify the presence of American forces in Syria is to defeat IS, push out Iranian influence and resolve the civil conflict between the Assad regime and domestic opposition groups. However, President Donald Trump recently minimized the American presence to out of the hands of Iran, the IS and Russia, and to allow American companies and allies to benefit from its . 

Aside from statements of for opening the Yarubiya crossing, congressional committees have not expressed more than a nominal interest in the significant loss of American regional influence. This is despite the trillions of dollars the US has invested to build up the American position in Iraq and Syria over the past two decades. As a result, the harsh reality must be accepted that one cannot expect the US government to do anything to protect American interests or regain its squandered strategic regional influence without the executive and legislative branches being willing and able to design and implement policy to that effect.

Unilateral Action

Fortunately, the opening of the Yarubiya crossing is a relatively simple policy that will require minimum resolve to carry out. Nonetheless, it will bolster American regional influence at the expense of its most bitter regional rivals. Pleas to the UN by humanitarian groups and NGOs seeking to reopen the Yarubiya crossing to aid will never overcome Russian opposition. However, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Khadimi has separate authority over Yarubiya. Having spent close to $2 trillion in Iraq on military operations, hardware and training of local military, police and emergency medical staff, as well as operating the largest embassy in the world in Baghdad, the US government has more than enough to instruct Khadimi to open the border crossing.

There are other added benefits to unilateral action. For instance, sidestepping the UN will itself add leverage to both the US position and that of its ally, the SDF. Brokering a deal with its rivals for the UN to open the crossing would require the US to make considerable concessions. By design, all anticipated requests, such as allowing Turkey to purchase Russia’s S-400 air defense systems, would likely be ones the US could never accept, as the status quo benefits all parties involved except the US and the population of northeastern Syria.

Acting unilaterally would bypass such futile negotiations. Instead, the US would gain considerable leverage that it can save for a final status agreement in the long term or, at the very least, demand concessions from other parties in exchange for limiting what would be allowed through the crossing, thereby ensuring continued and adequate aid shipments. Aside from humanitarian considerations, from an economic standpoint, the move would provide an avenue for oil in northeastern Syria to be brought to market. The windfall profits would lead to a boom of economic development in northeastern Syria as well as Iraq, through which all materials would have to be shipped, and would save the United States millions of dollars in humanitarian aid. 

This must be done soon. The Assad regime is being continually strengthened by Iran and Russia in order to reassert control over northeastern Syria, the Deir Az Zour oil fields and the profits they hold. Northeastern Syria contains 90% of the country’s oil and natural gas, but it does not have an efficient route to export these energy resources. As a result, what does get exported goes through markets controlled by Iran, and profits are also siphoned off by the Islamic State as it rebuilds its infrastructure.

The US finally allowed the of oil from Deir Az Zour recently, which increased the political leverage of the SDF against Assad in future settlement negotiations. Opening the Yarubiya crossing will further extend that leverage to the United States. The more oil that is exported in the meantime, and the more involved the US is in protecting it, the more leverage the US will have and the stronger its regional ally, the SDF, will become. By fortifying itself, the SDF, which controls northeastern Syria, will be better equipped to cut off Iranian land access to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In effect, the stronger northeastern Syria becomes, the more influence the US will have to counter Iranian and Russian influence in Syria. 

To reiterate, as America’s frontline ally in the fight against the IS, the SDF has led the fight against the armed group and continues to prevent its resurgence. However, as IS is now receiving aid from Turkey as part of Ankara’s effort to wipe out the Kurds, if the SDF were to lose its fight, American soldiers may be expected to take their place protecting considerable US strategic interests. Otherwise, the oil would fall into the hands of Russia, Iran and the IS. It is therefore imperative to act quickly so as to bolster the SDF as well as to mitigate the disaster of the COVID-19 pandemic that has increased humanitarian suffering in the region.

Challenging Russia, Turkey and Iran

Turkey and Russia have outmaneuvered the US in Syria over the last several years. As Seth Franztman in The Jerusalem Post, “Moscow has become friends with all sides in Syria — except with the Americans.” As a result, all of these actors have benefitted to different extents in Syria with the exception of the United States. Russian and Turkish efforts to divide up Syria include allowing Turkey to shore up its control in Idlib province in exchange for letting Russia fortify the Assad regime and act against US regional interests. Crucially, the opportunity created by sidelining Washington has allowed and will continue to allow the Assad regime and Iran to fortify their positions.

Russia punches far above its weight in terms of international influence. As Anna Borshchevskaya for The Hill, Moscow’s efforts to defend its imperiled interests around the world by sowing unrest requires considerable personnel and resources. These resources are not unlimited and are effective because of the perceived threat of retaliation by Russian President Vladimir Putin against those who act contrary to his interests.

�ѴDz����Ƿ�’s in Syria are among its most heavily challenged. Russia cannot afford to lose its gambit in Syria and will remain no matter what the foreseeable cost. Thus, there is no better way to undermine Russian influence globally than to spread it thin and weaken it by acting against its various global interests concertedly. Russia worked very hard to get the UN to close the Yarubiya crossing, thereby freeing up its resources to fight battles on other fronts. Those resources cannot simply be reassigned back to Syria without being removed from other fights.

As Turkey asserts itself as a regional political and military power, Ankara’s and Washington’s interests do not always align vis-à-vis Syria. For example, as analysis by the RAND corporation , Turkish attacks against YPG forces in northeastern Syria have led to the reappropriating of SDF personnel from fighting the IS in Deir Az Zour region to address Turkish incursions along the northern border. The State Department’s inspector general has Turkey of working in concert with the Islamic State to undermine US-supported YPG efforts in Syria. 

Turkey has been threatening war with Greece in the eastern Mediterranean, and its to northeastern Syria has considerably exacerbated an already dire humanitarian crisis in the region. Opening the Yarubiya crossing to allow in aid, supplies and water would challenge Ankara’s clout in northeastern Syria. It may cause Turkey to rethink its confrontation with Greece, making it more likely that Ankara will err on the side of diplomacy to resolve that conflict before it escalates into a military clash. It will also show Turkey that, despite its influence as a NATO ally, Ankara does not have carte blanche to act against US interests without facing consequences.

The involvement of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Syria has drained its coffers and its personnel. This has considerably frustrated the Iranian population as its resources are sent abroad rather than used to rebuild the struggling economy at home. Applying pressure by opening up the Yarubiya crossing will further drain Iranian resources as it will require even more money, personnel and influence to fight Iran’s battles in Syria and Iraq, which will in turn further inflame domestic opposition to the IRGC. 

Opening the Yarubiya crossing will aid the Kurds in northeastern Syria to their positions and take a big step toward economic stability in the territory. Historically, the Kurds have been reliable US allies in the region and will undoubtedly continue to be strategic allies in the near future. Leaving them in the lurch by allowing Turkey to attack them in October 2019 shattered American credibility with the YPG, and left them with little other than to put their hope in Russia for protection from Turkey. However, opening the Yarubiya crossing will considerably improve American credibility with the Kurds and work toward improving relations with a critical strategic ally, which will be imperative for American regional influence in the future.

Opening the Yarubiya crossing between Iraq and northeastern Syria is a singular action that will simultaneously put pressure on Putin, Iran, the Islamic State and the Assad regime. It will also reassert American leadership in NATO, rebuild credibility with regional strategic allies and safeguard US energy interests. Finally, and perhaps most critically, will improve humanitarian conditions on the ground, which will go a long way to win hearts and minds by saving lives.

*[51�Թ� is a  partner of .]

The post How the US Can Win Back Clout in Syria appeared first on 51�Թ�.

For years, Turkey has been tirelessly looking for oil and gas. To do so, Ankara mainly relied on the expertise of foreign companies. Encouraged by the recent discoveries of significant gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean, Ankara stepped up its efforts in the region as well as the Black Sea. This time, however, the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) decided to explore opportunities on its own. As a result, TPAO three drilling ships — Fatih, Yavuz and Kanuni, all named after Ottoman sultans — between 2017 and 2020, and deployed them in both the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The plan worked: Fatih was instrumental in making the August discovery.

