What is the Backstory of Western Sahara?

Western Sahara is a stretch of desert territory along the Atlantic coast. It borders Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. From 1884 to 1976, Spain was the colonial ruler of Western Sahara, which was then known as Spanish Sahara. During the great wave of decolonization in the second half of the 20th century, the —a Sahrawi nationalist liberation movement—waged guerrilla war against Spain.

Following the campaign of pressure that the UN, Morocco, and the Polisario Front launched against Spain in the late 1960s Madrid to consider withdrawing from the region, given that it no longer anticipated a future in the area. Subsequently, in 1974, Spain signaled its withdrawal by plans for a referendum in which the Sahrawi people could determine the future of the territory, whether to be a part of Morocco or Mauritania or to obtain their independence. Morocco and Mauritania welcomed Spain’s decision. However, the UNSG Resolution 3292 suspending the referendum until a formal process for this could be determined. 

On October 16, 1975, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague that while there were legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and certain tribes in Western Sahara during the time of Spanish colonization, and there were rights connecting the Mauritanian entity to the territory of Western Sahara, there was no evidence of a territorial sovereignty link between the territory of Western Sahara and either the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. In response to the ruling, in 1975 King Hassan II of Morocco  for a peaceful mass demonstration in the form of a march into Western Sahara. The King sought to reaffirm Morocco’s claim of sovereignty over the territory and called upon the Moroccan people to participate in the march. He emphasized that the march was the only way to regain control of Western Sahara.

Western Sahara is important for Morocco not only for sovereignty reasons but also for economic ones. It is rich in , a valuable fertilizer that secures the world’s food supply. This mineral is Morocco’s third largest export and brought the country $850 million in 2021. As a region along the Atlantic coast, Western Sahara is important for fishing, providing 75% of Morocco’s catches. Clearly, this region is of paramount to Rabat.

What Is Going on Now with Spain, Morocco and Algeria?

Therefore, Moroccan-Spanish ties turned when Spain admitted Polisario leader Brahim Ghali in April 2021 for medical treatment without officially telling Rabat. In 2022, Madrid agreed to support Rabat’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara, ending a year-long diplomatic crisis.

Spain’s change in policy has with Morocco after a year-long diplomatic spat. However, this move has infuriated Algeria, which an economic blockade on Spain in June 2022. This resulted in significant losses estimated at around $1 billion (€930 million) in the following seven months alone. Spanish Secretary of State for Trade Xiana Méndez Bértolo recently that, between June and November 2022, Spain’s exports were a mere $189.1 million (€176.2 million) to Algeria. In December 2022, Spanish exports to Algeria amounted to $11.81 million (€10.8 million), a fall of 84%. Spain’s position as an exporter to Algeria fell from second in 2021 to ninth in 2022.

This has hurt Spanish companies and businesses exporting to Algeria, especially in Valencia and Catalonia. These regions account for over 50% of to Algeria. In terms of sectors, enamelers and ceramic machinery manufacturers are facing significant negative impacts.The economic pain of this blockade has led the Spanish Ministry of Trade to the support of the European Commission. It has come up with a financial plan to support Spanish companies suffering from the blockade. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell to Algeria in March to resolve this crisis but the visit was .

Algeria Is Still Supplying Gas to Spain

Spain depends on Algeria for gas. Therefore, it is important for Madrid to maintain good relations with Algiers. Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune commented that “among all the Algerian statements, what matters to the Spanish state is the full guarantee of Spain’s supply of Algerian gas and the strict respect of the international contracts.” Algeria has assured Spain that it will continue to supply gas under any circumstances.

Spain gets much of its gas through the Medgaz pipeline from Algeria. According to Spanish reports, Madrid has recently turned to the US for gas. Many analysts speculate that Spain might be moving away from Algerian gas. Hence, Algeria decided not to escalate matters with Spain when it comes to supply of gas. Losing a lucrative export market would not be in Algerian economic interest.

Tensions between Spain and Algeria have occurred in the past but the two countries have always been able to achieve an accommodation. This time, things are different. Spain’s change of policy has touched a raw nerve and only a change in government might lead to the calming of the waters.

Algeria Strengthens Ties with Other Countries

As Spanish exports to Algeria have crashed, other countries such as Portugal and Italy have stepped in. In 2021, Portugal exports to Algeria totaled $241 million. The main products were uncoated paper, heating machinery, and acrylic hydrocarbons. Between February 2022 and February 2023, Portugal’s exports have increased by $384.6 million. The top exports to Algeria in February 2023 were vegetables, wood pulp, paper products, plastics and plastic goods, machinery, mechanical appliances and parts. 

Before the rupture in relations, Algeria preferred Spanish products. Sociedad Española Automóviles de Turismo (SEAT), a Spanish car manufacturer was active in Algeria. In 2018, SEAT strategic operations in Algeria. Now, Italian car company FIAT seems to be replacing SEAT. In March 2023, six carlines were launched in Algeria. In contrast, SEAT’s growth has suffered.

Italy and Algeria have good neighborly agreements. They are now deepening their strategic partnership. In January 2023, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni Algeria to launch her new Mediterranean policy in Algiers. It is well known that Italy wants to become an energy hub between Europe and the southern Mediterranean. The Russia-Ukraine War is causing an energy crisis in Europe, which is looking for alternative sources. This offers a great economic opportunity for both Italy and Algeria.

Both countries also signed  agreements relating to aerospace and pharmaceutical sectors. These agreements were not only about economics but also geopolitics. Italy sees Algeria as a vital actor in the Mediterranean region that can underpin regional stability. Algeria’s neighbors are facing turmoil. Libya is going through a civil war. Al Jazeera has Tunisia a “ticking time bomb.” The unsettled situation in North Africa makes Algeria critically important not only for Italy but also the European Union.

Is Morocco a Springboard for Spain Into Africa?

Spain has a growing interest in the Moroccan market. In 2022, Spanish exports to Morocco amounted to $12.9 billion (€11.748 billion) while Moroccan imports to Spain were $9.4 million (€8.6 million). Morocco lies just across the Strait of Gibraltar to the south of Spain. It is Spain’s closest neighbor in North Africa. Morocco is a natural trading partner where demand for Spanish goods and services is growing. Therefore, it makes sense for Spain to invest in closer relations with its southern neighbor.

Spanish President Pedro Sánchez Morocco in February. The two governments reached agreements on migration, tourism, trade and investment. Just as Italy is developing a strategic relationship with Algeria, Spain is betting on Morocco. Spanish companies are looking to expand in North Africa. Morocco could be a good base of operations for Spain. Given the fact that Spain’s relations with Algeria have taken a hit and other European rivals are stepping in, it makes sense for Madrid to cultivate Rabat. A closer relationship with Morocco makes both economic and geopolitical sense for Spain.

[ edited this piece.]

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The Unthinkable: War Returns to Europe

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The immediate answer is there are very few today outside of Russia itself, hence the large rise in gas prices witnessed lately. Over the medium term, however, Libya and Algeria have ample opportunity to increase their supplies to the EU.

Supplies From Libya and Algeria

Libya boasts proven gas reserves of 1,500 billion cubic meters (bcm). Its production is a modest 16 bcm. Algeria has 4,500 bcm of proven reserves and 20-25 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of unconventional gas reserves, the third-largest in the world after the United States and China (and Argentina whose proven reserves tie with Algeria). How much gas that could produce is anyone’s guess, but we are speaking of a figure in the tens of bcm.

Algeria today produces 90 bcm, of which 50 bcm were exported. Another feature of Algeria is the huge storage capacity — 60 bcm — of the Hassi R’Mel gas field, its oldest and largest compared with the EU’s storage capacity of 115 bcm.

Pierre Terzian, the founder of the French energy think-tank Petrostrategies, out that four underwater gas pipelines link these two producers directly to the European mainland: the first links Libyan gas fields with Italy; the second Algerian gas fields to Italy via Tunisia; the third Algerian gas fields to southern Spain; and the fourth the same gas fields to southern Spain via Morocco.

The latter has been closed since November 1, 2021, due to deteriorating relations between Algeria and Morocco, but this has not affected the supply of gas to the Iberian Peninsula. Algeria also has two major liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals, which adds flexibility to its export policy. Its exports to France and the United Kingdom are in LNG ships.

The leading cause of the current crisis is structural as, according to Terzian, EU domestic gas production has declined by 23% over the last 10 years and now covers only 42% of consumption, as compared with 53% in 2010. That decline is the result, in particular, of the closing of the giant Groningen gas field, which is well underway and will be completed by 2030.

Europe has done a lot to expand the gas transmission grid among EU countries, but some major gas peninsulas remain. In 2018, it was suggested that connections between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe needed developing. Spain boasts one-third of Europe’s LNG import capacity, much of it unused, and is connected to Algeria by two major pipelines that could be extended.

As Alan Riley and I four years ago, the “main barrier to opening up the Iberian energy market’s supply routes to the rest of the EU is the restricted route over the Franco-Spanish border. Only one 7-bcm gas line is available to carry gas northwards … The main blocking factor has been the political power of Electricité de France, which is seeking to protect the interests of the French nuclear industry.” An Iberian solution, we added, would not only “benefit France and Spain, but also Algeria, creating additional incentives to explore for new gas fields and maybe kick start a domestic renewables revolution,” which would encourage a switch in consumption from gas to solar in Algeria.

Germany, the Netherlands and Italy

Germany, for its part, has never put its money where its mouth is with regard to Algeria. In 1978, Ruhrgas (now absorbed in E.ON) signed a major contract to supply LNG to Germany. Germany never built the LNG terminal needed to get that contract off the ground. So far, it is the only major European country to have no LNG import terminals, although it can rely on existing facilities in the Netherlands and Belgium.

In 1978, the Netherlands also contracted to buy Algerian gas. Algeria dropped the contract in the early 1980s because of Germany’s refusal to go ahead. Later in the 1980s, Ruhrgas again expressed its interest in buying Algerian gas, but the price offered was too low and because Ruhrgas wanted to root the gas through France, which insisted on very high transit fees. By discarding Algerian gas, Germany has tied itself to Russian goodwill.

Italy, like Germany, a big importer of Russian gas, has positioned itself much more adroitly. In December 2021, Sonatrach, Algeria’s state oil and gas monopoly, increased the amount of gas pumped through the TransMed pipeline, which links Algeria to Italy via Tunisia and the Strait of Sicily at the request of its Italian customers. This followed a very successful state  by Italian President Sergio Mattarella to Algeria in early November. On February 27, Sonatrach  it could pump additional gas to Europe, but contingent on meeting current contractual commitments.

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Relations between the Italian energy company ENI and Sonatrach are historically close because of the important role played by the Italian company’s founder, Enrico Mattei, in advising the provisional government of the Republic of Algeria in its negotiations with France, which resulted in the independence of Algeria in July 1962.

The pursuit of very liberal energy policies since the turn of the century by the European Commission overturned the policies of long-term gas and LNG purchase contracts, which were the norm in internationally traded gas until then. Yet security of supply does not rest on such misguided liberalism. New gas reserves cannot be found, let alone gas fields brought into production if producers and European customers are, as Terzian points out, “at the mercy of prices determined by exchange platforms which have dubious liquidity (and can be influenced by major players).” This is an attitude, he adds, “that borders on the irresponsible.”

German energy policy has mightily contributed to the present crisis. It has blithely continued to shut down the country’s nuclear plants, increased its reliance on coal in the electricity sector and with that a consequent increase in carbon emissions.

Serious Dialogue

When considering Caspian gas as an alternative to Russian gas, I would add another country, Turkey, which has a very aggressive and independent policy as a key transit for gas. However, few observers would argue that such a solution would increase Europe’s security.

Engaging in serious long-term strategic dialogue with Algeria would provide Spain and the EU with leverage. This could help to build better relations between Algeria, Morocco and also the troubled area of the Sahel. When trying to understand the politics of different nations, following the money often offers a good guide. One might also follow the gas.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner organization of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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However, after signing the deal, the government in Madrid never formalized its political and diplomatic position regarding Moroccan over Spain‘s former colony in Western Sahara. A geopolitical matter of vital importance for Morocco, the question of Western Sahara remains an unhealed wound in the relationship between Madrid and Rabat.

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In 2021, this wound was reopened after Spain, in a somewhat secret and irregular move, welcomed Brahim Ghali, secretary-general of the Polisario Front, a nationalist movement seeking independence for Western Sahara vis-à-vis Morocco. On top of the fact that Ghali is wanted in Spain for crimes against humanity, rape and torture, among others, he is also a staunch enemy of the government in Rabat.

This politically embarrassing situation, a product of a diplomatic miscalculation by the Spanish government, created a feeling of betrayal in Rabat. Morocco quickly conveyed its discomfort, considering Spain’s harboring of Ghali a challenge to the kingdom’s sovereignty and interference in an internal state matter. Thus, Morocco issued a warning that continuing to host Ghali would have consequences.

Spain in North Africa

Despite these warnings, the government in Madrid decided not to make any political or diplomatic overtures to Morocco, declining to resolve the misunderstanding in a consensual manner. Therefore, in a way, the Spanish government forwent its diplomatic relationship with Morocco and disregarded the important role that Rabat has always played as a critical partner in the fight against illegal trafficking and terrorism stemming from the Maghreb and the Sahel.

Though the relationship between Morocco and Spain has lived through ups and downs, the tensions last year felt much different. Through relaxation of its military controls, Rabat‘s threat became a reality in May 2021 when Morocco effectively opened its border with Ceuta, a Spanish enclave and autonomous city located on the African continent, which made it easier for waves of irregular to reach Tarajal beach. Around 8,000 people, including more than 1,500 estimated minors, tried to cross the Spanish-Moroccan border on foot and by swimming to enter Spanish soil illegally.

As crude as it may seem, this political move by the government in Rabat, using Moroccans and Africans in general as a weapon against Spain, is not new. For years, Morocco has used this modus operandi as a diplomatic weapon to pressure and obtain concessions from its European neighbor. However, there has not been such a mass arrival of people, especially such a high percentage of minors, to the Spanish border in recent history.

The diplomatic crisis last May led to authentic moments of chaos and siege along Ceuta‘s border, making the passage of many of these immigrants to the European territory possible. Through its actions, Rabat sent a message without palliatives and the Spanish government to back down from political moves, such as open invitations to regional nationalist leaders.

The Existential Issue of Territorial Integrity

Morocco’s red lines related to Western Sahara have been drawn, and the kingdom has reiterated that interferences with its national sovereignty will not be tolerated. The crude political response at the Spanish border of Ceuta represents the harshness of Rabat‘s diplomatic relations, choosing, yet again, to weaponize its population.

Spain needs Morocco; indeed, Europe needs Morocco. Rabat is a crucial partner in Africa, especially given the many challenges in the region. However, Spain and the European Union should not allow the pressure and blackmail from their North African neighbor to stand because they embolden others. Spain and the EU should impose strict red lines on Morocco as well as clear and intelligent economic sanctions concerning development, education and health funds.

Political, and diplomatic issues can be resolved with class and delicacy without cheap blows and without trivializing despair and compassion. For this, Spain needs to reach a rapprochement with Morocco the status and future of Western Sahara.

Energy and Copycats

In tandem with Morocco’s migrant valve vis-à-vis Spain, Algeria started leveraging its gas valve to counter France’s escalation on matters like issuing visas to Algerian citizens. In this latter issue, Spain and Morocco, neither of whom are particularly close with Algeria, are collateral damage to the Paris-Algiers feud whether in the form of declining pipeline or a higher power bill.

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Since these episodes toward the middle of last year, the same playbook has been used by Moscow’s client in Minsk, who has fostered a migrant cul-de-sac along the EU’s Polish border. In doing so, Russia and Belarus are feeding the euroskeptic spirits the Visegrad countries and beyond, which are particularly sensitive to migration and border sovereignty issues. Moreover, Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin are playing good cop, bad cop on the issue of Europe’s gas supply by offering both threats and assurances that further highlight the EU’s vulnerable dependency on external providers when it comes to energy.

On the migration front, the European Union needs to reinforce its external borders and FRONTEX agency, particularly within the Schengen area, and formulate a common framework to tackle both migration quotas and allocation throughout Schengen member countries. Not only is the migrant in places like Spain, Greece, and Poland a human tragedy, but it is also increasingly a geopolitical lever weaponized by Morocco, Turkey, Belarus and other adversaries to destabilize the EU and bolster internal chaos to the benefit of figures such as Viktor Orban, Geert Wilders, Santiago Abascal, Marine Le Pen, and Eric Zemmour.

Whether nuclear, solar or wind, a common and comprehensive European defense framework urgently requires a holistic approach that tackles the issue of energy independence, in addition to that of border security, particularly in an increasingly hostile and multipolar neighborhood.

Building Solutions Where Possible

Along the Maghreb, one of the best solutions would be a new pragmatic and flexible bipartisan agreement between Spain and Morocco. An agreement that commemorates the golden jubilee of the Tripartite Agreement provides a firm solution to the Western Sahara dispute in a framework that benefits coexistence in the region and maintains collaboration in critical matters such as the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and human trafficking.

In the same way, Spain and the EU must encourage the good behavior of Morocco with humanitarian aid and fruitful commercial relations to definitively close the post-colonial wound that sometimes reopens between the two countries.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Not All Quiet on the Western Sahara Front

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The latest episode in this tense relationship between the North African nations took place in August when Algeria severed diplomatic with Morocco. The move came after a series of wildfires swept through the Amazigh-speaking Kabylie region in what Algeria claims was a covert Moroccan operation to bolster the MAK.

For Algeria, this was a delicate time for the government due to an economic crisis exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, political unrest since 2020, and the ill health and subsequent death of the country’s former leader, Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

Tension in the Maghreb

Algeria and Morocco have been antagonistic neighbors since their respective independence from the French. Border discord gave rise to a tenacious rivalry that worsened with the Western Sahara when Algeria became the main supporter of the Polisario Front. This unfinished conflict and the decades-long of the land border between Algeria and Morocco are the most tangible examples of the enmity that keeps the Maghreb divided.

Diplomatic spats and mutual accusations of instigating internal turmoil have been frequent. One area where the tense calm in bilateral relations has been the military. The two countries have engaged in a rapid arms fueled, in Algeria‘s case, by generous hydrocarbon revenues in the first decade of the century. Despite its efforts, Morocco’s military budget has been outstripped since 2006. Only as a result of Algeria‘s economic fragility has Morocco been able to make a significant .

Recent years have been characterized by Morocco’s impetuous diplomatic activity, particularly in the Gulf and throughout Africa. In the face of Morocco’s increased international projection, the Algerians have tried to respond despite the country’s poor economic situation.

In particular, the Algerians have sought to build closer relations with African nations. Algeria has strengthened ties with its traditional ally Nigeria, restarting talks on the construction of the trans-Saharan gas . It has also reinforced cooperation with countries such as Mali and Libya.

Implications for Spain

Europe overlooks North Africa and is separated by mere miles from Morocco. As a result, the Europeans have a direct stake in the tension south of the Mediterranean. The European country most affected by the recent escalation between Morocco and Algeria is Spain.

Taking a position in favor of one party could have on either the security of Spain’s southern border that is close to northern Morocco or the supply of natural gas that it receives from Algeria. This comes at a time when the flow of migrants across the Mediterranean is increasing and the price of gas, coal and electricity is rising.

The of the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline on November 1 has direct implications for Spain since the route was a major source of supply for over two decades. The pipeline also passes through Morocco, which retained part of the gas in exchange for allowing the line to operate via its territory. Morocco used the gas to produce around 12% of the country’s electricity. The Medgaz pipeline is seen as a replacement, which would allow Algeria to get rid of intermediaries and also strike a blow against Morocco.

Yet this will not spare Spain, which has no voice in regional disputes despite its desire to present itself as a strong European country. It is unclear how long this new episode of tension in the Maghreb will play out, but it could have serious implications for Europe.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Addressing Climate Change Impacts on the Sporting Calendar

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This, combined with flagging and in some cases stagnant yield increases in soil systems across the world, will soon require sweeping and rapid changes in growing methods. As the global population continues to increase, food production will rise and our methods of growing should change as well.

Better Methods

There are methods available to us today to not only change the way we grow produce for the better, but also increase yields in a smaller space. Vertical farming through hydroponics or aeroponics gives us the opportunity to grow larger amounts of produce in seemingly unavailable spaces. Rooftops and indoor areas such as old warehouses can be used to grow plants that are stacked on top of each other to farm a consistent crop that produces year-round and quickly. Such measures would require less water and energy, are more pest resistant and can help alleviate some of the logistical trouble of transporting produce to and from farms to cities everywhere.

Hydroponics and aeroponics are increasingly popular cultivation methods among both commercial growers and research scientists. They confer several advantages, with the foremost being their water use efficiency. Some studies suggest up to 70% and 95% less water usage for hydroponics and aeroponics, respectively. In a 2015  conducted in Arizona, an extremely dry place in the United States, it was found that hydroponically grown lettuce required 10 times less water as a system than soil-based lettuce crops.

This is particularly important based on the similarities between the climates of Arizona and Marrakech, a city in Morocco. While this study found that energy usage of a hydroponic farm was significantly higher than soil-based farms, this could be nearly completely offset by reducing the amount of supplemental lighting used in favor of currently available solar power technologies.

Another advantage of greenhouse hydroponic production is season independence, where a grower would be able to produce several harvests year-round by shielding the crops from seasonal changes through the use of LED lighting and heating and cooling of the greenhouse space. By utilizing existing ideas for a closed-loop hydroponic system, which can be easily constructed in any area of the world, it is possible to reuse nearly all water and nutrients that are not taken up and transpired by plants.

One  conducted in Indonesia suggested the use of such a system to more actively regulate water usage and increase the cost-efficiency of hydroponic production in a nutrient film technique (NFT) hydroponic system. Water efficiency and full-year production and harvest are attractive, and depending on the design of the greenhouse, pest resistance can be built in as well through the engineering of the facility to not be conducive to insect or microbial population accumulation.

While reusing nutrients and water can be economically and environmentally attractive (in reducing agricultural runoff, one of the main sources of pollution in the world), care must be taken to ensure consistent yield through several cycles of harvest. If not properly treated, reused nutrient solution can accumulate several  (plant-harming) organic acids that are released from the roots of any plant in order to regulate the microbial population of its roots. Studies have shown that the use of activated charcoal can help to mitigate some of the damaging effects of these chemicals, though further research is needed to determine a commercially viable solution.

Another promising area of research in hydroponics and aeroponics is a possible disease resistance conferred by the physical stress of constant flow or aerosolization. One  found that in aeroponic systems, the microbial population of the roots remained almost entirely distinct from the population of the nutrient solution reservoir, suggesting very little, if any, microbial population overlap.

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Another recent  attempted to use a chemical intervention solution to mitigate possible E. coli contamination of lettuce crops grown in NFT systems. Though the chemical intervention was unsuccessful, a notable result was the complete lack of colonization of root tissue and no uptake of harmful bacteria into the vegetative tissues of any of the tested crops. Though these studies are recent, they suggest that hydroponics may be much more pathogen-resistant than previously thought, leading to considerably lower contamination risk for hydroponic growers and safer food for consumers.

Benefits Are Many

The benefits of hydroponic and aeroponic farming are many, and emerging technologies are making the ease of access to such systems considerably lower, paving the way for a future generation of amateur and commercial growers to begin to farm in any place, at any time.

Africa has experienced wonderful agricultural and economic growth in some regions, but with current methods, this is not sustainable. At a recent pre-summit event of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) , “Agricultural Transformation for Sustainable and Resilient Food Systems,” there was a discussion regarding the need for change in the direction of agriculture in the future. There is a need for an increase in productivity in the land already used for agriculture, which will then lead to greater and more sustainable economic growth. Increasing productivity through new agricultural technologies would have lasting impacts on farmers, communities, and societies everywhere.

As per a 2020 World Bank , “Harvesting Prosperity: Technology and Productivity Growth in Agriculture,” there is particular weight given to innovation and the need to support this innovation through connection to markets. We believe that using new hydroponic and aeroponic technology as well as vertical farming can increase productivity, foster a closer connection for city residents to their food production and experience continued growth in the agricultural sector.

From Africa to the World

Across the world, we are conducting unsustainable practices and the use of land for agricultural growth. The High Atlas Foundation (HAF), an organization for the lasting and prosperous development of Morocco, has been working to address this problem. It has been following responsible procedures and using new technology to increase efficiency primarily through women and youth-led campaigns. In addition, it has been working to address the problem of climate change through monitoring trees that HAF has planted for carbon offsets.

There is a necessity in not only Africa but across the world to accept and utilize new technology to help increase the productivity of the land we have while also saving our planet. The advent of hydroponics, aeroponics and vertical farming is a great method to try to combat the pressing issue of how we are going to grow plants when there is little water and little surface area. This gives the possibility for many methods of urban farming, including vertical and hydroponics in rooftops and many unused areas that could be used for growing.
 
We only have one world, so being good stewards and living sustainable lives is imperative. Expanding use of the technology of hydroponics and vertical farming can allow the small grower to have much stronger financial gain while also helping alleviate the burden agriculture places on the planet. There is only so much space in the world, but we can always grow up.

*[The authors are interns at the .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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On September 28, the  was published, the first report of its kind designed to assess levels of organized crime and resilience to organized criminal activity in 193 UN member states. (There is no data for the Occupied Palestinian Territories or Western Sahara.)

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The index, a collaborative effort by over 350 experts worldwide funded by the US State Department and the European Union, provides the most comprehensive assessment to date of the pervasiveness of criminal markets, the influence of criminal actors and the effectiveness of resilience measures to combat the threat of organized crime. It is based on data from 2020, to be updated every two years in order to provide a global baseline for criminality and resilience over time.

Deeply Embedded

Overall, the index highlights the entrenched nature of organized crime, with more than three-quarters of the world’s population assessed as living in countries with high levels of crime and low levels of resistance to organized crime. State involvement in organized crime is shown to be a deeply embedded phenomenon globally, with state officials and their clients now the most dominant brokers of organized crime, not cartel leaders or mafia bosses.

