The Philippines relies on imports for approximately 90% of its oil supply, leaving the economy vulnerable to global market disruptions and geopolitical crises in the Middle East. Recent have led to double-digit fuel price hikes, thereby eroding consumer purchasing power. This susceptibility to external shocks is amplified by domestic institutional , especially those associated with political dynasties and incumbency bias.?

The economy has now slowed for consecutive quarters. Full-year 2025 growth settled at 4.4%, the weakest since the COVID-19 pandemic. The country now faces a stagflationary episode, threatening to regain the ¡°Sick Man of Asia¡± label (the label given to the Philippines near the end of the Marcos Sr. era, when the country saw contracting GDP, inflation of around in 1984, rising unemployment and a debt crisis) if regression continues.

Monopolizing the ballot: incumbency advantage and the low-information electorate

Persistent susceptibility to external shocks is not only driven by global volatility but also by rooted in incumbency bias and political dynasties. By monopolizing power and favoring patronage over public investment, entrenched elites have weakened the state¡¯s ability to manage , leaving the most disadvantaged households to shoulder rising costs. For example, during periods of oil price spikes, political leaders often respond by selectively distributing cash aid to supporters rather than investing in comprehensive social protection or infrastructure improvements that could cushion poor households from such shocks. This cycle perpetuates the exposure of marginalized groups.

The of candidates is an important individual-level predictor of campaign tactics. A defining feature of candidates with dynastic status is that they inherit personal support bases from their family members who have previously served in Congress.

Incumbents enjoy massive through name recognition, easier access to campaign finance and the indirect use of government resources to bolster re-election bids. Dynastic status is an important that can differentiate legislators, and few studies examine the role of political heredity. Some studies show that dynastic legislators tend to enter office earlier than nondynastic legislators and are consequently more likely to hold ministerial positions. Elections often become a referendum on their record rather than a choice between competing policy platforms, creating safe seats that discourage high-quality challengers from entering the race.

In developing countries, political parties commonly lack or credible programmatic reputations. These parties do not provide reliable information about a candidate¡¯s policy preferences. This lack of information gives voters strong incentives to use the incumbent¡¯s in-office performance as a shortcut for learning about their competence.

In high-information environments, parties are strong and programmatic. Party labels reliably inform citizens about candidates¡¯ policy preferences, past performance and other attributes. This enables voters to make choices based on candidates’ intrinsic qualities rather than merely on incumbency. In contrast, in low-information environments, citizens commonly rely on the incumbent¡¯s record, using it as a proxy for candidate competence against an ex ante expectation of good performance.

When the incumbency advantage is pronounced, the safest bet becomes re-electing the sitting official. This pattern undermines the democratic ideal of electoral uncertainty, reducing genuine competition and accountability that are fundamental to democratic systems. Consequently, entrenched incumbency can hamper political renewal and limit the electorate¡¯s ability to demand responsive or innovative governance.

Regulatory capture and dynastic stranglehold

In the Philippines, the is so pronounced that in many cases, candidates from warlord political clans run virtually unopposed. Recent examinations have found that political dynasties have grown stronger and increasingly linked, occupying a rising share of elected positions in the Philippines and reducing electoral competition and weakening incentives for effective economic governance.

This structure characterizes public office as a ¡°government-as-family-business,¡± in which the primary focus shifts from national development to the and prestige. Dynasties engage in practices such as regulatory capture to influence key public institutions, making sure that the bureaucracy serves the interests of the clan rather than the state, consistent with documented associations between political clans and detrimental practices in Philippine politics.

Patronage politics and food insecurity

The 2026 GDP growth of 2.8% is mainly attributed to issues in public investment, which have been worsened by governance-related hesitancy following high-profile corruption investigations. Although the expects the Philippine economy to grow above 5% until 2027, persistent concerns remain regarding the of dynastic leaders¡¯ preference for personality-based dole-outs over efforts to strengthen the social safety net. This approach particularly exposes the of households by income to the risks posed by oil shocks and food supply disruptions.

Public responses to global oil price spikes frequently focus on rising gasoline costs, with headlines highlighting the threat of transport strikes, higher tricycle fares and motorists¡¯ anxieties. However, as the Philippine Institute for Development Studies () notes, the oil shock extends beyond transportation and has become a significant food security issue. The resulting crisis unfolds most acutely in the kitchens of the Filipino families, where the primary casualty of the current global oil shock is ultimately the dinner table of the marginalized.?

Dynastic political leaders often undermine the creation of a strong social welfare safety net. Elites prioritize consolidating power through patronage and targeted handouts rather than building resilient, universal institutions. As a result, the bottom 30% of households remain exposed to macroeconomic shocks, food price increases and disruptions in global supply chains.

Empirical evidence links of political power to higher poverty rates and lower human development effectiveness. While theories indicate that the impact of political dynasties on development is an empirical question, international evidence indicates that governments dominated by dynasties are closely associated with misgovernance. Empirical evidence shows that dynasties in Congress.

However, some proponents of political dynasties argue that established families may contribute to governance stability or offer experienced leadership, thereby likely enhancing policy continuity. Nevertheless, prevailing empirical evidence indicates that any potential benefits are outweighed by the negative consequences for development, including entrenched inequality and diminished government effectiveness.

The by political dynasties in local government can reduce local economic growth and deter the provision of public goods and good governance. Incumbency bias sustains a dynastic status quo that favors over the structural reforms needed, such as rice tariffication or energy sector diversification, which help anchor inflation expectations.?

PIDS notes that fuel inflation affects more than transport and electricity. Higher fuel prices raise production and transport costs, quickly increasing food prices and squeezing real incomes, pushing struggling households closer to poverty as wages lag.

Breaking the cycle: institutional feasibility and the path to structural resilience

The issue is not primarily about managing pump prices or employing broad fiscal subsidies for oil use, which tend to disproportionately benefit wealthier groups. Rather, the difficulty consists in addressing the resulting distributional imbalances. While some may argue that measures such as price controls or subsidies provide immediate assistance to consumers, these interventions often create inefficiencies and lead to , especially when benefits accrue disproportionately to higher-income groups. Effective policy ought instead to focus on targeted support, such as direct assistance to poorer households, subsidies for at-risk sectors, measures to protect real wages and strategies to ensure secure food supplies. However, implementing such confronts several challenges, notably administrative limitations, insufficient capacity at both the local and national levels, and the complexity of precisely identifying and reaching eligible beneficiaries.?

Additionally, there is a persistent risk of political capture or leakage, in which resources intended for at-risk groups are diverted for partisan purposes or distributed in a non-transparent manner. These implementation barriers make it difficult to ensure that support consistently reaches those most in need. Breaking this cycle requires more than technocratic solutions. It requires a true Anti-Political Dynasty Law to realize the 1987 Constitution¡¯s mandate for equal access to public service.

Political restructuring must accompany the shift in social protection from reactive relief to proactive resilience-building. Group needs must differentiate interventions. Insurance and income-stabilization mechanisms must shield the majority from income volatility, but care must be taken to ensure they are adequately funded and resistant to elite manipulation. Targeted poverty-reduction programs must cushion the low-income population while remaining flexible enough to adapt to evolving macroeconomic shocks.

To guarantee sustained stability and achieve the 2040 vision, the state must enact bold reforms that expand social protection to universal coverage, meeting upper-middle-income country standards. Strengthening requires investment in protective factors: strong infrastructure, quality education, effective climate risk management and a sectoral shift from agriculture to more productive fields such as services, industry and manufacturing.

Until the monarchical nature of Philippine electoral politics is fundamentally reformed, the economy will remain exposed to global shocks, with state institutions incapable of effectively defending citizens or resolving the root causes of enduring vulnerability. Although enacting an Anti-Political Dynasty Law is still a critical objective, its political feasibility is currently constrained by the entrenched influence of dominant political families. Nonetheless, incremental strategies, such as coalition-building among reform-minded legislators, advocacy through civil society groups and strengthened public scrutiny, can incrementally increase the likelihood of passing such reforms.

Similarly, policy recommendations to improve local governance through participatory mechanisms such as the Barangay Assembly and community education programs must account for implementation barriers, including resource constraints and variable local institutional capacity. Establishing realistic benchmarks for openness along with inclusiveness can act as a catalyst for gradual progress. Although these measures may not immediately achieve full structural equity, emphasizing pragmatic pathways and flexible strategies improves the feasibility of institutional transformation and supplies a foundation for broader, sustainable reform.

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The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post The Monarchical Economy: How Political Dynasties Fuel Philippine Inflation appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

China opens its doors while competing for talent

Schneider explains that China has recently relaxed visa rules in two distinct ways: visa-free entry for many European visitors and the new K visa. The former aims to project China as an open and reliable international partner, while the latter seeks to attract highly qualified graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics without requiring prior employment. The initiative targets strategic industries including artificial intelligence, green technology and electric vehicles as Beijing seeks to strengthen its technological leadership.

Schneider says these policies also benefit from shifts in US immigration policy. As he puts it: ¡°For the Chinese government, of course, the Trump administration is in many ways a godsend… because it¡¯s… clearly rolling out xenophobic policies.¡± Yet he notes that the program faces obstacles because China¡¯s slowing economy makes relocating less attractive than policymakers may have anticipated.

Economic frustration fuels digital nationalism

Schneider and Satoh contrast China¡¯s effort to attract foreign talent with worsening employment prospects for many young Chinese graduates. Schneider explains that the promise of upward mobility has weakened, contributing to the ¡°lying flat¡± movement as many young people disengage from intense competition. Against this backdrop, some online users portray foreign recruits as competitors rather than contributors.

Rather than viewing this solely as state propaganda, Schneider suggests that online nationalism often expresses deeper social anxieties. National security language provides a politically acceptable way for citizens to discuss fears about unemployment, declining economic prospects and class insecurity without directly criticizing political leaders. Digital nationalism therefore reflects both government messaging and genuine grassroots frustrations.

Algorithms amplify politically safe debate

Schneider and Satoh examine how Chinese social media platforms such as Weibo, Douyin and Xiaohongshu shape public discussion. While these platforms are privately operated, companies design their algorithms to maximize engagement while remaining consistent with Communist Party guidelines. According to Schneider, ¡°the regulation has effectively been outsourced from the government to these corporations,¡± encouraging companies to err on the side of caution through extensive moderation.

But how does this model compare with Western social media? Although China exercises much stronger political oversight, Schneider contends that many commercial incentives remain remarkably similar, including the pursuit of engagement, advertising revenue and increasingly polarized online debate. Beijing also intervenes more directly when digital platforms promote harmful trends, such as self-harm or eating disorders. This illustrates the state¡¯s paternalistic approach to regulating online behavior.

Nationalism shapes both society and diplomacy

Schneider and Satoh explore how decades of patriotic education have embedded nationalist narratives within Chinese political culture. Japan continues to occupy a central role in these narratives, with historical events such as the Nanjing Massacre frequently resurfacing in online debates and periodically requiring official intervention to contain public outrage.

Schneider argues that digital nationalism has developed into a force that policymakers themselves must increasingly accommodate. Rather than simply directing public opinion, the government also responds to nationalist sentiment circulating online. ¡°You cannot have nationalism without some form of outsider hatred or antagonism,¡± he contends. Distinctions between patriotism and hostility toward outsiders become difficult to sustain once nationalist politics dominates public discourse.

The speakers also examine China¡¯s ¡°Wolf Warrior¡± diplomacy. Many diplomats adopt confrontational rhetoric, not necessarily because of centralized instructions, but because such behavior resonates with domestic audiences and advances their careers within a political environment that rewards nationalist messaging.

Competing visions of China¡¯s global rise

To end the discussion, Satoh and Schneider assess the optics of the recent summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump. They say many Asian observers interpreted the meeting very differently from audiences in Washington, seeing ceremonial protocol as reinforcing China¡¯s growing confidence rather than demonstrating American strength.

More broadly, Schneider suggests that international perceptions of American decline have strengthened China¡¯s confidence in its own long-term ambitions. Simultaneously, both speakers warn that rising nationalism, expanding military competition and shrinking diplomatic engagement are reinforcing global polarization. Schneider concludes that studying China¡¯s digital politics offers lessons extending well beyond China itself. They reveal how algorithms, online communities and nationalist narratives increasingly shape political life across the world.

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The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post FO Podcasts: What the West Ignores About China¡¯s Digital Nationalism appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

I realize this is beginning to sound like the lyrics of a song by Brazilian singer-songwriter Roberto Carlos ¡ª ¡°,¡± one of my favorites, to be precise ¡ª but those were the images that came to mind when I read what seemed at first like a bureaucratic piece of news: In 2025, Cubans Venezuelans as the largest group of refugees seeking protection in Brazil.?

Behind this statistical milestone lies a stark reality: a growing wave of displacement that, above all else, demands an urgent humanitarian response. I saw it firsthand in Vietnam, Cambodia and Tibet. We are seeing it now with Cuba. Nobody leaves home for sport. Nobody abandons their language, childhood friends, neighborhood and a lifetime of accumulated references simply because they woke up one morning eager to start over somewhere else. When people cross borders carrying their lives in a suitcase, desperation is usually involved long before any sense of adventure or opportunity.

But something else caught my attention: the common denominator. Cuba and Venezuela have different histories, different governments and different problems. Yet both have spent years living under US sanctions and economic restrictions. Their crises cannot be explained solely through American policy. To claim otherwise would be intellectually dishonest. At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the effects that decades of economic pressure can have on entire populations.

This gap between cold numbers and living flesh is what brings me back to the main point. When I criticize the US, I am not talking about its people, but its foreign policy. This distinction matters to me. I didn¡¯t learn it from textbooks or bureaucratic reports. I found it on the road. I put a face to it in airports, hospitals, refugee camps, temples and villages that still carry on their skin the deep scars of decisions made thousands of miles away.

The lasting echoes of conflict: Vietnam, Cambodia and Tibet

My first real lesson on this geographical chasm came in 1999. I spent nearly a year crossing Southeast Asia, the most transformative experience of my life. I would arrive in a country chasing one story and leave with ten in my bag. At every turn of that journey, the physical traces of the Cold War and superpower interventions were impossible to escape.

Vietnam was perhaps the clearest example. When I visited the country, roughly 25 years after the Vietnam War had officially ended, I reported on children born with severe deformities in areas exposed to chemical agents used during the conflict. I spent days speaking with doctors, parents and researchers. I walked through hospital corridors that I have never forgotten.

I remember a French doctor explaining why certain regions showed a much higher concentration of cases. I remember another mother holding her child, who had been born without one leg and with severely underdeveloped arms. I still have the photograph somewhere.

Most of all, I remember the discomfort of asking questions in the presence of so much suffering. The war had ended in history books. For those families, it had not.

I came back from Vietnam with the feeling that some wars continue long after the last shot is fired. They continue in bodies, illnesses and in the children and grandchildren of people who never fought in them.

I wrote about some of those experiences in my first book, Sem Pauta (Without Assignment). It is out of print now, although copies occasionally appear on second-hand marketplaces. If I ever manage to recover a digital version, I¡¯ll make it available on my website.

The same feeling returned in Cambodia. There I encountered another chapter in the story of what happens when entire nations become pieces on a geopolitical chessboard. The rise of the (members of the Communist Party of Kampuchea) is often presented as though it emerged in isolation, detached from its historical surroundings. It didn¡¯t. It grew out of a much larger context shaped by Cold War rivalries and by the obsession of great powers with expanding or containing spheres of influence.

Years later, I experienced something similar in Tibet. I went there as a reporter and came back haunted by the questions the trip left behind. What began as a journalistic assignment eventually evolved into a much deeper investigation, one that decades later became my master¡¯s dissertation on the tulkus ¡ª the reincarnated spiritual masters of Tibetan Buddhism ¡ª and the sophisticated succession system developed to preserve Tibetan Buddhism under Chinese rule and against the constant threat of cultural erasure.

It was there that I understood something maps never show. When powerful nations compete for territory, influence or hegemony, the bill is usually paid by people who happened to be born in the wrong place at the wrong moment. Flags change. Speeches change. Justifications change. The people buried beneath history remain people.

Yet when I read that Cubans have become the largest refugee group arriving in Brazil, my mind doesn¡¯t go first to diplomatic briefings or economic reports. It goes back to those hospital corridors in Vietnam. To conversations in Cambodia. To monasteries and long discussions in Tibet.

Unveiling the human stories behind displacement

Today¡¯s defining rivalry is no longer between Washington and Moscow. The Soviet Union belongs to the past. The central competition now runs largely through Washington and Beijing. China continues its remarkable ascent. The United States remains the world¡¯s dominant military power.

It goes back to people I met along the way, all of whom seemed to be fighting for the same thing: preserving something that mattered. A family. A culture. A sense of dignity. Sometimes simply survival. Perhaps that is why I struggle to see refugees as numbers. Numbers do not cross borders. People do. And they are almost always carrying far more than can fit inside a suitcase. This is why we must look past the spreadsheets and demand a diplomacy that values human survival over geopolitical leverage. We need to see the faces behind the numbers before the next family is forced to pack their lives into a suitcase.

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The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post The Picture Behind the Numbers: Refugees, Power and the Human Cost of Geopolitics appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

A dynasty shaped by history

Understanding North Korea requires looking far beyond the Korean War. Mahon traces the country¡¯s political culture back to the Joseon Dynasty, which ruled Korea for roughly five centuries and established a tradition of dynastic continuity that still shapes public acceptance of the Kim family¡¯s authority today. Legendary qualities attributed to the Kim leaders, he suggests, resemble those once associated with Korea¡¯s monarchs, reinforcing a political culture in which one ruling family occupies an almost sacred position.

Singh and Mahon then turn to the upheavals of the 20th century. Japanese colonial rule, liberation after World War II and the Korean War fundamentally reshaped the peninsula, yet the conflict ended only with an armistice rather than a peace treaty. Mahon notes that China withdrew its forces from North Korea after the war while the United States maintained troops in the South, creating the strategic balance that still defines Northeast Asia.

Isolation and economic survival

North Korea remains one of the world¡¯s most isolated countries despite recent diplomatic attention. Mahon describes an economy constrained by mountainous terrain, limited farmland and chronic shortages, leaving the country heavily dependent on China, which accounts for roughly 90% of its trade. During his visit a decade ago, he found a sharp contrast between the relatively prosperous appearance of Pyongyang and the extreme poverty of rural communities, where traditional farming methods remain common.

¡°There¡¯s a desperation in that country,¡± Mahon admits.

Beyond official trade, North Korea relies on weapons exports and illicit activities to generate revenue while maintaining strict internal controls over information and movement. Singh notes the country¡¯s chronic malnutrition, pointing to the significant height difference between North and South Koreans as evidence of decades of economic hardship. Yet despite repeated predictions of collapse, the regime has continued to survive through external support, internal repression and extraordinary political resilience.

Russia, China and the nuclear question

Recent visits by Putin and Xi signal what Mahon sees as a new phase in managing North Korea rather than transforming it into a formal military ally. Russia¡¯s need for ammunition and manpower during the war in Ukraine initially deepened ties with Pyongyang, while China now appears more willing to engage directly with its neighbor after years of frustration over its nuclear and missile programs.

Mahon argues that Beijing¡¯s primary objective is stability rather than confrontation. ¡°China has no benefit in seeing any conflict anywhere,¡± he states.

Mahon characterizes North Korea¡¯s nuclear arsenal as an insurance policy. He says that Pyongyang believes nuclear deterrence is the only reliable guarantee of regime survival after observing the experiences of countries that surrendered their strategic capabilities. Singh notes that while North Korea¡¯s conventional military already poses a serious threat to South Korea, long-range nuclear weapons have transformed it into a global security concern for both Washington and Beijing.

Reform or renewed instability?

Succession remains one of North Korea¡¯s greatest uncertainties. Singh observes that the leading candidates to succeed Kim Jong Un are reportedly women, an extraordinary possibility in a traditionally patriarchal political culture. Mahon nevertheless describes Kim as an effective ruler who has consolidated power despite inheriting leadership without the revolutionary credentials of previous generations.

Looking ahead, Mahon considers gradual economic reform modeled loosely on Deng Xiaoping¡¯s China to be the most plausible path toward greater prosperity while preserving political control. Simultaneously, he warns that declining American influence across the Asia-Pacific region could create new security risks by encouraging regional tensions involving Japan, the Philippines and the Korean Peninsula.

Singh also questions whether North Korea can indefinitely sustain its current economic model. Mahon acknowledges that repeated predictions of imminent collapse have consistently proven incorrect, arguing that highly centralized regimes often endure far longer than outsiders expect. While he believes gradual economic opening offers the country¡¯s best long-term prospect, he cautions that any transition will depend on decisions by the Kim leadership rather than outside pressure. Whether Pyongyang embraces reform, maintains its current path or faces an unforeseen crisis, he concludes that North Korea will remain a significant factor in the evolving strategic balance of East Asia.

¡°The West has to wake up and realize it’s about 500 years behind on its homework on Asia.¡± Mahon concludes.

North Korea¡¯s future remains deeply uncertain, but its isolation can no longer be understood in isolation from the wider transformation of the Asia-Pacific. As China, Russia and the US adjust to a changing regional balance, the choices made in Pyongyang will increasingly shape Northeast Asia¡¯s security and geopolitical future.

