A war built on flawed assumptions

Atul opens by asking Manu to frame the conflict. Manu describes it starkly as ā€œa royal fight betweenā€¦ two thoroughly different military ideologies,ā€ highlighting the clash between Western shock-and-awe doctrine and Iranā€™s long-prepared defensive model. The United States and Israel entered the war believing Iran was weakened by sanctions, internal unrest and economic decline. That assessment shaped a strategy centered on rapid decapitation strikes designed to collapse the regime within days.

Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or projecting power through regional proxies was a central objective. If left unchecked, Iran could potentially dominate Gulf energy flows, reshaping the balance of power in one of the worldā€™s most critical regions.

Yet the early premise ā€” that Iran would quickly crumble ā€” has not held. Despite economic strain and political tensions, the regime has endured. Atul and Manu suggest that Israeli and American planners underestimated the depth of Iranā€™s institutional and ideological structures, as well as its ability to absorb and respond to sustained military pressure.

Iranā€™s resilience and asymmetric strategy

Iranā€™s response rests on preparation rather than improvisation. Instead of relying on centralized command structures vulnerable to decapitation, it has implemented what a decentralized ā€œmosaic defense.ā€ This system distributes authority across 31 independent military commands, making it difficult to disable the state through targeted strikes.

The same logic extends to governance. Iranā€™s layered redundancy ensures continuity even under extreme conditions. Leadership positions are backed by multiple successors, while the broader theocratic system provides an additional reservoir of authority. As Atul notes, this creates a depth that is not easily dismantled through conventional military means.

Manu explains that Iran has effectively built a different ā€œoperating systemā€ for political survival. This system combines ideological commitment with military capability, allowing the state to withstand pressure that might destabilize more centralized regimes. The result is a conflict that has settled into a form of strategic stalemate, where none of the principal actors have achieved decisive political collapse.

Diverging political realities

While the battlefield remains contested, political responses differ sharply across countries. Atul says the war is highly popular in Israel, where even critics of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu broadly support the campaign. In contrast, public opinion in the US is far more divided, creating what Atul calls a ā€œtale of two countries.ā€

Iran, meanwhile, has focused on building support beyond its borders. Its diplomatic outreach across Asia, particularly among Shia Muslim communities, has generated both political sympathy and material support. There are visible signs of this mobilization, including donations and grassroots support, suggesting that Iranā€™s messaging resonates in parts of the Global South. Women are even donating gold, considered family treasure in Asia, to the Iranian war effort.

These dynamics reinforce a key point: The war is not producing uniform political outcomes. Rather, it is deepening fragmentation, both within societies and across the international system.

Economic warfare and Gulf vulnerability

Unable to match Israeli or American firepower, Iran has resorted to economic warfare. Iranian forces have targeted the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and shaken their economic foundations. Iran has also blocked the Strait of Hormuz and reduced the ships going through this chokepoint to a trickle. This strategy exploits structural vulnerabilities in a region that, despite decades of diversification, remains heavily dependent on energy exports and food imports as well as consumer goods and machines for critical infrastructure such as desalination plants.

By threatening shipping routes and energy facilities, Iran is effectively weaponizing geography. By blocking the Strait of Hormuz, Iran is driving up oil and gas prices, while attacks on infrastructure in the Gulf states create long-term supply constraints. In our globalized world, Arab states generating wealth through energy exports are diversifying their economies by pumping money into frontier economic activities. Iran has interrupted this flow of capital, which will have cascading effects far beyond the region.

The Gulfā€™s role as a hub for trade, finance and transportation amplifies these risks. Cities like Dubai in the United Arab Emirates and Doha in Qatar, built as global hubs with international airports, high-end shopping and luxury tourism, now face the possibility that their greatest strengths ā€” connectivity and openness ā€” could become liabilities in a prolonged conflict.

Global spillovers and systemic risk

The economic consequences extend well beyond energy markets. Gulf capital has played a crucial role in funding innovation and investment across Western economies, from real estate to cutting-edge technologies. If the war constrains the flow of this capital, the effects will ripple through sectors such as venture capital, artificial intelligence and infrastructure development.

Simultaneously, physical disruptions to energy production threaten the supply of critical industrial inputs. Helium shortages could affect semiconductor manufacturing, sulfur constraints could disrupt metal refining and reduced fertilizer production could reduce global agricultural output. These are not isolated shocks but interconnected pressures that strain the foundations of the global economy.

Manu captures the scale of the challenge with a warning: ā€œThis is a world that nobody is prepared for.ā€ The conflict is no longer simply about territory or regime change. It is about the stability of systems that underpin modern economic life.

As Atul concludes, the war has entered a new phase. Iran has survived the initial assault, the US and Israel remain engaged, but the Gulf economies ā€” central to global energy and finance ā€” are under growing strain. The longer the conflict continues, the more likely it is to trigger cascading crises that reach far beyond the Middle East.

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That leaves a more fundamental question: What comes next, where do we go from here and what does ā€œwinningā€ actually mean for Washington in a war defined by endurance?

The tools left in the toolbox are predictable: more military force, tighter constraints, a blockade, diplomacy and negotiation. But escalation is not a strategy. It is a bet. And there is little evidence that a second round of pressure will succeed where the first did not.

This is not a tactical miscalculation. It is a structural one. Washington still acts as if pressure, applied long enough, will force a decisive break. Tehran has already demonstrated the opposite. To persist under the status quo is not resolve. It is denial.

The mismatch is fundamental. The US is fighting to win. Iran is fighting not to lose, and, if necessary, to survive. That asymmetry is not a detail of the conflict. It is the conflict.

Victory in this war will not be decided by larger bombs or louder threats. It will be decided by how each side defines the game it is playing. Washington seeks a swift resolution with defined outcomes: restored deterrence, a diminished nuclear program and altered Iranian behavior. Iran seeks endurance, measuring success not in victory but in survival: regime continuity, deterrence preserved and pressure absorbed.

One side is playing a finite game. The other is playing an infinite one. This is a contest between speed and endurance, and the difference between them defines the war.

The infinite game and endurance

As American author Simon Sinek argues inĀ , finite players pursue clear victories and defined endpoints, while infinite players aim to remain in the game, adapting and outlasting. This pattern is not new. In Vietnam, the US pursued a decisive victory while North Vietnam fought to endure. In Afghanistan, Soviet forces sought control, while the Mujahideenā€™s strategy centered on survival. In the longest US war in Afghanistan, a simple battlefield truth captured the asymmetry: ā€œYou have the watches, we have the time.ā€ In each case, outcomes were shaped less by battlefield superiority than by endurance.

This is not only historical. It is structural. As a recent from the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies notes, escalation in the USā€“Iran conflict hinges less on battlefield dominance than on sustainability. Washington relies on high-intensity strikes and decapitation strategies, while Iran emphasizes decentralization and attrition designed to absorb pressure and extend the conflict over time. If one side is optimizing for rapid resolution and the other for survival, escalation does not resolve the conflict. It prolongs it.

Watch behavior, not rhetoric, and the contrast becomes sharper. Where Washington looks for breaking points, Tehran sees thresholds. Where the US applies pressure, Iran prepares to absorb it. Iranian leaders do not frame endurance as a burden; they frame it as a duty. What appears as strain from the outside functions as structure from within.

This is why the familiar playbook keeps failing. However many leaders Washington removes, Tehran replaces them, disperses authority and hardens its system against collapse. The US operates on a timetable, seeking a resolution. Iran stretches time, decentralizes power and extends the horizon of the fight. One side is trying to end the war. The other is built to ensure it does not end on those terms.

Strategic ambiguity and the need for a new approach

Part of the problem is strategic ambiguity. It remains unclear whether the US is attempting to counter a hostile regime, pursue regime change, or secure broader regional interests. That lack of clarity does not confuse Tehran; it empowers it. Ambiguity allows Iran to stretch the conflict across multiple fronts, adapt in real time and exploit the absence of a clearly defined end state.

A different approach begins with a simple recognition: Pressure alone will not produce surrender. If the objective is behavioral change, the strategy must shift from forcing collapse to shaping incentives over time. That requires pairing pressure with credible off-ramps, defining achievable objectives rather than maximal ones and aligning strategy with an adversary built for endurance. It also requires patience and coalition discipline as much as firepower.

The alternative is to continue mistaking persistence for progress. In a finite game, escalation can produce victory. In an infinite game, it can simply extend the conflict. And in wars like this, misunderstanding the nature of the game is often the fastest path to losing it.

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The world was waiting anxiously for his bombshell after the inconclusive talks in Islamabad. He didnā€™t take long to on his Truth Social: ā€œEffective immediately, the United States Navy, the Finest in the World, will begin the process of BLOCKADING any and all Ships trying to enter, or leave, the Strait of Hormuz.ā€ So, the US will now completely blockade the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran had only partially blockaded during the war.Ģż

Another strategic misadventure

Trump is a very capricious old man who will shamelessly renege on any position he has previously taken. He is also quite capable of throwing out the baby with the bathwater and shooting himself in the foot by making rash decisions that undermine his own efforts. Therefore, we canā€™t really say what the outcome of this situation will be. We are already hearing that the blockade will be to Iranian ports. But, if he presses ahead with this military action and stays the course ā€” inspired by the USā€™ past blockade successes in and ā€” it is likely to prove to be another huge strategic miscalculation against Iran.

Iran, in my view, had initially attempted to take similar action, or at least wanted to. However, after the US and Western propaganda machine began to construct a narrative that Iran was disrupting global energy security and economy by closing the Strait of Hormuz, the country began to backtrack from its initial maximalist position. It the strait to ease international ire and pressure by projecting a sense of normalcy along the Hormuz route, but this did not extend to its enemies.

Trump and his many advisers, it seems, have still not learned that the Middle East is not South America, and it is definitely not the USā€™ backyard.

Imperialist grudge

Perfected in the colonies, the Western powers ā€” claiming to be civilized rather than savage ā€” established a legal framework for exploiting the subjugated peoples, their lands and their resources. These laws were made by the colonial masters, who invoked, interpreted and applied them selectively to further their own metropolitan interests. In the post-colonial world, this Western imperialist practice has been institutionalized within the geopolitical landscape and extended to the whole globe, creating the so-called rules-based order that has governed international relations ever since.

After taking of the Strait of Hormuz during the war, Iran intends to maintain this dominance and impose a levy on tankers transporting oil and gas for safe passage. Iran argues that this is necessary to rebuild its war-ravaged country and views it as reparations for an imposed war. So far, Iran has made no rules, and it is allegedly levying transit fees selectively, exempting certain countries while charging others.

The US resents Iranā€™s attempt to impose its will in the region, viewing it as a disruption to the established international order. Only the US has the right to impose its will on other nations at the expense of international order; Iran cannot equate itself with the US. Moreover, this approach is seen as crude and unsophisticated compared to the Western way of ā€œlegallyā€ advancing vested interests, although by the selective and discriminatory interpretation and application of laws and rules. However, it actually mirrors Trumpā€™s tactics, from whom the world is quickly learning about arbitrary actions and bullying.

A coalition of international disorder

Trump that the Hormuz blockade will involve unspecified ā€œother countries,ā€ but he has not revealed which countries these partners might be. The United Arab Emirates? Bahrain? Kuwait? Who else, if the USā€™s European allies continue to shy away from involving their countries in the Iran war?

Israel is unlikely to act beyond securing its own national interest, and its participation in any operation to blockade Hormuz is highly doubtful. Trump can, of course, bring on board leaders such as Argentinian President Javier Milei, El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, and now acting Venezuelan President Delcy RodrĆ­guez from his own hemisphere. He can also buy the participation of a few militarily insignificant countries in Africa, Oceania and Polynesia. However, if Trumpā€™s Hormuz blockade coalition materializes, it will likely not represent the will of the so-called ā€œinternational community.ā€ Instead, it will harm more countries than it benefits, if it benefits them at all.

This US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz will negatively impact its own strategic partners, as well as strategic rivals and neutral countries. Disrupting the global economy will ultimately hurt the entire world. The blame for disrupting global oil and gas supplies will now fall on the US rather than Iran. After all, the Hormuz route was fully open before the Iran war. 

Businesses and governments would rather pay to cross the Strait of Hormuz than have the US close the strait indefinitely. They are already facing a serious energy crisis, and a complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz would significantly exacerbate the situation. Oil is deemed more important than equality, after all.

Given the importance of the Strait of Hormuz to global energy supply, the implications extend far beyond just the businesses and governments directly involved. As tensions rise and the US maneuvers strategically in the region, another major player finds itself in a precarious position: China.

The Chinese dilemma

China may find itself cornered after this US strategic move in the Strait of Hormuz. Its Venezuelan oil supply was choked by the US just a few months ago, and now the Hormuz blockade will stop Iranian oil, necessary for powering Chinaā€™s vast economic empire.

But, instead of confronting the US, China may once again chicken out as it did in Venezuela. While it verbally challenges the US with enthusiasm and responds firmly to economic pressures, it does not engage the US militarily. It seems China is waiting for its military muscle to grow bigger than that of the US. As an emerging superpower, China understandably appears to lack the confidence to directly confront a century-old reigning superpower.

However, it already has considerable military muscle, and all it needs is to flex it in the US. The right moment to act will arise, potentially in the Strait of Hormuz ā€” though this seems unlikely, given Chinaā€™s immense strategic patience and a long-term perspective. The descendants of the famous Sun Tzu, who wrote , may strongly believe in his advice that ā€œthe supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fightingā€ and ā€œthe greatest victory is that which requires no battle.ā€

The Iranian response

Iran has been battered by the US and Israelā€™s bombing, while inflicting far less damage to its enemies. Despite this, it has won the battle of perception by staying in the fight and successfully positioning itself to negotiate directly with the US in a third country for a long-term peace agreement. Iranā€™s morale is high, and its image has improved significantly, surpassing that of Israel after this war. Iran has presented itself as a tough and steely nation. Israel earned a name for itself by carrying out assassinations and defeating weak Arab nations, but Iran has successfully fought both the reigning superpower and Israel. Iran has displayed its unparalleled sacrificial courage, insurmountable will to resist and inexhaustible military arsenal in an all-out war.

Iran has that it is quite capable of taking on the US militarily, and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has indicated as much after Trumpā€™s Hormuz blockade announcement. Iran has other options, too. To make things worse for the world, besides the Strait of Hormuz, Iran can also block the Red Sea route involving the Bab Al-Mandab Strait with the help and support of its ally Ansar Allah (the Houthis). But what if Iran prefers to sit tight and see the world react? Then, in my view, this new US military venture is unlikely to last long because the entire world, already fed up and frustrated by Trumpā€™s unending tantrums, would likely unite against the US and force it to withdraw.

On the other hand, if Trump is employing his trademark bullying tactic to extract maximum concessions from the other party and get the most favorable deal for himself, this approach is unlikely to work against Iran, as previous military threats and actions didnā€™t. This behavior only shows that he and his coterie of yes-men donā€™t understand the character of the Iranian nation. He seems to be a prisoner of his past pressure-tactic successes. A better strategy would be to reach out in good faith and with sincere intentions, treating Iranians as equals rather than trying to intimidate them into submission for a durable peace agreement. The US has recently bombed Iran twice in the middle of negotiations, and there is absolutely no reason why they should trust the US again.

Washingtonā€™s strategic incompetence

The Iran War and the ongoing crisis in the Middle East  ā€” largely created by the US ā€” highlight a severe strategic incompetence in Washington that is unprecedented in history. Ironically, this is the superpower with decades of accumulated collective experience in controlling the world and the best pool of geopolitical strategists, yet it finds itself in a dire situation. But what can these experts do if they are booted out, intimidated, forced to quit or altogether ignored by their government? This contradiction lies at the heart of the declining US empire, a decline that has been largely self-inflicted.

The disruption of an established order is the surest sign of the decline of a geopolitical power that had built and maintained that order. A new world order is born from the ruins of the old. The world dominated by the West is gradually realizing ā€” and reluctantly accepting ā€” that the locus of geopolitical power is shifting eastward, with China emerging as the new global superpower. Historically, incompetent rulers accelerate the decline of a fading empire and hasten the transition to a new power structure.

The stories we read in history about incompetent rulers at the end of a weakened empire differ from those of today in one fundamental sense: In the past, ordinary people had no say in choosing their rulers. In contrast, the US has a system in which citizens elect their leaders. Therefore, it is the citizens of the US ā€” shaped by their educational and cultural systems ā€” who must take responsibility if their country fades into mediocrity in the coming decades.

But who knows? Maybe I will be proven wrong, and this will not be the end of the USā€™ hegemony over the world. Maybe the people who voted for Trump really did want to ā€œMake America Great Again.ā€ The only problem with their desire is how do you make an already great thing great again? You can only make it greater, and that doesnā€™t seem to be happening in any sense right now, at least.

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The three dates that shape the conflict

Atul begins by identifying three decisive turning points: 1948, 1953 and 1979. In 1948, the UN established the state of Israel. It immediately had to fight the invading Arab states. For Israelis, that moment remains inseparable from the trauma of the Holocaust and the fear that the state could be destroyed at birth. Palestinians remember this moment as the Nakba, the mass displacement that accompanied Israelā€™s creation. Atul suggests these two memories still shape how the region understands security and injustice.

He then turns to 1953, when Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh faced an overthrow after nationalizing oil. Atul presents the coup as a foundational rupture in modern Iranian political memory. Britain and the US, he argues, removed a nationalist leader and restored a monarchy that ruled through repression. He says that the intervention weakened secular opposition and unintentionally strengthened the clerical networks that later filled the vacuum. By 1979, those clerical forces were organized enough to take power during the Iranian Revolution and build a theocratic state deeply suspicious of both Washington and domestic dissent.

Revolution, paranoia and the proxy strategy

The discussion portrays the Islamic Republic as a regime shaped by insecurity from the start. Atul explains that after the revolution, the new leadership distrusted the regular military and built Iranā€™s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a parallel force. The Iranā€“Iraq War of 1980ā€“1988 then hardened the regime further, reinforcing a political culture built around sacrifice, siege and martyrdom.

From that position, Iran gradually extended influence through allied armed groups across the region. Hezbollah, Hamas and later the Houthis became central as instruments of an Iranian strategy designed to offset conventional weakness. Atul argues that the regime sought legitimacy by presenting itself as the one power willing to resist both Israel and the US, while many Arab governments moved toward accommodation.

Simultaneously, he makes clear that opposition to Western power did not make the Iranian system admirable. He repeatedly stresses its repression of women, students and dissidents, as well as its economic failures and political brutality.

A decisive moment for Israel and the US

Atul argues that Israel and the US believe Iran is now weaker than it has been in years. From the Israeli perspective, the danger is existential. A small state with limited strategic depth cannot easily tolerate the possibility of a hostile regional power gaining stronger missile and nuclear capabilities. As Atul puts it, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has built his career around the doctrine that ā€œpeace through strength is the way forward.ā€ In that framework, confrontation appears necessary.

Atul also highlights Israelā€™s confidence in its intelligence reach and military effectiveness. Atul describes a country that believes it has penetrated Iran deeply and can strike key personnel and infrastructure with precision. Yet he does not present victory as automatic.

Casey raises the possibility of Iranā€™s ā€œBalkanization.ā€ Atul explores the idea, noting that some American and Israeli thinkers see advantage in a looser, weaker or fragmented Iran. But he also warns that this could produce unintended consequences, including nationalist backlash, prolonged instability and deeper hostility toward outside powers.

Uncertainty inside Iran

Iranian society is fractured and complex. Atul notes widespread discontent with the regime, especially among younger and educated Iranians. Protest movements, secular aspirations and anger at repression all suggest that the Islamic Republic has lost legitimacy among many citizens. Yet he cautions against assuming that foreign bombing will automatically translate into regime collapse.

External attack can strengthen nationalism even where a government is unpopular. Atul remarks that ā€œnationalism is the last refuge of a scoundrel,ā€ but he also considers it a real political force. The killing of senior leaders, especially the Ayatollah, may not weaken the regime in the way outsiders expect. Martyrdom carries powerful weight in Shia political culture, and the failing oppressive late ruler has now become a symbol of resistance after being killed by a foreign enemy.

Kaitlyn and others push the conversation toward possible futures, including a democratic Iran. Atul sees some hope there, especially in a decentralized federal model that protects minorities and devolves power. But he also emphasizes that opposition groups remain divided among monarchists, republicans, federalists and competing ethnic movements. That makes any clean transition unlikely.

The warā€™s economic danger

When Zania asks about stagflation, Atul shifts from battlefield dynamics to global markets. He warns that a prolonged conflict could disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, drive up energy prices and trigger a supply shock across the world economy. Oil above $90 per barrel is not just a regional problem; it hits transport, industry, fertilizers, food production and financial confidence all at once.

The risk is not merely higher inflation but the toxic combination of inflation and stagnation that defined the 1970s oil shocks. The Gulfā€™s importance extends beyond crude exports. Capital from Arab states is deeply embedded in global finance, technology, property and sport. If war erodes confidence, both trade and investment could suffer.

This discussion ends with a broader warning: This is not only a Middle Eastern war. It may become a global economic and geopolitical turning point whose consequences reach far beyond the region.

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The complications of reality

There are, however, four very basic counterarguments to this myth.

Firstly and historically, winning is usually based on power, not on goodness. There are many examples of bad winning over good, of the powerful winning over the weak. For centuries, slave traders won over the slaves, the imperialists won over the colonized and men won over women. 

Secondly, it is largely the victors who get to tell their stories to the world, and they naturally position themselves as the good ones. Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill is famous for transparently saying, ā€œHistory will be kind to me, for I intend to write it.ā€ And he did, because he was an excellent writer and a powerful man. Other powerful men of yore asked others to write for them. Nowadays, they can simply the media. The result is that we see and hear the spin that the powerful want us to.

Third, not everyone has bought into these fairy tales, even to begin with. While the winners saw themselves as good and righteous, others did not. Ask the indigenous peoples of North America and Australia, who had their lands taken away from them, and now largely live in isolated reserves with little basic resources. Ask the millions of Africans who were brought to the New World as slaves, and never saw their families or homes again. Ask the multitudes in the Global South who were subjugated by colonialism for generations and did not see any justice in their lifetimes. Ask the countless women who have been killed due to domestic abuse and can no longer tell their stories. They certainly did not see the winners as good.

Fourth, to complicate things further, good and bad are not static states; sometimes good guys turn into bad guys. The individual does not necessarily change, but the story about them changes ā€” either because of new evidence, hearing the voice of previously marginalized groups, shifting moral standards or the long-term consequences of their actions becoming clearer. 

Falls from grace

History abounds with such individuals whose images have changed from good to bad. In some instances, the fall happened in their own lifetimes ā€” as with Roman Emperor Julius Caesar and British Major General Benedict Arnold. In others, it took longer. While some still view Italian explorer Christopher Columbus as a brave discoverer, many now see him as a symbol of colonialism. While English politicians still love to compare themselves to Churchill, historians now look at him with more doubtful eyes, knowing his views on the colonized and his role in the , which killed some three million people.Ģż

The present also offers many examples. Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi fell sharply from grace after her refusal to stand up for the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar. Football star O.J. Simpsonā€™s murder of his wife and her lover ruined his reputation and sent him to jail. Blade-runner and Paralympic poster-boy Oscar Pistorius was convicted of murdering his girlfriend. Entertainer Bill Cosby, darling of the media and Dr. Huxtable to all, was disgraced and jailed after multiple sexual assault incidents surfaced. Successful financier and sex offender Jeffrey Epstein was courted, supported and forgiven by the global elite until his papers were released.

Even Hollywood can sometimes reflect reality ā€” the most famous example being the fall of ā€™s Michael Corleone, who journeyed from a young war hero surrounded by a large, loving family to a murderous, aging mafioso who died all alone.Ģż

Falls from grace not only apply to individuals; they can also apply to countries and peoples.

Whoā€™s good in this war?

This current war between Israel and America on one side and Iran on the other gives us a chance to apply these counterarguments.

Firstly, since the powerful win, we like to believe that power confers goodness. But are America and Israel good because they are more powerful militarily and economically? Are America and Israel good because they have nuclear arms? Because Jews were persecuted during World War II (WWII), is Israel now so good that it is exempt from international rules of conduct? Are America and Israel good because they are largely white and Judeo-Christian countries? Is Iran bad because it is a Muslim country, it has been consistently the long-persecuted Palestinians and yet have nuclear arms? It may be important to ask these questions.

Secondly, the stories we hear about the war largely favor the West. Often, the powerful place the mantle of good on their own shoulders ā€” even if they are the ones who started the war or effected the regime change. They claim to have done so only out of humanitarian concern ā€” only to free a people from tyranny, to restore their human rights and to bring them democracy. Or to protect the rest of the world from imminent danger. They also claim that is on their side ā€” and God would only be on the side of the good.

As Ambassador Chas says, ā€œthe physical war is accompanied by an information warā€. Who is good and who is the winner is strongly influenced by propaganda. Currently, from much of the mainstream Western press, we get pro-American and pro-Israeli, but anti-Iranian, perspectives. And therefore, our evaluation of good, bad and the situation at large is skewed. To get more balanced and complete news and analysis, we also need to hear independent media voices (e.g., Glenn Diesen, Jeffrey Sachs, Alexander Mercouris, Yanis Varoufakis, Douglas Macgregor).

Third, many are no longer buying into the American-Israeli propaganda ā€” not even their erstwhile . Americans and Israelis think they are undoubtedly on the side of good. They see Iran as not just bad but downright evil: ā€˜the biggest danger to world peaceā€™. However, much of the world, and especially the Global South, does not agree with this presentation. They see Iran as a revered ancient civilization that has been manipulated, robbed, interfered with and for decades by the West ā€” and a country that is now retaliating in response to repeated attacks from Israel and the US.

And fourth, the characters are changing. America and Israel have fallen from grace. They no longer hold the moral high ground. Since WWII, the world has seen Israel occupy Palestine, displace Palestinians, perpetrate a in Gaza and currently persecute Muslims in the West Bank. It has noted Israelā€™s numerous , repeated in the region, of civilian targets, as well as its ambitions far beyond its borders. The world has seen America give Israel arms, diplomatic coverage and unconditional support in all its ventures. It has learned how America has instigated wars and effected in multiple countries for its own advantage. As Italian journalist Michele Serra quipped, ā€œAmericans are very lucky ā€” because wherever they go to bring freedom, they find oil.ā€

The comforts of fantasy

Of course, most of us know that there are, by and large, no innately good or bad people; only our circumstances (i.e., skin color, religion, nationality, economic condition, suffering, etc.) and our actions make us so.  

But despite knowing the complicated reality, we prefer to revert to our simplistic fantasy. We like fairy tales and Hollywood movies because there is no ambiguity. We like to know who to love and who to hate. And if someone else can tell us that, thatā€™s even better. We want a grand yet quick battle where we are not injured, a definitive victory and flawless heroes to celebrate at the end.

Maybe it soothes our souls, eases our conscience, and appeals to our innate intellectual laziness to assume that good always triumphs and therefore, those who triumph are good. That way, we donā€™t have to spend time and effort rummaging through the dirty gray areas, trying to judge individual actions, dealing with the messiness of the ambiguous and feeling unsettled by it all. We donā€™t have to question the ā€œwinner,ā€ the process or the results because good always wins. Right?

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The political nature of counting casualties

My 2018 , ā€œGrieving, Valuing, and Viewing Differently: The Global War on Terrorā€™s American Toll,ā€ demonstrates how the US has historically managed the visibility of its war dead. Focusing on Vietnam to Global War on Terror (GWoT) era policy and practice including the ā€œ,ā€ my research illustrates how consecutive US Administrations (on of the aisle) worked to move dead and suffering soldiers out of public view, not because they were unimportant, but because they were politically sensitive due to threatening a biopolitical facade of care and protection and ultimately threatening the ability for America to wage long-term wars.

This is the key insight: Visibility is not accidental ā€” it is governed.

The Novara article suggests that casualty figures are being obscured or selectively reported, but my work helps us understand why. As I have argued, soldiers are simultaneously treated as a ā€œā€ within an intensely militarized political economy and yet rendered invisible in death, their suffering managed through practices that limit public exposure and political accountability.

What we are seeing today is not just the undercounting of casualties ā€” it is the continuation of what I have identified as a broader system of statecraft that regulates how death is seen, counted and felt.

Grievability and the differentiation of lives

My research also highlights that the politics of counting is inseparable from the politics of valuing. The issue is not only whether deaths are recorded, but how they are framed, delayed, categorized or excluded altogether. Moreover, as author Thomas Gregory has recently pointed out in the case of produced by American wars, counting becomes a technique of governance: It shapes public perception, moderates dissent and ultimately enables the continuation of war.

This is where my continued emphasis on contested becomes especially relevant. If some lives (and deaths) are made and more readily recognized as more grievable than others, then the act of counting is never neutral. It is a process of differentiation. Some deaths are made visible, others are obscured; some are mourned publicly, others are quietly absorbed into statistical ambiguity.

The politics behind transparency and alternative narratives

The Novara report sits squarely within this logic. The discrepancy between official and estimated casualty figures is not simply a data problem ā€” it is a political one. It reflects ongoing struggles over who has the authority to count, whose counts are recognized and what those numbers are allowed to mean.

Importantly, attention to grievability also reminds us that these processes are never uncontested. Even in the face of state efforts to suppress visibility, alternative forms of counting, witnessing and memorialization emerge. Families, journalists and researchers continue to demand recognition ā€” to insist that these lives are not reducible to managed figures or bureaucratic categories.

That tension is still present now, as the search for the missing airman continues.

So rather than asking whether the US military is hiding casualties, a more productive question is this: What kinds of deaths are allowed to appear, and under what conditions?

Until we confront that question, debates about transparency will remain superficial. Because the issue is not simply that the numbers are wrong. It is that numbers themselves are part of the machinery through which war is made acceptable.

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These groups, which have formed an advocating the end of the Islamic Republic and the establishment of a federal, democratic Iran, have long been treated by Tehran not just as external adversaries but as potential catalysts of internal uprising. The concern extends beyond Kurdish regions alone to the possibility that unrest could spread into other marginalized areas, including Baloch, Ahwazi, Azeri and others.

Following the announced by US President Donald Trump on April 7, Tehran intensified pressure on Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to these Kurdish parties, accusing them of links to the US and Israel. While framed publicly as a security measure, the underlying concern remained the prevention of these groups from becoming focal points for internal dissent and political mobilization within Iran as they have done during past political upheavals.

Iranā€™s domestic repression and surveillance campaigns

During the war, Iranian intelligence services and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducted a sustained campaign to deter Kurdish involvement in the conflict, according to sources that spoke to . Inside Iran, Kurdish civilians faced waves of threatening text messages warning against cooperation with foreign powers, followed by surveillance operations targeting satellite communications. These measures escalated into house raids conducted by IRGC officers in both urban neighborhoods and rural border areas suspected of links to opposition networks.

At the same time, Iran has maintained a broader and long-standing pattern of repression against other marginalized communities. Human Rights , and the for Human Rights in Iran have documented repeated arbitrary arrests, executions and violent crackdowns in Baloch and Ahwazi regions, particularly during periods of political unrest. Iran Human Rights has further recorded recurring waves of executions and security operations in Sistan and Baluchestan, reinforcing a wider pattern of coercive state control across multiple ethnic regions.

Cross-border military pressure and regional impact

Across the border in Iraq, Tehran applied direct pressure on the KRG, warning that Kurdish forces near the border would face attacks if they did not withdraw. Despite compliance by Iraqi Kurdish authorities, Iranian drone and missile strikes continued to hit Kurdish offices, compounds and training bases, killing fighters and civilians and destroying infrastructure previously believed to be secure. According to monitoring, the Kurdistan Region has been struck by more than 638 drones and missiles since the start of the war, underscoring the scale and intensity of Iranā€™s campaign. Many of these attacks were carried out by Iranian-backed militias operating inside Iraq, illustrating Tehranā€™s willingness to project force across borders to prevent internal mobilization.

IRGC deployments during this period were extensive and deliberate. Intelligence indicated the presence of forces stationed in forests, mosques, schools and even hospitals, reflecting a strategy of embedding within civilian environments to monitor, intimidate and deter potential uprisings. Senior commanders also personally oversaw operations in border regions while strikes continued against Kurdish exile offices and training bases in Iraq.

The Kurdish alliance and the threat of wider resistance

Although the Kurdish alliance does not currently field a large enough military force to conduct a major ground offensive, it has historically mobilized thousands in past uprisings and rebellions. Its networks extend across Iranian Kurdistan and carry the potential to inspire wider resistance in other marginalized regions, including Baloch and Ahwazi areas. Tehran fears this greatly because it is aware that previous waves of unrest, most notably the ā€œWoman, Life, Freedomā€ movement, in Kurdish regions before spreading across the country and gaining international reach.

This historical precedent shapes the regimeā€™s calculations and actions against Kurdish opposition forces both inside and outside of Iran. Local uprisings have previously diverted security forces and exposed the fragility of state control in peripheral regions. The concern is not simply rebellion in one area, but the possibility of coordinated unrest across multiple regions simultaneously.

The regimeā€™s strategy and future outlook

Whether the ceasefire holds or collapses, the Islamic Republic continues to act with ruthless precision to maintain control. From threatening civilians to deploying forces in civilian locations, conducting drone and missile strikes, and pressuring the Iraqi Kurdish authorities, Tehranā€™s strategy illustrates a singular objective: to prevent the formation of organized opposition that could spark an internal uprising. The regimeā€™s fear of losing control across Kurdish, Baloch and Ahwazi regions, and potentially beyond, drives both its internal repression and its external military operations into Iraqi territory.

The next phase of Iranā€™s internal conflict is likely to be shaped by this persistent fear. Historical precedent and recent events suggest that if the population is left with no safe avenues for protest, the potential for armed resistance may rise, not because citizens desire conflict, but because the Islamic Republic has left them no other options for meaningful change.

The regimeā€™s approach ensures that Kurdish, Baloch and Ahwazi communities remain under constant pressure, illustrating its strong reliance on suppression to prevent revolt and highlighting why Tehran views these opposition movements as an existential threat to its grip on power. Regardless of what happens with the external war and negotiations, it is only an internal uprising that stands a chance of toppling the Islamic Republic and bringing about meaningful change for the people.

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That sentence should not be easy to read. But it needs to be said plainly, because the language coming from Washington in this war is the language of operational success, of degraded capabilities, of targets serviced: a language that hides human tragedy in the fog of strategic data. These schoolgirls were not collateral damage. They were innocent civilian lives ā€” lives that the laws of war are supposed to protect.

Similarly, when Pete Hegseth announced the sinking of the IRIS Dena, he did so in the register of a man describing a kill from behind a screen. Hegseth is not the Secretary of Defense. He calls himself (and has spent millions of dollars in rebranding his office as) the Secretary of War. It is not a slip or a provocation. It is a declaration of intent.

The he was celebrating was a frigate returning home from Indiaā€™s Milan 2026 naval exercise. It was in international waters when the USS Charlotte fired, without warning. Hegseth called it ā€œ.ā€ sailors were killed. None of them were combatants in any meaningful operational sense when the torpedo struck.

Foundations and evolution of just war theory

There is a framework for thinking about how wars should be started and how they should be fought. It is older than the US. It begins, in its systematic form, with Christian theologian and philosopher of Hippo, writing in the early fifth century as the Western Roman Empire collapsed around him ā€” not metaphorically, but literally. Responding to Christians asking whether a follower of Christ could take up arms, he did not grant blank permission; he set constraints. War might be permissible, but only under specific conditions, for specific purposes, conducted in specific ways. Fellow Christian theologian and philosopher codified what Augustine had begun: just cause, legitimate authority, right intention. that followed developed these into two operative branches: jus ad bellum, the conditions under which going to war is justified, and jus in bello, the rules governing how war must be conducted.

After 1945, this tradition was largely secularized. The established individual criminal liability for initiating aggressive war. The translated the core principles of discrimination and proportionality into binding international law. is explicit: Deliberate attacks on civilians are prohibited. Attacks causing civilian casualties disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage are prohibited. These are not aspirational norms; they are legal obligations that the US signed.

The current campaign fails both tests.

Failures of jus ad bellum and jus in bello

On jus ad bellum, the intelligence case for war was never made. Multiple assessments ā€” including from within the American intelligence community ā€” found of an active Iranian nuclear weapons program or an imminent restart. The foreign minister of Oman, who was overseeing negotiations between Washington and Tehran, that talks were close to a breakthrough when the bombing began. Hours before the first strikes, he appeared on American television to say a deal was within reach, a pledge Iran had made that US President Donald Trump would later claim it had refused. British government separately indicated that diplomatic channels had not been exhausted and that the strikes had no lawful basis. Forces were being positioned in the region while talks were still formally ongoing: preparation wearing the mask of diplomacy. That is not a last resort. Even the 2003 invasion of Iraq, whatever one thinks of it, involved months of attempted coalition-building and a formal UN Security Council process. That acknowledgment, however cynical, that unilateral action requires justification has now been abandoned entirely.

On jus in bello: Minab and the IRIS Dena are the answer.

In the immediate aftermath of Minab, the administration moved quickly to obscure responsibility. Trump initially Iran had bombed its own school, a claim requiring, implausibly, that Iran possesses Tomahawk cruise missiles, weapons only the US manufactures and deploys. When pressed, he claimed ignorance. Hegseth said the Pentagon was investigating. Within days, a Department of Defense found that a US missile was responsible. Independent investigations by The New York Times, NPR and BBC Verify reached the same conclusion, authenticated by of a Tomahawk striking the site. The posture of uncertainty was not confusion; it was a reflex.

As for the Dena, Hegseth reached for , invoking the sinking of the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano during the 1982 Falklands War. It is not a flattering comparison. The Belgrano was sailing away from the exclusion zone when the HMS Conqueror torpedoed her. The sinking killed 323 sailors and remains a stain on that campaignā€™s moral record. Hegseth appears not to have noticed.

The moral question: rightness over effectiveness

Just war theory does not ask whether a military operation is effective. It asks whether it is right. A school full of children, a warship returning home from a peacetime exercise sunk without warning in international waters; these are not aberrations or fog-of-war tragedies. Rather, they are the opening acts of an unnecessary war that is not being conducted with discrimination or proportionality and is being led by an administration that has renamed itself, at considerable public expense, to signal its intent to keep going.

The tradition Augustine began, and that international law eventually formalized, exists precisely for moments like this. But there is no world government, no global enforcement mechanism. International law is a system of voluntary restraint; it works only as long as powerful states choose to be bound by it. When the most powerful state opts out, it does not simply break the rules. It begins to dissolve them.

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Although the global transition to renewables is gaining momentum, the energy crisis during the Iran war has underscored a basic lesson: Oil and gas remain indispensable for a while, and no serious energy policy can neglect security, redundancy and resilience during the long years of this expected transition.

Therefore, a sound energy policy should pursue renewable energy while strengthening energy security. Strategic stocks, resilient pipelines, alternative routes and reliable firm power, such as nuclear, still matter because governments do not manage energy systems in theory. They manage them in the midst of shocks, shortages and war.

A chokepoint shock that markets cannot innovate away overnight

In 2025, around 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products moved through the . That was roughly a quarter of the worldā€™s seaborne oil trade, and around 80% of it was destined for Asia. These numbers explain why the Iran War is not a regional event for energy markets. When Hormuz closed, the shock spread immediately through oil prices, insurance costs and physical supply, especially for Asian importers.

For months, many analysts had already warned that if a US and Israeli attack on Iran began, Tehranā€™s greatest leverage would be the Strait of Hormuz. Yet despite that, the Trump administration openly that it did not expect Iran to close the strait. That was not simply a miscalculation. It was a serious policy failure that ignored an obvious strategic risk.

As the war has continued, fuel supply problems have begun to emerge, including shortages in gasoline and petroleum . Some Asian have stopped external sales, and prices have surged globally. In the US, the average gasoline price rose by nearly after the war began, while over oil export restrictions resurfaced and sanctions on were eased.

Meanwhile, the US has continued to threaten that keeping Hormuz closed would carry heavy consequences for Iran. Yet despite threats, potential and emergency measures, no truly reliable solution has emerged. That is why the search for alternatives has accelerated. The decision by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and its member countries to coordinate a emergency stock release in March was important, but such a measure only buys time. If , it cannot substitute for real supply security. Because no government can replace a chokepoint-scale flow with brand-new infrastructure or a fully transformed vehicle fleet in a matter of months. That is why governments need a balanced approach that pushes decarbonization forward while also building buffers and alternatives for future crises.

Fossil fuels remain the base of the system

The uncomfortable baseline is that the global economy still runs mostly on fossil fuels. In 2024, fossil fuels still accounted for of the global energy mix, which means that oil, gas and coal remain the foundation of the system even as cleaner sources expand. This structural fact shows that the world still moves goods, powers industry, heats buildings and supports global trade through fossil-based systems.

The same pattern is visible in the gas trade. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is not a marginal fuel in todayā€™s economy. GIIGNL reports tonnes of global LNG trade in 2024. And these volumes matter because crises rarely hit only crude oil. Disruption also affects refined products, gas logistics, petrochemicals, shipping networks and industrial production.

In other words, even a strong renewable build-out does not instantly eliminate dependence on oil, gas and the global infrastructure that moves them. Pretending otherwise only sets governments up for policy panic when the next shock arrives.