While Western democracies come out on top, Arab countries generally score poorly, with Libya, Yemen, Syria, Somalia and Iraq coming bottom or near the bottom in several categories. Overall, the most criminal Arab country is found to be Iraq (ranked 8^th globally), followed by Syria (14), Lebanon (15), Libya (20) and Sudan (24).

The index evaluates every country according to two metrics: criminality, which is based on criminal markets and five different types of criminal actors, and resilience to organized crime, based on 12 factors such as good governance, law enforcement and witness support.

The most pervasive crime in the region is found to be human trafficking, which includes modern slavery and organ trafficking, as well as human smuggling — the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants (by land, sea or air) by an organized criminal group for the purposes of a financial or material benefit.

Three Arab countries —&�Բ�����;, Yemen and the  — are ranked among the five worst countries in the world for human trafficking. Syria and  are both rated as the third-worst countries globally for human smuggling. According to the index, in Libya “Smuggling is generally associated with high levels of violence and high death rates. The state has little control over the entire territory and many state officials reportedly benefit from the profits of migrant smuggling.”

Regarding the UAE, the index notes that “In combination with the continuation of the sponsorship (Kafala) system and a failure of the government of the UAE to meet the minimum standards for combating trafficking and smuggling, the demand for cheap labour enables both human smuggling and trafficking on a relatively large scale.”

Narco-States

After trafficking and smuggling humans, other crimes the index considers are the narcotics trade, arms trafficking, and wildlife and resource crimes. Libya is ranked as the worst country in the world for arms trafficking, followed by ,  and . In Libya, “Most arms dealers are relatively small and play a mediator role between different actors.

Other enabling structures, such as offshore banking, offshore companies and jurisdictions with low levels of enforcement and high levels of corruption, play a much more significant role in facilitating arms transfers,” the index states.

“Yemen has widespread gun ownership and one of the largest arms-trafficking markets in the world, with weapons redirected from military stores or acquired from foreign actors. Ongoing conflict has resulted in an increase of light and medium weapons such as Turkish pistols and silencers, but tanks, ammunition, grenades, machine guns and light armoured vehicles are also sold in open-air arms markets.”

Iraq is ranked fifth-worst country globally for non-renewable resource crimes, meaning the illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources.  and  are ranked as the worst countries in the world (along with Paraguay and Jamaica) for the illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis. 

 is the next-worst cannabis offender globally: “In 2015, cannabis cultivation in Sudan generated over 7 billion USD in profits and in 2019, Sudan reported the seizure of over 16 000 cannabis crops.”

Syria is now a full-blown ranked number one globally for the production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs: “Syria’s cannabis and synthetic-drug trades are flourishing. … Synthetic drugs are also smuggled out of Syria to neighbouring countries and elsewhere in the Middle East, as well as to Europe. Easy access to ingredients enables synthetic-drug production to flourish, and Captagon production in particular has been increasing in recent years.”

In terms of resistance to organized crime, Jordan is ranked as the most resilient Arab country (39^th globally), followed by Qatar (51), Kuwait (=55), Bahrain (=55) and the UAE (68). The countries ranked as having the least resistance to organized crime in the world are Libya, followed by , South Sudan and Syria.

“There is little to no political leadership and governance in Libya on organised-crime issues. … The approach of different governing entities in Libya is consistently characterized by a co-option approach. The state has been involved in a co-option strategy for activities such as human smuggling and fuel. … Libya has one of the highest corruption perception levels in the world.”

On Somalia, the index observes: “Most NGOs and all UN agencies are banned from territories that are controlled by al-Shabaab. On the domestic level, while Somalia has several laws related to organized crime, it is the worst-performing country in the world when it comes to rule of law. Somalia’s penal code has not been updated since 1964. Currently, there is no legislation that explicitly criminalizes sex trafficking and forced labour.”

Shortcomings

The Global Organized Crime Index is compiled by in-house researchers as well as external journalists, academics and members of civil society. It is innovative in how it assesses the vulnerabilities and resilience to organized crime in a quantitatively based and expert-led way.

But it has its shortcomings, notably in the kind of terminology used that does not reflect the reality of organized crime in today’s Middle East and North Africa. None of the index’s four types of criminal actors — mafia-style groups, criminal networks, state-embedded actors and foreign actors — accurately describe groups like al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, Gulf royal families, the Houthis or Hezbollah that are among the biggest perpetrators of organized crime in the region.

While the report considers a range of international crimes, it does not include international  and  — such as those undertaken by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s personal group —&�Բ�����;even though Saudi dissidents in the UK are still forced to live under the  of British counterterrorism police.

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Nor does the index include the crime of  international and Western institutions, which Arab monarchies are known to be experts at. The case of King Juan Carlos who  in the UAE in 2020 after Spain’s supreme court launched an investigation into his alleged involvement in a high-speed rail contract in Saudi Arabia is just one high-profile example.

The report also fails to consider the spreading of , the  of UK citizens, the infiltration and  of the  or  — all activities Arab regimes busily pursue.

The index should highlight the key role Arab  play in perpetrating organized crime around the world, with Arab diplomats often linked to serious organized crime. This includes gold  by UAE diplomats in India, Saudi  against UN officials, as well as Saudi diplomats arranging flights for Saudi  who have committed very serious offenses in the West, including murder, to evade justice and abscond back to Saudi Arabia, undermining the Western judicial process.

*[This article was originally published by , a partner organization of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The COVID-19 Crisis Has Catalyzed Vision 2030

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No region is more complex in terms of confusing signals than the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Central Asia. This is the subject of the latest report by the International Monetary Fund , “Regional Economic Outlook: Arising from the Pandemic: Building Forward Better.”

What is clear from a review of the data is that 2020 was an outlier in terms of trend lines earlier in the decade, skewed by the COVID-19 pandemic, erosion of oil prices, diminished domestic economic activity, reduced remittances and other factors that have yet to be brought into an orderly predictive model. Even the IMF had to recalibrate its 2020 report upward for several countries based on rising oil exports, while decreasing marks were given countries slow to vaccinate against COVID-19 and that rely on service-oriented sectors.

Mixed Outlook

The numbers indicate a , ranging from Oman growing at 7.2% and the West Bank at 6.9%, to Lebanon receiving no projection and Sudan at the bottom of the range with a 1.13% real GDP growth rate. Yet, so much can impact those numbers, from Oman’s heavy debt burden to continuing turmoil in intra-Palestinian and Palestinian-Israeli affairs.

The good news is that real GDP is expected to grow by 4% in 2021, up from the projection last October of 3.2%. Much of the lift has come from two factors: a more optimistic trend line for the oil producers and the rate of vaccinations in countries that will promote business recovery.

As CNBC out, Jihad Azour, director of the IMF’s Middle East and Central Asia department, noted that recovery will be “divergent between countries and uneven between different parts of the population.” Key variables include the extent of vaccine rollout, recovery of tourism and government policies to promote recovery and growth.

In oil-producing countries, real GDP is projected to increase from 2.7% in 2021 to 3.8% in 2022, with a 5.8% rise in the region’s sector driven by Libya’s return to global markets. Conversely, non-oil producers saw their growth rate estimates reduced from 2.7% to 2.3%. In fact, Georgia, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, which are highly dependent on tourism, have been downgraded in light of continuing COVID-19 issues such as vaccination rollout and coverage.

As the IMF report summary notes, “The outlook will vary significantly across countries, depending on the pandemic’s path, vaccine rollouts, underlying fragilities, exposure to tourism and contact-intensive sectors, and policy space and actions.” From Mauritania to Afghanistan, one can select data that supports or undercuts the projected growth rates. For example, in general, Central Asia countries as a group seem to be poised for stronger results than others. Meanwhile, Arab countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council face greater uncertainty, from resolving debt issues to unforeseen consequences of negotiations with Iran.

So, how will these projects fare given a pending civil war in Afghanistan and the possible deterioration of oil prices and debt financing by countries such as Bahrain and Oman? Highlighting this latter concern, the report goes on to say that public “gross financing needs in most emerging markets in the region are expected to remain elevated in 2021-22, with downside risks in the event of tighter global financial conditions and/or if fiscal consolidation is delayed due to weaker-than-expected recovery.”

An Opportunity

Calling for greater regional and international cooperation to complement “strong domestic policies” focused on the need “to build forward better and accelerate the creation of more inclusive, resilient, sustainable, and green economies,” the IMF is on the countries to see a post-pandemic phase as an opportunity. This would involve implementing policies that promote recovery, sustain public health practices that focus on sustainable solutions, and balance “the need for debt sustainability and financial resilience.”

There is great uncertainty assigning these projections without more conclusive data on the impact of the pandemic, the stress on public finance and credit available to the private sector, and overall economic recovery across borders that relies on factors such as the weather, oil demand, external political shocks and international monetary flows. The IMF report is a very helpful bellwether for setting parameters for ongoing analyses and discussions.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The Winners and Losers of Israel’s Normalization Deal With Morocco

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This is just the beginning. Blinken’s predecessor, Mike Pompeo, left what many consider to be an on the world stage, and Secretary Blinken could hardly have inherited his department at a more crucial moment. However, between his on the US relationship with China and Russia, Blinken must also give top priority to a lesser-known foreign policy debacle simmering in North Africa: the Western Sahara conflict. Thanks to the Trump administration’s shortsighted acts, this conflict now directly threatens US regional diplomacy and has turned more dangerous than ever.

Trouble in the Sahara

The trouble first began in Western Sahara in the 1970s, when Spain decolonized the territory following pressure from the United States. Neighboring Morocco held secret negotiations with Madrid to take over half of Western Sahara, with the other half going to Mauritania. These plans leaked, to the ire of the Polisario Front, a nationalist rebel group in Western Sahara, and its military wing began a 16-year guerrilla war that ensnared Morocco, Mauritania, Spain, Algeria, France, Libya and the US. Tens of thousands of people died.

Officially, the fighting concluded in 1991 with a UN-brokered ceasefire agreement, which created the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to facilitate a solution. Three decades later, that solution has yet to appear, and opportunistic decisions by the Trump administration have now thrown even the ceasefire into doubt.

In fact, hostilities resumed on Trump’s watch. In November 2020, the Polisario Front began in the border zone of Guerguerat. In response, Moroccan troops launched a military operation to secure local roads, resulting in sporadic shooting matches and casualties along the berm — a 1,700-mile-long sand barrier Morocco built to contain opposing forces. Polisario top brass immediately condemned the move, the end of the UN ceasefire. The situation appeared incredibly fragile.

Then in swooped President Trump with the Abraham Accords. Capping off a spate of victories that diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan, Trump focused his energies on securing the support of Morocco. Rabat agreed to the terms on December 10, in exchange for the United States to Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, which became the only country in the world ever to do so.

Diplomatically, Morocco’s participation in the accords won Trump another round of praise from supporters of the state of Israel, to say nothing of Trump’s longtime ally, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But strategically, the Abraham Accords sent a far sharper message in North Africa: Stop the violence. The move to back Moroccan claims of sovereignty signaled America’s commitment to invest greater security resources in Morocco, including in regional peacekeeping to tamp down the Western Sahara conflict. It restyles American support as a high-stakes tripwire in the Maghreb, not to be crossed by either the Polisario Front or Rabat.

Tripwire

The US International Development Finance Corporation’s $5 billion in Morocco, as well as former US Ambassador to Morocco David Fischer’s of a consulate in Dakhla, Western Sahara, began enforcing this tripwire. Nevertheless, this did not stop Polisario fighters from causing in Guerguerat on January 24, launching four rockets at Moroccan targets overnight. Moroccan and American forces dramatically outnumber the rebels in both numbers and weapons, making the January flare-up stunning. However, by disregarding the US conditions and striking Morocco, the Polisario Front has made good on its threats to resume its armed struggle, imperiling both American activities and regional stability in the process.

First, the Polisario Front will likely launch a campaign of low-level tactical aggression in key southern zones, which will force a Moroccan response through either political pressure or military channels. This could lead Morocco to threaten military action. Such a provocation would almost certainly inflame nationalist zeal in Morocco — to which is key — and immediately complicate the US role in Dakhla. Finally, Washington will be faced with an awful choice. It will be forced to either support a hawkish, emboldened Morocco or talk Rabat into a position of non-action that will be extremely unpopular domestically and may give a green light to the Polisario Front to wage even broader campaigns.

In other words, the rocket launches in Guerguerat were not wanton decisions by a flailing guerrilla force. They were calculated, deliberate acts by the Polisario Front to test the US tripwire in Dakhla. They drive Washington to the extreme options of reining in its historical ally, sanctioning a new, Morocco-led war in Western Sahara or committing US forces to preserve peace and deal with the problem itself. Put simply, the tripwire failed, and the Polisario Front deftly called America’s bluff. With Trump-era actions laying the groundwork for present developments, the Polisario’s actions effectively begin a broader strategy to weaken the collective defense elements of the US-Morocco alliance.

By injecting himself into the Western Sahara fiasco, with no hindsight or understanding of its history, Trump planted diplomatic and strategic landmines that the Biden administration will need to work tirelessly to defuse. Worse, the former president’s actions have sucked Washington into the unenviable position of enforcing an accidental red line in North Africa, one that the Polisario Front has already, gleefully, crossed. And if Joe Biden sends in troops, it will serve only to raise the ghosts of Vietnam: another drawn-out, faraway engagement in which the United States holds no legitimate best interest.

Secretary Blinken must do more than take “a hard look” at the Abraham Accords. He must rescind the State Department’s recognition of Moroccan control over Western Sahara and allow MINURSO to continue its work. He must renegotiate the Western Sahara provisions of the accords — which former Secretary of State , former National Security Adviser , Senator and Western Sahara expert have all denounced as mistaken — and join President Biden in rescinding Trump’s proclamation on the topic. He must scrap plans to build a US consulate in Dakhla, and, unless he wants to entangle our troops in an unnecessary foreign incursion, he must do it at once. The stability of North Africa depends upon it.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The US-brokered agreement goes beyond a simple quid pro quo for Trump’s Arab peace deals. It represents a US investment in a North African security partner that is key to Washington’s conception of great power competition. Trump’s decision pulls Morocco closer to the US and the European Union. It also brings Rabat closer to the United Arab Emirates’ spheres of geopolitical influence in Africa and the wider Arab world. At the same time, the decision gives the EU cover to further align with Morocco.

Yet Trump’s gift to Morocco could have unintended consequences. Algeria might deepen its relationship with Russia and China, increasing their presence in the Maghreb region. The Biden administration is scrutinizing past deals signed by the previous president, and the decision pertaining to Morocco might come up for reconsideration. 

Not All Quiet on the Western Sahara Front

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The Moroccan kingdom conceives of its neighborhood’s stability in terms of a strong grip on Western Sahara, the continued development of the southern territory’s resources, and limited terrorist threats in and around its porous Saharan borders. In late November 2020, the US committed to $3 billion in Morocco — through the Development Finance Corporation — and designated the country as a regional hub for its Prosper Africa trade and investment program. A month later, the US committed to four sky guardian drones to Morocco, which expands its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capacity. By acknowledging Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, allotting Morocco more development funding and providing increased ISR, the US bolsters neighborhood stability as seen by King Mohammed VI.

In turn, increased stability for Morocco may reverberate across its littoral Sahara — a vacuum for terrorists and a potential target of Russian . New US development initiatives could amplify previous Moroccan actions in the region, such as the delivery of COVID-19 aid packages to Mauritania and Burkina Faso in . New ISR capacity will also see the increased interdiction of traffickers and terrorists, whose roles progressively overlap. These actions will not decisively change the nature of conflict plaguing the Sahel region, located just south of the Sahara Desert. But even marginal gains for Moroccan stability would decrease power vacuums for Russia to exploit with the , a private military company Moscow uses to surreptitiously advance its foreign policy.

Europe and the Gulf

Trump’s decision also provides political cover for the EU to overcome obstacles in its relationship with Morocco, which retains advanced status under the union’s . The Brussels-Rabat relationship is fraught with disputes over whether goods from Western Sahara should come under the jurisdiction of the EU-Morocco free trade agreement. Rulings in  by the European Court of Justice decreed that EU-Morocco trade and fishing agreements would only remain valid if they excluded goods originating from Western Sahara, contradicting the Moroccan autonomy plan for the territory.

Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty gives political cover to European states, including France, that lean toward the autonomy plan. European judicial decisions do not derive from US decrees, but if key EU member states were to change their stance on Western Sahara, the legal basis of the earlier court rulings could also differ. If so, like the US, the European Union would find itself pulled closer to Morocco, portending new initiatives that align with the European interest of Morocco as a stability exporter.

In the Gulf, Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty pushes Rabat and Abu Dhabi closer into alignment. This would continue their rapprochement after previous tensions, which stemmed from Morocco’s refusal to back the Saudi-Emirati-led blockade of Qatar between 2017 and 2021. To punish Morocco for its neutrality, in 2018, the UAE and Saudi Arabia voted against Morocco’s bid to host the 2026 FIFA World Cup. The states also recalled each other’s .

In October 2020, however, the UAE opened a consulate in Western Sahara’s , which at that time was not recognized as Moroccan territory by the US. This was an important symbolic gesture, given that the UAE was the first Arab state to do so. UAE actions that favor Morocco come amidst deteriorating Emirati-Algerian relations, as Abu Dhabi is unhappy with Algeria’s alleged support of Turkey or, to the UAE, “anti-Emirati lobbies in the region.” That the UAE is strengthening ties with Morocco while Saudi Arabia makes no such overtures could foreshadow Emirati attempts at constructing a new, intra-Sunni coalition.

Russia and China

US rivals have adopted less amenable stances. Russia has already Washington’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. The US decision, consequently, gives Russia and China an excuse to increase security and economic cooperation with the Algerians. As the most strident supporter of the Polisario Front — an armed group demanding independence for Western Sahara — Algeria is upset about the diplomatic win Morocco secured in the US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty.

To balance Rabat’s victory, Algiers could invite in Russian troops under the guise of counterterrorism operations to the Sahel. Algeria is one of Russia’s largest and China has already committed billions to in the east of the country. In light of the US move, both of these relationships could further develop.

Increased Russian and Chinese activity in Algeria would also diminish advances made in terms of Moroccan stability in the Sahel. Russia expanding its North African power projection and China increasing its investments in natural resources would balance Moroccan actions that close power vacuums to the Wagner Group. Unforeseen by Trump, Russia can also cite the US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara as justification for its annexation in 2014 of Crimea, which is officially part of Ukraine. The US may have improved ties with Morocco but, in doing so, pushed Algeria, another North African behemoth, firmly into a sphere of Russian and Chinese influence and provided Russia justification for its illegal invasions.

The New US Administration

The Biden administration has already stated its support of the Abraham Accords, a term used for the peace deals Israel signed with the UAE and Bahrain in 2020. In response to a question concerning US recognition of Western Sahara, however, Secretary of State Antony Blinken , “We’re also trying to make sure that we have a full understanding of any commitments that may have been made in securing those agreements.”

On January 27, 2021, US President Joe Biden the Trump-era F-35 sale to the UAE, pending review. Many considered the F-35 sale as a carrot Trump offered to the UAE. The freeze does not necessitate the reversal of the sale, but it indicates Biden’s resolve to scrutinize the quid pro quos that accompany the Abraham Accords. Once the US reaches “a full understanding of any commitments,” it will either continue or withdraw recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

If the Biden administration continues recognition of Western Sahara, Blinken would most likely work through an international framework at the United Nations to achieve increased support for Washington’s unilateral decision, as the US is the only state to recognize full Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. If EU states lean toward the Moroccan autonomy plan, the Biden administration will find some find needed political cover.

At the same time, Russia and China would continue their support for Algeria, and Morocco would export its version of stability across North Africa. Rabat would also continue its recognition of Israel. Malignant non-state actors, however, could use the endurance of the US decision to galvanize violent actions from some Polisario fighters, creating another opening for terrorist groups. Maintenance of the decision also comes at the expense of true self-determination for the Saharawi people in Western Sahara.

The US can also withdraw recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This action would see the White House realign with the UN-sponsored peace process and international law. Potentially, a US return to non-recognition would invigorate efforts toward a true autonomy plan. In this case, Morocco would withdraw its recognition of Israel and US relations with Morocco would cool. Although the US and Morocco would remain important partners, the Moroccans would feel betrayed by this decision and potentially align closer with Russia and China to castigate the Americans. The Polisario, moreover, would also find a renewed chance at some form of self-determination.

Regardless of the Biden administration’s actions, Trump blatantly circumvented a UN-sponsored peace process and gave Morocco a carte blanche to implement its autonomy plan. New US-Moroccan collaboration could see Morocco push Sahelian stability that benefits the US position in great power competition by closing power vacuums to Russian interests. Trump’s thirst for diplomatic wins, however, caused his administration to view Western Sahara through a transactional lens, obfuscating a legitimate international solution and potentially inviting new Russian and Chinese activity in North Africa.

*[51�Թ� is a media partner of .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Developmental nonprofits in the area have begun working with communities facing scarce economic prospects in the face of “extreme” climate events like drought, which occur in Morocco every two years. The High Atlas Foundation (HAF), working in part with Farmer-to-Farmer, a USAID program, creates tree nurseries in areas of the lower mountain regions. Some communities from the higher pasturelands have voiced their interest in these projects. This follows a trend within the past two decades of nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists seeking out additional or alternative forms of agriculture.

Why Are India’s Farmers Protesting?

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Since 2004, the number of  in the Maghreb region has declined by more than 60%. As of 2014, only 25,300 remain. Morocco is home to one of the largest regions of pastoral rangelands in the Maghreb. These rangelands make up about 40% of land territory, or 20 million hectares, in Morocco and Algeria. In Morocco, the majority of nomadic pastoralists range in the western coastal plains. Their pasturelands include the Rif and Tell mountains, where altitudes for some summer pastures reach 3,000 meters above sea level. There, the air is dry and the pressure is lower, limiting the kind of agriculture the area can sustain. Along these routes, pastoralists herd camels, sheep and goats, producing mutton and valuable products like wool (to be used for local handicraft) and manure, an alternative for chemical-based fertilizer.

Pastoralism is a process engrained in Moroccan history and heritage. Up until the last century, semi-nomadic pastoralists occupied the Middle Atlas regions, traveling with herds during the grazing season and growing crops like cereal for domestic consumption. Herders still use indigenous breeds and veterinary medicine developed over centuries.

Yet some pastoralist communities are beginning to favor more sedentary farming methods. Part of the reason is the rising and devaluing of mutton as a main source of meat, now associated with being unhealthy due to its high cholesterol content. However, the Moroccan ministry of agriculture suggests the reason is that pastoralists are suffering from the degradation of rangelands, which makes it difficult to maintain a livelihood.

Overuse, Not Overgrazing, Degrades Pasturelands

Moroccan pastoralism is changing for a wide range of reasons. Viable grazing lands are affected by the amount of rain per season, availability of shrubs for grazing and regional politics or poverty — all of which are subject to change. The main factors that make pastoralism difficult for many, and may be a reason for some to switch to sedentary farming, include shifting social values, environmental change and rising population in both urban and rural areas. But the most pressing issue for pastoralists is land degradation.

Many typically point to overgrazing as a reason for the degradation of pastoral rangelands. This is often blamed on pastoralists themselves, whose herds graze away the vegetation. Yet varying rainfall, especially in arid climates, leads to periods of drought, and the shrubs that typically cover the steppe lands are not as plentiful.

Rangelands in the Maghreb region  1,557 hectares a year to drought and degradation, and in nearly three decades, more than 8.3 million hectares of land have been “severely degraded.” This is one of the reasons there has been a recent movement of pastoral nomads traveling northward, particularly toward the Souss region in Morocco. But this kind of movement leads to regional  like land disputes and tension, especially in the Souss region that is home to a large population of Amazigh people, who must now compete with newcomers for land and natural resources.

Overuse, rather than overgrazing, more accurately explains the desiccation of pastoral land. Overuse, or human-induced degradation, comes from improper agricultural practices like plowing with heavy machines and over-irrigation, soil erosion by deforestation and, to some extent, overgrazing. Agricultural researchers have suggested that overuse, coupled with a growing rural population and a difficult climate, wears away the land, so pastoralists must either move to more viable pasturelands or build themselves an economic cushion by engaging in irrigation farming and growing crops, fruit or nut trees.

Land formerly used for pastoral purposes is being converted to sedentary farming areas. Fruit and nut trees provide diverse incomes as grass for herding becomes harder to find. Land used for forestry and herding has declined by 21% since the early 1980s, while agricultural land used for non-forestry and non-pastoral purposes has increased by 7.7%.

At the same time, as more people move to cities, rural areas face low population densities. Modernization policies have tended to favor farming expansions and development in areas with higher populations, leaving pastoralist societies — far from city centers — to be . This has reduced their access to certain services, such as privatized veterinary services, which makes it difficult for herders to afford veterinary care.

A Semi-Nomadic Majority

Many pastoralists in the region, in part a result of changing social norms and development in the region, are only semi-nomadic and will likely stay so. This means they may have both farmlands and herds, which they send off with a herder for the grazing season. As advancements in education expand access to rural areas, pastoral families value sending their children to schools for a more , which requires them to stay in one place. Yet despite shifting trends and smaller numbers, pastoral systems will remain important as the population grows and demand for meat rises.

As rural life changes, development must also change, so it is important to work with rather than against existing shifts. The High Atlas Foundation works with communities to address these agricultural changes by taking a participatory approach to development. HAF takes note of communities that are looking to grow fruit, nut or medicinal plants, thereby determining trends and producing a plan for the community to approve for implementation.