Discovery of Natural Gas Exposes Turkey’s Political Rifts

READ MORE

The finding could alleviate Turkey’s energy import options and equip Ankara with a powerful bargaining chip in negotiations with traditional suppliers. It could also help to transform TPAO into a significant player in the industry. The petroleum company has already made strides in this regard. During the last several years, the TPAO has its efforts in oil and gas exploration and production.

The company has also taken advantage of rapprochement between Ankara and the UN-recognized Libyan government in Tripoli in order to resume projects in 2014. Back then, the TPAO announced the successful completion of wells in Sirte and Sebha. In April, partnered with Russian Zarubezhneft, TPAO signed preliminary deals to participate in its upstream sector and has made strides in Algeria by up to an onshore project together with Sonatrach and Zarubezhneft. Furthermore, Turkish authorities have been vocal about their intentions to invest in Somalia’s and Ethiopia’s oil and gas sectors.

Given the complexity of deep-water drilling, TPAO’s inexperience when it comes to offshore projects and the costliness of such endeavors, the development of the Black Sea fields may require partnerships with more experienced companies. Turkish authorities have already mulled over a potential collaboration with Russian and Iranian companies, but it seems less likely given the state of Ankara’s relations with both countries. Ankara has diverging interests with Tehran and Moscow in Syria and is also trying to reduce dependence on both Russian and Iranian gas supplies. Therefore, Turkey will likely be reluctant to add another dimension to this complex web of relations by inviting a Russian or Iranian company to the project. It is more likely for Turkish companies to partner with companies from friendly states with experience developing such complex and costly projects.

TPAO has already with the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in upstream projects in the Caspian Sea. Given the fraternal relations between the two countries, which have only solidified in light of the recent fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, SOCAR’s engagement in the project is not excluded. Ankara’s unequivocal support for Baku in the conflict with Armenia and Azerbaijan’s increasingly growing share in natural gas supplies to Turkey could be easily translated into cooperation in the oil and gas sector as well.  

TPAO may also partner with Qatar Petroleum, which has extensive experience in managing such complex deep-water projects. Turkish authorities have already suggested such a possibility. In March, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu that Ankara is considering a partnership with Malaysian, British and Qatari companies in the eastern Mediterranean. Qatar Petroleum has decades of experience in operating the North Dome, the largest natural gas field in the world. Turkey and Qatar may use the opportunity to capitalize on their political relations and channel the geopolitical alignment into cooperation in the business sector.

If the findings are confirmed, aside from providing a strategic advantage in the energy sector, the deposits will be a crucial element in bolstering Turkey’s foreign policy efforts, such as the Blue Homeland strategy and the pivot to the Maghreb and the Sahel. TPAO’s recent expansion abroad, especially in Africa, indicates the prerogatives of Ankara’s foreign policy goals. Turkey already faces strong opposition from almost all eastern Mediterranean littoral states that have collectively aligned to resist Ankara’s endeavors. To cope with these challenges, Turkey will need to build geopolitical alliances and economic partnerships of its own.

*[51�Թ� is a media partner of .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post What Turkey Stands to Gain From Its Natural Gas Discovery appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Discovery of Natural Gas Exposes Turkey’s Political Rifts

READ MORE

The spat between EU candidate Turkey and EU member Greece over the boundaries of their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in the eastern Mediterranean has exposed this intra-EU discord. Greece’s repeated calls to Brussels for solidarity have mostly been ignored, and France’s relentless efforts to create a solid anti-Turkish bloc have yielded nothing but some rhetorical support for Greece. France sees the growing Turkish influence in Libya as a grave threat to its economic interests in West Africa and the Sahel. Due to this perceived Turkish threat, Paris has been doing everything in its power to sabotage it, including throwing unconditional support behind Greece.

Europe’s Locomotive

The Greek frustration with the EU peaked at an all-time high at the Foreign Affairs Council on August 14, when member states Germany, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Bulgaria and Malta  the request by Athens to sanction Ankara. In retaliation, the Greek Cypriots blocked an EU joint statement on sanctions against Belarus following the violent suppression of anti-government protests by the regime of Alexander Lukashenko. On September 10, French President Emmanuel Macron hosted the MED7 countries — Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain — on the island of Corsica, the birthplace of Napoleon, hoping to mount pressure on Turkey, only to be disappointed that the leaders of Spain, Italy, Malta and Portugal inflammatory remarks and  the importance of a dialogue with Ankara.

In fact, the day after the summit, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez  Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to express Spain’s willingness to enhance bilateral relations. On the same day, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Luigi Di Maio and Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Cavusoglu  on the phone “the matters related to Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean.” Two days after the Corsica summit, the Maltese Minister of EU Foreign Affairs Evarist Bartolo  with Cavusoglu in Turkey’s Mediterranean resort town of Antalya.

Macron’s European partners have disappointed him before. France  that on June 10, Turkish warships locked their weapons systems on to a French frigate, the Courbet, which was part of NATO’s Sea Guardian monitoring mission. As a knee-jerk reaction to this incident, France  its naval operations in the Mediterranean. France took the issue to NATO, which Macron has inconveniently  “braindead” in the past, and whose majority of members are also part of the EU. To Macron’s dismay, only eight of the 30 NATO members  France’s claims against Turkey, which French Defense Minister Florence Parly described as “.” Later, NATO announced that the probe into the incident was “.”&�Բ�����; 

So why is Europe so divided when it comes to Turkey? Why have France and Greece failed to create European unanimity against Turkey? The answer lies in the fact that the changing regional political and economic realities are forcing the European states to pursue their own individual agendas just like they did in the early 20^th century, heralding the demise of the ideal to create the United States of Europe. Simply put, because of their vested interest in Ankara’s handling of the refugee crisis as well as their uneasiness about an ascendant France in the Mediterranean, some EU member states choose to align with Turkey rather than defend Greece’s maritime claims, severely undermining Paris’ effort to curb Ankara’s ambitions.  

Germany, the locomotive of the European Union, is very concerned about the continuous influx of refugees into Europe, which has already begun to disrupt the financial, social and political make-up of the continent. For Berlin, Turkey’s ability to accommodate more than 4 million refugees it currently shelters is paramount to saving the  EU economies further stricken by COVID-19. Also, not angering Erdogan in this gloomy atmosphere is much more important for German Chancellor Angela Merkel than to mount a battle for Greece’s declared maritime borders in the far eastern stretches of the Mediterranean.

Merkel’s motivation to get along with Erdogan upsets Macron, who  the need to contain Turkey in Libya, West Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. Macron sees Brexit and the receding US influence as a historical opportunity to assert France’s role as the leader on the European continent, which in turn may herald Franco-German frictions. He repeatedly degraded the importance of NATO as a common defense mechanism at a time when Merkel is alarmed by US President Donald Trump’s decision to considerably  the number of American troops in Germany. Macron has frequently  Merkel for allowing Germany’s much-needed Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline into Europe as he believes it will increase the European reliance on Russia.

This approach has not only irked Germany, but also raised concern with France’s Mediterranean neighbors, Italy, and Spain, who have historically viewed an ascendant France with suspicion. Hence their tacit support for Turkey, France’s current geopolitical perceived arch-rival. 

Italy vs. France

The Italian resentment toward France goes back to the 2011 French and NATO-led military intervention in Libya, which toppled Muammar Gaddafi. Italy  the subsequent growing instability in Libya as a threat to national security as migrants, not only from Libya but also from sub-Saharan Africa, began to pour onto Italian shores. The Italians believed that Gaddafi’s iron-fist rule over Libya acted as a barrier between Italy and the more unstable and deprived parts of Africa.  