Renewables are growing, but the denominator is huge

None of this is an argument against renewables. It is an argument for realism about scale. For example, the transition is real, especially in the electricity sector. In 2024, renewables provided of global electricity generation. But the broader economy changes much more slowly. Modern renewables accounted for only of global total final energy consumption in 2022, which shows how difficult it is to decarbonize heat, heavy industry and transport at the system level.Ģż

Transport is a good sign of this gap between fast growth and limited total impact. Global electric car exceeded 17 million in 2024, yet the total electric car fleet reached only about 58 million, or roughly 4% of the global passenger car fleet.

Even the clean energy build-out still depends on carbon-intensive industrial production today. Around of global steel relies heavily on coal. In other words, electrification and renewables are expanding fast, but the denominator is so large that the overlap period will be long. For years to come, energy security planning will have to assume that societies need both cleaner systems and conventional fuels at the same time.

Security tools that work in a crisis

In the short run, the first tool available in a crisis is emergency stocks. That is exactly why they exist, as can be seen in the IEAā€™s largest coordinated stock release in March. But emergency stocks are a bridge, not a new supply system. The more important question is what happens when a disruption lasts longer.

This brings us to pipelines and alternative routes. Existing bypass capacity around Hormuz remains limited relative to the scale of normal flows. The IEA estimates that only barrels per day can be redirected through existing pipelines. The main examples are Saudi Arabiaā€™s from Abqaiq to Yanbu, which provides access to the Red Sea, and the United Arab Emiratesā€™ Abu Dhabi crude oil to Fujairah, which bypasses Hormuz by reaching the Gulf of Oman. Their value is not theoretical. During the current war, Saudi exports from Yanbu rose to nearly 4 million barrels per day as volumes were rerouted away from the Strait of Hormuz.Ģż

Another example, although far too small to replace Hormuz and not directly located in the Gulf, is Iraqā€™s northern export route through the Iraq-Turkey pipeline, which ends at Ceyhan on the Mediterranean. After being largely inactive for the past two years, the pipeline resumed operations in March at around per day, with plans to increase flows toward 250,000 barrels per day.

These volumes are still too small to bypass Hormuz, but that is not the point. Countries with alternatives can better absorb shocks. Countries with only one route cannot. Optionality is not a luxury in energy security. It is one of its basic conditions. Pipelines, LNG terminals, storage, multiple entry points and diversified contracts all improve resilience because they reduce the cost of disruption and increase bargaining power in a crisis.

Nuclear is still part of the balance

Another important part of a balanced policy is firm, low-carbon power that does not depend on daily fuel shipments through contested sea lanes. That is where nuclear still matters. Europeā€™s recent energy experience, first with Russian supply risk and now with the shock created by the Iran war, has pushed many leaders to see energy policy not only as a climate issue but as a strategic one. This is why the debate around nuclear has returned so strongly.

In 2024, nuclear power plants in 12 EU countries produced of the EUā€™s electricity. That is not a marginal share. It is a major pillar of supply security as well as decarbonization. The political debate in Europe reflects this reality. In March 2026, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen said that Europeā€™s decision to let nuclear powerā€™s share fall from about one third of electricity generation in 1990 to around 15% today was a ā€œ.ā€

Germany illustrates the same tension. Even after shutting its reactors, debate continues over whether some nuclear capacity if price pressures and import dependence worsen. The implication is not that every country must expand nuclear power. It is that removing firm options before credible replacements are fully in place raises the cost of every geopolitical shock and makes policy reversals more likely when a crisis hits.

As prices rise and import dependence becomes more politically costly, arguments for rethinking earlier decisions return. That alone shows the issue remains alive whenever security and affordability come under pressure.

Build the future, but defend the present

The clean energy transition is moving, especially in electricity. But the Iran War is a blunt reminder that energy systems change more slowly than geopolitics. States should invest aggressively in renewables, grids, storage and electrification because these reduce dependence on imported fuels over time. But they also need a security portfolio for the overlap years.

That portfolio should include strategic stocks that can be released quickly, diversified supply chains for LNG and refined products, resilient routes that bypass chokepoints where possible and reliable firm power where politically viable. It also means maintaining and modernizing pipelines and interconnectors, not as an alternative to decarbonization, but as insurance during an unstable transition.

The central policy inference is simple. Build the future, but do not leave the present undefended.

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The instability of the justification is not merely a communications problem. It reflects the absence of a coherent legal premise, and that absence has consequences that outlast any single administrationā€™s war.

Public debate has already moved on to a different question: not whether the operation was legal, but whether its will justify it. For some, the answer is already yes. An Iran without the Islamic Republic, a Middle East freed from the reach of Tehranā€™s proxy networks, an America that finally treated decades of hybrid warfare as the warfare it was ā€” these outcomes, if they materialize, strike many observers as worth the legal ambiguity. Some even argue that modern international law has become the preferred for regimes that treat procedural restraint not as a principle but as a tactical resource. Iran exploited every available ambiguity, from plausible deniability to the rituals of multilateral consultation and the manufactured distance between the regime and its proxies.

Meanwhile, Western governments remained and split over how to handle an increasingly aggressive and unpredictable America. Observing the situation in disbelief and helplessness, many people around the world are increasingly frustrated by the rules-based international order’s inability to matter when it most counts.Ģż

International law on the use of force provides some of the clearest and most unequivocal rules, especially within the post-World War II world order, but it also faces a serious enforcement problem. The gap between what the prohibits and what powerful states actually do has always been managed through creative interpretation and the selective will to enforce. Invoking legal prohibition as though it were self-executing is a form of bad faith that serves no one.

But a more fundamental difficulty is that self-defense arguments, followed to their conclusion, license far more than the dry law suggests. If law is camouflage for the weak and power reorganizes systems when institutions fail, that logic is available to every state with sufficient force and a grievance. The potential proliferation of certain types of weapons has been repeatedly cited as necessitating a preventive act of self-defense. Russia has deployed versions of it regarding NATO expansion and Ukraine. The door is increasingly being pushed open for others to deploy it regarding their own adversaries, their own thresholds of existential risk, their own calculations about when deliberation has run out.

Was it legal?

The short answer, on the publicly available evidence, is almost certainly not ā€” though the legal analysis is more complicated than the volume of condemnation might suggest, and the complications matter for what follows.

The laws governing the use of force are grounded in of the UN Charter, which prohibits force against the territorial integrity of any state, and in , which preserves the right of self-defense in the event of an armed attack. Iran had not launched an armed attack on either the US or Israel before the strikes began. The retaliatory Iranian missile and drone strikes came afterward and cannot be used to retroactively justify what preceded them.

Anticipatory self-defense ā€” acting before an attack lands ā€” has a narrow, contested but not implausible basis in customary international law, rooted in the 19th-century . The standard requires that necessity be instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. What US and Israeli officials actually described, however, was something considerably broader: a preventive campaign aimed at long-term capabilities, regional restructuring and the permanent foreclosure of Iranian nuclear ambitions.

The legal distinction between anticipatory and preventive force is not a technicality. Anticipatory self-defense responds to a threat that is genuinely about to materialize. Preventive war responds to a threat that might materialize at some future point. The latter has no serious basis in existing law, and the operation as described maps far more closely onto preventive logic than onto the narrow anticipatory model.

The timing compounds the difficulty. Oman had progress in nuclear negotiations. Technical discussions at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were reportedly days away. The UN Secretary-General a diplomatic window had been squandered. The Caroline standard requires no moment for deliberation. The available chronology suggests there were moments and that they were deliberately closed. As Marko Milanovic, professor of international law at the University of Reading, : Using force would require a basis in self-defense, and there are many ways to respond to a threat that fall short of launching a war. Senator Mark Warner was more still: There was no imminent threat to the US from Iran. There was a threat to Israel. Whether a threat to Israel constitutes an imminent threat to the US, he noted, is genuinely uncharted legal territory.

The structural problem with imminence

At this point, the legal argument becomes structurally interesting rather than merely factually contested, and it connects directly back to the argument from the other side of the debate.

The defenders of the operation do not simply claim the facts support imminence. They claim imminence itself requires reconceiving. Mobile missile launchers, cyber capabilities, decentralized proxy networks, nuclear latency ā€” all of these compress available warning time to the point where traditional temporal markers no longer apply. By the time a threat looks genuinely imminent in the older sense, the window for effective action may have closed.

This is not a frivolous position. It has been the subject of serious legal scholarship since the 2002 Bush National Security reopened the question after September 11, 2001. The problem is that accepting it transforms imminence from a temporal constraint into a capability assessment. Once the relevant question becomes not whether an attack is about to happen but whether a state possesses capabilities that could eventually be used against us, the constraint effectively dissolves. Any sufficiently powerful state can point to adversary capabilities and construct a legal rationale for force. The argument does not produce a principled limit. It produces a vocabulary.

This elasticity is not an accident of bad faith. It is a feature of the architecture. Legal scholars have long observed a dynamic they call ā€” the embedding of legal advisers within military planning cycles, where their institutional position leads them to read ambiguous terms such as military necessity and definite military advantage in ways that preserve operational flexibility rather than constrain it. The framework appears to regulate force while structurally accommodating it.

The Security Council after the strikes illustrated this with uncomfortable clarity. Every actor reached for legal language. The US ambassador invoked lawful preemptive self-defense. Iranā€™s ambassador called the strikes a crime against humanity. Russia invoked the precedent of Iraq in 2003. China called the timing shocking. The Arab League noted Israelā€™s own refusal to submit its nuclear facilities to international inspection. All of them cited international law. None of them agreed on what it said. This is not a failure of the framework. It is the framework operating as designed.

Why invoking the law may not be enough

The critical response to Epic Fury has understandably focused on its illegality. The legal critique is largely correct. But there is a prior question worth sitting with: What kind of order does international law on the use of force actually reproduce?

The framework was created by states, for states. It reflects a world order built by the most powerful actors in the post-1945 international system to manage interstate relations in ways broadly favorable to their interests. That order is preferable to its absence, and its erosion carries real costs. But it has never been neutral. It institutionalizes assumptions about sovereignty, force and legitimate violence that systematically favor technologically advanced states capable of fighting what are sometimes called clean wars ā€” wars conducted with lawyers present, precision weapons deployed and proportionality assessments documented in advance.

The just war tradition, which provides the intellectual foundations of the contemporary self-defense framework, has always served this dual function. It constrains violence at the margins while legitimizing it at the core. Michael Walzer, one of just war theoryā€™s most prominent defenders, that the triumph of just war thinking would normalize a world in which war is always, potentially, justifiable, provided the relevant criteria are satisfied. The shifting justifications for Epic Fury are a case study in meeting criteria after the fact, or attempting to.

When critics invoke international law to condemn the strikes, they implicitly accept this framework. The argument that the operation failed the legal tests ā€” imminence not established, proportionality strained, necessity undermined by ongoing diplomacy ā€” is probably correct in each of its particulars. But it concedes the premise that force is permissible when the tests are genuinely met. It leaves intact a structure in which powerful states can, with sufficient legal preparation and institutional support, always find a way to meet the tests, or to redraft them as the post-September 11 period demonstrated was possible.

There is a structural parallel here to the political dynamics that have followed right-wing populist challenges to democratic institutions in several countries. The progressive response has been to defend the institutions ā€” to insist on norms, procedures and legal constraints. That defense is understandable and not without value. But it can also function as a restoration of an order that itself generated the conditions for the challenge: an order that worked well enough for a certain managed consensus but accumulated, over time, a substantial deficit of legitimacy among those it claimed to serve.

International law on the use of force is in an analogous position. Defending it against its most cynical exploiters is necessary. But defending it without asking what it was built to do and whose interests it has consistently served is insufficient.

Maybe the war is legal, and that is the problem

The uncomfortable conclusion toward which this analysis points is that Operation Epic Fury may, in fact, be legal under international law as it is actually practiced ā€” not as it is ideally formulated, but as it functions in the real world of great power competition and doctrinal elasticity.

Not because the facts clearly satisfy the Caroline criteria, they probably do not, but because international law on the use of force has always been at its core. State practice is inconsistent. The Security Council is structurally incapable of enforcing the prohibition on force against its permanent members. The doctrinal debate about imminence has no clean resolution. In these conditions, legality functions less as a constraint than as a resource ā€” available, in practice, to whichever actor can most effectively perform compliance with its terms.

The commentator who argued that law is camouflage for the weak is, in a narrow sense, describing this accurately. Where the argument fails is in treating that description as a justification rather than a diagnosis. The observation that powerful states exploit legal ambiguity is not an argument for abandoning legal constraint. It is an argument for understanding why the existing framework fails so consistently and in whose favor those failures tend to run.

The mimetic dimension of this failure is both real and urgent. When the US stretches self-defense doctrine to license what is, by any careful reading, a preventive war, that stretch does not remain local. Other states observe it, cite it and adapt it. The legal order that consolidates around such precedents is not one in which force is better regulated. It is one in which force is more widely licensed, and the licensing vocabulary is borrowed from the most powerful actors in the system.

The question that follows from Epic Fury is therefore not primarily whether this operation was lawful. It is what kind of order the legal tests, as they actually function, reproduce ā€” who benefits from them, who is systematically disadvantaged by them and what alternatives exist beyond the horizon of a framework that has always, ultimately, found room for the wars that powerful states decide to fight.

International law will not save us from the next Epic Fury. It was not designed to. It was designed to regulate the world as it is, a world of unequal sovereign states in which the most powerful retain, in practice, the greatest latitude. Recognizing that is not counsel for despair. It is the beginning of a more honest conversation about what legal constraint on force would actually require.

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Ongoing repression and daily fear

and independent monitors report the in the tens of thousands, though precise figures remain difficult to verify amid severe reporting restrictions. Morally and psychologically, the number changes little. Families are shattered.Ģż continue to emerge of threats, executions, enforced disappearances, and individuals identified from protest footage later or abducted.ĢżDemonstrations, including children, were met with overwhelming and often .ĢżYet beyond headlines and geopolitical analysis, something deeper is unfolding: a nationwide trauma response that almost no one is naming.

Since the beginning of the year, the Islamic Republic has called protestors rioters and that they must be put in their place. Iranians have witnessed scenes more often associated with combat zones: live ammunition fired into civilian crowds; citizens attempting to carry away the injured only to be shot themselves; nighttime raids pulling people from their homes; and entire communities severed from one another during prolonged communications blackouts.

from international human rights organizations describe mass arrests, torture in detention and bodies documented under coercive conditions. There have been accounts of marketplaces set ablaze during crackdowns and refrigerated facilities containing victimsā€™ remains by fire under unclear circumstances. Funerals have been prohibited, and families have been for the bullets used to kill their loved ones. Medical staff have been threatened or detained. Journalists have been . Grieving families have been and arrested. The UN fact-finding missionā€™s has recognized the state of Iranian civiliansā€™ lives to be caught between that may amount to crimes against humanity.

And these decades-long patterns of repression have not ended. For most Iranians, theĀ  of fear and coercion continues daily; a reality exacerbated by a catastrophicĀ  of global health governanceĀ that has left civilians without even the most basic protections of international law.

Trauma does not start with one event

The outbreak of the USā€“Israelā€“Iran war has brought Iran back into the center of global discussion. Television panels debate escalation, deterrence, and regional alliances. Social media is filled with arguments about sanctions, military strategy and international law. The world is debating Iran while largely overlooking the psychological devastation unfolding inside it.

The uprising that preceded the war and the violence used to suppress it have already begun to fade into the background of geopolitical analysis.

The and restrictions on reporting are not incidental to the violence; they are part of it. When information is , uncertainty grows. Families cannot confirm who is alive. Rumors fill the gaps left by silence. In human rights investigations, access to verified information is often the first casualty of repression. But the psychological impact of that uncertainty is profound. It destabilizes trust, not only in institutions but in shared reality itself.

The cumulative psychological impact is unmistakable. As trauma scholars have long observed, prolonged exposure to systemic violence erodes basic assumptions about safety, trust and the predictability of power. When violence becomes chronic and institutional, populations adapt to a worldview in which vulnerability feels constant and authority appears unrestrained. This is how collective shock takes hold.

Iran is not only in a political crisis. Its population is exhibiting signs of collective nervous-system .

Inside the country, people are living under sustained threat. Many describe sleeping in fragments, waking at small sounds, struggling to breathe evenly. Anger surfaces quickly and just as quickly gives way to numbness. These are not abstract political reactions. They are physiological responses to sustained threat. When violence becomes routine, the nervous system does what it is designed to do: It prepares for survival.

The massacre did not land on neutral ground. It struck a population carrying decades of accumulated trauma: a revolution that hardened into theocratic authoritarianism; a devastating war scarred by chemical attacks; sanctions that strained ordinary citizens while consolidating power among elites; and repeated protest movements met with imprisonment and execution.

Collective trauma rarely disappears with time alone. It accumulates, shaping how new events are interpreted and remembered, especially in societies that have experienced repeated cycles of repression.

When a new shock arrives, it reactivates what is already stored. To those living through it,Ā Ā did not feel unprecedented. Instead, theĀ Ā and total digital isolation felt like a grimĀ confirmation of a of repression. The stateā€™s playbook of repression, refined over decades, was being executed once again.

Resilience runs deep in Iranā€™s cultural memory, but it should not be romanticized. In the context of 2026, thisĀ endurance signifies not a lack of harm, but a state ofĀ Ā where the nervous system has adapted to a ā€œhum of fearā€ just to survive.

What is unfolding now is not only grief but destabilization: a constant hum of fear, hypervigilance and a sense that the ground itself is unreliable. When a state deploys overwhelming violence against its own population, trust collapses not only in institutions but also in the future, further intensified by the absence of a meaningful global response. This is what externalized collective trauma can feel like.

The diaspora carries the trauma too

Outside Iran, another layer of trauma is taking shape. Across Europe, North America, Australia and Asia, theĀ diaspora watches in a state of externalized . It is a psychological weight that defies geography, where survivorā€™s guilt collides with moral urgency. This results in aĀ  of the collective psycheĀ as the social bonds that connect individuals to their homeland are systematically targeted. It is a state where survivorā€™s guilt collides with moral urgency, creating a vicarious trauma that is further weaponized by the stateā€™sĀ . Many feel compelled to act constantly by posting, organizing and protesting because they feel that rest is a betrayal.

As large demonstrations unfold globally, many continue to experience a painful sense of invisibility. WithĀ independent verification , skepticism often replaces empathy from the world. The diaspora experiences a as it asks for its collective reality to be witnessed. Casual suggestions that the numbers must be exaggerated, that the footage cannot be trusted or that it is better to stop watching the news, land as a dismissal rather than neutrality.

For the Iranian diaspora whose families remain in Iran, the crisis is not distant geopolitics. It is a daily negotiation between professional life here and fear for relatives there. When global attention shifts and reporting becomes sporadic, that distance deepens. In a democratic society that values civic participation and freedom of expression, the psychological well-being of diasporic communities is not peripheral. It is part of the civic fabric.

What is missed in these exchanges is the psychological cost. For Iranians, this minimization deepens isolation. It signals that their lived histories of repression and brutality are treated as uncertain, exaggerated or politically inconvenient. When suffering is questioned, identity itself feels destabilized.

, the temperature rises. Social media rewards outrage and punishes nuance. Political identities harden. Divisions sharpen. In private, there are tears and exhaustion. In public, fury.

This is what collective trauma does. It narrows cognition and collapses complexity. In times of threat, the brain seeks certainty, and black-and-white thinking feels safer than ambiguity. It is also why calls for rescue have intensified. Iranians inside and outside the country openly debate foreign intervention. When you are drowning, you do not ask who designed the life raft. When survival feels uncertain, people reach for whatever promises relief. Desperation reshapes judgment.

Why collective trauma matters politically

Recognizing that psychological reality does not mean endorsing every political conclusion that follows. Trauma can push societies toward extremes, toward savior fantasies, rigid ideologies and the belief that only overwhelming force can end overwhelming force. It also sharpens divisions, reducing complex differences to a binary of friend versus enemy and narrowing the space for democratic thinking.

History offers few simple answers. Peaceful uprisings succeed only when power fractures from within. rarely unfold as intendedĀ , and the lack thereof deepens mistrust. But none of that erases the emotional truth: Iranians feeling abandoned and exhausted, searching for any sign that the nightmare might end. What makes this moment especially dangerous is not only state violence; it is the perception that the world is speaking about the geopolitical entanglement with Iran while rarely speaking about the Iranians themselves.

The January massacre risks being absorbed into the background noise of permanent crisis and another headline in a saturated world. TheĀ February 2026 and executionsĀ of protesters have been largely ignored. But collective trauma does not dissipate when attention shifts. It embeds. It shapes political culture. It alters how communities trust, organize and imagine the future. If thisĀ Ā goes unrecognized, its consequences will not remain confined within Iranā€™s borders. Trauma reverberates across generations and across diasporas. It influences how societies polarize, negotiate power and respond to instability.

A rupture that will last decades

Recognizing is not an exercise in sentiment. It is necessary to understand how political behavior shifts under sustained threat. It insists that what is unfolding is not merely strategic conflict but a social reconstruction of meaning and mass psychological injury. Iranians do not need saviors. They need solidarity that respects and empowers their agency. They need humanitarian support that reaches civilians. They need platforms that amplify their voices rather than reduce them to geopolitical talking points.

Despite theĀ Ā in political science, sociology and historical literature that military interventions rarely lead to effective regime change, a growing number of civilians are now vocalizing a desperate plea for their own country to be bombed. On a human level, intellectualizing the failure of foreign intervention does little to address the immediate agony of those living under the boot. To understand this shift, the world must recognize theĀ , which is the cumulative and systemic wear and tear that occurs when an entire population is subjected to chronic institutional coercion. When this state of fear becomes unbearable, the collective psyche shifts into a mode of defensive dominance where even catastrophic violence is viewed as aĀ Ā to an agonizing status quo.

When people become desperate enough to call for foreign intervention, it is not ideology speaking but an existential survival mechanism. It reflects a population that feels cornered and recognizes its very existence is under threat. For decades, Iranians have protested through strikes, demonstrations and civil resistance, often at enormous personal cost. Many have lost friends, family members or colleagues to imprisonment or violence. When peaceful protest is met with live ammunition, people are fighting a war without weapons. Thus, their request, which goes against the scholarly evidence, is an emotional response to collective trauma that is not being witnessed. They also need the world to understand that collective trauma, once unleashed at this scale, does not simply disappear and only intensifies.

The Islamic Republic regimeā€™sĀ 2026 of civiliansĀ will be remembered for its brutality and for the that followed. It should also be remembered for the courage of millions who risked their lives for freedom, and as the moment a nationā€™s psychological threshold was breached. Iran is in a political crisis, but it is also living through decades ofĀ overlapping Ā and a profound psychological rupture that will shape its political future long after the violence fades from headlines.

Collective trauma at this scale does not remain confined within national borders. Through migration, digital networks and transnational families, its psychological consequences travel outward. Democracies that fail to recognize this risk misunderstand both and the long-term political consequences of sustained state violence.

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Foucault believed Western society had grown stagnant due to bureaucracy. In Tehran in 1979, he saw what he called the birth of a ā€œā€, a rare moment of collective revolt in which a nation attempted to shed its old identity and reinvent its soul. While Foucault was mesmerized by the collective revolt, critics argue that he focused on the drama of rebellion. This article explores that fundamental tension: how a thinker dedicated to unmasking the mechanisms of oppression could so passionately embrace a movement that, shortly after his writings, established a rigid, absolutist theocratic system.

An unlikely convergence

Pairing Iranian Supreme Leader and Foucault seems unusual at face value. Yet they intersected at a decisive moment in 1979, a historical juncture where political Islam hijacked the Iranian revolution, transforming a national event into a global phenomenon.

Today, as the Iranian theocratic regime faces pressure, interest in this case has grown again. To understand this interest, we must briefly revisit the history that forged this connection. At the time, Foucaultā€™s influence among the Liberal-Left intellectual circles of  Europe was at its zenith. As Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlaviā€™s fall approached, Foucault was contracted with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera to cover the Iranian revolution. 

The pillars of Foucaultā€™s illusion

Foucault visited Iran twice, first in September 1978, after which he visited Khomeini in his exile near Paris. He returned to Iran in October. During his second visit, Foucaultā€™s reports were met with a mixture of shock and loathing by the West, in stark contrast to his immense popularity among Khomeiniā€™s supporters at Tehran University, who translated his articles and plastered them on campus walls.

Foucault centered his analysis on the concept of ā€œpolitical spirituality.ā€Ā He sought a form of politics rooted in the organic beginning between man, religion, and politics ā€” a connection he felt Modernity had severed. After the failed in France and disillusionment with the Soviet model, Foucault sought alternatives. He saw in the ā€œanti-imperialistā€ discourse of the Iranian movement a way to overlook the specificities of Islamism in favor of a spiritual alternative.

Foucault drew parallels between the 16th-centuryĀ AnabaptistĀ movement in Europe and 1970s Iran, seeking an ā€œinspiring alternativeā€ for a Western audience. His reading of Khomeini proved deeply flawed. InĀ Ā (1978), Foucault described Khomeiniā€™s role in the Iranian revolution, ā€œIt is the same confrontation … between the master of the kingdom and the saintly man, the man of the armed power and the luckless exiled, the tyrant against the man who stands bare-handed and is cheered by a people.ā€

He portrayed Khomeini to Western readers as a legendary, unarmed figure representing a love for politics and spirit, divorced from the evils of ā€œmodernity.ā€

The historical blind spot

Foucaultā€™s dismissal of Khomeiniā€™s political history revealed a profound lack of contextual scrutiny. He turned a blind eye to the specific social and political alternatives that Khomeini had already outlined in his published books. Furthermore, he seemed unaware that Khomeini was imprisoned in his youth for opposing land reforms that reduced clerical power.

Foucault also overlooked the broader political context. Namely, the of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh, who foreign powers such as the US and Britain sought to remove due to his nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. All of this historical data did not deter Foucaultā€™s support. It appears he was either entirely ignorant of this history or chose to exist solely within the ā€œillusion of the present moment.ā€ In his reports, one finds a man ā€œdefendingā€ a project he had long been searching for. : ā€œBut one can also dream of another movement … a movement that would allow the introduction of a spiritual dimension into political life … so that it does not become the obstacle to spirituality, but its container, its opportunity.ā€

Without hesitation, he produced texts in a romantic style reminiscent of Greek epics to describe a volatile political event. He treated the revolution as a kind of epic transformation while framing it as a search for spiritual renewal in political theory. 

Criticisms and excuses

Some scholars defend Foucault.ĢżĀ (2009) argues that Foucault acted as a journalist, suggesting his errors stemmed from a lack of information. However, his writings suggest something deeper: the use of Iran as a validator for his own political theories. This obsession led him to ignore other actors in the revolution. He wrote:

When I walked through the streets of Qom and Tehran, I carried the question ā€œWhat do you want?ā€ in my head … I avoided asking this question of professional politicians … instead, I had long discussions with religious leaders, students, and intellectuals.

While Foucault focused on the ā€œspiritualā€ actors, he ignored the fact that 70% of a strategic city like Isfahan was controlled by workersā€™ councils (shuras), and that in Kurdistan, peasants were reclaiming land. The political Islam movement hijacked the terminology of the Left (e.g., ā€œRepublic of the Poorā€), a reality Foucault systematically ignored.

The dream of the Iranians or the dream of Foucault?

Foucault believed the world and revolutionary theory were at a ā€œpoint zero.ā€ He saw the Iranian revolution as a new path beyond modernity. He formulated this as a question: ā€œWhat is the mystery of this search for something that we ourselves have forgotten since the Renaissance and the great crises of Christianity: a political spirituality?ā€

He relied on the assurances of clergy members who claimed that ā€œwater and landā€ would belong to no one and that minorities would be respected. Yet, within a month of the revolutionā€™s success, the political spirituality manifested as the invasion of Kurdistan and the execution of ā€œimmoralā€ women, none of which appeared in Foucaultā€™s reports. Foucault was not pursuing the Iraniansā€™ dream; he was pursuing his own troubled dream. At the end of his , he wrote: ā€œI can already hear the French laughing. But I know they are wrong.ā€

In the end, his involvement in the Iranian Revolution became a cautionary episode. It showed how theory can distort judgment, and history has treated this moment with both criticism and irony.

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The Houthi dilemma

Jeunot frames the discussion around a fundamental tension shaping Houthi decision-making. The movement is strengthening itself amid fragmentation in South Yemen, using the lull to consolidate territory, recruit fighters and rebuild capacity. Yet it faces a strategic choice between ideological alignment with Iranā€™s ā€œAxis of Resistanceā€ and its own domestic priorities.

That tension is not abstract. The Houthis must decide whether to demonstrate commitment to Iran by joining the war or instead focus on expanding control toward resource-rich areas such as Marib in Yemen. Jeunot states, ā€œThe Houthi are for the moment at a crossroads in terms of objectives.ā€ Entering the war may reinforce their ideological legitimacy, but it could also undermine their long-term economic and political stability.

Fighting capacity and ideological momentum

Lotus shifts the focus from strategy to motivation. While previous US and Israeli strikes degraded Houthi military infrastructure, she argues that capability alone does not determine action. The groupā€™s ideological drive remains intact and may even outweigh material constraints.

She emphasizes that the Houthis are deeply embedded in the broader narrative of resistance aligned with Iran and Palestine. As she puts it, ā€œTheyā€™re very passionate about being part of the Axis of Resistance.ā€ That passion, however, exists alongside practical constraints, particularly the risk of reigniting conflict with Saudi Arabia.

Jeunot reinforces this point by describing the Houthis as a system sustained by conflict. War is not simply an activity, but a mechanism of governance and legitimacy. A prolonged peace could weaken the movement internally, making the presence of an external enemy central to its survival.

Geography, Saudi Arabia and strategic restraint

Carvajal grounds the discussion in geography and political reality. Yemen remains divided, with the Houthis controlling a smaller share of territory but the majority of the population. Meanwhile, South Yemen has shifted into Saudi-managed security control following the displacement of UAE-backed forces in late 2025.

This balance helps explain the Houthisā€™ current restraint. Despite their alignment with Iran, they have not targeted Saudi positions or escalated attacks in the Red Sea. For Carvajal, the key lies in their relationship with Riyadh, the Saudi capital. The Houthis may see more value in securing a stable arrangement with Saudi Arabia than in immediate participation in a regional war.

This creates a paradox. The group maintains ties with Iran while preserving flexibility to negotiate with Gulf powers. The result is a calibrated ambiguity that allows the Houthis to remain relevant without overcommitting.

Chokepoints and the global economy

Khattar Singh introduces the broader strategic stakes by focusing on the Bab el-Mandeb strait. If the Houthis were to disrupt this maritime corridor, the consequences would extend far beyond the Middle East, affecting global trade, energy flows and major economies such as China and India.

This raises the possibility that Iran itself may be exercising restraint. Rather than encouraging escalation, Tehran may prefer to keep the Bab el-Mandeb as a latent threat. A simultaneous disruption of both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea would approach systemic economic shock.

The panel also considers whether Israel might attempt preemptive strikes on Houthi positions. Lotus warns that such a move could trigger a domino effect, pulling Yemen fully into the conflict. Jeunot, however, questions the strategic logic of opening another front, noting that escalation in the Red Sea would draw in a far wider set of international actors.

Yemen as a long-term battleground

The discussion closes with a broader reflection on Yemenā€™s enduring strategic importance. Carvajal situates the country as a historic crossroads, long contested by regional and global powers. Its position along critical trade routes and its complex internal divisions make it both valuable and volatile.

Looking ahead, the panel diverges on whether the war could redraw borders. Lotus sees a shifting geopolitical landscape in which rapid changes in alliances could produce unexpected outcomes. Jeunot is more cautious, arguing that sovereignty remains deeply entrenched and that meaningful territorial change would require large-scale ground operations rather than air campaigns.

What the panel agrees on is the scale of the conflictā€™s potential trajectory. Yemen is not yet the central battlefield, but it is no longer peripheral. If the Houthis enter the war, the consequences will not be contained locally. They will reverberate across trade routes, regional alliances and the global economy, transforming an already dangerous conflict into something far harder to control.

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The question, then, is not whether multilateralism should be rebuilt. It must be. It is how to make multilateralism more effective, more credible and more resilient against the political pressures that have historically unraveled it. This is where emerging technology ā€” specifically, AI and blockchain ā€” enters the picture not as futurism, but as practical infrastructure for a new kind of international governance.

The role of AI in multilateral governance

Consider the challenge of real-time monitoring. One of the chronic failures in conflict prevention is the gap between intelligence and collective action. States possess information asymmetries; multilateral bodies move slowly; by the time consensus is reached, escalation has already occurred, and windows of opportunity are lost. AI-powered conflict , trained on satellite imagery, social media signals, economic indicators and diplomatic communications, can now detect escalatory patterns faster than any human analytical process.

Had such systems been feeding shared, verifiable data fed into a common multilateral dashboard in 2025, the trajectory from the International Atomic Energy Agencyā€™s (IAEA) to Israelā€™s 13 hours later might have looked very different. While the speed of information cannot substitute for political will, it can minimize uncertainty and clarify intentions and actions. Beyond early warning, AI prognostic models can simulate the downstream consequences of military action across economic, humanitarian and political dimensions ā€” giving decision-makers a clearer picture of second- and third-order effects before the first missile is launched.

Blockchain as a trust-building mechanism

Blockchain technology addresses a different but equally critical failure: the trust deficit that makes multilateral agreements fragile. Smart contracts deployed on a distributed ledger can encode compliance obligations in ways that are transparent, tamper-resistant, automatically verifiable and less prone to resistance. A next-generation nonproliferation framework built on blockchain infrastructure would not require parties to trust each other ā€” only to trust the protocol. Inspection data, enrichment levels and compliance milestones would be recorded in real time on an immutable chain, visible to all signatories simultaneously.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) collapsed in part because one party could unilaterally and privately, with no automatic mechanism to trigger a multilateral response. A blockchain-anchored treaty makes defection visible the moment it occurs, triggering pre-agreed consequences before escalation becomes irreversible.

Post-conflict reconstruction and accountability

The post-conflict dimension is equally urgent. History is unambiguous: reparations and reconstruction that are usually poorly coordinated, politically captured or opaque, producing grievance rather than stability. Iraq and Libya are cautionary monuments to that failure. Blockchain-based reparations frameworks offer a compelling alternative. Aid disbursements recorded on a distributed ledger are auditable simultaneously by recipient communities, donor nations and independent monitors. Smart contracts can condition tranches of reconstruction funding on verifiable benchmarks ā€” civilian infrastructure restored, civil society institutions stood up and transitional justice processes initiated.

AI tools can model the distributional impacts of different reconstruction strategies in real time, flagging approaches likely to entrench elite capture or regional inequality before funds are committed. Crucially, these systems can also surface the voices of affected civilian populations ā€” aggregating needs assessments, grievance data, community feedback and potential responses at a scale no traditional aid architecture can match. This is not technoutopianism; these capabilities exist today. What is lacking is the political architecture and will to deploy them multilaterally.

The Iran War has demonstrated, with painful clarity, what the world looks like when international institutions are bypassed, diplomatic processes abandoned and force is substituted for law. Whatever oneā€™s view on the optimal path to reform, it must be multilateral and take seriously the of all states, rather than only the small handful with extraordinary wealth, power and military might. AI and blockchain will not generate that political will on their own. But they can build the infrastructure upon which a more honest, more transparent and more durable multilateralism can be constructed ā€” one where compliance is verifiable, escalation is visible and the costs of unilateralism are harder to conceal. The technology is ready. The only question is whether the political will to use it will arrive before the next war.

[Daniel Wagner is managing director of Multilateral Accountability Associates and co-author of The New Multilateralism.]

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A war with shifting goals

Khoury begins by questioning the coherence of the American and Israeli approach. He notes that the stated goals keep changing, especially on the US side. US President Donald Trumpā€™s rhetoric moves from promises of a quick end to talk of an open-ended campaign, making it difficult to know what Washington is actually trying to achieve. For Khoury, that inconsistency matters because it suggests that the war is not being driven by a stable strategic framework.

He argues that Israelā€™s goals are clearer and more expansive. The conflict is not really about an immediate Iranian nuclear threat, but about weakening any force capable of resisting Israeli regional dominance. He links the current war to the broader trajectory of Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, arguing that force is being used not simply to deter Iran but to reorder the region. From that perspective, he warns, military escalation may temporarily damage adversaries but will not remove the political anger that generates future resistance. Violence keeps reproducing new forms of militancy rather than ending them.

Iranā€™s response and the failure of expectations

Khattar Singh presses the panel on the central question: Did Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expect a much faster collapse of Iranian resolve? The group suggests they did. Instead of mass unrest toppling the system after the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and senior figures in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Iranian state continues to retaliate with drones and missiles across multiple theaters.

Carvajal argues that this is now a regime-survival war for Tehran, Iranā€™s capital. Iran appears to have prepared for exactly this kind of confrontation and is responding in calibrated ways, including strikes on infrastructure and military targets across the Gulf. He also raises the possibility that some apparently irrational moves make more sense if Iranā€™s leadership believes its neighbors are also part of the threat environment. If Iran is being pushed backward, it may seek to ensure that the states around it do not emerge untouched or stronger.

Lotus goes further, arguing that Iran was underestimated during the months between the earlier 12-day war and the present crisis. She believes many regional actors assumed the US security umbrella would protect them, only to discover that alignment with Washington now carries serious liabilities. As civilian infrastructure, shipping and energy systems come under pressure, Gulf states must reckon with the costs of being drawn into a confrontation they did not choose.

Why the Houthis are holding back

A major theme in the discussion is the relative silence of the Houthis. Khattar Singh asks why Yemenā€™s Houthis, who had previously attacked Israel and maritime targets, have not yet entered this round of fighting with the same intensity as Hezbollah.

Al-Basha offers the most detailed explanation. He argues that the movementā€™s restraint reflects a combination of political calculation, financial weakness and operational vulnerability. The Houthis, he says, are cash-strapped, under pressure and eager to preserve the fragile truce with Saudi Arabia. They also do not want to hand their enemies a pretext for a renewed USā€“Israeli strike package while anti-Houthi forces are more coordinated than before.

Just as important, Basha says, the group wants to preserve its own agency. ā€œThe Houthi donā€™t want to be seen as an Iranian proxy,ā€ he explains. They want to appear capable of choosing their own timing rather than acting automatically on Tehranā€™s behalf. Even so, Basha and Khoury caution that this restraint may not last. If the war drags on and Iran faces a more existential threat, the Houthis may decide they can no longer remain on the sidelines.

Khoury adds another strategic point: The Houthis know that closing major waterways would damage their own access routes as well. For now, that creates an incentive to hold back. But if the conflict becomes all-or-nothing, those calculations could change quickly.

Gulf anxiety, Pakistanā€™s balancing act and the risk of widening war

Lotus describes a Gulf region increasingly anxious about the consequences of a war fought in its airspace and across its infrastructure. Gulf monarchies historically aligned with the Western bloc for security, she says, but now find themselves paying the price for that alignment. If the US cannot shield them from economic and military blowback, the value of that partnership comes into question.

The discussion then turns to Pakistan. Lotus sees its capital of Islamabad as trying to maintain relations with everyone at once: Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the US. Carvajal agrees that Pakistan is walking a narrow line, constrained by its own regional rivalries and unwilling to overcommit to any one side. Both suggest that this balancing act may work only for so long if the war expands.

Carvajal also highlights a growing divergence between Trump and Netanyahu. Trump, he argues, is transactional, while Netanyahuā€™s confrontation with Iran is ideological and long-running. That difference could matter if Washington seeks an exit while Israel wants escalation. He also warns that even if the US steps back, the conflict may continue through proxy networks, sleeper cells and asymmetric retaliation far beyond the immediate battlefield.

Can diplomacy still work?

Khattar Singh closes by asking the question only Khoury can answer as the diplomat on the panel: How does this end? Khoury insists that diplomacy remains possible because all wars eventually end in negotiation, however bitter the path there may be. Oman and Qatar, he says, are still the most plausible mediators when the fighting subsides.

But he also argues that diplomacy cannot succeed if the underlying injustices driving regional anger remain untouched. He rejects the idea that every armed actor in the region simply takes orders from Tehran, stressing that local groups often act from their own grievances, especially over Palestine, Gaza and repeated occupation. ā€œThere is always room for diplomacy,ā€ he concludes, but diplomacy without justice will only postpone the next war.

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An embassy left in limbo

AramburĆŗ opens by asking how the Afghan embassy in Vienna reached a point of financial and logistical isolation. Bakhtari situates the break not as a single moment but as a process that accelerates into rupture in August 2021. After the withdrawal of US and NATO forces, the Afghan government collapsed quickly. Bakhtari describes ā€œthe complete institutional disappearance of a state overnight,ā€ where ministries stopped functioning, parliament broke down and the banking system collapsed. For embassies abroad, the consequences were immediate. Vienna lost salaries, operational funding and the basic infrastructure that normally keeps a mission alive.

Bakhtari also draws a line the embassy refuses to cross. She does not recognize the Taliban, arguing it is impossible to work with a regime that excludes women from education and public life. Yet she also insists the embassyā€™s obligations to citizens do not vanish with the government. The Vienna mission became, in her telling, a moral outpost for human rights and a place to preserve a countryā€™s dignity when its political voice was forcibly muted. She stays because she believes diplomacy must be accountable to people, not only to regimes. As she puts it, ā€œdiplomacy is not only about governments; itā€™s about people.ā€

Making a film under threat

AramburĆŗ then turns to the documentaryā€™s origins and the practical constraints of filming a story shaped by censorship, danger and funding shortages. Halla describes her first hurdle as persuading Bakhtari to participate. The ambassador was ā€œexposedā€ and ā€œfragile,ā€ still holding office while being persecuted by the Taliban. Halla began with what she had, filming alone without financing, because she did not want to lose time. Only later did she bring on a Vienna production company, Golden Girls Filmproduktion & Filmservices, and expand the projectā€™s capacity.