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The views expressed in this article/video are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post FO Talks: North Korea ¡ª Unveiling the Hidden Truth appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Foreign investors lose confidence

The conversation opens with a striking statistic: Foreign portfolio investors have withdrawn roughly $45 billion from Indian markets over the past two years, including about $18.5 billion in 2025 and another $20 billion by early June 2026. Foreign ownership of Indian equities has fallen to its lowest level in over a decade, raising concerns that international investors are reassessing India¡¯s prospects.

Tully attributes the trend to both external and domestic factors. Geopolitical instability around the Strait of Hormuz has threatened energy and fertilizer supplies that are critical to South Asia, creating inflationary pressures across the region. Simultaneously, India¡¯s traditionally high market valuations have become harder to justify because corporate earnings have disappointed while competing markets such as China, Taiwan and South Korea have benefited from the global boom in AI-related hardware.

As Tully explains, ¡°India¡¯s expensive. It doesn¡¯t have the exposure to the AI hardware that we see in Korea, Taiwan and China.¡± As a result, investors increasingly see better opportunities elsewhere.

Growth slows as structural weaknesses emerge

Singh says that India¡¯s problems extend well beyond short-term market sentiment. He points to sluggish private-sector capital expenditure, weak innovation and declining international competitiveness. Indian technology companies have excelled in services but invested relatively little in proprietary products, leaving the country absent from many of today¡¯s fastest-growing industries.

Tully agrees that private investment has lagged despite strong corporate balance sheets. Rather than a shortage of capital, he points to structural obstacles including land acquisition, labor regulations and complex approval processes that discourage businesses from expanding manufacturing.

The speakers also revisit earlier policy decisions such as demonetization and the rollout of the Goods and Services Tax. Singh contends these measures damaged small and medium-sized businesses, reducing employment and weakening domestic demand. Tully adopts a more measured view, acknowledging that consumption has slowed while emphasizing that India¡¯s large domestic consumer market remains one of its greatest long-term advantages.

They also note that India failed to capitalize fully on the ¡°China plus one¡± opportunity. Although initiatives such as Make in India encouraged manufacturing, production has not expanded at the pace seen elsewhere in Asia, leaving India with relatively little exposure to sectors such as semiconductors and AI hardware.

Demographic pressures meet bureaucratic barriers

The discussion then turns to India¡¯s labor market. Around 90% of employment remains in the informal sector, only about 80¨C90 million people are registered taxpayers and roughly ten million new workers enter the labor force every year.

Singh argues that without stronger job creation, India¡¯s demographic dividend risks becoming a liability rather than an advantage. He observes that many talented Indians continue to pursue education and careers overseas, suggesting both capital and skilled labor increasingly ¡°vote with their feet.¡±

Tully acknowledges these concerns but highlights encouraging developments within India¡¯s startup ecosystem. Entrepreneurs are applying new technologies to agriculture, education and other sectors, creating innovative businesses that continue attracting venture capital despite broader economic uncertainty.

The speakers devote considerable attention to India¡¯s bureaucracy. Drawing on his own experience in government, Singh criticizes the Indian Administrative Service for retaining a centralized, interventionist mindset that he believes discourages entrepreneurship and efficient policymaking. Tully is more sympathetic toward institutions such as the Reserve Bank of India, though both agree that structural reforms remain necessary to improve the business environment.

The rupee, domestic investors and reform

The weakening rupee becomes another focal point of the discussion. Singh states that continued currency depreciation erodes investor returns while making India less attractive for foreign capital. Unlike export-driven economies that may benefit from weaker currencies, India¡¯s domestic-oriented economy gains relatively little from this adjustment.

Tully agrees the rupee¡¯s decline deserves attention but believes the broader economy remains more resilient than it was before the 1991 balance-of-payments crisis. Domestic investors have increasingly offset foreign selling, helping stabilize markets even as overseas funds reduce their exposure.

Nevertheless, Singh warns that systematic investment plans have left many middle-class investors supporting valuations while experienced foreign investors exit. He raises the possibility of a sharp correction if confidence deteriorates further.

Tully remains cautious but less pessimistic. ¡°I don¡¯t have quite that strong a sense of foreboding,¡± he says. He considers India¡¯s underlying fundamentals reasonably robust despite the recent setbacks.

Waiting for reform

India stands at an important crossroads. External shocks ¡ª from Middle Eastern instability to US tariffs ¡ª have compounded domestic weaknesses, yet many of the country¡¯s challenges originate within its own institutions and regulatory framework.

Singh and Tully believe another wave of structural reforms is needed to strengthen manufacturing, encourage investment and improve ease of doing business. They differ on urgency, however. Singh says history shows that meaningful reform often follows severe crises. Tully hopes corrective measures can arrive before conditions deteriorate that far.

Tully concludes, ¡°We must not underplay the extent of the success and transformation that you have seen in India,¡± even as the country confronts difficult choices about sustaining growth in an increasingly competitive global economy.

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The views expressed in this article/video are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post FO Talks: India¡¯s Reckoning ¡ª Reform or Regression? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s former Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with political commentator Appo Jabarian about Armenia¡¯s June 7 parliamentary elections and their significance for the South Caucasus. Jabarian argues that the vote represented a choice between continued foreign-policy diversification under Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and a return to closer alignment with Russia. The discussion ranges from Armenia¡¯s strategic geography and post-Nagorno-Karabakh politics to the interests of regional and global powers who watched the election.

Armenia¡¯s strategic position

Jabarian begins by explaining why Armenia occupies an outsized place in regional geopolitics despite its small size. Situated at a crossroads linking north and south as well as east and west, Armenia serves as a land bridge connecting multiple regions of Eurasia. The South Caucasus is an area of intense geopolitical competition where major powers seek influence.

The election carried implications beyond Armenia itself. Jabarian frames the country as part of a broader democratic space stretching across Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. The outcome may determine whether Armenia continues expanding its international partnerships or falls back into a sphere dominated by a single external power.

Two competing visions for Armenia

Khattar Singh asks Jabarian to explain the main political camps that contested the election. Jabarian identifies one camp with former Presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, as well as businessman Samvel Karapetyan. He characterizes this group as representing Armenia¡¯s former political establishment and alleges that it benefits from substantial Russian support.

The opposing camp was led by Pashinyan and his Civil Contract Party. This coalition sought to diversify Armenia¡¯s foreign relations and strengthen ties with Europe and other democratic partners. The objective was not exclusive alignment with the West, but broader integration with what Jabarian calls the global free world, including countries such as India, Japan, South Korea and Singapore.

Responding to criticism that Pashinyan has simply replaced dependence on Russia with dependence on the United States, Jabarian rejects that interpretation. He calls such claims ¡°Kremlin-approved talking points¡± and points to Armenia¡¯s growing relationship with India as evidence of a more diversified foreign policy.

The legacy of Nagorno-Karabakh

To this day, the loss of the Nagorno-Karabakh region to neighboring Azerbaijan continues to shape Armenian politics. Khattar Singh notes that this was the first parliamentary election cycle taking place after the region¡¯s depopulation and asks how voters were responding at the time.

Jabarian presents a highly contested interpretation of the conflict. He says the events of the 2020 conflict were not a conventional war but ¡°staged terrorist aggression¡± involving multiple regional actors. He also traces the dispute back to the Soviet period, claiming that Joseph Stalin¡¯s administrative decisions laid the foundations for later conflict.

Jabarian contends that successive Armenian governments failed to achieve a lasting settlement and that Russian influence helped preserve instability in the region. He contrasts what he sees as Russia¡¯s approach of maintaining leverage through regional disputes with the development model offered by democratic states. Throughout the discussion, Khattar Singh challenges several of Jabarian¡¯s assumptions, particularly regarding the role of the US in international affairs.

Pashinyan¡¯s standing with voters

Khattar Singh asks whether Pashinyan remains popular after losing Nagorno-Karabakh, noting that media portrayals range from democratic reformer to national traitor.

Jabarian mentions that the prime minister enjoys substantial support. Many Armenians view Pashinyan not as the architect of the defeat, but as a victim of a broader geopolitical effort involving Russia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Public pressure after the 2020 conflict encouraged Pashinyan to remain in office rather than resign because many voters feared a return of the previous political elite.

He further alleges that corruption and internal sabotage weakened Armenia during the conflict and contributed to the outcome. As a result, he believes the election was less a referendum on Pashinyan personally than a decision about Armenia¡¯s future geopolitical direction.

Regional and international stakes

In the final part of the conversation, the speakers examine the interests of outside powers. Jabarian argues that Russia, India, Iran, Israel, Turkey and Western countries all closely watched the vote because of Armenia¡¯s strategic location.

He alleges that Russia conducted a large-scale influence campaign involving financial resources, election bribery and hybrid operations, while Armenian authorities attempted to counter such efforts. Jabarian also emphasizes the importance of Armenia¡¯s growing relationship with India and suggests that Iran may pursue broader international engagement in the future.

The discussion concludes with Israel¡¯s ties to Azerbaijan. Jabarian attributes Israel¡¯s support for Azerbaijan largely to energy considerations, particularly oil imports routed through Turkey. Despite current tensions, he expresses confidence that regional relationships will eventually normalize.

For Jabarian, the election determined whether Armenia pursues deeper integration with a broader network of international partners or returns to a more Russia-centered orientation. He argues that the result influences not only Armenia¡¯s future but the wider geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus.

Ultimately, Pashinyan¡¯s Civil Contract Party would win the election with 49.81% of the vote, securing 64 seats in the 105-seat National Assembly, retaining power in Armenia. The Russian-supported opposition parties, Strong Armenia and the Armenia Alliance, received about 23% and 8% of the vote and netted about 29 and 12 seats, respectively.

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The views expressed in this article/video are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post FO Talks: Armenia Election ¡ª Can Nikol Pashinyan Win Another Term Despite Geopolitical Churn? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

How the Japanese economy has changed

Over the last three decades, Japan¡¯s debt-to-GDP ratio has increased massively. In 1991, this figure sat at around 65%. By 2025¨C2026, that figure has risen to 248%. This is the biggest debt burden in the developed world. This debt spike is partly a result of the 2007¨C2008 global financial crisis and the 2020 Covid pandemic. Mostly, however, it is because Japan has run consistent government budget deficits. 

Luckily for Japan, however, 88% of the debt is owed to the Japanese people, not to foreign investors. It is denominated in yen, and interest rates are low or zero. So, unlike a country that has borrowed from outside in dollars, Japan does not face the same risk of financial crises. Still, this massive debt is a burden, and it has slowed down Japan¡¯s growth rate.

This is a significant shift from Japan¡¯s postwar economic miracle. From the 1950s to 1973, Japan sustained rapid growth, often exceeding 10% annually. Growth only after the 1973 oil crisis, becoming more sporadic during the 1980s before settling into stagnation (known as the ¡°Lost Decades¡±) after Japan¡¯s asset bubble burst in 1990.

Since the bubble burst, the purchasing power of the yen has declined steadily. The yen has depreciated significantly. In April 1995, $1 was worth ?83.6895, while by May 5, 2026, $1 was equivalent to ?157.74. 

Economists still puzzle over the question of what caused Japan¡¯s decline. The ¡°economic miracle¡± of the land of the rising sun feels a long way away in the country with the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the developed world.  Atul believes that Japan¡¯s economic policies of the 1980s fueled an unsustainable bubble. Tokyo focused on the marketability of assets, eased access to credit and encouraged speculation, prolonging and exacerbating the bubble.

At the peak of Japan¡¯s economic bubble, around 1989 or 1990, economists estimated the theoretical land value of the Tokyo Imperial Palace grounds to be greater than the value of all real estate in the entire state of California. This represented one of the largest asset bubbles in history. Tokyo real estate was priced over 350 times higher than equivalent space in Manhattan.

There were real fears in America that Japan was a real threat to the US. The 1993 movie Rising Sun captured these fears. Many argued that the US had to adapt and adopt Japanese methods. A real estate developer called Donald Trump spoke out against Japan for stealing American jobs and ruining the country¡¯s economy. 

Neither the central bank nor the finance ministry acted in time to contain the bubble. By August 1990, the Nikkei stock index had plummeted to half its peak by the time of the fifth monetary tightening by the Bank of Japan. By late 1991, other asset prices began to fall. Even though asset prices had visibly collapsed by early 1992, the economy¡¯s decline continued for well over a decade.

Japanese postwar politics moves to the right gradually

Not only has Japan changed economically, but it has also changed politically. Japan and Germany were the two great losers of World War II. Both had their militarism and even nationalism beaten out of them. The US turned both countries into loyal allies and changed their culture. Both turned away from far-right political parties to focus on economic and social advancement.

Complete defeat in World War II rejected, suppressed or placed into question all the cultural guideposts for Japanese society. America set out to remake the Japanese political system in its image explicitly and achieved dramatic success. The American occupier suppressed the Japanese nationalist right because it was responsible for a brutal war and a complete defeat.

Yet Japanese society remained conservative. In 1955, Japan¡¯s two conservative parties, the Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party, merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a center-right, united front against the Japan Socialist Party. The key LDP argument was that it represented Japan while the socialist report to Moscow. General Douglas MacArthur wanted to ensure Japan did not turn communist. So, it made peace with Japan¡¯s ruling elite, which formed and dominated the LDP. Unsurprisingly, the LDP went on to become the ruling party of Japan, retaining power uninterruptedly for decades. It presided over the economic miracle and won election after election. The LDP only lost power briefly when the Japanese asset bubble burst and damaged its sheen.

In 2001, Junichiro Koizumi, a member of the Japanese political elite, won the LDP presidency and then became prime minister. He was a reformer who revived the fortunes of the LDP. Koizumi was focused on reducing Japan¡¯s government debt, privatizing Japan Post in the process. He was also an advocate of a more muscular foreign policy and won international attention for sending Japan¡¯s Self-Defense Forces to Iraq after George W. Bush¡¯s invasion of the country in 2003. This was the first time Tokyo had deployed troops outside Japan since World War II. Koizumi was also a strong nationalist who visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, fueling diplomatic tensions with neighboring China and South Korea. 

Koizumi resigned as prime minister in 2006 and was succeeded by Shinzo Abe. Although Abe lost power after a year, he made a comeback later and went on to become the longest-serving Japanese prime minister. He tried to counter Japan¡¯s stagnation through Abenomics, a combination of monetary easing, fiscal stimulus and structural reforms, which had mixed results. More importantly, Abe steered Japan to a more nationalist and muscular foreign policy. 

In 2007, Abe initiated the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), involving the US, Australia, India and Japan, to contain the rise of China. Abe was also a member of Nippon Kaigi, a far-right organization that downplays Japanese atrocities in textbooks and denies use of Korean or Chinese comfort women for Japanese troops during World War II. In a nutshell, Abe was the key figure in the public emergence of Japanese nationalism.

Today, his disciple Sanae Takaichi has become the first female prime minister of Japan. Just as Abe was more nationalist than Koizumi, Takaichi is more nationalist than Abe. Unlike the patricians Koizumi and Abe, Takaichi is of humble middle-class origin. In keeping with the Japanese conservative tradition, Takaichi also opposes immigration. She also wants to beef up Japan¡¯s military.

As China has become more nationalistic and threatening in recent years, Japan has become more independent and assertive. The fetters once put on by Americans after World War II are now coming loose. In Atul¡¯s words, ¡°Both Germany and Japan, in some ways, are normalizing and reverting back to historical mean.¡±

Demography has changed dramatically

While politics might have changed gradually, Japan¡¯s demography has changed dramatically. The Japanese fertility rate dropped to 1.15 in 2024, far below the 2.1, well below replacement level. The 65+ form around 30% of the population. The working age population between 15 and 64 is about 59%. The youth, those below 14, are only 11%. The median age is 49.4 to 50.2 (second highest after Monaco), life expectancy 81 for men and 87¨C88 for women. The highest total dependency ratio is 70.2, i.e. there are 100 workers for 70 dependents, which include the old and the young. This ratio is the highest in the world.

During the postwar boom of 1950, there were over 12 workers for every retiree. This massive workforce kept the tax burden low and productivity high. Japanese demography fueled the rapid industrialization of the 1950s and 1960s. Note that Japanese workers were educated and skilled unlike their counterparts in India or Pakistan. As Japan grew richer, birth rates fell and life expectancy rose. 

By 1970, the worker-to-pensioner ratio was 9.8-to-1. By 1990, this ratio was 5.8-to-1, which declined to 2.8-to-1 by 2010. Today, this ratio is 2-to-1. There is no precedent for the dramatic aging of the Japanese population and slower growth is to some degree a result of lower birth rates. Older people do not work or consume as much as young people. 

Japan is now a ¡°super-aging¡± society. Japan¡¯s current population is estimated to be in 2026. Projections indicate that it will plunge to by 2050. Japan has been a socially conservative society and has been reluctant to let large numbers of foreigners immigrate to their island nation. 

China¡¯s rise and America going home forces Japan to act

China has become increasingly aggressive and nationalistic even as the US has become more isolationist. Trump walked out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), leaving the field open to China in the region. Beijing came up with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which many Asian countries signed after the collapse of the TPP. In the US/Israel¨CIran War, American redeployment of troops and military kit from Japan and South Korea to the Middle East has worried both Tokyo and Seoul.

Consequently, Japan is adapting to changed circumstances. Japan has moved to replace, to the extent possible, American international economic leadership in Asia. Tokyo has replaced the TPP and countered the RCEP with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), also known as . Japan has also directed tens of billions of dollars to African development in an effort to counter China¡¯s Belt and Road Initiative and other African investments.

In the changed strategic environment. Japan has doubled its defense budget. Chinese aggression in the South and East China Seas and around the Senkaku Islands (known to China as the Diaoyu Islands) off the shore of Taiwan makes Japan uncomfortable. They also worry about a 2021 circumnavigation of Japan by a Chinese¨CRussian fleet. These threats have come at a time when North Korea continues to develop and test nuclear missiles.

Japan now finds itself in a position where it cannot just rely on a defensive posture but has to project force. At the end of December, 2025, the Japanese cabinet approved a $640 million defense budget, which includes the purchase of 300 US Tomahawk missiles and the development of a rapid reaction force similar to the US Marines. This force is capable of projecting power beyond simply defending the home islands. Japan has also engaged in strong bilateral discussions with Vietnam, the Philippines and Australia, and continues to engage with the US. 

What lies ahead for Japan

Despite a more robust foreign policy and increased defense capabilities, Japan lacks the size to take on either the US or China. Over the next few years, Japan will continue to slide slowly to middle-rank power status. 

Going forward, Japan will seek to fill the gaps left by America¡¯s isolationist policies with variable coalitions to counterbalance China, though this has significant limits. The QUAD hasn¡¯t met Japanese expectations. Thus, Japan has been deepening relationships with South Korea and Taiwan. Japan¡¯s grand strategy will be to contain and deter China. Fighting or boycotting China would lead to economic armageddon.

China¡¯s fixation with historic Japanese militarism is the result of Xi Jinping¡¯s obsession. Atul points out that no Japanese army can march all the way to India as it did in World War II. The Japanese simply do not have the numbers. Over time, Japan, South Korea and China will have similar challenges of aging societies and a detente makes most sense.

In the coming years, Japan¡¯s economy will suffer from aging pains. The nation has three possibilities to counter a declining and aging population: significantly increase immigration to keep its population numbers up, invest massively in robotics to automate work or accept economic stagnation despite technological leadership. Japan is debating the first option, but so far has chosen not to allow massive immigration. It has embraced the second wholeheartedly. The third is inevitable.

Japan will have to face an existential choice in the next 25 years: accept China¡¯s strategic and economic orbit; maintain a counteralliance with the US and other regional actors; or create a replacement, to the extent possible, for Pax Americana in Asia. This will involve not just an entente with other Asian states but also a detente with China based on the economic benefits of a peaceful China¨CJapan relationship. A more multipolar and uncertain Pax Asiana is likely to succeed Pax Americana in Asia.

[ and wrote this summary.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post The Dialectic: Japan ¡ª The Aging Land of the Rising Sun appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

A ceasefire that settles little

Olmert begins by outlining reports of a proposed agreement awaiting approval from both US President Donald Trump and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei. The arrangement would reopen the Strait of Hormuz and halt direct hostilities, but it postpones decisions on Iran¡¯s nuclear program, ballistic missiles and regional network of allied groups for another 60 days.

For Olmert, this is the central weakness of the deal. Rather than resolving the issues that triggered the conflict, it merely delays them. The agreement, he argues, amounts to a temporary pause rather than a durable settlement.

Before the war, discussions focused on Iran¡¯s military capabilities and the possibility of regime change. Instead, Tehran successfully turned the Strait of Hormuz into the decisive issue. Olmert says that Iran leveraged its ability to disrupt global trade and energy flows to force Washington and Jerusalem into a position they had not adequately anticipated.

¡°The main elements of the agreement are that basically, there is no agreement,¡± he states.

Military defeat, political victory

Olmert distinguishes sharply between military and political outcomes. Militarily, he believes Iran suffered enormous losses. Israeli and American operations severely damaged missile capabilities, destroyed much of Iran¡¯s navy and eliminated key military leaders. Iran¡¯s missile campaign against Israel also failed to achieve the catastrophic effects many had feared.

Yet Olmert argues that wars are ultimately judged by their political conclusions rather than battlefield statistics. From that perspective, he believes Iran emerged stronger.

The regime survived. The ceasefire appears to acknowledge Iran¡¯s influence over the Strait of Hormuz. Reports of a possible international investment mechanism could also provide substantial economic relief. Taken together, these developments allow Tehran to claim that it withstood a coordinated American¨CIsraeli campaign and preserved its core political structure.