The current migrant issue has severely hurt the Franco-Italian relations. Both sides have repeatedly summoned each other’s ambassadors, a serious sign of friction, criticizing the measures each refused to take. In June 2018, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  France’s ambassador to Rome after Macron harshly criticized Italy’s refusal to accept the migrant ship Aquarius carrying more than 600 people.

In June 2019, the current Italian foreign minister and then-deputy prime minister, Luigi Di Maio,  the French immigration policy by saying that “If today people are leaving, it’s because certain European countries, chief among them France, never stopped colonizing dozens of African countries. France prints the currency, the colonial franc, in dozens of African countries, and with this currency, they finance the French debt . . . If France did not have the African colonies, she would be the world’s 15^th economic power, but she’s among the first because of what she’s doing in Africa.” Di Maio even called for EU sanctions against France. The row escalated to a point where France  its ambassador to Italy in February 2019, a move unprecedented since the Second World War. The acrimony with France has prompted Rome to side with Ankara in this latest diplomatic spat.

Italy’s support for Turkey in Libya seems to have paid off. After Turkey’s successful military campaign against the French-backed General Khalifa Haftar earlier this year, a senior European diplomat  the Financial Times: “Let’s be honest, Turkey stopped the fall of Tripoli. Without their intervention, it would have been a humanitarian disaster.” The influx of those running fleeing Haftar’s retribution would have severely crippled Italy.  

An ascendant France in the Mediterranean basin also threatens Italy’s economic interests. Italy had considerable business stakes in Libya under Gaddafi, whose removal from power severely jeopardized them. The Italian energy giant ENI first entered the oil-rich country in 1959 and had a continuous presence throughout the 1980s, even when the West snubbed the Gaddafi regime for its links to terrorism. Before the French-led military intervention, Operation Harmattan, in 2011, Libya accounted for 15% of ENI’s , with oil production at 108,000 barrels per day and natural gas production at 9.4 billion cubic meters.

Today, a number of lucrative oil projects are at stake for ENI, including the , the largest offshore field in the Mediterranean Sea, located immediately off the coast of Libya. This area is controlled by the Turkish-backed Government of National Accord. Considering that ENI’s biggest challenger for the Libyan oil and gas is the French oil giant Total, Rome has naturally supported Fayez al-Sarraj’s Turkey-led coalition against Khalifa Haftar’s French-backed Libyan National Army. This too explains why Rome is reluctant to join France and Greece in imposing sanctions on Turkey.  

British Considerations

Historically speaking, France’s growing ambitions in the Mediterranean have triggered British suspicion. For instance, it was British support for the Ottoman Empire in the late 18^th century that facilitated the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte by the Turks in Egypt and Syria, which also safeguarded British regional interests. Just as it was then, today Turkey has become an important part of the UK’s geopolitical considerations, particularly in the post-Brexit era. London has manifested its support for Ankara on various occasions. For example, the UK, which has strategic Akrotiri and Dhekelia military bases on the island of Cyprus, openly rejected the Greek Cypriots’ request for cooperation against Turkey. Angered by this refusal, the Greek Cypriots  to France.

With regard to the Turkey-France naval incident, UK Prime minister Boris Johnson clearly sided with Turkey by publicly , “I do not give much credence to France’s view.” As a display of solidarity, the British frigate HMS Argyll and Turkish TCG Giresun  an exclusive naval training exercise in the disputed waters of the eastern Mediterranean the day after the French-led MED7 summit in Corsica. 

The UK’s desire to cooperate with Turkey in the Mediterranean is also reflected on the smallest EU member, Malta, which shares a maritime border with Libya. Although it declared its independence from the UK in 1964, Malta’s foreign policy still is heavily influenced by London. In Libya, the Maltese government has openly  its support for the Turkey-backed al-Sarraj administration. Moreover, as a blow to France’s efforts to prevent Turkey from sending weapons to Libya, Malta  EU funding for Operation Irini meant to enforce an arms embargo.

Malta’s support for Turkey in the Mediterranean partially stems from the anti-French sentiment that prevails in society. Prominent Maltese broadcaster Charles Xuereb, the author of “France in the Maltese Collective Memory: Perceptions, Perspectives, Identities After Bonaparte in British Malta,” that “Napoleon’s slaughter of thousands of Maltese and the heavy pillaging of the island created a Maltese collective memory which blocks anything French but sees the British as their saviors.” It is only natural for Malta to throw its support behind Turkey, which has confronted France throughout the region. 

Romantic Ideas

Where do we go from here? The romantic idea of a united Europe where prosperity, democracy and solidarity reign supreme is becoming increasingly obsolete. The aging population, the influx of refugees and the rising populist far right, the COVID-19 pandemic and the , which is increasing the north-south divide, have all but weakened the idea of a shared future for the Europeans.

The weakening of Europe is happening at a time when Turkey seems to be on the rise. EU Foreign Minister Josep Borrell  earlier this month: “Europe is facing a situation in which we can say that the old Empires are coming back, at least three of them: Russia, China, and Turkey; big empires of the past who are coming back with an approach on their immediate neighborhood, globally, which represent for us a new environment. And Turkey is one of these elements that change our environment.”&�Բ�����;

What is happening in the Mediterranean is not only a conflict between Greece and Turkey — it is also a European problem. Turkey’s ascendancy in the region should be expected to accelerate the fracturing of Europe, where each state is increasingly preoccupied with its own problems, forming competing alliances against one another.

The latest addition to this chessboard is the renewed fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Each side is accusing the other of causing the flare-up, but according to UN Security Council  Armenia is illegally occupying 20% of Azeri territory. In this conflict too, as in Libya, Syria and Iraq, Turkey holds the key. Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan has already  to heavy Armenian casualties. The Azeri-Armenian conflict will only strengthen Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Europe even more, disincentivizing Brussels to take measures against Ankara.  

The idea of a united Europe is becoming more of an unattainable dream each day. The question now arises whether President Erdogan will be the one to deal the final blow to that idea.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post As Europe Weakens, Turkey Is on the Rise appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Russia’s state-controlled  reported that what it called a “source” had said that the Turks had declined to evacuate five observation posts in Syria’s Idlib province. According to the source, “After the Turkish side refused to withdraw the Turkish observation points and insisted on keeping them, it was decided to reduce the number of Turkish forces present in Idlib and to withdraw heavy weapons from the area.”

A Coming Catastrophe

Whether that is the case has yet to be confirmed. However, it was enough for the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) to issue a : “Turkey may have agreed to cede control of Southern Idlib to pro-Assad forces in a meeting with Russia September 16. If the reports of a deal are true, a pro-Assad offensive is likely imminent.”

The ISW buttresses its argument by noting that Turkey had already withdrawn hundreds of its forces from southern Idlib on September 8. Turkey’s claim that the withdrawal is the result of rising tensions with Greece over hydrocarbon reserves in the eastern Mediterranean were treated with skepticism by the ISW: “Turkey may have used its dispute with Greece as cover for action consistent with an impending deal with Russia in Idlib.”

This may, indeed, be the “political negotiations” that Cavusoglu was speaking of. If so, and if an assault on what remains of Idlib in rebel hands is imminent, then it signals likely catastrophe for civilians trapped between advancing Assad forces and jihadist militias. Were the US not in the middle of a presidential race and were the incumbent in the White House not so inclined to call for the complete withdrawal of US forces from Syria (only to change his mind when presented with the outcomes of such a move), then there would be grounds for more hope for the civilian population of Idlib.

But such is not the case. And beyond President Donald Trump’s  that, as he expressed it, “People said to me, ‘Why are you staying in Syria?’ Because I kept the oil, which frankly we should have done in Iraq,” uncertainty about just what America’s intentions in Syria are remains very much in play. It is a factor that other external players, that is the Russians, the Turks and Iran, can all exploit as they seek to advance their strategic efforts at the expense of the Syrian people.