Halla spent four years completing the film, making it her longest project to date, with an especially complex edit. She constructed an 80-minute narrative from a ā€œmosaicā€ of footage, including filmed material, family archives and documentation from Afghanistan gathered through other sources. She avoided traveling to Afghanistan during production, fearing that filming there would endanger local people and her team. Her core aim was to build a film that does more than inform. She wanted viewers to leave feeling personally implicated, saying audiences often walk out thinking, ā€œI cannot stay silent.ā€

Gender apartheid and the collapse of justice

From filmmaking, AramburĆŗ moves into the reality the film documents. Bakhtari describes womenā€™s lives under Taliban rule as a coordinated system designed to erase them from society. Women and girls are banned from higher education, restricted from work, barred from public gatherings and denied basic freedoms of movement and participation. Compounding the crisis is the breakdown of constitutional order. Afghanistan is now the only country in the world ruled without a constitution or a functioning legal system. Democratic institutions are dismantled, and what remains serves the Talibanā€™s purposes rather than the publicā€™s rights.

AramburĆŗ asks about justice and the heightened risks women face, including sexual violence. Bakhtari answers that without functioning legal protections, women have no system to defend themselves. The violence is not incidental but structural, backed by those who hold coercive power. Bakhtari names that structure using the term ā€œgender apartheid,ā€ emphasizing that legal codification lags behind lived reality. Language is part of the struggle because naming the system clarifies accountability, and neutrality becomes complicity. ā€œSilence is never neutral; silence always sides with power,ā€ she says. As long as the world fails to act, the Taliban will continue to rule Afghanistan.

Resistance that stays local

AramburĆŗ asks what resistance looks like when public protest is met with imprisonment, torture and intimidation. Bakhtari stresses that Afghanistanā€™s situation is not easily comparable to other cases, including Iran, even when womenā€™s aspirations converge. She argues that Afghan women do not need to be ā€œrescuedā€ through a Western lens. They need to be heard and supported in ways that respect local realities.

Bakhtari describes an early wave of street protests after the Taliban takeover that was violently suppressed. Over time, resistance shifted into quieter forms, which remain today. Women continue organizing through clandestine gatherings, social media and educational initiatives that operate outside formal public space. Internet access still exists for many, though not for all, given poverty and uneven infrastructure. Even so, networks form through pseudonymous online activity and decentralized support. As Bakhtari says, the fight is global, but resistance is local, shaped by what is possible under dictatorship.

The Daughters Programme and what solidarity can become

AramburĆŗ closes by asking about ā€œbright momentsā€ and practical ways to help. Bakhtari describes the Daughters Programme, a small, decentralized, volunteer-led initiative. It supports school-age girls inside Afghanistan through a package that can include financial help, emotional support, mentorship and leadership guidance. The design is intentionally simple, minimizing administrative barriers so that individuals abroad can directly support one girl.

Both guests also reflect on the filmā€™s reception. Halla says screenings across continents produce overwhelmingly positive responses, often well beyond the Afghan diaspora. Bakhtari notes some criticism of her chosen title, The Last Ambassador, but she insists it is symbolic. It marks a historical turn from a recent period with several women ambassadors to the present, where she is the only one still serving.

Looking ahead, Halla states that the film will continue to appear at festival screenings. She intends to travel to Berlin, Germany, for a Cinema for Peace nomination. It will be screened in London for diplomats linked to the ā€œgender apartheidā€ campaign. She is also developing a new project on threats to the International Criminal Court.

For Bakhtari, the central question remains urgent. Condemnation is easy; action is harder. The Last Ambassador and the Daughters Programme are her answer to what can be done now, even if the work is incremental. Planting seeds is a resistance effort.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post FO Live: Afghanistanā€™s Last Woman Ambassador Defies Taliban Rule From Exile appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The strikes that followed were dramatic and politically consequential: Leadership compounds were hit; command nodes were disrupted; retaliatory missile exchanges expanded across the Gulf; regional air defenses were activated from the Levant to the Arabian Peninsula. Yet the visible destruction risks obscuring the more consequential development: The opening of this conflict demonstrated the operational maturity of a model of war in which the first hour is no longer a prelude ā€” it is the outcome.

What occurred was not merely a coordinated air campaign. It was a compressed, multidomain operation designed to fracture coherence before the defender could meaningfully respond. The war did not begin with impact; it began with integration.

Architecture before ordnance

Modern high-end conflict increasingly opens with degradation rather than detonation.

Long before kinetic strikes reached their targets, the battle space appears to have been shaped across multiple domains. Electronic interference, cyber pressure, signal distortion, decoy saturation and intelligence preparation of the environment preceded physical engagement. Military planners have long studied this model of integrated operations within what calls multidomain operations, which emphasize synchronized effects across cyber, space, maritime and air capabilities.

Whether achieved through airborne electronic warfare platforms, cyber access, space-enabled coordination or maritime stand-off positioning, the operational effect was similar. Defensive clarity was eroded before command authority could synchronize response.

In previous eras, suppression of enemy air defenses unfolded sequentially: Aircraft struck radar installations; follow-on waves targeted missile batteries. Air superiority was achieved in stages. For example, the 1991 required weeks of methodical dismantling before deep penetration became routine.

February 28 reflected a different logic. Degradation and strike were not staged in phases; they were layered.

Carrier strike groups positioned in the Arabian Sea and Eastern Mediterranean extended operational reach and redundancy. Long-range precision munitions provided stand-off pressure. Stealth aircraft functioned as networked data nodes within a broader ecosystem rather than as isolated strike platforms. Maritime assets contributed cruise missile salvos synchronized with airborne delivery systems. Tankers sustained persistence and flexibility. Intelligence and surveillance platforms integrated targeting flows across air, sea, space and cyber domains.

The result was not simply a simultaneous impact. It was simultaneous disorientation.

The decisive achievement was not the destruction of hardened infrastructure alone. It was the compression of the defenderā€™s decision cycle. By the time kinetic effects became visible, the architecture that enabled coherent response had already been stressed.

Recent suggest that this architecture increasingly incorporates artificial intelligence systems capable of accelerating data synthesis across the battle space. AI models developed by companies such as Anthropic and other advanced machine learning platforms are now being in military analytical environments to process satellite imagery, electronic signatures and intelligence feeds in near real time. While these systems do not replace human command authority, they significantly compress the time required to identify patterns, detect anomalies and generate operational options.

This reflects a central shift in contemporary warfare. The objective is no longer gradual attrition through sequential dominance. It is temporal dominance through integration.

What distinguishes February 28 is not merely the targets struck, but the scale at which multidomain integration was executed in a live state confrontation. Elements that had previously been demonstrated in fragments, such as cyber intrusion, electronic warfare, stealth penetration, maritime stand-off strike and networked targeting, were fused into a single operational cycle. That fusion suggests that hybrid warfare has moved from theory to mature practice.

Time compression and systemic shock

Military planners have long relied on time-on-target calculations to synchronize weapons launched from different platforms so that they arrive simultaneously. On February 28, that principle appears to have been elevated from tactical coordination to strategic design.

Cruise missiles launched from maritime platforms, air-delivered precision munitions and follow-on suppression measures converged within tightly compressed windows. Simultaneity denies defenders the opportunity to triage threats. It complicates prioritization and fragments command flow. It compresses political decision time.

Hybrid war amplifies this dynamic by attacking not only physical infrastructure but cognitive bandwidth.

When radar inputs are distorted, communications are strained and decoys saturate detection grids, defenders confront uncertainty before they confront impact. The first-order effect is confusion. The second is paralysis. The third is delayed retaliation.

The leadership strikes in Tehran must be understood within this framework. Whatever their political consequences, the operational objective was clear. Collapse coherence before counterforce can mobilize. Reduce the adversaryā€™s ability to transition from shock to organized response.

Increasingly, the compression of this decision space is also being reinforced by algorithmic assistance. AI-supported analysis platforms can process large volumes of battlefield data far faster than traditional intelligence cycles allowed. Satellite imagery, radar signatures, communications intercepts and open-source information can be fused into a rapidly updated operational picture. In such an environment, the tempo of conflict becomes shaped not only by weapons systems but by the speed at which data can be interpreted and translated into operational decisions.

This model reflects a broader transformation in high-end warfare. Space-based sensing, cyber operations, electronic warfare, stealth penetration, maritime precision strike and networked data flows increasingly function as a single operational ecosystem. Analysts have this convergence as a defining feature of next-generation conflict, in which networked command systems integrate targeting and intelligence across domains. The visible explosion is the final expression of an architecture that may have been positioned and calibrated weeks earlier.

Hybrid war, in this sense, is not irregular warfare; it is not proxy competition; it is an integrated state-on-state conflict across domains executed at compressed speed.

The strategic consequences of the first hour

The ongoing escalation across the region underscores the paradox embedded in this architecture.

Missile exchanges have reached or threatened the Gulf states. Air defense systems across multiple capitals have been activated in layered formations. Civil aviation corridors have narrowed. Energy markets have responded to uncertainty around maritime chokepoints, particularly the , through which roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption passes. Financial centers once considered insulated from direct confrontation have entered the strategic perimeter.

Recent maritime incidents in the Gulf further demonstrate how quickly hybrid conflict can expand into economic and logistical domains. Commercial shipping routes have experienced intermittent disruption, insurance costs for tankers have risen and naval patrols across the Strait of Hormuz have intensified. These developments illustrate how hybrid warfare blurs the boundary between military operations and systemic economic pressure. This is the structural tension of hybrid war. The architecture that enables surgical systemic shock can also accelerate escalation once activated.

By compressing the first hour, integrated operations force adversaries to reassess survivability. States observing these events will draw their own conclusions about resilience, redundancy and deterrence. Hardened infrastructure, distributed command systems, autonomous defensive layers and rapid decision protocols will become central to strategic planning.

The implications extend beyond the Middle East. In an era of renewed great power competition, first-hour survivability may determine campaign trajectories. The side that maintains coherent command and control under simultaneous multidomain pressure gains a disproportionate advantage. The side that loses situational clarity may find that retaliation becomes reactive rather than strategic.

This reality reshapes deterrence theory. Traditional deterrence assumed time for signaling, mobilization and escalation control. Compressed warfare reduces that time. Decision-makers may face irreversible outcomes before full information is available.

The February 28 operation, therefore, signals not only technological maturity but doctrinal adaptation. It reveals a confidence in the ability to integrate domains at speed and scale. It also reveals the vulnerability of centralized command structures to synchronized shock.

If conflict continues, analysts may ultimately study this opening less for the targets struck than for the lesson transmitted: War at the high end is no longer sequential; it is concurrent. Air superiority, cyber disruption, electronic suppression, precision strike and maritime maneuver now unfold as layered expressions of a single architecture. The most consequential battlefield may no longer be geographic, but rather temporal.

In previous eras, states prepared for long campaigns. They anticipated weeks of maneuver before decisive outcomes emerged. In this era, they must prepare for the first 60 minutes. Resilience must be engineered not only into physical infrastructure but into decision-making structures themselves.

The strikes over Tehran did not simply mark an escalation in a regional rivalry. They signaled that the decisive phase of modern conflict may occur before the public recognizes that war has begun. The first hour is no longer a threshold. It is a verdict.

As the conflict now expands toward maritime corridors and energy chokepoints, the logic of the first hour remains central. The architecture that compressed decision time at the outset may shape how escalation unfolds across domains. What began as systemic shock over Tehran now tests resilience from the Gulfā€™s airspace to its shipping lanes. Recent that AI-assisted analytical systems are being used to process battlefield intelligence further illustrate how the speed of decision-making is becoming as strategically decisive as the weapons themselves.

States that fail to protect that decision space may find that the war is effectively lost before it is formally declared.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post How Hybrid Warfare Shaped the Iran War Before It Began appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Under the shadow of economic sanctions imposed by the US and its Western brethren, Venezuelaā€™s oil remained largely buried after nationalization. The countryā€™s oil fields couldnā€™t be upgraded or developed due to a lack of investment, and whatever could be exploited still couldnā€™t be sold freely at the best price. The US thus successfully contained Venezuelaā€™s strategic oil wealth, ensuring that no other country could challenge or alter the USā€™s will.

As if all this were not enough, the US has militarily seized of Venezuelaā€™s oil, effectively turning the country into an oil colony after abducting the intransigent ā€œnarcoterroristā€ President NicolĆ”s Maduro and either coercing or bribing its remaining ruling leadership into absolute submission.ĢżThis is how an empire works.

Asymmetric Western wars

Western wars are always asymmetric in many ways. The unmatched military power and immense resources available to these predominantly Caucasian nations give them a tremendous operational advantage in warfare. Their enormously destructive military technology and ability to strike from a remote safe distance limit their own casualties and material losses to just a fraction of what they inflict on their enemies. Their lineal brotherhood and strategic alliances ā€” which provide a vast pool of military, financial and industrial resources ā€” serve as a powerful force multiplier. Moreover, their tight control over the global economy and financial institutions allows them to influence the official reactions and actions of almost all other countries to their liking. Their highly dominant and sophisticated propaganda machinery shapes the international public opinion in their favor. 

This comprehensive domination enables them to bring war to other peopleā€™s homes while their victims cannot retaliate in kind. The best these victimized nations can do out of vengeance and frustration is to carry out occasional bombings and shootings in the homelands of the Western powers. These occasional incidents are dubbed as the most heinous crimes of cowardly terrorism, while the hundreds of thousands of defenseless people killed in other countries by the relentless aerial bombings and missile strikes of Western nations are glorified as acts of valor and heroism.

Western powers wage such imperialist wars repeatedly under various pretexts, many of which are , full of lies, and marked by brazen dishonesty and double standards. They remain unaffected due to their domination over the international order. In the end, they always get away with their illegal and immoral deception and destruction. Their hegemonic wars are deemed just, while any resistance from others is labeled entirely unworthy and immoral. Others are only expected to surrender and accept the will of Western aggressors.Ģż

That is how things have largely been for a long time. 

In a matter of a mere month

After the implementation of US President Donald Trumpā€™s , which caused almost every country except China to fall in line, and the swift and impressive US military operation in Venezuela on January 3 ā€” which even made the Chinese that their Peopleā€™s Liberation Army (PLA) was lagging far behind ā€” Iran has managed to greatly diminish the USā€™s larger-than-life image in just one month.Ģż

In the eyes of the world, this marks a sudden decline of the US from the zenith of glory achieved in Venezuela. The mythical and mighty B2 bombers, F35 stealth fighters, Tomahawk missiles, Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs), Patriots, THAAD systems and the Gerald Ford aircraft carrier were all proven ineffective. Trumpā€™s much-trumpeted secret weapon, the ā€œdiscombobulator,ā€ which he was used in Venezuela, was nowhere to be seen. And the mockery of the Iranian, Russian and Chinese systems couldnā€™t be made.

The USā€™s acclaimed air superiority, along with its constant bombing and assassinations, couldnā€™t break the will of the Iranians. Nor could Western propaganda make pro-US Iranians march on the streets of Tehran. US Secretary of War Pete Hegsethā€™s animated bullying and Trumpā€™s cold threats on camera and faceless warnings on didnā€™t work either. Iran has stayed firm and held on to its tit-for-tat military strategy unwaveringly from day one.

The US arms lobby also found little to celebrate beyond supply orders, as there was nothing mind-boggling about its technological advancements to attract global interest. In contrast, Iranā€™s unparalleled sacrificial courage and fearless conduct have captured the public imagination. Its sustained and effective has taken the spotlight, sidelining storied Western military technology for the first time in memory.Ģż

Despite tall that the US has decimated Iranian missile capability and decapitated its political and military leadership, there is no let-up in Iranā€™s retaliatory strikes. There are no signs of the nation weakening, much less surrendering and capitulating.

War of attrition and will to endure

The myth surrounding technology and generalship often falls apart during a war of attrition. Scholarly inquiries such as Canadian historian Cathal Nolanā€™s dispel the powerful myths of ā€œmilitary geniusā€ and ā€œdecisive battlesā€ and rouse us to see that victory is achieved ā€œby grinding rather than genius.ā€ However, the heroic tales of Carthaginian General , King of Sweden , John Churchill, 1st duke of , Holy Roman Emperor , French Emperor , German military commander Helmuth von and even German Dictator are still widely told and believed, especially in military circles. Nolan explains this phenomenon:

Modern wars are won by grinding, not by genius. Strategic depth and resolve is always more important than any commander ā€¦ Losers of most major wars in modern history lost because they overestimated operational dexterity and failed to overcome the enemyā€™s strategic depth and capacity for endurance. Winners absorbed defeat after defeat yet kept fighting, overcoming initial surprise, terrible setbacks and the dash and daring of command ā€œgenius.ā€ Celebration of genius generals encourages the delusion that modern wars will be short and won quickly, when they are most often long wars of attrition ā€¦ We might better accept attrition at the start, explain that to those we send to fight, and only choose to fight the wars worth that awful price ā€¦ With humility and full moral awareness of its terrible costs, if we decide that a war is worth fighting, we should praise attrition more and battle less.

History tells us that there is no quick victory in wars that are fought against ideologically committed and determined nations. We have seen it in our own lifetime in Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan and Yemen. Iran, I believe, will be no different, given its conduct of warfare to date. And, it is not difficult to understand why.

Iran is neither Iraq nor Venezuela; it is neither Libya nor Syria. Iran is Iran, and its national honor and pride came out in its refusal to submit to Western money and military might. Today, it is evident to the whole world that the Iranian leadership, military and society are not corrupt like the Venezuelan government ā€” they cannot be bribed ā€” nor are they cowardly.

One cannot fight for long without absolute clarity and total commitment to oneā€™s beliefs. Against sacrificial courage and an iron will to endure, bombs, missiles, death, destruction, duration, along with petty tariffs, are ultimately insignificant. The Iranian people have demonstrated their ability to withstand the worldā€™s greatest military power. No empire can defeat this spirit. No technological superiority can subdue such people. Resistance is never a rational choice; it is always a moral imperative. Those who lead life pragmatically by calculating the costs and benefits of their decisions and actions can never understand why some people(s) resist against all odds.

Illusion of democracy and distortion of legitimacy

The conceit of politicians and intellectuals in democracies is well known. They strongly believe that only a democratically elected government is legitimate, even if the majority (opposition and abstentions) disapproves of their rulers. They are incapable of understanding that there could be other forms of government, backed by much greater majorities than Western-style democracies, due to the spontaneous convergence of minds shaped by shared ideologies and worldviews. 

This Western prejudice against Iran and its political system might have led Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and their advisers to believe that after decapitation strikes, the Iranian people would overthrow the Islamic Revolutionary regime themselves. Instead, powerful religious and nationalist feelings have rallied them all against the aggressors, making the regime more resolute than ever to take on the US, Israel and their hesitant nonwarring enablers in the Gulf and Europe. 

Emergence of doubt and erosion of morale

Whose wars are the imperialist wars? What if we were to arm all supporters of war ā€” including politicians, generals, industrialists, scientists, intellectuals, journalists and their young sons ā€” and send them to the front lines first, with professional soldiers only taking over afterward? In all likelihood, there probably wonā€™t be any wars because most imperialist wars are their wars. Despite the rich and powerful being the main beneficiaries of national projects, they donā€™t fight wars. Instead, wars are fought by the young sons of ordinary people, who stand at the broad base of the national pyramid. In the name of the nation, these countless faceless commoners make all the sacrifices in wars they have no control over starting or ending. 

In normal times, when life is comfortable and manageable, soldiers, along with their families and friends, have no doubts. They are co-opted completely by the overwhelming nationalist propaganda and brainwashed thoroughly by the hegemonic nationalist ideology. At the beginning of a war, people rally enthusiastically behind the nation and credulously believe in the judgment of their political masters. 

However, the seemingly solid national consensus begins to fracture when the death toll continues to mount in a war of attrition with no end in sight. Everyone knows that inside the endless truckloads of coffins that arrive neatly wrapped in the national flags lie the mutilated dead bodies of healthy and handsome young men and women whose lives have been cut short, along with their dreams. Against this dreadful and sorrowful reality, no amount of loud and skillful boasting, bravado, slogans and propaganda makes much difference.

Past that point, the same people ā€” civilians and soldiers ā€” now begin to question, doubt, and recognize the unfairness of the world and the unnecessary nature of the wars. Their common sense reveals truths that scholars discern after years of research. 

Scholarly critique of nationalist ideology and wars of choice

Historically speaking, nations as communities did not naturally exist; they were invented. They are the product of mass politics and its accompanying mythology. Irish political scientist and historian Benedict Anderson, therefore, calls them ā€œā€ in his famous book of the same name. Similarly, US historian Howard Zinn :

Nations are not communities and never have been. The history of any country, presented as the history of a family, conceals fierce conflicts of interest (sometimes exploding, most often repressed) between conquerors and conquered, masters and slaves, capitalists and workers, dominators and dominated in race and sex. 

British-Czech philosopher and social anthropologist Ernest Gellner also that ā€œnations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a mythā€ invented by nationalism. British historian Eric Hobsbawm that ā€œnations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round.ā€ Then, he remarkably sums up the reality of this ideology in just one sentence: ā€œNationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so.ā€

The problem with nationalism is that it not only seeks to make us believe in falsehoods, but it is an extremely hegemonic and intolerant political ideology. It claims absolute legitimacy and demands total loyalty from individuals it identifies as belonging to a nation. According to  Hobsbawm, nationalism ā€œoverrides all other public obligations, and in extreme cases (such as wars) all other obligations of whatever kind.ā€

On the topic of war, US psychologist Philip Zimbardo offers an interesting, yet often-overlooked, perspective when he , ā€œMost wars are about old men persuading young men to harm and kill other young men like themselves.ā€ In contrast, Nolanā€™s perspective is more inclusive and collective. He writes:

War remains the most expensive, complex, physically, emotionally and morally demanding enterprise that humans collectively undertake. No great art or music, no cathedral or temple or mosque, no intercontinental transport net or particle collider or space program, no research for a cure for a mass killing disease receives even a fraction of the resources and effort humanity devotes to making war. Or to recovery from war, and to preparations for future wars that are invested over years and even decades of always tentative peace.

And, we never seem to learn:

After every war we also write more heroic poetry and books preaching ā€œthe old lie.ā€ We bury the dead while neglecting survivors. We mourn awhile ā€¦ then write more war songs and speak of ā€œpouring out the sweet red wine of youthā€ to another generation of boys breathlessly eager for war. We bury more dead, erect more granite statues, and write lists of soon-forgotten foreign place-names scored with acid in brass on stone. We admire oiled images of oafish, mounted generals in silk and lace who led armies to slaughter in endless wars over where to mark off a kingā€™s stone borders. Perhaps most of all, we watch films with reassuring characters and outcomes which glorify war even while supposedly denouncing it.

We do all this without ā€œa critical look at the societies and cultures that produced mass armies and sent them off to fight in faraway fields for causes about which the average soldier knew nothing.ā€

Humanityā€™s moral disengagement and characteristic human hypocrisy

Perhaps, the simplest and the best description of the grotesqueness of the Iran war and dispositional ā€œWestern hypocrisy,ā€ or rather human hypocrisy, comes from the defense minister of Pakistan, Khawaja Asif, who on X, ā€œThe goal of the war seems to have shifted to opening the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before the war.ā€

Clearly, what is most important is the flow of oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz. Most deplorably, what is totally unimportant is the loss of countless human lives ā€” least of all ā€” and the immeasurable pain and suffering of all. We have just seen it in and are now seeing it in and Iran, too. Greed and power have made us all so dastardly pathetic and morally degenerate that we have lost the precious voice of human conscience completely.Ģż

The disruptive Iran war and its geopolitical repercussions

Among the three geopolitical theaters where the US has established military bases ā€” Europe, the Middle East and the Far East ā€” the Middle East offers the least serious military challenge to the US. This is due to the absence of any great military power, such as Russia or China, there. Nonetheless, Iran has delivered a serious strategic blow to the USā€™s reputation as the greatest military and economic power in the world when it initiated an unprovoked imperialist war against Iran.

The war in Iran has disrupted the long-held awe associated with US military might, forcing a reconsideration of its ability to impose its will on others. While the US remains the largest economic and military power, retaining its global network of military bases and alliances, the real impact of the Iran War extends beyond material changes. The war has fundamentally altered global perceptions of the US, especially among nations dependent on US support.

In light of Iranā€™s resolute resistance, no reasonable person can have total trust in the so-called invincible and fabled military might of the US and its ability to protect anyone. Genuine skepticism has replaced the blind faith in the USā€™s ability to prevail over its enemy, which is militarily capable and determined to fight back. Above all, Iran has shaken the confidence of the USā€™s allies regarding the security offered by the US. And, in that sense, the global domination of the US is no longer the same as it was before February 28, 2026. 

Although the final word on the Iran war is yet to be written, I must say, it is impossible to believe that there has been no erosion of confidence of its dependent allies in the US, and that there will be no perceptible strategic repercussions. My theoretical understanding and limited foresight point to the following direction the world may take. 

In a rapidly changing world, the US may not have the luxury of time to restore the perception of its military superiority and magical invincibility, even if public memory shortens. Before China could do it, Iran has fundamentally changed the world forever.

The Greenland incident has also changed many things. After the US laid to Greenland, many in Europe and elsewhere, who had previously been vocal about wanting war without the means to fight it, fell silent, believing in the unwavering and formidable support of the US in their wars. European liberals, once too aggressive in their nationalist rhetoric, are more cautious and measured now; they have stopped roaring and begun to meow. And, the Nordic and Baltic nations are now thinking twice before flexing their infantile muscles to fight a great war.

If Greenland had called into question Washingtonā€™s reliability, Iran has cast a shadow on its capability. So, what now? Maybe, most US vassals in Europe, the Middle East, the Far East and Oceania will come to their senses. Perhaps, they wonā€™t talk about war. Hopefully, many wonā€™t follow in the footsteps of their domestic fascist competitors. Probably, those in South Asia, Africa and South America who are scrambling and groveling to get some shade under the crowded canopy of the US security umbrella will reconsider and go back to their sensible nonalignment. Possibly, nations will rely on good old diplomacy again, choosing sanity over madness; they will sit around and talk, give and take to resolve contentious issues, and make concessions to buy peace.

Itā€™s easy to talk about war. Itā€™s extremely difficult to fight one, especially a protracted war of attrition. 

Lessons of history and the magical powers of propaganda

I will be pleasantly surprised if the world becomes saner as projected above, perhaps wishfully, after learning lessons from the Iran war. But, I will not be surprised at all if Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci is proven right again, when he perceptively , ā€œHistory teaches, but has no pupils.ā€

Throughout history, we have seen that while things may change, nothing actually does. The more things change, the more they stay the same. We know well that the two-and-a-half millennia-old Thucydidesā€™ dictum ā€” propounded in his work ā€” which states that ā€œthe strong do what they can; the weak endure what they must,ā€ continues to hold its ground, defying countless resistance struggles waged by the exploited and oppressed people throughout human history.

It is easy to believe that ā€œI am okay, you are not.ā€ It is easy to invent an enemy and sell its imaginary threat as real and imminent to the public. Dangerous enemies have always been there in the world ā€” the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Iraq, Libya, Syria and so on. There are still plenty in our world ā€” communist China, rabid Russia, nihilist North Korea, fundamentalist Iran, racist South Africa, terrorist Afghanistan, Yemen, Cuba, Colombia and more besides. Manufacturing a narrative around these invented enemies is not very difficult.

Propaganda is an organized and sustained misinformation campaign based on certain ideas, beliefs and, above all, lies, carried out for the purposes of capturing, securing or sustaining power. It is a political tool for manufacturing public opinion and rallying people behind a certain idea, ideology or individual. Propaganda tends to monopolize public discourse by discrediting competing narratives, punishing polemics and smothering dissent.

Propaganda has magical powers, and it is a great winner. It is said that a lie can travel halfway around the world before the truth can get its boots on. Imagine the fate of credulous and prejudiced masses with short memories when a million lies are bombarded from all directions and repeated endlessly. It can make them believe in anything. And, our beliefs and imagined realities can make us do and create anything. This fact is encapsulated in what is called . Propounded by US sociologists William and Dorothy Thomas, this theorem states, ā€œIf men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.ā€

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The Disruptive Iran War, Limits of Western Power and Moral Costs of Grotesque Imperialist Wars appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Warning signs flashing red

The US private credit is facing the greatest stress since the 2007ā€“08 financial crisis, following years of rapid growth. Signs of major trouble emerged this month.

Kunal Shah, the co-chief executive of Goldman Sachs International and global co-head of fixed income, currencies and commodities, that some of his iconic bankā€™s clients were ā€œjust glad thereā€™s something to talk about that isnā€™t software exposures and private credit.ā€ Blackstone Private Credit its first monthly loss since 2022. Ares Management has withdrawals from one of its marquee private credit funds pitched to wealthy individuals, as redemptions surged to 11.6% in the first quarter amid a broad flight from the asset class. Apollo Global Management redemptions from one of its flagship private credit vehicles, becoming the latest investment manager seeking to staunch outflows as wealthy investors retreat from the industry.

Investors are increasingly ditching private credit funds on worries over bad loans ā€” Publicly traded vehicles are trading at steep discounts in a gloomy sign for the broader industry. Last month, Blue Owl permanently restricted investors from withdrawing their cash from its inaugural private retail debt fund. Investors are no longer able to redeem their investments in quarterly intervals voluntarily. In September 2025, twin bankruptcies of Tricolor Holdings and First Brands Group shook private credit markets. Fraud allegations shook investor confidence, which has not recovered since.

These developments, Atul suggests, should be treated as early indicators rather than isolated incidents. The private credit market grew rapidly during years of cheap liquidity, but now faces a more challenging environment of higher rates and slowing growth. Investors appear increasingly concerned about bad loans and liquidity mismatches. Glenn reinforces this interpretation by noting that stress in one corner of finance often signals broader fragility. Like JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon, ā€œcockroach theory,ā€ explaining that ā€œif you see one cockroach, thereā€™s a likelihood there are many others,ā€ implying that the visible problems may only hint at deeper systemic risks.

How private credit works, advantages and risks

To explain the stakes, Atul outlines the structure of private credit. Unlike traditional bank lending, private credit involves non-bank institutions ā€” private equity firms, hedge funds and specialized lenders ā€” providing loans directly to companies. Borrowers are often mid-sized firms that struggle to access public bond markets or face stricter bank regulations introduced after the 2008 crisis.

The model offers advantages. Companies benefit from faster deal-making, flexible terms and confidentiality. Investors, including pension funds and sovereign wealth funds, are attracted by higher yields and floating interest rates that rise with inflation. In an era of low returns, private credit became a major destination for capital.

Yet these same features create vulnerabilities. Loans are illiquid, meaning investors cannot easily exit positions during downturns. Borrowers are typically more sensitive to economic stress, increasing default risk. Limited transparency reduces regulatory oversight. As conditions tighten, these weaknesses become more visible.

The structure of private credit creates a mismatch between investor expectations and underlying assets. Many funds offer periodic redemption windows for investors, but they cannot sell the loans on their books quickly. If investors withdraw simultaneously, funds may face liquidity troubles similar to bank runs.

Atul and Glenn highlight additional warning signs. Some borrowers are paying interest with additional debt rather than cash, a practice known as payment-in-kind. This can mask deteriorating financial health. Covenant-lite deals ā€” contracts with weaker lender protections ā€” have also become widespread, leaving fewer tools to manage distress. Sources say that years of low rates reduced risk premiums and encouraged aggressive lending.

Glenn links private credit stress to wider economic vulnerabilities. Rising interest rates, slowing growth and technological disruption ā€” particularly from artificial intelligence ā€” are putting pressure on mid-sized companies that depend on this financing. If defaults increase, refinancing options may narrow, potentially triggering layoffs and bankruptcies.

Investor warnings and the threat of systemic risk

Atul and Glenn note that prominent investors and policymakers are already raising alarms. Dimon has also cautioned that risks may be ā€œhiding in plain sight.ā€

Mohamed El-Erian, a legendary investor and the former CEO of investment manager PIMCO, has unequivocally sounded the alarm:

Is this a ā€œcanary-in-the-coalmineā€ moment, similar to August 2007? This question will be on the mind of some investors and policymakers this morning as they assess the news that, quoting the FT, the ā€œprivate credit group Blue Owl will permanently restrict investors from withdrawing their cash from its inaugural private retail debt fund.ā€ Thereā€™s plenty to think about here, starting with the risks of an investing phenomenon in advanced (not developing) markets that has gone too far overall (short answer: yes), to the approaches being taken by specific firms (lots of differences, yet subject to the ā€œmarket for lemonsā€ risk). Thereā€™s also the ā€œelephant in the roomā€ question regarding much larger systemic risks (nowhere near the magnitude of those which fueled the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, but a significant ā€“ and necessary ā€“ valuation hit is looming for specific assets).

Others are more optimistic than El-Erian and argue that financial markets will be able to shrug off private credit market risk. They think that the Federal Reserve will keep interest rates low, avoiding excessive tightening of credit markets. Also, although software companies face terminal value risk, this does not impact their debt in most cases. They can cut costs rapidly and generate significant cash.

Atul argues that banks withdrew from riskier lending after the financial crisis, allowing private credit firms to fill the gap. This shift moved risk into less-regulated areas. Complex structures, limited transparency and overlapping exposures now complicate assessment of true valuations. If stress spreads, mid-sized companies that rely on private credit may struggle to refinance operations, amplifying the economic slowdown.

Glenn concludes by placing private credit within a larger narrative of structural fragility. He links the sectorā€™s vulnerabilities to rising US debt, weakening demand for US Treasuries, delayed effects of the Trump administrationā€™s tariffs and broader economic imbalances. Together, these factors suggest that financial markets may be underestimating downside risks. Atul echoes the concern, warning of ā€œflashing warning signsā€ that point to a sustained downturn rather than a temporary correction.

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Yemen and the limits of proxy conflict

Carvajal explains that the roots of todayā€™s tensions lie in Yemen, where Saudi Arabia and the UAE cooperated for nearly a decade after forming a coalition in March 2015. Saudi Arabia managed operations in the north, while the UAE focused on the south, cultivating close ties with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) through financial and political support. This arrangement helped stabilize the southern provinces after Houthi militants were expelled in 2015.

That balance unraveled in December 2025, when a local dispute in Yemenā€™s southern Hadramaut region escalated. A deputy governor seized control of a government oil facility, prompting UAE-aligned STC forces to intervene. Saudi Arabia responded by declaring instability near its border a national security threat and deploying its newly trained National Shield Forces into northern Hadramaut and the eastern governorate of Mahra.

While media narratives framed the episode as a proxy war, Carvajal argues it was ā€œa natural consequenceā€ of rival factions competing for territory and influence. Crucially, the crisis exposed an unspoken rule within the Gulf: Despite rivalry, neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE will directly confront the other militarily. As Carvajal notes, this restraint reflects ā€œbasic tribalismā€ and an enduring awareness that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) remains inseparable and indivisible geographically and historically.

East Africa: Sudan as the new battleground

The rivalry now extends beyond the peninsula, particularly into Sudan. Carvajal points out that in late 2025, the United States delegated peace efforts in Sudan to Saudi Arabia after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salmanā€™s visit to Washington. With US engagement increasingly hands-off, Saudi Arabia moved from mediation to direct involvement.

Over recent weeks, Saudi Arabia announced it would purchase all of Sudanā€™s gold. This effectively underwrote the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and marginalized Iranā€™s role in the process. Carvajal observes that Iran has ā€œtaken a back seatā€ as Saudi Arabia stepped forward financially and politically. At the same time, the SAF signed a major arms deal with Pakistan, a move Carvajal links indirectly to Saudi funding.

These developments, he argues, are not isolated. They reflect Saudi Arabiaā€™s effort to counter Emirati influence in East Africa while filling a vacuum left by the US. Sudan, in this sense, has become a testing ground for a more assertive Saudi regional posture.

Nuclear signaling and strategic optics

A major theme of the discussion is the emergence of new defense alignments involving nuclear powers. In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a strategic defense agreement declaring that an attack on one would be treated as an attack on both. Turkey has since expressed interest in joining the pact.

Carvajal is blunt about the military realities. It is, he says, ā€œhighly unlikelyā€ that Saudi, Turkish or Pakistani soldiers would fight and die for one another. Instead, these agreements function as geopolitical signaling. They give Saudi Arabia what Carvajal calls ā€œthe optic of going nuclear,ā€ without crossing that threshold itself.

This signaling is aimed squarely at Iran and shaped by frustration with Washington. Saudi Arabia, Carvajal says, has been ā€œbeggingā€ the US for a formal defense pact since the administration of US President Joe Biden, unsuccessfully. In parallel, the UAE has pursued its own balancing strategy, announcing negotiations with India over defense cooperation and nuclear sharing. Carvajal frames the UAEā€™s outreach as ā€œshowing the flagā€ rather than a literal expectation of Indian military protection.

China waits in the wings

Underlying all of these shifts is the perceived retreat of the US. Carvajal argues that Washington is gradually pulling away from the region under US President Donald Trump, creating uncertainty for Gulf monarchies accustomed to US security guarantees. Trumpā€™s unpredictability, combined with looming US midterm elections, makes long-term planning difficult.

Carvajal sees Chinese caution rather than commitment. Gulf states are in a wait-and-see mode until the political direction of the US becomes clearer. Still, a shift toward Chinese weapons systems would be easy, especially as cheap, effective drones reduce reliance on expensive Western aircraft in conflicts like Yemen.

Rivalry without rupture

Despite escalating competition, Carvajal remains confident that Saudi Arabia and the UAE will reconcile. Yemen places such a heavy burden on Saudi Arabia that Saudi leaders will eventually ask the UAE to reengage under a new framework. The UAE has already signaled it is handing full responsibility for Yemen back to Saudi Arabia.

In the longer term, Carvajal envisions the two states acting as co-hegemons within the GCC, potentially positioning themselves as mediators beyond the peninsula, including in South Asia. The rivalry is real but temporary, a phase shaped by uncertainty rather than a permanent fracture.

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Military dominance and the limits of victory

Olmert begins with a stark assessment of the battlefield balance. Iranā€™s conventional military capacity has suffered severe damage, particularly in the air and at sea. ā€œItā€™s a major, major defeat to the Iranians,ā€ he says, pointing to the destruction of naval assets and the absence of effective air cover. Without those capabilities, he contends, Iranian ground forces cannot alter the strategic equation.

Singh presses him on whether military degradation alone determines the outcome. After all, Iran continues to launch missiles and project resilience. Olmert makes a crucial distinction between material losses and political meaning. Olmert emphasizes that victory is interpreted differently across cultures. From a Western strategic perspective, he suggests, the loss of command structures and military infrastructure signals defeat. Yet the Iranian capital of Tehran can claim success simply by surviving and continuing limited strikes.

This difference means the two sides are judging the war by different standards. As long as Iran continues to resist and avoids collapse, it can tell audiences at home and across the region that it is still standing firm. That makes it more difficult for the US or Israel to claim a clear-cut victory, even if they have done more damage militarily.

The Strait of Hormuz and global leverage

The conversation then shifts to the economic and geopolitical stakes surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. Singh underscores the chokepointā€™s significance: A substantial share of global energy, fertilizers and critical materials moves through the Gulf. Any disruption reverberates across Asia, Africa and Europe, raising inflation and questioning American credibility as a security guarantor.

Iranā€™s strategy of threatening shipping is predictable but risky. Olmert argues that Tehran is attempting to extract geopolitical leverage by challenging freedom of navigation, though superior military power will eventually counter this strategy. Regardless, the very existence of the disruption strengthens Iranā€™s narrative that the war is not settled.

The Strait thus becomes both a military and symbolic battleground. If shipping remains threatened, Iran can claim leverage despite battlefield setbacks. Conversely, reopening the corridor becomes a political necessity for Washington. The economic stakes, therefore, underline the same point: How the war is interpreted does not necessarily match what is happening on the ground.

Political pressures in Washington and Jerusalem

Singh and Olmert also examine domestic constraints on leadership. Olmert says that time may favor Iran politically, even if it does not militarily. ā€œ[US President] Trump doesnā€™t have a limitless amount of time,ā€ he notes, pointing to electoral pressures and public opinion. A prolonged conflict risks eroding American support, especially if the people do not see any concrete results from it.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces his own difficulties. Singh highlights Israeli public fatigue from continued missile threats and political controversies at home. Olmert agrees that Netanyahu is under pressure, though he believes Israelā€™s military achievements give him room to maneuver.

As a result, the political window is narrowing. Both leaders must demonstrate success without allowing the conflict to escalate out of control. This dynamic reinforces incentives for negotiation ā€” but also for continued pressure to improve bargaining positions.

Negotiations and uncertainty about authority

Reports of potential talks, including mediation efforts by Pakistan, complicate the situation. Olmert questions whether negotiators on either side possess real authority. Iranian representatives may not fully control decision-making, especially amid leadership uncertainty. On the American side, internal divisions within the administration complicate strategy.

Israel, meanwhile, is not formally at the negotiating table but influences outcomes through continued military operations. Singh characterizes this as a ā€œveto on the ground,ā€ shaping conditions for diplomacy. Olmert agrees that Israeli actions will help determine whether any agreement emerges.