Olmert compares the situation to Egyptian military officer Gamal Abdel Nasser after the 1956 Suez Crisis. Although Nasser suffered military setbacks, he ultimately secured political control over the canal and emerged stronger in the eyes of much of the Arab world.

¡°As it stands now in this round, Iran comes out victorious,¡± Olmert argues.

The problem of another round

The proposed agreement raises a larger concern for Olmert: the likelihood that the conflict simply resumes later.

By postponing decisions on nuclear activities, missile programs and Iran¡¯s regional alliances, the deal creates conditions for another confrontation rather than eliminating the causes of the current one. This could merely be one round in a longer struggle.

He believes the Trump administration has limited room for escalation. Time works in Iran¡¯s favor as American political attention shifts toward upcoming midterm elections. Even if Washington wanted to increase pressure, Olmert questions whether it has the political appetite for a prolonged campaign.

This concern extends beyond Iran. In Gaza, Hamas remains active despite Israeli military gains. In Lebanon, Hezbollah continues to operate despite suffering substantial losses. According to Olmert, Israel¡¯s battlefield successes have not translated into decisive political outcomes.

¡°The war is not over. This round may be over,¡± he says.

Netanyahu¡¯s declining position

Singh and Olmert turn to Israel¡¯s domestic politics. Olmert argues that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu enters this period politically weakened despite the military achievements of the Israel Defense Forces.

Public support for Netanyahu has declined, and Olmert believes growing dissatisfaction exists within parts of Israel¡¯s military and security establishment. After nearly three years of conflict across multiple fronts, fatigue has become a significant factor.

Olmert acknowledges Netanyahu¡¯s intellectual abilities but argues that his political standing has deteriorated. He predicts that the prime minister will struggle to survive the next election, which he expects within several months.

More troubling is what Olmert sees as Israel¡¯s increasing dependence on Washington. He argues that major strategic decisions are now heavily influenced by the US, reducing Israel¡¯s freedom of action. Previous Israeli leaders maintained greater strategic autonomy, while Netanyahu appears increasingly constrained by American priorities.

According to Olmert, a future Israeli government will need to rebuild both domestic trust and a more balanced relationship with the US.

A changing Middle East

Beyond Israel and Iran, Olmert sees signs of broader regional change. Saudi Arabia is exploring alternative partnerships. Gulf states are pursuing increasingly independent policies. Lebanon remains politically fragile despite Israeli military pressure on Hezbollah.

At the same time, criticism of Israel has intensified internationally. Olmert rejects many of the arguments made by foreign critics, particularly when they fail to propose viable alternatives to Hamas or Hezbollah. However, he also criticizes extremist settler activity in the West Bank and argues that a future Israeli government will need to address the issue more forcefully.

Despite these challenges, Olmert emphasizes that Israel remains a formidable military power. The question is whether military success can be translated into sustainable political outcomes.

Israel and the US won many of the battles. Iran lost ships, missiles, infrastructure and senior commanders. Yet because the regime survived and appears poised to negotiate from a position of continued relevance, Olmert concludes that Tehran achieved the more important victory.

The conflict demonstrates an enduring lesson of statecraft: Military success matters, but political results determine who ultimately wins the war.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post FO Talks: Iran Won, the US and Israel Lost appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Even though Xinjiang is theoretically autonomous, it has become an Orwellian nightmare, subject to severe restrictions by the central government. This region, which is half the size of Europe, has become a sophisticated system of social control and cultural repression. Under the gaze of millions of cameras, an entire people ¡ª the Uyghurs ¡ª is being slowly and methodically . Not through the gas chambers of the last century, but through intensive surveillance, forced sterilizations and family separations.?

Under the pretext of fighting terrorism, the CCP pursues a policy of ¡°,¡± a systematic strategy to forcibly the Uyghur population. What was once a peripheral province is today China¡¯s most militarized zone: a veritable open-air prison. Michelle Bachelet, the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, recently ¡°serious human rights violations¡± committed in Xinjiang that could constitute ¡°crimes against humanity.¡± As early as 2005, Human Rights Watch raised the alarm, claiming that the systematic repression of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang is a deliberate political strategy that ultimately benefits the state of China.?

Most importantly, what happens in the Xinjiang re-education camps extends beyond China¡¯s borders and encroaches on the international community. China is demonstrating to the world that cultural and religious identity can be rewritten or erased in the name of state stability and economic development. If the ¡°Great Wall of Iron¡± prevails without meeting cohesive global resistance, the risk is that the Xinjiang model will become an export product: a world where technology serves not to liberate humanity, but to perfect its imprisonment.

Demographic manipulation broke Uyghur roots

Today, Xinjiang is home to approximately 12 million Uyghurs, who refer to it as East Turkestan (Sherqi Turkistan). While the ethnic Han population primarily speaks Chinese, the Uyghur, Kazakh and Kyrgyz populations are ethnically Turkic, predominantly Muslim and have their own languages. Uyghur culture a close affinity with Central Asian nations. Their roots trace back to the collapse of the ancient Karabalghasan Empire (which was located in present-day Mongolia) in 840 AD, followed by centuries of for independence.

In 1759, the Manchu Qing Dynasty invaded East Turkestan, and between 1750¨C1863, the population residing under military control rebelled 42 times. Then, in 1863, Yaqub , the emir of the Kashgaria kingdom, liberated East Turkestan, set up an independent state and entered into diplomatic talks. However, the Manchu Qing Dynasty formally incorporated East Turkistan in 1884, renaming it Xinjiang. After the fall of the Manchu Qing Dynasty in 1911, Xinjiang continued to be ruled by various leaders.?

Nationalism began to spread in Xinjiang in the 1920s. On November 12, 1933, the peoples of Xinjiang declared independence as the East Turkestan Republic (ETR). It lasted less than a year ¡ª the ETR was overthrown on April 16, 1934 following an invasion by the Kuomintang (), the ruling political party of China from 1928 to 1949. On November 12, 1944, once again, the ETR declared independence. And, once again, it was short-lived. In 1949, a mysterious plane crash killed the ETR¡¯s core leadership and the republic was invaded by the PLA. With the arrival of the People¡¯s Liberation Army, Beijing began casting a veil of control that has never been lifted.?

Despite granting autonomy to Xinjiang (which is officially called the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, or XUAR) in 1955, the CCP¡¯s promises of self-determination clashed with government policies. The first part of policy aimed at Xinjiang was not ideological, but demographic. Until the 1950s, Uyghurs represented about 90% of the population in the region; today, they account for a reduced 45%. They are effectively strangers in their own home. This was not a natural evolution, but rather a surgical operation of social engineering.

Following the fall of the Uyghur leadership, hundreds of thousands of people were driven into exile, primarily toward . Between 60,000 and 100,000 Uyghurs and Kazakhs fled the country. Then, through the paramilitary system of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (the , also known as Bingtuan), a paramilitary organization that manages farms, factories and mines, the State orchestrated a mass of Han, the ethnic majority in China. The government offered economic incentives, housing and careers to Han settlers to dilute the local identity. This relegated Turkic-speaking Muslims to an economic , excluded from the most prestigious jobs and subjected to forced labor and wage discrimination. Many career sectors continue to advertise ¡°Han only¡± hiring.

In February 1997, tensions culminated into a series of initially peaceful protests led by Turkic-speaking Muslim communities in the municipality of . These demonstrations, however, were stifled by a violent counter-offensive launched by the Public Security Bureau and People’s Armed Police units. The outcome was dramatic: arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, unfair trials and death sentences.

However, the in July 2009 marked the definitive breaking point. What began as a peaceful protest by Uyghur students demanding an investigation into the killing of two Uyghur factory workers turned into extreme between the Han and the Uyghurs. According to CCP reports, nearly 200 people died, most of them Han. The Uyghur death and disappearance toll still remains unclear. The ensuing crackdown marked the final divorce between the Party and the minority. Beijing authorities that the World Uyghur Congress and its leader Rebiya Kadeer were the hidden directors of the unrest and accused them of planning the riots from exile.??

From that moment on, Beijing chose neutralization. Under the pretext of the ¡°Global War on Terror,¡± China labeled every expression of Uyghur culture and resistance as a manifestation of separatism, terrorism and extremism. The separatist group East Turkestan Islamic Movement () is of particular concern to China. In 2002, the US designated ETIM as an international terrorist organization. However, there is a lack of consensus and information on ETIM. Nonetheless, the CCP has turned to an extreme surveillance strategy across Xinjiang on the pretense of the Global War on Terror.?

Nightmarish, radical punishments are used to control the Uyghurs

The CCP¡¯s radical sinicization strategy is one of biological and social manipulation. Between 2015 and 2018, forced and the mandatory insertions of intrauterine devices caused the Uyghur birth rate to decline by more than . Approximately mosques have been demolished and villages renamed between 2009 and 2023 to erase any historical traces of the Uyghurs. Many children have been separated from their families and taken to state boarding schools that have banned the Uyghur language.

Everyday ¡ª such as sending messages containing Quranic verses, observing Ramadan, abstaining from alcohol, wearing a beard or donning a veil ¡ª are classified as ¡°signs of extremism,¡± punishable by detention and forced indoctrination. The CCP has invested millions of dollars to build 1,200 ¡°Vocational Education and Training Centers¡± () where, since 2017, more than one million Muslims ¡ª including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz ¡ª have disappeared.?

Analysis of leaked Chinese government documents such as the and the has shown that VETCs are maximum-security prisons with iron discipline and punishments. The Xinjiang Papers revealed that between 2017 and 2018, more than 12% of the adult population in a single county was detained in a camp or prison. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) used satellite data to reveal the existence of over detention facilities. However, obtaining precise statistics is nearly impossible.

Survivor testimonies are . Detainees are subjected to forced political indoctrination and torture practices such as sleep deprivation and confinement. There are also reports of unidentified pills or injections given to detainees that caused negative reproductive or psychological effects. Armed guards are ordered to follow a shoot-to-kill for anyone attempting to escape. Albeit with different technologies, the logic remains the same as Nazi Germany: the dehumanization, segregation and neutralization of a minority to ensure the purity and stability of the dominant social body.

Pervasive surveillance allows this system to thrive

The heart of the Xinjiang system is ¡°grid-style social management.¡± This massive control apparatus rests on a sophisticated digital surveillance system and predictive policing. Through a massive database called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (), the state used AI to cross-reference personal information data such as private messages and spending habits in order to create lists of ¡°suspicious¡± people. Cities are fragmented into zones, each monitored by a pervasive network of facial recognition technology and police stations. Big data, smart cameras and biometric databases track every breath of daily life.

The Xinjiang Papers also revealed that soldier-turned-politician Quanguo was the orchestrator of this intense security system. He forged his method during his time as Party Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) from 2011 to 2016, transforming the region into a laboratory for extreme surveillance. His tactic was labeled the ¡°securitization strategy.¡±?

His success in the TAR earned the full confidence of Beijing leadership. He became the Party Secretary of the XUAR in 2016, and his ruthless model was rapidly exported to Xinjiang in order to neutralize all dissent in the region. Even though Chen retired in 2021, his system has left a deep cut in Xinjiang. The subsequent security buildup in Xinjiang surpassed that of Tibet. In Xinjiang, there are approximately 323 police stations per 100,000 inhabitants compared to the 216 stations per 100,000 inhabitants in the TAR. 

This strategy integrated social control with massive state-led job creation. Chen promoted mass police recruitment campaigns. He applied a colonial tactic: enrolling local populations to police their own people. Thousands of Uyghurs and Tibetans have been absorbed into a continuously expanding public security sector. While the private economy stifles under the weight of controls, a state salary becomes the only means of survival. Economic dependency transforms potential rebels into cogs of the system, guaranteeing Beijing a forced loyalty and a stability bought at a high price ¡ª a price that many have denounced and called a genocide. 

Global eyes have turned to the CCP¡¯s abuses

In 2021, the Uyghur Tribunal in London issued a on the situation that profoundly shook the international landscape. Although an independent and non-judicial body in the strict sense, the Tribunal¡¯s analysis concluded ¡°beyond reasonable doubt¡± that the People¡¯s Republic of China is committing genocide against the Uyghur minority. This verdict denounced the CCP¡¯s systematic intent to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic and religious group. Even when faced with this evidence, however, the global community today appears dramatically split between the defense of universal values and economic pragmatism.

On one side, a bloc led by the US, Canada, the UK and the Netherlands has formally adopted the term ¡°genocide¡± to describe Beijing¡¯s policies. On his last day in office during the first Trump administration, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that Chinese actions constitute ¡°crimes against humanity.¡± At the time, President Joe Biden¡¯s choice for Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, agreed. This stance is supported by rigorous reports from and Human Rights Watch, both of which have documented the described violence.?

On the economic front, the Western response has struck at the heart of commercial interests. Xinjiang produces more than of the world¡¯s cotton. Investigations have provided significant evidence that more than half a million Uyghurs and other ethnic minority people are forced to pick cotton. New fNew factories have been built within re-education camps. When major Western retailers like H&M, Nike or Burberry expressed concern over the forced labor, China many of these brands from the Chinese web. Stores vanished from digital maps and disappeared from e-commerce platforms. Chinese celebrities boycotted the brands and taxis even refused to take consumers to physical stores. It is market blackmail: either accept our cotton (and the blood it carries) or lose millions of consumers.

?Legislation such as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act () in the US now impose an almost total block on goods coming from Xinjiang, assuming that any product extracted or manufactured in that region is the result of forced labor. The EU has also introduced similar that draw a clear boundary line in global trade, making access to the single market conditional on respect for fundamental human rights.

However, this Western unity clashes with the silence of many Muslim-majority countries. Nations such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, despite their cultural and religious ties with the Uyghurs, remain constrained by heavy debt and close infrastructural agreements with China and have adopted a position of strategic neutrality. For these governments, the issue is officially downgraded to a Chinese ¡°internal affair.¡± Economic dependence on the New Silk Road can, in many cases, silence confessional solidarity and the moral mandates of international diplomacy.  By claiming that the Uyghurs are waging a dangerous battle for independence, it asserts that counter-terrorism measures are a prerequisite for peace and prosperity in the region. The Uyghur minority has become isolated from their Muslim brothers for economic necessity and persecuted at home for ideological ambition. 

The CCP¡¯s authoritarian model is changing the international stage

One example of how Beijing is isolating the Uyghurs is China¡¯s relationship with Afghanistan. Following the of US forces from Afghanistan and the subsequent of Kabul in 2021, China has taken a turn in its Afghanistan policy. Beijing is moving to fill the strategic vacuum left by Washington. For China, Afghanistan is a fundamental piece in stabilizing the Xinjiang border and for securing BRI trade corridors. China had already woven a dense diplomatic with the Taliban. This is evidenced by over 140 diplomatic meetings between Afghanistan and China and the welcoming of Chinese Ambassador Zhao Sheng in Kabul.?

The pact is clear: oil, humanitarian and technological investments in exchange for security and silence. China has tariffs on Afghan goods, signed a $540 million oil contract (which has since been ) and $13 million in humanitarian aid. This support is the price for a guarantee of vital importance: the Taliban have ensured that Afghan territory will never serve as a base for Uyghur militants of the ETIM. It is a game Beijing knows well, having already woven similar threads with Mullah , ex-supreme leader of the Taliban, in 2000.?

Today, that historical precedent evolves into a digital alliance where Chinese cameras serve to seal a border that permits no terrorist infiltration and ignores human rights. Chinese tech giant Huawei and the Taliban have allegedly discussions about wiring Afghanistan with advanced surveillance systems. While the Taliban has claimed that the network would be used to counteract the Islamic State, there are concerns that China could use the surveillance to track Uyghurs in Afghanistan. Already the Taliban has relocated Uyghur fighters away from the border Afghanistan shares with China. It has also increased surveillance around the Uyghurs who live in Afghanistan.

The Taliban, while presenting themselves as defenders of the faith, have cynically sacrificed the Uyghur cause in exchange for economic oxygen and international legitimacy. This collaboration allows both regimes to proceed with internal repression without interference. Beijing offers Kabul a crucial lifeline to mitigate UN sanctions while the Taliban grant China privileged access to Afghanistan’s vast and unexplored mineral resources.

However, the agreement with the Taliban regime appears to be a risky bet. The threat from the terrorist group Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains an unpredictable variable that Beijing cannot control. This is evidenced by the 2021 suicide that killed nine Chinese workers involved in China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects in Pakistan. Despite the dense surveillance network and Kabul¡¯s reassurances, the region¡¯s chronic instability risks turning these billion-dollar investments into a strategic boomerang..

The use of security rhetoric to justify the destruction of an identity creates a disturbing bridge between Beijing’s strategies and other dark pages of history and recent events. Xinjiang was made to be a model of digital authoritarianism, and now that model is being exported. China is challenging the foundations of international coexistence. The immense scale of the repressive operation in Xinjiang rules out the possibility that this is an isolated case of abuse. Absolute stability has been prioritized over fundamental rights, and such a strategy will not stop at Chinese borders. 

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post Beijing¡¯s Uyghur Surveillance Model Is Being Exported to Afghanistan appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The regime access to the Internet on January 8, 2026, as it met nationwide protests with a brutal crackdown and that claimed the lives of thousands of unarmed civilians. This was the world¡¯s Internet blackout.

Outside Iran, headlines frame this moment as a ¡°restoration¡± of Internet access amid ongoing military escalation and political turmoil. But for many Iranians, the lived reality feels far more complicated than the language of reconnection suggests.

People emerged from prolonged informational isolation into an atmosphere still shaped by fear, surveillance, instability and emotional exhaustion. Communication remains inconsistent. Trust remains fractured. And beneath the technical discussion of bandwidth, restrictions and access lies a deeper psychological reality that is far more difficult to measure: What happens to individuals, families and entire societies when connection to one another becomes chronically interrupted?

How Iranians have endured

In reality, for many Iranians, the Internet never fully ¡°returned¡± in the way outside audiences may imagine. Access still depends heavily on virtual private networks (VPNs) used to bypass government filtering systems. They have become increasingly expensive, unstable and temporary. Once authorities identify widely used circumvention tools, they often block them, which forces citizens to purchase new ones repeatedly to maintain ordinary communication with the outside world.

Even sharing which VPN currently works has become difficult, as the landscape changes constantly. A VPN that functions one week may become useless the next. People are constantly trying new ones, sharing names with each other and hoping they work for at least a little while. For many families already under economic strain, the rising cost of reliable circumvention technology now determines who can remain connected and who cannot.

In this sense, the recent ¡°restoration¡± of Internet access has not marked a return to open connectivity. For many Iranians, it has simply meant a return to the fragile and exhausting conditions that existed before January: slowed Internet, unstable access, constant filtering and the ongoing emotional labor of navigating systems designed to make connection unreliable.

For those outside the country, Internet shutdowns are often understood primarily as political tools or technological events. For Iranians living through them, however, they become relational and psychological events as well. A disappearing checkmark on a messaging app does not merely indicate a lost signal, but uncertainty about safety, survival and reality.

During prolonged shutdowns, families outside Iran refresh applications compulsively, searching for signs of life from loved ones they cannot reach. Conversations become fragmented into moments of panic and temporary relief. Information circulates incompletely and often without verification. Videos emerge in fragments, detached from context, while audiences simultaneously confront another modern problem: the growing suspicion that what they are seeing may not be real.

Psychological damage

What makes this dynamic psychologically affecting is not only the absence of information, but the collapse of continuity itself.

Human beings regulate themselves through relational contact. We orient ourselves to one another through routines of response, communication and presence. Under ordinary circumstances, a delayed text message is an inconvenience. Under conditions of political violence, war and state-imposed disconnection, silence acquires entirely different meanings.

The nervous system begins to uncertainty as a chronic condition rather than a temporary interruption. Many Iranians both inside and outside the country have now lived through repeated cycles of blackout, fear, partial reconnection and renewed instability for years. The body learns to disruption before it arrives. People begin multiple channels simultaneously, sleeping irregularly and interpreting even minor communication changes as potential indicators of danger.

Gradually, this produces something deeper than acute stress. It alters itself.

changes not only how people feel, but also what they come to recognize as normal, tolerable or alarming. Humans gradually psychologically unbearable conditions into ordinary functioning because survival requires adaptation. The inability to reach family members for days at a time. Watching war unfold through fragmented footage. Navigating contradictory information streams. Living with the constant possibility that communication may disappear again without warning.

This adaptation creates a dangerous illusion for outside observers. The continuation of daily life is often mistaken for resilience without cost. But there is indeed an invisible cost.

Adapting to trauma

The restoration of Internet access does not automatically restore in information itself. Iran¡¯s recent crisis has unfolded during a historical moment in which digital reality itself has become increasingly unstable. Images, videos and testimony now face immediate skepticism online, and many often dismiss them as manipulated, exaggerated or AI-generated before fully examining them. Citizens attempting to document lived reality during periods of repression therefore carry a double burden: first, surviving events themselves, then struggling to convince others that those events actually occurred.

For many Iranians, this creates a painful contradiction. The world appears flooded with information, images and commentary about Iran, yet many still feel profoundly unseen. There remains a widening gap between the Iran discussed geopolitically and the Iran experienced intimately by ordinary civilians.

The disruptions gradually reshape how people experience reality itself. Communication and attention fragment, uncertainty intensifies and emotional stability becomes harder to sustain under conditions of chronic interruption. Even reality itself begins to feel fragmented. This is part of what makes Internet shutdowns so psychologically powerful within authoritarian environments. They reshape the emotional architecture through which people experience the world around them.