Old Enemies

It is a situation that has left the 500 or so US troops still in Syria and their allies, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in a vulnerable and exposed place, a point the Pentagon clearly gets, even if the commander-in-chief doesn’t.  of Bradley fighting vehicles to Eastern Syria on September 19, a Pentagon spokesperson stated: “These actions are a clear demonstration of US resolve to defend Coalition forces in the [Eastern Syria Security Area], and to ensure that they are able to continue their Defeat-ISIS mission without interference. The Defense Department has previously deployed Bradleys to northeast Syria pursuant to these goals.”

That deployment reflects a growing concern that, as documented by ISW and others, the Islamic State (IS) is resurging in Syria. Its recent attacks have been aimed at tribal elders who support the SDF and at efforts to develop governance capabilities that benefit civilians by removing festering grievances that the jihadists seek to exploit.

For their part, the Russians, playing on fears that the SDF Kurdish leadership has concerning an abrupt American withdrawal, may strive to build on pushing the Kurds to seek some sort of rapprochement with Damascus, thus hastening a US departure. In that regard, it is worth noting that the Russians were crucial to a  last year that saw the Kurds cede territory to Assad forces and withdraw rather than face a Turkish offensive in northern Syria.

Meanwhile, the ISW’s Jennifer Cafarella  that a sudden withdrawal without a strategic endgame plays straight into the hands of not just Russia and Iran; it emboldens a rising IS and empowers the jihadist ideology it shares with America’s oldest enemy in its war on terror, al- Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda has played a long game, happy for IS to take the brunt of the West’s military response. Cafarella says that while a global coalition led by America came together to defeat the caliphate (and force ISI into a guerrilla insurgency), the same cannot be said for al-Qaeda. “We have not been able to reach the same level of understanding with our allies and partners and that is in part because Al Qaeda is playing this much more sophisticated political game that in the long run, I do very much worry, could outflank us.”

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Is Assad Gearing Up for a Final Push in Syria? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

That island is Kastellorizo. It is Greek. It is far from being the only Greek island that sits close to the Turkish mainland, but it’s perhaps the most striking, since it is 78 miles from its nearest Greek neighbor, the island of Rhodes, and fully 354 miles from the capital, Athens. Indeed, landlocked Ankara, the Turkish capital in the center of Anatolia, is nearer.

Who Owns the Sea?

Nation-states are the oddity of the modern age. To people in the era of empires, today’s borders would seem extraordinarily restrictive. For centuries, Kastellorizo interacted freely with the mainland, which lies one mile away. Now it exists as a surreal outpost adrift in the Mediterranean. This tiny, quiet island is central to the latest crisis between Greece and Turkey — an argument over gas exploration rights and who owns where on the seafloor in the eastern Mediterranean. It has led to collisions between Greek and Turkish vessels, and even a confrontation in Libyan waters between Turkish and French frigates in June.

Discovery of Natural Gas Exposes Turkey’s Political Rifts

READ MORE

The clash with France is part of a wider confrontation in which France has become a vocal ally of forces in the eastern Mediterranean seen as broadly anti-Islamist. This includes European Union members Greece and , as well as Israel, Egypt and the forces of renegade General Khalifa Haftar in Libya, a figure from the Gaddafi regime. All these alliances put France at odds with Turkey, which has emerged as the most vocal and perhaps the most powerful force for political Islam in the region. The alliance with Greece has helped to reignite much older hostilities between Greece and Turkey, feeding into dangerous older narratives.

The argument surrounding territorial waters is as artificial as the nation states that have given rise to it. The intricacies of maritime law hang around the question of whether the far-flung isles of Greece can claim exclusive economic zones (EEZs) on the seabed around them — in effect, that they have a continental shelf that Greece can claim, a mile off the Turkish coast.

Such claims create a collision course with Turkey, given the unusual situation of the two geographic territories. The result of the 1919-23 Turkish War of Independence was the establishment of a Turkish state on the landmass of Asia Minor, but to the exclusion of almost every island in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas lying off its shore. The peculiarity of this scenario is evident to anyone who has visited the popular tourist regions of the Turkish coast and the eastern Greek isles. The two are intimate neighbors, far more alike than they are to their respective hinterlands, let alone their distant national capitals.

Arrival of Nationalism

Nationalism — since its arrival from Western Europe — has been calamitous for the wider region in which Greece and Turkey lie. It has brought chaos to the Arab world, to the Balkans and to Cyprus. Even today, it still informs the aspirations of the Kurdish people to add yet another state to a region of instability and ethnic tension.

On the face of it, Greece and Turkey appear to be two comparative success stories of the era of nation states in this region. They have been relatively stable, centralized states for much of the 20^th century, despite the recurrence of military intervention in politics. Yet Greece and Turkey are also examples of the failure of the nation-state model in their very nature. Both espouse a virulent ethnic nationalism. Both are rooted in an ancient tribal exceptionalism, layered with later religious identities.

Like the wider region, this nationalism has required that what was a patchwork of ethnicities, indeed a form of multiculturalism — or, at least, co-habitation — was systematically uprooted, most brutally in the state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing of the early 20^th century. State-sanctioned ethnic violence is nothing new to the region. It happened to the Sephardic Jews of Greece in the 1940s (themselves previously cleansed from Christian Spain after the retreat of the Moors), it has happened in the Balkans in the past few decades, and it happened in Greece and Turkey in 1923.

That was the year of the Treaty of Lausanne, which stipulated the transfer of populations between the two states based upon religious affiliation: Greek Orthodox to Greece, Muslims to Turkey. In many cases, this papered over cultural and ethnic complexities that were far from the clear-cut distinctions that Greek and Turkish nationalists believed inherent in their respective nation-state projects. This history, and the very human and very personal tragedy of it, has embedded an antipathy towards the “other” in the body politic of both states to the present day.

It is this reality that makes questions surrounding continental shelves, exclusive economic zones and rights to resources that lie under the sea so intractable. It was hard enough and bloody enough to divide the land of this region between the warring parties, often leading to strange and unnatural results like the sad fate of the little isle of Kastellorizo — severed from the mainland it gazes upon with every sunrise. To attempt the division of the waters as well is likely to lead to yet another hard and bloody outcome.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Tangled Maps of Greece and Turkey appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The secretary general of the CHP, Selin Sayek Boke, went so far as to  that Erdogan is going to use the gas for his own ends. Engin Atalay, the deputy chairman of CHP’s parliamentary group, had previously  that “Even if the government has done the best thing in the world, we will unconditionally criticize and refuse it,” which is indicative of the opposition’s modus operandi.

The New Cold War in the Middle East

READ MORE

So, what explains the opposition’s hostility toward this seemingly groundbreaking development in the Black Sea, as well as its steadfast total rejection of government actions? Simply put, it is part of the opposition’s long-time perception that Erdogan is consolidating his power and that the hydrocarbon discovery may serve his interests. This state of mind is also a reflection of the opposition’s fear that it is running out of options to stop Erdogan’s rise.

Safety Valve

Since CHP’s inception on September 9, 1923, by Mustafa Kemal, a secular nationalist and founder of modern Turkey, the CHP elite has considered itself entitled to govern the country. Having completely severed ties with the Ottoman past, Kemal crafted the state on the strict interpretation of Westernism and secularism. The CHP elite assumed the responsibility of upholding those principles by perpetuating the CHP single-party regime by suppressing any opposition. This state of privilege and entitlement lasted until 1950. That year, the first democratic elections in the history of modern Turkey were held as a prerequisite for receiving funds as part of the Marshall Plan, which the CHP desperately needed given the abysmal state of the economy after World War II despite Turkey’s neutrality.

The opposition, under Adnan Menderes, a conservative who overtly displayed his Muslim identity, won the elections by a landslide, allowing him to form a single-party government — a blow to the CHP elite. In his 10-year tenure, Menderes defied the Kemalist establishment by, among others, reverting the Muslim call to prayer to Arabic, and allowing the education of the Quran in primary school. He  in 1951 that “Turkey is a Muslim country and will remain so.” Secular CHP’s three electoral defeats against Menderes convinced the CHP elite that democracy is not an option to regain what they believe was theirs and that the erosion of the Kemalist principles can only be halted by force.