Despite discussion of a potential multi-point framework restricting nuclear activity and missile capabilities, Olmert remains cautious. He estimates the chances of success at less than even odds: ā€œI would give it only 49%.ā€

Survival, escalation and possible outcomes

Singh and Olmert conclude with competing scenarios. Iran could capitulate, negotiations could succeed or escalation could continue. All parties have incentives to push further: Israel to degrade Iranian capabilities, the US to secure the Strait of Hormuz and Iran to maintain leverage through resilience.

Olmert ultimately argues that the Iranian regimeā€™s primary objective is survival. Even limited concessions might be framed domestically as victory if the system endures. Historical precedent, such as Iranā€™s decision to end the Iranā€“Iraq War in 1988, suggests that ideological regimes may compromise when survival is at stake.

Whether that moment arrives depends on time, pressure and political calculations in Washington and Tehran. The coming weeks will be decisive. The battlefield may favor Israel and the US, but the strategic outcome will hinge on perception, leadership constraints and the fragile balance between escalation and negotiation.

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As Khattar Singh presses Alavi on military capabilities, regional reactions and global alignments, the discussion probes whether Washington and Tel Aviv have triggered a wider strategic shift they cannot easily control.

A miscalculation with unintended consequences

Alavi argues that the killing of Khamenei reflects a fundamental misreading of Iranian society and the broader Muslim world. Instead of triggering unrest, the attack appears to have consolidated support for the Iranian state. ā€œThe United States and Israel miscalculated and did not realize the popularity of Ali,ā€ he says, pointing to emotional reactions across Shia communities and beyond.

Khattar Singh tests this claim against the expectation in Washington and Tel Aviv that regime change pressures would follow. In Alaviā€™s account, the opposite has occurred. The removal of a central figure has not fractured the system but instead strengthened it, reducing the likelihood of internal dissent in the short term. This inversion of expectations raises a larger question about whether external military pressure can still produce predictable political outcomes in the region.

The nuclear threshold

What lies in the future for Iranā€™s nuclear policy? Alavi suggests that Khamenei had acted as a restraining force against weaponization and that his absence may remove a key barrier. ā€œWith him gone, chances are Iran probably will go [for a] nuclear weapon,ā€ he warns, framing the shift as both a response to public sentiment and a strategic necessity.

Khattar Singh connects this argument to the logic of deterrence. If Iranian leaders conclude that nuclear capability could have prevented such a strike, the incentive structure changes dramatically. The war risks accelerating precisely the outcome it may have sought to prevent. It is unclear whether this shift would be immediate or gradual, but strategic calculations can quickly evolve under pressure.

Missiles, drones and the balance of force

Turning to the battlefield, Alavi emphasizes Iranā€™s use of ballistic missiles and drones to target US and allied assets across the region. He claims that Tehran has already degraded American infrastructure in the Persian Gulf and retains significant reserves of more advanced weaponry. According to his assessment, the current phase of attacks may represent only a partial deployment of Iranā€™s capabilities.

Khattar Singh raises a critical point about sustainability. While the tempo of launches has fluctuated, the key question is how long Iran can maintain pressure. Alavi says that Iran has planned for a prolonged conflict and may be conserving its most destructive systems. US defensive capacity could erode over time. ā€œThe sky is very much open for Iran,ā€ he warns.

Regional reactions and shifting alignments

The conversation widens to examine how regional actors are responding. Alavi portrays Gulf states as constrained, reliant on US systems they do not fully control, and increasingly uneasy about Washingtonā€™s priorities. At the same time, he suggests that public sentiment in parts of the Arab world is diverging from official policy, reflecting deeper frustrations with existing political arrangements.

Khattar Singh introduces the roles of India and Pakistan, highlighting how the war is reshaping relationships beyond the immediate theater. Alavi predicts strain in Iranā€™s ties with India while describing Pakistan as more cautious, at least for now. These shifts point to a broader reordering in which countries are recalibrating their positions amid uncertainty about US strategy and regional stability.

Toward a multipolar order

The discussion concludes by examining global implications. Alavi situates the conflict within a larger contest involving Russia and China, both of which he believes have incentives to support Iran through intelligence, coordination or economic alignment. The war, in this view, is not an isolated crisis but part of a wider transition in the international system.

Khattar Singh presses on whether this moment marks a turning point. Alavi argues that sustained conflict could weaken US influence and accelerate the emergence of a more multipolar order. While his conclusions are sharply framed, the underlying point is clear: the consequences of this war extend far beyond the battlefield. What began as a targeted strike may instead be catalyzing a broader transformation in regional and global power dynamics.

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A distinct identity, not a proxy pawn

The (Anį¹£Är Allāh) are frequently labeled as Iranian proxies, but this characterization oversimplifies their nature. While Tehran has supplied weapons and technical know-how over the years, the Houthis are not a direct military arm of Iran and retain significant autonomy in their decision-making. Researchers that Iran lacks direct control over Houthi behavior, which is shaped by Yemenā€™s local dynamics as much as by transregional alliances.

Historically, the group emerged in the early 2000s from local grievances in northern Yemen long before any meaningful Iranian support, and its ideology ā€” rooted in Zaydi Shiā€˜a traditions ā€” differs from the Lebanese or Iraqi militias often described as Tehranā€™s ā€œproxies.ā€ 

1. Preserving diplomatic gains with Gulf powers

One central reason for the Houthisā€™ calibrated posture is their quiet diplomatic engagement with Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia. After years of brutal conflict in Yemen, mediated talks ā€” often facilitated by Oman ā€” have created openings for a potential political settlement that could legitimize the Houthisā€™ control in the north and expand their role in national governance. 

Escalating militarily in a broader regional war could jeopardize these fragile diplomatic advances by provoking Riyadh and its partners, putting at risk the limited dĆ©tente that has allowed a relative lull in Yemenā€™s .Ģż

2. Lessons from past military reprisals

Another powerful deterrent has been the memory of punitive strikes on Houthi positions by the US and Israel. During the Gaza conflict and its aftermath, heavy bombardments Houthi infrastructure and leadership, including air strikes that significantly degraded their military capabilities.Ģż

Analysts argue that the Houthis are acutely aware of their limitations against the superior air power of the US and Israeli militaries. They may well fear that renewed escalation on behalf of Iran could invite another round of devastating strikes, further eroding their ability to hold territory and govern effectively. 

3. Economic fragility and domestic priorities

Yemen remains one of the worldā€™s , and Houthi-controlled areas have been economically devastated by years of conflict. The group faces severe budgetary constraints, disrupted port revenues and widespread socioeconomic hardship among its population.Ģż

With many public sector workers unpaid and basic services collapsing, escalating into a full-fledged regional war could inflict catastrophic economic damage on areas under Houthi control, eroding the regimeā€™s legitimacy among its own people.

4. Strategic patience and timing

A recurring theme across expert analyses is that the Houthis may simply be waiting for the right moment to act. Their leadership has suggested readiness, their ā€œfingers are on the trigger,ā€ but stops short of committing to open conflict.

This ā€œstrategic patienceā€ could be aimed at preserving military capability for when it matters most ā€” not necessarily in defence of Iran, but to strengthen their bargaining power in any future regional settlement or negotiations over Yemenā€™s political future. Such a move, analysts suggest, could enhance their leverage at a critical juncture rather than diminish it prematurely.

A broader regional balance

Finally, the Houthisā€™ caution reflects a broader recalibration of alliances across the Middle East. Even other Iranian-aligned groups in Lebanon and Iraq have shown restraint, balancing ideological solidarity with considerations of domestic stability and geopolitical risk. 

The Houthisā€™ restraint should not be interpreted simply as indecision or weakness. Instead, it underscores the complex interplay of local interests, diplomatic maneuvering and strategic self-preservation that defines Yemenā€™s role in a wider regional conflict. As the war evolves, so too might the Houthisā€™ calculations ā€” but whatever course they take, it will likely be driven first by Yemeni considerations, rather than solely by allegiance to Iran.

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The White House had warned that Iranian power plants and energy facilities could be hit if the Strait of Hormuz was not reopened. But by Monday, Trump had paused those strikes after what he called ā€œproductiveā€ contacts, even as Iran any talks were taking place. Reuters also that the pause appears to apply only to energy sites, not to wider military targets. That is not a coherent strategy. It is a tactical retreat from one especially dangerous form of escalation.

The limits of military pressure and the tactical retreat

The most telling detail is why Trump pulled back. Reuters also that Gulf Arab states had warned Washington that strikes on Iranian power infrastructure could trigger severe retaliation against energy assets across the Gulf. In other words, the threat to hit power plants did not promise control; it threatened a wider regional breakdown. That matters because it changes how we should understand the original ultimatum. It was not a credible plan for reopening Hormuz. It was a way of shifting pressure away from a military bottleneck and onto civilian systems. When a government cannot quickly solve the problem in the water, it starts looking for leverage on land. Too often, that means ordinary life becomes the battlefield.

That shift should worry anyone who still believes strategy and restraint belong in the same sentence. The Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed, oil is still , and countries like Japan are reserves because the disruption has not ended.

The five-day extension: buying time, not solutions

The five-day extension did not reopen the channel. It bought time in the markets and perhaps time for mediation, but it did not change the underlying fact that the US has not found a workable way to force the strait open without risking . A threat against civilian infrastructure may sound forceful on television, but it does not move mines, widen shipping lanes or create political consent where none exists.

The military problem here is more stubborn than Trumpā€™s rhetoric suggests. Hormuz is one of the worldā€™s most critical , with about 20 million barrels per day of crude and oil products moving through it in 2025, or roughly a quarter of global seaborne oil trade. There are only a limited number of ways around it. That geography is why even some of Washingtonā€™s allies have being dragged into a rush to ā€œunblockā€ it on Trumpā€™s terms.

Alliesā€™ reservations, geographic reality and humanitarian stakes

According to , several allies were unenthusiastic about providing military support, and some conditioned any role on de-escalation rather than war expansion. The problem is not a lack of threats; it is that threats do not solve geography.

This is also where the legal danger becomes impossible to ignore. International humanitarian law attacking or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. That principle matters everywhere, but it carries special weight in the Gulf, where electricity and desalination are not luxuries. They are part of how millions of people get water and keep hospitals, homes and public life functioning.

The EUā€™s leaders recognized the danger last week when they for a moratorium on strikes against energy and water facilities in the Middle East. That call was not a diplomatic decoration. It was an acknowledgment that this war is edging toward attacks whose civilian consequences cannot be brushed aside as collateral.

Trumpā€™s defenders will argue that the threat worked because it created diplomatic space. Maybe. But even that claim looks thin. Iran publicly denied the existence of direct talks, and Reuters that Tehran has hardened its negotiating position and is demanding far more than Washington appears willing to accept. If so, the five-day pause is less a breakthrough than a holding pattern. It may for a few hours and allow intermediaries to shuttle messages, but it does not settle the central issue. A bluff against power infrastructure is not the same as a maritime solution. It is an attempt to compensate for strategic frustration by raising the civilian stakes.

The drift toward civilian targets and the erosion of strategy

That is what makes this episode larger than one deadline. The real story is not simply that Trump changed 48 hours to five days. It is that the warā€™s logic has drifted. The pressure is no longer confined to ships, missiles and naval patrols. It is being pushed outward, toward grids, pumps, ports and desalination plants, as if civilian vulnerability can succeed where military coercion has stalled. That is a familiar pattern in modern wars.

When leaders cannot deliver the outcome they promised, they do not always scale back. Sometimes they widen the pain until something breaks. The danger now is that what breaks first will not be the blockade. It will be the line separating war from the deliberate degradation of civilian life.

If the Trump administration were serious about reopening Hormuz, it would be investing its political capital in de-escalation, coalition diplomacy and a realistic assessment of what force can and cannot do in a narrow, mined, heavily exposed waterway. Instead, it flirted with the idea of turning energy and possibly water systems into bargaining chips, then stepped back only after Gulf allies warned that the costs could spiral beyond control. That is not strength; it is an admission that the original approach has failed. And once a war begins leaning on the infrastructure civilians need to live, it is usually a sign not that victory is near, but that strategy is running out.

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Tactical success, strategic uncertainty

Atul starts with the scale of the military campaign. By March 21, 21 days into the war, US and Israeli forces had struck more than 7,800 targets, destroyed over 120 vessels and flown more than 8,000 combat missions. The opening phase appeared to demonstrate overwhelming operational dominance. Yet the expected political result ā€” rapid Iranian capitulation ā€” has not materialized.

Instead, Iran has absorbed the strikes and continued to resist. Glenn emphasizes that tactical superiority does not automatically translate into strategic victory. The early assumption that Iran would collapse under pressure now appears misplaced. The discussion, therefore, pivots from battlefield metrics to the structural factors underpinning Iranian resilience.

The IRGC and the ā€œmosaicā€ model

Atul and Glenn argue that Iranā€™s endurance stems largely from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its decentralized ā€œmosaic strategy.ā€ Over decades, the IRGC has built a dispersed command structure with redundant leadership layers, independent provincial decision-making and distributed infrastructure. This design reduces the effectiveness of decapitation strikes and allows continued operations even after heavy losses.

Glenn explains the logic by comparing centralized vulnerability to distributed resilience: ā€œIf you have a single point of failure, you cut a telephone wire andā€¦ the communication stops, but if you have 50 different telephone wires going 50 different routes, then you have a much harder problem.ā€ The analogy underscores how Iranā€™s structure mirrors modern networked systems. Deep underground facilities, dispersed drone production and succession planning up to four levels reinforce this resilience. As a result, the conflict has shifted from expectations of quick collapse to the prospect of prolonged attrition.

Four scenarios, one dominant trajectory

Atul and Glenn outline four potential outcomes. The first, Iran folding, now appears unlikely. The second, an early negotiated settlement, is rational but improbable given mutual distrust and divergent objectives. The third scenario, unilateral cessation by Washington and Jerusalem, also seems doubtful because Israel perceives the conflict as existential and seeks continued pressure.

The fourth scenario, escalation, appears the most likely. Iranā€™s leverage lies in constraining traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, while the United States faces pressure to reopen the chokepoint. Glenn questions Washingtonā€™s strategic clarity, invoking a proverb to highlight the problem: ā€œWhatever wind is blowingā€¦ serves no purpose if you have no destination.ā€ Without a clear objective, escalation risks becoming self-perpetuating.

Atul adds that Israeli strategy resembles ā€œmowing the lawn,ā€ repeatedly degrading Iranian capabilities in hopes of weakening the regime. Yet this approach, combined with Iranian resilience, increases the likelihood of sustained conflict rather than decisive resolution.

Short- and medium-term economic shock

Beyond military scenarios, Atul and Glenn stress immediate economic consequences. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz constricts energy supply, raising prices for crude oil, LNG and refined products such as jet fuel and diesel. Prices of fertilizers and industrial inputs will shoot up as well, causing high inflation globally. All ā€œdanger signs are flashing red.ā€

Within a year, the effects compound. Higher fuel and fertilizer costs threaten agricultural output, raising the risk of food shortages, particularly in import-dependent countries. Gulf monarchies, facing reduced energy revenue, may draw down investments, sell assets and pause purchases of US debt. These shifts could push interest rates higher and depress global asset prices.

The ripple effects extend across Europe, Asia and emerging markets worldwide. Energy-dependent economies face slower growth, while manufacturing centers confront rising input costs. Financial markets may be underestimating the persistence of these pressures.

Long-term consequences for global order

Looking further ahead, Atul and Glenn warn of a profound structural transformation. Sustained high energy prices could produce stagflation reminiscent of the 1970s, or even more severe inflation given todayā€™s monetary conditions. Monetary policy has been far too loose for far too long. Furthermore, the petrodollar system may weaken if Gulf states lose confidence in US security guarantees. Reduced demand for dollars could gradually erode Americaā€™s financial dominance.

Glenn concludes with a broader geopolitical warning. He suggests what intelligence planners like him once envisaged as the worst-case scenario: Pax Americana is giving way to a fractured international system. The restraints of international law and the UN-Bretton Woods system on inter-state behavior are declining. Instead, the world is experiencing an increase in Hobbesian conflict, and increasing striation of states into ā€œhavesā€ and ā€œhave-nots,ā€ in which the strong become stronger and the weak become de facto satellites. A system with several poles with several great powers is emerging. Weaker states increasingly orbit around these poles. A Hobbesian world where the powerful dominate and the weak suffer is increasingly coming into place. 

Atul concludes by saying that this could be Americaā€™s Suez and 2026 is the new 1956. If Iran prevails then it will extract geopolitical rent from the Strait of Hormuz. The Persian Gulf will not be an American lake again. Donald Trump would end up as the American Anthony Eden who presided over the British disaster to retake Suez, another key chokepoint, in 1956. There is a further question about American global hegemony: If America cannot open the Strait of Hormuz, can the US Navy enter the Taiwan Strait?

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Their significance is linked to that of maritime transport itself, which represents the fundamental bloodstream of global trade. This transport carries of the worldā€™s trade by volume, carrying vital crude oil and other raw materials, semi-processed goods or finished products. As such, it plays a fundamental role within international supply chains.

Different kinds of maritime routes

Maritime routes man-made or natural. Among the first group are the Panama and the Suez canals. Within the second, among others, are the Hormuz, Malacca or Gibraltar straits. In both cases, they represent funnels of high strategic significance. Some more than others, of course. Indeed, according to their strategic importance, they can be divided into primary and secondary chokepoints. The former refers to connectors that, if disrupted, could seriously impair global trade. The latter, on the contrary, represent support maritime passages that entail significant detours in the event of disruption. The best example of a primary chokepoint is the Strait of Hormuz, while the Strait of Taiwan, the Sunda Strait (between the islands of Java and Sumatra) or the Dover Strait are examples of secondary ones.

The top four

The top four maritime routes (or chokepoints) are the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal. The first of them represents the compulsory crossing pathway between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Beyond being a very important merchandise transit route, representing of the global seaborne trade, it is one of the worldā€™s two main energy chokepoints. It is indeed the inescapable transit route for 20 to 21 million barrels of oil per day, representing of global oil consumption and 25% to 30% of global seaborne oil trade. At the same time, it is the passage route for 20% of the global liquified natural gas (LNG) trade. Some of the worldā€™s largest hydrocarbons exporters ā€” Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ā€” rely on this route, as do the largest Asian consumers: China, India, Japan and South Korea.

The connects the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea (in the Pacific Ocean). It is the route through which 30% of global trade and 23.7 million barrels of oil pass daily. This includes two-thirds of Chinaā€™s trade volume and around 80% of its energy imports. It is between the island of Sumatra (Indonesia) and the Malay Peninsula (Malaysia and Singapore). Around 29% of the global seaborne oil trade passes through the Strait of Malacca. In fact, to reduce its critical reliance on the Strait of Malacca, China has a major energy corridor through Myanmar. A corridor consisting of two parallel pipelines transporting crude oil and natural gas from the Indian Ocean coast of Myanmar to Southwestern China.

The , on its part, connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea, which leads to the Indian Ocean. Between 12% and 15% of worldwide trade and about 30% of global container traffic transits this route. Roughly 9% of the global seaborne oil flows (about 9.2 million oil barrels a day) and 8% of liquified natural gas (LNG) volumes use this route.

The connects the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. About 5% of global marine trade passes through it. Meanwhile, barrels of oil per day pass through this waterway. However, while the Suez Canal allowed for the transit of supertankers of up to 200 thousand tons, the Panama Canal was limited to 65 thousand tons and to a configuration adapted to its particular standards. The so-called Panamax standards. Since 2014, as a result of the expansion of the canal, the standard has applied, substantially increasing both capacity and tonnage ā€” now reaching 120,000 tons.

Other maritime routes

In addition to the aforementioned big four maritime routes, the Cape of Good Hope and the Strait of Magellan must also be mentioned. While the former connects the Atlantic and the Indian oceans at the South of the African continent, the latter links the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans through the Southern seas of South America. The Cape of Good Hope has much greater strategic significance, not only because the economic emergence of China and the Indo-Pacific sphere has enhanced its relevance, but also because the Strait of Magellan has lost much of its significance in the last few decades. This was a result of the 1980s transcontinental , which allowed for the massive transport of containers between the USā€™s East and West coasts.

However, the Strait of Magellan could have better days ahead if climate change keeps affecting the Panama Canal. Indeed, lack of has hampered canal operations in recent years. In 2023, the El NiƱo climate phenomenon, which impacted rainfall, caused water levels to plunge in the lakes that feed the canal, leading to a forced reduction in vessel crossings.

Of much relevance, as well, are the Strait of Gibraltar, the Turkish straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles) and the Danish straits (Kattegat and Skagerrak). They respectively connect the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea (through the Sea of Marmara), and the Baltic Sea with the North Sea. 

As a result of global warming, two additional major maritime routes are opening in the Arctic ā€” the North-East route (bordering Canada) and the North-West route (bordering Russia). While they are considered interior waters by both Canada and Russia, the US asserts that they are international straits conferring open transit rights. The US, indeed, both countriesā€™ claims as illegitimate. The geopolitical and economic significance of the Arctic routes may be enormous, as they could represent new active passages between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. This would diminish the geostrategic importance of the Strait of Malacca and, as a consequence, that of Singapore as a maritime hub.

Highly sensitive geopolitical spots

Needless to say, in addition to their economic relevance, or precisely because of it, maritime routes are highly sensitive geopolitical spots. The Suez Canal has a longstanding history in this regard. In 1956, after Egyptā€™s President Gamal Abdel Nasser the canal, an invasion by Britain, France and Israel took place. For several months, the canal remained closed, significantly disrupting global shipping and trade. Ten years later, in 1967, the Suez Canal was again closed, as it became the frontline between the combatant forces of Israel and Egypt, during the . Following the conflict, this waterway remained shut for eight years, adding around 8,000 to 10,000 kilometers to trade shipping routes that depended on the canal.Ģż

At the opposite end of the waterway that connects with the Suez Canal ā€” in the Southern tip of the Red Sea that joins the Indian Ocean ā€” there have also been recent problems. In the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, the Iranian-backed Houthis of Yemen have been commercial shipping since the end of 2023. This is in retaliation for Israelā€™s war in Gaza.

Although the Strait of Malacca is not a contentious international spot, its adjacent South China Sea remains one of the worldā€™s most disputed maritime areas. Stepping over the claims of several South East Asian countries, as well as over the normative of the on the Law of the Sea and the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, China asserts its rights over 90% of the South China Sea.

Moreover, in 2010, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi that the sea represented a ā€œcore national interestā€ for his country, while telling his Southeast Asian counterparts at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting that ā€œChina is a big country and other countries are small countries, and thatā€™s just a fact.ā€ Additionally, in order to assert control over this waterway, China has built and militarized to the teeth 27 within it.

Chinaā€™s claims are not only rejected by its South China Sea neighbors but also by the US and a significant part of the international community. The US and many Western nations assert a right of free passage through this sea, challenging Chinaā€™s claim by periodically sailing its warships through it. Although 80% of Chinaā€™s crude oil imports and the bulk of its exports sail through this waterway, the same happens to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, it is a vital trade route for the 620 million people who inhabit Southeast Asian countries. A trade of more than takes place annually in those waters, representing more than one-third of the worldā€™s maritime traffic.

The Panama Canal has also become a sensitive geopolitical spot in recent times. By asserting American rights under the Monroe Doctrine, US President Donald Trump has to take it, while forcing Chinese interests out of the canal. Indeed, Hong Kongā€™s company CK Hutchinson, which controlled two ports within it, was as a result of Washingtonā€™s pressure and forced to sell such assets to the American BlackRock group. However, the represented by Trumpā€™s threat of taking possession of the Panama Canal has not disappeared.

Geopolitical significance of the Strait of Hormuz

The previous geopolitical issues provide the background for the current state of belligerence in the Strait of Hormuz. Americaā€™s bombardment of Iran, being the result of a war of choice, led to what should have been anticipated ā€” Tehranā€™s blockade of the strait. This has led to an in oil prices that, amid fluctuations, have reached up to 40% above pre-crisis levels, while halting about 20% of global oil and liquified natural gas flows. This makes the current crisis even worse than the two oil shocks of the 1970s put together.

This situation had its antecedent in the so-called Tanker War of 1984ā€“1988, a critical phase of the , during which both sides targeted oil shipping in the Persian Gulf. As a result of Iraqā€™s attacks on Iranian oil exports, Iran retaliated by targeting not only Iraqi shipping but also neutral vessels. Over 400 oil tankers and commercial ships were struck during that period, making the targeting of civil shipping a tool of war. More recently, as mentioned before, the Houthis carried out attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, in retaliation for events in Gaza.

Both cases show a worrisome pattern of maritime insecurity. Within it, state and nonstate actors exploit maritime chokepoints to exert pressure on global energy flows as an instrument of war. Maritime routes represent the ideal setting for asymmetric warfare, as they allow for weaker actors to exploit geography, cheaper technology and economic vulnerability to inflict maximum damage. Whereas in sea or on land, narrow paths have always been the perfect spot for the few to successfully confront the many. A good historical example in this regard dates back to 480 BC, when King Leonidasā€™s 300 Spartan hoplites stopped for several days hundreds of thousands of Persian invaders, at the Pass of .

Current events in the Strait of Hormuz have become a perfect example of both the paramount importance and the extreme vulnerability of maritime routes. Especially so when there are no alternative routes involved, as in this case. Contrary to the closure of the Suez Canal in the 1960s and 1970s, which had an optional, although much longer shipping route around the Southern tip of Africa, the Strait of Hormuz presents no alternative. There is no other waterway, indeed, to go in or out of the Persian Gulf.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The Strait of Hormuz and the Significance of Maritime Routes appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Of course, such personal exposure inevitably brings both insights largely inaccessible to foreigners and also potential biases. Such biases are not necessarily problematic but merely reflect the fact that personal exposure is likely to add to an outsiderā€™s knowledge and also modify their understanding of why they are as they are and see the world as they do. Gaining such cultural insights greatly aids communication. Of course, acquiring such insights by ā€œā€ is not the same as necessarily agreeing with whatever is revealed. I was a kind of opportunist ā€œbarefoot ethnographer,ā€ a participant observer, not a ā€œdisciple.ā€

Nevertheless, with this unusual level of access and understanding over such a long period, I confess to having become somewhat conflicted ā€” the more so over recent years since President Donald Trump first came to power in the US in January 2017 and took a decidedly aggressive stance against Iran, and his subsequent unrestrained joint military attacks with Israel on Iran in 2025 and 2026. On the one hand, who would not want a freer, unrepressed and more prosperous life for Iranā€™s 94 million population and both national and regional security and peace for all nations in the Middle East (including Iran and Israel)? But, on the other hand, has the increasing belligerence of Israel and the US towards Iran, culminating in their joint unprovoked mass bombing of Iran in February and March 2026 (an undeclared but de facto imposed war) delivered ā€” or ever likely to ā€” those desirable objectives?

Iranians are conflicted

Having endured decades of imposed wars, international sanctions, economic decimation, pariah status, great hardship, authoritarian government and a suffocating lack of personal freedom, those still in Iran desperately crave a normal, safe, peaceful and hopeful life for themselves and their families. But, does the recent US and Israeli military onslaught against Iran really herald such a change, or is it foolsā€™ gold offered by devils-in-disguise?

The present Iranian population, inside and outside Iran, is very conflicted. Some of their reasons are broadly similar to my own, outlined above. In addition, most Iranians, including, I would gauge, a majority of those thirsting for a change of governance, are also angered not only by being relentlessly bombed but also by the sheer ā€œmight is rightā€ arrogance and the megalomaniacal and bloodthirsty anti-Iranian rhetoric and vilification emanating from Trump, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and others in the White House coterie. The Times, noted for its right-leaning pro-US editorial worldview, ran a on Americaā€™s Iran War, which noted that Trumpā€™s White House had twisted British Prime Minister Winston Churchillā€™s famous maxim that ā€œJaw, jaw is better than war, warā€ to now mean ā€œJaw, jaw is better for war, war.ā€ Providing copious examples of quotes by Hegseth, Trump and others, the article opined, ā€œYouā€™d be forgiven for thinking that Donald Trump and his staffā€™s salvoes were culled from a Bond villain.ā€ More on Team Trumpā€™s psycho-dramatics later.

A profile of Iranā€™s population

The Iranian population today comprises three discernible main worldview groupings. Group 1 are ultra-conservative die-hard Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) regime supporters. One subgroup, amounting in total to some 10% of the adult population, incorporates the vast majority of state and municipal officials, judiciary, senior and middle-ranking military officers, most of the Shia clergy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including their Baseej enforcers. In addition, a larger subgroup includes the relatively uneducated and conservative masses in low-income jobs. The latter sub-group is estimated to be some 20% of the adult population. Following the targeted killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini by US-Israeli bombing on February 28, 2026, vast celebrated the succession of his son, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khameini, as Iranā€™s Supreme Leader on March 9, 2026.

Group 2 comprises well-educated, Western-oriented 18ā€“35-year-olds, typically living in the Tehran-Karaj conurbation of some 12 million people or in other large cities across the country. This group, which accounts for an estimated 40% of the adult population, are desperate for substantive liberal change in Iranā€™s governance, economic reform and rapprochement with the US. They have provided the majority of street protesters against the IRI regime. These have been going on for several years, during which large numbers of protesters have been killed or wounded on the streets by armed IRGC/Baseej forces, or have been jailed, and some even executed. Reported beatings, torture, sexual assault and even murder of arrested protesters are legion. The most egregious period of regime crackdown so far has been over several weeks from December 2025 to February 2026, when many thousands of protesters were reportedly .

Group 3, amounting to an estimated 30% of the adult population, comprises over 35-year-olds with rents, mortgages and families to provide for or elderly parents to look after in an ongoing hyperinflationary economy, all of whom value safety and economic and political stability. These include large numbers of middle-aged veterans of the 1979 Revolution and Iran-Iraq War (1980ā€“88) who survived firstly the hardships and privations of that era and then the decades of Western economic sanctions up to the present. Most of this group, while fed up with years of international sanctions, chronic corruption and economic mismanagement, and yearning for change, veer away from actively deposing the IRI regime unless it is done by nonviolent means and does not involve interference from external forces or interests. Like Group 2, they would greatly welcome a change to a liberal, competent and noncorrupt regime, but not by their openly challenging the IRI regime or engaging in its violent overthrow.

Why arenā€™t Iranians rising to depose the IRI regime?

As if to demonstrate the Trump regimeā€™s appalling ignorance of Iranā€™s long history and its contemporary reality, in the days before the US and Israelā€™s joint blitzkrieg on Iran started in February 2026 and while bilateral negotiations between Iran and Washington were still proceeding, Trumpā€™s Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, made an astonishing . With a puzzled facial expression and language, he said that the President was ā€œcuriousā€ as to why Iran was ā€œnot capitulatingā€ to his demands to give up immediately and cease forever all nuclear ambitions and activities (military and civil) and cease backing and using armed proxies to terrorise the region, while having to accept that all US economic sanctions against Iran would remain in place. Or else!!

Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi gave his own succinct and telling : ā€œCurious to know why we do not capitulate? Because we are IRANIAN.ā€ In other words, Trump and Witkoff appeared unaware of a core national characteristic of the cultural and psychological makeup of Iranians, namely an absolute resistance to foreign threats and bullying or any kind of attack on their national identity, sovereignty, territory and self-determination. Such national pride, patriotism and ā€œunto deathā€ stoic resistance served them well during the eight years of the Iraqi-imposed Iran-Iraq War (1980ā€“88) in which Iraq was backed and armed by the US and other Western countries.

With vastly superior military equipment and US backing, Saddam Hussein said he expected to win this war in a few weeks or months, but after eight years, he had to concede a stalemate ceasefire. The same stoic and tough resistance has characterized Iranā€™s response to subsequent decades of increasingly harsh international economic sanctions, largely orchestrated by the US. With a 7,000-year history and national survival of Persia ingrained in their culture, todayā€™s Iranians are unlikely to be impressed or swayed by the threats, swagger or attacks (military or economic) from the 250-year-old neophyte USA. Defiance and resistance will be their defining response.

The common reaction to Witkoffā€™s and Trumpā€™s puzzlement, from the bevvy of seasoned political analysts, historians, Iran watchers, journalists, etc. (e.g., ), was one of initial incredulity at the breathtaking ignorance and naivety of these two most senior representatives of the US government regarding Iranā€™s history and USā€“Iran relations. This was then quickly followed by unrestrained guffaws at such an embarrassing display.

Further embarrassing puzzlement has been expressed by Trump and White House grandees about why the Iranian population has not heeded to rise up and sweep away the IRI regime. In addition to the police, the IRI regime has established an extremely well-organized, well-armed and ruthless internal security system (IRGC plus Baseej militias) to keep the population in line. In contrast, anti-regime protesters and the general population are unarmed, unorganized and lacking in any identifiable national or even local leaders. It is amazing that so many unarmed protesters have nonetheless persisted in challenging the IRI regime for so many years. Many have already paid the price with their lives or serious injury, but to seek to overthrow the regime by force without any weaponry or organization would be doubtless suicide.

In addition, as outlined above, most of the estimated 70% of the adult population who want regime change shy away from engaging in violent overthrow or else recognize its futility without leadership, organization and weaponry. The detailed analysis of the thirst inside Iran for regime change, and the percentage likelihoods of the various scenarios for it happening, provided by my colleague James Dentonā€™s 51³Ō¹Ļ article in early 2023, is still highly relevant. 

In addition, when Iranians hear Trump imploring them to rise up and overthrow the IRI regime, they scoff cynically at the notion that he would ever provide them with any tangible assistance to achieve such an outcome. Even in Trumpā€™s first presidency, he and his then White House team were keen on regime change in Iran. As I wrote in 2018 (pages 234-235) in a on The Alt-Right Anti-Iran Project, ā€œthey envisaged this resulting from a popular uprising inside Iranā€ but failed to understand that, just as when US-backed Saddam Hussein launched his unprovoked war on Iran in 1980, the whole population including those disaffected by the IRI regime responded with zeereh parcham (rally to the flag) patriotism. 

As recently as January 2026, the US Department of Defense (unofficially now Department of War) issued a new National Defense Strategy , which contains (paragraph 2) the following statement: The Department will ā€œno longer be distracted by interventions, endless wars, regime change and nation building.ā€ Iranians ask themselves why, in less than two months, Trump has radically changed his mind, or was this new doctrine intentionally a complete fiction?

Iranians also vividly remember US President George H.W.Bush in 1991, the Iraqi population to rise up against Saddam Hussein with implied promises of US military assistance. No such help materialized, and the Iraqi Marsh Arabs, Shia anti-Baā€™athist insurrectionists in Najaf and Karbala, and Kurds in northern Iraq, in particular, suffered . Iranians today take full note of how glib and duplicitous US Presidents can be in sacrificing foreign populations from the safety of the White House. It is unsurprising, then, that they would not be persuaded by Trumpā€™s implied but doubtful promises of practical assistance to overthrow the IRI regime. 

Lack of a credible leader

What about the lack of any political group or popular leader in Iran who could replace the Islamic regime and its Supreme Leader? It is unsurprising that any potential contenders fail to make themselves known, since to do so would invite rapid detention or elimination by the current regime. 

Ah, but have no fear, there is surely a ready-made leader-in-waiting in the person of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, son of the last Shah, who has been living in comfortable exile in the USA for much of the time since 1979. He was then still in his teens. He has never held any government office or responsibility, but has established a and well-oiled publicity campaign for his return to Iran as the next Shah. The campaign has essentially been to reestablish the Pahlavi monarchy and to reintroduce an imperial style of semi-feudal governance like his fatherā€™s. More recently, perhaps sensing such an outdated model just wonā€™t fly with Iranā€™s population today, he has raised the possibility of his returning as a constitutional figurehead monarch ā€œat an appropriate time.ā€

Crown Prince Reza appeals mainly to older Iranians, those old enough to remember the Pahlavi era before 1979. These are mainly Iranian emigrĆ©s abroad and a minority inside Iran who hanker after the pre-Revolution days. Although Reza is well educated, articulate and charming and receives much publicity and airtime in the West, his prospectus suffers from a number of handicaps. 

The outdated ā€œreprise modelā€ of his fatherā€™s pre-Revolutionary era is one handicap. Others include his lack of government experience and, apparently, a poor intellectual grasp of the extent and depth of state governance requirements for such a strategically pivotal country as Iran. However, perhaps the most damning criticism is a lack of self-awareness of his controversial personal attitude and conduct in public. In recent years, he has made no secret of his keenness for a post-IRI Iran to return to strong and friendly relations with Israel, which existed during his fatherā€™s reign.

While such sentiments are perhaps not in themselves outrageous, unverified videos and photos from 2023 of the Crown Prince and Israelā€™s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with arms round each otherā€™s shoulders and beaming faces (since deleted from internet sources), and Reza socializing with Israeli politicos and ā€œbig shotsā€ in a Tel Aviv , have been received very badly among Iranians generally. Such behavior demonstrates a shallow regard for the sensitivities of the Iranian people and a preparedness to engage in what many see as inappropriate collaboration with Iranā€™s sworn enemy.

Even President Trump, while not unfriendly towards Reza Pahlavi and offering him words of encouragement and photo opportunities, has nevertheless that he does not regard the Crown Prince as a credible new leader for a post-IRI Iran. 

MAGA President Bluto Knuckledragger rules the world

ā€œMy name is Ozymandias, King of Kings. Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair.ā€ This famous from Percy Bysshe Shelleyā€™s poem in 1818 about the Egyptian pharaonic ruler Ramses II (Ozymandias in Greek) was intended not to idolize the greatness of Ozymandias but rather to warn of the vulnerability of leaders with inflated and narcissistic egos to unnoticed context changes over time and unforeseen developments and events that they cannot control.

Unsurprisingly, President Trump is widely thought of as an Ozymandias figure, given his unrelenting penchant for uttering grandiose and bombastic statements about his own superlative greatness and achievements, contrasted with equally bombastic assertions about the alleged worthlessness or bad character of ā€” well ā€” just about anyone and everyone, from foreign leaders, US politicians, judges, corporate leaders, dignitaries, celebrities, sports stars, film stars, pop stars, religious leaders, journalists, ethnic groups, non-Judeo-Christian religions, particular nationalities, disabled people, refugees etc.

Even a small fraction of such insults and invective would be unbecoming, unprofessional and unacceptable from any person holding even a minor position of responsibility or authority, let alone a President of the US. But, clearly, the Bluto Knuckledragger (the main antagonist of Popeye) personality of this King Ozymandias could not care less.

Trumpā€™s vast array of pet hates, targets for disparaging remarks and petulant Executive Orders naturally includes anyone who dares to disagree with, contradict or challenge him in any way, or simply stand their ground on what they regard as their own national best interests. So, unsurprisingly, Iran has long been a candidate for his angry invective, petulance and threats, culminating in his 2025 military strikes and current 2026 Operation Epic Fury, otherwise known as the War on Iran.

In the past ten years, there have been many published analyses and commentaries on the source of Trumpā€™s often bizarre emotions and behaviour. For example, Professor Tim Wilsonā€™s in 2026 on Trump as a dangerous liability suggests that his childlike tantrums stem from an arrested development, whereby his adult personality is locked into a permanent state of infantile perception, attitude and behavior. 

The Dangerous Charisma by Professor Jerrold Post, psychiatrist and political psychologist, examines the psychopathology of Trump and his followers, which is highly relevant to his wide-ranging neoimperialist aggression, unsupported territorial claims and bullying against several countries, mainly traditional allies of the US. Most countries trading with the US have also capitulated to his bizarre aggression. Countries (e.g., Canada, Greenland, Denmark, Panama) confronted by his potential land-grab rhetoric are still attempting to negotiate a way out. Venezuelaā€™s historically anti-US authoritarian dictatorship has been left in power following the US short-lived invasion, the extraordinary rendition of President Nicolas Maduro to await trial in the USA and the US effectively taking control of Venezuelaā€™s vast oil industry. Meanwhile, Trump has now an oil blockade of Cuba and threatened to end its 67-year-old communist regime.

However, confronted by an Iran that is not just uncooperative, resistant and noncompliant to US demands but also steadfastly defiant, Trumpā€™s narcissism, delusional paranoia, and fragile and easily wounded ego finally responded in 2025 to Netanyahuā€™s persistent urging for the US to join Israel in a massive unprovoked and on Iranā€™s nuclear and other facilities in June 2025 (the Twelve Day War). The further unprovoked preemptive attack in February 2026, but on a much larger scale (Operation Epic Fury), is still ongoing. However, Trumpā€™s apparent ignorance about Iran and its post-World War II history, his lack of grasp of military matters (or perhaps his deliberate dismissal of good advice from the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]), his inadequate war planning, his frequent and often contradictory changing and expansion of the warā€™s objectives, and contradictory statements from Trump and his Cabinet colleagues have been .

Also characteristically, Trump has continued with his narcissistic, grandiose hyperbole regarding the current war on Iran. Almost every day, he has issued formal statements in such language, or similar statements on his Truth Social online platform or at press conferences or public events, for example, , and his triumphant, if premature, claim ā€œWe won! We won!ā€ on . Trump also appears to be unconcerned when US or Israeli missiles inflict mass civilian casualties on Iranā€™s cities (e.g., a in Minab). At a Republican conference, he even gloated in ā€œgallows humorā€ style over the death of nearly 100 sailors when, without warning, the US sank an Iranian warship in open waters off Sri Lanka, some 3,400 kilometers from Iran, with a smirk, ā€œItā€™s more fun to sink ā€˜emā€ than to capture them.

But what about all the sycophants and ā€œyes men and womenā€ that Trump has surrounded himself with as his White House Cabinet and entourage? These, too, fall under the scope of Jerrold Postā€™s political psychological assessment. Two top officials in particular evidently share Trumpā€™s penchant for displaying a narcissistic, aggressive, bullying, self-congratulatory style: Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who has unilaterally and without Congressional approval retitled his post to that of Secretary of War. 