When reality is repeatedly interrupted or questioned, maintaining psychological coherence requires increasing emotional labor. Keeping our internal world from fracturing when everything around us is breaking isn’t a passive state; it takes a massive, invisible toll on our daily just to force a sense of meaning onto the chaos taking place.

Part of what makes this so exhausting is that nothing stays stable long enough for people to emotionally settle. Uncertainty becomes regulatory. Access, safety, visibility and communication can disappear at any moment. Under these conditions, even reconnection can carry alongside relief. A message arriving from a loved one no longer feels ordinary. It feels precious, temporary and vulnerable to interruption.

For diasporic families, these disruptions create an especially painful form of . Many people outside Iran live in a constant oscillation between connection and helplessness. They witness events unfolding in fragments while remaining physically unable to intervene. The result is a chronic state of emotional partiality: never fully informed, never fully disconnected, never fully reassured.

Yet despite repeated rupture, people continue reaching toward one another. Parents cannot reach their children. Siblings disappear from communication unexpectedly. Friends rely on brief moments of unstable access to reassure one another they are still alive.

Over time, many people begin adapting to these ruptures as though they are of life. When a threat lasts long enough, the human mind is forced to treat the abnormal as ordinary just to keep functioning day to day. This is one of trauma¡¯s most profound effects: the gradual of instability. Such prolonged exposure slowly narrows collective expectations about what people deserve from life, governance and human connection.

When unpredictability becomes chronic, emotional survival often depends on reducing expectations themselves. Lowering our expectations isn¡¯t a sign of giving up; it is an active the mind uses to protect itself from breaking under conditions it cannot control. Safety becomes temporary. Reliable communication becomes a luxury. Consistent access to reality becomes uncertain.

Preserving Iran¡¯s shared humanity

When Iranians receive a message from a loved one after weeks or months of silence, they do not experience it simply as information. It becomes confirmation that someone still exists within reach of your relational world. In this sense, Internet shutdowns do not only interrupt communication, but witnessing. They sever the ordinary rhythms through which human beings reassure one another that they are still here.

This is partly why moments of reconnection can feel emotionally overwhelming even when conversations themselves remain brief or incomplete. Beneath the relief lies . Many Iranians have spent years living within recursive cycles of fear, rupture, uncertainty and partial restoration. The nervous system does not instantly return to simply because a connection briefly reappears.

Selective restoration of Internet access raises difficult questions about visibility and inequality within the crisis itself. Who is able to reconnect? Who remains unreachable? Which voices become visible internationally and which disappear again into silence? Even access to reality becomes unevenly distributed.

And yet, despite all of this, many Iranians continue documenting, communicating and maintaining connection however they can. Families improvise around restrictions. Friends develop coded ways of checking on one another. People continue sending fragments of ordinary life alongside moments of crisis such as sharing photos of daily life, brief jokes and messages asking whether others are safe.

These small exchanges preserve something authoritarian disruption often erodes over time: relational continuity and shared humanity.

Global harm

Unfortunately, the world gradually becomes accustomed to these disruptions as well. Repeated shutdowns, partial glimpses of events and cycles of ordeal can produce a kind of global desensitization in which instability begins to appear permanent and therefore less shocking. But we must never mistake normalization for acceptability. Constant digital exposure to unyielding crises leads to global ¡ª a state where the human mind emotionally detaches from ongoing tragedy not out of a lack of moral care, but as a structural defense against relentless, unresolvable distress.

Perhaps all these stated reasons are why so many Iranians both inside and outside the country experience moments of reconnection with such emotional intensity. A simple notification sound, a familiar voice message or a delayed reply can suddenly release weeks or months of accumulated fear a person has silently held. What appears technologically minor from the outside often carries enormous psychological weight for those living within these conditions.

This is crucial in an era where public attention moves rapidly between crises. For many outside observers, Internet shutdowns become temporary headlines attached to geopolitical events. But for those living through them, uncertainty, hypervigilance and fractured trust linger long after the signal returns.

Technological disruption under authoritarian conditions is never solely technological. It becomes embedded within the emotional fabric of everyday life. It shapes how children watch adults respond to fear, how families organize connections across continents and how individuals learn to interpret silence, interruption and unpredictability.

The world often measures Internet shutdowns through statistics: percentages restored, regions affected, hours disconnected. But the more difficult reality to quantify is the emotional cost of repeatedly losing access to one another. Millions of homes, conversations and nervous systems carry that burden long after the signal briefly returns. The Internet may reconnect devices, but rebuilding psychological trust in continuity, safety and reliable connection takes far longer.

These are not merely individual psychological reactions. They become collective relational patterns that ripple across families, communities and diasporic networks over time. When a whole community is subjected to chronic instability, the fear changes the very atmosphere of how people connect and how loved ones interact with one another. Children absorb the emotional atmosphere surrounding interrupted communication. Adults internalize hypervigilance as ordinary functioning. Communities learn to navigate reality through fragments rather than continuity.

Human beings do not seek connection during crises only to exchange information. They seek reassurance that they still exist within one another¡¯s emotional worlds.

Iran¡¯s Internet shutdown wasn¡¯t so devastating because of censorship, but because it ruptured people¡¯s human connections, leaving lasting psychological and relational wounds that will continue to shape daily life, family relationships and people¡¯s sense of safety for years to come.

[ edited this piece.]

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While the White House presents the Trump¨CXi meeting as a historic diplomatic success, the reality does not match the rhetoric. Despite Trump taking along a gaggle of CEOs to Beijing, China did not concede much to the US. Similarly, Putin arrived in Moscow very much as a junior partner to Xi. 

In a nutshell, years of strategic missteps by the US have helped propel China¡¯s rise.

The Trump¨CXI summit was more show than substance

Trump¡¯s visit to China was the first for an American president in nine years. The White House tells us that ¡°President Donald J. Trump Secures Historic Deals with China, Delivering for American Workers, Farmers, and Industry.¡±?

Per this document, ¡°the United States and China should build a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of fairness and reciprocity. President Trump will welcome President Xi for a visit to Washington this fall.¡±

Furthermore, both ¡°leaders agreed Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon, called to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and agreed that no country or organization can be allowed to charge tolls.¡± Trump and Xi also ¡°confirmed their shared goal to denuclearize North Korea.¡±

Trump and Xi also established two new institutions: a US¨CChina Board of Trade and a US¨CChina Board of Investment. According to the White House, these bodies will provide formal mechanisms for managing trade in non-sensitive goods and discussing investment issues between the world¡¯s two largest economies.

The White House also trumpets a number of wins for American workers and businesses. China pledged to address US concerns regarding rare-earth minerals and related technologies that are critical to advanced manufacturing and supply chains. Beijing also approved an initial purchase of 200 Boeing aircraft, its first commitment to buy American-made Boeing planes since 2017. China also promised to purchase at least $17 billion annually in US agricultural products through 2028, restored market access for American beef producers and resumed poultry imports from states certified free of avian flu.

Glenn responds by saying that Atul has presented the smoke billowing from the chimney of the White House from the squib that fizzled into nothing. He then refers to Dean Acheson, arguably the greatest US secretary of state, who said, diplomats or officials in any negotiations claim they won every argument. Atul points out that the Chinese spin on the summit is very different and painted a picture of Xi being the senior statesman to Trump.

Glenn believes the summit was ¡°sound and fury signifying not quite nothing but not a whole lot.¡± Trump did not achieve a grand bargain as he had hoped. Neither Taiwan nor trade was addressed in a damp squib. He believes the summit was ¡°a tactical and even strategic win¡± for China. The US has made far too many strategic mistakes, aiding China¡¯s rise.

Atul points out that China has achieved the biggest and fastest transformation in history. Never before have so many people emerged from poverty, and never before has a country gone from the catastrophes of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution to the spectacular success of market reforms and extraordinary economic growth. Deng Xiaoping¡¯s U-turn in 1978 from Mao Zedong¡¯s Marxist orthodoxy was historic. By saying, ¡°it doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white, if it catches mice,¡± Deng propelled China to its dramatic rise after the humiliations of the 19th century and the disasters of Mao¡¯s communism.

Glenn recalls a very different China from his childhood, when American mothers told their children to clean their plates because millions were going hungry in China. Today, that very country competes at the technological frontier and may become one of the leading powers in space exploration. Regardless of political disagreements with Beijing, Glenn says that the scale of China¡¯s achievement is impossible to ignore.

He also goes on to say that China has transformed from a cat on the back of a porch feeding on scraps from the dinner table of the benevolent United States to a large lion or tiger that might eat the person feeding it. Unsurprisingly, American attitudes have shifted. Also, the US backed China to counter the Soviet Union. As Russia has declined and China has risen, the US has less reason to continue its old China policy.

Yet the US was unable to achieve anything concrete to contain China during this summit. The boards are symbolic and are likely to achieve much. China has now substantially diversified its agricultural imports, buying Argentinian beef and Brazilian soybeans. Prior to the summit, Boeing expected to sell 500, not 200, planes. After the summit, Boeing¡¯s stock fell. Trump promised no more tariffs but the Chinese offered little in return. NVIDIA, the flagship American tech company, offered to sell its most advanced chips but no purchases have materialized yet. The bevy of tech CEOs went like tributaries to the Middle Kingdom and got nothing either.

The Taiwan question, North Korea and more

Trump¡¯s willingness to discuss arms sales to Taiwan was an exercise in American self-restraint on Taiwan. Sadly, the US  got nothing conciliatory from China in return. The strategic ambiguity that has been US policy for decades weakened during this summit.

In a nutshell, Trump¡¯s negotiations with Xi followed a pattern. After Trump¡¯s meeting with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, his hermit kingdom has tripled its number of nuclear weapons, improved the quality of its intercontinental ballistic missiles, increased missile numbers and sent dozens of thousands of soldiers to fight in Europe. 

Similarly, Trump¡¯s war against Iran has been a catastrophe. The Strait of Hormuz is now closed, which his ceasefire hopes to open in a wobbly and fuzzy way by paying $10¨C20 billion to Iran. In return, Tehran is likely to agree to much less stringent and less verifiable agreement than the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated by the Obama administration, which Trump abandoned. This tendency to undermine the little that is left of the American-led international order has undermined US strategic interests.

Atul points out that David Mahon, the Beijing-based executive chairman of Mahon China Investment Management Ltd, agrees with Glenn. In Mahon¡¯s words,

¡°The recent US¨CChina summit in Beijing, though symbolically significant as the first meeting between the two leaders on Chinese soil in nine years, yielded little concrete progress. While both sides emphasized cordiality and trade promises, underlying tensions over Taiwan, Iran and strategic distrust remained unresolved. The visit underscored a cautious, transactional coexistence between the rival powers, with deeper collaboration unlikely given entrenched geopolitical rivalries.¡±

Putin¡¯s Beijing visit signals China¡¯s growing strength

Atul goes on to discuss Putin¡¯s visit to Beijing by noting that over 40% of the foreign exchange trading in Moscow is now in Chinese renminbi. Glenn responds by posing questions: Where are people going? They are going to Beijing. Why are they going? Because China has the wind in its sails. 

Per Glenn, Beijing is now the reference point for both Russia and the US. Russia would not be able to continue its war without China. The US also needs China for trade and critical minerals. Therefore, both Trump and Putin showed up for a summit with Xi.

Atul quotes Mahon saying that ¡°Putin met Xi as a reliable collaborator, confidante and compadre, but in economic and geopolitical terms, a junior, dependent partner.¡± He goes on to say that the Russia¨CChina relationship is now more strategic. It is similar to the late 19th and early 20th century relationship between Imperial Germany and the Austro¨CHungarian Empire. Like the former, China is now the industrial power while Russia is a supplier of fossil fuels. Despite border disputes and historical problems both Beijing and Moscow are locked together for now. China needs Russia¡¯s energy while the latter needs the former¡¯s manufactured goods and money.

[ edited this piece.]

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India¡¯s Gulf dilemma

Sibal begins by outlining why the Gulf sits at the center of India¡¯s strategic thinking. The United Arab Emirates, he explains, has become the ¡°hub¡± of India¡¯s West Asia policy, with bilateral trade exceeding $70 billion and nearly four million Indians living and working there. Beyond commerce, the relationship now spans defense cooperation, artificial intelligence, green energy and semiconductor development.

These partnerships form part of a broader Indian strategy linking the Gulf to Europe and Africa. Sibal points to the India¨CMiddle East¨CEurope Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced during India¡¯s G20 presidency, as a major geopolitical initiative that is now stalled by regional conflict and Israel¡¯s deteriorating position in the region.

India is severely exposed to instability. Nearly 10 million people of Indian origin live across West Asia, sending home roughly $40 billion in annual remittances. The region also supplies around half of India¡¯s oil and 60% of its liquefied petroleum gas imports. Any prolonged disruption, Sibal says, threatens India more directly than most other global powers.

Iran, connectivity and strategic balancing

Sibal stresses that India¡¯s relationship with Iran is driven by long-term geopolitical necessity rather than ideology. Before US sanctions, Iran was one of India¡¯s largest oil suppliers, and New Delhi has continued maintaining diplomatic ties despite pressure from Washington.

Two connectivity projects remain especially important. The Chabahar Port project gives India access to Afghanistan and Central Asia while bypassing Pakistan. The International North¨CSouth Transport Corridor links India to Russia through Iran and the Caspian Sea, potentially reducing both shipping times and costs.

For Sibal, Iran also matters because it represents a crucial counterweight in the balance between Sunni Gulf monarchies and Shia regional power. India therefore seeks to maintain relations with all sides simultaneously: Iran, the Gulf states, Israel and the United States. That balancing act now severely constrains India¡¯s diplomacy.

Rather than adopting a public position, Sibal supports what he calls ¡°quiet diplomacy¡± behind the scenes. India¡¯s leadership, he says, has remained in constant contact with regional actors while avoiding overt mediation efforts that could entangle New Delhi in unpredictable American decision-making.

Trump¡¯s diplomacy and Pakistan¡¯s role

Sibal expresses strong skepticism toward Trump¡¯s handling of the crisis. He describes the US president as ¡°extremely erratic¡± and argues that he repeatedly undermines negotiations through inflammatory rhetoric and maximalist demands.

Sibal is especially critical of Trump¡¯s demand for ¡°unconditional surrender¡± from Iran, arguing that such language makes meaningful diplomacy nearly impossible. ¡°That¡¯s not negotiation,¡± Sibal comments. ¡°That¡¯s humiliation.¡±

Isackson and Sibal also examine why Pakistan has emerged as a key intermediary between Washington and Tehran. Sibal explains that Pakistan¡¯s long border with Iran, large Shia population and Islamic identity make it a more practical interlocutor than India in the current environment. Geography and domestic politics force Islamabad to carefully manage relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran while avoiding internal instability.

Sibal cautions that India should avoid becoming directly involved in mediation efforts. In his view, attempting to broker negotiations would risk turning India into ¡°a hostage to Trump¡¯s idiosyncrasies and egomania.¡±

America¡¯s reliability and India¡¯s constraints

Despite his criticism of Washington, Sibal acknowledges that the US remains India¡¯s most important economic and technological partner. Bilateral trade in goods and services has reached roughly $240 billion, and India continues to rely heavily on American investment and advanced technologies.

Simultaneously, Sibal argues that the Trump administration has badly damaged global confidence in the US. Tariffs, attacks on allies and the erosion of international institutions have reinforced the perception that Washington is no longer a dependable strategic partner.

India therefore faces a difficult reality. It cannot fully align with China or Russia, yet it also cannot completely trust the US. Sibal says India must continue ¡°hedging¡± while recognizing that its options remain constrained by its rivalry with China and its dependence on Western technology.

Within India itself, attitudes toward the US are mixed. Business and technology sectors remain strongly pro-American because of deep links to Silicon Valley, while parts of the political class and broader public remain skeptical of American power and intentions.

Israel, Gulf monarchies and a fractured region

Toward the end of the discussion, Sibal turns to the growing fragmentation inside West Asia itself. Gulf monarchies, he argues, now face a ¡°nightmare¡± scenario. They fear Iranian dominance, yet US military bases have also made them targets without guaranteeing security.

Sibal believes Israel has benefited strategically from the crisis because international attention has shifted away from Gaza, Lebanon and the West Bank. He argues that Israel continues expanding its regional influence while Arab states remain divided and unable to present a unified front.

Despite growing controversy, India¡¯s partnership with Israel remains strong. Israel is deeply integrated into India¡¯s defense ecosystem, particularly in missile technology, surveillance systems and counterterrorism capabilities. Sibal suggests that Israel may also serve as an indirect channel for certain advanced American technologies unavailable through formal US transfers.

Still, he acknowledges that India¡¯s public positioning has become more difficult as regional polarization intensifies. What once appeared to be a manageable balancing strategy between Israel and the Arab world is becoming increasingly fragile as the wider regional order fractures.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

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Rohan and Manu also explore how these regional outcomes could influence neighboring Bangladesh and Sri Lanka as India¡¯s political center of gravity continues to evolve.

A tectonic shift in eastern India

The conversation opens with West Bengal, a state long associated with communist politics and later dominated by Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee¡¯s Trinamool Congress. Manu describes the BJP¡¯s victory as a historic transformation, noting the ideological leap from decades of left-wing politics to a party rooted in Hindutva nationalism. He compares it to ¡°a hardcore atheist communist state¡± in Europe suddenly aligning with a church-backed movement.

For Manu, the result reflects more than identity politics. He believes the BJP succeeded because voters increasingly judge governments through economic performance and infrastructure delivery rather than ideological loyalty. ¡°The fate is not decided on the battlefield or the ballot box, but on the balance sheet,¡± he says, pointing to roads, electricity and public services as decisive factors.

Rohan notes the irony that West Bengal produced some of India¡¯s most influential economists and intellectuals while struggling economically for decades. Manu responds that Bengal excelled at theory but failed at implementation. The BJP¡¯s rise represents a broader shift in eastern India¡¯s political and economic center of gravity toward a more development-focused model.

Rohan and Manu also discuss the election¡¯s unusually peaceful polling process. For the first time since Indian independence, no voters were killed during voting in West Bengal, though violence erupted after the results. Manu attributes this to the region¡¯s historically ¡°high-pitched¡± political culture rather than flaws in the constitutional process itself.

Assam¡¯s stability dividend

In the northeastern state of Assam, the BJP returned to power with an even larger mandate. Rohan highlights two major changes: sweeping infrastructure development and the decline of insurgent violence. Massive bridges over the Brahmaputra River have dramatically reduced travel times, while former militant groups have increasingly entered mainstream politics.

Manu describes Assam¡¯s strategic significance as the meeting point between the Indian and Tibetan-Sinic spheres of influence. The state¡¯s geography, heavy rainfall and vast river systems historically made development difficult, leaving communities isolated from one another. Infrastructure therefore became politically transformative.

He argues that Assam is now benefiting from a ¡°virtuous cycle¡± in which political stability improves economic performance, which in turn reinforces stability. Former insurgent movements have largely been pacified, and the state increasingly functions as the political and logistical nucleus of India¡¯s northeast.

Rohan notes that the BJP¡¯s next challenge will be employment. Assam¡¯s population is exceptionally young, with nearly two-thirds under the age of 28. The election victory therefore creates expectations that economic development must now translate into jobs and rising living standards.

South India¡¯s political divergence

The speakers contrast the BJP¡¯s northeastern success with its weak performance in southern India. Despite extensive campaigning by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the party performed poorly in both Tamil Nadu and Kerala.

Manu explains this through the bandwagon effect, arguing that voters in low-trust societies tend to support parties already viewed as viable contenders. In states where the BJP has not yet achieved critical mass, many voters instead choose among established regional players.

Tamil Nadu produced the election¡¯s biggest surprise. Actor Vijay¡¯s TVK party shattered the longstanding duopoly of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam parties, emerging as a dominant new force. Rohan says that Vijay successfully captured younger voters through social media, satire and celebrity appeal.

Manu places this within Tamil Nadu¡¯s distinct political culture, where cinema and literature have long shaped leadership. He compares the state to France within the European Union: culturally self-confident, linguistically distinct and deeply attached to its own icons. Actors and writers have historically wielded enormous political influence there.

Simultaneously, Manu praises outgoing Chief Minister MK Stalin for delivering exceptional economic growth. Tamil Nadu achieved some of India¡¯s strongest industrial and manufacturing performance, yet voters still demanded political change. He posits that India¡¯s elections often reveal a disconnect between macroeconomic growth and voter satisfaction because rapid expansion does not always generate broad wage growth or social mobility.

The decline of Indian communism

In Keralam, the Congress-led alliance defeated the Communist Party of India (Marxist), dealing another blow to a movement that once dominated Indian left-wing politics. Rohan jokes that communists now survive mainly in universities, reflecting a broader perception of ideological decline.

Manu argues that Indian communists failed to modernize in the way their Chinese or Vietnamese counterparts did. Rather than adapting to aspirational politics and economic transformation, they remained attached to older Soviet-era frameworks. ¡°They failed to address the core question of human aspirations,¡± he says.

The result is significant for the Congress Party as well. After weak performances elsewhere, Keralam prevented the party from being completely marginalized nationally. Yet the broader story is less about Congress revival and more about the fading relevance of traditional communist politics in India.

Regional consequences beyond India

Rohan and Manu conclude by examining how the elections affect neighboring countries. Bangladesh closely monitored the outcomes in West Bengal and Assam because both states share borders, cultural and linguistic ties with it.