In 1960, the Kemalist Turkish armed forces (TAF) stepped in and toppled Menderes, executing him and the two other prominent cabinet members. This launched the tradition of military coups in Turkey, where the TAF assumed the guardianship () role of the Kemalist principles, specifically secularism. In the next 50 years, the TAF would “keep the civilians in line” by stepping in three more times, in 1971, 1980 and 1997. It made its presence known to governments through the supreme national security council, in which top generals dictated domestic and foreign policy recommendations to civilian government members. 

Fast forward to 2002, when Erdogan’s ascent to power and the beginning of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) single-party rule in Turkey heralded the impending clash with the military reminiscent of the Menderes era. This time the Kemalist military would lose. Erdogan had long believed that the military’s interpretation of strict secularism, particularly in the 1990s, suppressed the pious masses to which he belonged. He skillfully used Turkey’s European Union accession process to take on the military. He did this by zealously implementing EU guidelines, among which was the “civilianization” of politics requiring the demilitarization of the supreme national security council. In 2004, for the first time since its inception in 1938, a civilian, Mehmet Yigit Alpogan, became the secretary general of the council.

The Turkish military would strike back in April 2007 by issuing a stern warning against the election of Erdogan’s then-comrade, Abdullah Gul, as president. The move backfired, and the AKP won the general election by a landslide that summer, heralding the beginning of total civilian control over the Turkish armed forces. It is this loss of the Kemalist “safety valve” that began to raise alarm bells for the CHP. The abortive coup of July 15, 2016, was probably the oppositions last dimming hope. To its dismay, the popular resistance against the coup resulted in failure, along with the widespread purge of the supporters of — Erdogan’s “public enemy number one” — in the military, judiciary and law enforcement, allowed Erdogan to further consolidate his grip on power. 

The New System

An unexpected glimmer of hope for the opposition in its effort to topple the invincible Erdogan emerged with the introduction of the presidential system in 2017, which replaced the parliamentary system. In the parliamentary system, the main opposition party, the CHP, had no chance of forming a government, mostly due to unfavorable demographic realities. Its numbers consistently hovered around 20%-25%, whereas the AKP doubled that. In the new two-round presidential elections, a candidate is required to obtain at least 50%+1 of the popular vote in order to be elected. If no overall majority is reached, then a runoff is held between the two most popular candidates from the first round.    

The first such election was held in June 2018, where four major parties — the AKP, the CHP, the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) and the Good Party — nominated their candidates, with President Erdogan polling highest. With what is now called the People’s Alliance, where the AKP and the right-wing Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) formed an official pact, Erdogan won 52% of the popular vote. However, a win by a slight margin convinced the opposition that in a 50%+1 system, it may have a chance against him. Therefore, in an unprecedented turn in Turkish politics, the opposition began to coalesce around the idea “anybody but Erdogan.”

The opposition formed what is now called the Nation Alliance, where the CHP and the Good Party created an official pact with the HDP and the Felicity Party (SP, Erdogan’s former party) throwing in their unofficial support. The Good Party, with its moderate nationalist ideology, did not want to enter into an official pact with the Kurdish nationalist socialist-leaning HDP, which is the political arm of the outlawed PKK terrorist organization. The prospect of this new style of opposition was first tested in the March 2019 mayoral elections.

To ensure success, the Nation Alliance nominated only the candidates whose party had the highest chance of winning against the People’s Alliance. This tactic seemed to have worked. For the first time in 30 years, a party with a manifestly leftist and secular worldview and with the support of the rest of the opposition, the CHP, won the mayoral elections in Turkey’s four biggest cities: Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana.

However, in the aftermath of this success, the anyone-but-Erdogan alliance began showing signs that it was headed for a catastrophic failure. One of the biggest problems was that the alliance had only one requirement — without any meaningful policy contribution to Turkish politics — for the completely opposite political views, and that was to coexist in the name of toppling Erdogan. The right-wing Turkish nationalist Good Party constituency grew resentful of the de facto alliance with the HDP. Furthermore, the HDP’s  that “without its some 1 million votes [10-12% of total votes], the anti-Erdogan alliance would not have won the elections in Istanbul” further inflamed the Good Party base, which represented some 7%-8% of voters. This led to the  of five Good Party deputies.

Moreover, in order to appeal to conservative constituents, which was necessary to take on Erdogan, the leftist-secular CHP nominated former ultranationalists and conservatives as mayoral and presidential candidates. For instance, the current mayor of Ankara, Mansur Yavas, is listed as affiliated with the CHP, but he used to be a prominent member of the MHP, which is currently in an official alliance with Erdogan. Yavas’ newly surfaced undated video where he called Deniz Gezmis and his friends — the icons of the Turkish leftist movement who were executed in 1972 on charges of communist affiliations — a “bunch of thugs” drew criticism from certain leftists within CHP.

The biggest threat to the alliance appeared to be Muharrem Ince, who unsuccessfully contested the current CHP premier Kemal Kilicdaroglu for the seat of party chairman. He has sternly criticized Kilicdaroglu for being undemocratic and lambasted him for leading the CHP astray from Mustafa Kemal’s interpretation of secularism and nationalism (ulusalcilik) by courting the former conservative candidates and aligning with the Kurdish secessionist HDP. Ince,  to form his own party, drew  from the anti-Erdogan coalition for dividing the much-needed block of votes.

Foreign Entities Against Erdogan  

With the armed forces now under Erdogan’s full command following the July 15 coup, Turkey began to display activism abroad, which once again is perceived by the opposition as part of Erdogan’s powerplay. Since 2016, Turkey has successfully conducted three incursions into Syria, saved the UN-recognized Libyan government from implosion, and defended its maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean against a coalition of countries including Greece, France and the United Arab Emirates.    

The anybody-but-Erdogan coalition has harshly criticized the president’s virtually every foreign policy move. The “What are we doing in …?” phrase has become an iconic expression the anti-Erdogan block used to decry Turkey’s military involvements in Syria, Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, which pro-Erdogan circles see as a crucial matter of national security.

In the name of weakening Erdogan, the members of the opposition have not shied away from supporting foreign countries and entities that Turkey is known to clash with militarily and politically. For instance, as opposed to Erdogan, Kilicdaroglu does not  the PKK’s Syria branch, the YPG, as a terror organization. Whereas Erdogan has expressed his desire to remove Syrian President Bashar Assad, Kilicdaroglu  dialogue with him.

Kilicdaroglu  Turkey has no business in Libya, whereas the government states it is an important move to counter the Greek maritime claims in the East Mediterranean that could cripple Turkey’s ability to navigate in those waters. Moreover, the CHP mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu, criticized the government for converting the Hagia Sophia from a museum into a mosque, which led the pro-Erdogan circles  Imamoglu of being a “Greek spy.”&�Բ�����;

Despite these appeals, the Turkish opposition has very few prospects to receive meaningful support from abroad. The bygone days when the Western governments were able to wield absolute influence on the Turkish authorities are just that — gone. The inability of the US and EU to dissuade Turkey from dislodging the PKK from northern Syria is a clear sign of a relative weakening of Western influence over Turkey, conversely signaling Erdogan’s ever-growing power. Likewise, last week’s refusal of EU members — Germany, Spain, Italy, Hungary and Malta — to adopt the sanctions against Ankara proposed by Greece indicates that Erdogan’s Turkey is much more important to Germany in the post-COVID-19 world than a member state’s declared interests in the Mediterranean. What is more, France was dismayed when President Emmanuel Macron could not convince NATO that Turkey was at fault in the naval incident where Turkish and French frigates dangerously came too close off of Libya in July. Finally, Greeks  that Europe has bowed to Erdogan on Hagia Sophia.  