The armchair comic book warriors

Hegseth has been especially vocal about the Iran War, giving regular briefings extolling the USā€™s military supremacy, predicting a quick and overwhelming victory, and dismissing Iranā€™s military capabilities with contempt. In many ways, Hegsethā€™s wild anti-Iran has far upstaged that of Trump. For example:

ā€œThey are toast, and they know it.ā€

ā€œWe will hunt you down without apology and without hesitation, and we will kill youā€.

ā€œThis was never meant to be a fair fight; we are punching them while they are down, as it should beā€.

The Iranian leaders are ā€œrats in hiding,ā€ and the newly elected Supreme Leader has been ā€œdisfiguredā€ by US/Israeli bombing.

On day 13 of Operation Epic Fury, gave a lengthy one-man public statement and press briefing on the warā€™s progress, seeking to convince an increasingly skeptical American public that early victory was assured with a complete annihilation and capitulation of Iran, and to soothe domestic and global anxieties and markets about growing economic damage. Reaction inside the US and globally has been cool and largely unconvinced.

It is not just Hegsethā€™s self-aggrandizing, triumphalist language, his repeated exaggerated assertions of Iranā€™s crushing imminent defeat (now stretched already from one week to fourā€“six weeks or longer) and his bloodthirsty, undiplomatic words that cause increasing skepticism and alarm. Just as telling are his physical presentation, body language and stage performance.

Hegseth always appears immaculate and well-groomed, perhaps reflecting his grounding as a Fox News TV presenter. Although this may be a potential advantage for audience acceptability, in his case, it seems excessive. Rather than cutting the gravitas figure of a cabinet secretary, his square-jawed, clean-cut, lightly tanned, play boy visage makes him look much more like a telegenic model for TV adverts for male grooming products, toothpaste or tanning lotion. Add to this his uncontrolled habit of looking overly earnest and sincere, his dramatic turns of phrase, his dogmatic assertions, his aggressive evangelical delivery and his constant emphatic hand gestures, and he falls naturally into the genre of crusading ā€œhard sellā€ politico-religious televangelists so popular in the US.

Another unmistakable trait is Hegsethā€™s barely suppressed, constant bubbling anger. This anger seems to be caused by deep frustrations, particularly relating to his strongly held Christian fundamentalist beliefs and agenda (set out in his book of that name) that he would like to see fulfilled, but which so far seems to elude him. His on this issue involves his seeking to impose on the Pentagon an ā€œonward Christian soldiersā€ culture that normalizes exclusively Christian ideology and language from a bygone era and sanctifies using Americaā€™s military might to achieve notionally superior Christian subjugation or elimination of non-Judeo-Christian religions and nations. The US war program against Iran, which started in 2025, has become Hegsethā€™s major launch pad for his and fixation to ensure a Messianic return, a second coming of Christ, through declared US supremacy and, as necessary, intimidation, conquest and subjugation of ā€œthe other.ā€

His ethnocentrist, religiocentrist and politically partisan superiority beliefs, agenda and actions also apply to the US Military and the US population overall. This directly rejects the equal rights of all citizens guaranteed by the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution. Hegsethā€™s White House Colleagues, President Trump, the Republican Party and many of their supporters have raised no complaints or objections about this flagrant rejection of the Constitution that Trump and all his Cabinet have sworn under oath to uphold.

For Hegseth, his knowledge of the history of Iran and its relationship with the US appears to start with the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the ā€œevil Ayatollahs.ā€ No apparent recognition of the CIAā€™s orchestration (with British involvement) of the against the Shahā€™s Prime Minister Dr Mohammad Mossadegh, which relegated the Shah to the role of Washingtonā€™s puppet ā€” and sowed the seeds of the 1979 Revolution. As the distinguished has put it, ā€œThe coup revealed Americaā€™s influence and malevolent ambitions in Iran. The immense sense of betrayal that was felt ā€“ and cultivated for later generations.ā€

Deep mistrust of the US government stemming from the 1953 coup continues today, seared into the psyche of every Iranian, and accentuated by Trumpā€™s that any new national political leader of Iran must meet his approval. Trump, the suzerain imperator, sees Iranā€™s future only as a US vassal state, and Hegseth seeks to oblige.

Hegseth exudes a juvenile, immature attitude towards governance, international affairs, international conflict and the prosecution of war. His gung-ho jingoistic fervor for battle whenever he addresses audiences betrays the excitement of a 13-year-old armchair ā€œwarriorā€ getting carried away reading Captain America comic books or playing video war games. His vicarious ā€œfantasy heroā€ exposure to battle avoids him ever being in harmā€™s way, unlike all the American service personnel sent into the Iran War theater.

Vance also shares Hegsethā€™s barely suppressed bubbling anger. He rarely smiles and always looks possessed by inner demons and ready to explode. His outrageous televised against Ukraineā€™s President Volodymyr Zelenskiyy (a US ally) in the latterā€™s White House meeting with President Trump on February 28, 2025, with Trump and others egging him on, will surely go down in history as the most disgraceful display of undiplomatic bullying in modern times.

While less vocal than Hegseth on the Iran War, by Vanceā€™s rhetoric and published , he nonetheless shares Hegsethā€™s militant worldview on Christian fundamentalist supremacy and the importance of the US government imposing this on its own population and the rest of the world. He is reportedly a supporter of the , namely that the state should actively advance Christian supremacy in US society via control of seven key spheres: government, religion, education, family, business, media, arts and entertainment.

Unlike Hegseth, who possesses a very high degree of certitude about his identity and divinely ordained Christian mission, Vance appears conflicted and unhappy with his identity. Born James David Bowman, he first changed his name in 1990ā€“91 to JD Hamel and then again to JD Vance in 2013. It is rare for males to change their surname, although his first surname change appears to have a reasonable justification. However, more than one surname change is extremely rare. There is speculation that he may suffer from some kind of narcissistic delusion of grandeur condition that drives him towards gaining enhanced public and political approval and adulation by reinventing his name to something more memorable, attractive and high-powered.

Hubris, delusion and the illusion of total victory

As many seasoned military and statecraft experts and observers have noted, all the hyperbolic US triumphalism spewing out daily from King Osymandiasā€™s White House regarding a total Iranian defeat may be a tad premature on several major counts.

Beware hubris. The US has failed repetitively to learn from its past strategic mistakes overseas regarding inflated false assumptions that its undoubted massive military superiority alone will guarantee total victory in all respects, e.g., the Vietnam War, Iraq Wars and Afghan debacle. Unleashing overwhelming military firepower may succeed in causing a target country great loss of life, economic and material damage, and even capitulation, but military victory alone cannot win hearts and minds or guarantee long-lasting peace. Total victory also requires ensuring that a defeated enemy retains sovereignty, builds stable governance, rebuilds a strong economy, ensures political and religious freedoms and human rights, and stays at peace with other countries.

When it comes to Iran, the Trump White House has failed miserably to acknowledge the old maxim ā€œknow your enemy but know yourself better.ā€ The limited individual and collective self-awareness displayed has been as pitiful as their knowledge and awareness of the Middle East in general and Iran specifically. 

Destructive, damaged personalities and pathological traits also seem to pervade the Trump White House and negatively influence US policy towards Iran. Large-scale field and clinical studies (e.g., Fritzon, Brooks et al, ; and , pages 295ā€“325 and 327ā€“365) have revealed that compared to a normative expectation of some 3% of the general population exhibiting clinically raised levels of psychopathy, when it comes to boardrooms and similar power centers, the prevalence rises to 20%. Could it be even higher among the Trump White House Cabinet and entourage? And, what about the governing groups in Iran and Israel? Perhaps all countries should conduct ā€œdue diligenceā€ clinical psychological evaluation of political leaders, just as is often already standard for police and military personnel. Such screening might then encourage ā€œJaw, jawā€ rather than ā€œWar, war.ā€

Perhaps soon the long-suffering Iranian people might finally be able to chant with confidence the Persian New Year invocation ā€œSad saal beh, az in saalhaā€ ā€” (May the next) one hundred years (be) better than these years.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Beware Hubris: Trumpā€™s Iran War Has an Ozymandias Flavor appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

According to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the international system is undergoing ā€œintensified fragmentation and geopolitical polarisationā€ as competition among China, Russia and the US reshapes the global order. In this context, the behavior of states that are neither great powers nor small, dependent states is crucial to systemic stability.

Why the middle matters

Middle powers matter because they offer more than geographic or economic weight; they constitute a relational space that sustains cooperation even when the largest actors retreat into rivalry. 

Middle powers are not solely defined by material capacity but by their strategic behavior, which explains that these states ā€œleverage their resources through selective leadership, niche diplomacy and active engagement in specific issue areas.ā€ Their influence arises not from overwhelming force but from credible, flexible diplomacy embedded in international networks.

Yet middle power behavior cannot be purely transactional. Unlike great powers, which can absorb reputational costs through sheer weight, middle powers depend on a consistent record of principled engagement ā€” the moment their positions appear for sale, their value as mediators and bridge-builders evaporates. Strategic flexibility is only credible when it rests on stable principles.

Notably, some of the most effective middle power actors ā€” Norway, Qatar, Singapore and Switzerland ā€” formally present themselves as small states, yet their diplomatic footprint tells a different story. 

This capacity to function between poles gives middle powers a unique stake in stability ā€” they thrive not by domination but by preserving openness and predictability in a world where rivalry threatens to narrow options for all.

The pressure to choose ā€” and the value of autonomy

Great power rivalry today extends beyond security to trade, technology and supply chains. The pressure on other states to align is real. Yet for most, alignment is neither simple nor costless.

Kazakhstan, for example, openly maintains relations with Russia, China, the EU and the US ā€” not out of indecision, but as deliberate diversification that enhances its strategic autonomy and flexibility. As Thomas Greminger, the author of the GCSP brief, explains, this diversification gives such states greater agency while preserving room to maneuver amid competing pressures. And, TĆ¼rkiye offers an even sharper illustration: a NATO member that nonetheless purchased Russiaā€™s S-400 missile system, demonstrating that strategic autonomy is exercised not only outside alliances, but sometimes in deliberate tension with them. 

Scholars describe this as ā€œflexilateralismā€ ā€” shifting coalitions across different issues and configurations ā€” or simply ā€œmultialignment,ā€ where a state maintains simultaneous partnerships across rival blocs without fully committing to any.

Autonomy in this sense is not neutrality in a moral vacuum but a careful exercise of agency ā€” preserving space for diplomacy, cooperation and engagement across rival blocs.

When geography constrains

Geography shapes middle power behavior, but does not determine it. A strategic location between major powers can amplify diplomatic options ā€” Kazakhstanā€™s position at the crossroads of Russia, China and Central Asia sharpens rather than limits its multivector diplomacy, while Qatarā€™s contested neighborhood has pushed it toward mediation and strategic connectivity as survival tools. But geography can also become a trap.

Countries wedged between Russia and the West ā€” Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine ā€” cannot exercise middle power agency in the same way; their contested position pushes them toward bandwagoning rather than bridge-building. The difference between a middle power and an ā€œin-between countryā€ is ultimately less about location than about the political space available to make independent choices.

Communication when giants drift apart

As great powers communicate less directly, middle powers often keep vital conversations alive.

The GCSP Policy Brief highlights that middle powers deploy a range of diplomatic strategies ā€” including bridge-building, coalition formation and mediation ā€” to bring parties into dialogue and cooperation. It points specifically to cases like Oman and Qatar playing roles in regional mediation, facilitating negotiations between actors that might otherwise lack direct channels.

This kind of facilitation rarely makes headlines. But preventing escalation matters. When crises do not escalate into conflict, when lines of communication hold even loosely, fragmentation is contained.

Coalitions without camps

Global institutions are under strain. Consensus is harder to achieve. Formal mechanisms stagnate.

In response, middle powers are forging issue-based coalitions that sidestep rigid bloc politics. Rather than insisting on universal agreements that exclude major disagreements, these coalitions generate functional cooperation on shared risks ā€” climate, health, food security and technology governance.

The GCSP brief notes that by forming ad hoc alliances and working collectively, middle powers can help ā€œrepair, adapt and stabilise the international orderā€ precisely through these narrower but productive agendas.

This cooperation does not require full alignment on all strategic questions; it is rooted in practical outcomes and shared interests in avoiding collapse into zero-sum rivalry.

Gremingerā€™s most concrete proposal points in exactly this direction. During the Cold War, a group of neutral and nonaligned states ā€” the so-called ā€œN+Nā€ ā€” played a quiet but decisive role in facilitating dialogue between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, contributing to the stable European security order that emerged from the Helsinki Process. He asks whether a similar coalition might be needed today: Should the current Ukraine conflict move toward settlement, reconstructing a European security order will require more than deterrence ā€” it will need committed, credible states willing to facilitate risk reduction, confidence-building and arms control. Could that coalition include middle powers like Kazakhstan, Norway and TĆ¼rkiye alongside traditional neutrals like Austria, Ireland, Malta and Switzerland, with Germany and Italy as cooperative security anchors? The question is deliberately open, but the precedent is real.

Economic connectivity as a stabilizing force

In a fragmented world, economic interdependence is not just a driver of prosperity. It is a buffer against division.

Middle powers often act as connectors, integrating regional trade networks and hosting platforms for economic cooperation. Financial and logistical corridors, middle powers help build complicated efforts to draw hard bloc lines in the global economy, reducing incentives for complete decoupling.

Even outside the GCSP brief, analysts note that middle powers can exercise influence by mobilizing coalitions and exploiting opportunities where great powers are indifferent or immobilized, essentially shaping cooperative spaces where larger players otherwise struggle to do so.

The risks of erosion

Stabilizing the middle is no guarantee. Strategic autonomy can be squeezed by coercive tactics. Economic levers can become tools of political pressure. Domestic politics may harden into pro-alignment rhetoric.

Here, the GCSP brief highlights that middle powersā€™ agency depends not just on capacity but on political commitment and diplomatic skill, observing that countries like Norway, Qatar and Switzerland combine principled engagement with reputational credibility to act as effective bridge-builders.

These dual attributes ā€” conviction and craft ā€” are what allow middle powers to operate as stabilizers in fractured environments.

Holding the system together

The international system need not collapse, and rivalry among great powers will surely continue. Yet the degree of fragmentation the world ultimately experiences will depend not only on the behavior of the largest states, but on whether enough mid-level states sustain cooperation, connectivity and dialogue.

In this sense, middle powers do not just fill gaps left by great power abstention. They actively shape the contours of the emerging order ā€” not by opposing or neutralizing superpowers, but by keeping diplomatic and institutional space open.

As the GCSP brief illustrates, middle powers are uniquely positioned to contribute to stability precisely because they do not seek domination but manageable, predictable cooperation in an unpredictable world.

Their success is not a function of overwhelming force, but of relational influence ā€” a blend of credibility, commitment and strategic autonomy. Yet realizing this potential is not automatic. It requires coordinated action, long-term vision and the willingness to lead on principled yet pragmatic agendas. In this sense, the resurgence of middle powers may be the most viable path to sustaining a rules-based international order in an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world, if they choose to act collectively and in time.

[This is an op-ed, summarized version of the publication for the GCSP, where you can find all the sources.]

Roberta Campani had some follow-up questions for the author, which he answered. You can find their exchange below:

1. On Escalation and Structural Change

Roberta Campani: Your policy brief describes a fragmented but still manageable international order. Do the recent US-Israeli strikes on Iran represent a qualitative shift from fragmentation to open confrontation? Has the structural environment for middle powers fundamentally changed?

Thomas Greminger: The recent US-Israeli strikes on Iran have only further strengthened our perception of a polarized and fragmented world order where great powers choose to follow what they perceive to be their interests without any consideration of international law. This is not to say that I wouldnā€™t condemn the way the Iranian regime has been treating its population. So, I see a further erosion of international law with unpredictable repercussions on regional stability and the global economy, but no fundamental changes of the structural environment for middle powers.

2. On Credibility and Negotiation

Roberta Campani: When major powers signal openness to negotiations and then rapidly escalate militarily, how does that affect the credibility of diplomacy itself? Does such behavior narrow the space in which middle powers can operate as mediators?

Thomas Greminger: It undermines the credibility of diplomacy and, more specifically, conflict mediation. Just imagine that the Omani Minister of Foreign Affairs, tasked to mediate between the US and Iran, was still reporting in Washington on what he perceived to be fairly successful negotiations in Geneva, when the decision to attack militarily was taken. Compare my comments to the :

3. On Strategic Autonomy Under Pressure

Roberta Campani: You argue that middle powers rely on strategic autonomy and diversified partnerships. In moments of acute crisis, does the pressure to align intensify to a point where autonomy becomes unsustainable? How resilient is the ā€œmiddleā€ under coercive conditions?

Thomas Greminger: Yes, this may well happen. We have, for instance, witnessed several cases where middle powers came under US tariff pressure and felt obliged to offer major concessions. I believe that resilience can be strengthened through regional alliances that offer stronger bargaining power.

4. On International Law and Norms

Roberta Campani: Many middle powers anchor their diplomacy in multilateral norms and international law. If great powers appear willing to bypass or reinterpret these frameworks, does that weaken the normative foundations on which the middle power agency rests?

Thomas Greminger: It does. At the same time, middle powers have an intrinsic interest to preserve and rebuild a predictable, rules-based international order because they donā€™t dispose of the might necessary to impose right. The good news is that they can still rely on a large majority of states that continue to believe in international law. There is also still a large majority of states that continue to believe in addressing global challenges through international cooperation.

5. On the Risk of Systemic Fragmentation

Roberta Campani: Is the greater danger today the rivalry itself ā€” or the erosion of trust in diplomatic signaling and institutional commitments? In other words, what threatens the middle more: power politics or unpredictability?

Thomas Greminger: I believe it is easier for middle powers to adapt to power politics that remain stable and thereby predictable over a certain time, as we have seen in the 19th century, than having to deal with the high degree of unpredictability that marks current times.

6. On Collective Action Among Middle Powers

Roberta Campani: Your brief hints at coordination among middle powers. Do you see realistic prospects for collective middle-power initiatives in de-escalation or crisis mediation in the current environment?

Thomas Greminger: We are seeing some initial signs of such alliances. An example is regional powers aligning in response to the war in Gaza. It is true that many mini-lateral structures have popped up in recent years that address specific challenges in a pragmatic, ad-hoc way, but most of them actually serve great power interests. Clearly, middle powers would have to aim for such alliances much more systematically. This would often also imply readiness to overcome regional differences.

7. On Switzerlandā€™s Role

Roberta Campani: Given Switzerlandā€™s diplomatic tradition and your own background, do you see particular responsibilities or opportunities for neutral or non-aligned states in preventing further fragmentation?

Thomas Greminger: Yes, absolutely! At the same time, Swiss foreign policy is very busy regulating its long-term relationship with the EU, dealing with the repercussions caused by the wars in Europe and in the Middle East, and responding to the challenges of the neomercantilist trade policies of one of its most important trade partners. There is therefore a need for a lot of political leadership and commitment for exploiting the opportunities offered to middle powers like Switzerland. It would like other middle powers also to look for creating new cross-regional alliances, perhaps similar to the Human Security Network operating successfully some 25 years ago.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The Agency of Middle Powers in a Fragmented and Polarized World appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The rich Gulf funds face the risk of the great liquidation

The most immediate threat to consumers is the price of petrol ā€” gas in the US ā€” at the pump. However, there is a bigger threat lurking in the shadows for Western economies. Over the years, the Gulf monarchies have used their oil and gas revenues to create sophisticated sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). By 2024, these Gulf SWFs were managing , representing 38% of all global SWF assets. 

Saudi Arabiaā€™s Public Investment Fund (PIF) has $45 billion to become the anchor investor in the SoftBank Vision Fund, in addition to taking major stakes in Uber and Lucid Motors. In addition to technology, the PIF has made multibillion-dollar investments in gaming and sports, such as Electronic Arts, Nintendo and LIV Golf. 

The Saudis have attracted attention, but Abu Dhabi is the true leader of the Gulf SWFs. This emirate has two SWFs. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) invests to create diversified long-term wealth, while Mubadala focuses on strategic industrial partnerships. A cursory look at ADIAā€™s tells us that it invests 45ā€“60% of its $990 billion capital in North America and 15ā€“30% in Europe. ADIAā€™s investments range from equities and fixed income to hedge funds, real estate, private equity and infrastructure. Mubadala describes itself as a sovereign investor with an entrepreneurial mindset and has invested in US-based semiconductor chipmaker GlobalFoundries, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) and the Carlyle Group.

Qatar is known for its massive trophy investments from Al Jazeera, a top global news organization, to Paris Saint-Germain, Franceā€™s top football club. The SWF, Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), has a that includes Londonā€™s Canary Wharf, stakes in the likes of German automaker Volkswagen, British bank Barclays and Anglo-Swiss multinational commodity trading and mining company Glencore.

Even tiny Kuwait is deeply invested in US Treasuries. The SWF, Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), has aggressively invested in East Asia, but most of its assets are still in the US. Interestingly, KIA is a long-term major shareholder in Mercedes-Benz.

An oft-overlooked fact is that these Gulf funds have invested tens of billions of dollars in AI. Saudi PIF has a partnership with NVIDIA/AMD, Abu Dhabiā€™s Mubadala joined with BlackRock and Microsoft to create a $30 billion fund. This capital will fund massive AI data centers and the energy infrastructure to power them. Not to be left behind, the QIA invested in Anthropicā€™s $30 billion Series G round in early 2026.

After the 2007ā€“09 Great Recession, the Gulf states have been global investors and creditors. They have been able to deploy capital in Western economies struggling with rising debt, stagnant wages and low growth. That may no longer be true. After the US and Israel attacked Iran, Tehran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz. No longer can these Gulf nations export oil and gas or import food. Note that these Gulf nations import almost all their food and depend on desalination for daily life. Gulf revenues have crashed and costs have soared. For the first time in decades, the Gulf states face a catastrophic resource crunch. 

It is important to note that these Gulf monarchies run extremely generous welfare states. The rather small number of locals are used to massive state subsidies. Expats perform most of the work, from pilots at Emirates or Qatar Airways to workers on oil rigs. Feeding the local and expat population is essential to avoid social or political upheaval. So, the Gulf monarchies would be compelled to cannibalize their global holdings to survive their liquidity crisis. 

Prima facie, we can expect the three following developments:

1. Equity Dumping: A massive drawdown of blue-chip holdings in the US and Europe as SWFs seek immediate liquidity, causing stock prices to fall significantly.
   
2. AI Winter: A sudden pause, if not a stop, in the funding of speculative tech and AI infrastructure, where Gulf capital has been a primary engine of growth, leading to the bursting of the AI bubble.
   
3. Treasury Volatility: Gulf SWFs cease purchasing American debt because of a shortage of cash, precipitating short-term interest rates to flare uncontrollably, just as US borrowing needs hit record highs.

Note that the US debt has $39 trillion, less than five months after it first hit $38 trillion in late October 2025. When US President Donald Trump first took office in January 2017, this debt was $19.9 trillion.ā€‹ Not only has US debt nearly doubled since 2017, but interest costs have also risen to over $1 trillion per year. This has provoked even in usually complacent Congressional circles. The most recent $69 billion auction of two-year Treasuries ā€œ tepid investor demand,ā€ and the ten-year yield jumped from 3.94% to 4.38%. The drying up of Gulf demand for US treasuries could not have come at a worse time.

Inflationary triple threat: from disruption to devastation

The recent war in Iran has unleashed a supply-side shock similar to those in the 1970s.

In October 1973, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) imposed a total oil against countries that had supported Israel at any point during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. This war began after Egypt and Syria launched a massive surprise attack to regain territories they had lost to Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War. This attack was unsuccessful, but the US paid heavily for its support of Israel. Note that OAPEC resented the persistent decline in the value of the dollar, which was no longer convertible into gold after August 15, 1971.

By the end of the OAPEC embargo in March 1974, the price of oil had risen by 300%, triggering a decade of stagflation. This is a scenario where low growth, i.e., stagnation, combines with high inflation to cause much economic pain. Output shrinks, unemployment rises, wages donā€™t rise and purchasing power goes down. As economic pain increases, social unrest and political upheavals follow.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution led to another energy . Although the global oil supply decreased by only 4%, oil prices more than doubled over the next twelve months. Major Western economies avoided prolonged stagnation thanks to increased oil production and greater energy efficiency. 

More recently, the world experienced an energy shock once the Russiaā€“Ukraine War began in February 2022. Western sanctions forced Russian oil and gas off global markets. Because Russia has used a ā€œdark fleetā€ to bypass Western sanctions and mitigate the supply shock to the global economy.

The current supply shocks are stickier than either 2022 or 1979. A synchronized spike of oil, gas and fertilizer prices threatens to cause sustained inflation. A third of the fertilizers shipped globally pass through the State of Hormuz, and they are no longer reaching their destinations. As a result, crop yields will fall. Prices have already by 30% in many parts of the world. Farmers have been fretting about fuel and fertilizer driving up food prices. Additionally, food scarcity will trigger a delayed, yet violent, jump in global food prices. 

This inflationary threat has come at a time when central banks have followed loose monetary policies, including quantitative easing (de facto printing of money to buy assets), for years. A supply shock at a time when excess money sloshes around in the economy threatens to unleash hyperinflation and a painful period of stagnation.

Asian economies that are dependent on Gulf energy are suffering. Japan over 90% of its crude oil from the Gulf. Rising energy prices are already ā€œthreatening factory closures, raising prices for consumers and halting wage rises that help drive consumption growth.ā€ Japanese markets have tumbled. So have markets elsewhere, from South Korea to Thailand. Emerging markets are likely to suffer even more.

In a nutshell, Asian markets that are structurally dependent on Gulf energy will experience a more sustained asset price decline than is currently priced in by markets. We are no longer looking at a “V-shaped” recovery, but a protracted period of global stagflation.

The medium-term: from disruption to devastation

While the current market volatility is severe, the medium-term grey swan events ā€” foreseeable high-impact, potentially catastrophic developments ā€” are even more chilling. There is now a real question about the sustainability of the Gulf economies. Escalating risks might cross the sustainability threshold itself.

So far, Iran has largely spared the regionā€™s water desalination and treatment infrastructure. If Iran abandons this restraint, the Gulf would lose access to clean water. It would become physically uninhabitable, and oil production would become operationally impossible.

A water crisis has not yet started, but a food crisis is imminent. Ships carrying food to Gulf ports cannot get through the Strait of Hormuz. The collapse of exports lowers earnings precisely at a time when imports cost more. In a region of generous subsidies, the Iran war will cause a fiscal squeeze in Gulf monarchies. This squeeze would erode the social contracts of Gulf monarchies, increasing the risk of instability and regime collapse. The prospect of the current leadership in Gulf countries giving way to factions less interested in maintaining energy flows is very real.

Finally, Israel/US and Iran are firmly climbing up the escalatory ladder. Neither Israel nor the US is designed or has the stomach for a long war. The US is running short of interceptor missiles and spending a lot of money on a daily basis. Israel is suffering constant attacks and has been at war against Hamas and Hezbollah for over two years. Recently, Iran struck the towns of Arad and Dimona near the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center in response to an Israeli attack on its Natanz nuclear facility in Isfahan province. As the kinetic conflict exhausts Israelā€™s traditional defenses and its capacity for endurance diminishes, the probability of an Israeli nuclear strike on Iran has moved from the unthinkable to the probable.

The Iran war has unleashed the 2026 Hormuz Crisis. To Stefan Angrick, Japan economist at Moodyā€™s Analytics, ā€œThere is no Goldilocks scenario where the conflict ends, and everything just snaps back to the way it was.ā€ The crisis will inexorably cause a structural realignment and very possibly a global stagflation. This is a time to prioritize liquidity, hedge aggressively against general inflation, and pivot away from dependencies on high-risk markets. We are entering a cycle where the cost of energy, together with the cost of political survival, will rewrite the rules of the global economy.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Iran Triggers Hormuz Chokepoint Crisis and Risk of Global Stagflation appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Such a closure should have been anticipated by US planners and administration officials well before launching the first wave of attacks on February 28. The security of the Persian Gulf and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz have been a fundamental principle of US policy in the Middle East since at least the administration of Jimmy Carter in 1979.

But the administration either heed or discounted warnings from those who would have known. Trumpā€™s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, specifically Trump that a closure attempt was a real possibility. The president erroneously reasoned that once the Americans and Israelis took out the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, the Iranians would capitulate. As the administration has come to realize, this was a major failure in judgment.Ģż

For decades, Iran has threatened to close the Strait if attacked. During the so-called phase of the Iran-Iraq War (1980ā€“1988), the Iranians tried to close the Strait but ultimately failed. Additional attempts and/or threats were made in 2011ā€“12 and 2018ā€“19. During the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, the Iranian parliament to close the Strait, but Tehran eventually backed off. Professional American diplomats, intelligence officers and military planners of the State and Defense (now War) Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would most certainly have known this and communicated the information up the chain.Ģż

The US administration and its Israeli allies now face a conundrum. Even if Trump decides to declare victory and end the US attacks, Iran appears determined to maintain closure of the Strait until certain commitments are made, including a pledge not to renew attacks in the future, closure of US bases in the Middle East and payment of war reparations. There is zero chance of the US or Israel accepting such terms, and even if accepted, they would be meaningless. Tehran is certainly aware of that but seeks to save face and use such commitments as ā€œproof of victoryā€ to their public in a war in which theyā€™ve suffered devastating and humiliating losses.

An avoidable problem but still hope

Trump appealed to NATO allies to commit vessels to secure safe passage in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Unsurprisingly, NATO countries with the means to do so the request. Having been left out of the planning for the attacks, NATO members were understandably reluctant to commit their forces to an operation to secure the Gulf and Strait without prior planning for such an undertaking.Ģż

A more farsighted US administration would have reached out to NATO members well before the attack launch to propose that they support freedom of navigation operations in the area in the event the Iranians attempted closure. That would have allowed for planning and mobilization in advance. It is also the way NATO has operated throughout most of its nearly 77-year history.

Of course, it has not helped that, dating back to his first administration (2017ā€“2021), Trump and others in his administration have used nearly every opportunity to insult, denigrate, disparage, demean and humiliate NATO members and the NATO organization. His contempt for Americaā€™s most important and oldest alliance is hardly a secret. It is also a stain on Americaā€™s image as a reliable global superpower.

There may still be hope yet for persuading some NATO allies to lend support. After all, Europe needs the Strait to be open to normal tanker and shipping traffic at least as much as the US does, and probably more. Moreover, the Gulf Arab countries also do. The administration should consider ending its rhetoric and discreetly consult NATO and Gulf countries about securely opening the Gulf and Strait. Others with similar interests, in Asia, for example, might also be persuaded. But it will require respectful, urgent and serious diplomacy. 

Such help would be most welcome as the war taxes the US military and its diminishing stocks of munitions and other critical supplies. The president has US ground forces to the region, including US Marines, and may be considering adding the elements of the US Armyā€™s 82nd Airborne Division. While the exact purpose isnā€™t known, speculation suggests the US may be planning to seize Iranā€™s principal oil terminal and port, Kharg Island, responsible for 90% of the regimeā€™s oil exports, or to capture or neutralize the estimated 400ā€“440 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium stored in underground bunkers in Isfahan, but also perhaps Natanz and Fordow. These operations are fraught with challenges and risks and would be highly complex and costly for the US in terms of lives and expense, irrespective of the outcome.

Declare victory and end the war?

In addition to failing to anticipate the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the US administration and its Israeli partners failed to fully consider the commitment, fervor and resolve of Iranā€™s regime. It is one deeply immersed in the righteousness of their political-religious mission. To capitulate and deny that mission would be to deny their identity and betray the fundamental principles of the Islamic revolution. Married to Iranā€™s dominant Shiā€™a religious faith, which glorifies martyrdom for the faith, this revolutionary resolve takes on a dimension and depth not fully appreciated in the West. It gives the leadership and its followers, especially among the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an almost mystical or spiritual determination to defend the regime, whatever the costs and in spite of overwhelming losses and the unpopularity of the regime.

This reality leaves the US administration with few options. It may continue to wage this war and inflict ever more destruction on the countryā€™s defenses and perhaps even economic infrastructure. The regime and the Iranian people will suffer, but the leadership will not capitulate short of annihilation. 

The US could also negotiate. But it should not expect more than short-term, tactical concessions made after extended negotiations spent haggling over microscopic details. The regime wonā€™t negotiate itself out of existence. Its threat against the Strait is one way to demonstrate its remaining capability in the face of incalculable military and political losses. They have found the Americansā€™ Achilles heel: oil and the global economy. They wonā€™t give up the Hormuz card without concessions from the US and Israel.

President Trump can also declare victory and end the US role in the war. Israel might go along. But the Iranians have a say, too, and might choose to continue threatening shipping traffic in the Gulf and Strait. It might also decide to begin enriching its remaining 400 kilograms of enriched uranium (provided it still possesses the requisite number and type of centrifuges, which is unknown). Therefore, the war does not end, though this ā€œfirst phase,ā€ if it may be called that, may. At that point, the US must decide when and how to re-engage with Iran to end Iranā€™s effective siege of the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. It becomes the very ā€œforever warā€ against which Trump so vigorously campaigned in running for office.

There is one final alternative. But itā€™s one Trump and the formidable war machines of the US and Israel have little control over. Itā€™s the Iranian people and their abiding resentment of the regime.

The war is a disaster for the regime

However the Hormuz predicament is resolved, it should not distract anyone from the countryā€™s current state. Iran has been irreparably weakened. The Hormuz closure is a ploy intended to show that the regime still has leverage. It does indeed, but it canā€™t sustain a regime thatā€™s lost its navy and air force, seen its regional proxies reduced to gun-toting tunnel dwellers and suffered significant losses in its ballistic missile capabilities. 

Its economy was already on the brink of collapse before the war started. Its currency is worthless; punishing economic sanctions will continue. It has no allies willing to come to its aid. Soon, it wonā€™t be able to feed its people, pay public employees or conduct the most basic public services. A greater number of Iranā€™s middle class will slip below the poverty line. It will lack energy to cool homes and offices in Iranā€™s fast-approaching searing summer heat. Water shortages, which have plagued the nation for years, will worsen. The regime was helpless to resolve any of these problems before the war. It will end the war in a much worse state.

Iranā€™s security forces have been weakened but remain largely intact. Morale has reportedly suffered as rank-and-file IRGC forces and their paramilitary militia, the Basij, and regular armed forces, the Artesh, have helplessly watched the nationā€™s defense and security infrastructure systematically destroyed. Some troops arenā€™t getting paid, and desertions have been . Potentially worse, have begun to appear between the better-funded and more politically powerful IRGC and the larger but less supported Artesh.

Worst of all for the regime, the Iranian people will know all of this, having witnessed much of it firsthand. They and the regime know the regime is at its weakest point in its 47-year history. Oppression will increase, and the system necessary to maintain it will be more costly. There may not yet be outward signs of another uprising of the sort we saw in January. But perhaps when the war dust settles and Iranians feel safer from the war itself, they will emerge to challenge the regime again with renewed vigor, hope and rage.

When they do, it is likely to be ugly. Updated estimates of the number killed by regime security forces in January now reach more than . The next round will be worse as the regime struggles for survival against its own citizens. Should the people prevail, regime elites know their fate. Rank-and-file troops of the Artesh and police may feel hard-pressed to defend a regime they know is on life support and cannot provide for the most basic needs of government and the people. Will they be motivated to attack their own people?

If and when that happens, the world will know the Islamic Republic has reached its well- deserved end. That may be Mr. Trumpā€™s best hope, but itā€™s out of his hands.

[ edited this piece.]

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Among the ā€œantique legendsā€ most helpful in understanding the likely outcome of the current US intervention in Iran is the Suez Crisis of 1956, which I describe in my new , Cold War on Five Continents. After Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956, a joint Britishā€“French armada of six aircraft carriers destroyed Egyptā€™s air force, while Israeli troops smashed Egyptian tanks in the sands of the Sinai Peninsula. Within less than a week of war, Nasser had lost his strategic forces and Egypt seemed helpless before the overwhelming might of that massive imperial juggernaut.

But by the time Anglo-French forces came storming ashore at the north end of the Suez Canal, Nasser had executed a geopolitical masterstroke by sinking dozens of rusting ships filled with rocks at the canalā€™s northern entrance. In doing so, he automatically cut off Europeā€™s lifeline to its oil fields in the Persian Gulf. By the time British forces retreated in defeat from Suez, Britain had been sanctioned at the United Nations, its currency was at the brink of collapse, its aura of imperial power had evaporated and its global empire was heading for extinction.

Historians now refer to the phenomenon of a dying empire launching a desperate military intervention to recover its fading imperial glory as ā€œmicro-militarism.ā€ And coming in the wake of imperial Washingtonā€™s receding influence over the broad Eurasian land mass, the recent US military on Iran is starting to look like an American version of just such micro-militarism.

Even if history never truly repeats itself, right now it seems all too appropriate to wonder whether the current US intervention in Iran might indeed be Americaā€™s version of the Suez Crisis. And should Washingtonā€™s attempt at regime change in Tehran somehow ā€œsucceed,ā€ donā€™t for a second think that the result will be a successfully stable new government that will be able to serve its people well.

Seventy years of regime change

Letā€™s return to the historical record to uncover the likely consequences of regime change in Iran. Over the past 70 years, Washington has made repeated attempts at regime change across the span of five continents ā€” initially via CIA covert action during the 44 years of the Cold War and, in the decades since the end of that global conflict, through conventional military operations. Although the methods have changed, the results ā€” plunging the affected societies into decades of searing social conflict and incessant political instability ā€” have been sadly similar. This pattern can be seen in a few of the CIAā€™s most famous covert interventions during the Cold War.

In 1953, Iranā€™s new parliament decided to nationalize the British imperial oil concession there to fund social services for its emerging democracy. In response, a joint CIA-MI6 coup known as ousted Mohammad Mosaddeq, the reformist prime minister, and installed the young Shah, then just 34 years old, in power as the countryā€™s ruler. Unfortunately for the Iranian people, the Shah proved to be a strikingly inept leader who transformed his countryā€™s oil wealth into mass poverty, thereby precipitating Iranā€™s 1979 Islamic Revolution.

By 1954, Guatemala was implementing a historic land reform program that was investing its mostly Mayan indigenous population with the requisites for full citizenship. Unfortunately, a CIA-sponsored invasion known as installed a brutal military dictatorship under the leadership of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, plunging the country into 30 years of civil war that left 200,000 people dead in a population of only five million.

Similarly, in 1960, the Congo had emerged from a century of brutal Belgian colonial rule by electing a charismatic leader, Patrice Lumumba. But the CIA soon ousted him from power under , replacing him with Joseph Mobutu, a military dictator whose 30 years of kleptocracy precipitated violence that led to the deaths of more than five million people in the Second Congo War (1998ā€“2003) and continues to take a toll to this day.

In more recent decades, there have been similarly dismal outcomes from Washingtonā€™s attempts at regime change via conventional military operations. After the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, US forces toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Over the next 20 years, Washington spent ā€” and no, that ā€œtrillionā€ is not a misprint! ā€” in a failed nation-building effort that evaporated when the resurgent Taliban captured the capital, Kabul, in August 2021, plunging the country into a mix of harsh patriarchy and mass privation.

In 2003, under Operation Iraqi Freedom, Washington Iraq in search of nonexistent nuclear weapons. It sank into the quagmire of a 15-year war that led to the of a million people and left behind an autocratic government that became little more than an Iranian client state. And in 2011, the US led a NATO air called Operation Unified Protector that toppled Colonel Muammar Gaddafiā€™s radical regime in Libya, precipitating seven years of and ultimately leaving that country divided between two antagonistic failed states.

When Washingtonā€™s attempts at regime change fail, as they did in the Bay of Pigs of Cuba in 1961 and the invasion of Venezuela last year, that failure often leaves autocratic regimes even more entrenched, with their control over the countryā€™s secret police strengthened and an ever-tighter death grip on the countryā€™s economy.

Why, you might wonder, do such US interventions invariably seem to produce such dismal results? For societies struggling to achieve a fragile social stability amid volatile political change, external intervention, whether covert or open, seems to invariably be the equivalent of hitting an antique pocket watch with a hammer and then trying to squeeze all its gears and springs back into place.

The Iran warā€™s geopolitical consequences

By exploring the geopolitical implications of Washingtonā€™s latest intervention in Iran, itā€™s possible to imagine how US President Donald Trumpā€™s war of choice might well become Washingtonā€™s very own version of the Suez Crisis.

Just as Egypt snatched a diplomatic victory from the jaws of military defeat in 1956 by shutting the Suez Canal, so Iran has now closed off the Middle Eastā€™s other critical chokepoint. In the first week of war, Iran fired its Shahed drones at in the Strait of Hormuz (through which of global crude oil and natural gas regularly passes) and at petroleum refineries on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf. Iranā€™s ongoing drone strikes have blocked more than of tanker departures from the Persian Gulf and shut down the massive Qatari refineries that produce 20% of the world supply of liquified natural gas, sending natural gas prices soaring by in much of the world and by in Asia. The price of gasoline in the US is heading for a gallon and the cost of oil is likely to reach a staggering per barrel in the near future.

Moreover, through the conversion of natural gas to , the Persian Gulf is the source for nearly half the worldā€™s agricultural nutrients. The prices are soaring by for urea fertilizer in markets like Egypt and threatening both in the Northern Hemisphere and food security in the Global South.