Manu says that Kolkata¡¯s decisive ¡°rightward turn¡± could reshape regional dynamics. A stronger and more economically assertive West Bengal may begin pulling economic influence back from Dhaka, while future governments in Kolkata could adopt a tougher stance regarding the treatment of religious minorities in Bangladesh.

Sri Lanka also watched developments in Tamil Nadu carefully because of the island¡¯s long and complicated history with Tamil separatist movements. While Manu does not see any immediate revival of militant politics, he says Colombo will closely observe the rise of Vijay¡¯s new political movement and its potential regional implications.

[ edited this piece.]

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The more profound issue is that peer-level rivalry cannot be managed through the tools designed for lesser powers. A country that lacks the power to withstand the pressure can be successfully sanctioned and isolated. The same cannot be said of the world¡¯s second-largest economy, the factory of the world and the near-monopoly supplier of materials that America¡¯s military and industrial base cannot function without. Every instrument US President Donald Trump has sought to deploy against China has hit this ceiling. That is the primary reason Trump deployed his charm offensive in Beijing.

The limits of tariffs and economic pressure

Trump¡¯s theory was simple: Escalate tariffs until Beijing folds, but China did not fold. Instead, it retaliated methodically ¡ª with on American agricultural exports that squeezed Trump¡¯s rural base and rare earth export licensing restrictions that briefly threatened to halt American auto and defense manufacturing.

China controls roughly of the global supply of permanent magnets made from rare earth elements. When Beijing almost immediately activated that lever, Washington insiders reported that Trump reversed course within a , acknowledging the extent of China¡¯s leverage. Companies trying to diversify away from China find that diversification almost always involves , which dominate manufacturing investment across Southeast Asia. China is not a node in the global supply chain; in many sectors, it is the chain.

When, earlier this year, the struck down Trump¡¯s emergency tariff authority as unconstitutional, the instrument he had used to impose sweeping, flexible pressure across virtually every American trading partner had evaporated. Trump arrived in Beijing not as the man who had broken China¡¯s economy, but as the man whose primary legal weapon his own Supreme Court had made irrelevant.

The Iran War and the erosion of US influence

If the tariff debacle reduced Trump¡¯s leverage, the Iran War is eviscerating any remaining aura of dominance. Iran has not capitulated. The strait has not reopened. The ongoing conflict has left the US weaker, more distracted and more resource-constrained than it might otherwise have been in Chinese eyes.

Trump arrived in Beijing clearly needing President Xi Jinping¡¯s help on Iran, as well as his forbearance on trade. In short, Trump has put himself in an impossible box, and only Xi can dig him out of the hole he has dug for himself. But Trump left without a rare-earth agreement, a tariff resolution or any hint of Iranian cooperation. Instead, he got (rehashed) soybean commitments, a long-term apparent to purchase Boeing aircraft and a photo at the Temple of Heaven.

All of this points toward a conclusion that neither side can make politically, but that facts compel: The US and China have no realistic alternative to functional coexistence. Climate, AI, food security and financial stability are some of the domains in which both countries remain indispensable. Genuine decoupling ¡ª the kind that ends China¡¯s structural leverage ¡ª would require rebuilding global manufacturing and critical resource supply chains from the ground up, over decades. That is simply not going to happen. While America and the world were sleeping, Beijing secured critical mineral supplies worldwide. The world made China the epicenter of global manufacturing, and that is where it will remain for the foreseeable future.

The inevitability of coexistence

When the US and China collide, the shockwaves travel through every supply chain, energy market and financial system simultaneously. , in which China and the US maximize their comparative advantages while maintaining the economic interdependence that neither can afford to sever, appears to be the only viable path forward.?

Trump¡¯s deference toward Xi is not simply a sign of weakness; it is an encounter with structural reality ¡ª the undeniable fact that China has built leverage, across rare earths, manufacturing, trade and now Iran, that no tariff can neutralize and no Supreme Court ruling can restore. Attempting to manage a true peer requires something Trump has resisted throughout his presidency: a strategy designed not for domination, but for coexistence. The Beijing summit was evidence that he is beginning, reluctantly and without admitting it, to learn that lesson.

[Daniel Wagner is CEO of Country Risk Solutions and author of 5 books on China.]

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¡ª Lao Zi, fifth century BCE.

China US President Donald Trump and his entourage in Beijing last week under intense global scrutiny. The d¨¦tente benefited both sides, and the watching world took some solace that, in volatile times, these two presidents met in person. Expecting little, few were disappointed at the outcome of Trump¡¯s three days in China. The fact that they passed without major mishap ¡ª and that it was the first US-China engagement at which they met as great-power equals ¡ª was significant.

Symbolism and stagecraft in Beijing

Chinese President Xi Jinping was a gracious host, showing moments of uncommon spontaneity in a political culture where, while Chinese leaders are usually hospitable ¡ª even towards adversaries ¡ª they usually work within tight, well-prepared formulas. Meanwhile, Trump was unusually contained behind his characteristic grin.

It is important that an American president met his counterpart on Chinese soil for the first time in nine years. Any time great powers meet, there is potential for deeper understanding and a chance that each may temper the other¡¯s actions in projecting its power, at least at the margins. Yet beneath the carefully choreographed symbolism, the visit also exposed the extent to which Washington arrived unprepared for a genuinely strategic engagement with Beijing.

Washington¡¯s poor preparation for the d¨¦tente was emphasized by what appeared to be a hurried between Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng and US Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent in Seoul on the eve of Trump¡¯s arrival. No China specialists or even experienced diplomats accompanied Trump. His entourage was comprised of the usual former conservative TV anchors and real estate magnates. Trump is dismissive of the US foreign service to the extent that 115 of Washington¡¯s 182 embassies still lack ambassadors, and he has removed many of Washington¡¯s experienced sinologists.?

Businessman Elon Musk, Apple¡¯s Tim Cook, and NVIDIA founder and CEO Jensen Huang accompanied Trump and may have shared their experiences and insights on China, but that was not evident. Trump was characteristically crass. For example, he made no attempt to recall, if he ever knew it, the name of Taiwanese president Lai Ching-te, the political ghost at the Beijing banquet.

Trade promises and strategic distrust

If the political atmospherics appeared cordial, the substance of the discussions revealed a far narrower and more transactional agenda. Trump China agreed to purchase 200 Boeing jets ¡ª a claim recently by China. His delegation mentioned a breakthrough in China¡¯s commitment to buy more US farm products, although no agreements were signed, nor were there any memoranda to support a Chinese commitment to buy more US oil or for the US to lift sanctions on Chinese companies buying Iranian oil.

Trump¡¯s team indicated that they had extended the trade truce, and both sides announced that Washington would establish jointly staffed boards of trade and investment to manage the US¨CChina economic relationship and avoid conflict. But the absence of formal agreements underscored the deeper reality that neither side fundamentally trusts the other¡¯s long-term intentions.

As Iran has learned, a US truce is one in which the US to wage war through blockade. Washington¡¯s determination to block China¡¯s rise, supported by both Republicans and Democrats, has been a fulcrum of US foreign policy since President George W. Bush, making meaningful collaboration on future boards of trade and investment highly unlikely. More tariffs will be applied and embargoes mandated.?

Trump to exchanges in which China agreed to restrict help for Iran¡¯s nuclear development, but these were missing from Chinese summaries of the discussions. However, China does not want Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.

Diplomacy, face and mutual illusions

That lack of trust, however, did not prevent both sides from performing the rituals of diplomatic warmth with considerable skill. In a strange alchemy of toxicity and attraction, the US¨CChina d¨¦tente worked superficially. Trump craves the center of the stage and constant flattery. In Chinese traditions of hospitality, the guest is flattered and contention avoided, for at all times, Chinese hosts confer face on their guests as they would expect face to be conferred on them. In a Chinese diplomatic context, face is a governing principle in relationships between states, in which each recognizes the other¡¯s status and dignity.

Trump soaked up the flattery and apparent deference, seemingly oblivious to the fact that it was neither acquiescence nor heartfelt respect, and that the trust and empathy he shares with Xi exist only in his imagination. Xi does not trust the man who has waged a trade war against his country for a year, fronting an administration which has fought to contain China for 33 years.

Taiwan and the Thucydides Trap

Beneath the ceremonial politeness and carefully managed displays of respect, the central geopolitical disputes between the two powers remained firmly unresolved. Xi the US against supporting Taiwan with a directness uncharacteristic of a state banquet speech. He veiled it thinly behind an allusion to the ¡ª which assumes that, in China¡¯s case, the rising power is not so much supplanting as it is diminishing the primacy of the incumbent hegemon. Xi has previously rejected the inevitability of the US and China falling into the trap Thucydides described, but was subtly suggesting in his speech that the US was the declining power in the relationship.?

The ambiguities and mixed signals that characterized the broader visit were equally evident regarding Taiwan and other strategic questions. Neither Trump nor Xi may follow through on commitments made by their teams. Whatever was agreed on soybeans, aircraft purchases or rare earths may be bedeviled in the detailed execution and prove largely performative. With some directness, but mostly innuendo, both sides signalled their geopolitical concerns. Trump¡¯s of Taiwan¡¯s declaring independence was a concession to his hosts, although he equivocated on the pending $14 billion arms sale to the island.

Iran, maritime chokepoints and China¡¯s long game

The same uncertainty extended beyond East Asia, particularly regarding the Middle East and the future of American power in the region. Trump probably came hoping for practical help with his war with Iran, but appeared to get little. He is likely to try to exit the Iranian entanglement with a spasm of missile strikes, leaving Iran with significantly degraded military and civilian infrastructure, but greater political and economic agency in the region than before the war. The trip to China may have reinforced his intention to quit.

As America departs from the Persian Gulf, China will not fill the political space it leaves. It will benefit from reconstruction projects and resources priced preferentially in the future, but Beijing is likely to let the region find its own power equilibrium. 

That approach reflects China¡¯s broader preference for strategic influence without assuming the burdens of direct regional dominance. Xi will continue to work to encourage Iran to avoid escalating regional tensions and to help broker peace and economic stability. China rues that Iran will likely continue to levy tolls for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, resenting the US for having created the conditions for this and, even more so, for the precedent it has set, with other nations now considering similar measures. 

Jakarta has it may charge ships for the right of passage through the Straits of Malacca. While not as directly affected by the partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz as most nations ¡ª 30 Chinese tankers through while Trump was in Beijing ¡ª China dislikes the fact that its trading partners will face greater economic costs and deplores the US¡¯s dismantling of the over 200-year-old principle of freedom of navigation. You may ask tolls for the use of the canals you build, but not for passages forged by geography.?

Ultimately, the visit highlighted not a resolution of tensions between Washington and Beijing, but the emergence of a more cautious and transactional coexistence between rival powers. Xi will probably travel to New York to address the UN General Assembly in September. If so, he may add a state visit to Washington, signalling the US had slipped in geopolitical importance. He may also announce a state visit to Washington, to which he would add an address to the UN General Assembly, conferring face on Trump. Despite the economic tariffs and embargoes, Trump has been circumspect toward China, militarily and geopolitically. It would be in China¡¯s interest to nurture this stance while Trump is in the White House.

[ first published this piece as a memorandum]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

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Japan¡¯s middle-power strategy

Khattar Singh opens by asking about Takaichi¡¯s recent five-day tour of Vietnam and Australia, which took place from May 1 to May 5. Kiba says the trip reflects Japan¡¯s effort to deepen both bilateral and multilateral partnerships at a time of growing uncertainty in global politics.

Australia has become especially important as Japan loosens restrictions on arms exports and explores joint defense development projects. Simultaneously, both countries are reassessing the Quad¡¯s future.

Kiba argues that the Quad has lost momentum amid uncertainty surrounding American policy. ¡°The Quad cooperation has actually stopped,¡± she says, pointing to the failure to hold a planned summit in India last year. In response, she believes countries like Japan and Australia are increasingly relying on middle-power coordination to preserve regional stability even when Washington appears inconsistent.

For Tokyo, Southeast Asia remains equally important. Kiba describes the region as Japan¡¯s ¡°most essential neighboring partner,¡± particularly during ongoing energy and supply-chain disruptions across the Indo-Pacific.

Updating the Indo-Pacific vision

A major focus of Takaichi¡¯s Vietnam visit was the announcement of an updated version of Japan¡¯s ¡°Free and Open Indo-Pacific¡± strategy, commonly known as FOIP. Originally introduced by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe a decade ago, FOIP sought to promote regional cooperation around maritime security, infrastructure and rule-based order.

Kiba explains that the revised framework places greater emphasis on emerging economic and technological challenges. The updated FOIP now includes cooperation on artificial intelligence, supply-chain resilience, renewable energy and public¨Cprivate investment partnerships.

Japan is not distancing itself from the US despite its growing regional activism. Washington remains Tokyo¡¯s only formal military ally, and Japan continues to coordinate closely with the US government. Instead, the new strategy reflects Japan¡¯s attempt to modernize its regional relationships.

¡°The updated FOIP is more focusing on the co-creation facing the new challenges together,¡± Kiba explains. Rather than treating Southeast Asian countries as aid recipients, Japan increasingly frames them as equal partners confronting common problems such as energy insecurity and economic vulnerability.

This shift is also visible in Japan¡¯s ¡°Power Asia¡± initiative, announced earlier this year. The program seeks to expand regional energy cooperation, particularly around renewable energy and zero-emission technologies. Meanwhile, it links partners such as Australia, India and Southeast Asian states into a broader Indo-Pacific framework.

Australia and the rise of minilateral alliances

Khattar Singh notes that even as the Quad struggles to maintain momentum, bilateral cooperation between Japan and Australia continues to intensify. Kiba says the two countries now share far more aligned strategic concerns than they did in previous decades, especially regarding China¡¯s expanding military presence.

Their cooperation increasingly extends beyond traditional defense issues into ¡°economic security,¡± including supply chains, critical minerals and energy resilience. Both governments also support deeper engagement with Southeast Asia through new regional frameworks.

Kiba highlights the growing importance of ¡°minilateral¡± arrangements ¡ª smaller coalitions built around specific strategic goals. During a recent visit to Indonesia, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and his Indonesian counterpart mentioned trilateral cooperation among Japan, Australia and Indonesia.

For Kiba, these emerging security networks represent one of the most significant developments in Indo-Pacific diplomacy. Instead of relying entirely on large multilateral organizations, middle powers are constructing flexible regional partnerships designed to address practical economic and security concerns.

Japan¡¯s debate over lethal arms exports

The most controversial part of Japan¡¯s new strategy involves defense exports. Khattar Singh asks Kiba about reports that Tokyo may sell lethal weapons, including destroyers, to the Philippines. Such a move would have been politically unthinkable under Japan¡¯s traditional postwar pacifism.

Kiba confirms that recent cabinet decisions have dramatically expanded Japan¡¯s legal ability to export military equipment. ¡°Technically, we can export any kind of the defense equipment,¡± she says.

However, the process remains politically and bureaucratically difficult. The relaxation of export restrictions occurred through a cabinet decision rather than parliamentary legislation, a process she says has generated domestic criticism.

¡°Many people criticize, and I agree [with] that point,¡± Kiba notes. She argues that such a major shift should involve broader democratic debate. Japan and the Philippines have only agreed to begin discussions regarding the possible transfer of Taylorcraft TC-19 aircraft and destroyers. Any final agreement would require extensive parliamentary review, operational planning and legal guarantees concerning transparency, maintenance and non-resale provisions.

Kiba emphasizes that Japan¡¯s bureaucratic safeguards remain extensive. Recipient countries must comply with strict procurement rules and operational restrictions, while both governments would need to negotiate thousands of pages of technical and legal documentation before any transfer could occur.

For now, Japan¡¯s evolving defense policy reflects a country attempting to balance regional security pressures with the institutional constraints of its democratic and pacifist traditions.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

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¡ª Sun Zi, fifth century BCE

China is responding to the Persian Gulf War as it did to Russia¡¯s invasion of Ukraine: with a stance of strategic non-action. Chinese President Xi Jinping apparently did Russia planned to invade Ukraine, but once the action had begun, he took no side, passed no public judgment, maintained trade ties with both and urged them behind closed doors to stop. China has been passive in respect of the military conflict in the Gulf, but has been talking to all the regional belligerents behind the scenes. Working closely with Pakistan and using its particularly close relations with Iran, Beijing helped to the US-Iranian ceasefire in April. But China could not restrain Israel, and there was not a ceasefire so much as a cessation of hostilities between the US and Iran.

Beijing will likely have emphasized to Tehran¡¯s leadership the economic damage the war has already inflicted and offered support for reconstruction and perhaps post-conflict rearmament. Tehran cannot, however, have accepted the pause in fighting easily, for Israel and the US Iranian diplomats after Iran accepted two previous invitations to parley. Tehran will not wish to risk a temporary peace today as long as the threat of a recurring war remains.

Washington, for its part, will be skeptical of Beijing¡¯s impartiality, and while it may outwardly appear to acknowledge Iranian conditions for control of the Strait of Hormuz, security guarantees and the lifting of all sanctions, it will not, in reality. Lebanon is included in the Farsi version of the ceasefire demands, and Iran maintains the right to enrich uranium for civilian use, a point missing from the English version. In any case, the US is too committed to this folly and its economic interest in the region to withdraw now. 

Israel triggered this war, knowing the US animus toward Iran, desire for leverage in the Gulf and US President Donald Trump¡¯s toxic need to demonstrate power and manipulate global markets. Israel is in fact fighting two wars: one to disable Iran¡¯s military and civilian infrastructure, and the other to expand its borders north into Lebanon while consolidating gains in Gaza and the West Bank. The US, for its role, has already sown the seeds of decades of deadly reprisals: a future series of perhaps lesser, but no less deadly, September 11ths. 

In the past, China has taken on a passive but still influential role in dispute resolution, as opposed to the US¡¯ proactive ¡°Camp David¡± approach, in which US presidents would use military might and economic incentives as diplomatic leverage, shuttling between adversaries to secure firm, swift outcomes. Where Washington coerces, Beijing facilitates. Indeed, Beijing facilitated the Saudi-Iranian security agreement in April 2001.

Although it weakens the US¡¯ ability to contain China, Beijing does not welcome the current war, for China depends on unimpeded flows of global trade, especially through potential choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz. China will nevertheless benefit in the medium term as it did after the Iraq War. It is now the of the oil so coveted by the US and its allies, and the control of which was one of the prime motives for their invasion of Iraq in 2003. China is also best placed to rebuild shattered Middle Eastern infrastructure once this Persian Gulf War ends.?

Who benefits??

With each missile fired and each bombing run, Trump is handing China a military advantage in Asia. Washington is expending its military arsenal profligately, while redeploying missiles, missile defense systems, warships and marines away from China¡¯s borders to the Persian Gulf. It will take the US years to replenish its arsenals, while China will continue to expand its own. Multiple Pentagon war games have China¡¯s ability to resist US attempts to garrison Taiwan or strike Chinese bases in the South China Sea, and to even damage America seriously in a limited naval conflict, but the US remains and will remain the largest military force in the region for years to come.

China has already won the struggle for economic primacy in Asia, and it has no intention of being drawn into war while it consolidates its regional economic influence. This is not only because such adventurism is inimical to it, but also because China knows its limitations. It prefers trade agreements to political treaties, demonstrated by its of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation with Russia, which essentially states that China and Russia will not attack each other, but not that they will defend each other. It has one with North Korea, a loose mutual commitment to protect each other if attacked. Viewing alliances as dangerous political and military tethers, and often a historical cause rather than a restraint on war, Beijing is one of the world¡¯s least allied nations. Another such nation is India.?

The US is reacting to the loss of its empire and primacy across the globe by attacking cities in nations posing it no threat, spawning anarchy and imposing arbitrary sanctions and tariffs, while China is building its domestic economy and extending commercial and diplomatic influence steadily. Trump¡¯s largely amateur cabinet is alienating the US¡¯ beleaguered allies, and in doing so, weakening the economic and military coalition its predecessors had striven over decades to construct in order to contain China¡¯s rise. The US will still remain a global economic and military power for the foreseeable future, and rather than replacing the US, China will slip into an uneasy equilibrium, sharing complex multipolarity with India and Russia, and acting as the steadier economic player.

Empires of the mind?

US and Western soft power is embedded across Asia, which acknowledges the West¡¯s education, cultures, brands, entertainment and much of the anglophone internet, and tries to emulate core aspects of Western institutions, including its civil and economic management and governance. China has its Belt and Road initiative, the largest developmental-credit endeavor undertaken by a sovereign nation in modern history. It has facilitated infrastructure and utilities, and generated greater trade, spawning economic growth and common wealth in Africa, South America and Southeast Asia, and establishing Chinese prestige while also creating degrees of obligation and dependence.

China has, however, yet to match the soft power of the West, or even the regional soft power generated by the popular cultures of its neighbors, Japan, South Korea and to a lesser extent, India. The combined yin and yang of soft and hard power form the complete, enduring power that sustains nations¡¯ preeminence over generations, even centuries.

China¡¯s strength lies in its scale, its ability to plan and organize, the industry and endurance of its people, and its geographical and relative political isolation. China is hard to attack and impossible to invade, let alone control. China¡¯s political isolation is also a disadvantage, for it has no great-power partners; in fact, apart from Russia, it often counts India, the US and the EU as adversaries. Where in previous centuries Chinese creativity, culture and civil institutions attracted its friends, today more nations and individuals seek the material and transactional benefits of dealing with China. 