The entitled CHP elite still resents that the country it believes it founded has been taken over by what it sees as a conservative Muslim. What is more disappointing for the CHP is that the Turkish military’s DNA to meddle with domestic politics has been removed, leaving little chance for a coup. It also appears that growing infighting among the members of the anti-Erdogan coalition after the successful 2019 local elections is likely going to affect the opposition’s prospects of taking on Erdogan in 2023.

The impression that, in the name of weakening Erdogan, it would rather collaborate with foreign entities hostile to Turkey will further damage the opposition. Most Turks are wary of this type of political game. Perhaps some sort of cooperation with Erdogan is a must for the Turkish opposition to save itself from extinction.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Discovery of Natural Gas Exposes Turkey’s Political Rifts appeared first on 51�Թ�.

First, let’s consider the defense for President Erdogan’s position. The Turkish Foreign Ministry has suggested that history will not forget or forgive the UAE’s action. Inasmuch as the UAE has sold out the Palestinian cause for its own interests, the Turks have a point.

Israel-UAE Deal: Arab States Are Tired of Waiting on Palestine

READ MORE

On the face of it, the Palestinians get little from the deal. All the UAE has wrung out of Israel is a promise to suspend its attempt to annex large swathes of the West Bank where illegal settlements exist. This merely prevents an inroad rather than offering any real concessions.

But then the UAE was negotiating for its own ends, not for the Palestinians. In the regional battle against Qatar and Turkey — and more broadly against political Islam — the UAE merely wished to cement its position as the West’s true friend and ally in the region. It should also be noted that the UAE has done so as something of a shock troop to the real power of the counterrevolutionary alliance in the region, Saudi Arabia. The kingdom that is the custodian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina has been silent on the deal with Israel.

Turkey Stays on Script

The Turkish response is one calculated entirely within the framework of the regional battle with the UAE-Saudi-Egypt axis. In this context, Turkey has a clear opportunity to position itself as a vital ally of the Palestinian cause: not as extremist as Iran, yet not as silent as Saudi Arabia. This is vital to Turkey, since the UAE has been a big investor in the West Bank and Gaza in recent years. At the same time, the UAE has become Turkey’s key adversary in the region. The new deal gives Ankara an opportunity to fully usurp the UAE as the Palestinians’ most important ally.

Turkey, being a Sunni Muslim power, also has a natural lead on Iran in the Palestinian cause. Although Iran has supported Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon in their conflicts with Israel, as a Shia power it has always been one step removed from the Palestinian cause.

Which brings us to Israel, the other key element in the equation. It is easy to see Erdogan’s latest move as simply an Islamist attack on Israel propelled by a revisionist instinct that wants to harm Israel in whatever way possible. But unlike Iran, Turkey’s relationship with Israel is complex. Turkey and Israel have long and deep ties that are rooted in their shared experience as non-Arab and democratic states in a region where both characteristics are unusual. Diplomatic links are strong, if strained, under the Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Turkey’s position has little to do with harming Israel and everything to do with Ankara’s position in respect to the Arab world. President Erdogan wishes to be a key regional player in the Middle East and in the Sunni Muslim world. Turkey is also the major Islamist force in the region.

The UAE-Israel deal and the Turkish response have occurred in a context in which Ankara is at loggerheads with both countries in the eastern Mediterranean. The UAE is supporting renegade General Khalifa Haftar in Libya, while Turkey supports the more Islamist Government of National Accord in Tripoli. At the same time, Israel and the UAE’s ally Egypt have signed a maritime agreement with Greece and Cyprus aimed at freezing Turkey out of gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean. In these circumstances, both can expect to be snubbed. Their decision to shift the diplomatic landscape of the Palestinian issue was equally expected to be used by Turkey as an opportunity to gain leverage in this conflict.

The Power of Belief

Alongside all the geopolitical considerations, there is one that is rather more obvious. It is that President Erdogan might actually believe in the cause he is backing. The current political climate is often assumed to be one of purely Machiavellian intrigue and design, but Erdogan has built a career as a conviction politician. Behind the soundbites and the posturing, much about the long reign of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, first as prime minister and then president leading the AKP, has been about long-term historical issues and the restitution of perceived past wrongs.

This is as much an internal Turkish legacy as an external one, but given the nature of Turkey as the chief successor state of the disintegrated Ottoman Empire, many of the issues close to the president’s heart have a wider regional implication. This can be seen in antagonisms everywhere from Greece and Cyprus to the Gulf states and North Africa.

The centrality of Islamic faith is as important to President Erdogan as it was to the rulers of the Ottoman Empire throughout much of its history. It informs his ties to countries across the Islamic world. It is evidenced in Turkish engagement in Somalia, Sudan and Libya, where Turkey is supporting the more Islamist faction in the civil war.

All this means that Palestine, the central Islamic cause in the Middle East since the First World War, is of central and very personal importance to him. At this moment of conflict with other powerful nations of the Sunni Muslim world, when Palestine’s chief allies appear to be Shia powers such as Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia, President Erdogan and his party may feel it beholden on Turkey to seize the mantle as the predominant Sunni ally of the cause.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Turkey Takes on the UAE in Palestine appeared first on 51�Թ�.

With the BRI, China Still Has a Long Road Ahead

READ MORE

As such, ensuring China’s energy security constitutes one of the core objectives of Beijing’s much-hyped Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a multitrillion-dollar infrastructure and development project at furthering China’s geopolitical and geo-economic clout on the world stage. Predicated upon the revival of the ancient Silk Road connecting the Mediterranean and the Pacific, Beijing’s “project of the century” hinges upon developing a vast of highways, pipelines and strategic ports across the Greater Middle East, a geographical macro-region stretching from Morocco to Afghanistan that is as rich in fossil fuels as it is to the most damaging repercussions of climate change.

Crescent of Fragile States

Even absent the threat posed by climate change to Middle Eastern countries, the broad crescent of fragile states spanning from the Levant to the Hindu Kush already represents one of the most challenging environments for foreign investors. Plagued by the aftershocks of the war on terror and the Arab Spring, political and security risks remain endemic across the region, from widespread social discontent exemplified by ongoing in Lebanon and Iraq to incessant as seen in Syria, Libya and Yemen set against the backdrop of an escalating Saudi-Iran proxy conflict encouraging all but the most fearless investors to steer a wide berth.

Moreover, climatologists predict that Middle Eastern countries stand to be among the worst affected on the planet if current meteorological patterns persist, with summer temperatures set to at double the global average, increasing the likelihood of devastating droughts, famines and extreme weather events across the region.

Climate change has long been as a threat multiplier exacerbating conflict, social unrest and state fragility. For instance, Ankara’s damming of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers as part of the colossal Southeastern Anatolia Project aimed at transforming Turkey’s underdeveloped provinces through mass irrigation serves to conflict over scarce water resources downstream in Syria and Iraq. As water shortages and decreased rainfall undermine agricultural livelihoods and increase food insecurity, desperation has driven millions to to urban centers such as Baghdad, Basra and Damascus, causing overpopulation and overburdening already fragile urban infrastructures.

Unsurprisingly, the Syrian crisis was predated by a , which saw the country’s urban population increase by 50% over a decade and is widely attributed as a major underlying factor propelling its descent into civil war in 2011. Nor can less obvious yet equally damaging second and third-order effects of climate change be neglected. Unprecedented monsoon seasons during 2018 and 2019 driven by a warming Arabian Sea have given rise to immense that have decimated crops, exacerbated food insecurity and fueled the worst humanitarian crisis of the 21^st century in Yemen.