This process has taken root as HAF’s House of Life program, through which 12  have been built around Morocco. Trees are planted every  where they grow for two years, contributing around 30,000 trees annually to be donated to local farmers and schools as a way to reduce environmental damage and improve local livelihoods. As communities continue to mark their interest in sedentary farming, projects like this face new levels of expansion.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The Sahrawis: Obstacles to Self-Determination

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What happens next could determine the fate of the 29-year-old ceasefire that marked the cessation of hostilities and the beginning of UN efforts to resolve the status of the territory that Morocco claims is part of its kingdom. While Rabat has offered broad autonomy to the region under its sovereignty, the Polisario Front and its backer, Algeria, are demanding a referendum that the UN Security Council dropped from its agenda in 2007 after multiple failed attempts at compiling a mutually agreed voter list stymied any credibility for that option.

So far, 16 African countries, the UAE and Jordan have opened consulates in the region, providing Morocco with crucial international support for its territorial claims. As per , “The strategy has been effective: Out of 84 countries that previously recognized the Polisario, 44 recently rescinded their support and recognition.”

Tension Builds

Morocco described the blocking of the road by Polisario supporters, allegedly backed by armed fighters, as a breach of the ceasefire. The Polisario said the Moroccan army’s entry into the buffer zone had fatally undermined the ceasefire. And so the tension builds. Behind it are lingering questions of why (and why now), of what the end game is, and of why Algeria and the Polisario are of one mind on this latest conflict?

The UN is now on alert despite the lack of a special envoy to monitor the crisis after the previous representative resigned last year due to health issues. The African Union has also indicated its concern, although it has not proposed a concrete intervention. Among the Arab states, only Algeria condemned Morocco’s reaction to the blockade. The war of words continues.

For years, supporters on both sides have indicated displeasure at the lack of formal and realistic negotiations between the parties. Morocco has garnered broad international support for its autonomy proposal, which has been “serious and credible” by the US and many others. While in the Polisario camp, its youth are becoming increasingly restive at the lack of more aggressive action by the leadership to change the status quo and push for independence or something more acceptable than the present doldrums.

To some analysts, this is what lies at the core of the current tension — actions by a small group of unhappy camp-dwellers, fed up with the cronyism and corruption of the leadership. The Polisario Front and Algeria had no option but to follow behind this tiny minority as neither has a better alternative other than engaging in negotiations. The status quo has many benefits regionally and internationally. First of all, Algeria, which is in a serious domestic crisis with its own people and competing leadership cadres, sees this as a way to help relieve some of the dissonance at home. However, this does not seem to be working as there have been no public expressions of support for the Polisario’s announced withdrawal from the ceasefire.

Similarly, the Polisario elite, who have refined their autocratic leadership and kleptomania for more than four decades, cannot allow the dissidents to draw them into a war that they are neither prepared for nor capable of carrying out effectively. Morocco benefits from the perception that the Polisario —&�Բ�����;and, by inference, Algeria — are more interested in fomenting instability in a critical region where terrorism in the neighboring Sahel is of concern rather than in engaging in formal negotiations to resolve the conflict.

The UN, the United States and France, the major international players at the scene, would be happy with the former status quo as it relieved parties of using diplomatic leverage to move the combatants to proactively engage in peaceful steps for conflict resolution. It has become increasingly obvious that the modus operandi here goes along the lines that if no crisis exists, there is no point in starting something that no one wants to intervene in. In his statement, UN Secretary-General António Guterres “grave concerns” surrounding the most recent developments in Western Sahara, warning against “violations of the ceasefire and the serious consequences of any changes to the status quo.”

No Simple Way

There is no simple way forward or return to the status quo without Algeria facing up to its role in sponsoring the Polisario Front for over 40 years and enabling some kind of diplomatic movement. In the of the Organization for World Peace, “As the Polisario’s main backer, Algeria has a responsibility to prevent this situation from escalating or being manipulated by other organizations. Working with Morocco, both sides should encourage a peaceful de-escalation of the current violent rhetoric in order to prevent the conflict from reigniting.”

Similarly, Morocco should take no action beyond its setting up a military outpost in the buffer zone until the Polisario Front returns to the ceasefire agreement. It should also work with the UN to restart formal and comprehensive negotiations on its autonomy proposal. Algeria cannot, for its own domestic reasons, escalate military threats that destabilize the area. It should work to calm the situation so that it can more effectively mediate its own going on now for more than a year.

Finally, the incoming Biden administration in Washington —&�Բ�����;quite familiar with the Western Sahara as it is comprised of many members of the Obama administration, which was a strong supporter of delaying any proactive US push to resolve the conflict — should understand the larger potential disaster if regional destabilization accelerates, terrorist cells expand from ungoverned spaces, and other players agitate for their own interests in the area. This is not the best scenario for starting out the new US administration’s North Africa strategy.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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There are two overriding issues to consider in this regard. King Mohammed VI has consistently and strongly supported a peace agreement between Israel and Palestine, and he may see a Moroccan agreement with Israel as damaging to such prospects. Also, the timing to act now, during an election year in the US, may be a deterrent for Morocco to move too hastily.

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The king has made his viewpoint clear over the past two decades with regard to Palestine and used his position as chairman of the Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Committee of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to assert strong support for a Palestinian state. At the same time, he has expressed his support for warm and full relations with Israel and seems perfectly situated as the next peace partner with Israel, given the fact that Moroccans are the second largest ethnic group in Israel, after Russians.

Such a move, however, will have to be balanced with the statements that King Mohammed VI has constantly to over the years in his support for Palestine. In November 2019, he  that “the continuing Israeli practices in violation of international legitimacy and international humanitarian law in the occupied Palestinian territories fuel tension, violence, instability and sow the seeds of religious conflict and hatred,” The North Africa Post reports. Following the king’s comments, Moroccan diplomats  Morocco’s steadfast and unwavering support for Palestine.

In February of this year, a from King Mohammed VI conveyed to the Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas, by Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita reaffirmed Morocco’s unwavering support to the Palestinian cause. The number of times the king has reiterated his support for Palestine during the past is too numerous to repeat here.

Since the days of King Hassan II — the reigning monarch’s father — Moroccans have been encouraged to give to the poor in Palestine and have inspired a Moroccan population deeply supportive of a Palestinian homeland. King Mohammed VI would have a hefty price to pay if he went back on his word and didn’t first extract meaningful concessions for the Palestinians before signing any agreement with Israel.

Remember also that the king opposed Gulf countries’ pressure on Morocco to support their of Qatar in 2017 and he Morocco’s participation in the war in Yemen in 2019. Such stands took courage for a country so dependent on economic development from the Gulf. Analysts who predict that Morocco will be next to sign a peace accord with Israel may not understand the strength of King Mohammed’s moral compass.

Partisanship

The other consideration of Morocco to normalize relations with Israel is timing. There’s a joke in Morocco that says, “I’m not sure who the next US president will be, but I do know who the king’s best friend will be.” Morocco has always avoided partisan gestures during US election cycles dating back to the time when, in 1777, Sultan Mohammed III recognized the independence of the US. Morocco was the first country in the world to officially recognize the United States and was among the first countries to sign a treaty of peace and friendship between the two nations. Every monarch since has been careful to avoid the appearance of taking sides in US politics.

Morocco understands that if it is not early to the peace party, the country will have less to gain from it. The king will have to balance that notion with his moral authority and long-held beliefs — and those of his citizens — to remain steadfast in support of a Palestinian state, as well as considering US election year timing.

There are obvious reasons for Morocco to move quickly toward normalization given cultural and family ties with Israelis of Moroccan descent. For these and other reasons, many Morocco watchers believe that when the right concessions are made that include a serious negotiation between the parties that include a contiguous state of Palestine, based upon the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as a capital of both Israel and Palestine — and when Morocco is not playing into election-year politics — the king will move swiftly to normalize relations.

Many Moroccan and Israeli citizens already know through their cultural and family ties that when that day arrives, their new relationship will be a peaceful, warm and genuine one.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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As the US aims to improve race relations, black culture and heritage have become more than just an expression of the black community, but something that is inherently all-American. The BLM movement has highlighted the need for change in the US, and it may be helpful to consider the methods of Moroccan multiculturalism. In Morocco, cultural protection is tied to development, limiting socioeconomic divides and welcoming diversity.

A Model for the World

There is a word for the Moroccan ideal of multiculturalism — a term borrowed from the Spanish — known as convivencia (coexistence). Originally a reference to the relative harmony among Christians, Muslims and Jews living in Islamic Iberia (al-Andalus) during the Middle Ages, it now represents the shared history, culture and heritage of Morocco’s diverse national identity and a guide for modern multiculturalism.

Moroccan Judaism has roots in the time of antiquity. Jewish merchants came to Africa around 500 BC, likely to take part in the riches of the Carthaginian gold market. Before the Arab conquest, several native Amazigh (Berber) tribes converted to Judaism, one of which, located near Sefrou, survived long into the 11th century.

In 1948, about 265,000 Jews lived in the French and Spanish protectorates of Morocco, although the numbers soon began to decrease as many emigrated to newly-formed Israel. Those who remained resided mostly in small towns and villages, dispersed throughout the country, limiting their access to educational institutions and health care. The illiteracy rate for some Moroccan Jews was  than 40%.

When Morocco gained independence in 1956, after rising hostilities and anti-Jewish in 1948, many Jews believed they had no future in a country where they felt they were unwelcome. However, despite these setbacks, Morocco has and continues to be protective of its Jewish community as a model for inclusion.

The 2011 amendment to the Moroccan Constitution redefined Moroccan national identity, establishing difference — Arab, Muslim, Jewish, Amazigh, Andalusian, African, Mediterranean — as a facet of Moroccan identity. It also made Tamazight, which is spoken by native Berbers, roughly one-third of the Moroccan population, an official language. And two years later, Morocco’s new migration policy  24,000 migrants, beginning the first phase of a human-rights approach to migration and strengthening support of Morocco’s African heritage.

In combination with Morocco’s municipal charter — requiring participatory methods in community planning and thus involving minority voices — and the country’s stance within the UN Alliance of Civilizations (which ties multiculturalism to development), this solidified a tradition of multicultural preservation. This was a result of efforts by the late King Mohammed V and King Hassan II as well as the current monarch, King Mohammed VI.

The Role of Society

Morocco’s preservation of cultural heritage has led to greater community development and reduced poverty in neglected minority areas. Cultural preservation projects, funded by the ministry of culture in the  — a Jewish quarter whose traditional name was reinstated in 2017 — have restored streets and town squares, creating a safe, clean space for its inhabitants.

The House of Life , initiated in 2010 by the chief rabbinate of Morocco and the ministry of interior, permits the restoration of 167 mausoleums and cemeteries in 14 different regions within Morocco. This has led to the development of pilgrimage destinations such as Ouezzane Cemetery in northern Morocco, where Jews of Moroccan descent who emigrated to Israel return to visit.

On lands surrounding these protected cemeteries, the High Atlas Foundation, a developmental organization in Marrakesh, creates nurseries for medicinal and fruit trees. These are then given to farmers as a way to diversify local produce and improve local economies, promoting both Jewish heritage and community development.

These projects are made possible through participatory methods, where members of the communities they serve decide which resources are most in need, a method that could be useful in underrepresented American neighborhoods. Promoting black art, culture and history gives recognition and provides a basis for the rest of the country to learn about differences.

“I always advocate for education,” says Laziza Dalil, a guest speaker on a series of Jewish-cross-cultural lectures hosted by the Kivunim Institute. “[Education] is a building bridge. It causes people to deal with diversity in a more positive way,” she adds. Dalil is also the vice president of the Association Mimouna, a Moroccan organization run by Muslim university students in the promotion of Jewish culture and tradition.

While the Moroccan case is not identical to the US, the development and support of a Moroccan multicultural society, through cultural preservation and promotion of minority visibility, can serve as a guide for NGOs and policymakers in America working to combat systemic racism. Such a plan may include funding the preservation of buildings and landscapes infused with black culture and history, supporting small museums or exhibitions on African American activism and achievement, and backing arts programs focused on diversity and inclusion.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In the latest World Bank , “Morocco Economic Monitor,” it is projected that the Moroccan economy will contract in the next year, which would be the first severe recession since 1995. “Over the past two decades, Morocco has achieved significant social and economic progress due to the large public investments, structural reforms, along with measures to ensure macroeconomic stability,” the report notes.

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The World Bank’s forecast indicates that Morocco’s real GDP is projected to contract by 4% in 2020, which is a sharp swing from the 3.6% positive growth rate that was predicted before the pandemic. Consequently, the bank expects Morocco’s fiscal deficit to widen to 7.5% of GDP in 2020, around 4% more than expected before the COVID-19 outbreak.

Meanwhile, the country’s public and external debt is to set rise but still remains manageable. In assessing the government’s well-regarded response to the crisis, the World Bank puts an emphasis on moving from mitigation to adaptation, which is key “to ensuring a resilient, inclusive, and growing Moroccan economy.” It also points out that despite this year’s setbacks, Morocco can still “build a more sustainable and resilient economy by developing a strategy to adapt,” similar to what it has done to address issues of climate change and environmental challenges.

A Strong Position

When viewed in comparison to the rest of North Africa and the Middle East, let alone its sub-Saharan neighbors, Morocco is in a strong position to capitalize on global changes as companies rethink supply chains and vulnerabilities in logistics. Globally, and especially in Europe and the US, corporations are rethinking their reliance on China as a key supplier, and Morocco is poised to benefit, as I mentioned in a previous article on 51�Թ�.

The European Union, in particular, is already calling for “strategic autonomy” in sectors such as pharmaceuticals by focusing on more reliable and diversified supply chains. The new  is expected to entail tighter rules on human rights and environmental protection on imported goods, a move that experts say would boost local manufacturers, and Morocco is near the top of the list.

Guillaume Van Der Loo, a researcher at the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels, to DW about the opportunities for Morocco. “If you look at Morocco, there are more favorable conditions there for specific areas in particular, in relation to renewable energy and environmental related sectors, [and] Morocco is quite a frontrunner and the EU tries to chip in on that,” he said. “The idea that the European Commission has already expressed about diversifying supply chains could be beneficial for Morocco and that could accelerate negotiations on the new trade agreement.”

Morocco is one of few countries that have free-trade deals with both the United States and the European Union, and it is seen as an entry point for Western investment in Africa. As Alessandro Nicita, an economist at UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), , “Morocco is very well positioned because of its proximity [and] because it’s part of [the] EU’s regional trade agreements, its rules of origin are kind of integrated with those of the EU.”

The Challenges

Yet Morocco faces challenges in grabbing these economic opportunities, including restrictive capital controls and a paucity of high-skilled workers. Having been overhauled in the 1980s, the country’s education system “has failed to raise skill levels among the country’s youth, making them especially unsuitable for middle management roles,” DW reports.

Another concern has been by the National Competitive Council in Morocco, which said that if the country was to move forward efficiently, it had to end monopolies in key sectors. These include fuel distribution, telecoms, banks, insurance companies and cement producers, which have created an oligopolistic situation in the country.

The Oxford Business Group (OBG) has also released a  focusing on the success that Morocco is achieving in terms of combating the effects of COVID-19. “Morocco boasts a robust and diversified industrial base, developed through years of heavy investment, which enabled the country to take actions to control the pandemic and mitigate supply chain disruptions,” the OBG notes. The investment-friendly climate and robust infrastructure, with Africa’s fastest train network, will enhance the country’s attraction for manufacturers looking to relocate Asia-based production, as supply-chain disruptions due to distant and vulnerable suppliers have resulted in many companies pursuing a strategy of near-shoring, the report adds.

So, Morocco’s future in manufacturing, agro-business and technology may well determine the country’s capacity to recover its positive GDP growth rate as it overcomes the COVID-19-induced recession. To do so, it will need a robust marketing campaign as a country for reliable and relatively inexpensive supply chains and a skilled workforce.

*[An earlier version of this article was published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Morocco Looks to a Future After COVID-19 appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In other news, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has declared that a Moroccan digital tracking system is the most “innovative initiative in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) for the protection of farmers and vulnerable groups against COVID-19 contamination,” Zuza Nazaruk . Writing for Morocco World News, she adds that by “digitizing the processes of cultivation and harvesting, the innovation facilitates the management of key stages of cultivation.”

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The program benefits all sizes of farms and is one of the results of the 2008 Green Morocco Plan, which funded a range of initiatives and programs. The aim of the plan was to make agriculture one of the main growth engines of the national economy by stabilizing production and thereby increasing its contribution to “GDP growth, job creation and poverty reduction.”

To enable farmers and companies in the agricultural sector to access financing during the coronavirus pandemic, Moroccan bank Credit Agricole has signed a 560-million dirham  with the French Development Agency. At around $57 million, this would enable micro, small and medium-sized companies to secure funding at reduced rates for seeds, equipment and social services for rural families and marginalized people during the health crisis.

The line of credit is in to 16.8 million dirhams ($1.7 million) that is intended to support sustainable agricultural projects that “contribute to the deployment of more sustainable and local agriculture,” which includes “integrated irrigation, energy efficiency, organic farming, agricultural waste treatment and local farming.”

In manufacturing, a number of analysts believe that the global infrastructure of value supply chains may undergo dramatic changes due to COVID-19, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus. As the US is experiencing, there is now greater awareness of factors other than costs and speed of delivery, which must be taken into account.

Supply Chains

There is growing concern about excessive reliance on China for global manufacturing. A great deal of analysis is being given to medium and long-term alternatives to reduce vulnerabilities in supply chains of major sectors, including the automobile, textiles and electronics industries as well as pharmaceuticals and health. For example, China monopolizes more than 15% of the world export market. When its labor force was constrained by the coronavirus lockdown earlier this year, coupled with the dramatic rise in demand for medical and protective equipment, the fragility of the current system became obvious.

Other factors calling into question the primacy of global supply chains are the rising wage costs in Asia that are no longer offset by productivity gains, the growing utilization of robotics and artificial intelligence (AI) in production, resurgent protectionism in the US and Europe, trade and tariff regimes that penalize some categories of imports, and growing concern for the environmental impact on labor and nature due to a lack of monitoring by foreign companies.

While there are several scenarios of options moving forward, Morocco is in a unique position to up its game by becoming a regional leader in supply-chain production. Morocco has the capacity to expand its industrial base quickly to meet demands in Europe and the US through the kinds of partnerships it already has with automobile and aeronautical manufacturers.

This kind of regional relocation will only have an incremental impact on costs balanced against a more reliable and convenient supply chain. This would mean that companies reorganize their production systems and those of their partner suppliers — as Boeing has done in Morocco — to take advantage of the human, material and energy resources available and accessible in Africa.

As Hafsa el-Bekri and Hicham Sebti pointed out in a recent , “In the automotive, textile, and electronic components sectors, for example, Morocco could benefit from the repatriation in a Euro-Mediterranean area of ​​part of the productions currently carried out in Asia. This movement could also be accompanied by flows of Asian FDI [foreign direct investment] wishing to retain their European customers by setting up in Morocco.” This is already obvious in the automotive sector, which serves as a model for other industries.

The Arab Maghreb Union

Another possible — though currently unlikely — benefit from the pandemic is extending this proposed value chain model across the Maghreb region in North Africa. This would see Tunisia and Algeria work with Morocco to become  of a vital supply chain for Europe and Africa, with some outreach to US markets. All three nations have well-qualified people who need training for industry 4.0 opportunities — use of digital technology, AI, agile organizational infrastructure, and supportive government and legal infrastructure. Algeria already has energy links to Tunisia and Morocco to reduce those costs, and all three countries would greatly benefit from expanding 5G networks and backbones throughout the region.

If Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia can manage the coronavirus pandemic with some success, they could emerge with new energies to explore opportunities to resurrect the Arab Maghreb Union on a practical basis that responds to the basic needs of their citizens for opportunities and dignity. It’s a stretch, but it’s better than the status quo.

Consistent with this concept was a recent  by economist Abdelghani Youmni, who highlighted the “potential of public-private partnerships (PPP) and foreign investment in facilitating” Morocco’s post-coronavirus economic recovery. He believes that Morocco can attract global investors using the PPP model, which has had great success in the country.

Youmni thinks that Europe, with its aging population, should consider integrating its businesses with North Africa and building upon the success of existing ties between international companies and Morocco. “An industrially strong Morocco could be a reliable partner where environmentally responsible European companies could establish joint ventures,” he said.

This is exactly why a stronger and multifaceted value supply chain reorientation to the Maghreb makes great business sense.

*[A version of this article was cross-posted by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Morocco Sets Out a Post-Coronavirus Recovery Strategy appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Algeria

In an interesting analogy to how a person’s health status may determine their ability to resist the coronavirus, Sarah Feuer : “For Algeria and its 43 million inhabitants, a weak medical infrastructure, a year-long political crisis, and a stalled reorientation of an economy that has been overly dependent on hydrocarbons for decades have all made the North African country particularly vulnerable to repercussions from the virus.”

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Feuer, an associate fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is not alone in this assessment as the government has been perhaps the slowest to put in place the necessary tools to detect and combat COVID-19. She points out that the “2019 Global Health Security Index, which measures various health-sector capacities in countries around the world—including preparedness to manage pandemics������԰��� Algeria 173rd out of 195 countries and 17th out of 21 Arab states (surpassing only Djibouti, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia).” This is clearly not a healthy picture.

Algeria’s ally and largest trade partner, China, is doing its part, sending medical supplies, equipment and professionals, along with the construction of a hospital to treat patients. One of the most notable effects of the COVID-19 pandemic has been the cessation of its biweekly demonstrations by the Hirak, a movement that is opposed to the current government. Now, off the streets, protesters have moved online, raising money for food and medical supplies to hard-hit areas and pointing out the government’s shortcomings in addressing the crisis. This has not slowed down the government’s push against its opponents as journalists, activists and opposition figures continue to be arrested.

With the plunge in demand for gas and oil worldwide, Algeria is especially vulnerable to economic shocks that disrupt its ability to provide subsidies and services. Announced national budget cuts of 30% may only delay the inevitable drain on foreign reserves, forcing the government to seek external assistance, which may prove quite onerous if it upsets existing arrangements between big business, military and government officials.

Morocco

In Morocco, King Mohammed VI has received near-unanimous approval for his leadership, yet there are concerns that continued restrictions on the country’s media and activists portend challenges that may signal a more restrictive regime after the pandemic is over. As an energy importer, Morocco has benefited from low energy prices, but remittances, tourism, transportation and hospitality services are all suffering as a result of global restrictions and weaknesses in supply chains. The Moroccan economy can hardly afford to suffer a prolonged shutdown, and many small businesses have already disappeared. The government has few resources to sustain small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and larger companies, and its social and health services networks are strained.

Moroccans have taken up the challenges of social distancing and lack of contact fairly well for the moment and, in some ways, the Islamic month of Ramadan has helped. However, closing mosques and the inconsistent availability of food items and medicines are generating dissent. With more testing being carried out and greater outreach into the rural areas, the number of cases may well beyond the capacity of the public health system. With the nationwide lockdown extended until May 20, right before the Eid al-Fitr holiday, the government is hoping that its early interventions, along with increased testing and treatment protocols, will absorb most of the new cases and take Morocco through any spikes in infections.

As with other countries in the region, the government has released thousands of prisoners from jail to reduce the threat of spreading the virus in confined facilities. Yet since March 20, authorities have arrested thousands of individuals for violating the state of emergency or for spreading false information. Most of these have resulted in fines rather than incarceration.

Morocco, along with the rest of the world, faces a great deal of economic uncertainty. Official figures show that 700,000 workers lost their jobs and some 113,000 businesses closed from March 20 to April 1. This has severely depleted the state’s safety net, despite funds from international donors to support SMEs in this difficult transition. Questions are being asked not only about Morocco’s recovery, but its supply chain and customer links — largely in Europe — which are also under duress with no bright prospects on the horizon.

Tunisia

Like neighboring Morocco, Tunisia mobilized its rich human resources to help in the fight against the coronavirus. Engineering and health students and technology innovators are working on a variety of equipment and IT programs to boost the country’s anti-virus capacity. For example, as in Morocco, Tunisians now have locally ventilators, personal protective equipment (PPE) and other critical resources for protection and treatment. The Pasteur Institute in Tunis has already decoded the local strain of COVID-19, which is critical to developing a vaccine, and technicians are pushing ahead with applying artificial intelligence to the identification of early signs of the virus through X-rays.

While the number of confirmed infections is currently low in Tunisia, reporting is now coming in on the rural and interior areas where the infrastructure and professional staff are limited. The biggest hit, however, is to the economy as tourism, remittances, hospitality, transportation and services are suffering from lockdowns in Europe and restricted movement across borders. This has forced the Tunisian government, which has been in deficit spending and slow growth for the last five years, to adopt a support for the poor, SMEs and various sectors of the economy.

The economic stimulus includes some 450 million dinars ($155 million) in aid to poor families or those who have lost their jobs due to the coronavirus outbreak. In addition to a postponement on taxes on SMEs, repayments on low-income employee loans are being delayed as well. The International Monetary Fund is providing a $745 million loan, the European Union has pledged a grant of $273 million, Italy a $55 million grant and a loan of $280 million from the Islamic Development Bank.

Politics Not as Usual

How these countries emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic will shape their economic, social and political futures, with little assurances that the social contracts — which have been strained in the past decade — will survive without key alterations. As Intissar Fakir in an article on Carnegie Middle East, “As the aftereffects of the Covid-19 pandemic become clearer, they are likely to bring to the fore the policy failures that made the North African nations so fragile and susceptible to the virus in the first place. Economic mismanagement and underinvestment in infrastructure and human development have resulted in systems characterized by inequality and social precariousness. The governments of the three countries might be able to reinvent themselves in the short term, but beyond that the consequences of their errors are potentially destabilizing.”

While Morocco may seem to be the most stable based on its more diverse economic foundations and the leadership of the king, it has a weak political system, large wealth disparities, too many unfulfilled pledges from the government and a large youth population in need of jobs. These conditions are true in Tunisia as well, except that it lacks a unifying national authority and suffers from a continued dysfunctional political system and a faltering economy. Algeria, the most repressive regime, will certainly have to with the Hirak once the number of new infections has gone down and demonstrators return to the streets. Their demands, like the others, for an open, effective, transparent government and significant efforts to create jobs and diversify the economy may be beyond the scope of the traditional political leadership.