Hard power often comes from the barrel of a gun, while soft power flows from the endeavors of exceptional people ¡ª creating art, innovating, and directing scientific endeavors and inquiry into the self ¡ª unencumbered by government control. The American Empire seems committed to its own destruction, but it will take more than a few unbalanced presidents to significantly diminish its soft power. The British Empire unraveled swiftly after the Second World War, but Britain still projects soft power in language and culture eight decades later. China will enhance its comprehensive, lasting global influence when the government coerces and curates its society less and, rather than focusing on projects to grow soft power, allows it to emanate spontaneously. This will flow not only from China¡¯s contemporary popular and modern classical culture but also from unlocking thousands of years of accumulated civil, educational, creative and metaphysical understanding. 

American Caligula?

In the Persian Gulf, Trump hoped, just as Putin did initially in Ukraine, that a short military campaign would secure territorial control and resources, allowing the more powerful nation to then sue for peace with a broken, humbled foe. After four years, Russia has failed to defeat Ukraine or end the War, despite its overwhelming advantage in military and human resources. After unleashing a localized armageddon, Israel is still struggling to drive Hamas out of one city in Palestine. Having forgotten the defeats of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, and seemingly incapable of learning from deeper history, Trump and his coterie cannot reflect upon yesterday¡¯s events, let alone last year¡¯s largely ineffectual on Iran.?

By launching a war he cannot fight effectively or finish, and through the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and provocation of Iranian retaliatory strikes on the US¡¯ bases in the Gulf States, Trump has wrought economic chaos on the world. Like the first-century Roman emperor, , Trump engages in military adventures abroad in part to distract the people from his economic and political incompetence and personal scandals at home. He is surrounded by men informed by distorted Christian and Rabbinic theology and who manipulate him through fawning displays of admiration and support. For Trump, the conflict with Iran is largely a performative war, undertaken to demonstrate his personal power and feed his vainglory, with little consideration for strategic objectives or humanitarian cost. Caligula allegedly appointed his horse to the Roman Senate; Trump has gone further and surrounded himself with a cabinet-coffle of asses.?

Wars without cause, wars without end?

The Chinese economy has been deeply affected by America and Israel¡¯s attack on Iran, and this will continue. While China has oil reserves speculated to exceed 260 million tonnes and large, unknown stores of fertilizer, grain and other essentials, Beijing cannot afford to deplete them significantly as they are intended to be strategic assets in the event of direct attack or domestic natural disaster. Because belligerents in the Persian Gulf War lack viable off-ramps, despite any ¡°ceasefires,¡± the conflict and its disruption will likely continue in some form for months. 

The Chinese government is already fuel prices to avoid the impact on the wider economy, but will subsidize gasoline and diesel prices soon and may impose car-free days. The Chinese Ministry of Finance has been vigilant in controlling inflation, particularly food prices. It has been grappling with deep in the pork, beef and dairy sectors due to the rapid spread of in recent years, a significant part of which has been state-backed to increase food self-sufficiency. Chinese food companies and firms in many key sectors have slim margins with which to adjust to inflation accelerated by the war.?

Although Chinese ships are able to pass through the Strait of Hormuz unmolested, as with all economies, China will struggle to sustain imports of petroleum and petroleum-derived products due to the destruction of processing capacity in the region. China will also suffer from falling demand from the damaged economies of its trading partners, while at the same time needing to pay more for imports of a wide range of goods and components.

Commentators have focused primarily on the disruption of oil supply for energy generation from the Persian Gulf and its cost to the global economy. Equally important is that petroleum products are used to make plastic and other synthetic materials, helium for microchips, and material for fertilizers such as urea and ammonium nitrate. Another 12 weeks of war will likely trigger famine in developing countries and potential widespread undernourishment of the poor in the West. 

Not since the immediate aftermath of the Second World War or the 1970s have leading economies been so burdened by debt and deficits at a time when solvency was needed to mitigate the impact of external shocks. China¡¯s long-term strategic policies, such as its rapid transition to renewable energy and electric vehicles, and its history of positive relations with non-North American oil producers, will help cushion it from some of the deeper impacts of fuel inflation. China¡¯s nearly $1.5 trillion trade surplus and $3.4 trillion foreign exchange reserves will also help it to endure this phase of global instability better than most. Non-US trading and currency coalitions, such as , will unify and continue to expand to become arbiters of global trade.?

With the US behaving increasingly as a rogue actor internationally, Western nations are forced to reassess whether siding with Washington on issues of security and war is strategically prudent, economically wise or even moral. Some continue to do so directly or tacitly: the EU out of Russophobia, and the UK and Australia, through the Australia¨CUK¨CUS security partnership (), out of a fear of abandonment and loss of reflected power. Canada and the BRICs nations provide a different template, having taken against the war and American bullying, while exploring deeper economic ties with Beijing. As long as China presents itself as a counterpoint of stability, more and more nations will gravitate towards it. When caught in a leaking, storm-tossed vessel, it is better to be the passenger disembarking early than the one swimming frantically from the sinking wreckage.

[Mahon China first published this piece as a business report.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

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Analysts warn that oil prices could surpass a barrel if the tanker flows are not restored quickly, a prospect that has sent a chill through the corridors of power in Jakarta. As a net energy importer, Indonesia is particularly exposed to major disruptions in the Middle East. Countries across Southeast Asia are scrambling to reduce their dependence on imported oil, accelerating the shift toward renewable energy with a renewed sense of urgency.

¶Ù²¹²Ô²¹²Ô³Ù²¹°ù²¹¡¯²õ defining test

For Indonesia, managing this shock will require not only sound fiscal policy but also a decisive role from the Danantara Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). One of the largest SWFs in the world by claimed assets, Danantara is now under pressure to demonstrate its value, and jump-starting a long-term transition to renewables could be its defining test.

While the Indonesian government is oddly indifferent to the issue ¡ª with senior ministers reportedly saying that the country is not at risk of an energy crisis ¡ª if Danantara can jump-start a permanent, long-term transition to renewables, it could reduce dependence on imported fuel.

While efforts to transition Indonesia¡¯s energy mix from coal to renewables have gained an unexpected endorsement from the top, feasibility and governance remain significant challenges. 

From ambition to acceleration: Indonesia betting on solar

During first anniversary celebration in mid-March, President Prabowo Subianto set a striking target: 100 gigawatts of solar power capacity to be installed within two years. He also established a special task force on renewable energy and energy conservation to drive the initiative forward.

The president said, as quoted by local media, that the 100 gigawatts is a strategic step to accelerate Indonesia¡¯s energy transition and reduce reliance on imported fossil fuels ¡ª now more costly due to disruptions tied to the US-Israeli war on Iran. It was not an entirely new idea; the 100 gigawatts figure had been floated since 2025, but the current circumstances have given it fresh urgency and explicit presidential backing.

That backing has a track record behind it. At the inauguration of renewable energy projects in 15 provinces in , President Prabowo expressed his intention for Indonesia to achieve energy independence, emphasizing solar energy as the primary solution for achieving energy sufficiency in remote areas.?

Then, in , Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Bahlil Lahadalia outlined how the government seeks to bring electricity to 5,700 villages and 4,400 hamlets across the archipelago by 2030. Bahlil, the president, said the villages will have solar power plants in cooperation with the private sector and the state utility company? Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN). The plan calls for 80 gigawatts of distributed solar photovoltaic (PV) systems paired with 320 gigawatt-hours of Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS), managed by the Merah Putih Village Cooperatives (KDMP), alongside 20 gigawatts of centralized solar.

Ambition, legality and capacity to deliver

Solar ambitions run into legal cracks and questions about the government’s ability to deliver. The plan itself is not without flaws. Indonesia¡¯s Constitutional Court has held that electricity for public use must remain under state control. Yet the village solar scheme leans toward an ¡°unbundled¡± model ¡ª one that separates generation, transmission, distribution and retail into distinct businesses. That tension is more than a regulatory technicality; projects built in rural communities can profoundly transform local life for better or worse, and getting the legal framework wrong could jeopardize both the communities and the program itself.

The government¡¯s broader capacity to execute large-scale programs has also come under scrutiny. The Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) initiative and the Merah Putih Village Cooperatives (KDMP) show what the administration can mobilize when it chooses to do so. But more than 21,000 of food poisoning linked to the MBG program serve as a sobering reminder of what happens when ambitious schemes are launched before they are ready.

Capital flows in, but details stay scarce

Danantara’s solar bet draws fresh capital, but the details behind the deal remain thin. So far, the country¡¯s newest sovereign wealth fund, Danantara, seems to be upbeat about the initiative. Danantara on March 5 said that it received in investment to accelerate solar power plant development, but Danantara did not address this properly with enough details.?

CEO Rosan P. Roeslani said only that the investment was made in 2025 as part of the 100 gigawatts effort and would fund a facility expected to take a year and a half to build. The source of the funds, the nature of the facility, its location, the technology involved and its projected impact on surrounding communities were all left unaddressed.

Despite the expected shortcomings, though, the timing could not be better. A significant sum to support renewable energy is a much-needed boost for Indonesia¡¯s ambitious energy transition. Not only does it signal to international partners that Jakarta is serious about turning its long-standing transition pledges into tangible investment on the ground, but it also comes at a time when the global energy supply is under significant strain and Indonesia requires alternatives.

Turning crisis into a catalyst

Rising fuel costs are forcing Jakarta’s hand, but turning the crisis into lasting change will take more than momentum. In the near term, the government is likely to resist raising prices for subsidized fuel and the ubiquitous three-kilogram liquified petroleum gas (LPG) canisters. But if the conflict in the Middle East persists, tighter quotas and eventual price adjustments are all but inevitable. That pressure, uncomfortable as it is, creates a political opening.

This moment can be used as a catalyst, a valid reason for the administration and the lawmakers to come up with a strong, accelerated shift to renewables as part of the efforts to reduce reliance on the global supply chain. But catalysts only work if they produce lasting structural change. That means improving transparency about the solar program¡¯s progress, making investors¡¯ identities public, and being clear about the technologies chosen. Without accountability, ambitious targets have a way of quietly fading when the sense of crisis passes.

Indonesia¡¯s clean energy promises and the road ahead

The targets are set, and the tools exist, but Indonesia has yet to match its clean energy promises with action. Indonesia has an ambitious energy transition target, but it harbors skepticism due to slow progress, continued reliance on coal and conflicting policy priorities. Our leaders set ambitious targets and brag about them at international summits. Besides Indonesia¡¯s net-zero emissions (NZE) by 2060 or sooner,? President Prabowo has publicly promised a coal within 10¨C15 years and shift to 100% renewable energy within a decade.

Indonesia needs to take this opportunity to make its energy sovereignty dream come true. Domestic renewables rely on local resources, so once they are built, they will be immune to fuel price swings in the Middle East.

Policy tools are already available. We do indeed seek a higher share of renewables in the primary energy mix. Now we need to realign the Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL) with Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) and the National Energy General Plan (RUEN), accelerate coal retirement, avoid new fossil capacity, prioritize grid upgrades outside Java¨CBali and invest in storage so that solar and wind can displace oil and gas.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post ¶Ù²¹²Ô²¹²Ô³Ù²¹°ù²¹¡¯²õ Role in Surviving the Global Energy Crisis appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

A fragile state at the center of diplomacy

Singh opens by outlining Pakistan¡¯s internal strains. Economic instability, repeated reliance on assistance from the International Monetary Fund and a lack of broad political legitimacy define the current moment. Regional tensions compound this picture; Pakistan has strained ties with Iran, Afghanistan and India.

Against this backdrop, Pakistan¡¯s emergence as a diplomatic venue appears counterintuitive. Ahmed acknowledges the contrast but points out that context matters. When major powers seek a channel for dialogue, practical constraints narrow the field. Pakistan excludes Israel because it does not recognize Israel, while other potential venues carry their own political complications.

Why Pakistan, not Turkey?

Why are peace talks not being hosted in a more obvious location, like Turkey? Ahmed points to leadership dynamics and geopolitical rivalries. Personal rapport plays a role in shaping diplomatic choices, particularly under the current US administration. He notes that strained relations between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and US President Donald Trump make Turkey a less appealing venue.

Pakistan, by contrast, benefits from a convergence of factors. Its leadership maintains working ties with Washington, reinforced by recent economic and business engagements. Simultaneously, Pakistan is not seen as a direct rival by Iran in the way Turkey might be. This combination creates a degree of acceptability across parties. As Ahmed puts it, ¡°It¡¯s been more credible to have such talks in an apparently neutral Pakistan than, let¡¯s say, in Istanbul.¡±

Strategic depth and social links

Geography and demography further strengthen Pakistan¡¯s case. The country shares a long border with Iran and maintains deep cultural and religious linkages. Its sizable Shia Muslim minority, integrated across political, military and economic life, provides an additional layer of connection. These factors contribute to a level of familiarity and understanding that can facilitate dialogue.

Leadership also matters. Singh highlights the role of Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir, described as an Iran specialist with prior engagement on related issues. Ahmed says that this expertise enhances Pakistan¡¯s credibility in the eyes of external actors. Combined with ties to Saudi Arabia, China and the US, Pakistan occupies a rare position of overlapping relationships. This allows it to engage multiple sides without appearing fully aligned with any single one.

A diplomatic opening with domestic impact

Ahmed characterizes Pakistan¡¯s current posture as unusually effective. ¡°For once, I think Pakistan¡¯s diplomacy has been very effective this time,¡± he says. In the past, Pakistan¡¯s geostrategic positioning was often used primarily for military alliances rather than diplomatic leverage.

This shift has produced tangible domestic effects. A government previously criticized for weak legitimacy has gained a measure of public approval. Even political opponents have adjusted their behavior to avoid disrupting the diplomatic process. The perception of Pakistan as a constructive international actor has created a narrative of competence at a time when internal governance remains contested.

Pakistan presents its approach as balanced. It has criticized both US¨CIsraeli actions against Iran and Iranian actions against Saudi interests, framing its role as principled rather than partisan. Ahmed broadly accepts this characterization, noting that such positioning helps sustain credibility across competing actors.

Limits, risks and regional implications

Despite the current momentum, both Singh and Ahmed remain cautious about long-term outcomes. The situation remains fluid, with only a ceasefire rather than a durable settlement in place. If negotiations falter or conflict escalates, Pakistan¡¯s role could quickly diminish.

Ahmed stresses that future influence depends on execution. ¡°Right now, they have done it very well,¡± he observes, but sustaining that advantage requires continued diplomatic skill and favorable external conditions. A second round of talks could reinforce Pakistan¡¯s standing, while failure could expose its limitations.

Regional implications further complicate the situation. India has reacted critically, reflecting broader tensions in South Asian geopolitics. Meanwhile, unresolved conflicts with Afghanistan highlight the limits of Pakistan¡¯s diplomatic reach. Ahmed raises a pointed question: Can a country capable of facilitating dialogue between distant powers apply similar energy to resolving disputes closer to home?

Ultimately, Pakistan¡¯s current role reflects a convergence of circumstance rather than a guaranteed shift. It draws on historical patterns, including its past role in facilitating US¨CChina rapprochement, but unfolds in a more volatile environment. Whether this moment translates into sustained influence or remains a passing alignment of interests will hinge on how Pakistan and the wider region respond to what follows.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post FO Talks: Why Pakistan Is Mediating Between the US and Iran ¡ª and Why Is Israel Not Invited? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

If Indonesia is serious about turning pledges into progress, it should take concrete, immediate action. One of these actions is to negotiate a concessional financing facility with the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to retire a first tranche of coal capacity, targeting roughly 500 megawatts. Not as a grand gesture, but as a proof of concept.

Why start small?

Indonesia is not short on transition frameworks. The Asian Development Bank¡¯s Energy Transition Mechanism (ETM) is precisely to blend concessional and commercial capital to buy out and retire coal plants early. Similarly, climate funds have already pilot programs aimed at retiring gigawatts of coal capacity over time.?

What¡¯s missing is execution at scale ¡ª and that begins with a deal that actually closes.

A 500-megawatt retirement, financed through JBIC concessional lending, would do three things at once. First, it would establish a replicable financial template. Early coal retirement is expensive because plants are often locked into long-term power purchase agreements, with revenues guaranteed for decades. Concessional capital ¡ª cheaper, longer-tenor and risk-tolerant ¡ª is essential to bridge that gap.

Second, it would align Japan¡¯s evolving climate finance posture with Indonesia¡¯s needs. JBIC has already a shift toward supporting decarbonization and energy transition projects in Indonesia, including partnerships with state entities and utilities. The institution¡¯s mandate to support both economic development and climate goals makes it a natural anchor for such a facility.

Third, it would send a signal to markets that coal retirement is bankable. Right now, investors remain skeptical. One reason is structural: Indonesia¡¯s power sector is governed by rigid contracts and planning assumptions that continue to favor coal. Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) analyses have to ¡°policy distortions¡± and financing structures that rely too heavily on commercial debt rather than concessional capital.?

In that environment, no private investor wants to be first. A JBIC-backed facility could change that calculus.

Why JBIC ¡ª and why now?

Japan has long been a central player in Indonesia¡¯s power sector, financing and supporting infrastructure for decades. That legacy is both a liability and an opportunity. On the one hand, Japanese institutions have historically supported coal projects. On the other hand, they now have the capacity ¡ª and arguably the responsibility ¡ª to help unwind them.

JBIC¡¯s existing cooperation agreements with Indonesian institutions, including PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur, a state-owned enterprise that finances national infrastructure development, and the State Electricity Company, already the energy transition. A concessional early-retirement facility would be a logical extension of that cooperation.

Timing matters as well. Indonesia has set ambitious emissions reduction targets and a long-term goal of net-zero by 2060. But ambition without near-term milestones risks eroding confidence. A first-tranche retirement ¡ª visible, measurable and financed ¡ª would anchor those long-term goals in reality.

The politics of early retirement

Of course, retiring coal plants early is not just a financial challenge; it is a political one. Coal remains deeply embedded in Indonesia¡¯s economy, providing jobs, revenues and energy security. Any transition must be ¡°just,¡± ensuring that workers and communities are not left behind.

But that is precisely why starting with a modest 500-megawatt tranche makes sense. It allows policymakers to test compensation mechanisms, workforce transition programs and regulatory adjustments on a manageable scale before expanding.

Moreover, the alternative ¡ª delay ¡ª carries its own risks. The longer Indonesia waits, the more new coal capacity locks in emissions and financial liabilities. Early retirement becomes harder, not easier.

From pilot to platform

A JBIC concessional facility should not be seen as a one-off transaction but as the foundation of a broader platform. Once the first deal is completed, the same structure could be scaled up, blended with other sources of concessional capital, and integrated into Indonesia¡¯s ETM and JETP frameworks. In other words, 500 megawatts is not the goal. It is the beginning.

Indonesia¡¯s energy transition will ultimately be judged not by announcements but by assets retired, emissions reduced and clean capacity built. The gap between ambition and implementation remains wide ¡ª but it is bridgeable. A single, well-structured deal could start to close it.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post A 500-Megawatt Test of Credibility in Indonesia¡¯s Energy Transition appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The result is a war in which the heaviest economic consequences are being absorbed by those with the least influence over how it ends. That is not an unintended side effect. It reflects how modern conflict now interacts with an interconnected global system.

A war that moves through systems

The violence of the war may be concentrated in the Gulf, but the disruption is not. Pressure around the , which carries a substantial share of global oil and liquefied natural gas, is already translating into broader instability. Insurance premiums for shipping have . have been adjusted or delayed. Even limited disruptions have forced rerouting through longer and more expensive corridors. Energy markets have responded with volatility that reflects not only current supply risks, but uncertainty about how far escalation could extend.

These effects are not linear. They move through the same channels that sustain the global economy. Energy flows, maritime logistics, financial markets and supply chains react simultaneously, but unevenly. A disruption at one point in the system propagates outward, reshaping conditions elsewhere.

The Gulf states are encountering the first layer of this pressure. Infrastructure, once treated as secure, is now exposed. Oil facilities, ports and shipping terminals are at increasing risk. More critically, , which provide the majority of potable water in several Gulf countries, have emerged as potential vulnerabilities. Any sustained disruption to these systems would not only affect economic output but also the basic functioning of daily life.

These states are not directing the war, but they cannot distance themselves from it. Their exposure is structural, rooted in geography and infrastructure. Beyond the Gulf, the effects become less visible but more complex.

South and Southeast Asia are absorbing the next layer of impact. Countries such as , which rely heavily on imported energy, are particularly sensitive to even modest price increases. Currency pressure intensifies as import costs rise; inflation begins to move; governments face difficult trade-offs between stabilizing prices and maintaining fiscal discipline. These pressures do not appear all at once; they build gradually, often unnoticed at first.

Recent movements in global have already begun to translate into higher domestic costs across several Asian economies. Airlines face rising fuel expenses, manufacturing sectors dependent on energy inputs adjust output and households encounter rising costs that are not immediately traceable to the conflict, but are directly linked to it.

There is also a human dimension that remains largely overlooked. Millions of from South Asia are employed across the Gulf. Their income supports families and local economies back home. As uncertainty increases, their position becomes more precarious. Flight routes are disrupted; insurance premiums increase; mobility becomes more constrained at the very moment when flexibility is most needed. They are not participants in the conflict. Yet they are embedded within its consequences.