The extraordinary concentration of petroleum production, international shipping and capital investment in the Persian Gulf makes the Straits of Hormuz not only a chokepoint for the flow of oil and natural gas but also for the movement of capital for the entire global economy. To begin with the basics, the Persian Gulf holds about of the worldā€™s proven oil reserves, estimated at barrels or, at current prices, about $86 trillion.

To give you an idea of the scale of capital concentration in the regionā€™s infrastructure, the national oil companies of the Gulf Cooperation Council invested in their production facilities in 2025 alone, with plans to continue at that rate for the foreseeable future. To keep the global oil tanker fleet of that largely serves the Persian Gulf afloat, it costs nearly for a single large ā€œSuezmaxā€ tanker. There are about 900 of these normally on the high seas, worth a combined $90 billion (with frequent replacements required by the corrosion of steel in harsh maritime conditions). Moreover, Dubai has the worldā€™s busiest international at the center of a global network ā€” with 450,000 flights annually ā€” now largely shut down by Iranian drone strikes.

Despite all the White House media hype about the terrible swift sword of Americaā€™s recent airstrikes, the USā€“Israeli bombing runs against Iran (which is two-thirds the size of Western Europe) in the warā€™s first week pale before the 1,400,000 bombing sorties over Europe during World War II. The striking contrast between those numbers makes the current US air attacks on Iran seem, from a strategic perspective, like shooting at an elephant with a BB gun.

Moreover, the US has of about 4,000 interceptor missiles, which cost up to $12 million each and canā€™t be rapidly mass-produced. By contrast, Iran has an almost limitless supply of some 80,000 , 10,000 of which it can produce each month for only $20,000 each. In effect, time is not on Washingtonā€™s side if this war drags on for more than a few weeks.

Indeed, in a recent interview, pressed about the possibility that Iranā€™s vast flotilla of slow, low-flying Shahed drones might soon exhaust the U.S. supply of sophisticated interceptor missiles, Pentagon leader General Dan Caine was surprisingly evasive, saying only, ā€œI donā€™t want to be talking about quantities.ā€

Whose boots on the ground?

While economic and military pressures build for a shorter war, Washington is trying to avoid sending troops ashore by mobilizing Iranā€™s ethnic minorities, who make up about 40% of that countryā€™s population. As the Pentagon is silently but painfully aware, US ground forces would face formidable resistance from a Basij militia; Revolutionary Guards trained for asymmetric guerrilla warfare; and Iranā€™s regular army troops.

With other ethnic groups, like the Azeris in the north, unwilling or ā€” like the Baloch tribes in the southeast, far from the capital ā€” unable to attack Tehran, Washington is desperate to play its Kurdish card, just as it has done for the past 50 years. With a population of 10 million astride the highland borders of Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran, the Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the Middle East without their own state. As such, they have long been forced to play the imperial Great Game, making them a surprisingly sensitive bellwether for larger changes in imperial influence.

Although Trump made to the top leaders in Iraqā€™s Kurdistan region during the first week of the latest war, offering them ā€œextensive US aircoverā€ for an attack on Iran, and the US even has a military airbase at Erbil, Kurdistanā€™s capital, the Kurds are so far proving uncharacteristically cautious.

Indeed, Washington has a long history of using and abusing Kurdish fighters, dating back to the days of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who turned their betrayal into a diplomatic art form. After he ordered the CIA to stop aiding the Iraqi Kurdish resistance to Saddam Hussein in 1975, Kissinger an aide: ā€œPromise them anything, give them what they get, and fā€¦ them if they canā€™t take a joke.ā€

As Iraqi forces fought their way into Kurdistan, killing helpless Kurds by the hundreds, their legendary leader Mustafa Barzani, grandfather of the current head of Iraqi Kurdistan, pleaded with Kissinger, , ā€œYour Excellency, the United States has a moral and political responsibility to our people.ā€ Kissinger did not even dignify that desperate plea with a reply and instead told Congress: ā€œCovert action should not be confused with missionary work.ā€

Last January, in an amazingly ill-timed decision, the Trump White House betrayed the Kurds one time too many, breaking Washingtonā€™s decade-long alliance with the Syrian Kurds by forcing them to give up 80% of their occupied territory. In southeastern Turkey, the radical Kurdish PKK Party has made a deal with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan and is actually disarming, while Iraqā€™s Kurdistan region is staying out of the war by respecting a 2023 diplomatic entente with Tehran for a peaceful Iranā€“Iraq border. Trump has called at least one leader of the Iranian Kurds, who constitute about 10% of Iranā€™s population, to encourage an armed uprising. But most Iranian Kurds seem more interested in regional than regime change.

As Trumpā€™s calls upon the Kurds to attack and the Iranian people to are met with an eloquent silence, Washington is likely to end this war with Iranā€™s Islamic regime only further entrenched, showing the world that America is not just a disruptive power but a fading one that other nations can do without. Over the past 100+ years, the Iranian people have mobilized six times in attempts to establish a real democracy. At this point, though, it seems as if any seventh attempt will come long after the current US naval armada has left the Arabian Sea.

From the granular to the geopolitical

If we move beyond this granular view of Iranā€™s ethnic politics to a broader geostrategic perspective on the Iran war, Washingtonā€™s waning influence in the hills of Kurdistan seems to reflect its fading geopolitical influence across the vast Eurasian land mass. Eurasia remains today the epicenter of geopolitical power, as it has been for the past 500 years.

For nearly 80 years, the United States has maintained its global hegemony by controlling the axial ends of Eurasia through its NATO alliance in Western Europe and four bilateral defense pacts along the Pacific littoral from Japan to Australia. But now, as Washington focuses more of its foreign policy on the Western Hemisphere, US influence is fading fast along the vast arc of Eurasia stretching from Poland through the Middle East to Korea that geopolitical scholars like Sir and once dubbed the ā€œrimlandā€ or ā€œthe zone of conflict.ā€ As Spykman put it succinctly once upon a time: ā€œWho controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.ā€

Since the rise of Trumpā€™s foreign policy in 2017, major and medium powers along that entire Eurasian rimland have been actively disengaging from US influence. These include Europe, which rearmed; Russia, which challenged the West in Ukraine; Turkey, which has remained neutral in the present war; Pakistan, which allied with China; India, which broke with Washingtonā€™s Quad alliance; and Japan, which is rearming to create an autonomous defense policy. That ongoing disengagement is manifest in the lack of support for the Iran intervention, even from European and Asian allies ā€” a striking contrast with the broad coalitions that joined US forces in the 1991 Gulf War and the occupation of Afghanistan in 2002.

With Trumpā€™s micro-militarism in Iran inadvertently but clearly exposing the limits of American power, Washingtonā€™s fading influence across Eurasia will undoubtedly prove catalytic for the emergence of a new world order, which is likely to move far beyond the old order of US global hegemony.

Just as Sir Anthony Eden is remembered ruefully today in the United Kingdom as the inept prime minister who destroyed the British Empire at Suez, so future historians may see Trump as the president who degraded US international influence with, among other things, his micro-military misadventure in the Middle East. As empires rise and fall, such geopolitics clearly remains a constant factor in shaping their fate ā€“- a lesson I try to teach in Cold War on Five Continents.

In difficult times like these, when events seem both confused and confusing, Twainā€™s ā€œbroken fragments of antique legendsā€ can remind us of historical analogies like the collapse of the power and influence of Great Britain or the Soviet Union that can help us understand how the past often whispers to the present ā€” as it indeed seems to be doing these days in the Straits of Hormuz.

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Reports that is considering arming Iranian Kurdish groups point toward a familiar and dangerous strategy of proxy regime change ā€” one that rests on a fundamental misreading of Iranā€™s demographic and political realities and carries potentially catastrophic risks not only for the US, but for the wider region and beyond.

A geographic misunderstanding 

To begin with, the strategy appears poorly informed about Iranā€™s internal political and demographic realities. Iranā€™s Kurdish population represents a relatively small minority of the countryā€™s roughly 90 million people. Most place their numbers between 8% and 10%. 

They are concentrated largely in the mountainous northwest of the country along the borders with Iraq and Turkey, hundreds of miles from the political and economic center of gravity around Tehran. By contrast, the majority of the population is ethnically Persian, around 60%, with a long and deeply rooted sense of national identity stretching back more than two millennia. Two factors further make the idea even more problematic. 

First, most Iranian Kurds are Sunni Muslims in a country where more than of the population is Shia. That sectarian divide is not trivial. Sunniā€“Shia tensions have shaped Middle Eastern politics for centuries and continue to structure alliances and rivalries across the region. Arming a small Sunni Kurdish minority in the hope of toppling a Shia Persian state suggests a fundamental misreading of the countryā€™s ethnic and sectarian realities by US national security advisers.  

Second, the largest Kurdish population in the region is not in Iran at all but in southeastern Turkey, where Kurdish groups have fought a bitter against Ankara, in the capital of Turkey, for more than 40 years. During the Syrian Civil War, the US armed and supported forces as part of its campaign against the Islamic State. 

Once that mission was largely accomplished and American support began to recede, Turkey intervened militarily to weaken those same Kurdish forces, fearing they would embolden its own Kurdish minority. In other words, Kurdish proxy strategies rarely remain neatly contained within national borders.

Poor strategizing and underestimating 

There is also a broader strategic risk. Attempts to overthrow regimes from the outside often produce the opposite of the intended effect. Rather than weakening the government in Tehran, overt foreign support for insurgent groups could encourage Iranians, many of whom are critical of their own leadership, to rally around the flag in the face of . 

Iran also possesses far stronger state cohesion than many outsiders assume. While the regime faces significant domestic dissent, as evidenced by the in recent months, the Iranian state itself has proven resilient, a war with Iraq, decades of sanctions and sustained external pressure.

The alternative scenario may be even worse. Iran is a country of 90 million people, geographically larger than Texas and California combined, with a complex ethnic mosaic and a long history of regional power politics. If the state were to fragment into civil war, the conflict would almost certainly draw in outside powers. Russia and China, both of which maintain with Tehran, could support competing factions to counter American influence.

History offers few examples where external powers successfully engineer regime change through minority proxies. Far more often, such strategies produce fragmentation, civil war and prolonged instability. Pursuing that path in Iran risks turning one of the Middle Eastā€™s largest and most historically cohesive states into the next Syria, only vastly larger and far more dangerous. 

 [ edited this piece]

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Asset managers are closing their doors on investors

The news from that it will be limiting withdrawals from one of its private credit funds is a watershed moment. The worldā€™s largest asset manager has done something once unthinkable: it has effectively locked the doors. Faced with in redemption requests this quarter ā€” nearly 10% of its $26 billion flagship private credit fund ā€” BlackRock paid out only half. The rest of the investors were told, quite simply, that they cannot have their money back.

To understand why this matters, you have to look at the mechanics of the private credit boom. Private credits are funds that make loans to mid-sized companies ā€” businesses that are too small for the bond market but too large for a local bank. These loans are illiquid, meaning they cannot be sold quickly. This works perfectly fine as long as everyone stays in their seats. But when a crowd rushes for the exit at the same time, the fund doesnā€™t have the cash. It has to gate the fund, trapping investors inside.

We are seeing a systemic shudder. In finance, refers to the repayment of mutual fund shares or bonds before those funds mature, that is, reach the date theyā€™re supposed to be paid back. , the other titan of the industry, faced a record 7.9% redemption request. To avoid a similar freeze, it had to break its own rules, raising withdrawal limits and pumping of its own capital into the fund just to keep the peace. Blue Owl went further, entirely and issuing IOUs. Across the board, shares in these firms ā€” KKR, Apollo, Carlyle ā€” have plummeted.

Threat of stagflation looms large

This panic is not happening in a vacuum. It is being fueled by a broader, more ominous economic shift. For the past week, the US economy has been flashing red. We are witnessing the return of a ghost from the 1970s: , or the combination of a reduction in spending and an increase in prices. On one side, we have a sudden, violent spike in inflation. Following the joint USā€“Israeli strikes on Iran last week, oil prices have gone vertical. crude surged over 12% in a single day, settling above $90, while Brent crude has breached the $100 mark this morning. The Strait of Hormuz, the worldā€™s most vital energy artery, is effectively a war zone. This isnā€™t just a market fluctuation; it is a massive supply-side shock that acts as a regressive tax on every consumer and business in the world.

On the other side, the stagnation half of the equation is arriving faster than expected. Last Fridayā€™s was a disaster. Instead of the modest growth the markets expected, the US economy actually lost jobs in February. Revisions to previous months were equally grim, showing that the robust labor market we were promised was largely a mirage. This puts the Federal Reserve in an impossible position. Usually, when the job market weakens, the Fed cuts rates to stimulate growth. But with oil prices skyrocketing and fueling inflation, cutting rates risks pouring gasoline on a fire. If they hold rates high to fight inflation, they crush an already fragile economy.

What we are seeing is what market analysts call a Davis Double Kill. Itā€™s a rare and painful event where both corporate earnings and market valuations collapse simultaneously. Earnings are eroding because outside of the AI-fueled tech sector, the real economy is contracting. Manufacturing and construction are struggling under the weight of high interest rates and now, rising energy costs. Mary Daly of the San Francisco Fed recently that the market faces ā€œtwo-sided risksā€ that complicate the path forward.

Guarantees no longer exist

The Trump administrationā€™s decision to initiate a conflict with Iran appears, in hindsight, to have been made without a clear calculation of the economic fallout. The assumption was likely a swift, Venezuela-style collapse. Instead, we have a protracted war, a closed Strait and a global community ā€” including many of our NATO allies ā€” expressing deep dissent. The geopolitical premium is finally being collected, and the US dollar is feeling the weight of it. Jan Hatzius of Goldman Sachs had previously that a fragile job market could spark recession fears; that moment has arrived.

When the worldā€™s largest fund manager tells you that you canā€™t have your money, it is a signal that the era of easy assumptions is over. For years, we treated private credit as a risk-free alternative to the public markets. We treated the US consumer as an infinite engine of growth. And we treated geopolitical stability as a given. Today, all three of those assumptions are being tested at once. This is more than a market correction; it is a fundamental reassessment of the American economic narrative. If the Fed cannot find a way to balance the dual threats of rising oil and falling jobs, the soft landing we were promised will remain a dream, and the closed gates at BlackRock may be just the beginning.

[Cheyenne Torres edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

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Early signals of external encouragement and rising attention

On the first day of the war, US President Donald Trump addressed the Iranian people and urged them to seize the momentous opportunity by over their government once America and Israel are done destroying the regime. His message was positively received by opposition groups and activists as it suggested that the US was serious about using its military might to weaken the brutal regime and pave the way for conditions for internal political change.ĢżĀ 

Days later, the Kurds of Iran became the focus of international attention after CNN that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was looking to arm Kurdish groups based across the border to spark an uprising against the regime. While the report suggested Kurdish fighters could engage Iranian forces in western Iran or seize territory in Kurdish regions in a ground operation, it framed the Kurds more as proxies comparable to terrorist Iranian militias in the region rather than a stateless nation with more than a century-long struggle for self-determination.

Consequently, Kurdish political parties strongly the claims by publicly denying any requests from the US or Israel to launch such operations. Nevertheless, the Kurds and US administration came under intense scrutiny due to the negative framing of the development that President Trump had made a phone call to not only Kurdish leaders in Iraq but also to Mustafa , the leader of the Democratic party of Iran (PDKI), whose party was crucial in the formation of a multi-party coalition known as the Coalition of the Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK).

Mixed messaging and cautious Kurdish calculations

In the days following this coverage, Trump was asked about Kurdish forces potentially becoming involved in the conflict by . He initially described Kurdish participation as a ā€œwonderfulā€ idea, but walked back his statement days later by that he did not want to further complicate the conflict or endanger Kurds by getting them involved. This left many Kurds wondering whether they could rely on America as an ally, given the Presidentā€™s mixed messages and what they had witnessed recently in Rojava, where the Trump Administration abandoned the Kurds in support of the new Jolani government.

The combination of attention and ambiguity on exactly what the US and Israel want has made Kurdish leaders act cautiously while monitoring developments closely. As Komala leader Abdullah Mohtadi has repeatedly warned, the Kurds ā€œwill not send [their] forces to the ,ā€ underlining that any move into Iran without clear guarantees and adequate support would be strategically reckless. Mohtadi added that the highly organized Kurdish parties, part of a new alliance, are ready to take up arms if supported by US air power, noting ā€œ strongā€ forces are prepared but fear attacks from Iranian forces without such backing.Ģż

In a recorded message to Fox News on March 9, Khaled , spokesperson for PDKI, emphasized that Kurdish forces are not rushing into the war. ā€œWe are not part of the ongoing war between Israel, the United States and the Islamic Republic,ā€ Azizi explained, ā€œBut we have been struggling against this regime for many years.ā€ He noted that the current conflict is primarily being fought through air and naval operations: ā€œRight now, ground forces are not the topic.ā€ Kurdish groups are therefore not currently preparing to cross into Iran in large numbers, but they do have many members on the inside. Azizi also highlighted that the Kurdish coalition is carefully watching developments and coordinating politically with other Iranian opposition groups.ĢżĀ 

His remarks suggest that the Kurdish strategy is to wait for a further weakening of the regimeā€™s missile and drone capabilities while building an internal coalition of opposition groups, including Baluch, Ahwazi Arab and Azeri forces, along with other opposition to eventually confront the regime from within. This corresponds well with other sources that I have spoken to on the matter. Even without direct engagement from the Americans and Israelis, Kurdish leaders are preparing for the possibility of future operations, as the decimation of the IRGCā€™s infrastructure in the Kurdish regions may open the vacuum of power necessary for them to consolidate control. If attacks on the political, economic and military capabilities of the regime continue with intensity, the Kurds may develop the confidence to move into their regions in Iran sooner rather than later.

Military requirements and political risks of escalation

For Kurdish forces to engage in ground operations, they would likely require substantial support to counter the regimeā€™s military capabilities. A no-fly zone over Kurdish regions in Iran, anti-drone defenses, air defense systems to intercept missiles and heavy weaponry capable of countering the IRGC would be crucial in not only taking territory but also keeping it. While the mountainous terrain of Iranian Kurdistan provides a natural defensive advantage, launching a large-scale campaign without a reduction in missile and drone threats would be extremely risky. Kurdish leaders are fully aware of these dangers and are therefore waiting for the right moment to act. Their cautious posturing is directly linked to both military realities and the broader political stakes within Iran.

Another factor curtailing possible operations is concerns about civil war. There are many that Kurds are attempting to break up Iran. Such statements are not only misleading but also echo by the Islamic Republic and ultranationalist Iranians to justify attacks on Kurdish people and forces in Iran and across the world. For more than a century, Kurdish movements have consistently demanded autonomy for Kurdistan and democracy for Iran, not secession. A federal Iran represents a return to a historically grounded governance model that recognizes ethnic and cultural diversity while strengthening unity by allowing all peoples to preserve their identity through participation in a shared political system.ĢżĀ 

In contrast to narratives that paint Kurdish movements as inherently divisive, Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan, particularly in Iraq and Syria, have shown a strong preference for avoiding civil war with neighbors and maintaining cooperative relationships across ethnic and national lines. The semiautonomous Kurdistan Region in Iraq has functioned within a federal framework that balances Kurdish self-rule with peaceful coexistence with Baghdad and neighboring communities. Likewise, in northeastern Syria, Kurdish leaders have for a democratic, decentralized system that protects Kurdish rights while recognizing equal citizenship for all Syrians. This history reflects a political tradition among many Kurdish movements of seeking coexistence and mutual respect rather than domination or secession.

As Qubad Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) rightly pointed out in a recent with the UKā€™s Channel 4, ā€œKurds are not just good fighters, they are also diplomats and negotiators.ā€ PDKIā€™s US representative, Hejar echoed similar sentiments, stating that:

The Iranian Kurds should not be seen as a security issue. We are not asking to be seen as a side story ā€¦ We are part of the answer and the biggest chance at a democratic and great Iran and region.

Another factor that makes Kurdish efforts at autonomy likely in Iran is the strong Kurdish yearning for self-rule and the memory of the Kurdistan founded in 1946 in Mahabad by the PDKI. The Republic, often referred to by Kurds as Komar, remains a powerful symbol of both hope and possibilities for a generation of Kurdish youth who take great pride in their roots.

A potential turning point for Kurdish strategy

While the Kurdish coalition may be exercising caution now, it may not remain that way for long. Kurdish parties possess thousands of experienced forces, strong networks and organizational structures that may allow them to assert control over parts of Iranian Kurdistan if the Islamic Republicā€™s authority continues to weaken. The Kurdistan region of Iraq (KRG) may not be able to host Iranian Kurdish forces for much longer, given the heightened danger it poses to their security. Thus, even without direct foreign support, the coalition may seize the moment to carve out what territory it can in the Kurdish regions in Iran. Kurdish party leaders have that for Iranā€™s Kurds ā€œthe priority is to overthrow the Islamic Republic,ā€ but in a way that leads to a democratic, decentralized Iran in which ā€œthe rights of all nations and citizens are guaranteed,ā€ not just those of the Kurds.

Kurdish consolidation of rule in western Iran could have consequences far beyond Kurdish areas in Iran. By consolidating control in parts of western Iran, the Kurds could trigger a domino effect, inspiring other marginalized regions and opposition movements across the country to assert control over territory and challenge the regimeā€™s authority. The leadership in Tehran is well aware of this significant fact and knows the serious threat that Kurdish forces could pose to its power in the Kurdistan region in Iran. This is precisely why Iranā€™s president, Masoud , recently warned Kurdish parties ā€” referring to them as ā€œcertain groups and factions in neighboring countriesā€ ā€” not to join the conflict on the side of outside powers in his apology to regional countries that have been attacked by Iran.Ģż

The century-long struggle of the Kurds for autonomy, combined with the current military and political upheaval unfolding in Iran, has placed them at a historic crossroads where the wrong decision could doom them to another century of subjugation and assimilation. The decisions made by Iranian Kurdish leaders in the coming days and months could shape not only the future of the Kurdish region of Iran but also the broader course of Iranā€™s internal opposition movements and the status of the Kurds in Iran, the Middle East and on the international stage.

[ edited this piece.]

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The Islamic Republic of Iran came into being when Ayatollah Khomeini other Iranian factions and assumed the role of the revolutionā€™s leader in 1979. Although other groups, such as the Tudeh Party of Iran, the Peopleā€™s Mojahedin Organization (MEK), the Peopleā€™s Fedayeen guerrillas and others, helped topple the late Shah of Iran, these organizations were sidelined.

Khomeini established a Shiā€™a theocracy advocating anti-American and anti-Israeli policies. At the same time, the new regime focused on supporting Shiā€™a groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah across the Middle East, both politically and militarily. Domestically, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) took over sensitive governmental institutions and gradually its authority in every aspect of the Iraniansā€™ lives, from financial to construction to military sectors. Furthermore, any protest by Iranians was met with violence, where torture and the death penalty systematically used.Ģż

Up to a couple of years ago, very few analysts would have imagined military action of such significant scale against Iran. This happened mostly due to Tehranā€™s miscalculations and missteps in its long-term strategic plan. These miscalculations have given Iran a horrid endgame. 

Strategic miscalculationsĀ 

The first major strategic miscalculations began shortly after the 1979 revolution, driven by the desire to export it. The revolutionaries chose an ā€œanti-imperialistā€ path and declared themselves pioneers of resistance against the Sunni-American powers. While this gave the Islamic Republic a network of loyal, mostly Shiā€™a militias, it also turned Iran into a pariah regionally and internationally.

Pursuing an anti-Western path soon brought Iranian support for nonstate actors such as the Lebanese Amal Movement and Hezbollah. This network of alliances grew over time and included many groups, such as Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Iraqi Shiā€™a militia groups and Yemenā€™s Houthi movement. As this network (referred to as the Axis of Resistance) grew throughout four decades, Tehran, which was a close US and Israeli ally (before the 1979 revolution), became their archenemy, advocating the annihilation of Israel and suspending all diplomatic ties with the US.Ģż

This axis of resistance required military, political and financial assistance from Tehran to maintain its struggle. For instance, between 2012 and 2018, Iran more than $16 billion supporting the Assad regime and proxy groups in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. These expenses and harsh sanctions directly affected the livelihoods of ordinary Iranians. At the political level, the international community lost trust in Tehran, and the Islamic Republic grew increasingly isolated. Iranians experiencing hardships both at home and abroad gradually grew more bitter and turned to protests. Thousands of Iranians were murdered during the last wave of protests, which began at the end of December 2025, with the official reports around 30,000 killed and human rights organizations more than 7,000 protestersā€™ deaths.Ģż

Tehran focused and sacrificed much of its resources and finances on its nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions for more than four decades. The nuclear project has been degraded not only by the American bombings during the 12-day war in 2025, but also by Israeli and US and the of Iranian nuclear scientists. As for the ballistic missile part, Iran has fired a good number of them at Israel and other targets across the Middle East; however, they have not been as effective because of airstrikes carried out by Israeli and American warplanes. Iran has no modern jet fighters, insufficient air defense systems, or proper sirens or shelters for its citizens.

Ideological fervor

The Islamic Republicā€™s adherence to a specific ideology led it to increasingly curtail opportunities for engagement and collaboration, even as other nations sought to maintain open dialogue amid global challenges. Iran pursued alliances with nonstate actors and the building of proxy networks in hopes of regional dominance. The dominance seemed to work when, in the aftermath of the Iraq War of 2003, Iran became a significant player. Tehran became further misguided with the success of keeping Bashar Assad in power for more than a decade following the Syrian civil war. 

This alliance slowly following the start of the Israel-Gaza war after the Hamas October 7 attacks on Israel. The conflict dramatically reshaped the regional power dynamics with surprising speed and brutality. Initially, Hezbollah suffered a . Their military capabilities, once considered a formidable deterrent, were severely diminished following a coordinated and sustained offensive. They lost key commanders and crucial supply lines, leading to a significant contraction of their influence and operational capacity. This immediate setback sent shockwaves through the anti-Western alliance.

Following closely on this initial defeat, the long and brutal reign of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad came to an abrupt and chaotic end. Within a single devastating ā€œblitz week,ā€ the remaining loyalist defenses . Facing an overwhelming coordinated assault and internal revolts, Assad lost his grip on the capital and the remaining heartland, forcing him to flee the country and ending decades of dynastic rule. This power vacuum in Syria had immediate and profound consequences for the rest of the region.

With their most reliable state sponsor gone and their primary proxy weakened, Iranā€™s network of outposts, bases and militias across the Middle East has become much less tenable. The Iranians still have partners in the region, but they are not capable of inflicting a decisive defeat against their enemies. The weakening of their alliance is devastating for Tehranā€™s ability to project power.

However, Tehran remained determined, at least in rhetoric, to be the dominant regional power and possesses a leverage significant enough to afford intransigence in its diplomatic efforts to reach a deal with the US over the nuclear program. Further, Tehran refused to discuss its ballistic missile program under any circumstances, calling it . This aligned with the unbending rhetoric of IRGC commanders and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This shows they were overconfident that they could play the game as they had for 47 years, which had enabled their survival, with periods of stricter or looser sanctions.Ģż

Fatal consequences

Like a slow-motion game of positional chess, international politics and foreign policy unfold over time. Both sides meticulously develop their resources, secure their core interests, establish a strong structural base with a firm opening and build toward a solid middle game. Then they can aim for a draw if they are unable to win in the endgame. 

Anywhere in the world, it is quite difficult to win a war if the public is not supporting the government. of Iranians cheering the death of Khamenei by dancing on the streets, shooting fireworks and chanting anti-regime slogans prove the limited support the regime has among Iranians, even when under attack by a foreign country.Ģż

Both in June 2025 and since the start of the war, Iran has failed to defend its skies against the Israeli and American fighter jets. Iranian cities proper siren systems, and there are no adequate shelters for people to find refuge in when fighter jets pound the ground.Ģż

Iran made an opening move in its game that contained a few grave mistakes. Their middle game continued with a series of more mistakes, too. By antagonizing the West, being overconfident about its regional proxies and investing in a nuclear program and ballistic missiles instead of proper air defense and addressing its citizensā€™ grievances, Tehran believed it could beat the whole world. Thus, the prospect of the endgame turned out to be far from victorious for Tehran. 

Even if the Islamic Republic survives the current war, it has been beaten twice at home in less than a year and has taken a great blow at its outposts in the region. Managing its position will be a tough task, as both domestically and internationally, it has little leverage to play with. 

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The symbolism of recognition

For Israel, Modiā€™s return visit carries both symbolic and strategic weight. In 2017, Modi became the first sitting Indian prime minister to visit Israel. His decision to return now ā€” and to address the Knesset, Israelā€™s house of representatives ā€” reinforces the sense that the relationship has entered a new phase.

Amoss argues that the meaning of these visits lies in the way India publicly frames the relationship. As she explains, ā€œthe meaning of that is that India sees Israel as a strategic partnership.ā€ For Israeli observers, the optics matter. Modiā€™s speech, delivered partly in Hebrew and referencing historical connections between the two countries, resonated widely in Israel.

The timing also heightened this visitā€™s significance. The international community has criticized Israel since 2023, when Israel went to war in the Gaza strip following the infamous October 7 attacks. In that environment, Indiaā€™s continued engagement and Modiā€™s willingness to appear publicly in Israel carries diplomatic importance beyond the bilateral relationship.

From quiet cooperation to a broad partnership

India and Israel formally normalized relations in 1992, but cooperation between the two countries had already begun decades earlier. Agriculture, water management and defense formed the foundation of early ties. Over time, defense cooperation became the most visible pillar of the relationship.

Amoss notes that much of this collaboration remained discreet for years. Until the mid-2010s, the relationship was often conducted quietly, even when defense cooperation was substantial.

That dynamic has changed significantly. Since 2014, the partnership has expanded into new areas such as the digital economy, finance, education, innovation and labor mobility. Government-to-government engagement now complements longstanding business and research ties.

For Israeli policymakers, this diversification reflects a growing recognition that India represents far more than a defense partner. With its vast market, technological ambitions and expanding global influence, India increasingly appears as a long-term strategic actor.

Indiaā€™s ā€œmulti-alignmentā€ approach

Amoss continues on to discuss Indiaā€™s distinctive foreign policy strategy. Unlike many Western countries, India maintains relationships with a wide range of competing powers, including the United States, Russia, Iran and China.

Amoss describes this approach as ā€œmulti-alignment.ā€ Rather than choosing sides in geopolitical rivalries, India seeks to pursue overlapping partnerships based on national interests.

This logic contrasts sharply with the Western diplomatic mindset, which she characterizes as more binary. As she puts it, ā€œthe West way is a zero-game play.ā€ Amoss believes Israel could benefit from understanding this difference rather than interpreting Indiaā€™s relationships as contradictions.

Indiaā€™s ties with Iran, for example, include economic projects such as the development of the Chabahar port. Yet Amoss argues that such cooperation does not necessarily conflict with Indiaā€™s relationship with Israel. Instead, it reflects Indiaā€™s need to navigate a complex regional environment that includes difficult neighbors such as Pakistan and China.

IMEC, regional integration and stalled normalization

The discussion also turns to the Indiaā€“Middle Eastā€“Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), an ambitious project intended to connect India to Europe through Gulf states and Israel. Announced at the 2023 G20 summit, the corridor was widely interpreted as a potential driver of regional economic integration.

The October 7 attacks disrupted that momentum. One motive behind the violence, Amoss suggests, may have been to derail emerging normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia ā€” a development that would have strengthened the corridorā€™s viability.

For now, the project remains uncertain. Israel is largely sidelined while other participants, including India, the United Arab Emirates and several European countries, continue exploring cooperation.

Amoss nevertheless believes Indiaā€™s engagement remains important for Israelā€™s regional standing. Indiaā€™s partnerships across the Middle East could help maintain diplomatic openings that might eventually revive broader economic integration.

Strategic gaps and the future of the partnership

Khattar Singh and Amoss conclude with a broader reflection on Israelā€™s strategic outlook. Amoss argues that Israel often focuses on immediate security threats at the expense of long-term planning. As she states, ā€œIn Israel, we donā€™t have a national strategy.ā€

India provides a useful contrast. Its ability to maintain diverse partnerships while pursuing long-term economic growth illustrates a different model of international engagement.

Despite the challenges, Amoss remains optimistic about the trajectory of Indiaā€“Israel relations. Expanding business ties, growing technological cooperation and stronger political recognition are gradually deepening the relationship. As both countries navigate a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape, their partnership may increasingly extend beyond defense into a broader strategic alignment.

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The post FO Talks: Why Israel Sees India as a Game Changer in the Middle East Power Balance appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

One of the most consequential of these developments is the weakening of Iranā€™s regional leverage. Mounting economic pressure, diplomatic isolation and security challenges across several fronts have constrained Tehranā€™s ability to sustain influence through its proxy networks. This has direct implications for Yemen, where the have benefited significantly from Iranian political and military support.Ģż

A by a UN Panel of Experts on Yemen has highlighted how Iranian support has enhanced the Houthisā€™ missile and drone capabilities, enabling the group to conduct attacks not only within Yemen but also against regional infrastructure and maritime shipping routes. Should Iranā€™s ability to maintain support for the group decline, the Houthisā€™ operational reach and political leverage will diminish, thereby creating space for new political arrangements to stabilize the country.Ģż

Gulf strategic realignment and opportunities for cooperation

For Saudi Arabia, the evolving regional context presents an opportunity to reassess its Yemen policy. Over the past decade, Riyadhā€™s approach to Yemen has largely been driven by security concerns, particularly the necessity to counter Houthi expansion and limit Iranian influence along Saudi Arabiaā€™s southern border. While these priorities remain relevant, changing regional dynamics may enable Saudi Arabia to adopt a broader strategy that emphasizes long-term stability over short-term security considerations. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) could play a role in this expansive strategy.ĢżĀ 

Although between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have intensified in recent years due to their competing visions over Yemenā€™s political future, especially regarding the role of the Emirati-backed southern separatists, the wider regional security environment is shifting rapidly. Escalating tensions following the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, which prompted an Iranian retaliation on and in the Gulf, have underscored the interconnected nature of Gulf security.

In this context, current regional instability may paradoxically create an opportunity for cooperation, as heightened security threats often encourage greater coordination among partners who share common security vulnerabilities. The issue of Southern Yemen could therefore transform from a point of divergence into a platform for renewed strategic cooperation between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. 

Stabilization prospects in Southern YemenĀ 

Despite years of conflict, Yemenā€™s southern regions have retained relatively security structures and administrative institutions. These local capacities provide a solid foundation for broader stabilization efforts in the region focused on governance reform, economic recovery and institutional development. Through coordinated Gulf support, strengthening such capacities could help create conditions conducive to sustainable stability.Ģż

The past decade of conflict has demonstrated that a military approach alone cannot deliver lasting peace in Yemen. Durable stability in the country will depend on , effective governance and partnerships rooted in local legitimacy. This is particularly important given South Yemenā€™s strategic geographic location. The region borders the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the worldā€™s most vital , through which an estimated 10ā€“12% of global seaborne trade passes via the Red Sea corridor. Ensuring security along these waterways is therefore both a regional priority and a matter of global economic significance.Ģż

Current regional dynamics offer Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the opportunity to expand their role in Yemen beyond short-term security objectives. Moreover, geopolitical developments provide an opportunity for Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to reconcile, thereby contributing to a more stable future for southern Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula.

However, it is vital for southern political actors to strengthen governance performance and demonstrate commitment to inclusive and accountable administration. Yemenā€™s long-term stability will ultimately depend on political arrangements that reflect realities on the ground and address the aspirations of the countryā€™s diverse regions. 

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War without a clear end

Atul begins by pressing Gary and Glenn on the most immediate issue: how long the conflict might last. Gary rejects the idea that US President Donald Trump can simply decide when the war ends. Iran retains agency and can continue the confrontation even after Washington declares success. Tehran has multiple ways to keep pressure on the US, Israel and the Gulf states, so the conflict could stretch on for weeks or even months.

Glenn agrees and places the problem in a broader American mindset. He argues that US leaders too often imagine war as if it were governed by the logic of sports, with fixed rules, a final whistle and an obvious winner. That illusion is especially dangerous in this case. ā€œThere is always a tomorrow and today is never decisive,ā€ he says, warning that military campaigns rarely produce clean political endings.

Even so, Glenn notes that the war does have material limits. However powerful the US may be, it cannot sustain high-intensity operations indefinitely because munitions are being consumed faster than they can be replaced. That creates a likely window of several weeks, after which political patience in Washington may begin to erode.

Iranā€™s regime is wounded, not transformed

The discussion then turns to Iranā€™s internal structure after the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the rise of his son, Mojtaba. Atul describes the succession as a hardening rather than a break, arguing that the new order combines personal vengeance with institutional continuity. Gary agrees that the regime sees the war as existential, but he stresses that the decisive force is not the supreme leader alone. In his account, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps remains the true center of power, shaping strategy, controlling major parts of the economy and exercising influence across intelligence, security and the judiciary.

Although many Iranians may despise the system they live under, both Gary and Glenn are skeptical that popular anger can easily become organized political transformation. Glenn argues that autocratic systems are highly effective at eliminating credible challengers before they can emerge. Gary adds that in wartime, ordinary people worry first about survival: food, water, work and family security, not abstract democratic transition.

Military pressure may weaken Iran, destroy infrastructure and deepen public misery without producing a viable alternative political order. It seems hopes for a sudden uprising or a unifying opposition figure remain improbable.

Global economic shock

Atul next broadens the frame from strategy to economics. He points to soaring insurance costs, stalled shipping and the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of global gas and oil passes, along with a significant share (a third) of the global fertilizer trade. Even before any total closure, fear alone is enough to disrupt commerce. Shipowners hesitate, insurers raise premiums and energy markets become unstable.

Glenn argues that these effects will not collapse the world economy outright, but instead generate inflationary and recessionary pressures that reach nearly every country. Gary further emphasizes how deeply interdependent the global economy remains. Gulf monarchies rely on hydrocarbon revenues, imported food and fragile social bargains. South Asia and Africa are particularly exposed to spikes in oil, gas and fertilizer prices. Iran, already under strain, is even more vulnerable.

Atul also raises a larger possibility: that prolonged disruption could force states to accelerate their transition away from Middle Eastern hydrocarbons. Gary agrees, suggesting that the war may strengthen long-term investment in electric vehicles, solar energy and other alternatives. In that sense, a conflict centered on oil could also hasten the search for a post-oil future.

Grand strategy or chaos

Atul asks whether the Trump administration is pursuing a wider geopolitical strategy aimed at controlling oil chokepoints, weakening Iran and squeezing China. Glenn dismisses this idea outright. ā€œThat is crazy talk,ā€ he says. He argues that foreign policy is usually far less coherent than outside observers imagine. Statesmen are rarely master strategists calmly moving pieces across a global chessboard. They are more often overwhelmed officials responding to crises as they arise.

Gary broadly agrees. Long-range planning exists in theory, he says, but war reduces governments to reacting under pressure. He doubts that any such strategy would work anyway, especially because Russia would almost certainly continue supplying China if Beijing faced an energy shock. Both Gary and Glenn therefore see less evidence of a grand design than of improvisation, contradiction and strategic drift.

That diagnosis leads to a deeper criticism of US power. Glenn argues that American conservatives have repeatedly assumed military force can reshape political and cultural realities abroad, despite decades of evidence to the contrary. Iraq remains the obvious warning. In Iran, as in earlier wars, destruction may be achievable, but durable political transformation will not be.

A long conflict with no satisfying outcome

Atul, Gary and Glenn converge on the view that Iran may emerge weaker and less able to project power beyond its borders, but the underlying political structure may survive. Israel and the US may win battles in the air while failing to produce a stable regional order. The global economy may absorb the shock, but only by spreading pain far beyond the battlefield.

Gary and Glenn also dismiss fears of an imminent Israeli nuclear strike on Iran, arguing that such an action serves no meaningful military purpose under present conditions. That restraint matters, but it does not change the larger picture. This war is less a controlled campaign than a dangerous process whose consequences will be felt in the capitals of Tehran, Tel Aviv, Washington and far beyond.

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In the vacuum of this post-regime reality, a tempting but dangerous narrative has surfaced again from the archives of strategic thinking from the 1980s. This is the belief that the long-term security interests of the State of Israel, the United States and the larger Western alliance are by the balkanization of the Iranian state, or its breakup into its component ethnic and sectarian micro-states. This reasoning is dangerously counterproductive and lacking, as Israel should fear a balkanized Iran more than it wants such a dissolution.

The fragmentation strategy, famously by Oded Yinon in 1982, represents a catastrophic misreading of the 2026 security environment. While the dismantling of a hostile central government might remove a unitary threat, the resulting vacuum would not yield a collection of benign, manageable statelets. Instead, it would detonate a geopolitical dirty bomb that no amount of missile defense or border walls could contain.

The hard realities of 2026 dictate that a fragmented Iran would birth a constellation of nuclear warlords operating outside the logic of deterrence. It will also open a super-highway that enables a resurgent Islamic State of Khorasan (ISIS-K) and Al-Qaeda to reach the Mediterranean. Fragmentation will destabilize the crucial NATO anchor of Turkey through unmanageable refugee waves, and hand the strategic coastline of the Indian Ocean to the Peopleā€™s Republic of China via a vassalized Baluchistan. Furthermore, the operational paradigm of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which relies on ā€œintelligence dominanceā€ over a centralized adversary, would be rendered obsolete in a chaotic landscape of fifty warring militias.