What lies ahead for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia will very much be determined by the level of trust governments are able to build with their constituents based on how they combat the coronavirus, protect the needy, develop more comprehensive health sectors and work transparently to promote economic recovery. This is a global phenomenon but especially critical in countries struggling to survive.

*[Updated: May 1, 2020.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Will COVID-19 Change Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

After a delay of at least four to six weeks, the novel coronavirus known as COVID-19 was first reported in China and later to Iran, which also had a period of denial before reporting began. Since neither country is a paragon of statistical accuracy or openness, it is no wonder that many of the initial projections have been skewed by poor data using Chinese reports. With reliable inputs from South Korea, Taiwan and Europe, projections are now more reliable, yet local conditions are a major factor in gauging the impact of the pandemic in any specific country, the US included.

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Local conditions are a significant issue in determining how countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) will emerge from the effects of the virus in the medium and long term. There have been many analyses of likely outcomes for the , , and the . Each raises important questions that reinforce the need to understand that recovery strategies will vary in four categories:

Group A: Energy producers with access to financial liquidity — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar

Group B: Energy producers with limited access to financial liquidity — Algeria, Egypt and Iraq

Group C: Energy importers with access to liquidity — Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia

Group D: Energy producers or importers with credit, financing and liquidity issues — Bahrain, Oman, Sudan and Lebanon

The rest of the MENA countries are either failing or fragile states (Yemen, Libya and Syria) or have yet to publish useful data, which includes Somalia and Mauritania. The World Health Organization (WHO) reports both on a country-by-country and regional basis.

In this analysis, access to liquidity is from domestic and international sources. Morocco, for example, has tapped credit lines with the IMF and will receive support from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)to provide a cushion for its declining exports, remittances and internal revenues to maintain public services and subsidies for food, fuel and pharmaceuticals. Kuwait, on the other hand, will rely on its own financial sector, private and government as the first line of support for funding needed to ramp up health services, protect companies and maintain government operations. Given its stability and conservative fiscal policies, it can also access external funding if needed.

Group A: The Gulf

Access to sources for stabilizing finances is only part of the need. In the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), much is being made of the three shocks to the oil producers: low prices, the pandemic and the recent price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia. The decline in oil prices has put the Vision 2030 projects in Saudi Arabia under scrutiny, and delays are being implemented to protect dwindling funds. A similar slowdown is happening in the UAE and Qatar.

Even if the latest to cut oil production is honored, the participation of Mexico and the US is essential for price stabilization, which may not occur until the fourth quarter at the soonest given the production glut of the last month and declining global demand as people stay at home and planes are grounded. The GCC countries are already experiencing a contraction in the second quarter, tens of thousands of foreign workers have and are returning home, and currently upwards of an estimated $140 billion worth of stimulus funding to local companies will be needed to maintain even an acceptable level of domestic economic activity.

Recovery steps will be hampered by the length of the contraction, available supply chains that GCC countries rely on for imports, the stability of trade relations as countries take steps to protect their citizens’ access to needed goods and services, and rising budget deficits as energy exports provide the bulk of government revenues. Banks do not have the tools to support companies with loan refinancing mechanisms, dealing with distressed assets, financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and similar means of propping up the private sector that directly or indirectly depends on government contractors and projects.

Finally, the GCC depends on foreign labor for construction, agriculture, health services, maintenance and blue-collar jobs producing items for export or local consumption. How it will be able to recall and recruit those who have left may require a rethink of such items as visa sponsor policies, unemployment insurance, pension benefits and health care for both domestic and foreign labor.

Group B: Algeria, Egypt and Iraq

One of the major differences between Groups A and B is the high level of domestic labor in the economy, which focuses on all of the factors mentioned previously — insurance, pension, health care.  These are key factors in reviving the workforce. All of this will require funding that is in scarce supply in Algeria, Egypt and Iraq for many reasons, many of which are related to corruption, control of the economy by the military and elites, and in Iraq’s case, Iranian interventions into its economy and political decision-making.

In these countries, significant political issues are being faced as well. Popular unrest, terrorism, internal dissension and instability will make international lenders wary of investing. Recovery will take some degree of accommodation with the people, such as more economic and political openness, more job opportunities at all levels, better services and protection of civil and human rights, and an independent and transparent judiciary. All of this takes time. Accountability and transparency are not hallmarks of these regimes and continued delays cannot be blamed on the pandemic; in fact, it may be a mobilizing factor once restrictions on movement and assembly are lifted.

Group C: Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan

Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan face the same political challenges as Group B: political demonstrations are demanding an end to corruption, a more open economy and opportunities, and the provision of better services. The overriding issue as this point is how to fight the virus and build a foundation for resuscitating the economy for the citizens. All three countries face financial issues. They regularly run national deficits and are reliant on foreign assistance to survive and maintain services. External financing is imperative if they are to transition through combating the coronavirus to rebuilding their economies and reducing wealth disparities.

All are doing their best locally. Morocco has raised more than $3.5 billion for a fund started by King Mohammed VI to combat the virus. Its engineers and others have already invented a locally-manufactured ventilator that is now in production, and its textile factories are producing masks and gowns. In Tunisia, similar initiatives are ongoing to produce equipment and supplies to combat the virus, and Jordan is doing the same.

These nations are similarly challenged by the return of overseas workers who have been instrumental in providing significant remittances that are the second or third-largest component of their revenues. Internal issues such as the need for governmental reforms, corruption, lack of adequate public services, and human and civil rights deficiencies continue to hamper building trust that will be sorely tried in the coming months.

Group D: Bahrain, Oman, Sudan and Lebanon

It seems counterintuitive to put these countries in the same category, but they all have similar issues related to national budgets, domestic political stability and dependence of external sources of assistance for fighting the virus and rebuilding their economies. Bahrain will most likely be able to rely on Saudi Arabia for its financial needs, but that does not remove the lack of accommodation with the majority Shia population.

Oman has simply overspent its revenues too often in the past five years and will require extensive economic and political restructuring to appeal to international creditors and investors for its recovery. This is a real test for the new sultan, Haitham bin Tariq, which he is well equipped to manage.

Sudan will struggle under the impact of its feeble health services and recurring political instability while trying to effectively address the pandemic. Recovery will require retooling a government that for too long sustained elites to the detriment of the major populations. Although tribal identities remain strong and determinant, dealing successfully with the virus is a key opportunity for building trust, developing sound strategies and drawing investments from the international and expatriate communities. 

Lebanon has the professional and technical personnel required to mitigate the worst impact of the pandemic. It is constrained by political elites who see the virus as an opportunity to disarm opposition to their decades of corrupt practices. While the quasi-technical government is taking mini-steps in the right direction, it is unable to command the power needed for medium and long-term solutions beginning with the financial sector. Lebanon has few if any sources of revenues by which to procure needed supplies to combat COVID-19 and its private sector is pitching in but at modest levels compared to the needs.

The intertwined interests of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, the political elites and the demonstrators in Lebanon make this a perfect tsunami if steps are not taken concurrently to fight the pandemic and implement political and economic reforms. Otherwise, Lebanon will certainly become a failed state in the coming year.

While this may seem a dire analysis of the region, it reflects the reality that its weaknesses have been building for years. Without comprehensive, thorough and inclusive strategies that include economic initiatives that serve the countries in the long term, the Middle East and North Africa will continue to underperform. This is as true for the oil producers with cash on hand as for the resource-challenged nations that must address other causes of instability only highlighted by the pandemic.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post How the Middle East Reacts to the Coronavirus Pandemic appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Recently, I conducted an independent study on hostels in Morocco through the School of International Training, seeking to add context to the dilemma of local investment versus tourist intrusion in the country’s rapidly gentrifying medinas. Hostels in Morocco are a recent phenomenon, an institution in early 20th century Germany and brought to Morocco in the past two decades alone. There is an unfortunate dearth of data on Morocco’s hostels, though their establishment has paralleled the rapid development of guesthouses in the old cities.

What Are the Priorities of Morocco’s Youth?

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Since the late 1990s, numerous riads — traditional homes built around a central courtyard — have been converted into tourist accommodations or second homes. The process has been swift. In the Marrakech medina, there were merely a handful of guesthouses in 1997, and still under 50 in the year 2000. By 2008, the University of Warsaw’s Maciej Kalaska that there were approximately 450 guesthouses in the medina, 70% of which were owned by foreigners of European origin. 

With Open Arms

Most of the critics of gentrification in Morocco, however, don’t come from inside the country’s medinas, but rather from national media and middle-class Moroccans living outside the old cities. Professor Sadik Rddad, of Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University, said in an interview that the converted riads are “working wonderfully” for the Fes medina, which was in a state of decline before an influx of foreign investment in the 1990s. In his view, it is vital that the people of Fes benefit directly from tourism — and tourists are able to experience Fes more in a more immersive way. 

This is not to say that the whole community embraces tourists with open arms. Fes is known as Morocco’s spiritual capital, and tourist presence has had a particularly acute impact. Economic and cultural reshaping aside, the presence of tourists on hostel and guesthouse terraces has entirely disrupted the city’s rooftop culture. Rooftops are a conservative and female space, sacred under traditional norms of privacy. As Rddad puts it, “It’s going out without going out.”

Women do not expect to see men in this space or have their privacy violated by tourists, and can no longer use the roof as they have in the past. The disturbance of conservative spaces is more than just a side effect. Rddad says that the government uses tourism as a vehicle for modernization and to open up society.

And, of course, gentrification pushes residents out. According to Rddad, you used to be able to rent a room in the Fes medina for about 100 dirhams per month, or just over $10. Its affordability was part of what made the city attractive. By 1995, however, a beautiful old house Rddad’s family was selling could go for around $13,000. Now, he estimates, that the house could be worth $70,000 or more.

The Price of Conversion

Cultural tourism has been evolving in Morocco for well over a century, and was further by an international tourism campaign during the French Protectorate. The new phenomenon of converted riads, however, is bringing tourists into residential spaces where hotels are not necessarily present. This facilitates global gentrification in a similar way to , driving up housing prices, raising standards for luxury amenities and high internet speeds, and propping up food and entertainment businesses over those that cater to permanent residents.

According to scholars Rachele Borghi and Claudio Minca, other of riad conversion include the modification of urban cultures, economic segregation, a lack of regulation in renovation and the sexual behavior of tourists. Yet 57% of residents surveyed for a study cited by Borghi and Minca asserted that the gentrification of the medina was a positive trend. Foreign investment in tourism in the medinas creates jobs, supports local craftsmanship and has resulted in the rehabilitation of many deteriorating riads.

The World Bank and the Moroccan government have played a key role with strategies such a in the 1990s, which opened up the medina to private, national and international investment. The state has long promoted tourism as an engine for development, Morocco as an accessible Oriental ideal. In 2011, the industry for 8.9% of the country’s GDP and directly contributed to 7.8% of total employment. However, scholars have the possibility of reverse causality, arguing against the blind promotion of mass tourism as a driver of long-term economic growth. 

This is due in part to economic leakage, which is a predominant issue for the tourism industry worldwide. Often, of the total cost of a trip actually remains in the host destination. By importing building materials, supplies and human resources, hotels and resorts — particularly international corporations — are the primary culprits. Though these establishments might employ residents of the host country, their salaries will be lower than top management staff, many of whom are expatriates.

Tourist gentrification results in inflation and increased land values in the host economy, as well as over-dependence on this economic sector, making communities vulnerable to natural disasters and even seasonal changes in demand.

To an extent, hostels are an antidote to this superstructure of Western Orientalist exploitation. Establishments geared toward budget travelers are arguably more sustainable than other forms of accommodation. Timothy and Teye that these places are “more likely to be locally owned, employ destination residents, and utilize locally produced goods and services.” Furthermore, a larger percentage of budget travelers’ expenditure directly benefits the host community, and they often spend more time, and therefore more money, in the host country.

Local Communities

But it isn’t quite this simple. Foreign ownership of converted riads still removes capital from the local market and into the hands of foreign intermediaries. The Moroccan government a “friendly investment climate” that allows foreign investors to hold up to 100% of share capital and transfer all profits to their home country. According to a New York Times by Roxana Popescu on real estate in Morocco, foreigners comprise 70% to 80% of Morocco’s luxury real estate buyers. With a nice riad in Marrakech or Tangier costing between $240,000 and $360,000, the startup costs are simply too high for most Moroccans to enter the hostel industry. 

Regardless of ownership, each of the four hostels I studied had a predominantly Moroccan staff. Only five of 11 interviewees offered any criticism of foreign ownership, and only one of these was a hostel owner or employee. Interviewees were largely indifferent or even supportive of foreign ownership and acknowledged without fail that it is necessary due to high startup costs.

My research indicated a perception that most hostel owners are generally either foreigners or wealthy Moroccans who have traveled abroad. Not only is the concept of hostels new to Morocco, but so is the idea of internal tourism. In the past, Moroccans would travel to stay with family, and now they either opt for the home of a family member or a hotel. There are plenty of cheap hotels, and they are easier to find. 

“Hostels are not part of our culture,” Professor Rddad said. “People do not think of hostels when they travel.”

I conducted 11 interviews in Fes, Tangier, Rabat and Essaouira, and the perceptions of interviewees reflected Rddad’s assertion that hostel culture is rather uncharted territory for many Moroccans traveling domestically. However, in some cases, the relative scarcity of Moroccan guests in hostels is a result of overt exclusion rather than unfamiliarity.

Article 490 of Morocco’s Penal Code sexual relations outside of marriage, and unmarried Moroccan couples are not allowed to stay together in a private room. There is no law, however, that bars couples or solo travelers with Moroccan passports from staying in hostel dormitories. Early in my research period, I stayed in a hostel that is owned and operated entirely by Moroccans, but does not allow Moroccans to stay in its dormitories. In subsequent interviews, I was told that this is sometimes a business orientation that hostel owners subscribe to for the purpose of appearing more attractive to foreign tourists. 

This was not always the case, and I also encountered business models that explicitly include and give back to the communities in which they are based. One hostel involved in this study even reinvests revenue into training local youth how to surf. But such a racist and exclusionary policy adds another dimension to the complex social dynamics of Morocco’s burgeoning hostel industry, on top of the ubiquity of foreign ownership. 

Though my research was limited in scope, it is clear that not all hostels are created equal. As Morocco’s tourism industry expands, it will not only cope with a dominant superstructure of multinational corporations but also the social implications of a changing industry with pervasive undercurrents of essentialization, exploitation and exclusion. 

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Morocco Pays a High Price for Tourism Gentrification appeared first on 51�Թ�.

As one person mentioned, “There is no care here in Morocco for the population. It‘s the lack of care that makes people migrate.” The data reflects this observation. Almost half of Moroccans are considering emigrating. The proportion is up sharply after a decade of decline, the survey indicated. The BBC reports: “About 45% of the population is under 24 and on most issues the country is riven by a generational split. Some 70% of adults under 30 want to emigrate versus 22% of people in their forties. While half of over 60-year-olds have a positive view of the government, the figure for those aged 18-29 is 18%.”

Does this mean that protest marches to overthrow the current government are coming in the near future? A more likely scenario is the article’s conclusion that “Morocco is at a crossroads.” It can reduce corruption, realign its development priorities to focus on building worthwhile jobs and public services, and to open the political space for greater citizen participation. Or it can muddle along, disabling dreams of a better life that reaches into the interior of the country as well as the urban coastal areas, and see if crises threaten the status quo.

Morocco is no stranger to protests. They occur frequently, focused either on specific sectors such as public health workers or teachers, or regional grievances such as those in the Rif region that continue to simmer as the government is still dragging in efforts to promote prosperity and upgrade services in the north. Facing a slower growth rate and a government, including parliament, that prefers to follow than to lead development and reform efforts, prospects for real constructive change are unlikely without a jolt to the body politic.

Moroccan Ministries

Adding to the discontent in Morocco is the bickering among ministries about the transparency and reliability of government data.  Morocco World News ran an excellent  in which the president of the High Commission for Planning (HCP), Ahmed Lahlimi Alami, called out several ministers and high-ranking government officials for not sharing “data on the performance of their respective departments’ performances.”

HCP data is always seen to be credible and reliable, so this charge merits close attention. Tamba François Koundouno writes: “As the main provider of economic, demographic, and statistical data on Morocco, HCP prides itself on its independence and the fact that all departments of Morocco’s public administration have the obligation to share their data with the institution.”

There is a disparity between figures released by the HCP and the trade and investment ministry concerning job creation. “In that particular case, HCP’s data on employment in Morocco, which offered a grim reading of the Moroccan labor market, was the exact opposite of the government’s ‘lofty’ figures and its insistence on delivering a target number of employments HCP rightly predicted it could not attain,” Koundouno mentions.

Without a reliable source of data inside the government that makes its information available widely, the country lacks credibility with analysts, investors, researchers and others who rely on HCP data for their reports, predictions and analyses. If the HCP’s mission is to develop updated and accurate data on “Morocco’s economic and political trajectories,” a lack of transparency will only undermine the country’s ability to attract investors and build partnerships to promote its economic and political goals. What’s equally important is that by having up-to-date and reliable data, the HCP can provide international financial institutions and rating agencies with critical data for making accurate log projections and rankings.

This relates back to the first article in that the scope of the challenges to Morocco’s development cannot be a “feel-good” exercise so that the government can pat itself on the back. Morocco faces serious economic challenges that will not disappear through a lack of accurate reporting.

The rainy season is coming in Morocco and with it an uptick in the agricultural sector. Yet there are signs of public frustration, including political chanting at football matches and popular rap songs that recently landed one rapper in jail for a year. Lahlimi Alami out that, “More than poverty, social disparities create frustrations that may trigger protests. These disparities are often viewed as a result of an illegitimate accumulation of wealth.”

Since a quarter of Moroccans are either poor or at risk of poverty, according to a recent World Bank report, and the kingdom ranks 123rd in the UN’s Human Development Index, the government needs to seriously recommit to support economic, social and political development.

Algeria’s New President

Looking at Algeria, there is a different challenge: installing a regime that has little or no legitimacy with the people, through elections that lack transparency, credibility and popular support. While the army was content to push ahead with the presidential election on December 12 that was at odds with the demands of anti-government demonstrators, the consequences of this faux election mirror the simplistic view of the West when fingers with ink-stains somehow represent democracy. Voting does not make a government legitimate, but the army and elites seem to be willing to continue with the charade to force a sense of normalcy on the political life of Algeria.

As an article by Dalia Ghanem on  opined, “Algeria will end up with a president who will suffer from a lack of legitimacy. This will put him under enormous pressure, caught between citizens who have increased their demands and changed their perception of the institutions and elites governing them and the military that brought him to power. With such a lack of legitimacy, the president will not be able to meet the political and socioeconomic challenges lying ahead.”

The fact that there is not a “central committee” or other mechanism representing the agenda of the demonstrators — who have protested weekly for nearly a year — has given the Algerian army a breathing spell to impose its will. But that does not mean that President Abdelmadjid Tebboune will automatically achieve legitimacy with the people. More likely, the new president “will need to negotiate with the popular movement immediately after the election.”

How this will play out is still a crystal ball exercise. Given that the popular movement reflects a variety of concerns from wanting more resources for local economic and social development, to empowering civil and human rights, expanding opportunities for political participation, and dealing with corruption and an unbalanced set of national economic initiatives, Tebboune will not be able to reach agreements on priorities and actions quickly, thus feeding popular discontent. What this means for the largest country in Africa by size is a challenge of major proportions.

*[A version of this article was published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Writing the Next Chapters of Morocco and Algeria appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Overall, all groups see the economy and the quality of public services as the most important challenges facing the government. They also “say corruption is found in state institutions,” although to a lesser degree than the last survey in 2016 (38% vs. 39%).

The weak performance of the government has resulted in a correspondingly low level of trust among the citizens, especially the youth. Yet the majority still support the army, police and judiciary, according to the survey results. Among those under 30 years of age, 70% believe they have to emigrate to have a good life, which only falls to 50% among all those surveyed. Unfortunately, it is the young people with higher levels of education who feel most strongly that they have to leave to succeed.

This concern with emigration was the subject of a very opinion piece on Morocco World News by writer Hassan Masiky, who pointed out the great loss to Morocco because educated young people are leaving and finding success abroad rather than at home. He says this is both a validation of “the competence, aptitude, and talent of Moroccans and evidence of the failure of the Moroccan government to create an environment for attracting and keeping a talented workforce.” He blames this on three conditions.

The first is that “unqualified people hold many high-level positions in the public and semi-public sectors in the Kingdom.” He adds: “Nepotism and favoritism continue to dominate the hiring practices in the government and in some private sectors. This fact nullifies the government’s heavy investments in human capital.” Second, he takes aim at “a deteriorating public education system, nepotism, incompetence, and lack of transparency,” which is depriving Morocco of some of its brightest youth. Third, he points to the lack of enforcement in contracts for programs targeting employment opportunities as the third force destabilizing the economy and not firming up the local job market.

Perceptions of corruption were part of the focus of surveys done by the . It compared attitudes of Moroccans from 2015 and 2019 and found that 53% think that corruption has increased in the past year — twice the number of 26% in 2015 — while 31% responded that they had paid a bribe in the previous 12 months to access a public service (down from 48% in 2015). Added to this, 74% think the government is doing a poor job of tackling corruption (up from 64% in 2015) and, importantly, 49% believe that ordinary citizens can make a difference in the fight against corruption. When asked which institutions were corrupt, the biggest increase was in the office of the prime minister from 20% in 2015 to 39% in 2019, followed by members of parliament, which rose from 36% to 41%.

Economic Development and Loans From the World Bank

Funding for economic development always has preconditions, and one of the biggest challenges facing developing countries, particularly non-oil producers, is borrowing to build needed infrastructure for transportation and power production, education and health facilities, and environmental projects.

One only needs to look at the high-speed train from Tangier to Casablanca, the trams in Rabat and Casablanca, large-scale renewable energy projects and funding for the growth in ports over the past two decades to identify where external funding is required for their realization. While some initiatives like toll roads and ports have built revenue streams, other projects are built on the assumption that their revenue, in time, will offset the interest and principle payments when they come due. While this is true for public-private partnerships in renewable energy whether solar, wind or hydro, it does not apply to programs that have no direct revenue streams, such as building human resources.

This is a conundrum faced by Morocco, which must reach out to international agencies and donors to support its efforts to develop its human resources. Building the skills and capabilities of Morocco’s citizens is a consistent policy focus of King Mohammed VI, underlying his plans to build cities focusing on regional advantages and promoting technical and vocational skills needed in the country.

It is in this context that the World Bank announced its approval of a new $300-million loan to support the strengthening of “Morocco’s municipalities” as part of the country’s reforms to upgrade public administrations. This is tied to both Morocco’s regionalization and decentralized economic development goals.

The statement from the World Bank said that the loan seeks to help Morocco in its “broader efforts to upgrade urban services and turn urban conglomerations into engines of growth and job creation.” It is critical that local governments receive training in all the skills needed for providing services institutionally and effectively. According to , the World Bank’s Maghreb country director, the “program will target key gaps in performance to promote a transparent, efficient, and accountable urban management system that can drive long-term local development and enhance Moroccan cities’ attractiveness.”

This program and the recent $500-million loan from the World Bank to improve the education sector exemplify the mounting external debt that results from borrowing for development. While Morocco’s external debt is still relatively manageable, Abdellatif Jouahri, the governor of the central bank, said he  to rise to 16.6% of Morocco’s GDP in 2019, up from 13.8% of GDP in 2018. In his annual report, he noted that Morocco is in a financial crisis as the economy is not able to keep up with growing special demands financed by external sources. CEIC found that the external debt in Morocco reached $53.2 billion in June 2019, compared to $51.4 billion in the previous quarter.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post What Are the Priorities of Morocco’s Youth? appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Foreign Direct Investment

In , there was an interesting assessment of why foreign direct investment (FDI) has recently declined in Morocco. The chief culprit seems to be that it is a symptom of the general economic malaise in the European Union, which has long been the top investor in the country. Overall, FDI declined some 17.2% at the end of July compared to the same period in 2018.

Saad Guerraoui writes: “Experts said the Moroccan government must significantly improve the country’s international attractiveness and competitiveness and offer a favourable business environment to foreign companies to be the leading destination for FDI in the [Middle East and North Africa] region.” The article also points to bureaucratic snafus and “meagre tax benefits” as impeding FDI.

Another, maybe not so surprising factor is that Moroccans abroad are not investing as much in Morocco due to the high real estate prices in tourism areas, which have long been a favorite investment destination. Similar properties in Spain and Portugal are more competitively priced. Last year, the EU and Morocco set up a program to improve the business environment and promote economic development.

Johannes Hahn, the commissioner for enlargement negotiations and European neighborhood policy, noted: “The European External Investment Plan will help leverage significant private funds into key sectors of Morocco’s economy. The plan will in turn empower local entrepreneurs and create jobs in the country.”.

Business Hub

There’s some good news. The 2019 International Franchise Attractiveness Index Morocco 39 out of 131 states. This made it the number 1 attractive business hub for US-based franchises in Africa and the second in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) after the United Arab Emirates. This ranking shows it competing with some leading international powers, including France, Spain, Germany and Australia, according to a  by Morocco World News. The index combines peer-reviewed research and a survey of franchise executives to produce two rankings, balanced growth and aggressive growth.

These results support the 2019 Investment Climate appraisal from the US State Department that said “Morocco’s political stability, geographical location, and efforts to build a robust infrastructure, contribute ‘to its emergence as a regional manufacturing and export base for companies.’” That report also mentioned Morocco’s strategy for attracting investors, with several measures in place, including facilitating foreign investment in export-oriented sectors like manufacturing (i.e., cars).