Strategic Planning

For Beijing’s investors and strategic planners, such increasingly volatile environmental conditions and, more importantly, their associated social, economic and political consequences, are likely to prove a thorn in the side of China’s BRI ambitions. Already, Chinese-led infrastructure projects along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor have been repeatedly by the Balochi Liberation Army, a separatist militant group that widespread water insecurity exacerbated by climate change to fuel insurgent recruitment in Pakistan’s restive Baluchistan province, as illustrated by a spate of recent attacks that have resulted in the deaths of several Chinese nationals.

As Beijing grows its footprint in the fragile states and frontier markets of the Greater Middle East, it is reasonable to expect Chinese investments to be increasingly targeted, for example, by Islamist extremists hailing from East Turkestan active in Syria, enraged by Chinese activities in Xinjiang vis-à-vis the Muslim Uighur minority. Such incidents not only represent physical risks to BRI projects but also commit potential investors to extensive private security operations, potentially undermining the financial viability of such investments. Indeed, China’s BRI projects may exacerbate the risk of climate-related instability across the region in the long term as evidenced by the projected of the Chinese-built Sardasht and Rudbar dams in Iran on water security downstream in Iraq.

Moreover, connecting China’s diverse portfolio of investments across the Greater Middle East into a single integrated economic corridor traversing East and West demands the incorporation of fragile and conflict-afflicted states holding valuable geostrategic locations such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan into the Belt and Road Initiative. While Beijing has expressed a keen in playing a pivotal role in post-conflict reconstruction in such fragile environments, ongoing food and water insecurity, land degradation and migration resulting from climate change may drag China’s geo-economic ambitions into the same quagmire of intractable conflict that thwarted Washington’s geopolitical aspirations over the past two decades.

Green Investment

Nevertheless, the notion that Beijing’s New Silk Road is merely a path to ecological ruin is a mistaken one. Domestically, China is the world’s largest of wind and solar energy as well as the most prolific innovator in the renewables sector, holding more patents for renewable technologies than any other nation. Moreover, Beijing realizes such comparative advantages represent a valuable yet insofar underexploited resource to fuel development along the Belt and Road, setting up a state-backed Green Silk Road Fund to investment in carbon-neutral projects abroad, such as Morocco’s Ouarzazate Solar Power Station and Pakistan’s Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park.

Despite widespread of the detrimental impact of dam construction on downstream habitats, efficiently managed dams backed by Chinese capital not only offset emissions through the provision of hydroelectric power but hold the potential to mitigate the most detrimental effects of climate change through irrigation systems in hitherto arid regions of Iran and Pakistan.

Paradoxically, Beijing’s most lucrative opportunities for green investment may lie in the petroleum-rich monarchies of the Persian Gulf. As Gulf states look toward a post-oil future, ensuring the prosperity and relative political stability such countries currently enjoy in the coming decades is paramount. Given the Gulf’s immense energy demands and vast for solar, wind and tidal energy production across the region, green investment represents an pillar of post-petroleum diversification initiatives such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, Kuwait’s Vision 2035 and the United Arab Emirates’ Energy Strategy 2050, with investment in renewables across the Gulf 313% from 2014 to 2018.

Already, Beijing has successfully harnessed such ambitious visions to promote the Green Silk Road, partially funding the Mohamed bin Rashid Solar Park, the world’s largest solar plant, in partnership with the UAE government, while a 49% stake in Saudi ACWA Renewable Energy Holdings, one of the largest financiers of green energy projects across the Middle East and North Africa. At one level, Chinese investment in the renewable energy transition in the Gulf is likely to present a win-win situation: financing the diversification of petroleum-dependent economies while providing ample scope for Beijing to export its domestic success promoting a sustainable energy transition abroad. However, even among the more stable, petroleum-rich monarchies of the Persian Gulf, the prospect of rapidly rising temperatures and an accelerated transition from fossil fuels to renewables may endanger Beijing’s BRI ambitions.

As increased global investment in renewables the cost of solar, wind and tidal energy relative to fossil fuels, decreased demand for petroleum and natural gas is likely to mean that Gulf monarchies in the midst of an energy transition yet still dependent upon non-renewables for a substantial proportion of their GDP may encounter insurmountable as they are forced to shift from their traditional rentier political economies, raising the prospect of widespread social and political unrest.

As the unprecedented collapse in global fossil fuel prices as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Saudi oil price war during the first half of 2020 , the political and economic systems of the Gulf monarchies remain ill-prepared for the rising debt, tax hikes and extensive austerity measures that such a transition may entail. The prospect of increased political volatility in countries that have long represented an anchor of stability in an otherwise turbulent Middle East may yet undermine what has so far been one of the clear-cut successes of Beijing’s BRI across the region.

Overall, China’s greatest obstacle to realizing its expansive ambitions for a New Silk Road is not Beijing’s economic or geostrategic rivals — of which there are many — but rather an increasingly hostile geophysical environment in the states that straddle its heartland. By 2049, the proposed terminus date of Beijing’s flagship project on the centenary of the People’s Republic of China, average temperatures across the Middle East and North Africa region are set to by more than 4°C, followed by extreme droughts and famines rendering large swathes of land surrounding the Persian Gulf .

How China’s investors and strategic planners respond to this looming threat only time will tell. Despite recent positive signals indicating Beijing’s desire to jump aboard the renewables bandwagon, the most damaging repercussions of anthropogenic climate change are likely already irreversible. Just as America’s unipolar moment became unhinged amid the shifting sands of the Greater Middle East, China’s BRI ambitions may prove to be little more than a mirage in the desert.

*[ a partner organization of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Are China’s New Silk Road Ambitions a Desert Mirage? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

First, most regimes in the Arabian Peninsula do not perceive Israel as a grave strategic threat, nor do most in the GCC view standing up for the Palestinian cause as a high-ranking priority, especially compared to dealing with the perceived Turkish and Iranian threats. Second, throughout the 20^th century, Israel has developed extensive relations with some states in the GCC. Such engagement and cooperation spread across numerous domains such as intelligence, security and economic cooperation. Third, the question of Palestinian statehood is generally linked to either pan-Arabism or Islamism, and most Arab Gulf regimes seek to limit the power of such ideologies in their own countries.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Faces Its Most Consequential Decision in Decades

READ MORE

Furthermore, while officials in the GCC have issued public statements warning Israel to not to go ahead with the planned annexation of the West Bank, such rhetoric is mainly intended for domestic and regional consumption and does not directly reflect the warming relations between Israel and the Gulf capitals. 

Strategic Relations

Foreign ministers and Gulf officials have publicly condemned the move, that “annexation will certainly and immediately upend Israeli aspirations for improved security, economic and cultural ties with the Arab world and with UAE.” Moreover, Bahraini minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani, that the “Israeli plan threatens international peace and security and endangers the region,” while both ’s ambassador to the United Nations and ’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued similar statements condemning annexation. 

Doha would likely react negatively to annexation based on the close relationships developed with Hamas and a litany of Islamist movements across the region since the 1990s. However, Qatar has had to go to pains to cement its close relations with the Trump administration amid the past three years of being subjected to a blockade by its neighbors. Thus, officials in Doha would likely have to be cautious about taking any steps vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine that could trigger a negative response from the most pro-Israel leader who has ever occupied the Oval Office.

At the same time, examining the strategic relations between Israel and the GCC member states allows one to understand the potential repercussions of annexation. Accordingly, Israel’s economic, security and intelligence ties with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and the UAE are likely to withstand annexation. This is mainly due to most Arab Gulf states’ tactical acceptance of Israel’s military and technological predominance in the region, especially when viewed in terms of the perceived Iranian threat, Turkish “neo-Ottomanism” and Washington’s waning military commitment to the region. Notwithstanding Qatar and Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman all formed durable ties in the realms of security, intelligence, and economics. In the domains of security and intelligence, the common enemy — Turkey — and the threat of Iranian hegemony cohere Israel with the UAE, Bahrain and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Israel and Arab Gulf states’ clandestine diplomatic engagement began decades ago and surfaced into overtly public relations. Consequently, the move toward normalization of ties has shuttered away the long-standing Arab demand that Israel withdraw from lands captured in 1967 as a precondition for acceptance of Israel.