Consequently, the only viable pathway to regional stability is not the passive observation of a state collapse, but a coordinated US-Israeli Smart Intervention. This is a strategy predicated on the reality that the Iranian regime must change to prevent the catastrophic alternative of a failed, balkanized state. Unlike the model of fragmentation, that is, drawing borders along ethnic or religious lines, a Smart Intervention utilizes absolute air superiority, digital paralysis of the IRGCā€™s repressive apparatus and legal snapback isolation to facilitate a transition that preserves Iranā€™s historical and institutional integrity. A unified, secular Iran is a prerequisite for the model ā€” a framework of strategic cooperation that transforms a former adversary into a regional anchor of stability. The opportunity cost of trading a potential future ally for a guaranteed failed state is a miscalculation that would haunt global security for the next century.

Yinon Paradigm is strategic anachronism in 2026

The Yinon Paradigm comes directly from Oded Yinonā€™s February 1982 , ā€œA Strategy for Israel in the 1980s.ā€ Yinon, a former Israeli Foreign Ministry official, argued that Middle Eastern states were fragile ā€” glued together only by repression ā€” and that breaking them down into smaller ethnic and religious states was the only way to guarantee Israelā€™s survival. The logic was simple: A neighborhood busy fighting its own civil wars is too distracted to threaten you.

But trying to paste a theory from 1982 onto the reality of 2026 is a massive mistake. The region hasnā€™t just changed; it operates on completely different rules now. Yinon assumed that breaking up big states would create weak, contained micro-states that couldnā€™t hurt anyone. Recent history proved the exact opposite. When central authority collapsed in Iraq after 2003, we didnā€™t get a quiet partition; we got ISIS erasing borders. When Syria fragmented in 2011, it didnā€™t create a safe buffer for Israel. Instead, it created a chaotic vacuum that the IRGC used to park advanced missiles right on the edge of the Golan Heights. In 2026, chaos doesnā€™t contain threats ā€” it incubates them.

The biggest in applying Yinonā€™s logic to Iran is treating it like an artificial state, similar to Iraq or Syria. Iraq and Syria were modern creations, glued together by colonial powers from different Ottoman pieces. When they fell apart after 2003 and 2011, they cracked along lines that dictators had merely covered up. Iran is different. It is a civilizational state with thousands of years of shared history.

Despite having many ethnic groups ā€” Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluch, Lurs ā€” the concept of Iran-zamin (the Land of Iran) creates a loyalty that runs deeper than ethnic differences. Western strategists often underestimate this ā€œrally around the flagā€ effect. Trying to push separatism from the outside usually backfires; it just hands the regime a perfect excuse to claim foreigners want to carve up the motherland. During the protests in 2025ā€“2026 across Tehran, Isfahan and Tabriz, of ā€œWe are all togetherā€ drowned out any separatist voices. Even with the economy in ruins and political repression high, Iranians want to reclaim their country, not dissolve it.

Why fragmentation hampers Israel

The Yinon Plan was conceived in an era of conventional state-on-state warfare, where the primary threat was a massed Arab armored column crossing the border. In that context, breaking a large army into smaller, feuding militias made sense. Warfare in 2026, however, is defined by precision intelligence, cyber dominance and integrated air defense. Israelā€™s ā€œā€ and subsequent defense plans rely on precise, data-driven targeting of enemy centers of gravity. As Israeli defense analysts have , the IDFā€™s superiority is maximized against a state actor with assets to lose and a hierarchy to target.

Dealing with ā€œ50 militiasā€ in a balkanized territory removes the targets. There is no central server to hack, no commander-in-chief to deter and no economy to sanction. The enemy becomes hydra-headed, invisible and immune to the pressure points that Israel has spent decades mastering. The 1980s strategy assumed that chaos targets the enemy; the 2026 reality is that chaos targets the global order, energy markets and non-proliferation regimes upon which the West depends.

The most terrifying variable in the equation of Iranian fragmentation is the status of its nuclear program. Unlike the denuclearized Libya or the nascent programs of the past, Iran in 2026 possesses a mature, dispersed and deeply hardened nuclear infrastructure. Following the 12-Day War in June 2025, Israeli and US strikes parts of this infrastructure but failed to obliterate the technical knowledge or the entirety of the fissile stockpile. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a critical loss of ā€œcontinuity of knowledgeā€ regarding Iranā€™s production of centrifuges and enriched uranium inventories.

In a scenario where the central government in Tehran collapses, command and control over these strategic assets would evaporate. The resulting is the ā€œNuclear Warlordā€ scenario: local commanders, factional IRGC leaders or separatist militias seizing control of nuclear sites like Natanz, Fordow or Esfahan to use as leverage or a source of revenue. Graham Allison, a leading scholar on nuclear terrorism, has long that the ā€œloose nukesā€ problem ā€” the theft or sale of weapons-usable material ā€” is the ā€œultimate preventable catastrophe.ā€ In a fragmented Iran, the barriers to such theft would be nonexistent.

A fragmented Iran would leave critical nuclear sites in contested territory or under the control of local warlords who view these assets as the ultimate insurance policy or a source of immense wealth. The following table the specific risks associated with key facilities in a fragmentation scenario:

The collapse of the Soviet Union provides a chilling historical parallel, yet the Iranian scenario of 2026 presents unique dangers. The Soviet collapse occurred in a context of cooperative threat reduction with the United States; an Iranian collapse would likely occur amidst civil war and fierce anti-Western sentiment. Rogue IRGC elements, facing the loss of their state privileges, would have a massive financial incentive to sell enriched uranium or weapon designs to the highest bidder ā€” be it a terrorist organization like Al-Qaeda or a state actor seeking a shortcut to the bomb.

David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security that in a state of internal chaos, the government loses the ability to protect nuclear assets. Theoretically, this creates a possibility of non-state actors manufacturing crude nuclear devices. The compartmentalized nature of Iranā€™s program, designed to survive airstrikes, ironically makes it harder to secure during a civil collapse. There is no central ā€œswitchā€ to disable the program. Instead, a balkanized Iran creates multiple nuclear threshold entities. Israel would effectively trade one nuclear-threshold state for five or six unpredictable entities possessing nuclear materials, none of whom can be deterred by traditional diplomatic or military threats. Furthermore, the IAEAā€™s monitoring relies on the cooperation of a sovereign host government. Without that legal and logistical framework, the international community would be blind.

Intelligence dominance vs. the chaos of militias

Israelā€™s security architecture in the mid-2020s has to prioritize intelligence dominance ā€” the ability to deeply penetrate the digital and communications networks of its adversaries. This doctrine was vindicated during the 2025 conflict, where Israel successfully executed strikes against Hezbollah leadership and targeted key Iranian logistics hubs. Operations like the assassination of Hamas leaders in Iran or the disruption of IRGC networks rely on the adversary having a structure: a digital backbone to hack, a hierarchy to map and a chain of command to disrupt.

A unified Iran, for all its hostility, is a known entity with a centralized nervous system. The IDFā€™s Unit 8200 and the Mossad excel at infiltrating these centralized systems. They can monitor the orders flowing from Tehran to proxies in Lebanon or Syria. Deterrence is possible because there is an address for the return mail; when Iran threatens Tel Aviv, the regime understands the cost. Strategic deterrence relies on the concept of a ā€œreturn address.ā€ When the Iranian regime acts ā€” via a missile test or a proxy attack ā€” Israel knows where to send the message, whether diplomatic or kinetic. The survival instinct of the regime in Tehran provides a lever for deterrence; the leadership values its hold on power, its economy and its strategic assets.

Balkanization shatters this advantage. Replacing one centralized regime with fifty competing militias, warlords and ethnic separatist groups creates an intelligence environment characterized by ā€œnoiseā€ and opacity. Hacking a stateā€™s Ministry of Defense is a fundamentally different challenge than tracking the handheld radios and encrypted messaging apps of dozens of independent militia leaders in the Zagros Mountains.

In a civil war scenario, intelligence collection suffers a severe loss of signal-to-noise ratio. As the volume of threats multiplies, the quality of intelligence degrades, making it exceedingly difficult to distinguish valid threats from background chatter. This chaos exacerbates the ā€œaddressā€ problem, undermining a deterrence theory that relies on a rational actor who values their survival and holds assets at risk. Because a militia leader in a fractured Baluchistan or Kurdistan may not value infrastructure or stability in the same way a state does, Israel cannot effectively deter a group that has nothing to lose. 

Consequently, this dynamic creates an overwhelming resource drain, requiring immense operational bandwidth to monitor a fragmented Iran. Instead of focusing on a single nuclear program or a specific Quds Force general, Israeli intelligence would be forced to track simultaneous threats from multiple vectors ā€” including loose nukes, cross-border raids, refugee flows and new proxy alliances.

The argument that Israel benefits from ā€œweakā€ neighbors is a relic of conventional warfare. In the era of hybrid warfare and asymmetric terror, weak neighbors create safe havens for groups that are far harder to defeat than standing armies. The chaos in post-Gaddafi Libya, which destabilized the entire Sahel region, serves as a stark warning. Israelā€™s strategic interest lies in a demilitarized, non-nuclear, but a secular and functional Iran ā€” not a Somalia on the Caspian Sea.

Turkey, NATO and the refugee weapon

For Turkey, a critical NATO ally and the gatekeeper of Europeā€™s southeastern flank, the prospect of Iranian fragmentation is viewed not as an opportunity but as an existential threat. In 2026, Turkey is already approximately 3.3 million Syrian refugees, a demographic reality that has strained its social fabric, economy and political stability. The Turkish economy, while showing signs of recovery with inflation dipping to around 30% in early 2026, remains fragile and highly sensitive to external shocks.

A collapse of the Iranian state would trigger a refugee wave of biblical proportions. Iran has a population of over 90 million. The destabilization of its urban centers ā€” Tehran, Mashhad, Isfahan ā€” would send millions fleeing westward toward the Turkish border. Turkish intelligence agencies and the National Intelligence Academy have this potential influx as a top-tier national security risk. Unlike the Syrian crisis, which was managed with significant international aid and a gradual buildup, an Iranian collapse could be sudden and overwhelming. The cost of integrating or managing millions of new refugees would shatter Turkeyā€™s economic recovery. Housing inflation, job competition and social services strain would likely lead to severe civil unrest within Turkey itself.

Beyond migration, the fragmentation of Iran would inevitably reignite the ā€œKurdish Questionā€ with explosive intensity. An independent or autonomous Iranian Kurdistan (Rojhelat) would be viewed by Ankara as an intolerable threat to its territorial integrity, fearing it would embolden the PKK and separatist movements within Turkeyā€™s own borders.

Historical precedents suggest Turkey would not remain passive. The Turkish military would likely launch cross-border interventions to establish ā€œbuffer zonesā€ or dismantle Kurdish statelets, similar to its operations in Northern Syria and Iraq. This would place a NATO member army in direct conflict with various Iranian factions and Kurdish groups. Such a conflict would be a diplomatic nightmare for the NATO alliance. It would divert Turkish military resources away from the Black Sea and Mediterranean, weaken the allianceā€™s southern cohesion and potentially draw the US into a complex peacekeeping quagmire to prevent a war between its Kurds and its treaty partner (Turkey). The stability of the Turkish-Iranian border ā€” which has remained largely unchanged since the in 1639 ā€” is a pillar of regional order. Removing it invites chaos that NATO is ill-equipped to manage.

The vacuum and the terrorist resurgence

The maxim ā€œnature abhors a vacuumā€ is nowhere more applicable than in the landscape of transnational terrorism. The collapse of central authority in Iran would create a power vacuum spanning from the Zagros to the Hindu Kush, a vast ungoverned space ideally suited for the resurgence of jihadist groups. As of 2026, has already its growing lethality and ambition. Attacks such as the Kerman bombing in early 2024 and subsequent strikes in Shiraz have highlighted the groupā€™s ability to penetrate deep into Iranian territory.

The IRGC and Iranian intelligence services do not act out of a commitment to global security. Rather, they engage in calculated suppression of rival extremist networks like ISIS-K to protect their own hegemony. Their activity along the Afghan border and within Salafist cells is less about counter-terrorism and more about monopolizing regional militancy. While the regime portrays these operations as a service to global interests, they are fundamentally interterrorist rivalries ā€” a ā€œā€ between the regimeā€™s state-sponsored proxies and ISIS-K.Ģż

ISIS-K propaganda already frames the Iranian regime as apostate rivals. Consequently, a fragmented Iran would be exploited as a ā€œdivine victoryā€ to absorb existing radicalized networks. A foothold in eastern Iran would simply swap one terror architect for another, bringing ISIS-K geographically closer to the Arabian Peninsula and Europe, utilizing the very logistical hubs the Iranian regime has spent decades perfecting for its own global export of terror.

Similarly, Al-Qaeda leadership, much of which has been sheltered or contained under house arrest in Iran, would be unleashed. A chaotic Iran would provide a land bridge connecting jihadist theaters in South Asia (Afghanistan/Pakistan) with the Levant (Syria/Iraq). This ā€œJihadist Highwayā€ would facilitate the movement of fighters, funds and expertise. The 2025 Homeland Threat Assessment by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other intelligence warn that the threat from these groups remains dynamic and persistent. A balkanized Iran would not be a localized humanitarian disaster. It would be a global security incubator for the next generation of transnational terror, necessitating renewed Western military intervention in a theater larger and more complex than Afghanistan and Iraq combined.

The Baluchistan corridor and the Chinese vassal state

One of the specific fragmentation scenarios often by proponents of balkanization is the independence of Baluchistan ā€” a vast, resource-rich yet sparsely populated region spanning southeastern Iran and southwestern Pakistan. The argument posits that an independent Baluchistan could be a pro-Western ally that checks Iranian power. In reality, the geopolitical dynamics of 2026 suggest that an independent Baluchistan would inevitably drift into the orbit of the Peopleā€™s Republic of China, becoming a strategic vassal rather than a Western outpost.

Chinaā€™s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) hinges critically on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the crown jewel of which is the port of Gwadar in Pakistani Baluchistan. Beijing has invested tens of billions of dollars into infrastructure in this region to secure a direct energy lifeline from the Persian Gulf to Western China, bypassing the vulnerable Strait of Malacca. In the event of Baluch independence (unifying Iranian and Pakistani Baluch territories), the new state would be economically destitute and desperate for patronage. The West, geographically distant and politically hesitant to engage with a likely unstable tribal confederation, would be outmaneuvered by Beijing. China, with its existing infrastructure on the ground and deep pockets, would step in as the primary patron.

China, utilizing ā€œdebt trap diplomacy,ā€ would likely long-term leases on ports and mineral rights in exchange for immediate economic stabilization. The secession of Baluchistan would likely catalyze the total disintegration of the Pakistani state, which remains fundamentally dependent on the provinceā€™s vast gas and mineral wealth for its survival. A collapse of this magnitudeā€”involving a nuclear-armed nation of 240 million people ā€” creates a security vacuum that dwarfs existing regional threats and invites unchecked Chinese opportunism.Ģż

The Peopleā€™s Liberation Army Navy (), under the guise of stabilizing a new state, would likely secure a permanent naval base on the Indian Ocean, effectively encircling India and placing a direct stranglehold on vital Western shipping lanes. Furthermore, this geopolitical shift would grant Chinese industry exclusive control over the regionā€™s massive copper, gold and gas reserves. This will systematically lock Western interests out of a critical global supply chain and cement a new era of resource hegemony.

Hormuz and the global energy pulse

The Strait of Hormuz remains the worldā€™s most critical energy chokepoint with approximately 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption through its narrow waters daily. The current state of the Strait of Hormuz is not one of ā€œsecurity,ā€ but rather a precarious regional hostage crisis maintained by the Iranian regime. The IRGC Navy does not ā€œharassā€ shipping out of a standard naval doctrine. It engages in state-sanctioned maritime terrorism and extortion, utilizing its proximity to the strait as a primary tool of geopolitical blackmail. While the IRGC operates within a hierarchy, its actions are not ā€œrationalā€ in a defensive sense. Rather, they are the aggressive probes of a predatory actor that weaponizes global energy supply chains to ensure its own regimeā€™s survival.

In a fragmented Iran, the northern coast of the Strait ā€” the entire strategic coastline ā€” would fall under the control of competing local warlords or pirate enterprises. The ā€œSomalizationā€ of the Strait of Hormuz would be an economic catastrophe for the West and the global economy.

Without a state navy to enforce order (or at least provide a singular point of accountability), piracy and extortion would become the primary economic model for coastal militias. Beyond the immediate physical danger, the economic and strategic costs of a lawless Persian Gulf would manifest as a permanent, crippling tax on the global economy. The collapse of a centralized ā€” albeit predatory ā€” security apparatus would cause war risk insurance premiums to skyrocket from their standard rates to prohibitive levels, dwarfing the jumps to 0.5% seen during previous periods of volatility. 

This institutionalized instability would inject a massive, permanent risk premium into energy markets, potentially driving oil prices above $150 per barrel and triggering global recessionary pressures on par with the 1970s oil shocks. Consequently, the United States and its allies would be locked into a perpetual, resource-draining military commitment. To prevent total maritime anarchy, Western navies would have to maintain a high-tempo presence to counter relentless swarms of suicide boats and drone strikes launched from an ungoverned coastline. This ā€œendless constabulary missionā€ would not only deplete Western treasuries but also critically overextend naval resources, diverting vital assets away from the Indo-Pacific theater and other strategic priorities.

The opportunity cost of peace

The alternative to this dystopian landscape of fragmentation is the ā€œā€ ā€” a strategic vision proposed by exiled Iranian leadership and supported by various opposition groups for a transition to a secular, democratic and unified Iran. This roadmap fundamentally rejects the premise that Iran is naturally hostile to the West or Israel. It posits that the hostility is a function of the regime, not the nation.

The Cyrus Accords propose:

1. Immediate Recognition of Israel. A post-theocratic Iran would normalize relations with Israel, building on the pre-1979 history of cooperation.
2. Expansion of the Abraham Accords. This includes the integration of Iran into the emerging regional security architecture alongside Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel.
3. End of Nuclear Military Ambitions. A democratic Iran would return to full compliance with non-proliferation norms in exchange for economic reintegration and access to civilian nuclear technology.
4. Energy Stability. Iran would resume its role as a reliable energy supplier to Europe and the West. This will diminish Russian leverage over global energy markets.

A unified, democratic Iran serves Western interests in ways a fragmented one never could. The could be reborn. Historically, Israelā€™s security was bolstered by ties with non-Arab regional powers (Turkey, Iran). Restoring this axis would fundamentally shift the balance of power in the Middle East, isolating radical Arab rejectionist fronts and creating a formidable bloc against extremism. A capable Iranian state army, purged of ideological elements, would be the most effective bulwark against ISIS-K and drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Furthermore, the reconstruction of Iran ā€” estimated costs range from to up to based on the 12-Day War ā€” would be the largest economic opportunity in the region, driving growth for Western contracting, technology and energy firms. A balkanized Iran offers no such market, only humanitarian aid bills.

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The uncertain future of Iranā€™s leadership

What comes next is uncertain. A day after Ali Khamenei was assassinated, a temporarily assumed the duties of the Supreme Leader, until this past Sunday, when his second son, Mojtaba Khamenei, was chosen to be . Iranā€™s state machinery, albeit weakened, remains intact ā€” for now. The Iranian regime has been preparing for this scenario for a long time. As for US President Donald Trump, there is little reason to believe that he and his team have a strategically sound plan for Iran.

Lindsey Graham, a US senator and longtime Trump ally, said as much in a recent appearance on NBC. Asked by the host if the president has a plan, Graham : ā€œNo, itā€™s not his job.ā€ Whatever Trumpā€™s thinking may be, democracy and the well-being of Iranians are not at the forefront of his mind. Hence, there is good reason to be skeptical that the US-Israeli military campaign will lead to a better future for Iranians or a more peaceful Middle East. We can only hope that this skepticism proves to have been misplaced.

As of this moment, the war in Iran has already resulted in well over a thousand deaths, reportedly including more than a hundred young . Like all wars, it is tragic. But it also reflects something deeper about who we are as humans and forces us to confront an uncomfortable truth: Wars are not aberrations of history but recurring expressions of a more general human failure.

The persistent human failure to overcome conflict

It has been thousands of years since we left the cave, and in that time, we have built machines that split atoms and reach the stars. And yet, here we are: still killing each other. We are unwilling to truly listen to each other and lack the courage to solve conflicts peacefully.

Instead of sincerely trying to put ourselves in the shoes of those we disagree with, we carve the world into comforting yet lazy oppositions: friend and enemy, believer and nonbeliever, us and them. In doing so, we foreground the superficial differences between us and background our fundamental equality. Why are we looking at disagreement as a threat, rather than an opportunity to learn? Why do we cling so tightly to answers and resist the questions that could change us for the better?

Unlike our prehistoric cave-dwelling ancestors, we now have food in abundance, enough for everyone. We have the knowledge and tools to ensure that nearly everyone can live a healthy and fulfilling life. We have libraries filled with carefully argued books on dignity, rights, freedom and tolerance. And yet, we use hunger as a , let people in the Mediterranean, resort to , extrajudicial and as means of international politics, sleepwalk into and keep of animals in slavery. We look to billionaires as models of success, rather than the doctors going into war zones, risking their lives to save others, the teachers trying to make a difference in a world where some are born with the cards already stacked against them, or the social workers and counselors who guide those crushed by trauma.

You see, we havenā€™t actually quite left the cave yet. Doing so remains an ongoing challenge: to notice the suffering around us, to resist indifference and to act with humanity whenever we can. Knowledge and abundance are meaningless without compassion and courage. The tragedies we witness today are not just distant horrors; they are reminders of our shared responsibility ā€” we must do better, as a species.

Life is precious. About everything else, we can talk.

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Palestinian films over the years

Palestinian films are no doubt difficult to make and hard to come by. As one can imagine, they donā€™t have big budgets. Instead, their richness lies in the simple, moving, real stories of the daily challenging lives of ordinary Palestinians. Despite their quiet presentation, their impact on the world stage is growing louder.

The first one I saw was Israeli filmmaker Eran Riklisā€™s The Lemon Tree. This 2008 film portrays the true story of a Palestinian widowā€™s legal and emotional struggle when her lemon grove is threatened by the security concerns of her neighbor ā€” the then Israeli defense minister. The film won in Europe and Australia.

British-Palestinian filmmaker Farah Nabulsiā€™s (2020) follows a Palestinian father and daughter as they navigate West Bank checkpoints to buy an anniversary gift, showing quiet resilience under occupation. The film won many awards ā€” including the Academy Award for Best Live Action Short Film and the British Academy of Film and Television Arts Award for Best Short Film.

Another film by Nabulsi, (2023), depicts a Palestinian schoolteacher struggling to balance his commitment to political resistance, his role as a father figure to his students and his newly forming relationship with a volunteer worker. The film won a long list of awards (best film, best actor, audience award, best music) at a variety of film festivals (including Belgrade, Brooklyn, Red Sea, Galway, Trondheim and San Francisco).

(2024), written and directed by Israeli-Palestinian Scandar Copti, follows interconnected Palestinian families whose secrets and strained relationships surface during the festive season, revealing tensions around love, duty and societal expectations. The film won awards in Hamburg, Marrakech, Thessaloniki, Tromso and Venice.

The year 2024 also delivered a brilliant documentary ā€” No Other Land, the directorial debut of Basel Adra, Hamdan Ballal, Yuval Abraham and Rachel Szor ā€” that shows the destruction of a Palestinian community in the West Bank, alongside the development of an alliance between a Palestinian activist and an Israeli journalist. Despite winning a long string of accolades at numerous (including Berlin, Chicago, Asia Pacific, Toronto, Vancouver, Washington, DC, Los Angeles and London) and even the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature Film, it had difficulty finding a US distributor.

Palestinian films of 2025

This past year has gifted us three amazing works. This, in spite of the ongoing Israeli killings in Gaza and violence in the West Bank ā€” or perhaps because of.

Written, directed and produced by Palestinian-American Cherien Dabis, All Thatā€™s Left of You () traces a Palestinian familyā€™s multigenerational journey, linking love, loss and memory as personal lives unfold against decades of displacement and political upheaval. Since receiving rave reviews and awards at global film festivals, actors Javier Bardem and Mark Ruffalo have thrown their weight behind the film. It was supposed to be filmed in Palestine, but the Gaza War necessitated a shift to neighboring countries, so the film is officially Jordanā€™s entry for this yearā€™s Academy Awards in the International Feature Film category.

Palestine 36 (written and directed by Palestinian filmmaker Annemarie Jacir) dramatizes the 1936ā€“39 Arab Revolt through the intertwined lives of Palestinians, showing how colonial rule, resistance and sacrifice reshape a society. It received a standing ovation at the Toronto International Film Festival. It was Palestineā€™s official submission to the Academy, where it was shortlisted but not nominated ā€” despite support from Hollywood stalwarts such as Susan Sarandon, Mira Nair and Julie Delpy. Israeli Police prohibited screening of the film in Israel, saying that it was promoting terrorism.

And one I am dreading to see: The Voice of :

January 29, 2024. Red Crescent volunteers receive an emergency call. A 6-year-old girl is trapped in a car under fire in Gaza, pleading for rescue. While trying to keep her on the line, they do everything they can to get an ambulance to her. Her name was .

Tunisian filmmaker Kaouther Ben Hania brings us this powerful true story, blending actual audio recordings and investigative reporting to examine civilian suffering, accountability and the very human and inhumane cost of war.

Since its premiere, several eminent personalities of the film world have thrown their weight behind the film ā€” including Brad Pitt, Joaquin Phoenix, Rooney Mara, Spike Lee, Jonathan Glazer and Alfonso CuarĆ³n.

The Voice of Hind Rajab is Tunisiaā€™s official entry to the Academy ā€” but in essence, it is the worldā€™s entry for justice and compassion. In Ben Haniaā€™s at the Venice Film Festival ā€” where The Voice of Hind Rajab won practically every award given ā€” she explains how she came to make the film. But her words regarding why are even more striking: ā€œI cannot accept a world where a child calls for help and no one comes. That pain, that failure, belongs to all of us. This story is not just about Gaza. It speaks to a universal grief.ā€

The nominees areā€¦

The Voice of Hind Rajab has been nominated for this yearā€™s Academy Awards under the Best International Feature Film category.

The four other nominations under this category are no doubt noteworthy: Norwayā€™s entry, (situated in Norway, the story follows two adult sisters in their reunion with their estranged father); Spainā€™s entry, Sirat (situated in the deserts of Morocco, it focuses on rave culture, regional conflicts and the sudden tragic vagaries of life); Franceā€™s entry, It Was Just An (a group of former Iranian political prisoners struggle with whether to exact revenge on a man they believe may been their tormentor in jail); and Brazilā€™s entry, The Secret Agent (situated in 1977, a former professor joins other political dissidents to resist the military dictatorship).

But for me, The Voice of Hind Rajab stands alone in its impact. Perhaps itā€™s because Iā€™ve seen the plight of Palestinian children over the years; some are listed by the UN Relief and Works Agency as refugees. Perhaps itā€™s because Iā€™ve read the statistics that some children are estimated to have been killed or maimed in the most recent war. Perhaps itā€™s because, as a mother and a grandmother, I can imagine one of my own children when young or one of my grandchildren now as Hind Rajab: alone, terrified, hopelessly trapped in an unnecessary, cruel, tragic situation. Perhaps itā€™s because the story is true and the voice we hear is indeed that of six-year-old Hind Rajab.

And the winner isā€¦

Since the beginning of the most recent war in October 2023, more than Palestinians ā€” including more than 20,000 children ā€” have been killed in Gaza. During that same period, in the West Bank ā€” where there is no official war ā€” some 1,055 Palestinians have been killed, including 230 children.

And despite the apparent ceasefire, the persecution of the Palestinian people continues. Since October 2025, ā€œ have been killed, and 1630 injured.ā€ There is still a : 77% of the population faces food insecurity, and over 200,000 children face acute malnutrition in 2026. Israel continues to restrict of the critically ill (including children) from Gaza. Some 20,000 Palestinians want to cross the Rafah border from Gaza into Egypt to access medical treatment; Israel has only allowed some 200 to do so. The comprehensive air, land and sea that Israel imposed on Gaza in 2007 continues.

In the face of corrupt and immoral powers, it seems as if there is nothing we can do to stop the ongoing oppression, starvation, killing and, indeed, slow extermination of the Palestinian people. The least we can do is hear their voices before they die ā€” or in this case, as they die.

Whether the Academy will hear Hind Rajabā€™s voice, weā€™ll know on March 16.

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Everyone is anticipating this reshaping and discussing potential changes. However, one aspect that is often missing from these discussions might, perhaps, trigger the most radical shift in global strategic perception since the establishment of the post-war order and the post-USSR singular hegemony of the US in the world.

The US post-war dominance and security umbrella

After defeating Germany and Japan comprehensively ā€” jointly with the USSR, UK and resistance forces ā€” and deliberately demonstrating the previously unknown and unimaginable destructive power of its nuclear arsenal, the US managed to establish its dominance and made itself indispensable to a number of countries in Europe and Asia. The US did this through effective ideological propaganda and paternalistic dollar diplomacy. The countriesā€™ total dependence on the US created a global security net of US military bases on the soil of both wartime allies and enemies.

This formidable protective umbrella of the US gave the people and rulers of these countries a tremendous sense of security, so much so that most of them chose (or were coerced) to remain militarily weak. The strangest aspect was the collective psyche of Germany and Japan. These two nations overnight swallowed their utterly mutilated and trampled national honor and pride, permanently surrendered much of their strategic independence along with a large part of foreign policy and happily agreed to become loyal vassals of the US empire. 

After the collapse of the rival USSR empire, the US security umbrella added more spokes to its canopy by additional military bases in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Now, there was no one left to challenge its military might in the world, and there seemed to be no one on the horizon. This reality thus became the ā€œend of history.ā€

Donald Trump as the architect

While it is always a collective effort of many officials that sets the scene and the meeting of many powerful minds that culminates in a major foreign policy decision, such as a war, the final decision always rests with the chief executive of a country. Irrespective of what transpired behind closed doors, therefore, Donald Trump, as the President and the Chief Commander of the US, will be remembered for causing this profound shift in geopolitics and military strategy.

Trumpā€™s first presidency, and indeed his second, have been marked by a distinctive approach to foreign policy ā€” often characterized by unpredictability, transactional diplomacy and an ā€œAmerica Firstā€ stance that challenged longstanding alliances and global norms. His administrationā€™s posture toward Iran has been uncompromising, escalating tensions through a combination of economic sanctions, covert operations and overt military threats. The decision to engage in or permit military aggression against Iran was a culmination of this hardline stance.

Iranā€™s shattering of the US security myth

Within just eight days of the US and Israel launching this unprovoked and unjustifiable military aggression on February 28, 2026 ā€” following years of relentless covert warfare and a short 12-day in 2025 against Iran ā€” Iran has permanently shattered the 80-year-old post-war myth of the US as a protective shield. When pushed to the wall, Iran has blown a wide, gaping hole in the sense of security of host nations by all US military bases in the region, without intending to harm the nonwarring host countries themselves. It is a forced choice in wartime whose legitimacy, in my view, cannot be questioned.Ģż

The future question is even more unsettling. At best, Iran is just a middle power. What if tomorrow, China or Russia engages in a military confrontation with the US? Both are major military powers with far superior arsenals and war machines compared to Iran. What will happen to South Korea, Japan and other Asian countries, as well as the USā€™s European allies, if they choose to stay out of direct involvement in such a war? The answer is now clear: They will become legitimate military targets, regardless of their desire to avoid that outcome.

NATO countries will likely unite, but non-NATO countries also have little choice now. They all must sail together or sink together. Call it a catch-22 or a Faustian bargain ā€” embrace its risks willingly or regret it as a necessary evil ā€” you canā€™t have your cake and eat it too.

US military bases can no longer be seen as valuable security assets; theyā€™ve become dangerous liabilities for those who host or plan to host them. Iranā€™s decisive and categorical targeting of US Middle East military bases has radically shifted the geopolitical landscape ā€” so much so that I will call February 28, 2026, a turning point in world history. 

The new reality of global involvement and consequences

Nothing is certain yet regarding the final outcome, aftershocks and side effects of this war. However, what is clear is that you can no longer deceive yourself with passivity or get voyeuristic pleasure from the chaos. The days of schadenfreude (pleasure from someone elseā€™s pain) are over. The writing is on the wall, and the message is loud and clear. If youā€™re involved in the game, then youā€™re truly part of it. It doesnā€™t matter whether you choose to play or not; the same rules apply. If you lend your shoulder to fire, you will be fired at. And in the game of giants, you could suffer a deadly blow even before a single shot is fired from your side.

Many may have planned this, but Iran has demonstrated it in practice and shown the world the way. For striking a deal with the devil, you must make sacrifices. Your death, destruction, pain and suffering are certain. Fabled US security cover will not save you but bring disaster to your home. So, youā€™d better be ready and brace yourself for fatal blows!

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Khattar Singh and Zunes examine why the Trump administration may have misjudged Iranā€™s internal structure and resilience. Their discussion explores Iranā€™s military capabilities, the regional consequences of the war and the possibility that the conflict could settle into a prolonged war of attrition with global economic repercussions.

The limits of decapitation strategy

The conflict began with what the US described as precision strikes targeting Iranian leadership and military infrastructure. Some in Washington expected Khameneiā€™s death to create a power vacuum that might weaken or even collapse the regime.

Zunes argues that this expectation misunderstood how the Iranian political system actually works. Iran is not governed by a single leader whose removal would dismantle the state. Instead, the system functions through overlapping institutions that collectively sustain the regime.

ā€œItā€™s not a matter of one-man rule where you could get rid of the bad guy and then things can open up,ā€ Zunes says. He describes Iran as an oligarchic structure in which clerical authorities, state institutions and military organizations share power.

Perhaps the most important pillar of that system is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Over decades, the IRGC has expanded its authority far beyond military functions, controlling major sectors of the economy and embedding itself throughout Iranian political life. Even after the loss of senior commanders in US strikes, Zunes notes that the organizationā€™s leadership network ā€œruns pretty deep,ā€ making regime collapse unlikely.

Geography and the limits of war

A large-scale ground invasion of Iran remains improbable. Unlike Iraq, where US forces advanced rapidly across open terrain in 2003, Iran presents formidable geographic obstacles.

Iran is roughly three times larger than Iraq in both area and population and is dominated by mountainous terrain. This geography alone makes conventional invasion extremely difficult.

ā€œIran is a very mountainous country,ā€ Zunes explains. It is not a place where mechanized forces could simply ā€œroll your tanks through.ā€

As a result, the conflict is likely to remain an air and missile war rather than a conventional invasion. Both sides are increasingly striking infrastructure and urban areas as the initial strategy of targeted attacks fails to achieve decisive results.

Retaliation and regional risk

Iranā€™s response has expanded the battlefield across the wider Middle East. Missile and drone attacks have struck US bases as well as facilities in allied states including Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Zunes finds Iranā€™s targeting choices noteworthy. Although the UAE hosts relatively limited US military infrastructure compared with countries like Qatar or Bahrain, Iranian forces have launched multiple strikes against it.

He suggests that the UAE may represent something symbolic in Iranian calculations. ā€œThe UAE symbolizes some of the worst excesses of an Arab Islamic state, and its ties to global capitalism and the United States,ā€ he says.

At the same time, many Arab governments have avoided joining the US-Israeli strike campaign. Despite possessing advanced Western weapons systems and large military budgets, states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have kept their distance from direct participation outside of their own defense.

According to Zunes, regional leaders recognize that their populations are deeply uncomfortable with the sight of thousands of Muslims being killed by a US-led coalition. Public opinion and fears of domestic unrest are therefore constraining their involvement.

A war of attrition

As the fighting continues, both sides appear increasingly locked in a struggle of endurance rather than quick victory. Iran has sustained significant losses, including the destruction of naval assets and repeated attacks on missile infrastructure. Yet the country continues to launch retaliatory strikes.

Zunes believes Washington underestimated Iranā€™s ability to sustain this type of conflict. ā€œThe United States grossly underestimated Iranā€™s military capabilities and its ability to continue firing missiles even after significant losses,ā€ he argues.

Simultaneously, American forces face their own constraints. Missile defense systems are under pressure, particularly in protecting regional allies from Iranian ballistic missiles and drones. Both sides may therefore be hoping the other will exhaust key resources first.

In such situations, conflicts often end in what analysts call a ā€œhurting stalemateā€ ā€” when neither side achieves its objectives and the costs become unsustainable.

Economic shock and political fallout

Beyond the battlefield, the war is already affecting the global economy. Roughly 20% of the worldā€™s oil supply ships through the Strait of Hormuz, which has become a central pressure point in the conflict. Iranian strikes on regional energy infrastructure and the threat to maritime traffic have already pushed energy prices higher.

Zunes warns that prolonged disruption could ripple across the global economy. Oil is not only essential for transportation but also for fertilizer, plastics and countless industrial processes. Rising energy costs could therefore contribute to inflation and economic slowdown worldwide.

Domestically, the war also carries political consequences for the US. Polling cited during the conversation suggests unusually strong public opposition to the conflict. Zunes notes how even controversial wars, like the 2003 invasion of Iraq, had majority support once they got underway. US citizens tended to rally around the flag and ā€œsupport our troops,ā€ only to decline as more American casualties mounted, the goals remained elusive and it became clear there was no end in sight. This is the first time there has been such strong opposition at the outset. 

For Zunes, the larger problem is strategic rather than political. He argues that neither side can realistically achieve a decisive victory and that the war risks producing massive human and economic costs without a clear outcome.

In his view, this conflict resembles a natural disaster more than a traditional military campaign. Once unleashed, it may simply continue until both sides are exhausted.

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The economic consequences are immediate. Oil prices have already jumped as markets price in the risk of supply disruption and prolonged instability. Analysts that a prolonged conflict could push oil prices above $100 per barrel and intensify inflation across import-dependent economies.

For Indonesia, the war presents a clear danger. The country still relies heavily on imported crude oil and refined fuels. When global prices surge, Indonesiaā€™s fiscal burden through fuel subsidies and higher import bills. Yet crises often create opportunities for structural change. The current oil shock could become a catalyst for Indonesia to accelerate its long-delayed energy transition.

A global oil crisis should not be treated only as a short-term emergency. It should also be treated as a catalyst for a faster shift toward cleaner, more resilient energy systems. Indonesia, as well as the rest of the world, must invest in this change now before it is too late.

Renewable energy expansion

The most immediate step is electrification. Indonesiaā€™s transport and logistics sectors remain deeply on diesel fuel. Trucks, buses and delivery fleets vast amounts of imported petroleum. Electrifying these systems would reduce exposure to global oil volatility. Electric buses for urban transport, electric freight corridors for logistics and electric two-wheelers for urban mobility could significantly reduce oil demand. When electricity increasingly comes from renewable sources, the economic benefits multiply.

The power sector is equally important. Many regions across Indonesia still on diesel-fueled generators, particularly in remote islands. This diesel-based electricity generation is expensive and heavily reliant on fuel logistics. Replacing these plants with renewable systems would deliver immediate gains.

Indonesia also has enormous renewable energy . Solar energy alone could reach around 100 gigawatts through the large-scale deployment of panels across the archipelago. Wind energy has the potential to provide roughly 154.6 gigawatts of capacity, with hydropower resources potentially contributing another 89.3 gigawatts. The technology and human resources already exist; what remains is decisive government policy.

A major renewable expansion would also reduce the burden of energy subsidies. Diesel imports expose the state budget to global price spikes, and renewable energy systems operate without fuel imports once installed. The result is more predictable electricity costs and greater fiscal stability.

Government policy should therefore focus on accelerating investment in renewable energy, particularly in the power sector. Fiscal incentives can support the installation of solar panels, wind turbines and hydropower plants. Tax credits, concessional financing and long-term power purchase agreements would attract both domestic and international investors.

Indonesia has already set a target of at least renewable energy in the national energy mix. That level should be seen as a minimum threshold rather than a ceiling. The higher the renewable share, the stronger Indonesiaā€™s buffer against external shocks such as oil price spikes. However, not all policy responses move in that direction.

The environmental and energy security trade-offs

One frequently proposed response to rising oil prices is expanding biodiesel blending mandates. The idea of moving toward B50 ā€” a 50% palm oil biodiesel blend with diesel fuel ā€” is often as a solution to energy security. However, it is not an ideal solution, as palm oil blending still relies on petroleum diesel. The system continues to depend on imported fossil fuels. That is the policyā€™s fundamental weakness. Blending reduces diesel demand, but it does not eliminate it.

Environmental consequences also deserve attention. Expanding palm oil plantations can worsen deforestation and ecological degradation. The recent flooding in parts of Sumatra has already raised concerns about the loss of natural water absorption areas linked to plantation expansion. Several companies whose permits were revoked were connected to plantation related environmental violations.

Further expansion of plantations could create new risks. In Papua, large-scale palm oil development raises fears of land conflicts with local communities and further deforestation. A cleaner strategy lies elsewhere: Solar farms, wind projects and hydropower installations reduce fossil fuel demand without triggering the environmental tradeoffs associated with large-scale plantation expansion.

Indonesia should also strengthen its international commitments to move away from fossil fuels. Joining the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation would provide a clear roadmap to reduce dependence on crude oil while accelerating investment in renewable energy systems.

The time to diversify

The war in the Middle East is a geopolitical crisis with global consequences. Oil prices are rising sharply; trade routes remain unstable; import-dependent countries are starting to feel the pressure. For Indonesia, the lesson is straightforward: Energy security cannot depend on imported fossil fuels vulnerable to distant conflicts.