Further east, the constraints tighten. Japan and South Korea sit at the far end of the same energy chain, but with far less flexibility. Their dependence on Middle Eastern energy imports is not marginal; it is structural. A significant portion of their oil imports passes through the same contested maritime routes. When supply tightens, they are forced into competition for alternative sources, often at higher cost.

This has immediate effects: Industrial output begins to slow, petrochemical production adjusts, and financial markets react to uncertainty in input costs and output expectations. What begins as an energy shock extends into industrial and financial systems. The war is not expanding geographically in the traditional sense; it is expanding through systems.

The economies that carry the burden

The most consequential aspect of this dynamic is not simply the scale of disruption, but its distribution. The countries bearing the greatest economic pressure are not those setting the conflict¡¯s trajectory. They are not determining strategy or shaping escalation. Yet their economies, infrastructure and populations are directly exposed to the consequences. What emerges from this is a structural imbalance that is difficult to correct.

The US, despite its central role, is relatively insulated from the immediate energy shock. As a major energy producer, it experiences price fluctuations differently. Domestic pressure exists, but it does not threaten systemic stability in the same way. Iran, for its part, is already operating under long-term economic constraints. Additional pressure intensifies existing challenges, but does not fundamentally alter the conditions under which it operates. Israel¡¯s exposure is primarily security-driven, rather than rooted in systemic economic vulnerability of the same kind.

The most severe pressures are concentrated elsewhere. They are felt most acutely in economies that are deeply integrated into global systems, but lack the capacity to shape them. This is where the situation becomes more complex than it initially appears.

If energy prices continue to rise, governments across affected regions will be forced to respond. Subsidies may be expanded; strategic reserves may be drawn down; emergency fiscal measures may be introduced to stabilize domestic conditions. These responses are not cost-free; they shift pressure into financial systems.

Several large Asian economies hold substantial foreign-currency reserves, including . In periods of sustained stress, the liquidation of such assets can serve as a tool for maintaining domestic stability. If undertaken at scale, these actions would transmit pressure into global financial markets, affecting borrowing costs, liquidity and investment conditions.

A regional conflict begins to generate global financial consequences. At that point, the distinction between participant and observer begins to weaken.

A system that redistributes risk

What is unfolding is not simply economic disruption. It is a redistribution of risk across an interconnected system. Energy markets are beginning to fragment, as different regions experience different price pressures and supply constraints. are adjusting, but not uniformly. Some states are able to absorb shocks through reserves and diversification. Others face more immediate constraints. The longer the conflict persists, the more these differences widen.

Recent developments suggest that even limited escalation can have disproportionate effects. Temporary disruptions to shipping routes have already extended delivery times and increased costs. Insurance markets have adjusted faster than physical supply, amplifying the economic impact. Financial markets are reacting not only to current conditions, but to the possibility of further escalation.

Over time, this begins to resemble a feedback loop. Uncertainty drives cost. Cost drives policy response. Policy response introduces new distortions. The system does not stabilize quickly. It adjusts, but unevenly and often with delay. This is not a temporary disturbance that will dissipate once the conflict slows. It reflects a deeper shift in how war interacts with global systems. Conflict is no longer contained by geography. It is transmitted through connectivity.

The wrong economies

The countries most exposed to the economic consequences are not the ones making strategic decisions or defining objectives. Yet they are the ones managing inflation, stabilizing currencies, protecting supply chains and absorbing social pressure. They carry the cost without controlling the cause. This is increasingly how modern conflict operates. Power is exercised in one place. Consequences are distributed across many. The further a country is from the center of decision-making, the more likely it is to experience the conflict as an external shock rather than a controllable process. And the longer the war continues, the more entrenched this pattern becomes.

Wars are still fought between states, but their effects are no longer confined to them. They move through the systems that connect economies, societies and markets. And in that movement, the burden does not fall where power is concentrated; it falls where exposure is greatest. That is why this war is not just reshaping the balance of power; it is reshaping the distribution of vulnerability. And in doing so, it is placing the heaviest burden on the economies least able to shape the outcome.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post The Iran War Is Breaking the Wrong Economies appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Despite this enormous potential, Indonesia faces a persistent threat that continues to undermine its economic strength and maritime sovereignty. One of the most serious challenges is the practice of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing. This activity has become a major concern for marine governance and fishery sustainability in the region.

For many people, IUU Fishing is often understood simply as the theft of fish by foreign vessels. Such a perception, however, oversimplifies the problem. In reality, IUU Fishing represents a multidimensional issue that involves economic losses, environmental degradation, violations of maritime sovereignty and connections to transnational organized crime.

Massive economic losses

From an economic perspective, the impact of IUU Fishing on Indonesia is extremely significant. National losses are estimated to range from ($1.7 billion) to Indonesian rupiah ($5.9 billion) annually. Earlier estimates from Indonesia¡¯s Supreme Audit Agency suggested that the potential losses could reach as high as Indonesian rupiah ($17 billion) per year.

These figures demonstrate that IUU Fishing is far more than an ordinary illegal activity. It represents the extraction of natural resources without contributing any economic benefit to the state. Fish caught through illegal operations are not recorded in official fishery statistics and are not subject to taxes or landing fees.

In many cases, the catch is transported directly overseas without passing through Indonesian fishing ports. This situation deprives the country of potential non-tax state revenue and eliminates opportunities for domestic value-added activities in fish ports. Practices such as illegal transshipment at sea prevent catches from entering national supply chains, thereby reducing for local fish processing industries.

The economic consequences are also felt directly by small-scale fishers. Large industrial vessels that operate illegally create an uneven competition with traditional fishing communities. In several cases, such conditions have and intimidation against local fishers.

Threats to marine resource sustainability

Beyond economic losses, IUU Fishing also poses a serious threat to the sustainability of marine resources. Unregulated fishing pressure accelerates overfishing and leads to significant declines in fish stocks. Such pressures can disrupt marine ecosystems and weaken the resilience of fishery resources.

and unreported catches are estimated to result in substantial losses of marine resources each year, with some estimates suggesting figures of up to tons annually. Losses of this magnitude not only harm the fisheries sector but also disturb the ecological balance of marine environments.

The situation is further aggravated by the use of destructive fishing methods such as blast fishing, cyanide poisoning and trawl fishing. These practices have caused extensive damage to marine habitats. Reports indicate that around 33.82% of Indonesia¡¯s have experienced degradation due to fishing activities.

Fish is also one of the main sources of protein for many Indonesian communities. Declining fish stocks, therefore, have direct implications for national food security. Reduced fish availability may increase the risk of nutritional deficiencies in coastal and .

In a broader global context, the degradation of Indonesia¡¯s marine resources carries international implications. Indonesian waters form part of important migration routes and habitats for globally traded fish species. Declining productivity in these waters may therefore influence seafood supply stability in international markets.

Violations of maritime sovereignty

IUU Fishing also represents a direct violation of Indonesia¡¯s maritime sovereignty. Many foreign vessels illegally enter Indonesia¡¯s Exclusive Economic Zone and conduct fishing operations without permits. Such activities undermine the authority of the state over its own maritime territory.

To evade detection, these vessels often disable their Vessel Monitoring System or manipulate ship documentation. Some vessels also engage in double flagging by changing and registration. These strategies make enforcement more complicated and reduce the effectiveness of monitoring systems.

Law enforcement at sea also faces institutional challenges. In Indonesia, at least seven agencies share authority over maritime law enforcement. These include the Indonesian Navy, the National Police, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries and the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency.

The overlapping responsibilities of these institutions often create coordination challenges in the field. Such institutional fragmentation may open opportunities for illegal operators to in enforcement. As a result, IUU Fishing continues to persist despite regulatory efforts.

Links to transnational organized crime

Over time, IUU Fishing has evolved beyond a simple violation. The practice increasingly operates as part of transnational organized crime networks that threaten and . These networks frequently operate across national borders and utilize complex logistical structures.

Criminal involvement in illegal fishing operations often includes labor exploitation and human trafficking. Such practices further increase in maritime regions.

In addition, illegal fishing operators often rely on document manipulation and vessel identity changes to conceal ownership and evade monitoring systems. These methods complicate law enforcement efforts to identify the structures behind illegal fishing operations.

Illegal transshipment at sea is another key mechanism used in these networks. This activity allows vessels to transfer catches offshore in order to avoid customs inspections and sanitary regulations. As a result, illegally caught fish can be and mixed with legally caught products in global seafood markets.

Investigations into IUU Fishing operations have also revealed connections to other crimes such as and drug trafficking. These activities often rely on the same distribution networks operating across international waters. Empirical studies indicate that this form of transversal criminality involves thousands of violations globally and includes hundreds of industrial fishing vessels linked to corporate entities across .

Legal challenges further complicate efforts to prosecute the masterminds behind these networks. Fishery regulations frequently impose penalties only on vessel crews rather than targeting the corporate actors responsible for organizing illegal operations. Jurisdictional ambiguity in the high seas also to obscure the origin of catches before landing them in port.

This situation not only threatens marine ecosystems but also worsens the vulnerability of coastal communities that depend heavily on fishery resources. The continued exploitation of marine resources through illegal activities food security and undermining sustainable fishery governance.

Strengthening ocean governance

In response to these challenges, Indonesia has implemented policies based on three main pillars: sovereignty, sustainability and welfare. One of the most widely known policies is the sinking of illegal fishing vessels. This measure was designed to create a deterrent effect against illegal fishing operators.

The policy has contributed to a temporary reduction in certain types of violations. However, combating IUU Fishing requires more than symbolic enforcement actions. Strengthening through technology remains essential.

Improved coordination among maritime enforcement institutions is also necessary. Institutional integration would help close enforcement gaps that illegal fishing operators frequently exploit. Effective governance requires collaboration across agencies responsible for maritime security.

International cooperation is equally important. Because IUU Fishing networks operate across borders, regional collaboration in maritime surveillance and fishery governance is essential. Data sharing, coordinated patrols and supply chain transparency can significantly strengthen enforcement efforts.

IUU fishing and the challenge of achieving the SDGs

Ultimately, IUU Fishing is not merely a fishery management problem. It is an issue that intersects with economic development, environmental protection, maritime security and human rights. In the context of global sustainability, the persistence of IUU Fishing also directly undermines the achievement of several (SDGs).

Unchecked illegal fishing threatens SDG 14 (Life Below Water) by accelerating the depletion of marine resources and damaging critical ocean ecosystems. At the same time, declining fish stocks and the loss of fishery income weaken coastal livelihoods and undermine SDG 1 (No Poverty) and SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), particularly for communities that rely heavily on fisheries as a primary source of food and income.

The human rights dimension of IUU Fishing further highlights its relevance to SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth) and SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions). Illegal fishing operations are frequently linked to labor exploitation, human trafficking and weak maritime governance, which undermine fair labor conditions and effective law enforcement in maritime sectors.

Addressing IUU Fishing should therefore go beyond enforcement alone. It requires strengthening governance systems, improving transparency in fish supply chains and reinforcing in maritime territories. In this context, combating IUU Fishing is also part of safeguarding national sovereignty and institutional integrity.

At a time when global marine resources are under increasing pressure, Indonesia¡¯s ability to tackle IUU Fishing will play an important role in advancing the global sustainability agenda. Effective action against IUU Fishing can contribute not only to ocean conservation but also to food security, equitable economic development and stronger institutions across the Indo¨CPacific region.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post IUU Fishing: A Devastating Threat to Indonesia and the World appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Although the global transition to renewables is gaining momentum, the energy crisis during the Iran war has underscored a basic lesson: Oil and gas remain indispensable for a while, and no serious energy policy can neglect security, redundancy and resilience during the long years of this expected transition.

Therefore, a sound energy policy should pursue renewable energy while strengthening energy security. Strategic stocks, resilient pipelines, alternative routes and reliable firm power, such as nuclear, still matter because governments do not manage energy systems in theory. They manage them in the midst of shocks, shortages and war.

A chokepoint shock that markets cannot innovate away overnight

In 2025, around 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products moved through the . That was roughly a quarter of the world¡¯s seaborne oil trade, and around 80% of it was destined for Asia. These numbers explain why the Iran War is not a regional event for energy markets. When Hormuz closed, the shock spread immediately through oil prices, insurance costs and physical supply, especially for Asian importers.

For months, many analysts had already warned that if a US and Israeli attack on Iran began, Tehran¡¯s greatest leverage would be the Strait of Hormuz. Yet despite that, the Trump administration openly that it did not expect Iran to close the strait. That was not simply a miscalculation. It was a serious policy failure that ignored an obvious strategic risk.

As the war has continued, fuel supply problems have begun to emerge, including shortages in gasoline and petroleum . Some Asian have stopped external sales, and prices have surged globally. In the US, the average gasoline price rose by nearly after the war began, while over oil export restrictions resurfaced and sanctions on were eased.

Meanwhile, the US has continued to threaten that keeping Hormuz closed would carry heavy consequences for Iran. Yet despite threats, potential and emergency measures, no truly reliable solution has emerged. That is why the search for alternatives has accelerated. The decision by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and its member countries to coordinate a emergency stock release in March was important, but such a measure only buys time. If , it cannot substitute for real supply security. Because no government can replace a chokepoint-scale flow with brand-new infrastructure or a fully transformed vehicle fleet in a matter of months. That is why governments need a balanced approach that pushes decarbonization forward while also building buffers and alternatives for future crises.

Fossil fuels remain the base of the system

The uncomfortable baseline is that the global economy still runs mostly on fossil fuels. In 2024, fossil fuels still accounted for of the global energy mix, which means that oil, gas and coal remain the foundation of the system even as cleaner sources expand. This structural fact shows that the world still moves goods, powers industry, heats buildings and supports global trade through fossil-based systems.

The same pattern is visible in the gas trade. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is not a marginal fuel in today¡¯s economy. GIIGNL reports tonnes of global LNG trade in 2024. And these volumes matter because crises rarely hit only crude oil. Disruption also affects refined products, gas logistics, petrochemicals, shipping networks and industrial production.

In other words, even a strong renewable build-out does not instantly eliminate dependence on oil, gas and the global infrastructure that moves them. Pretending otherwise only sets governments up for policy panic when the next shock arrives.

Renewables are growing, but the denominator is huge

None of this is an argument against renewables. It is an argument for realism about scale. For example, the transition is real, especially in the electricity sector. In 2024, renewables provided of global electricity generation. But the broader economy changes much more slowly. Modern renewables accounted for only of global total final energy consumption in 2022, which shows how difficult it is to decarbonize heat, heavy industry and transport at the system level.?

Transport is a good sign of this gap between fast growth and limited total impact. Global electric car exceeded 17 million in 2024, yet the total electric car fleet reached only about 58 million, or roughly 4% of the global passenger car fleet.

Even the clean energy build-out still depends on carbon-intensive industrial production today. Around of global steel relies heavily on coal. In other words, electrification and renewables are expanding fast, but the denominator is so large that the overlap period will be long. For years to come, energy security planning will have to assume that societies need both cleaner systems and conventional fuels at the same time.

Security tools that work in a crisis

In the short run, the first tool available in a crisis is emergency stocks. That is exactly why they exist, as can be seen in the IEA¡¯s largest coordinated stock release in March. But emergency stocks are a bridge, not a new supply system. The more important question is what happens when a disruption lasts longer.

This brings us to pipelines and alternative routes. Existing bypass capacity around Hormuz remains limited relative to the scale of normal flows. The IEA estimates that only barrels per day can be redirected through existing pipelines. The main examples are Saudi Arabia¡¯s from Abqaiq to Yanbu, which provides access to the Red Sea, and the United Arab Emirates¡¯ Abu Dhabi crude oil to Fujairah, which bypasses Hormuz by reaching the Gulf of Oman. Their value is not theoretical. During the current war, Saudi exports from Yanbu rose to nearly 4 million barrels per day as volumes were rerouted away from the Strait of Hormuz.?

Another example, although far too small to replace Hormuz and not directly located in the Gulf, is Iraq¡¯s northern export route through the Iraq-Turkey pipeline, which ends at Ceyhan on the Mediterranean. After being largely inactive for the past two years, the pipeline resumed operations in March at around per day, with plans to increase flows toward 250,000 barrels per day.

These volumes are still too small to bypass Hormuz, but that is not the point. Countries with alternatives can better absorb shocks. Countries with only one route cannot. Optionality is not a luxury in energy security. It is one of its basic conditions. Pipelines, LNG terminals, storage, multiple entry points and diversified contracts all improve resilience because they reduce the cost of disruption and increase bargaining power in a crisis.

Nuclear is still part of the balance

Another important part of a balanced policy is firm, low-carbon power that does not depend on daily fuel shipments through contested sea lanes. That is where nuclear still matters. Europe¡¯s recent energy experience, first with Russian supply risk and now with the shock created by the Iran war, has pushed many leaders to see energy policy not only as a climate issue but as a strategic one. This is why the debate around nuclear has returned so strongly.

In 2024, nuclear power plants in 12 EU countries produced of the EU¡¯s electricity. That is not a marginal share. It is a major pillar of supply security as well as decarbonization. The political debate in Europe reflects this reality. In March 2026, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen said that Europe¡¯s decision to let nuclear power¡¯s share fall from about one third of electricity generation in 1990 to around 15% today was a ¡°.¡±

Germany illustrates the same tension. Even after shutting its reactors, debate continues over whether some nuclear capacity if price pressures and import dependence worsen. The implication is not that every country must expand nuclear power. It is that removing firm options before credible replacements are fully in place raises the cost of every geopolitical shock and makes policy reversals more likely when a crisis hits.

As prices rise and import dependence becomes more politically costly, arguments for rethinking earlier decisions return. That alone shows the issue remains alive whenever security and affordability come under pressure.

Build the future, but defend the present

The clean energy transition is moving, especially in electricity. But the Iran War is a blunt reminder that energy systems change more slowly than geopolitics. States should invest aggressively in renewables, grids, storage and electrification because these reduce dependence on imported fuels over time. But they also need a security portfolio for the overlap years.

That portfolio should include strategic stocks that can be released quickly, diversified supply chains for LNG and refined products, resilient routes that bypass chokepoints where possible and reliable firm power where politically viable. It also means maintaining and modernizing pipelines and interconnectors, not as an alternative to decarbonization, but as insurance during an unstable transition.

The central policy inference is simple. Build the future, but do not leave the present undefended.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post The Iran War Is a Reminder: Decarbonize Fast, But Do Not Gamble with Energy Security appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Atul sets the framework at the outset:

So, as usual, we¡¯ll have a three-part structure. We are going to first ask the question: What are these tensions? Then we are going to pose the question: Why do we have these tensions? And then we will pose the third question: What could happen next? We will paint some scenarios.

Those three questions ¡ª what, why and what next ¡ª shape the entire conversation. What appears at first glance to be another People¡¯s Liberation Army (PLA) drill at the end of 2025 becomes an examination of sovereignty and legitimacy of Chinese claims over Taiwan as well as the evolving balance of power between a rising China and a still-dominant US.

What: rising military and political tensions

These tensions are both military and political. Atul and Glenn begin by outlining the former.

At the end of 2025, the PLA staged a massive display of force around Taiwan. The exercise, titled Justice Mission 2025, included ten hours of live-fire drills and effectively encircled the island. It took place just 11 days after Washington approved an $11 billion arms sale to Taiwan, the largest deal to date between Washington and the Taiwanese capital of Taipei.

On December 30, the PLA¡¯s Eastern Theater Command conducted a second consecutive day of large-scale operations involving army, naval, air and rocket forces. Taiwan¡¯s Defense Ministry reported that it ¡°detected 130 Chinese military aircraft and 14 naval vessels.¡± Of a total of 130 sorties, 90 entered Taiwan¡¯s northern, central, southwestern and eastern air defense identification zone (ADIZ). For defense forces, ADIZ functions as an early warning system ¡ª though in a strait only 160 kilometers wide, reaction time is barely a few minutes.

Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te condemned the drills as undermining regional stability through military intimidation. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi criticized Taiwan for continuous provocations, rebuked Japan¡¯s leadership for openly challenging China¡¯s territorial sovereignty and denounced the $11 billion US arms sale.

In some ways, the political tensions are more important. Since Xi Jinping became president in 2012, China¡¯s tone on Taiwan has shifted. Before Xi, China was aggressively pursuing economic integration with Taiwan and boosting travel between the countries. Its goal was to achieve de facto integration over time. Since Xi took over, China has engaged in increasing levels of military confrontation and adopted a much more nationalistic tone on political integration. 

Under Xi, China has adopted increasingly aggressive policies in the South and East China Seas and in Tibet. Beijing has also stepped up harassment of Chinese students in obscure Australian or American universities, as well as engaged in a shrill ¡°wolf warrior¡± diplomacy that confronts anyone who says anything out of harmony with China¡¯s Taiwan policy. In recent years, Xi has dialled down this aggressive diplomacy, but the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) takes an increasingly hardline stance on Taiwan. 

After saber-rattling against Taiwan, China eased its show of force. Both sides have now signaled interest in stabilizing relations ahead of a planned ¡°Grand Summit¡± between Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump this April. At his Florida Mar-a-Lago, Trump responded to news about Taiwan with characteristic nonchalance, saying he has a ¡°great relationship¡± with Xi. ¡°Nothing worries me,¡± said Trump.

The immediate danger, Glenn argues, is not a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The real danger concerns the standard of behavior, which China has successfully shifted. The normalization of Beijing¡¯s coercive behavior ¡ª the steady shifting of what counts as routine ¡ª has resulted in a gradual erosion of Taiwan¡¯s de facto sovereignty. 