Tourism in Morocco

Another area drawing attention is, of course, tourism. Reporting on the Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report 2019, Kawtar Ennaji that “Morocco boasts the MENA region’s top TTCI [Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index] scores on natural resources, North Africa’s best enabling environment, infrastructure, and tourist service infrastructure.” Criteria include the “set of factors and policies that enable the sustainable development of the Travel & Tourism (T&T) sector, which in turn, contributes to the development and competitiveness of a country.” This includes government support for the tourism sector, natural attractions, ease of access, tourism infrastructure, marketing, and security and stability.

In other news, the Dakhla port is moving ahead. In line with the country’s 2030 National Ports Strategy, the Moroccan government has given the go-ahead for the formation of a Dakhla Atlantic Port committee to oversee the construction of the port project, which includes a broad range of infrastructure projects with a value in excess of $1 billion.

“The committee is expected to launch a tender for the project, which is expected to take some seven years, in the last three months of 2019, according to a by Morocco World News. King Mohammed VI has mentioned that the port will make Dakhla a significant link in Morocco’s outreach to business in Africa.

There’s also relief for the traveler. It’s time to say to the immigration cards that have to be filled out at the ports of entry. Currently, travelers must fill out their details on an immigration form and hand it to the border police before going on to baggage or customs. This is just another great step forward in promoting travel to Morocco.

A New Development Model

One final piece is a commentary on the king’s directive to appoint a committee to come up with a new development model for the country. An by Menas Associates points out that the failure to achieve sufficient progress in past efforts was not due to the absence of plans, from the (INDH) to the Economic, Social and Environmental Council (CESE) recommendations for the south. While much has been achieved, full implementation has not always occurred.

The report reads: “This is due to various reasons, including: the lack of follow up; the absence of real expertise; a lack of finance; and perhaps most important of all, the pervasive corruption that has seen funds that have been earmarked for development projects being siphoned off or wasted. There is also the problem of the government’s hands being tied with those around the King still holding the real reins of power.” It hopes that the government will have a higher degree of success than past efforts to combat the unrest and protests that regularly occur and make a qualitative difference in the lives of Moroccans.

*[A version of this article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post There Are Mixed Messages on the Moroccan Economy appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The Achilles’ heel of that effort is the fact that the major Muslim holy sites — Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem and Karbala — lie outside Iran. Additionally, not even among Shia Muslims, let alone Muslims writ large, is there a consensus behind the official interpretation of the Muslim jurisprudence school adopted by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Wilayat al-faqıh. For example, Abu al-Qasim Khui, Sheikh H. Fadlallah in Lebanon and Ayatollah Montazeri in Iran itself, in addition to other prominent Shia clerics,  Khomeini’s interpretations.

Vectors

A multitude of vectors enforce the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. In parallel to regular diplomatic activity, many agencies, political and media organizations, and even local paramilitary groups are responsible for different independent tasks. These local proxies are trying to gain access to political power or at least influence the public sphere in their countries, and they are often involved in terrorist activities. This violence is presented as a legitimate patriotic act that  to oust the “imperialist aggressors.”

Although the international community has paid close attention to Tehran’s nefarious activities in the Middle East, a well camouflaged and hidden Iranian effort has been at play in Africa, particularly in the Maghreb. Furthermore, Iran’s activities in Africa are extremely important to the regime, especially considering how Tehran’s proxies on the continent support its bellicose conduct in other regions too, such as Latin America and Europe.

The multitude of paramilitary groups that exists in Iran is instrumental for the Islamic Republic’s power. While the Basij militias are responsible of law enforcement and internal security, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is an ideologically indoctrinated military structure that is parallel to the regular military. It has an international component, the Quds (Jerusalem) force, which serves as the international arm of the IRGC’s intelligence organization (IOIRGC). Created in 2009, the IOIRGC is a contender of the Iranian official intelligence ministry, the MOIS or Ettelaat. The third component is the Hezbollah chapters in different MENA countries, which also include a large network of non-Islamist political parties that mainly adhere to Arab nationalist and left-wing ideologies.

The first significant IRGC activities in North Africa started in the early 1980s. During that decade, when Iran was at war with neighboring Iraq, the Iranian regime was actively  for French-speaking recruits in order to conduct assassinations and terrorist operations in Western Europe, and in France in particular. These operations were coordinated with the help of North African, Middle Eastern and European communist groups. They were  to put  on French authorities to stop delivering weapons to Iraq and to pay back the shah’s participation in the EURODIF joint nuclear program from which Iran was excluded after the Islamic Revolution. These operations went in parallel with terrorist activities that included the kidnapping of Western nationals and the introduction of suicide bombings in Lebanon despite Islamic law prohibiting the practice. In fact, the same contraband networks of North African immigrants were recently found to be  in the support of Islamic State (IS) operations in Europe.

The recruiting process that is still enforced today started by  the youthful Marxist and Arab nationalist groups in North Africa, including their diaspora in Europe. These groups often have a deep divergence with local traditional Sunni religious schools and identify themselves in the anti-Western revolutionaries promoted by the Iranian regime. The recruits adhere to Khomeini’s ideology but do not necessary convert to Shia Islam. This “international terrorist joint venture’’ between Marxists and Shia extremists  in the early 1990s in Sudan, where Osama bin-Laden personally  the participation of his group of Sunni extremists, later known as al-Qaeda.

Threat to Spiritual Security

Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary Islamic narrative represented an inspiring militant activism that also helped Islamists in their traditional rivalry with the Marxist left in local politics of virtually all Maghreb countries, save Algeria. This activism is marked by its clandestine nature. The first organization  by that ideology in North Africa was Jund al-Islam (JaI) that was founded in Morocco and should not be confused with the IS chapter in the Egyptian Sinai or the Kurdish-jihadist group that share the same name.

After considering itself as a local Sunni organization, JaI started to adopt a mixture of Marxist ideology and the Iranian government’s Islamist narratives, and became a Shia group. This unique path that is  by its members as a “theory of change” was imitated by many other Sunni groups through politics, education, media and what Moroccan analysts call “intellectual influence in society.”

Following Morocco’s adoption of the 2011 constitution that guarantees religious freedom, a group of Moroccan Shia announced the founding of the Ressali Line (Al-Tayyar Al-Risali). This faction was  by Kamal al-Ghazali and Isaam Hmaidan. Despite its initial commitment to public participation, the activities of this group followed the same pattern of secrecy due to the strong antagonism with the Sunni majority and persecution from Moroccan authorities who  Shia activism as a “threat to the spiritual security” of the country.

North Africa is also a platform for smuggling drugs coming from the Brazilian side of the three-border area —&�Բ�����;shared by Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, where Hezbollah  various degrees of control —&�Բ�����;to Europe. The recent  of a massive shipment of cocaine coming from Brazil to Oran, Algeria, via Spain,  a large network of high-ranking security officers, politicians, governors and judges who were collaborating with the smugglers. The link between contraband gangs, Islamist terrorists and Iran was discovered by Algerian security services in the late 1990s, and former President Lamine Zeroual mentioned it when Algeria cut its diplomatic relations with Iran.

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Beginning in 2015, pro-Iranian groups in North Africa started  their legal denomination to become commercial entities instead of political parties, civil society organizations or religious groups. This initiative raised concerns about money laundering and clandestine activities. During the pre-election period this summer, an interesting leak from left-wing Tunisian politicians accused some local communist leaders of having received illegal funding from Tehran through money laundering of Iranian products, particularly pistachios. According to the same sources, this “pistachio scandal’’ looks like a systematic policy and not an isolated case.

The controversial  of the Iranian cultural attaché Ameer Musawi in Algiers in 2017 and the alleged links to the , an independence movement in Western Sahara, efficiently used by Tehran in 2018 showcased the versatility of Iranian policy toward Arab states.

The best example of this versatility took place in Libya. In fact, during the prelude of the Iranian Revolution, the Libyan regime participated in the assassination of Imam Musa al-Sadr, one of the most influential Lebanese Shia clerics, whose death  the door to Qom-based Iranian clerics, to gain influence over the majority of Shia Muslims throughout the Middle East. Al-Sadr was the founder of the Supreme Islamic Shia Council and co-founder of the Amal militia, a longtime Shia rival to Hezbollah.

Ironically, the Islamic Republic’s proxies used al-Sadr’s assassination to  their support for the anti-Qaddafi insurgency that took off in 2011. At that time, both sides of the conflict acknowledged the presence of Hezbollah operatives in the city of Misrata. Tehran’s  for Sunni Islamists in Libya, plus other factors such as the rise of anti-Shia Salafist groups in post-Qaddafi Libya, as well as Iranian support for Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria all  to widespread rejection of Iranian influence in North Africa on the part of many Libyans.

Nefarious Activities

However, the most interesting  of Iran’s nefarious activities in North Africa remains in Tunisia, where the political, militant and media components of the IRGC activities are present. The influence of pro-Iranian proxies like Attayar al-Chaabi, the Party of Communist Workers, the union of journalists, the leftist defectors of the Nidaa Tounes party and the pro-Iran wing among the Nahda Islamist party led by Sahbi Attig  the Tunisian government through an intensive media campaign to delay talks on purchasing advanced weapons from its strategic partners like the US. These weapons are desperately needed in the fight against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and IS in the western mountainous areas of the country.

The political component consists of the same pattern of alliances between radical leftists and radical Islamists in high-ranking positions. Their influence forced the government to refuse to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization despite the fact that it was one of the early recruiters of Tunisian radicals. Moreover, during a public hearing session last year, the Tunisian parliament passed a resolution that concerned “the role of the US in the transfer of ISIS operatives from the Levant region to the Caucasus and north Africa.” Ultimately, this statement  official Iranian, Syrian and Russian political propaganda rooted in complex conspiracy theories.

This resolution was introduced by Aida Ben Arab, a senior fellow at the government funded Tunisian Institute for Strategic Studies. It was approved by the pro-Iranian group of deputies led by Sahbi Ben Fradj, Leila Shettaoui (who publicly admitted having unauthorized meetings with Syrian intelligence in Damascus) and Mbarka Brahmi, who leads the pro-Hezbollah group in parliament and whose son is the chief of the Tunisian volunteers battalion engaged with pro-Assad regime forces in Syria since 2015.

Although the involvement of hundreds of Tunisians with Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State was extensively covered in the media, an unknown number of Tunisian fighters trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon and engaged in the Syrian conflict —&�Բ�����;especially the returnees — remained under the radar. A Tunisian unit, the Brahmi battalion, is part of the al-Haras al-Qawmi al-Arabi (the Arab Nationalist Guard), which is a  joined by fighters from other Middle Eastern and North African countries under the  of Syrian military intelligence and the IRGC.

This complaisance with Iranian proxies is due not only to their infiltration of Tunisian government institutions, in particular the Ministry of Interior, via the security forces labor unions, but also to the favorable atmosphere created by a complex network of media agencies and civil society organizations, including the largest labor union in Tunisia, the recipient of the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize. The first objective of this media network is to gain the status of a major source of news and information for Arabic and Muslim audiences through a multitude of satellite and radio channels that broadcast the official Tehran narrative. This status allows Iranian agencies to run efficient influence campaigns targeting public opinion in the MENA region.

The public statements made by Iranian officials in their Persian-speaking media outlets contradict their narratives broadcast in Arabic, English, Dari or Urdu. The most hostile statements to Arab neighbors, like the ones made by the deputy commander of the IRGC who declared that Iran already controls five Arab capitals, or by the editor-in-chief of the semi-official Kayhan newspaper who wrote that the kingdom of Bahrain is an Iranian province, are never broadcast in English-speaking Iranian media outlets. The latter adopt a narrative of tolerance and dialogue specifically designed for Western audiences.

Translation Problems

This difference goes far beyond a simple translation problem, and this tactic of using conflicting narratives allows the regime to play on ambiguity and deception. In time of crisis in particular, Iranian official media and their supporters claim that any pressure on the regime will weaken its moderate wing. But in reality, the so-called moderate elements are wholly adopting that hawkish policy.

After Iran’s initial strong support for the Arab revolutions that started in 2011, Tehran’s involvement in sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia in both Syria and Iraq led the traditional pro-Iranian media outlets to lose a significant part of their audience. Their programs became politically polarized and switched to a clear partisan narrative. Pro-Iranian media morphed into a complex network of social media news outlets relayed by traditional media agencies.

The main role of local Iranian social media proxies is to provide an updated influx of local news that is relayed by news agencies. The information is broadcast in a tailored version of local news that corresponds to the Iranian policy based on logical fallacies and false news. This position is successfully used to influence local public opinion. When an Algerian IL76 military cargo plane crashed in 2018, local pro-Iranian proxies circulated a video of the crash of a US contractor Boeing 747 that took place in Afghanistan, which spread suspicion about the official version of facts.

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This parallel foreign policy aims to fan the antagonism between MENA countries and the major international powers, which allows Tehran to play a mediating role between them, talking in the name of all Muslims.

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Next door in Tunisia, where the union of journalists is also controlled by pro-Iranian leftists who publicly support the Assad regime, local media claimed that Tunisian IS operatives are responsible for the chemical attacks against civilians in Syria. This information that lacks proof was quickly relayed by both Iranian and Syrian media in order to deny any responsibility. Iranian official agencies established numerous partnerships with local media institutions, like Nessma TV, which has a large audience in Tunisia, Algeria and Libya.

This channel was used to broadcast Iranian religious media content, series and films. It is managed by Nabil Qarwi, a media mogul and presidential candidate who was imprisoned in late August, and is co-owned by Tarek Ben Ammar, an international movie distributor and the cousin of the Tunisian prime minister, Youssef Chahed, and whose Iranian affiliated company (LTC Iran) could have provided audiovisual equipment to Tehran’s media agencies.

The same pattern is used to provide Iran and its proxies plausible deniability that is a cornerstone of its continuous disinformation effort. One of the masterpieces of influence was the  of  (dubbed Prostitution Holy War by the Arab media) that surfaced after the curious declaration by former Tunisian interior minister, Lotfi Ben Jeddou, regarding Tunisian female recruits within Jabhat al Nusra in Syria. This  was  by the Iranian media to increase the social chasm and antagonism between Shia and Sunni groups in the Middle East.

Although local analysts  that the minister had likely imitated the Syrian regime tactic in order to discredit Islamic terrorists, there was no link between him and his cousin, G. Ben Jeddou, who is the director of the pro-Iranian Al Mayadeen channel based in Beirut that relayed the story. In fact, Beirut hosts an important hub for processing information, where all the news influx from the MENA region Iranian proxies is centralized and relayed. This hub hosts dozens of Arab journalists who are invited for internships, training and exchange programs.

Disinformation Effort

The disinformation effort follows the same news cycle that starts from local proxies who broadcast a tailored and redundant version of facts. They are relayed by traditional media that mention them as reliable sources that serve as a basis for the official narrative and political positions. This information warfare cycle is also  with Ayatollah Khomeini’s calendar, established in the mid-1980s and developed later by the IRGC. It is a series of events and commemorations of various events that ranges from the kidnapping of US diplomats in Tehran to the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. This calendar includes various events related to Palestine and Jerusalem and is in synergy with the Islamic religious calendar.

During every Muslim holiday or religious event, a systematic discreditation campaign directed against Arab governments is organized by Iran to question the decisions of local religious authorities. Since Muslims  a lunar calendar, Iranian proxies spread serious doubt about the dates of the month of Ramadan and the two major Muslim holidays, Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Idha. This year wasn’t an exception.

By infiltrating pan-Arab professional organizations, the Tehran regime is able to not only influence local politics in the MENA region, but also to promote a parallel foreign policy designed to replace the official government position. This parallel position will be easily endorsed by local public opinion due to the continuous disinformation campaigns that were never efficiently countered.

This parallel foreign policy aims to fan the antagonism between MENA countries and the major international powers, which allows Tehran to play a mediating role between them, talking in the name of all Muslims. It aims also to counter the influence of the United States and its regional allies by undermining any cooperation program through aggressive propaganda that doesn’t shirk from threatening the lives of diplomats, military personnel and other officials, like the apologetic narratives following the violent attacks on US diplomatic facilities in Benghazi and Tunis.

This policy aims finally to take advantage of the human and natural resources of north African countries, like the recruitment of Tunisian engineer Mohamed Zouari, who designed drones for Hamas’ Palestinian military wing, the al-Qassem Brigades, or the attempts to acquire Libyan “yellow cake’’ — a purified form of uranium — stored in the southern city of Sabha.

The number of North African operatives recruited by the different pro-Iranian militias, and especially the returnees, remains unknown. The political and social crisis in the Maghreb and the collapse of state institutions in Libya, where local militias are operating in synergy with criminal gangs and even terrorists in North Africa, the Sahel and Southern Europe, prevents any coordinated effort to track these activities. The increasing clashes off the Libyan coast between Egyptian, Tunisian and Libyan boats carrying fishermen, oil smugglers and human traffickers are another warning sign of the potential destabilization front that could be opened by the IOIRGC and lead to a situation similar to what is happening off the .

With the devastating effects of US economic sanctions on Iran, the Tehran regime has opted for intensifying its asymmetrical warfare. This choice was also dictated by the weakness of Iran’s conventional military capabilities. Tehran’s reaction to US sanctions veered toward a maximalist and aggressive policy that pushes the region to the edge of a dangerous crisis. Iran’s policy seems to be rushing headlong from one incident to the next, using the same old tactic of denying all responsibility.

*[ is a partner organization of 51�Թ�.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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I was told that there are spiritual answers to the question, “Why Morocco?” — every person has a story to explain why they are in this country. The hospitality, emphasis on community and religious practice are only a few of the reasons Moroccans and visitors have provided. While personal narratives and my own experience have intertwined to affirm this point, so do the tenants of community and participatory development that I have witnessed as an intern at the High Atlas Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to local initiatives that community beneficiaries determine and manage.

During my first week in Morocco, after traveling toward the Amazigh village of Akrich, we stopped at a tree nursery. The seemingly small plot of pomegranate and fig saplings is the backdrop to a linkage of cultural cooperation. While Jewish pilgrims visit the mausoleum of Rabbi Raphael Hacohen year after year, a Muslim man, Abderrahim Beddah, serves as the caretaker of the land. This relationship helps the High Atlas Foundation engage a women’s cooperative in the neighboring village. Initiatives are interconnected.

Now, these multicultural nurseries are receiving government support. The National Initiative for Human Development has provided land-assessments to monitor the viability of an organic fruit tree nursery near the mausoleum of Rabbi David-Ou-Moshe in the Ouarzazate province. They will begin implementing a project that will generate more than 1 million trees over five years.

Sustainable development was created through, and continues to depend on, interfaith partnerships. If Beddah did not share the story of Jews crying on the journey to visit their saint and express his deep appreciation for their faith, then this partnership would be unlikely. However, the investment Moroccans make when they support their neighbors is a testament to development that depends on pluralism.

Muslims and Jews in Morocco

This concept resurfaced in a new friendship. The Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs — in cooperation with the Association of Friends of the Jewish Museum — provides funding to bring Jewish people with Moroccan heritage back to discover their roots, meet government and religious leaders, and encourage local investment.

The High Atlas Foundation interns were invited to attend a Shabbat dinner during the program for these Moroccan Jews, and it was at that dinner that my observations were confirmed. I met a woman who has grown up in France, but her parents were from Agadir, Morocco. This was the first time she traversed the site of her great-great-grandparents’ graves and engaged with her heritage. We got to talking about religious coexistence and respect.

She put it quite simply: “[I]n Morocco, Jews and Muslims are first Moroccan. They live well together because their identity is placed in the fact that they are neighbors.” She told me she believed that allegiance should be first to one’s country and then to religion, at least in how it is outwardly expressed. We both agreed that country needs to be respected and humanity needs to be respected.

Pluralism is a framework written into Morocco’s foundational documents. Development requires all parties, faiths and populations of Morocco. I have seen this visiting a women’s cooperative where dialogue and decision-making are priorities. I have seen this in visiting the grave of a venerated Jewish saint, guarded by a Muslim. I have seen this in the logistical processes that allow for the purchasing of carbon credits and maintenance of olive, walnut and carob farms.

In 2008, King Mohammed VI announced a vision for Morocco in which “culture serves as a driving force for development as well as a bridge for dialogue.” Moroccans are stepping up to the plate, imagining and wrestling to manifest this vision. The country’s potential should serve as an example.

But we must not forget that there are villages still plagued by diarrhea, girls not in school and trees left unplanted. These examples remind us that although potential is not lacking, resources are forever necessary. Volunteers should never back down in fear of not doing enough. Passion for understanding others, learning a new language or living immersed in a beautiful expression of religion should be motivation to bring you to Morocco. Finding or supporting organizations like the High Atlas Foundation is integral to this vision.

My spiritual explanation to “Why Morocco?” has come to rest in my hope for this pluralistic and collaborative future of development. Creating cooperatives, living together and working toward a common goal or vision is very “Moroccan.” But it is also very “human.” I wonder how life would look if other countries began to call for pluralistic-driven development in their constitutions, laws, policies and institutions.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Real Strength of Morocco appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The king recounted Morocco’s achievements in modernizing its infrastructure and implementing key reforms, and added: “Let me say this clearly and frankly: what undermines this positive result is that the effects of the progress and the achievements made have not, unfortunately, been felt by all segments of the Moroccan society.” He went on to say: “Indeed, some citizens may not directly feel their positive impact on their living conditions, or in terms of helping them meet their daily needs, especially in the areas of basic social services, the reduction of social disparities, and the consolidation of the middle class.”

This is not the first time that King Mohammed VI has raised these issues: calling for inclusive economic growth, a streamlined public sector doing its job of providing services efficiently, and building on the strong civic sense of Moroccans to have a better life. Yet there is still a lack of sufficient momentum toward achieving the goals that he himself has set. Whether in carrying out promised development projects or modernizing the education sector to make it more market-friendly, obstacles seem to reduce the pace and scope of needed changes.

So when he exclaimed, “God knows how much I suffer personally when a fraction of the Moroccan people — even if it were just 1% of the Moroccan population — endures hardships and lives in poverty,” the 1% does not include those public officials and friends of the king who have been the targets of outrage and boycotts over the years but still remain in power.

Despite his message of reform and development, there is a disconnect as public officials, members of political parties in the house of representatives and leading private sector figures do not pursue the king’s agenda through equitable, speedy and transparent implementation.

He expressed the contradiction quite well: “As I said in last year’s address, there will be no peace of mind for me so long as we have not properly tackled the hurdles faced and found the right solutions to development and social issues. This, however, cannot be achieved without a comprehensive vision, without qualified human resources, or without meeting the conditions required to carry out planned projects.”

So, as the king has done before when facing obstacles, he announced the creation of a special committee to assess and redefine Morocco’s development model. “I expect the committee to be totally impartial and objective, and to report on facts as they are on the ground, however harsh or painful they may be. And when proposing solutions, I want it to be daring and innovative.”

But How?

An immediate question is how will he ensure that this effort will be effective where others have failed — notably in the south where cronyism, corruption, inefficiencies and distortions in public services were all called out, and yet conditions have only marginally improved there? This is compounded by the king’s mention that the committee would be advisory. So without some mandate to drive reforms, how will it be effective?

While the king intends to appoint people “who are able to feel the pulse of society, who understand its expectations and who have the nation’s best interests at heart,” this may appear as more of the same good intentions without real change. What about youth, the marginalized and women speaking for themselves and through elites or the notables in the NGO sector? How will those who struggle with health services, local officials, poor educational facilities and sense a general decline in prospects for their children participate?

To bring about this new resolve, the king recognizes the need to rebuild trust between citizens and the government. “[T]he challenge of enhancing trust and consolidating achievements … is the recipe for success and a condition for fulfilling our ambitions. It concerns trust among citizens and trust in the national institutions that bring them together. It is about having faith in a better future.” He went on to say that a new mentality is critical: “The public sector needs an immediate three-dimensional revolution: a revolution in simplification, a revolution in efficiency and a revolution in ethical standards.”

To underscore the task of moving the country forward, the king spoke of the need for social and regional justice, “to complete the building of a nation of hope and equality for all; a country where there is no place for blatant inequalities, frustrating behavior, rent seeking or time and energy wasting. Therefore, there must be a final break with such negative attitudes and conduct; we must uphold the values of hard work, responsibility, merit and equal opportunity.”

Reenergize the Leadership

Great speech, great themes, great hopes, but will there be any change? Will Morocco become, in his words, “a country that accommodates all its sons and daughters; a country in which all citizens — without exception — enjoy the same rights and have the same obligations, in an environment where freedom and human dignity prevail?”

King Mohammed VI needs to reenergize the commitment of Morocco’s political leadership beyond their personal gain. Public officials must also act to a higher standard in delivering projects and services to all Moroccans. And citizens must prod their elected representatives and party leaders to act as their advocates rather than playing to the royal palace. His agenda is on target and his instincts still clear and focused on the Moroccan people. How to get there given the systematic flaws in the government is the greater challenge.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post King Mohammed VI Calls for National Development Strategy Restart in Morocco appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Over this time, peacekeeping and the wars to which it has been applied have changed. The challenges peacekeepers face have evolved from ones that were relatively straightforward to assignments that were becoming highly complex. More recently, peacekeepers are facing challenges that are impossible to overcome.

There are currently 14 employing nearly 100,000 soldiers, police and civilians at an annual cost of $6.5 billion. These missions reflect the three stages of peacekeeping’s evolution. The oldest among them were launched in response to wars between countries over territory. The second stage involved multidimensional operations, in which peacekeepers undertake a wide variety of tasks to help countries recover from civil wars. The most recently launched operations represent the third stage, the protection and stabilization missions. These mandate peacekeepers to protect civilians and aid governments that are threatened by violent extremism — a task where the peacekeepers will not have success.

Wars Over Territory

The six classical peacekeeping operations have logged a combined total of more than three centuries of peacekeeping efforts. Yet none of the six is going to end in the foreseeable future, mainly because that doesn’t serve the interests of some of the permanent members of the UN Security Council: Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States.