Omani-Israeli relations are largely predicated on clandestine diplomacy and are historically orchestrated by the Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency. To be sure, Mossad officers have routinely to Muscat to consult with Omani officials regarding Iran and other shared regional concerns. Oman’s willingness to work with Tel Aviv is based on a historic pattern of bilateral economic and political ties. It follows that Oman will not disrupt ties with the Jewish state but rather continue its historical role as a diplomatic mediator — a position Muscat is likely to attempt to embrace in the short term in the event of annexation.

Durable Ties

Moreover, Israel established durable intelligence and security ties with other GCC members. For example, Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS) caused a bit of a surprise in the regional when he that “there are a lot of interests we [Saudi Arabia] share with Israel and if there is peace, there would be a lot of interest between Israel and the GCC.” Further, GCC support for Israel was during the 2019 Warsaw Mideast Summit, with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE’s chief diplomats all Israel’s right to exist and alluding that the perceived Iranian threat overshadowed the question of Palestinian statehood. That same year, MBS that “the Palestinians need to accept [Trump’s] proposal or stop complaining.”

Although, as noted, Tel Aviv’s intelligence and security relations with GCC member states are predicated on sharing information regarding Tehran and terrorism, many Arab Gulf monarchies are acquiring signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities from the Israeli defense sector. As an anonymous European intelligence official The Washington Post, “The tools you need to combat terrorism are the same ones you need to suppress dissent.”

To be sure, the Israeli defense sector has sold GCC member-states SIGINT collection methods and eavesdropping capabilities to internal dissent and entrench the power of the central authority. For example, Israel sold Saudi Arabia over $250 million worth of electronic and signals intelligence eavesdropping equipment in 2018, while Tel Aviv the Iron Dome advance air defense system to the kingdom a short time earlier. In 2016, Israel sold more than $1 billion to Arabian Peninsula sheikdoms, with most of the weapons directed to the Emiratis and Saudis, although the majority of such deals are kept .

The defense and intelligence relationships are again important given the convergence of interests around the Iranian threat, Ankara’s ambitious and Muslim Brotherhood-friendly foreign policy, along with the relative decline of Washington’s regional influence. For many Gulf monarchies, Israel represents a strategic partner that can effectively contribute to regional and global efforts to counter Iranian conduct in the wider Arab/Islamic world, provide intelligence information and collection capabilities to counterterrorism operations, and eavesdrop on domestic detractors while also gradually embracing the regional security role previously commanded by Washington.

Domestic perceptions triggered by annexation among the GCC population are likely to the strength of public diplomacy between the Gulf monarchies and Tel Aviv in the short term, despite Riyadh and Abu Dhabi often viewing Hamas with trepidation given the group’s Islamist ideology and its relations with Turkey, Qatar and Iran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are worried about Islamist movements and affiliated political power as a challenge to authority, yet they are equally concerned about domestic perceptions of annexation given the overtly public relations between the two monarchies and Tel Aviv.

In sum, the annexation process is unlikely to rupture Tel Aviv’s relations with GCC members. Israel is united with the Arabian monarchies by the common perception of the Iranian threat, while the Israeli defense and intelligence establishment provides an abundance of weaponry, intelligence information and collection capabilities to Gulf partners. Moreover, while annexation will stir internal opposition in the region, the GCC member states are only likely to publicly condemn the policy while continuing with diplomatic engagement, trade, intelligence sharing and defense acquisitions.

*[ is a partner organization of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Annexation or No Annexation, Little Will Change in Israel-GCC Relations appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Irrespective of stance, fabricating dualities between religions, nations and civilizations over Hagia Sophia directly contradicts the genuineness of accusations about its preservation as a cultural heritage site. Hagia Sophia and its historical role encapsulate various forms of power, such as state capacity, religious significance, symbolic power and historical role.

Why Making Hagia Sophia a Mosque Again Is Good News

READ MORE

Since the sixth century, Hagia Sophia, which literally translates as “sacred wisdom,” has acquired a universal meaning and role as a museum. Building on the varying forms of power it has embraced and disseminated, today, we should be cognizant of the inclusive role it can play as a space of faith. Hagia Sophia’s historical significance is best understood if it is appreciated with its spatio-historical presence instead of its place-based legal-jurisdictional status. It is natural to debate and assume a position over this transition, but not at the expense of its sacredness and universality across time and space stretching across civilizations, religions and humanities.

What needs to be discussed should revolve around the representation of Hagia Sophia as a mosque — a discussion that invites humanity to act collectively to address global dialogue. What humanity needs is for the people of the world to become “citizen pilgrims,” which is a term that Dr. Richard Falk, a professor at Princeton University, referred to in a recent speech at Hamad bin Khalifa University in Qatar about bringing communities together to work for a better future for all.

A “citizen pilgrim,” as Falk defined, “is a person with a trusting faith in the unseen yet desired end of human endeavors. Such a person engages in struggle and conceives of his or her life as a spiritual journey or pilgrimage toward a better future.” With this mindset, we would be able to establish a path that is genuinely devoted to working toward human and global interests.

Achieving Global Goals

Hagia Sophia has the potential to represent the power of faith and to unite instead of divide humanity, and its current unilateral role with the reconversion into a mosque should not compromise this important capacity. As an example, there has been a surge in faith-based organizations and religious leaders showing strong commitment and sensitivity to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A case in point is Religions for Peace, a multi-religious coalition that recently held its third plenary in Germany entitled, “Advancing Shared Well-Being by Promoting Just and Harmonious Societies.”&�Բ�����;

There has been an annual call to action where stakeholders raise awareness and attempt to accelerate efforts to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which is also known as the Global Goals. While governments, transnational organizations and civil society have long been involved in advancing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, we are now witnessing greater participation by players from a variety of sectors and industries such as faith-based actors. With its legacy and inclusivity between different religions, empires and states, Hagia Sophia’s universality may be a new driving force for uniting humanity toward the Global Goals.

To understand this perspective further, we need to dive into the history of Hagia Sophia. It was not a regular church; it has always symbolized unity. Most people merely see a materialistic transformation of the Hagia Sophia from a church to a mosque, but that is not necessarily the case. The church that became a mosque under the Ottoman Empire was not deprived of its Christian characteristics, and those remained essential elements of the building.

As the Muslim historian Sa’d-ud-Din observed a century after the Ottomans conquered Constantinople, the former name of Istanbul and the capital of the Byzantine Empire, “The hearts of those who bear witness to the single nature of God rejoiced at the erection of the true symbol of faith.” Hagia Sophia represents the unity of faiths, not the division.

The Importance of Representation

According to Richard Winston in his book, “Hagia Sophia: A History,” the hierarchies of patriarchy and clergy, emperor and court converged and symbolized the citizen of Constantinople, a community that is heavenly and majestic. Moreover, Hagia Sophia was not only about space but also light. The space is dynamic, but the light is transcendental. Besides the natural sun and moonlight that shone in through the windows, it was filled with lamps and candelabra.

These are merely metaphors in his book that can be used to reflect the universality and space-free understanding of what used to be the church. It was not entirely about spatial architecture, but rather about what it represented.

Winston states: “The creation of Hagia Sophia was a task that called not merely for the technical skill of the engineer but for the intellectual equipment of the scientist and the imaginative perception of the artist; it called for a man who combined the daring of an innovator with the esthetic vision of a genius.” This description of how the church was created is exactly what we need in many aspects of today’s world. We require a combination of technical knowledge with morality, ethics and so on.

This is why faith plays such an important role in society and in achieving the SDGs. Advancing the world does not and cannot rely solely on technical applications. It requires communities and faith groups to contribute their knowledge and influence.

*[The views expressed are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the official stance of Hamad bin Khalifa University.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Is Hagia Sophia Merely a Place of Worship? appeared first on 51�Թ�.