The current war may destabilize energy markets, but it may also provide the political urgency needed to accelerate Indonesiaā€™s transition toward renewable power. Crises often force choices that normal politics would otherwise delay, and Indonesia now faces one of those moments. The only question now is whether Indonesia will seize this opportunity to diversify its energy supply or remain dependent on oil.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The Middle East War Could Finally Push Indonesia Toward Renewable Energy appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

While this image may seem a throwback to a bygone era, it is strangely relevant in todayā€™s geopolitics.

The lumbering beast is the current USA. It is big and powerful ā€” in terms of economic might and military ability ā€“ and it throws its weight around. It has soft power too and a broad cultural reach. Sometimes and unexpectedly, it shits on other countries ā€” friends and foes alike. It is not always smart. And it can be directed.

The mahout is Israel. Itā€™s small and relatively weak, but itā€™s smart. It directs the US and tells it what to do. Vote this way in Congress and give us these arms. Shield us in the UN. Make our enemies your enemies. Now start a war on Iran (June 13, 2025). Now stop the war on Iran (June 24, 2025). Now, restart the war on Iran (February 28, 2026). And now, report this on the news ā€” and report it in this way. Say this; do not say that; and certainly donā€™t ask about that other stuff.

The Israeli narrative

Not only is Israel steering US foreign policy in the Middle East, but itā€™s also steering the Western narrative surrounding this most recent war on Iran. The story coming from the Israeli administration, Western leaders and Western mainstream news channels is identical. And with the recent takeover of TikTok by pro-Israeli , even social media is being controlled by Israel.

In that strongly pro-Zionist story, the chapter on Iran does not begin in 1953, when the British and American secret services the democratically elected, hugely popular, anticolonial government of Iranian Premier Mohammad Mosaddegh ā€” because Mosaddegh was planning to nationalize their countryā€™s oil industry so that at long last the Iranians could profit from their own oil resources ā€” and placed their own man, ā€œThe Shah of Iranā€, as dictator. In fact, no one ā€” not even supposed hard-hitting objective journalists ā€” should bring up this seminal event.

The Israeli narrative ā€” and now the Westā€™s accepted narrative ā€” begins on the date that the countries and the people Israel and/or the US (the border blurs) have been long harassing, finally cannot take it anymore, and retaliate. In terms of Iran, that story begins on November 4, 1979, when ā€” for no apparent reason ā€” 66 Americans were at the US Embassy in Tehran.

The rules of the ride

Like any good story, there are several simple, easy-to-understand premises. Israel is the good guy and ā€œthe victim,ā€ and always will be. And as such, it is to be unconditionally supported, even if it is conducting a in its own country. Iran is the bad guy and the aggressor, and always will be. And as such, it can never be trusted or negotiated with. There is no room for nuance.

The Iranians are supremely unhappy under their current government. This has nothing to do with the fact that, since 1979, the West has severely its energy, banking (leading to shortages in medicines and agricultural products) and military sectors, resulting in a difficult life for Iranian citizens. It is only because the Iranian administration is suppressing, torturing and killing its people. Apart from making life hell for Iranians, the Iranian administrationā€™s other raison dā€™ĆŖtre is to destroy Israel and the US. Therefore, as long as Iran exists, neither Israel nor the US ā€” nor indeed the world ā€” can be safe.

In a throwback to a colonial and racist era, Israel ā€” being a white-presenting and west-facing country ā€” is the only country in the Middle-East that is mature, trustworthy and responsible enough to have nuclear arms. Never mind that in the 1960s, US President John F. was against Israel having nuclear weapons. Conveniently, he did not survive for long. Israel then stole both nuclear technology and from the US to make its own nuclear weapons.

And like any good story, it is selective. Donā€™t portray Israel as anything less than perfect. Donā€™t mention that they invaded Palestine in the early 20th century, and later formally occupied the country. Donā€™t mention that they displaced and have suppressed Palestinians for over 70 years. Donā€™t mention that Israel has a history of inciting wars in the Middle East ā€” beginning in when they preemptively attacked Egypt during the Suez Crisis and in when they proactively attacked Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Donā€™t mention that Israel has killed over in Gaza since October 2023 and, despite a supposed current ceasefire, to do so in both Gaza and the West Bank.

Donā€™t bring up former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeoā€™s about Mossad agents walking together with the Iranian protesters this January. Donā€™t question if and how Israel may be involved in Jeffrey Epsteinā€™s network, nor why the US feels compelled to do Israelā€™s bidding ā€” even when it goes against American national interest. Do not state that this most recent war on Iran, and the US was forced to join in. Do not report that Israel continues to use the Gaza-honed tactic of ā€œā€ targets (including schools and hospitals) to maximize civilian casualties in Iran. Donā€™t question possible Israeli attempts to expand the war with in Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, Azerbaijan and Cyprus. And donā€™t forget that Israel is Godā€™s ā€œā€, the current US President is that same Godā€™s ā€œchosen oneā€, and so neither is bound by any earthly rules of sovereignty or human rights.

Donā€™t portray Iran as anything more than evil. Donā€™t mention that Iran has a glorious to rival that of ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome. Donā€™t mention that Israel owes Iran of dollars (mostly for purchases of oil before 1979), which it has been ordered to pay but still has not done so. No need to mention that Iran has a moral backbone and has been continuously Palestinians in their fight for freedom.

Remember that while Israel has an ā€œadministrationā€ and ā€œallies,ā€ Iran only has a ā€œregimeā€ and ā€œproxies.ā€ Donā€™t mention how Iran came in good faith to the with the US several times in the past year, and each time, just when they were making progress, Israel bombed Iran. Donā€™t mention that this time Iran had already agreed to all US demands before Israel attacked them. Donā€™t humanize Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (despite his regimeā€™s obvious transgressions) by mentioning that he was also a religious leader revered by many, was a family man with a wife and six children, spoke several languages, loved poetry and lived a Spartan lifestyle. Donā€™t mention that his death was mourned ā€” not only in Iran, but in Pakistan, , and Australia.

Say that Iran is bombing neighboring countries, but donā€™t clarify that theyā€™re aiming specifically at bases and assets in those . Donā€™t mention that by allowing US bases and arms on their land and allowing US planes to use their airspace, those neighboring countries are aiding the US in its attack on Iran. And certainly donā€™t ask why ā€” contrary to the American administrationā€™s earlier confident predictions and ā€” not all Iranians are in the streets of Tehran deliriously happy that Israel and the US are bombing them and killing their leaders, nor are they demanding regime change; those expressions seem limited to the Iranian , mostly in the US.

All aboard

The Western nations ā€” both leaders and people ā€” see the elephant and are impressed by its massive strength. In their awe, they unquestioningly swallow the narrative. But they donā€™t always notice the mahout. Within hours of the US and Israel attacking Iran, regardless of their ongoing disagreements on trade and even severe concerns over the US threatening their sovereignty, the Western nations all fell in line behind the proposed narrative.

“”³Ü²õ³Ł°ł²¹±ō¾±²¹ā€™s did not go so far as to openly support the attack on Iran, but painted Khamenei as a total bad guy and therefore an acceptable target for assassination and regime change. Canadaā€™s prime minister, Mark Carney, was more robust in his support, Iran ā€œthe principal source of instability and terror throughout the Middle East.ā€ Both men were reiterating long-established Israeli talking points. And stunningly, most countries (such as Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden) actually condemned Iran for retaliating.

Israel has already been successful with its first target of regime change: the US. It has weaponized the US and is using it as a spearhead to attack Iran. But the rest of the West need not follow. The big question is not who will win this immediate physical war, but rather, who will win the narrative war. In the answer to that question lies our worldā€™s well-being.

As long as we swallow this Israeli narrative, conflict will continue. Israel does not seem satisfied with just Palestine or even destroying Iran. Its ambitions (and recently US ambassador to Israel, Mike ) speak of a ā€œā€ spanning from the Nile in Egypt to the Euphrates in Syria and Iraq, as well as parts of Turkiye. Just last month, former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali said, ā€œTurkey is the new Iranā€. And with Americaā€™s unconditional support, Israel has the muscle to fight for it. However, thereā€™s no need for the rest of the West ā€” people and politicians ā€” to help Israel fulfill this ambition. In fact, it would be dangerous, destructive and immoral to do so.

Fortunately, today, our sources of news and views are no longer limited to mainstream press and our leaders. We now have a range of independent media. One can easily turn to numerous online platforms and podcasts to get different perspectives from respected voices. As just a few of many examples, hear retired American Colonel Douglas and Columbia University economics professor on political science professor Glenn Diesenā€™s Greater Eurasia podcast, or foreign analyst Alexander on The Duran podcast, or geopolitical theorist Xueqin on the Breaking Points podcast. We should listen and learn.

In fact, weā€™ve probably already learnt several significant things just in the last few days. Weā€™re being taken for a ride. The elephant is big and has the potential to do a lot of harm, but donā€™t be overawed by it. However, notice the mahout; itā€™s wise to know who he is and where he wants to take us. And most importantly, itā€™s imperative to know when to get off.

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post The Tale of the Elephant (the US) and the Mahout (Israel) appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

That world is largely gone. Since the US from the JCPOA in 2018 and, together with Israel, turned increasingly to unilateral kinetic action against Iran, Europeā€™s most tangible diplomatic success has become the stage on which its influence is steadily eroding. The massive USā€“Israeli on Iran launched on February 28, 2026, and the subsequent killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on March 1, marked not only the decapitation of the Islamic Republicā€™s leadership but also laid bare Europeā€™s strategic paralysis and its profound doubts about the way American power is now being applied.

The case for confronting Iran ā€” and Europeā€™s unease about how it is being done

There is a serious, substantive case for confronting the Iranian regime, up to and including efforts to bring about its end. Effectively, the US and Iran have been in a shadow war since . Tehranā€™s network of proxies has killed more than American servicemen in Iraq alone and has US and allied bases across the Middle East.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), now officially listed as a by the EU, has orchestrated or supported operations targeting civilians and infrastructure from the Levant to the Gulf. This is a regime whose leaders ā€œDeath to Americaā€ and ā€œDeath to Israelā€ and have backed those slogans with missiles, militias and terrorism. Ending the rule of a government that openly calls for the destruction of US and European partners and acts to that end is, in principle, a perfectly defensible strategic and moral objective.

Not only that, but Iran has developed biological weapons and can launch . also has sleeper terror cells in Latin America and could try to infiltrate Europe and the US, if it hasnā€™t already.

Many European policymakers, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, quietly, and sometimes openly, recognize the danger. For them, an Iranian regime willing and able to the Strait of Hormuz, attack EU-flagged vessels, destabilize Gulf monarchies and edge toward nuclear weapons is not an abstraction but a direct threat to European security and prosperity. But if the case for confronting Iran is strong, the way the US has chosen to wage this war, and the reasons President Donald Trump appears to have for doing so, are far more troubling to European eyes.

A personalized American war

In previous eras, American presidents who embarked on wars of this magnitude, however flawed their decisions, at least made an effort to answer two basic questions: Is this in the American national interest? And what is the political endgame? Trumpā€™s approach is different. Because his administration is so thoroughly personalized, the key question appears to be: How is this in my interest? How will this shape my image as an actor on the world stage? Trump has always possessed a predatorā€™s instinct for exploiting his opponentsā€™ weaknesses. He is now deploying that instinct globally, probing for vulnerabilities he can exploit to glorify his own legacy. He has already pointed to the successful external pressure that helped topple President NicolĆ”s Maduro in Venezuela as a model he can replicate in Iran, overlooking the fact that the Middle East is an entirely different strategic and political landscape.

For Europeans, this is the heart of their discomfort. The war in Iran may be justifiable as a confrontation with a bloodthirsty state that has harassed Western interests for decades. But it is being conducted by a Washington that increasingly seems to substitute presidential ego for strategy, and media cycles for end-state planning.

Europeā€™s fractured response

European foreign policy toward Iran has undergone a dramatic transformation since the first missiles fell. For years, Brussels clung to the JCPOA as the embodiment of its preference for negotiated solutions. Even after the Trump administration reimposed sanctions in 2018, the EU3 tried to keep the deal .

That posture collapsed in late 2025. With Iran expanding enrichment and stonewalling inspectors, the EU3 the snapback of UN sanctions, effectively ending what remained of the JCPOA. By early 2026, European diplomacy had already shifted from salvage operation to damage control.

The outbreak of a USā€“Israeli war in 2026 accelerated this transformation. In a striking break with past caution, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has publicly for a ā€œcredible transitionā€ in Iran that reflects the democratic aspirations of its people. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas Khameneiā€™s death as ā€œan open path to a different Iran.ā€ These are not the words of a bloc neutral on regime change; they are the vocabulary of a Europe that has, at least rhetorically, moved closer to endorsing it. Yet this new language masks deep internal fractures.

Member states are sharply split on how far to go in supporting the war and an implied regime-change agenda. Germany, under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, has largely avoided criticizing US strikes and stresses solidarity with Washington. Merz has gone so far as to that international law is becoming a thing of the past and that Israel and US tactics should not be criticized if Europe shares US objectives on Iranā€™s nuclear and missile programs. Berlinā€™s view reflects both long-standing Atlanticism and a sober recognition that a nuclear-armed Iran would be catastrophic for European security.

The UK, led by Prime Minister Keir Starmer, has aligned closely with Washington militarily and diplomatically. London has always allowed the US to use its bases in Cyprus for strikes on Iranian missile sites and frames its role as ā€œdefensive,ā€ aimed at protecting shipping lanes and allied forces. The UK government initially to grant the US permission to use the Diego Garcia base for potential strikes against Iran, citing legal concerns. However, this stance was , and permission was later granted for limited, defensive and specifically targeted operations. Post-Brexit, the UK sees unwavering support for the US not just as a strategic choice but as a core element of its identity as a global actor.

France, while also a close US ally, has taken a more ambivalent stance. Paris has bolstered its regional military presence after its base in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was by Iranian missiles, but it has been more outspoken than Berlin or London in insisting on respect for international law and a clear post-war political roadmap. French policymakers are acutely aware that France has economic stakes in the region and that there is a significant domestic debate over another Middle East war.

Spain and several Southern European countries have the war outright as a violation of international law. For them, the USā€“Israeli campaign against Iran looks alarmingly like previous interventions ā€” Iraq, Libya, Syria ā€” where Europeans paid heavily in terms of migration, terrorism and economic disruption without having a meaningful say in the original decision to use force.

Strategic risks: escalation, sea lanes and economic shock

This patchwork of responses has left Brussels struggling to speak with a coherent voice. On paper, EU institutions call for de-escalation, respect for international humanitarian law and a renewed diplomatic track. In practice, some member states are facilitating military operations while others denounce them, and the Commissionā€™s own rhetoric edges toward support for transition in Tehran.

To Tehran and to many observers in the Global South, the current situation looks like another European double standard, as member states loudly preach international law in Ukraine, but quietly accept its creative reinterpretation in Iran.

Trump has presented the war as a low-cost, high-impact campaign in which air and cyber power can force political change in Tehran. Europeans with operational experience in the region are more skeptical. In the modern era, there are few, if any, examples where air power alone has toppled a regime and produced a stable successor. Even is not a true precedent, since in that case Libyan forces were on the ground advancing against Muammar Qaddafi. In Iran, by contrast, the regimeā€™s security forces remain cohesive, and nationalist sentiment has been inflamed by the perception of an existential foreign threat.

Khomeini, for all his radicalism, always pulled back from directly provoking a full-scale US attempt to destroy the regime. He knew that the US had the capacity to do it. Todayā€™s leadership in Tehran, decapitated but not defeated, has every reason to believe that it is already under such an existential assault. That removes any remaining incentive for restraint. The logical response, from their perspective, is to escalate as far as possible and to fight to the death.

Europeā€™s fear is that Washington has not fully grasped what that means. A regime that believes it has nothing left to lose can drag the entire region, and by extension Europe, into an escalating conflagration. If Trump is not prepared for that, Europeans argue, he owes his own citizens and his allies a frank explanation of the rationale, the risks and the endgame. So far, that explanation has not been forthcoming.

Europe on the front line of the consequences

The war has immediate operational consequences for Europe, particularly at sea. As Iran and its proxies intensify attacks on maritime traffic in retaliation for USā€“Israeli strikes, the EU is debating an expansion of its Red Sea naval mission, . An expanded mission could secure critical trade routes, especially for energy and container traffic transiting between Asia and Europe. Signaling European resolve might protect its own interests, rather than merely free-riding on US naval power. But the enlarged role could also deepen military entanglement, turning European ships into direct targets of Iranian missiles, drones and proxies.

Europe canā€™t easily proclaim a neutral, law-centric position while its vessels help contain Iranā€™s retaliatory capabilities. For some in Brussels, reinforcing Aspides is necessary to preserve Europeā€™s economic lifelines and credibility. For others, it is precisely the sort of incremental step that could transform the EU from wary observer into active belligerent in a war whose strategy it does not control.

European economic interests in Iran have already shrunk dramatically since the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, but they have not disappeared. Before sanctions snapped back, European energy giants and industrial firms ā€” French, Italian, German and others ā€” saw Iranā€™s vast gas reserves and large consumer market as major long-term opportunities. Even under , European companies and banks have remained attentive to potential future access, while member states like Italy, Greece and Spain track Iranian energy flows as part of their broader diversification strategies.

The war has revived Europeā€™s greatest nightmare: an energy crisis triggered by instability in the Gulf. Iranā€™s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and its strikes on Gulf energy infrastructure have sent gas prices , doubling in a matter of days. For heavily import-dependent economies such as Germany or Italy, this is not an abstraction but a direct hit to households and industry.

Beyond energy, EU agencies warn of potential refugee waves of ā€œunprecedented magnitudeā€ if Iranā€™s population of is further destabilized. Europe still bears the political scars of the 2015 ; another influx triggered by a war it did not initiate but is seen as condoning could be politically explosive, strengthening far-right forces and deepening divisions inside the Union. In short, even as formal trade and investment with Iran have withered, Europeā€™s economic and societal exposure to instability in Iran and its neighborhood remains immense.

Europeā€™s strategic dilemma

This war crystallizes a broader shift in Europeā€™s perception of the US. On one level, the old dependency remains. The EU still relies heavily on American hard power to deter Russia, protect sea lanes and provide strategic enablers, from intelligence to logistics, that Europe lacks at scale. Many Central and Eastern European governments, in particular, view US power as indispensable.

On another level, however, the way Washington is using that power in Iran reinforces every European anxiety about an increasingly personalized, unpredictable America. The US appears less bound by multilateral procedures and legal constraints than by the impulses of its president and his political calendar. European interests are consulted late, if at all, and often treated as secondary to domestic political needs in Washington.

To some in Europe, the US now looks less like a guardian of order and more like a great power ready to launch regime-change wars whose costs will largely fall on others. The result is a dual sentiment in European capitals, a reluctant recognition that there is a strong case for confronting Iran and that only US military power can credibly do it, coupled with an equally strong fear that this power is being wielded without a coherent strategy and with little regard for European vulnerabilities.

The most frustrating aspect, from a European perspective, is that this conflict should have been precisely where the EU could make a constructive difference. With Tehran weakened but not destroyed, Arab Gulf states desperate for security and the US searching for a viable endgame, there is a real need for a diplomatic framework that can rein in Iranā€™s nuclear and missile programs, address regional security and provide off-ramps to de-escalation. In the past, Europeā€™s ability to convene, mediate and design such frameworks was one of its few distinctive strengths.

Instead, by passively condoning the decapitation strike against Khamenei while refusing to engage openly with the regime-change implications of the war, Brussels has undercut its credibility. It now risks being seen as a moralizing actor that invokes international law when convenient, looks away when its allies violate the same norms and offers only vague calls for ā€œdialogueā€ when hard choices are required. If the war ends with an unstable, embittered Iran and a shattered JCPOA framework, Europe will have lost not only influence in the Middle East, but also one of the last proofs that its model of power ā€” legalistic, diplomatic, multilateral ā€” can shape events.

The stakes for Europeā€™s strategic future

Uncertain wars rarely yield stable outcomes. Air strikes can decapitate regimes; they cannot, on their own, build legitimate successors. Iranā€™s leadership has every incentive to fight to the bitter end. The regimeā€™s fall, if it comes, could unleash a wave of chaos, refugees and nuclear insecurity whose front line will be Europe, not the US. Iran itself could fragment. of Iran is made up of minorities, many of whom resent the Persian majority. There has long been an active and violent low-level insurgency by armed Kurdish groups (many based in Iraq) fighting for autonomy or secession.

For that very reason, diplomacy should not be dismissed. But neither should the reality that the diplomatic track is now intertwined with a war prosecuted by a Washington whose motives are, in European eyes, uncomfortably personal. Europe needs to reconcile three truths. First, there exists a powerful case for confronting an Iranian regime that has waged war by against the West for decades. Second, the way the US is currently applying its power in Iran is dangerously personalized and opaque. Finally, the EU cannot afford either moralistic passivity or automatic alignment, but rather must define and defend its own interests, even when that means resisting both Tehran and Washington.

Whether Europe rises to that challenge, or resigns itself to being a sidelined commentator on a war that will shape its own security for years to come, will be one of the defining tests of its strategic maturity. If Europe is serious about once again playing a serious strategic role in international affairs, this is the moment to put up or shut up.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post Europe, Iran and the New Face of American Power appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

The conversation, though clear on the military aspects, remains cautious not to predict the campaignā€™s overall outcome.

Military dominance, political uncertainty

Olmert argues that Israel has established overwhelming superiority in the opening phase of the Iran war. He says Israeli intelligence penetration is deep, aerial control is firm and Iranā€™s armed forces have taken severe damage across multiple fronts. In his view, the immediate military picture is not ambiguous. As he puts it, Israelā€™s battlefield performance is ā€œan amazing but really unbelievable success.ā€

Singh pushes back, citing skeptical reporting in Israeli media, including Haaretz, and noting that air superiority does not automatically break an adversaryā€™s will. He points out that Iran has continued to fight and that Israeli officials themselves acknowledge that the war is not yet over. Olmert does not deny that Iran remains dangerous, but he insists that the military balance is already clear and that the real issue is no longer whether Iran is losing on the battlefield. The real issue is whether the regime can survive sustained military and psychological pressure.

That distinction runs through the entire conversation. For Olmert, war is judged not only by what happens on the ground, but also by its political outcome. The battlefield may already favor Israel and the US, but the decisive question is whether that military success can trigger internal collapse inside Iran.

Regime change without a clear day-after plan

Singh repeatedly asks what comes next if the strikes continue to weaken Tehran. Olmert says a collapse of the regime is possible and more plausible now than before the war began. He points to reports of weak coordination inside the Iranian leadership and signs of unrest among Kurds, Baluchis and Arabs. He als notes that many Iranians abroad appear openly jubilant, which he interprets as evidence of broader anger inside the country.

Yet he also admits that neither Israel nor the US appears to have a fully determined plan for postwar Iran. That is one of Singhā€™s sharpest concerns. If the regime falls, what replaces it? A stable transition, a patchwork of autonomous regions or a prolonged civil conflict?

Olmert outlines three elements he sees as necessary for regime change: weakening the regime militarily, encouraging internal opposition and connecting those pressures into a coherent political transition. He says the first has largely happened and the second may be emerging, but the third remains uncertain. He hopes discussions are taking place behind the scenes between Israel, the administration of US President Donald Trump and Iranian opposition figures, but he cannot say that a genuine blueprint exists.

Assassination, succession and the risk of fragmentation

The conversation turns to the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Singh raises a criticism from an unnamed Israeli intellectual who believes the killing may have turned an old and unpopular ruler into a martyr across parts of the Shia world. Olmert rejects that argument completely. He describes Khamenei as ā€œthe modern-day Hitlerā€ and says Israel had no reason to spare a man who openly threatened its destruction.

Even so, Singh raises a deeper strategic issue. Removing senior leaders does not necessarily end a regime. It can produce harder, younger and more fanatical successors. Olmert says the regime still has committed supporters, but many more Iranians oppose it. Prolonged military destruction could make the system unsustainable.

From there, the discussion widens into the possibility of fragmentation. Singh asks whether Iran could face a Syria-like future, with weakened central authority and stronger peripheral actors. Olmert says he supports some form of Kurdish self-rule and suggests that different regions may demand greater autonomy in any postwar settlement. He points in particular to the Kurds, Baluchis and Azeris, noting that Azerbaijan is an important Israeli partner and that Turkey and Pakistan would also have major stakes in any new regional order.

Still, he stresses that Israel cannot manage such an outcome on its own. Any serious transition, he says, would require US leadership and coordination with neighboring states.

Trump, China and the wider geopolitical game

Singh then shifts to the US angle. The war is unpopular with much of the American public, including many in Trumpā€™s Make America Great Again base, and rising oil and gas prices could intensify that discontent. Olmert acknowledges the risk, especially for Israelā€™s long-term standing in the US, but he believes the Trump administration sees the war in broader strategic terms.

For him, the conflict is not only about Iran. It is also about China. He argues that disrupting energy routes weakens Beijing at a time when the Chinese economy is already under strain. In that framework, support for Israelā€™s campaign also serves a larger American objective. He even suggests that Trumpā€™s earlier posture toward Russia may reflect a ā€œreverse Kissingerā€ logic aimed at loosening Moscowā€™s ties to Beijing.

Even so, Olmert remains cautious about Washingtonā€™s planning. He believes Trump is willing to take risks and may hope for a dramatic political payoff before the November elections.

A short war or a longer reckoning

Singh concludes by asking the question that hovers over the whole conversation: How long can this last? Olmert says Israeli sources believe Iranā€™s remaining missile-launch capacity is limited and that the war should end sooner rather than later. He dismisses talk of nuclear escalation as political theater designed to frighten audiences. Israel still has other ways to intensify pressure.

If the current rate of military destruction continues, Olmert does not believe the regime can endure for long. But even he stops short of certainty. The war may be moving quickly on the battlefield, yet the politics of collapse, succession and reconstruction remain unsettled.

However, military victory is one thing, political resolution another. Olmert believes Iranā€™s rulers may be nearing the end. But it remains to be seen whether this war marks the beginning of regime change or simply the opening of a longer and bloodier phase.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the authorā€™s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ō¹Ļā€™s editorial policy.

The post FO Talks: Iran War ā€” Former Israeli Negotiator Josef Olmert Explains What Comes Next appeared first on 51³Ō¹Ļ.

Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, discuss a mounting crisis in the Middle East. A new USā€“Iran conflict, they warn, now ā€œlooms large.ā€ With American military deployments at their highest level since the 2003 Iraq War and faltering diplomacy in Geneva, Switzerland, the risk of a large-scale strike appears high and rising. What began as maximum pressure may be drifting toward shock and awe.

Maximum pressure and military momentum

Atul opens with the scale of the buildup. The US armada now in and around the Persian Gulf follows intensified sanctions and Operation Midnight Hammer, the joint USā€“Israel action targeting Iranian nuclear facilities. Security, political and diplomatic sources tell 51³Ō¹Ļ that US military action is increasingly probable.

Washingtonā€™s approach combines coercive diplomacy with visible force. Negotiators in Geneva, led on the American side by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the President Jared Kushner, have struggled to find common ground with Iranian counterparts whose patient, formal style contrasts sharply with the blunt, fast-moving dealmaking culture of New York real estate. Talks have failed thus far to produce a breakthrough.

Meanwhile, Iran has conducted maritime drills in the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of global oil and gas transit. Failed diplomacy and expanding deployments now reinforce each other. With so many assets in the theater, backing down carries political costs. Advancing carries strategic risks.

Three weak governments, one dangerous dynamic

Atul recounts a British security sourceā€™s observation that the three pertinent governments ā€” Iran, Israel and the United States ā€” are all domestically weak and cannot afford to appear so. Massive anti-government demonstrations in Iran have narrowed the regimeā€™s social base. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu leads a fractious coalition and faces corruption allegations. In Washington, the US Supreme Court has just struck down most of US President Donald Trumpā€™s sweeping tariffs, undercutting executive authority at home even as he projects power abroad.

This convergence of weakness raises the risk of miscalculation. As Atul notes, none of the actors may want a full-scale war, yet all may drift toward one. Some US military sources worry that the ā€œVenezuela highā€ ā€” referring to Operation Absolute Resolve, the January military operation to seize Venezuelan President NicolĆ”s Maduro ā€” could breed overconfidence in Washington. After US Secretary of State Marco Rubioā€™s Munich speech called for a renewal of the West under American leadership, Iran appears next in line for pressure.

Israeli sources suggest Trump may pursue a shock-and-awe operation, which would use incredible displays of force to make Iran lose its nerve. But Glenn cautions against strategic optimism built on thin assumptions. He argues that the belief that ā€œkinetic powerā€ can remake a society rests on ā€œthe thinnest of all imaginable grounds.ā€ History offers sobering parallels.

Regime change or regime hardening?

Atul detects a generational divide within Washington. Some younger Republicans believe Iranā€™s economic woes, youth unemployment and protests by students, women and minorities create a window for a ā€œsmart interventionā€ that weakens or even topples the regime of 89-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. American firepower could degrade military capacity, intensify domestic unrest and open space for intelligence operations by the CIA and Mossad, Israelā€™s foreign intelligence agency.

Older intelligence and military hands are more skeptical. Glenn warns that removing leaders does not dissolve entrenched power structures. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), founded after the 1979 Iranian Revolution as a parallel military reporting directly to the clerical leadership, functions as a praetorian guard. Khamenei has reportedly implemented succession planning up to four levels deep across key posts.

Even if the top leadership was eliminated, Atul predicts that ā€œblack beardsā€ would replace ā€œwhite beards.ā€ The likely successors would not be liberal reformers but hardened elements of the IRGC. To highlight the stakes, Iranā€™s capital of Tehran has acknowledged 3,117 deaths during recent unrest, while independent authorities have confirmed over 6,800 killings. Higher estimates reach 30,000. The regime is ruthless, but it is organized.

Asymmetry, oil and global shock

Glenn frames the conflict in existential terms. For the Iranian leadership, survival is nonnegotiable. For the US, war remains a policy choice. States do not act on altruism when vital interests face grave danger.

The military balance is asymmetric. The US could reportedly conduct up to 800 sorties a day. Yet Iran possesses large numbers of relatively cheap missiles and drones capable of targeting high-value assets, including $5 billion aircraft carriers. The ā€œcost per killā€ calculus favors Tehran: low-cost weapons against high-cost platforms. Iranian tolerance for casualties, in a system that valorizes martyrdom, may far exceed that of the US.

The economic stakes are global. Closure or disruption of the Strait of Hormuz could trigger oil price spikes reminiscent of those seen in the 1973 and 1979 oil crises, raising input costs, transport expenses and worldwide inflation. Missile strikes on refineries, maritime insecurity and surging insurance premiums would disrupt shipping and logistics. Equity selloffs, widening credit spreads, emerging-market currency instability and risk-off capital flows could follow. A prolonged conflict could push the world toward recession.

The nuclear deal revisited

Against this backdrop, Glenn points to a pragmatic alternative: revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The original agreement constrained Iranā€™s nuclear program under international monitoring. Tehran expanded its activities only after Washington withdrew.

A restored deal, perhaps rebranded to allow Trump to claim political victory, would not satisfy Iranian protesters seeking systemic change. Yet Glenn argues it could avert catastrophe. Even if imperfect, diplomacy is preferable to a regional war that might draw in Israel and Gulf states and potentially escalate to tactical nuclear threats. This rhetoric is already circulating on the far right in Israel and within segments of the IRGC.

Ultimately, on Saturday, February 28, the US and Israel coordinated a bombing attack on Iran as part of Operation Epic Fury, killing Khamenei and initiating a greater offensive.

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The House has shown the same pattern. A bipartisan War Powers push led by Representatives Ro Khanna and Thomas Massie a test not only of Republican loyalty to Trump but also of whether Democratic leadership would risk a recorded vote that could split the caucus. Even when members publicly invoke the Constitution, many behave as if the vote itself is the threat.

That is the ā€œtheaterā€ problem. Congress keeps rehearsing oversight while letting the executive branch set facts on the ground. A War Powers process that begins after thousands of sorties and hundreds of deaths is not a guardrail. It is a postscript.

A strategy built on speed and ambiguity invites civilian catastrophe

The administrationā€™s public case has leaned heavily on urgency and prevention, but urgency is not evidence, and prevention is not a legal blank check. A UN panel was ā€œdeeply disturbedā€ by the on the Shajareh Tayyebeh girlsā€™ school in Minab, southern Iran, which Iranā€™s UN mission said killed more than 160 children, with calls for transparency and an investigation. Washington and Tel Aviv can say they did not intend to hit a school, yet intention is not the only standard. International humanitarian law feasible precautions, distinction and proportionality. When children die at that scale, the burden shifts to the attackers to explain what happened, what intelligence supported the target, what safeguards were used and what changes will prevent repetition.

Hospitals have also been pulled into the blast radius. Reuters imagery and reporting the aftermath at the Gandhi Hotel Hospital in Tehran, including residents carrying belongings and visible damage. Al Jazeeraā€™s photo gallery likewise damage at Gandhi Hospital amid the US-Israeli strikes. These are the kinds of incidents that turn policy failure into moral failure. Once hospitals and schools become recurring features of the warā€™s footprint, claims of surgical precision stop sounding like reassurance and start sounding like evasion.

This is where Trumpā€™s approach is uniquely dangerous. His political style favors maximal threats and minimal disclosure. In war, that combination is not strength. It is volatility. The less the public knows about objectives, target selection and constraints, the easier it becomes for the campaign to expand while accountability shrinks.

Costs are not just dollars; they are capabilities

War Powers debates often get framed as constitutional symbolism. The numbers make the argument concrete. Estimates indicated that the first day of the US offensive through roughly $779 million, about 0.1% of the 2026 defense budget, a staggering sum to spend before Congress authorizes anything. Even if precise accounting varies, the direction of travel is unmistakable: The US is consuming high-end munitions at a high speed.

The more strategically relevant story is what those expenditures do to readiness. The US is shortages of key missiles and interceptors such as Tomahawks and SM-3s amid the ongoing offensive. Shortages do not simply raise the bill. They narrow the menu of choices. As stockpiles tighten, leaders become more likely to ā€œdouble downā€ to avoid an ugly pause, more likely to widen the battlefield to chase decisive outcomes and more likely to treat restraint as weakness. A campaign that begins as air strikes can drift into a larger commitment because the political cost of stopping rises as the sunk cost grows.

This is the core indictment of Congressā€™s passivity. When lawmakers refuse to force an upfront authorization debate, they do not prevent war. They prevent strategy. They hand the executive a blank check, then act surprised when the ink runs out.

Trumpā€™s war-making model is escalation plus impunity

A serious war policy requires three things the administration has not credibly supplied: a clear legal rationale, a defined objective and an off-ramp. The legal debate is not academic. Experts have whether the scale of the operation fits within presidential authority absent congressional approval and noted the limits imposed by international law on the use of force. If the White House believes the operation is lawful and necessary, it should be able to state the rationale plainly, publish supporting evidence where possible and accept independent scrutiny where evidence cannot be made public.

Instead, the administration has relied on assertion. A striking example is the reported gap between the rhetoric of imminent threat and what officials privately told lawmakers. Reports the Pentagon told Congress there was no sign Iran was going to attack the US first, undercutting claims of urgent self-defense. When a war is framed as necessary to stop an imminent attack, but briefings acknowledge no clear sign of one, the policy begins to look less like defense and more like a choice.

This is where Trump is politically exposed. A president who normalizes war without authorization is not merely bypassing Congress. He is hollowing out the accountability mechanisms that protect Americans from executive overreach and protect civilians from unchecked military force. The civilian toll inside Iran and the strain on US capabilities are not separate issues. They are the predictable products of the same model: act fast, disclose little, dare Congress to stop it.

What an actual War Powers response would look like

If Congress wants to prove the War Powers Resolution still has meaning, it has to treat authorization as a threshold, not as commentary. That means a binding requirement for specific authorization for continued hostilities, with defined objectives, geographic limits, time limits and mandatory public reporting on civilian harm. It means independent investigations into incidents like the Minab school strike and the damage to medical facilities, with findings released in a form the public can evaluate. It means funding tied to compliance, not compliance tied to vague promises.

A War Powers vote that comes after the bombs is still better than silence. But if Congress lets this war proceed without authorization, it will be sending a message that the Constitution is optional in wartime, civilian protection is negotiable and presidential discretion is the only policy America needs. That is not oversight. That is surrender.

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The current freeze draws a direct, haunting parallel to the 1992 Mykonos Restaurant assassinations. On that September night in Berlin, Iranian agents executed Dr. Sadegh Sharafkandi, the Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (PDKI), alongside three aides.

In April 1997, after a that exposed the inner workings of the regimeā€™s ā€œSpecial Affairs Committee,ā€ a German court took the historic step of naming the highest echelons of power ā€” including Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and then President Hashemi Rafsanjani, among others ā€” as the architects of the massacre. The EUā€™s response was swift: For the first time, every member state recalled its ambassador.

Yet, the resolve was fleeting. Within months, European officials were already rushing back to Tehran, desperate to resume the ā€œCritical Dialogueā€ that had supposedly been suspended. Using the 1997 Iranian election of the ā€œreformistā€ Mohammad Khatami as a convenient exit ramp for their principles, EU diplomats were soon seen seeking permission to re-enter Iran, effectively burying the Mykonos verdict under a mountain of new trade agreements. Today, however, that cyclical retreat seems impossible; the ā€œreformistā€ illusion has shattered, and the door is being locked from the outside ā€” an absolute blockade that remains impenetrable unless the regime undertakes a seismic, foundational reversal to dismantle its own political architecture.

The end of engagement

That 30-year hope ā€” that trade and diplomacy could moderate the Islamic Republicā€™s behavior ā€” finally died in the streets of Tehran over the last two years. In late January 2026, the EU closed a dark circle of history by formally the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization.

It is a move of profound symbolic and legal weight: the very same IRGC and its shadow proxies that orchestrated the 1992 Mykonos murders have finally been branded with the label they earned three decades ago. This long-overdue alignment with Washington raises a haunting question: ā€œWhat if?ā€ Had Europe stood firm and declared the IRGC and its branches a terrorist organization alongside the US back then, the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East ā€” and the security of the Iranian diaspora in Europe ā€” might look fundamentally different today. Instead, 30 years of hesitation allowed the regimeā€™s paramilitary arm to entrench its influence and refine its machinery of repression.

Now, the divorce is absolute. The EU has achieved energy dependence on Iran, cutting off the investments that once served as Tehranā€™s lifeline. The conversation has turned toward the ā€œnuclearā€ option: the total of Iranianembassies across the continent. Influential Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) argue that as long as these missions are used to coordinate transnational repression, they have no right to exist on European soil.

De-platforming the regime: a parliament of fury

The physical manifestation of this decoupling is most striking within the halls of European power. In January 2026, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola took the extraordinary step of all Iranian regime officials and diplomatic staff from entering the Parliamentā€™s premises.

ā€œThis House will not aid in legitimizing a regime that sustains itself through torture,ā€ Metsola declared. This ban represents a jarring departure from the era of ā€œappeasement diplomacy.ā€ Not long ago, EU officials were lining up to meet their counterparts in Tehran, with female leaders often obeying regime orders to be during their visits. Those images of ā€œveiled diplomacyā€ are now being replaced by a total eviction of the regime from the heart of European democracy.

This institutional ban provided the backdrop for even more visceral acts of protest. In a moment that defined the current session, Italian MEP Isabella Tovaglieri recently stood before the chamber and a photograph of Ali Khamenei. The collective anger was further cemented in February 2026, when the Parliament issued a blistering condemnation of the UN for sending a to the regime ā€” a blood-stained insult to the estimated 35,000 Iranians killed in recent state violence.

Europeā€™s hard pivot

The landscape shifted irrevocably on February 28, 2026. The decapitating US and Israeli that claimed the life of Khamenei and his top military command have forced a hard pivot in European capitals. While the EU initially refrained from joining the kinetic phase of the assault, the regimeā€™s response has made continued neutrality impossible.

In its final, agonizing throes, Iran has launched indiscriminate missile and drone strikes that targeted Gulf states and impacted European interests, viewing any Western presence as a fair target for its frustration. This unprovoked aggression against European assets has fundamentally altered the calculus in Brussels. Western leaders now realize that the IRGC is not a state actor to be contained, but a terminal threat to be neutralized. The ā€œCritical Dialogueā€ has been replaced by an urgent necessity to counter the regimeā€™s desperate and final acts of regional aggression.

The images of MEPs tearing up portraits of the Supreme Leader mark the funeral rites of a failed policy. Europe is finally standing on the right side of history; with the regimeā€™s indiscriminate strikes on European interests having shattered the last shreds of diplomatic hesitation, Brussels is now forced to move beyond mere condemnation. 

The strikes of February 28 did more than remove a Supreme Leader; they removed the final barriers to a unified Western front, signaling that Europe will finally have to join the US and Israeli assaults to neutralize Iranā€™s remaining infrastructure. This shift also represents a long-overdue closure for the 1992 Mykonos assassinations; by with organized Iranian Kurdish forces on the ground to topple the regime, the US is finally helping to enforce a judicial verdict that was long deferred by European trade interests.

In this new geopolitical reality, Europe simply cannot afford to antagonize US President Donald Trump by standing against him or failing to provide the support his administration demands. Consequently, as Iran continues to lash out against the region and Western interests, the EU is no longer just ā€œdecouplingā€; it is now preparing for the total collapse of the political architecture it once tried to save and aligning its strategic weight with the inevitable transition of power.

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