The operation in the Western Sahara that began in 1991 is supposed to hold a referendum on independence for the region. Morocco, which claims the territory, will not permit a referendum that would result in independence. The Polisario Front, which represents the freedom movement of the Sahrawi people, will not agree to a referendum that does not grant independence. Because France protects Morocco’s interests, the mission will not end.

In , the UN mission began in 1964 and is tasked with getting the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to live together in peace. Britain has military bases on Cyprus, so Britain’s interest is in preserving the status quo. There is little chance for change because the Turkish Cypriot leaders have no desire to be a minority in a united country. They declared their own independent state on the northern end of the island, even though Turkey is the only nation that recognizes it. The Turks also don’t want a united country dominated by Greek Cypriots. And the Russians also see political advantage in making sure that the Cyprus issue remains unresolved. That mission will never end either.

���� has operated in Kashmir for more than 70 years. Since it is supposedly helping to avoid a war between India and Pakistan — two countries with nuclear weapons — no one is ready to terminate that mission, even though what it is accomplishing is unclear.

Classical Peacekeeping

The remaining three classical peacekeeping operations are located in and around Israel. They are the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in Jerusalem, the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in Syria and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). A fourth operation, the Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) is located in the Sinai as a result of the Camp David accords. It is not a UN effort because Russia would have vetoed its establishment, so it was set up independently.

UNTSO, the UN’s first peacekeeping operation, began in 1948. It continues to this day, but makes no visible contribution to peace. UNDOF was created in 1974 after the Yom Kippur War. Because the civil war in Syria has made it unsafe for the peacekeepers, UNDOF can’t carry out its functions. In addition, the Trump administration has that “the United States recognizes that the Golan Heights are part of the State of Israel.” Since Israel is never going to withdraw from the Golan, and Syria is never going to give up its demands to recover the area, the peacekeepers will apparently never be able to go home.

UNIFIL was established in 1978 to ascertain , after fighting between the Palestine Liberation Organization and Israeli military forces in southern Lebanon. While its 10,000 peacekeepers from 40 countries patrol dozens of times every day, it can’t do anything without the cooperation of the Lebanese government. That government now includes Hezbollah, which controls southern Lebanon. The US considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization. The Israelis believe it is stockpiling tens of thousands of rockets in population centers and digging tunnels under the border, much as Hamas — another US-proclaimed terrorist group — has done in Gaza. Yet when the Israelis pointed out a brick factory that they believed was being used to hide one of the tunnels, the Lebanese government refused to let the UN investigate because the factory was private property.

UNIFIL facilitates communications between the two sides — since they don’t talk to each other — but that does not require thousands of peacekeepers. Perhaps to calm tensions in the region, UNIFIL does have one accomplishment: It has organized��.

The MFO came into being in 1981, when Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula. Because of terrorism in northern Sinai, the peacekeepers have now largely withdrawn to the south, far from the border. Meanwhile, the Egyptian and Israeli armies, which the MFO was set up to keep apart, are conducting joint combat operations together against the extremists.

In other words, these operations in the Middle East have no exit strategy. And, like Jared Kushner’s peace plan, none of them is doing anything to encourage a political process that might resolve the conflicts that caused them. They do allow Israel to blame the UN when things go wrong. And, like the Iron Dome missile defense system, they provide the Israelis some relief from thinking about the longer-term implications of their defense strategy and foreign policy.

Since there seems to be nothing that the current American administration will not do to please Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (and Sheldon Adelson, the casino billionaire), the US will ensure these missions will also never end.

Civil Wars

The second type of peacekeeping — multidimensional operations — began as a result of civil wars over political power. Once a ceasefire was established in these conflicts, peacekeepers could be sent in. They were given a long list of goals to help the peace become permanent. The list could include demobilizing most of the former combatants and reintegrating them into civilian life, forming a new national army that was not loyal to only one side, aiding refugees to return to their homes, providing humanitarian aid and development assistance to restart the economy and holding elections in a country with little to no democratic experience.

Given the cost of such operations — thousands of peacekeepers were required for such tasks — there was pressure to achieve all the objectives on a tight schedule. If the elections produced a government with some legitimacy, the peacekeepers could declare success and depart.

While the UN has achieved mixed results in its multidimensional missions, they are, at least for the moment, largely a thing of the past. Of the current missions, only two are multidimensional. Actually, it would be more accurate to call them unidimensional because their objectives have been drastically reduced over the years. Today they are small operations limited to attempting to professionalize the police in Kosovo and in Haiti (as well as carry out judicial reforms there). Yet Russia won’t let the UN close the mission in Kosovo.

Dealing With Terrorism

The remaining six operations are all in sub-Saharan Africa. They represent the third stage of the evolution of peacekeeping — the protection and stabilization missions. They are the most dangerous and difficult operations where peacekeeping will inevitably fail.

At the risk of being tautological, peacekeepers are bound to fail if there is no peace to keep. When a ceasefire is negotiated, peacekeepers can potentially do their work. Without one, they are either ineffective or they have to take on a combat role. That requires the international community — the UN Security Council — to let peacekeepers inflict and take casualties.

To make matters much worse, the five countries where these protection and stabilization missions are taking place — Mali, South Sudan, Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo — have governments that are among the most corrupt, repressive and incompetent in the world. These countries are therefore not particularly interested in protecting their own citizens. Their armies and police exist mainly to protect the regime in power.

The wealthy nations with the most capable armies are unwilling to provide a significant number of troops for this type of peacekeeping. So it is left largely to poorly equipped and inadequately trained soldiers from developing nations who are not going to defeat violent extremism. If the US cannot prevail against violent extremists in Afghanistan after 18 years of trying, there is no chance that the peacekeepers can do so in Africa.

This third category of missions has become a way for rich countries to send the soldiers from poor countries to deal with conflicts that the rich countries don’t care all that much about. The fundamental problem is that there is no peace to keep, and the UN forces will never be capable of imposing one, because peacekeepers are not warfighters.

Peacekeeping is a bandage, not a cure. At best, it stanches the bleeding, but it cannot heal the wound. To use it any other way is to ensure its failure.

*[A version of this article was originally published on .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Why Peacekeeping Fails appeared first on 51�Թ�.

King Mohammed VI has managed to provide an overall vision for the country’s development that has raised the standard of living, increased high-value jobs in manufacturing and technology, brought order to the national development strategy, and opened up a society that still manifests lingering symptoms of wasta (connections) as a gateway to success despite one’s educational and social achievements.

But the king is no magician, and the number of young people dissatisfied with the country reflects his own impatience with government ministers who are unable to “fix” issues like youth unemployment, a weak educational sector, inefficiencies in public services and blatant abuses by the security services.

Morocco has its flaws. Parliament has never risen to its potential as an equal partner in policy leadership in the country. Its institutions still reflect a culture of deference to the royal palace that leave it lacking an independent judiciary, full protections of civil liberties and robust employment opportunities. Its handling of civil disobedience can be rough, as in responses to the 2016 Hirak Rif movement in the north and the pro-Polisario — a separatist group — demonstrations in the south.

Yet Morocco does not have overcrowded correctional facilities with political prisoners, its media is relatively open and it is creating jobs in new industrial centers, but not at a pace sufficient to meet the demand — a common problem throughout the Arab world.

Morocco has its own internal logic, quite different from Sudan and Algeria. Religious authority rests with the king and its parliament is led by an Islamic party. It has an unofficial Islamic opposition, Al Adl wa Al Ihsane (Justice and Spirituality), that eschews the monarchy and participating in government. And the country has religious training centers that prepare imams and others to promote moderate, Sufi-influenced Maliki Islam in Africa and Europe.

Of course, many of its young people want to leave. This is the reality of the region. Too many young people with mismatched education to job skills would rather test their options elsewhere than take jobs that require vocational and technical skills, again not unlike most of their peers in the Middle East and North Africa.

There are many initiatives to build job opportunities, but even the most optimistic know that the public sector cannot absorb more entrants, the private sector is unable to generate jobs at the same pace as graduates, and emphasizing enterprise and entrepreneurship to fill the gap requires more than words. Enabling new business means systematic, comprehensive, sustainable approaches. And it would help if securing business licenses, loans, permits and services was less arbitrary and more transparent.

So, the BBC has got it wrong about Morocco. While demonstrations are not uncommon, and while young people are frustrated with their options, there is still a strong sense of loyalty to the country, even with its shortcomings.

As a Moroccan friend noted: “The loyalty here is to the king and his vision, to the history that connects the people to the monarchy. But on a social level, I think that Moroccans are conflicted between all the hopeful signs that show we are actually doing much better than others in the region, and between the unmistakable déjà vu of the struggles of the 80s that marked the re-emergence of the social classes and the balance tipping in favor of the palace.”

Where these frustrations lead in the coming years will test the Moroccans’ commitment to the current political order — one that demands more robust and sustainable initiatives that enable youth to fully engage in the country’s future.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Morocco Is Not the Next Algeria or Sudan appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Over 12% of humanity to one of the 3 million cooperatives on the planet. Cooperatives not only stimulate local economies, but also act as a vehicle for bringing opportunity and profit to people worldwide, who otherwise would not be actors in the formal sector of the economy. This tangible empowerment is perhaps best embodied by the Cooperative Aboghlo Women of Ourika in Morocco.

Cooperative Aboghlo

Just a 30-minute drive outside of Marrakech to Tnine Ourika in the Al Haouz province, situated across the street from a furniture retailer is a deceivingly unremarkable storefront. Peering through the glass display case you will find packages of couscous and dried herbs sitting alongside bowls overflowing with chocolate, pistachio, almond and walnut cookies. All of which is made from local Moroccan ingredients.

But this is not the real gem found inside the Cooperative Aboghlo. The true beauty is hidden away on the second floor of the co-op, where 23 women sit in circles and talk back and forth. They are not making casual conversation. Instead, they are debating various aspects of the internal and external marketing for their cooperative enterprise. For hours, these women engage in conversations about how to better spread the word about their product, how to enforce the timeliness of each respective worker, and how to resolve problems of communication and organization — issues every business must grapple with.

This in itself is remarkable, but it is even more so when one is reminded of the context. The discrepancy in opportunities and education of women compared to men is widely experienced throughout the world. This creates an uneven playing field for women. From the time they are little girls, females are not given the same support as their male counterparts.

The consequences are crippling. Unemployment among young women in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are 80% higher than that of young men. This is compared to the average gender differential of 20% worldwide, according to Brookings.��Most women in Cooperative Aboghlo could not read or write, but now they are taking literacy classes at the co-op and are able to write their names and read street signs.

When considering these astonishing circumstances, it is obvious these women, who are successfully managing their own well-established cooperative, are extraordinary exceptions. But that should not be the case. It is just and right to commend the women of this enterprise, but the ladies of the Cooperative Aboghlo are a much-needed reminder not only of what is possible but of what should be.

The cooperative started in October 2016 with 10 women from one village. Now, there are 33 women from five different villages actively participating. In addition to selling various products from their brick-and-mortar site, the co-op exports directly to internationally-recognized cosmetic companies. These women set an example of what is possible when given education and opportunity.

Women and the Economy

Women’s active participation in the labor force can have a tremendous, positive impact on the developing economies of Morocco and other MENA states. In 2015, McKinsey Global Institute found that supporting women’s could add $12 trillion to global GDP by 2025 and grow the MENA region’s economy by 85%. Closing the gap between men and women in hours worked per day could lead to a 47% increase in the annual GDP of the Middle East and North Africa.

The root of the issue of female participation in the workforce lies in cultural obstacles. Family opposition and traditional gender roles create rigid barriers for women. This is especially the case in rural regions, where their domain is often confined to that of domestic life.

However, globalization and increased pushes for equality have ushered in a new wave of changes. Moudawana, the Moroccan family code, addresses gender equality and rights by raising the minimum legal age of marriage and limiting divorce and polygamy terms, thus giving back the innate rights of women that have long been forgone. Morocco has reduced the barriers to entry for cooperatives, further encouraging women’s involvement in the economy. This is a huge step forward for Morocco in addressing the systemic inequalities that are so deeply integrated.

This progress, though commendable and remarkable, is just the first step. The path to sustainable development and equality is one that is not easily achieved. Through its partnership with the High Atlas Foundation, a Moroccan nongovernmental organization, Cooperative Aboghlo was given a platform and the skills training necessary to grow tremendously. The cooperative embodies what is possible with this support and facilitation of development.

The time for these changes is long overdue. The time for these changes is most certainly now. It starts with the simplest action. It starts with the women of Cooperative Aboghlo Women of Ourika taking initiative and, most importantly, with the education of marginalized people.

The future should not be a mere continuation of the past. It takes a single lifetime of empowered women to spurn generations of empowered girls.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Hidden Gems of Morocco appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The Middle East and North Africa continues to reverberate from the 2011 Arab Spring protests that rocked the region eight years ago. The protests, which have also been referred to as uprisings, revolutions and revolts, led to the overthrow of lifelong dictators in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. While Tunisia emerged from the Arab Spring with new competitive elections, consensus politics and a series of democratic reforms, Egypt entrenched authoritarian rule with the election of the military commander Abdel Fattah el-Sisi after he led a coalition to depose President Mohamed Morsi.

Sisi has since ruled with an iron fist, limiting the number of opposition candidates allowed to compete in elections and cracking down on any form of dissent. has described Egypt under Sisi’s rule as “an open-air prison for critics” and “more dangerous than ever” for activists.

Libya, meanwhile, is fragmented between two rival governments split between the eastern and western parts of the country. The political vacuum created in the wake of the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi enabled the rise of armed groups that gain significant influence over political factions, further complicating the peace process and prospects of a unified country. General Khalifa Haftar, who heads the Libyan National Army in the east with the support of Egypt, the UAE and France, has begun advancing on Tripoli in a bid to expand his power to the west, threatening to ignite another full-blown civil war with the UN-backed government.

Then there’s Syria. President Bashar al-Assad responded to peaceful protests in 2011 with a brutal crackdown that threw fuel on the fire, which grew into a brutal civil war, now in its ninth year. The conflict is being fought on multiple fronts, from a civil war between the Assad regime and the opposition, a sectarian proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and a war against the Islamic State (IS) and other Islamist groups. The has left over half a million Syrians dead and over 12 million displaced both internally and around the world. With IS losing its last remaining stronghold of Baghouz in March, many are speculating whether the conflict is coming to an end in Syria.

The Arab Spring has also helped alter political dynamics throughout the region, at the forefront of which is Saudi Arabia and Iran’s cold war over competing spheres of influence. Iran has undermined Riyadh’s ambitions to position itself as the region’s leader by bridging its Shia sphere of influence across Iraq, Lebanon and Syria. The two countries have transformed Yemen into a sectarian battleground to swing the pendulum of power in their favor. Under the Trump administration in Washington, however, Iran has found its regional influence and power waning as the US has thrown its support behind the kingdom.

While President Donald Trump has sent mixed messages with his Middle East foreign policy — from withdrawing from the Iranian nuclear deal to calling for a complete withdrawal of US troops from Syria to bolstering the US’s support for both Israel and Saudi Arabia — his actions have had, and will continue to have, a profound impact on the region.

Gilbert Achcar is professor of development studies and international relations at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. Professor Achcar is an expert on the Middle East and North Africa, and has written profusely on the region, particularly on the Arab Spring and the regional order. His published work includes and .

The region is a fluid environment and constantly shifting, and our interview with Professor Achcar took place prior to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika stepping down in Algeria, Haftar’s advance on Tripoli and the ouster of President Omar al-Bashir in Sudan, all events that transpired over the span of the past two weeks. At the same time, much of the region is static between Saudi Arabia and Iran’s relentless power struggle and the Syrian conflict. You can find Professor Achcar’s most recent take on the revolution unfolding in Sudan .

In this edition of the Interview, 51�Թ� talks to Achcar about the ongoing turmoil in the region, his vision for its future and reasons for hope, if not optimism.

The text has been lightly edited for clarity.

Dina Yazdani: Last December, President Trump announced that the US had defeated the Islamic State in Syria, and that he was withdrawing all US troops from the country. Last month, after agreeing to keep 400 US troops in Syria, he claimed again that US forces had reclaimed 100% of IS territory. Is the Islamic State truly defeated — can it ever be defeated?

Gilbert Achcar: That’s a good question indeed. The very nature of such networks makes it very difficult to suppress them. ISIS is the continuation of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which had morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq and then re-emerged in Syria during the civil war, turning into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, then the Islamic State tout court after it spilled over back into Iraq. This kind of terroristic enterprise will carry on as long as there are factors breeding violent hostility to the United States and the local regimes. We will keep seeing various brands of terrorist networks popping up as long as the underlying causes are there.

Yazdani: Since IS lost the territory it managed to conquer in Iraq and Syria, do you anticipate them resorting to more guerrilla warfare or splintering into smaller groups that will make it harder for US and other forces to crackdown on them?

Achcar: Well, it wasn’t difficult to foresee that in the face of overwhelming power — the whole world is leagued against ISIS — they wouldn’t be able to hold on for long to the vast territory they controlled at their peak. That they managed to keep a portion of it until very recently is what is most surprising indeed. It is a testimony to their determination, enhanced by the sense of being trapped in their last recesses.

The potential exists.��There’s a new generation that is not willing to be subservient as previous generations have been, a generation of young rebels who will keep fighting, especially when their own future and even their own present are at stake.��

But otherwise the logical response by fighters in the face of such circumstances is to abandon the territory under their control and resort to guerrilla warfare and/or terrorist attacks, whether in the same region or at large. One shouldn’t forget that ISIS, or IS, has spread to other regional territories such as the Sinai and Libya, as well as territories beyond the Arab world in sub-Saharan Africa or elsewhere. So how can one claim to have terminated them when they have managed to form an extensive international network still active in several territories?

Yazdani: Trump has made it clear that defeating IS was America’s only mission in Syria in his view. Since he claimed that the group has been defeated, at least territorially, what is his strategy in Syria? Do you believe that US troops are going to be gradually withdrawn, and who would replace them if they do? Does this not play in the hands of Iran, which has been pressuring the US to leave?

Achcar: There is a fundamental contradiction in Trump’s position on Syria. It is manifest in that many of those who are usually very much in agreement with him are for once rather unhappy with the position he took on Syria. Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, sees eye to eye with Trump on practically everything, except on this issue. That’s because Trump’s desire to remove troops from Syria clashes with Netanyahu’s anti-Iranian priority, for the one key function of US presence in Syria is precisely to make sure that the vast territory east of the Euphrates, which is now controlled by the US-backed Kurdish troops and their Arab partners of the Syrian Democratic Forces, doesn’t fall under Iranian control.

If US troops leave northeastern Syria, Kurdish troops won’t remain in the Arab parts of that territory. They will withdraw into the Kurdish areas, into what they call Rojava. The major threat for them is Turkey, not Iran. The Turkish president is seizing every opportunity to promise that he will invade the Kurdish-dominated territory in northeast Syria. The Arab-populated territory east of the Euphrates would thus become open to Syrian regime control, which means either Russian or Iranian control, or both, since the Syrian regime as an independent factor is but a fiction nowadays — it depends fully on its two backers. The withdrawal of US troops will inevitably be an invitation for other powers to get control of that large swath of territory.

For Iran, this would be a very important opportunity because it would allow it to complete the corridor that goes from Tehran through to the shores of Lebanon, which has become the main axis of the Iranian regime’s expansionist drive. That’s why some of the closest people to Trump on the issue of Iran were very disappointed by his announcement of US withdrawal from Syria. They exerted pressure on him, which led him to compromise and agree to keep a reduced number of troops.

Yazdani: What’s next for Syria?

Achcar: Very difficult to tell, not only for Syria, but for the whole region since it entered a protracted period of destabilization starting from the 2011 Arab Spring. The explosion was long overdue after the accumulation of so many economic, social and political problems in the region. It took a very tragic character in Syria, unfortunately. What we are witnessing now is not the Syrian regime’s victory over the Syrian opposition, but indeed the victory of the alliance of Iran and Russia on the ground in Syria.

The big question, at least for the foreseeable future, is, therefore, What will happen between the two partners of this victory? How will the relations between Russia and Iran in Syria evolve? That’s the big question because, although the two countries converged in shoring up the regime of Bashar al-Assad, they have quite different agendas. The issue of Iran is a major card in Vladimir Putin’s hand: He is in the best position to prevent Iran from consolidating its presence in Syria. He wouldn’t do any of that just for the sake of controlling Syria because he already controls what is of any need to him there. It would rather be a bargaining card in his relations with Europe and the United States.

For Europe, the refugee issue is the most serious outcome of the Syrian tragedy, the millions of Syrians who had to flee their country and take refuge either in adjacent countries or in Europe. They are concentrated in such large numbers in some countries, especially Syria’s neighboring countries, that it can’t be contemplated that they could remain there for many years without becoming a major source of tension.

Many countries have a major stake in getting those refugees back to Syria, and Russia holds the keys to that because it is the only power that can provide a credible safety guarantee to the refugees and entice them to go back to their homeland. Russia is seen by the Syrians as a pro-regime power, for sure, but one without a stake in the sectarian or ethnic revenge wars that unfolded in the country. Iran, on the other hand, is the exact opposite of that. A major part of Syrian refugees would not contemplate going back to parts of Syria that are dominated by Iran, a power motivated by a sectarian political agenda.

This said, the only safe prediction one can make about Syria, or the whole region for that matter, is that the situation won’t stabilize in the foreseeable future. The turmoil is not going to cease there for many years to come, if not decades.

Yazdani: Earlier this year, you wrote in Al-Quds al-Arabi (an was posted on the Jacobin website) that the old Arab regimes’ despotic order will eventually collapse. Can you explain what you mean by despotic order and what will it take to precipitate these regimes’ collapse?

Achcar: The despotic character of the order that is prevailing in the Arabic-speaking region is obvious, with very few exceptions. One of them is today’s Tunisia, the only one of the six countries where the Arab Spring did peak that managed to maintain its democratic gains. Another is Lebanon, a country which has a long-standing different political tradition because of its multi-confessional political system. But beyond that, most of the states in the region are either autocracies or military dictatorships in the sense that the military controls the regime, as is the case in Egypt and Algeria, for instance. The eight Arab monarchies are all absolute monarchies, even those with a constitution and parliament. Sovereignty belongs to the king, or emir or sultan in all eight cases, not to the people. All remaining countries have authoritarian regimes.

This despotic order cannot remain in place forever. Of course, the question is, After how many years will it end, and after having done what kind of damage and caused the death of how many people? What I meant, however, is what I have been saying since 2011, from the very beginning of what was called the Arab spring: I have been emphasizing the fact that it was not going to be a smooth, peaceful and brief phase of democratic transition as the label Arab Spring did convey. The 2011 revolutionary shockwave affected the whole region. A major surge in social protest occurred in almost all its countries during that year, with six countries witnessing major uprisings. This was not a coincidence or merely a result of linguistic contagion. It was the product of the accumulation over decades of several explosive factors, most crucial among which were low rates of economic growth leading to the world’s highest rates of unemployment — especially youth unemployment, male and female.

The same explosive ingredients are now being produced massively at higher speed. Unemployment, youth unemployment, and all sorts of social and economic problems are only getting worse. They are not at all on their way to ease off in the region. That’s why I emphasize the fact that it is a major structural crisis that can’t be solved short of radical change in the region’s social, economic and political order. Of course, such a change is not easy to obtain, especially in the face of regimes that are resolved to massacre in order to remain in power.

It takes exceptional leaderships to be able to steer through such a change, and they are nowhere on the horizon for now. This means that we are facing the prospect of many years, probably several decades, of turmoil in the region. And there’s no guarantee, to be sure, of a happy end. If a radical change for the better doesn’t happen, the alternative is more chaos and violence, and more descent into barbarism of which ISIS was a such a crude illustration.

Yazdani: You mentioned earlier that the Arab Spring has shaken the entire region. Are the protests that we are witnessing today in Sudan, Algeria, Jordan and Gaza a second wave of the Arab Spring? I think it is also interesting to note that these countries did not undergo massive upheavals in 2011, unlike the six countries that you mentioned earlier, nor did they see any significant political transformation during that period.

Achcar: But you should have added Tunisia to the list. Tunisia was the country that opened the way to the Arab Spring when the movement started there in December 2010 and achieved a victory in January 2011. Since 2011, there has been a setback for the whole wave on the regional scale: In 2013, a shift occurred from revolutionary upsurge into reactionary backlash with a partial restoration of the old regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, and reactionary violence turning into civil war in Libya and Yemen. Despite that, the underlying structural crisis kept getting worse everywhere, leading to social and political struggles starting, or resuming, in various countries.

The ongoing upsurges in Sudan and Algeria are not lightnings in a blue sky. Sudan had witnessed a wave of protests in 2011, and then again in 2013, and a new round last year before the present upsurge. In the face of harsh repression, it took time for the movement to gather momentum into the kind of massive mobilization that we have been seeing in recent weeks. In Algeria, there were limited protests in 2011, and the regime quickly offered economic concessions, like the Saudi kingdom did. They managed to buy the people’s quiescence by injecting oil money in the form of increases in wages and social spending. In Algeria, there was an additional factor that is now at play in all Arab countries, which is the fear of getting into the kind of tragic situation that developed in Syria over the last few years or the one that Algeria has been through in the 1990s.

But as we can see now, even such a deterrent as the terrible decade of war that Algeria has witnessed 20 years ago was not enough to deter indefinitely its people from rising. The young people now came to the fore. They want to change the regime. It won’t be easy, for sure. But the fact is that the Algerian people have joined in its turn the regional aspiration of the people to affirm its will. “The people want…” is the slogan that you hear everywhere. The people want to overthrow the regime, or the people want this or that. This is very important, and it will certainly carry on. Whatever defeats there may be, repression won’t solve the core problems. Even in Syria itself, and despite the magnitude of the tragedy, social protest has been recently on the rise. This is to say that it is a revolutionary process for the long haul, and that more countries will join the fray sooner or later.

Morocco is another country that has already witnessed important waves of social protest. The crisis is simmering there, and sooner or later it will explode. Anyone believing that Egypt has reached long-term stability under Sisi’s dictatorial rule is fooling themselves. That’s another country where the boiling point will be reached again, rather sooner than later, because the social and economic conditions are becoming unbearable.

Yazdani:�� There’s increasing scrutiny of Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman — his growing litany of human rights abuses, from the Saudi-led war on Yemen to the brutal killing of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and, more recently, the mass detention and torture of high-profile activists, particularly women rights activists. Do you think that the kingdom is feeling any pressure either politically or economically from the international community to reverse course, especially as it is positioning itself as a regional leader and even as a global player? And is the Trump administration’s close relationship with MBS helping or hurting human rights in the country?

Achcar: Reversing course in the Saudi kingdom would take the dismissal of the crown prince from his position — he is basically a spoiled brat. He grew up in an environment where he believes everything is permissible to him. And he is very ambitious and without scruples. He’s the product of a rotten monarchy where a few thousand princes have almost unlimited access to state resources. What we see today concentrated in one person does not represent such a major change in the situation of the country. It’s just that MBS has become the single embodiment of the ruling elite at the expense of the other members. But for the rest of the people, the climate of terror has always been there.

The fact that MBS is backed by Trump and his family — Jared Kushner being in a central position in this regard — played a key role in limiting the domestic impact of the damage that resulted from Jamal Khashoggi’s botched assassination. The Saudi kingdom is so closely linked to the United States that if Donald Trump were to leave the scene and be replaced by a president with a different attitude, it might well lead to the dismissal of the crown prince. It is certainly a problem for a regime that is so dependent on the United States for its security to be ruled by a person who, aside from Trump and Kushner, is loathed in the US and the rest of the world.

Yazdani: I would like to ask a question that would invite some optimism or flowery picture of the future of the Middle East, but I don’t want to manufacture any optimism if it doesn’t exist. So instead I’m going to ask, What is the biggest threat to stability in the Middle East today?

Achcar:��Well it’s not a threat —��it’s a reality. The main factor of destabilization is the socio-economic blockage of the region. Add to that several factors that are pouring fuel over the fire. One of them is, of course, the Israeli state. Netanyahu’s provocative policies have tremendously increased anger at the regional level, not only among the Palestinians. The war in Yemen is a major source of tension in addition to its being the worst humanitarian crisis of our time. Iran’s behavior in the region and the Saudi-Iranian sectarian rivalry are also key factors in increasing tensions all over the region. So, there are many factors of destabilization and hardly any at all working in the opposite direction.

But as you said, we can’t manufacture optimism, and it would be utterly artificial to end on an optimistic note when dealing with such acute and immense problems. I make a distinction, however, between optimism and hope. Optimism is, of course, the belief that the best will occur, but hope is different — it is conditional. Hope is the acknowledgement, while hope exists, that there is a potential for something better.

And from that point of view, I would assert categorically that there are reasons for hope. The potential exists. There’s a new generation that is not willing to be subservient as previous generations have been, a generation of young rebels who will keep fighting, especially when their own future and even their own present are at stake. The key issue is that of leadership, as I mentioned earlier. Will we see the emergence of organized movements and leaderships capable of coping with the immense task of transforming this part of the world? If the young generation manages to produce an organized movement able to channel their formidable energy into bringing the needed transformation, the region could get out of this very dark tunnel and back on the track of modernization and development.

This is a big “if,” for sure, but in the face of the pessimism that prevails today, it is important to emphasize that the potential exists. When optimistic euphoria prevailed in 2011, I sounded pessimistic to some, and today I would sound optimistic to others or even the same. But I’m neither pessimistic nor optimistic: It’s just a matter of recognizing the scale of the problems and the existence of a potential that has not been crushed and would be very difficult to suppress.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post There Is No End in Sight for Turmoil in the Middle East appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Invisible Women of the Middle East: True Stories is a by Moroccan author Sana Afouaiz, exploring the deepest layers of women’s lives across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region under the shadow of patriarchal culture.

The book, which narrates true stories based on the life of several women in different MENA countries whom the author interviewed during her trips to these nations, illustrates how women grapple with misogyny and discrimination in various forms, and how gender realities are shaped across the region.

Afouaiz is a gender expert and public speaker on women issues in the Middle East and North Africa, who touches upon a number of themes in her book and depicts the life of women in the region while struggling with the impact of virginity, sex, hijab, prostitution, honor and emotional abuse on their lives.

The 83-page book tells the reader how radical and self-serving interpretations of Islam by oppressive men complicate the lives of defenseless women and undermines their independence and dignity. Ranging from women being forced to wear a hijab to those who submit to sexual slavery, Invisible Women of the Middle East puts the reader in a mentally challenging situation to relate to the bitter realities of the lives of women who fall victim to patriarchy and religious extremism.

In this edition of The Interview, 51�Թ� talks to Sana Afouaiz about her book, the impact of religion on the lives of women in the Middle East and the male-dominated values of the region.

Kourosh Ziabari: When did you decide to travel to a host of countries in the Middle East and North Africa and interview women with intriguing and thought-provoking stories? Had you thought of writing a book before starting these trips to the region, or did you come to the conclusion to write the book after collecting all the stories and doing the interviews?

Sana Afouaiz: I grew up in a traditional environment. I’ve always questioned the norms of my society. At the age of 5, I witnessed injustice inflicted on women in my immediate surrounding. I wondered if this situation was similar in other places or unique to my environment. This pushed me to travel and explore misogyny across the Middle East and North Africa.

It was then that I was exposed to the decadence and the extraordinary contradictions of the Arab and Muslim society: the dichotomy between what it preaches and how it behaves. Men would force their sisters and daughters to never engage with men outside the immediate family, yet these limits are never enforced on them or the male siblings. I also found that hymen reconstruction is the rage, as much as the virginity test. I discovered a hypocritical society.

I started my journey as a story collector with one objective: exploring the situation of women in this region. Five years later, I thought to myself: It’s time for the world to know about these real stories and start a revolution of ideas and beliefs upon which gender realities are constructed in this region.

This was not an easy book to write. Sometimes I would walk away from my laptop. Most of the stories it narrates reflect the brutal side of the long history of misogyny in the Arab world.

Ziabari: What are the main causes of the suffering of women whose stories you’ve retold in your book? Where does the unchallenged patriarchy and male domination culture in these countries come from?��

Afouaiz: We live in societies which dictate on us how to behave, how to feel and how to think. The ideas and behavior we grow up in as individuals influence the way in which we perceive the female gender. As a woman, your image and your destiny were already carved in the minds of others. What was handed down was all you knew. You had no say in it. Your self-image, your worth, your future were mapped out by your family and by the ideas, beliefs that governed the society you were a member of. Your hymen is the indication of your purity and worth.

Where do these ideas and beliefs come from? Religion. Mainly religion. The power religion has on the minds of the people is incredibly unimaginable. It has shaped a culture that dominates and treats with disrespect everything else that is not a man. It reinforces behaviors, conditions and attitudes that foster stereotypes of social roles based on sex. These ideas and belief systems are kept alive for no reason other than that “it is what it is” and that they are what “the sacred scriptures allegedly confirm.”

Of course, there are other factors — resource dependency, historic colonization, traditions, the class and urban, rural divide and repressive political conditions that may contribute to the discrimination against women, but they are not as potent as religion.

Ziabari: Women in the developed world easily and freely raise their voice in protest against whatever causes them discomfort and restricts their freedoms. There are feminist activists and advocacy organizations who champion the cause of women. Why do you think the women of the Middle East cannot act similarly and have their voice heard when they’re unhappy with their social status?��

Afouaiz: I do not agree with the mistaken belief that women in the MENA region cannot speak up. I also don’t look at the Western feminist movements exclusively championing the cause of women. It took women like Angelina Jolie, a human rights advocate and ambassador of gender equality, 20 years to report the sexual harassment she encountered with Harvey Weinstein.

Women of the MENA region led revolutionary movements during the Arab Spring, fought against laws that allowed rapists to marry their victims in Morocco and Jordan, called for women’s rights to vote in Kuwait and to drive in Saudi Arabia, although some were imprisoned, raped and assaulted.

The only difference between women in the West and the MENA region is the establishments and the spaces available for women to voice their concerns and be heard and respected as humans. At the region, possibilities, spaces or opportunities for women to speak up are censored at home, society and even internally.

I believe that a unifying start for women whether in the West or the East is to examine and question their role, impact and actions in their societies. Questioning their behaviors and thoughts��— independence begins in our minds.

Ziabari: Many men in the Middle East and North Africa push for their superiority and dominance over women by citing the religious mantra that women are lacking in mental and spiritual capacities and are created to only serve, feed and breed. Does Islam actually say such a thing?

Afouaiz: The majority of monotheistic religions described Eve, allegedly the first woman on earth, as merely man’s spare rib. All religions, including Islam, told us imagined stories that women are inferior to men and they should be assigned less social status because God said so. Islam positions itself where to question it is like to question God. If we shrink down the religion of Islam, we will find that it is all about controlling women’s thinking, behavior, attitudes, sexuality and bodies.

According to Islam, women should be treated as commodities who must submit to the will of men. Women are given only half the share of property compared to men. Islam claims to treat women equally, but allows no mobility if not accompanied by a male guardian or mahram. Men are allowed to marry four wives, but only one husband to women. Even in heaven, Islam gives the devout woman a man, but 72 virgins to the man. This is just to name a few of Islam’s instructions on how women should be viewed in society.

Religion is the opium of equality, censuring any possibility of critiquing Islamic teachings and doctrine regarding women. But we should not shy away from dialogue and debate. This how we evolve.��

Ziabari: One of the pains many of the women whose stories you’ve narrated in your book suffer is emotional abuse and neglect. How do you think this can be tackled in practice while there’s understandably no government ruling or regulation on how men should treat their wives or how the damages caused by emotional abuse and neglect can be compensated?

Afouaiz: Emotional abuse and violence are an expression of patriarchal oppression against women that is socially sanctioned and normalized among men and women. Socially and culturally there is no recognition of “emotional abuse” as a crime. It is an intimate terrorism that is rooted in the patriarchal tradition of men controlling their women and treated as a “norm.” I believe the first step to tackle this issue is to further our knowledge on emotional abuse and its effects on human psychology and our societies.

Ziabari: Do the women whose stories you’ve recounted in your book represent a big majority in the Middle East and North Africa and the Arab world? Do you think the majority of women in the region are grappling with mistreatment and violation of their rights and liberties?

Afouaiz: Oppression is not the same for all women in this region. Women are individuals, not merely one homogenous group. They belong to society, but their experiences are unique to them. They experience life through their own lenses, thus they create their own realities. Their social class, education and access make their views on subjects like honor, hijab, religion, freedom and so on, sole and distinctive.��

Ziabari: It was interesting to me that you didn’t include the stories of Iranian women in your book. Iran is not an Arab country, but at the heart of the Middle East with women who have many important stories to retell. They are also fighting for their rights. Is there any reason you evaded or ignored Iran?

Afouaiz: The only reason I didn’t cover stories of women from Iran is because of the difficulty of entering Iranian soil.��I’m an admirer of the Iranian furious feminists who have inspired my feminism. I remember reading about Taj Al Sultana, the Iranian historical feminist figure, when I was 10. I hope one day I will have the honor of visiting the country and hearing from its own women.

Ziabari: You have retold the story of several embattled and troubled women, but there are certainly women who have resisted the difficulties and made striking achievements in patriarchal societies. Will the MENA region change for better in favor of women? Are you optimistic about the future?

Afouaiz: Will MENA change for better? I believe that MENA’s better future depends on creating a peaceful revolution in the ideas and images we utilize to drive our actions and govern our behaviors.��The salvation is in examining the root causes of our maladies and not only in trying to suppress the apparent symptoms. The ultimate solution lies in our minds that store our ideals and our images of the future. As far as women are concerned, our worth is not a couple of inches deep.

Am I optimistic about the future? I have to be optimistic.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Invisible Women of the Middle East appeared first on 51�Թ�.

It is now the half-way point in Ramadan, the holiest month in the Islamic calendar. The festival commemorates the moment that the Quran was first revealed to Prophet Muhammad. For either 29 or 30 days — Islam is based on a lunar calendar — Muslims around the world abstain from food, drinks, smoking and sexual intercourse from dawn till sunset.

Ramadan is a spiritual time for Muslims, and it symbolizes compassion, reflection and��willpower. During the month, special attention is given to acts of worship in the form of prayer, inner peace and dhikr (remembrance of God). People who do not usually pray five times a day or attend a mosque put special emphasis on their religious practices in Ramadan. Around the world, mosques are busier, especially with the additional tarawih prayers that are held at night. In countries such as Morocco, places like the Hassan II Mosque in Casablanca are full to the max and the overflow of worshippers extends to the street.

Throughout the day, Muslims dedicate more of their time to religion, and the Quran is often read in its entirety. Ramadan is known as a month of giving, being generous and sharing. More alms or sadaqa are given to charity in Ramadan than any other month, and people provide those who cannot afford enough with meals. For example, if one is prevented from fasting due to poor health, it is obligatory to feed a fasting person for every day of the month — namely those living in poverty. Among other food, this often includes a certain amount of flour or the cash equivalent.

All spirituality aside, it has become more difficult to fully indulge in the Ramadan atmosphere on a long summer’s day and, for some, the festival is slowly losing its crucial characteristics in big city life.

Life as usual or time to relax?

In Rabat, the Moroccan capital, the streets are empty during Ramadan. As a country known for its stray animals, even cats try to hide from the heat of the summer sun. Cafés and restaurants, except for some fast-food chains that target foreigners, remain closed. The rhythm of the normally pulsing city slows down to a snail’s pace. The same goes for most Muslim-majority countries around the world.

Although everything seems to change in Ramadan, there are many who follow their normal routines with work and studying. For them, it is increasingly difficult to immerse themselves in all the spiritual endeavors that Ramadan has to offer. Some may simply be too tired after a day’s work to attend a mosque for tarawih or read the Quran at home. This is especially the case if you have to wake up early.

For those working or studying full-time, it can be difficult to focus after a day of fasting for anywhere between 16 and 20 hours, depending on the country. Before fasting each day, Muslims have suhoor, a pre-dawn meal. In the summer months, this is at around 3am, and most people will either stay wake until that time or get up for the meal. For those who start working early, this can lead to sleep deprivation, which could impact the benefits of spirituality if they are unlikely to find the energy to do anything else. Over the last few years, Ramadan has also coincided with the exam periods of high schools and universities. Taking an exam after an entire day of fasting adds extra stress.

For people who live in the countryside, there are just as many temptations and distractions lingering��that may hinder them from completely embracing the spirit of Ramadan. Some may get up late in the day in order to shorten the period of being awake and fasting and, therefore, feel less strain. As a result, they may not understand and empathize with the suffering of the poor, which is an objective of the fast.

Ramadan TV

In Muslim-majority countries, especially Arab ones, TV channels run programs specifically for the month, knowing that people spend extra time watching television. During the final hours before the breaking of the fast, some people are so drained from not eating or drinking that they simply watch these Ramadan soap operas.

Indeed, Ramadan can easily turn into a month of relaxation and laziness, which also reduces people’s productivity — both in the daily routine and spirituality. While the festival should be a time of religious consciousness and serve as an occasion to reflect on life, all the mass consumption — especially in the form of TV drama — seems to be killing the meaning of the month.

Compassion for the poor

Fasting in Ramadan should raise awareness and compassion for the poor, who may not have easy access to food and water. While Islam itself advises against overindulgence — Prophet Muhammad said Muslims should leave space of one-third for food, one-third for water and one-third for air — this is not the case for many today.

At iftar, when the fast is broken at sunset, a big meal is usually par for the course. It may be a bit difficult to understand how the poor really feel while sat anticipating the exact moment you can eat a big meal. Such practices might not leave room for any further thoughts about the meaning and purpose of fasting.

Spirituality Fades

Ramadan remains a special time for Muslims, but even in countries like Morocco, it has become harder to follow the traditions and objectives. Fasting requires willpower and strength when it coincides with the hot summer months, exam periods and a full-time job. The space for reflection and spirituality slowly gets filled by distraction and consumption.

While it is indeed true that many Muslims focus on their religious duties, straight after the month is over mosques suddenly have fewer people in them. Though the spirit of Ramadan may still linger in the air, normal life returns quicker than the spirituality fades.

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In January 1998, I arrived in Morocco as the new US ambassador. Arriving at the end of Ramadan, I was able to immediately feel the warmth and character of the country, and it was the beginning of a close-up view of the changes going on in Morocco.

During my first meeting with King Hassan II, shortly after my arrival, he wasted no time in addressing Morocco’s agenda with the US, challenging me on our positions, especially the kingdom’s existential issue regarding sovereignty over the Sahara. This unexpected candid and warm exchange set the tone for regular meetings through my tenure during which concerns and grievances were voiced in private, rather than aired publicly. King Mohammed VI would continue this practice with me after his father’s death.

My first few months in the country also coincided with the beginning of the first government of Alternance, led by opposition leader Abderrahmane El Youssoufi — a watershed moment for Morocco that many political analysts mark as the beginning of significant democratic reform and economic liberalization after years of a strong-armed approach to governing and limited civil rights. Youssoufi, whose political activities had previously resulted in two years in jail and then 15 years of exile, became prime minister after his party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), won the most seats in the November 1997 elections. And since then, the international community has confirmed elections as occurring in a fair and transparent manner.

Two Decades Ago

In 1997, the unemployment rate in the country was 17% and growing, with youth making up a disproportionate percentage of the population. Women lacked equal rights with men. The percentage of the population living at or below the poverty line for lower middle-income countries was around 28%, and more than half of the entire adult population was illiterate, with rates among rural women much higher. Electricity in the country reached only around 60% of the population, and almost a quarter did not have access to potable water. Infant mortality rates were 23% higher than the regional average and maternal mortality ratios were nearly double. Overall, the micro-economic picture was in dire shape.

The economy was too dependent on agriculture, accounting for 20% of GDP and heavily reliant on rainfall. Infrastructure was lacking throughout the country, and environmental degradation was widely apparent throughout the cities and the countryside, presenting a challenge to the growth of tourism. Of particular note, the northern part of Morocco was completely neglected after a series of militant actions created an irreparable rift between King Hassan II and his citizens there.

In contrast to the micro economic indicators, by 1997 King Hassan II had established a strong��macro-economic climate: low debt to GDP ratio, a low budget deficit and an open, competitive economic system. He adopted IMF and World Bank reforms that, had Morocco been a member of the European Union, would have qualified it for the monetary union.

Upon his death in 1999, King Hassan II left the country unified with a very strong nationalistic belief in country and king, a reasonably performing economy and, most importantly, with a solid commitment in its support for US objectives to fight terrorism.

Twenty years later, where is Morocco today? Where is it headed tomorrow?

Morocco Under King Mohammed VI

Upon ascending to the throne in 1999, King Mohammed VI immediately gave a clear indication of his vision for reform and equality for all Moroccans, stating in his first public speech in August 1999, “How can we talk about the progress and development of society when women who constitute half of this society are being denied their rights?�� Our true religion, Islam, has granted them rights that are not respected. They are equal to men.” By 2004, Morocco had passed one of the most progressive family codes in the region, the��Moudawana, putting women on equal footing with men in regards to children and divorce.

Also in 2004, King Mohammed VI established the Equity and Reconciliation Commission to reconcile victims of previous human rights abuses, providing a public forum for victims to make their case and receive compensation.

In 2005, a massive anti-poverty program, the National Initiative for Human Development, was instituted in 600 of the most vulnerable poor areas of the country and city districts to increase job creation and provide adequate social services for the most vulnerable of the population. The poverty rate in Morocco now stands at 15.5%, nearly a 50% reduction.

King Mohammed VI also took great efforts at rapprochement with the north of Morocco, indicating his intentions early on with his first official visit as king to Tangier, in September 1999 — the first visit by a monarch in nearly 40 years. These efforts have paid off. Rapprochement brought the establishment of economic zones, port and highway infrastructure, and tax incentives. With these and other measures, the north of Morocco has undergone an economic renaissance, and is now a hub for auto, aeronautics, and renewable energy manufacturing. And although youth unemployment is still problematic, the overall unemployment rate is now around 10.4%, nearly 40% less than it was in 1997.

Infant and maternal mortality rates have been cut in half. Electricity reaches 98.9% of the population and more than 85% have access to potable water. The birth rate is among the lowest in the region and is now comparable to rates in Europe. Morocco even has a new law that protects the civil liberties of migrants, making it one of the most progressive countries in the developing world on this issue. And today, while there is still work to be done, after concerted efforts Morocco has improved literacy among adults to around 70%, with rates reaching over 90% among youth, and even higher for those under 15 years old.

The cities are cleaner, with advances in waste collection and disposal. By 2030, Morocco aims to generate 50% of its electricity from renewable sources, making it a global leader on the environment. Tourism has increased five-fold since 1997.

The country has undergone an incredible transformation after years of serious efforts to modernize and expand its infrastructure, upgrading roads, ports, and airports to support its intentions of becoming a commercial crossroads between Africa and the West. In line with these efforts, Morocco and the US concluded a free trade agreement in 2004, and in 2017, Morocco reestablished its relationship with the African Union and many of its members following a 33-year absence.

Macro-economic rates, strong under King Hassan II, remain strong today. Agriculture still accounts for a large percentage of GDP at 13.6%, but that marks a 32% decrease from when King Mohammed VI assumed the throne, and a substantial amount of the production is now irrigated, reducing reliance on rain. New highways now connect most of the major cities in Morocco, and a new high speed train from Tangier to Casablanca will begin service in 2018, cutting travel time between the two cities by more than half to just over 2 hours.

The Sahara

When I arrived in Morocco, the bilateral relationship with the US was at a low point largely due to the lack of public support for Morocco on the Sahara issue. The United Nations was extending its MINURSO mandate overseeing the dispute for one or two months at a time, constantly prompting US criticism of Morocco regarding their differences on this issue.

As a result of discussions and agreement with Morocco in 1999, the United States proposed a political compromise to provide an internationally accepted framework of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. By 2007, the UN and the US were describing a new Moroccan sovereignty-autonomy initiative as serious, realistic and credible, and the US has since begun to fund Morocco to provide countrywide programs, services, and economic growth initiatives that include the Saharan regions. This, more than anything else, has solidified the relationship between our two countries during the past two decades.

Future of Morocco

Today, as I look back, I realize I’ve had a front row seat to Morocco’s internal and international evolution over the past 20 years. Morocco has come a long way, although more still needs to be done: addressing youth unemployment; improving education and creating jobs; tackling corruption and weaknesses with regard to the rule of law in both the public and private sectors; enforcement of existing laws; and dealing with ongoing government inefficiencies.

It is obvious that Morocco is moving steadily forward, albeit at its own pace. It is a delicate balancing act as the king moves cautiously to make Morocco a more open and modern leader among developing countries. Change that comes too quickly could expose vulnerabilities and create an opportunity for those who wish to destabilize the country, terrorists among them. On the other hand, too slow a pace could cause Moroccans to rise up and demand change at a more striking rate.

The US should be cognizant of this challenge and seize the opportunity to work in partnership with Morocco as it finds its “sweet spot” for movement and change, as it is in America’s interest to see this Arab country remain stable and grow increasingly more prosperous and democratic.

*[This article was originally published by .]

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Nearing the one-year anniversary of (AU), further interpretations can be made concerning the implications of the AU’s majority 39-15 vote. Following Morocco’s historic withdrawal from the Organization of African Unity more than 30 years ago, King Mohammed VI’s desire to join the AU was seen by many as a step toward pan-Africanism and global governance. Those voting in favor of Morocco accredited their decision to principles of inclusivity and integration throughout the African continent. Loosely modeled after the European Union, the AU has discussed its potential to establish a central bank, a monetary fund and a human rights court.

With all of this in mind, some may ask: Which 15 members voted against Morocco’s admission, and what influenced their decision?

One of the most impactful countries on the African continent to vote against the Kingdom of Morocco’s request for admission was South Africa. Ironically, the reasoning Morocco gave for leaving the Organization of African Unity in 1984 was the same argument given by those opposing its entrance into the AU in 2017: the recognition of Western Sahara. Referred to by some as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Western Sahara has been a controversial territory for over 40 years. As a result, it is not difficult to see why Morocco was disappointed to hear the surprising news that South Africa established diplomatic relations with the so-called Sahrawi Republic and offered those living in Moroccan territory a separate at the expense of cutting ties with its Moroccan ambassador.

The hostility that South Africa has showed toward Morocco is not a common sentiment of African countries. The 39 heads of state that voted in favor of Morocco have acknowledged the value of the kingdom’s readmission. These countries recognize King Mohammed VI’s positive contributions to regional development, including his speech at the , the creation of a ministerial department dedicated to African affairs, and the hosting of the . These actions have demonstrated the resources and effort that the kingdom is willing to invest in regional progress. For example, the World Policy Conference held in Marrakech in November 2017 brought together world leaders to discuss security, development and investment throughout the continent. Morocco’s commitment to the progression of Africa has been made evident through these consistent actions.

Moreover, the fact that the (ECOWAS) responded to the kingdom’s admission request with an invitation to its December meeting in Lomé, Togo, attests to the potential for further cooperation. The regional committee has even overlooked the fact that Morocco is technically not located in West Africa. By disregarding this key geographical detail, it is apparent that the committee sees a significant amount of value in Morocco’s admission. In the first quarter of 2018, the commission will dedicate a specific session to discuss its potential with Moroccan integration.

Countries across the continent have been favorable to Morocco’s readmission into the AU, request to join the ECOWAS and hosting of the World Policy Conference. Consequently, it is reasonable to presume that South Africa’s outlying position has more to do with its political power on the continent and less to do with its concern for Moroccans living in western Morocco. It is ironic to consider a country with the history of South Africa pointing fingers at its northern neighbor over a fabricated moral argument. Furthermore, it is ironic to say the least that a president with the numeric literacy of Jacob Zuma can understand the complexities associated with the annexation of a landmass over 40 years ago. It is more likely the case that South Africa views Morocco’s increasing regional hegemony as a threat.

In fact, Morocco’s ambitions of becoming a pan-African political and economic leader can be seen through its ranking in (FDI). Morocco is the second leading country on the continent for FDI in sub-Saharan Africa — second to only South Africa. Moreover, from 2008 to 2016, . It is clear that these statistics make Morocco an influential player in regional trade and development.

Not only has Morocco exhibited an economic impact throughout Africa, but it has held key political positions as well. It can be presumed that South Africa’s political concerns are also associated with . In the 70th General Debate, and stronger representation of the African continent — more specifically stronger South African representation. While South Africa yearns for the power of a permanent seat, Morocco’s increased leadership continues to threaten its political ambitions. South Africa’s self-motivated actions will continue to cause a deeper rift between Rabat and Pretoria at the expense of the continent.

*[Gulf State Analytics is a of 51�Թ�.]

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Hajar Benallal is a modern-day hero. This young Moroccan woman takes care of some of the many street cats of Rabat. Each week, she feeds hundreds of cats.

Stray cats in the Moroccan capital usually hide behind trees or under cars, occasionally taking a peek as they look for something to eat. Being careful is part of daily life for a cat, especially on the streets of an urban city like Rabat. But when they see Hajar, their fear is gone.

Every day, Hajar travels around the city, carrying a big backpack filled with bags of cat food, spare bottles and a large container of water. The 30-year-old has dedicated her life to the wellbeing of street cats. For six years, Hajar has been doing her feeding tours around Rabat. Her love for cats began at an early age as she fed and looked after animals in her neighborhood before she slowly extended her mission.

Hajar has never stopped despite the many challenges she has faced. In the beginning, she received almost no support and had to pay for the expensive cat food out of her own pocket. The reaction from people on the street was often negative or even hostile, since many of them failed to appreciate her efforts. Instead, they saw stray cats as a plague, undeserving of any attention.

Till today, Hajar has only received limited support from her fellow citizens. Most of the help she gets is from abroad. Through her Facebook page, she receives donations from people in France, Belgium and Germany, most of whom she has never met. Not only does she use the money to feed around 400 cats a week, but she also gets some of them sterilized — in which she contributes to a long-term solution.

Despite the obstacles and difficulties she faces, Hajar has never stopped. Her compassion and determination are stronger than the fatigue and frustration. Her work makes her happy and sad at the same time. She is happy and grateful because she is making a change and has beautiful encounters with cats. But she always feels that she is not doing enough. In spite of Hajar’s strength and willpower, there are simply too many mouths to feed for just one catwoman in Rabat.

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At the end of June, the winds of the old port city of Essaouira move to the rhythm of Gnaoua music when the takes place. At this time, the small Moroccan city on the Atlantic Ocean becomes a magnet for music lovers who are drawn to Essaouira from around the world.

For three days the maalems, the masters of Gnaoua music and tradition, enter a musical dialogue that breaks the borders of language and culture. During the Gnaoua festival, Essaouira is taken over by music, joy and happiness, and the people only speak one language: that of Gnaoua music.

What makes Gnaoua music an internationally-understood language is mainly its compatible and captivating rhythm. It can be paired and combined with different musical genres like jazz and the Blues and, therefore, many global artists are eager to indulge in fusing their music with the Gnaoua spirit.

Gnaoua music is an important part of Moroccan culture. The music is spiritual and its sounds are mystical, which can help the musicians fall into a state of trance.

However, their music is not only about joy and happiness, but it also tells a story of suffering and endurance. The ethnic group of the Gnaoua such as Mali and Senegal, and they were trafficked as slaves to Morocco in the . During their journey to North Africa, they suffered under inhumane circumstances, and music helped lift their spirits so they could cope.

The Gnaoua people pass on their culture and stories from generation to generation, and their music is one of their means in sharing and preserving it. The festival, therefore, has an important function in keeping the traditions and narratives of the Gnaoua alive.

There is much to be discovered at the festival. The spirituality is not only a part of the music; it is also the basic way of life of the Gnaoua. Apart from the big performances, the real stories and authentic emotions can be discovered off the main stages — especially in the faces of those playing their in small streets or those selling instruments in the main square, or in the faces of all those that seize the opportunity of the festival to live a little.

Even though the Gnaoua festival only lasts for three days, the spirit remains in every corner of Essaouira.

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In 2006, the Dar Si Hmad Foundation and the University of La Laguna began investigating the viability of obtaining drinking water from fog in southwest Morocco. Researchers chose Mt. Boutmezguida as a testing ground for its��ideal climatic conditions. The project subsequently attracted support from��, a Canadian nongovernmental organization that developed and installed 20 fog-water collection units. In 2011, Dar Si Hmad expanded the project after winning Munich Re Foundation’s call to tender for 2011-12 Fog Net��.

With the support of Munich Re Foundation, researchers from the Technical University of Munich began monitoring a����generation of fog nets. Testing to optimize their design began in November 2013, while construction was underway to connect the previous generation of fog nets��to five villages. The project was officially inaugurated in March 2015, when pipes began carrying water into the homes of people in participating villages.

The project achieved��its main goal to provide potable water to five��rural communities. In the future, additional piping and fog nets will be installed to supply more villages. A key question to consider is the extent to which the project met its other reported goal to reduce women and children’s water-gathering chores and thereby enable girls to regularly attend school. Self-reporting on this project and external assessments could have provided more evidence to show that a reduction in water-gathering chores empowers women and girls.

Project Outputs: Empowering Women?

There are no case-specific evaluations to support the argument that reducing water gathering responsibilities increases girls’ enrollment in school. In the past, women and girls spent about four hours per day retrieving water. Still, a redistribution of labor responsibilities surrounding the collection of water can shift existing power structures without significantly increasing girls’ enrollment in school.

This is due to the gendered structure of labor within participating households. Men typically leave home to engage in income-generating activities, while women stay at home to manage domestic responsibilities or seek out limited income-generating opportunities at local cooperatives. Within these communities, domestic responsibilities fall almost exclusively on women because men move to bigger towns in search of��.

Even if women and girls are able to attain higher levels of education and generate more wealth, the project lacks a vision for helping women balance new��responsibilities with unpaid domestic labor. While development projects celebrate women’s integration into the formal economy, they are generally indifferent to the ways in which this process leads to inequitable outcomes. Whether the fog harvesting project will buck this trend and encourage��a more equitable distribution of labor is open to question.

Unforeseen Outcomes

Although Dar Si Hmad spearheaded the project, it unfolded as a collaborative effort, attracting several partners over a decade of research, testing and community outreach. One of the unforeseen outcomes of these partnerships was the development of a more efficient generation of fog nets. Likewise, unforeseen collaborations expanded the project’s budget and timeline.

In 2015, Dar Si Hmad received a $59,770����from USAID for environmental development. This exceeds the expense of phase one fog harvesting nets, which����$200 per unit. During phase one, 20 units were installed. Therefore, the cost of phase one was at least $4,000, plus the cost of piping, labor and permits.

Data from phase one shows that 20 fog catchers����6,300 liters of fresh water per day. Estimating along average weather patterns for the region, researchers predict that the project will yield 2.3 million liters of water per year. That��is enough to����around 400 residents, or the number of year-round residents in the five��participating villages.

Another unforeseen outcome was a collaborative project led by visiting researcher Leslie Dodson. She worked with women in participating villages to develop “fog phones.” This technology��allows beneficiaries to report maintenance needs to project managers using standardized codes. Women learn to operate their phones through literacy and numeracy workshops. By linking beneficiaries��to project managers, fog phones create a feedback channel that facilitates water monitoring tasks.

Dodson����that this technology allows women to take on “infomediary” roles without challenging��cultural norms.��The availability of channels for��women to participate in the management of water is an example of how the project tries to mitigate its��disruptive effects on established water management��patterns.

Assessment and Recommendations

Despite the lack of evidence of women’s empowerment, it continues to shape the narrative that captures the international community’s attention. On the other hand, the project partners were much better at documenting and measuring outcomes related to��meeting the water consumption needs of participating communities.

In order to meet this goal, project partners undertook community outreach, research and testing activities for a decade. This long period of engagement allowed for trust building; experimentation with different generations of fog collectors; data collection through household surveys; and the creation of educational programming and participatory mechanisms.

The climate, involvement of beneficiaries and long-term commitment of multiple partners supported the project’s success. The major limitation of this project is that the particular climate and social ecology that enabled its success are difficult to replicate elsewhere. Therefore, the fog harvesting project seems difficult to scale up without compromising its community oriented��approach.

One way to increase the project’s effectiveness in existing locations is with��greywater recycling systems. Using water that has been lightly dirtied through household consumption, this process uses��a filtration system to make��used water safe for non-drinking purposes, such as irrigating small farms. Currently, the water delivered to participating households is quickly consumed.����have investigated the possibility of installing greywater recycling in participating households to further stretch the project’s impact.

Sustainable Development��and Politics

����major critique of this project is its framing of vulnerability in terms of��increasing cycles of drought, rain scarcity and low aquifer replenishment rates. There is no acknowledgement of the political processes that have marginalized rural populations and deprived them of their right to subsistence. By depoliticizing the struggle of rural populations and creating an official narrative around climate change, technology and women’s empowerment, this project obscures social realities and contributes to the image of Morocco as a defender of environmental justice and women’s rights.

A more political project would��address the history of colonial and postcolonial land governance. Moreover, it would consider the state’s role in eroding collective land ownership through privatization��. Finally, it would shed light on confrontations over private and public interests, and be critical��of��how participatory approaches��create new opportunities for control and management.

A historical perspective raises questions about the future management of the fog harvesting project. To not reckon with this historical context is to cut off potential future solutions. What will happen if this previously marginalized land becomes revitalized through fog water? Who will lay claim to it, and how will local communities defend their rights? If the state does implement similar projects, will it draw on its own version of participatory development that uses consultations to inform populations rather than seek approval and build��? Dar Si Hmad and its partners do not address these questions. The failure to do so risks excluding local communities from decision-making processes in the future.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Poverty eradication is one of the greatest challenges of our time. Eliminating relative and extreme poverty is an essential requirement for the sustainable growth of any nation as well as to ensure basic human rights to all.

Like many developing countries, Morocco faces the challenge of maintaining a modest standard of living for its citizens. But the in North Africa has a long way to go.

In 2005, Morocco announced a project called the (INDH). Over a five-year period, and for a budget of $1 billion, the aim was to improve the living conditions of citizens, reduce poverty in urban and rural areas, assist the most vulnerable groups in society and support families in difficult economic situations.

What was the result?

According to the World Bank, Morocco has made substantial progress in reducing poverty over recent decades. In 2007, 8.9% , compared to 16.3% in 1998. But the picture is far from rosy. As of 2014, the , but “nearly 19% of the rural population are still living in poverty or are vulnerable.” And while , as many as 15.5% live on $3.10.

Morocco has , as per the Borgen Project. So, the fact that 3 million of these reside in rural areas is telling of the geographical divide.

Despite this, there are underlying factors that have played a role in falling poverty rates, including remittances from Moroccans living abroad, the deceleration of population growth, macroeconomic stability and the role of nonprofit organizations. While these efforts have aided the country in its gains, Morocco’s experience has three limitations.

First, illiteracy in rural areas remains very high among both the older and younger generations. As per , the national adult literacy rate rose by just 10% between 1994 and 2004—from 42% to 52%—meaning that nearly half the population was classified as illiterate at the turn of the century. As of 2015, adult literacy in Morocco stands at 72%. While this is a vast improvement over just 11 years, much more needs to be done if the country is to lift people out of poverty.

Second, the gap between the rich and the poor has not been reduced. The measures a nation’s economic inequality—zero represents absolute equality while the value of 100 shows absolute inequality. Between 1990 and 2006, the . While inequality is a global phenomenon that is a seeing a shrinking middle class in places like the United States, this clearly shows the persistence of high inequality in Morocco.

Third, economic growth in Morocco remains fragile and volatile, mostly in the agricultural sector, which accounts for ) and nearly��. Today, this sector is still dependent on weather conditions, and only land is arable. This shows a breakdown between policymakers and pragmatism.

Clear Solutions for Morocco

Morocco’s experience has many limitations, so it is far from a perfect model. Unfortunately, the positive effects of the INDH and other projects have not reached both urban and rural areas. Policymakers need to take time to truly understand how to eradicate poverty in Morocco.

First, the government should work on building the country’s human capital by making the eradication of illiteracy a top priority. This will clearly improve the awareness among poor families to keep their children in school so they can be well educated and, in time, become part of a skilled workforce.

In addition, not only can education help lift households out of poverty, but also protect them from falling back into poverty. In doing so, the fight against illiteracy has the potential to serve as a tool of social mobility for Moroccans.

Second, to end poverty in Morocco, corruption must be tackled. By creating an environment of , people will once again start believing in public services such as law enforcement, schools and hospitals. It is essential that national sentiment in such fundamental sectors is restored so people start to value them again. Good governance that combines transparency, credibility and efficiency is essential for any state that seeks to end poverty once and for all.

Finally, promoting the benefits of volunteering will make an important collaboration between young change-makers and national and international organizations possible. Therefore, both sets of stakeholders should work together to solve the issue of poverty by creating innovative solutions, as well as accelerating national efforts that help impoverished people to lift themselves out of poverty. Entrepreneurship could be such a means.

Many of the world’s poorest people continue to suffer from socioeconomic challenges that include unstable food and fuel prices as well as food and water shortages—Yemen, the , is a case in point. There is no better time to evaluate the impact of existing strategies and to put the effective policies of Morocco’s approach into realization in order to alleviate poverty.

For Moroccans, it is our hope that the country will one day join the league of developed nations. But, for now, many hurdles lie in wait.

*[This article was written for the��. In partnership with the United Nations Foundation, 51�Թ� taught more than 400 students in six countries—India, Morocco, Kenya, Austria, Mexico and the United States—about journalism and substantive issues such as water, health and poverty. Click��here��to read more.]

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Poverty has always been a serious obstacle to the growth of developing countries, and Morocco is no exception. Stymied in part through several decades of colonialization by two European countries, Morocco has yet to establish a satisfactory quality of life for a large part of the population. Many wake up every day and struggle to provide basic necessities for themselves and their children. These lower-income individuals and families are highly sensitive to constant fluctuations in prices for necessities.

There are many factors that contribute to the state of poverty in Morocco. Household debt . As more families tie their wealth up in property values, their home can become like a jail, restricting their freedom and burdening them with debt for most of their lives. In addition, the educational system has been inadequate in equipping students with the necessary skills employers are looking for. This has lowered many Moroccans’ faith in education, and many families opt out when their children are still young.

Many of these problems are symptoms of poverty in Morocco. Poverty, which is characterized by low-income levels, is significantly influenced by unemployment and the ability for businesses to grow and hire employees.

As of 2014, . According to , the International Finance Corporation head for the Maghreb, in order to bring that level down Morocco would need to grow by an additional 5% annually. The best way to do that, she argues, is to grow the private sector—specifically entrepreneurs and small to mid-size businesses that account for close to 80% of employment.

In order to stimulate the private sector and lower unemployment, Morocco will need to encourage entrepreneurship and the growth of small businesses. There are two ways to do this.

YOUTH AND EDUCATION

First, Morocco should focus on improving the quality of youth education and encouraging youth participation in meaningful careers. Improving youth unemployment statistics is critical, as leaving youth unemployment unchecked will only exacerbate income inequality going forward. Young people in Morocco represent a significant percentage of the population, . This is alarming given the fact that , as per 2014.

If Morocco is going to encourage youth participation and improve these statistics, attention should be directed in part at the quality of education. Many schools are not equipping students with the skills that employers are looking for. This can be seen in statistics which suggest that than it is for individuals without a college degree.

The result is a lack of faith in the education system and a significant number of youths who drop out of education early. This may help explain the fact that and a fifth are illiterate.

Initiatives aimed at aligning employer needs with the skills developed in primary schools and universities will improve the ability for young Moroccans to get jobs after graduating. In addition, the renewed faith in their education, along with the confidence of relevant experience, will spur many down the path to entrepreneurship.

THE START-UP INDUSTRY

Second, because small businesses and entrepreneurs play such an important role in job creation in Morocco, it is vital that access to capital is improved. Currently, although for close to 50% of jobs in Morocco and more than 30% of gross domestic product (GDP), their share of the available capital is severely underrepresented. Fortunately, emerging initiatives show promise for entrepreneurs seeking financing.

One source of improvement in the availability of capital for entrepreneurs comes from support organizations like Dare, Inc. and the (Moroccan CISE). These organizations are building crowdfunding platforms, providing coaching and support for entrepreneurs, and generally helping to bridge the gap between investors and start-ups.

According to Eric Asmar, former director of programs at Moroccan CISE and former director of Dare, Inc., the incubation program was created to address three critical challenges facing social entrepreneurs: lack of access to long-term coaching and support, lack of access to networks, and lack of access to early stage financing. He posits that “long-term coaching and access to international networks go hand-in-hand with financing,” because there are not many traditional financing options available to Moroccan entrepreneurs. Improving access to financing “can have a significant impact on the development of these projects and their long-term sustainability.”

Support organizations like these are critical to improving the availability of capital for entrepreneurs. Most banks will not provide loans to businesses that cannot show at least two years of profit, and this is extremely prohibitive for entrepreneurs in need of capital to get their ideas off the ground for the first time.

The government can indirectly improve financial options for small businesses by aiding support organizations like Dare Inc. and Moroccan CISE, which work with start-ups, investors and entrepreneurs directly to create investment opportunities. This will also have the added benefit of encouraging competition with traditional banks, which would improve the ability for small businesses to obtain capital through traditional means.

There is a crisis of poverty in Morocco. Stimulating growth in the private sector is a crucial step in the direction of addressing this crisis. Improving the quality of schools so education is better aligned with employer needs will help combat youth unemployment and encourage engagement in meaningful careers. And improving the access to capital for entrepreneurs and small businesses will spur the development of businesses that contribute the most to the economy but face the greatest challenges.

The resulting economic growth and lowered unemployment rate will go a long way in combating the state of poverty in Morocco.

*[This article was written for the��. In partnership with the United Nations Foundation, 51�Թ� taught more than 400 students in six countries—India, Morocco, Kenya, Austria, Mexico and the United States—about journalism and substantive issues such as water, health and poverty. Click��here��to read more.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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On February 8, 2017, my wife and I arrived in Casablanca, Morocco. Just like outside many international airports around the world, we were greeted with hand-made signs in various languages, awaiting families and eager friends. A cool wind and relative calm stood in stark contrast to the chaos of the nearby metropolis—throughout Morocco, Casablanca is known for its traffic and constant bustle.

Over the next week we traveled the diverse country, having mint tea in homes, crossing snowy mountains, sleeping among the dunes of the Sahara, getting lost in the labyrinthine interiors of royal cities and meeting the residents of countless small kasbahs and villages of the Moroccan interior.

Along this journey, we were greeted with unfailing hospitality. Once we were met with an emotional outpour, as we were the first Americans one rural Moroccan has seen in a generation. The experience had a touch of grey, however, being less than two weeks removed from President Donald Trump’s —the “Muslim Ban”—which halted the arrival of non-US citizens from seven enumerated Muslim-majority countries, making specific exceptions for non-Muslims. Politics was on the mind of many of our hosts and acquaintances.

Most Moroccans shared concern or dismay with recent US political developments. While Morocco was not specifically targeted by President Trump’s ban, there was little reason to view the United States as a tolerant place for Muslims. The basic unfairness of such a broadly applicable policy was at the heart of the dissent. A Bedouin camel herder provided a persuasive assessment of the ban as affecting too many innocent people, all while holding up seven fingers and shaking his head.

In the Past Tense

After the president’s first executive order was repeatedly challenged in court, the administration a that similarly claimed to only be aimed at preserving US national security. That too was struct down by a court, relying upon the same evidence many Moroccans did: the of the president and those close to him.

Indeed, while many Moroccans expressed interest in and even admiration of the United States, those feelings often occurred in the past tense, either grammatically or emotionally. Countries like France, Germany and China prove more attractive for education, business and trade, respectively. Indeed, Chinese tourists were ubiquitous throughout the entire country. One friend said he may only consider visiting the United States after Trump and his policies have come to pass.

A common concern heard in our travels of the North African country was whether Morocco would be next to be added to the list. The to ban the use of electronics larger than a smartphone on US-bound flights from airports across the Middle East, which includes Mohammed V International Airport where we landed, will surely feel to many as if their concerns have now materialized.

Like the original Muslim ban, the official justification for this newest restriction is national security. But, unlike the immigration ban, the real underlying reason is likely against the government-subsidized airlines that operate in the region.

Regardless of stated or unstated motives, this recent action serves to limit the options and agency of travelers of the 10 airports spanning eight countries, all of which are majority Muslim. Combined with the seven countries named in the original ban, this administration has now directly targeted, within two months of taking office, travelers from 15 Muslim nations, crossing language and ethnic divides. These actions can only be reasonably construed as deliberate steps to discourage and limit the travel of Muslims to the United States, likely with further measures to follow.

Keeping Our Promise

Before the Trump administration took office, Morocco would take great pride in its history as the US independence in 1777, then referred to by Europeans as part of the Barbary Coast. Twenty years after that recognition, the United States signed a series of treaties with North African leaders, including Morocco, known as the Barbary Treaties. The first of those treaties , in part:��

As the government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion,—as it has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion or tranquility of Musselmen,—and as the said States never have entered into any war or act of hostility against any Mehomitan nation, it is declared by the parties that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries.

The text of this treaty, like any ratified document, was passed by Congress and enshrined into law by the president, which occurred under John Adams only ten years after the ratification of the US Constitution itself. The actions of the Trump administration to pit the United States in direct conflict with Islam are not only counter to the statements of his presidential predecessors and , but also contravenes the intentions of nation’s founders such as .

It is my hope, which is shared by millions in this country and the Muslim world, that the United States can honor the promise of our Founding Fathers that we have no enmity against Islam or Muslim nations.

I hope that Americans continue to resist the president’s actions on behalf of our Muslim friends and family, citizens and visitors alike. And I hope we can finally put in to practice the tale we tell our children—that America accepts anyone who plays by the rules and works hard.

Only then will my Moroccan friends or my Iraqi family feel safe to visit loved ones and experience the natural and cultural beauty of America, which can still capture the imagination of people around the world, regardless of their religious convictions.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Poverty is one of the most pressing issues of our time, and the whole world suffers from it. The term can be as the state of one who lacks a certain amount of money or material possessions.

With the growth of inequality worldwide, ones affected by the phenomenon. In fact, poverty grows every year, and some believe it can never be eradicated.

According to , a movement with 5.5 million young people who want to make a positive change, nearly half the world’s population “live on less than $2.50 a day.” Considering there are over 7 billion people on the planet, that’s more than 3 billion who live in poverty. The website adds that over “1.3 billion live in extreme poverty — less than $1.25 a day.”

This is alarming.

So, what causes poverty, and what are its consequences?

According to the , a US-based nonprofit that seeks to address poverty and hunger worldwide, there are three key issues.

First, history plays an important role. Most of the poorest countries in the world were former colonies of European powers. These nations in the so-called Third World sent slaves to faraway lands and had their territories seized by colonizers—from which .

Second, war and political instability are often the case in countries marred by poverty. Simply : “Both of these factors have often been tied to histories of colonialism, but whatever the causes of war and political upheaval, it is clear that safety, stability and security are essential for subsistence and, beyond that, economic prosperity and growth.”

In other words, without peace in the land and security for all, no amount of wealth or education will benefit the everyday person. And that helps exacerbate poverty for a country’s most vulnerable people.

Third national debt is a huge problem for former colonies. As per the , “poor countries carry significant debt loads due to loans from wealthier nations and international financial institutions.” And when a country gets a development loan, they are often required to “open their markets to outside business and investors.” In the end, small business owners take a beating at the market place due to large conglomerates eating away at the proverbial pie.

THEN WHAT HAPPENS?

Poverty has its fair share of consequences on society, including .

Malnutrition: Often, people who live in poverty—both relative and extreme—rarely have access to nutritious foods. And even if they have access to such foods, they are unlikely to possess enough purchasing power to buy them, not to mention the risk of inflation driving up the price of basic essentials like bread.

Health: Poverty and disease often go hand-in-hand. People who live in poverty usually “. They are almost always lacking in nutritious foods, which decreases their bodies’ ability to fight off diseases.”

Education: Children who grow up in poverty often do not attend school from a young age. While school is free in countries like Morocco, getting an education does cost money. For example, school uniforms and supplies such as books are often out reach for many people. In the end, many kids drop out of school and work with their families.

The sums it up: “Whatever the reason, there is a clear correlation between families living in poverty and their lack of education. Without the ability to attend school, many people go through life illiterate.” As a result, people run the risk of an endless cycle of poverty when generations of a family go through the same thing: being born into a poor household, dropping out of school at an early age, having children and living a life in poverty all over again.

Indeed, while each country differs in their experience with poverty, there are similarities around the world.

UNDERSTANDING POVERTY IN MOROCCO

In Morocco, the majority of those who live in poverty reside in rural areas, since the people there lack the resources to access clean water, electricity and quality education. Even with its major improvements to reduce the level of poverty in rural parts, Morocco still falls far short of other lower middle-income countries.

There are key questions that must be asked: What is the solution to prevent the expansion of poverty in Morocco and the world in general? And how can civil society and government solve this critical situation?

Many people do not see the bigger picture here: If we fail to address the causes of poverty today, the more likely it is to increase tomorrow. And, as a result, the more it will harm our children and their children.

The future generation is at stake. The time to act is now.

*[This article was written for the . In partnership with the United Nations Foundation, 51�Թ� taught more than 400 students in six countries—India, Morocco, Kenya, Austria, Mexico and the United States—about journalism and substantive issues such as water, health and poverty. Click here to read more.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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