Why: history ¡ª bitter legacy of a brutal civil war on Mainland China

To answer the second question, Atul and Glenn turn to history.

The roots of the China-Taiwan tensions lie in the Chinese Civil War, which lasted from August 1, 1927, to December 10, 1949. CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT) fought a brutal civil war for control of China. The KMT, founded by the revolutionary Sun Yat-sen in 1894 and reorganized in 1911, ruled Mainland China, which was then known as the Republic of China (ROC). General Chiang Kai-shek succeeded Sun as the KMT leader, but, bit by bit, he lost on the battlefield, and the KMT lost public support. Why?  

American journalist Theodore White¡¯s reporting answers the question. He captures the story of the civil war in one grotesque scene: White observed miles and miles of dead Chinese peasants on the roadside, as the KMT forces marched to oppose the Communists. They had died to a significant extent not from war but due to KMT corruption, which caused mass starvation. In addition, the KMT, for all its sincere, visceral hostility to the West ¡ª KMT leaders were often true nationalists ¡ª was tainted as the pawn of the imperial powers. Therefore, KMT leaders could never really escape the perception that they were corrupt warlords beholden to the colonial, exploitative gweilo (foreigner). Meanwhile, the communists, who were equally if not more ruthless, were identified with helping the peasants, not the ruling elites, and were not gweilo-tainted in the minds of peasants. End of story.

At the end of 1949, Mainland China under the CCP became the People¡¯s Republic of China (PRC) as the KMT retreated to Taiwan, which now became the Republic of China (ROC). Both the PRC and ROC claimed to be the legitimate state for all the Chinese people. Both believed in the One China policy and reunification. The CCP wanted to assimilate the ROC into the PRC. The KMT thought that one day the PRC would crumble and the ROC would include Mainland China.

Why: history ¡ª another bitter legacy on a small island

Since 1949, the KMT has ruled Taiwan, but never quite forgotten its past. In 1894, Sun had founded the party in Honolulu, Hawaii, as the Revive China Society. In 1919, he reformed the party in 1919 in the Shanghai French Concession and renamed it the KMT. Chiang, Sun¡¯s brother-in-law, succeeded him as leader. Known as Generalissimo, Chiang reunited China after his Northern Expedition against regional warlords from 1926 to 1928. Yet, as mentioned earlier, Chiang¡¯s star faded, and the KMT decamped to China. Chiang was the de facto dictator until his death in 1975, and the KMT ruled Taiwan as a one-party state till 1987. 

Chiang¡¯s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, succeeded him. Chiang Junior lifted martial law and the ban on opposition parties. In 1988, Lee Teng-hui succeeded the Chiang family as president and continued democratic reforms. He won the first direct presidential election in 2016. Chen Shui-bian succeeded Lee by winning the 2000 presidential election. Chen ended 72 years of KMT presidencies, but the party later reclaimed power eight years later with the landslide victory of Ma Ying-jeou in the 2008 presidential election. The KMT lost the presidency and its legislative majority in the 2016 elections, but remains a force in Taiwanese politics. The party won a legislative plurality in the 2024 elections.

Today, Chen¡¯s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is the center-left force in Taiwanese politics. Founded in 1986 by Hsu Hsin-liang, Roger Hsieh and Lin Shui-chuan, a year prior to the end of martial law, the DPP is a strong advocate of human rights and opposes authoritarianism. President Lai Ching-te is the third DPP president. Chen was the first DPP president who held office from 2000 to 2008, and Tsai Ing-wen was the second one who held power from 2008 to 2016.

The DPP¡¯s roots lie in the Tangwai movement, which opposed the KMT¡¯s one-party authoritarian rule. The movement opposed the ¡°party-state¡± system and gathered force in the mid-1970s and early 1980s. In 1979, the same year in which the US ceased its recognition of the ROC, conflict between authorities and the tangwai again turned violent in the Kaohsiung Incident. Also known as the Formosa Incident, the Meilidao Incident or the Formosa Magazine incident, this was a crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations that occurred in Kaohsiung on December 10, 1979. Note that the KMT imposed martial law from 1949 to 1987. In fact, the KMT rule from 1949 to 1992 has come to be known as the White Terror. This terror is held to have only ended in 1992 when the criminal code changed and the Taiwanese could no longer be prosecuted for ¡°anti-state activities.¡±

Having lost a bitter civil war to the CCP, the KMT had an anti-communist ideology. It ruled Taiwan through martial law and curtailed civil liberties. Many of the founding members of the DPP suffered greatly at the hands of the KMT. Today, the DPP is a nationalist party that advocates strengthening Taiwanese identity, opposes pan-Chinese nationalism of both the KMT and the CCP, and criticizes China¡¯s claims of sovereignty over Taiwan as a new form of colonialism and imperialism. Unsurprisingly, the DPP harbors bitter memories of KMT martial rule from 1949 to 1987.

Given the country¡¯s past, Taiwanese politics is famously fractious. The Legislative Yuan, as the Taiwanese parliament is called, has been an arena for punching, hair pulling, and the throwing of plastic bottles and water balloons over the years. In one particularly heated fight in July 2017, legislators lifted up and threw chairs at each other as they argued over an infrastructure spending bill. In 2020, legislators threw pig guts and exchanged blows amid a heated row over pork imports from the US.

Right now, the DPP has the presidency while the KMT controls the legislature. The current official position of the DPP is that the ROC is an independent and sovereign country. Its territory consists of Taiwan and the surrounding smaller islands whose sovereignty derives only from the ROC citizens. The DPP¡¯s philosophy of self-determination is based on the 1999 ¡°Resolution on Taiwan’s Future.¡± The party considers Taiwan an independent nation and finds a formal declaration of independence unnecessary.

Why: tricky question of nationalism and legitimacy

For decades, both the CCP and KMT claimed to be the real representatives of the Chinese people. Both followed the One China policy because they fought a battle for legitimacy and sought to emerge as the unifying force in Chinese politics. 

Over time, the KMT has lost power and evolved into a vibrant Taiwanese democracy. In contrast, the CCP is stuck to its old dogma in an authoritarian system where Mao Zedong seized power through the barrel of a gun.

The core of the CCP¡¯s legitimacy rests on three planks. First, the party offers hundreds of millions of Chinese high economic growth, greater prosperity and rising living standards. Second, the CCP is the standard bearer of Chinese nationalism, which is seen as an antidote to the century of humiliation when foreigners invaded and exploited China. Third, the CCP seeks to absorb Taiwan and reunify China. As a one-party state, the CCP-led PRC sees the ROC multiparty democracy in Taiwan as a threat. 

In fact, the absorption of Taiwan is an article of faith for the CCP. This Taiwan obsession is, in part, irrational. After all, on what rational basis can the CCP claim to be a single-party ruling elite? Be this as it may, Xi has clearly chosen to prioritize Taiwan since he came to power in 2012. Unification would be the apotheosis of two of the CCP¡¯s pillars of legitimacy since 1949. Xi has played the nationalism card with increasing vigor, and now even the CCP sometimes struggles to control the nationalist surges it foments. Even as a DPP-led Taiwan has become increasingly independent-minded, the CCP-led China has become ever more intransigent.

Why: equally tricky question of sovereignty and great power politics

When the CCP set up the PRC in 1949, it sought to independence or any prospect of independence, as well as any potential foreign intervention in Taiwan. The CCP was not entirely successful. The First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954¨C55 was an unsuccessful attempt by the PRC to deter the US from signing a mutual defense treaty with the KMT government. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 followed soon after. The PLA bombarded Kinmen, and the US deployed a US aircraft carrier Essex and other naval vessels to the Taiwan Straits.

The Department of Defense recommended and pushed hard for a ¡°massive retaliation¡± doctrine. This involved the use of nuclear weapons in the event China invaded Quemoy (as Kinmen was known then) and Matsu. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower never conveyed this threat to China, and his response was conventional. He used naval force alone. The ¡°massive retaliation¡± doctrine later changed to a policy of graduated response under President John F. Kennedy.

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995¨C96 occurred nearly 40 years later. The Chinese wanted to express disapproval of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui¡¯s visit to the US. More importantly, the US acknowledged (but did not endorse) the PRC¡¯s One China policy in 1979. Since then, the US policy has been not to take a position on Taiwan¡¯s sovereignty and regard its ultimate status as undetermined. 

In 1979, President Jimmy Carter also signed into law the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which commits the US to ¡°make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.¡± The TRA also obligates the US to maintain the capacity ¡°to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.¡± Note that the TRA, however, does not obligate the US to come to Taiwan¡¯s defense, and for decades, US presidents have refused to say whether they would intervene on Taiwan¡¯s behalf ¡ª a policy known as strategic ambiguity.  

In May 2022, President Joe Biden signaled a change in this policy, saying that the US had a commitment to come to Taiwan¡¯s defense. He made at least three similar comments since 2021 ¡ª a move from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. Seemingly underscoring the changed US policy, Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in early August 2022 and met with President Tsai Ing-wen of the DPP, the dominant political force of the 21st century, as well as democracy and human rights activists.

In response, the PLA launched a four-day military drill and surrounded Taiwan, simulating a blockade. The live-fire exercises were more extensive than those performed during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. Chinese military aircraft crossed the median line over 300 times during the demonstration and continue to cross it on a near-daily basis, effectively erasing the status quo. The CCP applied additional pressure through sanctions, halted exports and cyberattacks.

After Pelosi¡¯s visit, several other US delegations visited Taiwan. Tsai met with Pelosi¡¯s successor, Speaker of the House of Representatives Kevin McCarthy, on a stopover in the US. In response, China has intensified threatening air maneuvers, flying more frequently and closer to Taiwan, and Chinese warships have increasingly joined in the movements.

The end-of-2025 PLA exercises are part of a recent pattern. The PLA has increased military activities near Taiwan in recent years. It increasingly sends jets into Taiwan¡¯s ADIZ as a show of force. Cyberattacks have increased. In 2020, the Chinese attacked ten Taiwanese government agencies to steal information. 

The US Department of Defense¡¯s 2021 Military Power Report highlighted China¡¯s prioritization of ¡°joint long-range precision strikes across domains, increasingly sophisticated space, counterspace, and cyber capabilities, and accelerating the large-scale expansion of its nuclear forces.¡± Moreover, China has integrated emerging technology into its military strategy through an approach known as ¡°intelligentized¡± warfare.

Atul and Glenn also mention a key economic and strategic fact: Taiwan is the leading global producer of advanced semiconductors. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces 65% of the world¡¯s semiconductors and 90% of the most advanced chips. If conflict between China and Taiwan were to break out, global supply chains would be severely disrupted. The US would be severely affected. A potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait also has implications for the territorial dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea. The PRC views the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as a part of ¡°Taiwan province¡± and may seek to take the islands during a conflict. Atul mentions that he has covered China-Japan tensions in great detail, which erupted in 2025 after Beijing made a big deal of the Japanese prime minister¡¯s comments in parliament.

Given China¡¯s increasing aggressiveness, Washington has acted to contain Beijing. Before Biden took office, the first Trump administration sold more than $18 billion in arms to Taiwan and eliminated long-standing restrictions on US diplomatic engagement with Taiwanese officials in 2020. US officials now acknowledge that a small but expanding contingent of Marines has been secretly training Taiwan¡¯s forces since at least 2021. Tensions between China and the US over Taiwan amount to a classic security dilemma: both are taking actions they view as defensive, which the opposing side views as escalatory. The Thucydides Trap, a term that refers to the high possibility of ruling and rising powers clashing, is trickiest over Taiwan.

What could happen next: three scenarios

Atul and Glenn tease out three scenarios for the future. The first scenario is conservative and extrapolates the status quo. Deterrence proves to be successful after sustained increased effort by Taiwan, the US, Japan and arguably the international community. The goal would be to increase the costs of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, deterring Beijing from military conquest. The status quo would also persist if China softens its demands. This could only happen after Xi has left office. 

In the first scenario, Taiwan continues its de facto independence in the name of ¡°one country, two systems.¡± The world remains as we know it, and eventual de facto reunification is contingent on China¡¯s political evolution.

The second scenario is moderate and envisages China continuing its slow increase in economic, political and military pressure on Taiwan. The US and other powers fail to demonstrate a commitment to defend Taiwan. Without American leadership, other powers do not come to the rescue of Taiwan, and international support slowly becomes less effective. China continues to extend its influence over Taiwan even as the Taiwanese continue their paradigmatic shift decisively away from being a part of China. Taiwan becomes the Ukraine of the Orient. In this world, Taiwan progressively loses de facto sovereignty, and China achieves de facto reunification. 

The third scenario is aggressive and imagines China taking decisive military action against Taiwan. The result would be uncertain and depend on both the PLA¡¯s ability to conquer Taiwan as well as the Taiwanese forces to defend Taiwan. Hundreds of thousands would die. Taiwan is hilly, the PLA is not battle-tested, its senior officers have just been purged, and the local population would be restive even if China conquered the island. Taiwan¡¯s porcupine strategy might work just as Vietnam gave China a bloody nose in 1979.

The clock is ticking for China. The Chinese century may be difficult to achieve with the demographic balloon fizzing away. China is getting smaller every year at an accelerating pace and will be hundreds of millions smaller in a few decades. Arguably, the time to act for China is now. 

If China acts and invades Taiwan, that would be a disaster. Even as the military result may be uncertain, China¡¯s attack on Taiwan would unleash an international economic tsunami. Trade would plummet, currencies would crash and GDP rates would crater. Taiwan is critical to the global economy as the world¡¯s primary producer of advanced semiconductors, fabricating over 90% of the most cutting-edge chips used in AI, smartphones and defense systems. Led by TSMC, it controls roughly 63% of the total foundry market. As a top-20 global economy and major exporter of electronics, Taiwan¡¯s technological, manufacturing and trade output is essential to the global tech supply chain, which would be severely disrupted.

A Chinese version of the Anaconda plan of the Mainland wrapping around Taiwan and swallowing the island is more rational, but leaders have made rash decisions in similar situations. Atul and Glenn wish that leaders on all sides make wise choices, cheekily invoking the gods and goddesses of myths from around the world to smile upon mere mortals.

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post China¨CTaiwan Tensions ¡ª Civil War Legacies and Geopolitical Chess appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Their significance is linked to that of maritime transport itself, which represents the fundamental bloodstream of global trade. This transport carries of the world¡¯s trade by volume, carrying vital crude oil and other raw materials, semi-processed goods or finished products. As such, it plays a fundamental role within international supply chains.

Different kinds of maritime routes

Maritime routes man-made or natural. Among the first group are the Panama and the Suez canals. Within the second, among others, are the Hormuz, Malacca or Gibraltar straits. In both cases, they represent funnels of high strategic significance. Some more than others, of course. Indeed, according to their strategic importance, they can be divided into primary and secondary chokepoints. The former refers to connectors that, if disrupted, could seriously impair global trade. The latter, on the contrary, represent support maritime passages that entail significant detours in the event of disruption. The best example of a primary chokepoint is the Strait of Hormuz, while the Strait of Taiwan, the Sunda Strait (between the islands of Java and Sumatra) or the Dover Strait are examples of secondary ones.

The top four

The top four maritime routes (or chokepoints) are the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal. The first of them represents the compulsory crossing pathway between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Beyond being a very important merchandise transit route, representing of the global seaborne trade, it is one of the world¡¯s two main energy chokepoints. It is indeed the inescapable transit route for 20 to 21 million barrels of oil per day, representing of global oil consumption and 25% to 30% of global seaborne oil trade. At the same time, it is the passage route for 20% of the global liquified natural gas (LNG) trade. Some of the world¡¯s largest hydrocarbons exporters ¡ª Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) ¡ª rely on this route, as do the largest Asian consumers: China, India, Japan and South Korea.

The connects the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea (in the Pacific Ocean). It is the route through which 30% of global trade and 23.7 million barrels of oil pass daily. This includes two-thirds of China¡¯s trade volume and around 80% of its energy imports. It is between the island of Sumatra (Indonesia) and the Malay Peninsula (Malaysia and Singapore). Around 29% of the global seaborne oil trade passes through the Strait of Malacca. In fact, to reduce its critical reliance on the Strait of Malacca, China has a major energy corridor through Myanmar. A corridor consisting of two parallel pipelines transporting crude oil and natural gas from the Indian Ocean coast of Myanmar to Southwestern China.

The , on its part, connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea, which leads to the Indian Ocean. Between 12% and 15% of worldwide trade and about 30% of global container traffic transits this route. Roughly 9% of the global seaborne oil flows (about 9.2 million oil barrels a day) and 8% of liquified natural gas (LNG) volumes use this route.

The connects the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. About 5% of global marine trade passes through it. Meanwhile, barrels of oil per day pass through this waterway. However, while the Suez Canal allowed for the transit of supertankers of up to 200 thousand tons, the Panama Canal was limited to 65 thousand tons and to a configuration adapted to its particular standards. The so-called Panamax standards. Since 2014, as a result of the expansion of the canal, the standard has applied, substantially increasing both capacity and tonnage ¡ª now reaching 120,000 tons.

Other maritime routes

In addition to the aforementioned big four maritime routes, the Cape of Good Hope and the Strait of Magellan must also be mentioned. While the former connects the Atlantic and the Indian oceans at the South of the African continent, the latter links the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans through the Southern seas of South America. The Cape of Good Hope has much greater strategic significance, not only because the economic emergence of China and the Indo-Pacific sphere has enhanced its relevance, but also because the Strait of Magellan has lost much of its significance in the last few decades. This was a result of the 1980s transcontinental , which allowed for the massive transport of containers between the US¡¯s East and West coasts.

However, the Strait of Magellan could have better days ahead if climate change keeps affecting the Panama Canal. Indeed, lack of has hampered canal operations in recent years. In 2023, the El Ni?o climate phenomenon, which impacted rainfall, caused water levels to plunge in the lakes that feed the canal, leading to a forced reduction in vessel crossings.

Of much relevance, as well, are the Strait of Gibraltar, the Turkish straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles) and the Danish straits (Kattegat and Skagerrak). They respectively connect the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea (through the Sea of Marmara), and the Baltic Sea with the North Sea. 

As a result of global warming, two additional major maritime routes are opening in the Arctic ¡ª the North-East route (bordering Canada) and the North-West route (bordering Russia). While they are considered interior waters by both Canada and Russia, the US asserts that they are international straits conferring open transit rights. The US, indeed, both countries¡¯ claims as illegitimate. The geopolitical and economic significance of the Arctic routes may be enormous, as they could represent new active passages between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. This would diminish the geostrategic importance of the Strait of Malacca and, as a consequence, that of Singapore as a maritime hub.

Highly sensitive geopolitical spots

Needless to say, in addition to their economic relevance, or precisely because of it, maritime routes are highly sensitive geopolitical spots. The Suez Canal has a longstanding history in this regard. In 1956, after Egypt¡¯s President Gamal Abdel Nasser the canal, an invasion by Britain, France and Israel took place. For several months, the canal remained closed, significantly disrupting global shipping and trade. Ten years later, in 1967, the Suez Canal was again closed, as it became the frontline between the combatant forces of Israel and Egypt, during the . Following the conflict, this waterway remained shut for eight years, adding around 8,000 to 10,000 kilometers to trade shipping routes that depended on the canal.?

At the opposite end of the waterway that connects with the Suez Canal ¡ª in the Southern tip of the Red Sea that joins the Indian Ocean ¡ª there have also been recent problems. In the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, the Iranian-backed Houthis of Yemen have been commercial shipping since the end of 2023. This is in retaliation for Israel¡¯s war in Gaza.

Although the Strait of Malacca is not a contentious international spot, its adjacent South China Sea remains one of the world¡¯s most disputed maritime areas. Stepping over the claims of several South East Asian countries, as well as over the normative of the on the Law of the Sea and the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, China asserts its rights over 90% of the South China Sea.

Moreover, in 2010, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi that the sea represented a ¡°core national interest¡± for his country, while telling his Southeast Asian counterparts at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting that ¡°China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that¡¯s just a fact.¡± Additionally, in order to assert control over this waterway, China has built and militarized to the teeth 27 within it.

China¡¯s claims are not only rejected by its South China Sea neighbors but also by the US and a significant part of the international community. The US and many Western nations assert a right of free passage through this sea, challenging China¡¯s claim by periodically sailing its warships through it. Although 80% of China¡¯s crude oil imports and the bulk of its exports sail through this waterway, the same happens to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, it is a vital trade route for the 620 million people who inhabit Southeast Asian countries. A trade of more than takes place annually in those waters, representing more than one-third of the world¡¯s maritime traffic.

The Panama Canal has also become a sensitive geopolitical spot in recent times. By asserting American rights under the Monroe Doctrine, US President Donald Trump has to take it, while forcing Chinese interests out of the canal. Indeed, Hong Kong¡¯s company CK Hutchinson, which controlled two ports within it, was as a result of Washington¡¯s pressure and forced to sell such assets to the American BlackRock group. However, the represented by Trump¡¯s threat of taking possession of the Panama Canal has not disappeared.

Geopolitical significance of the Strait of Hormuz

The previous geopolitical issues provide the background for the current state of belligerence in the Strait of Hormuz. America¡¯s bombardment of Iran, being the result of a war of choice, led to what should have been anticipated ¡ª Tehran¡¯s blockade of the strait. This has led to an in oil prices that, amid fluctuations, have reached up to 40% above pre-crisis levels, while halting about 20% of global oil and liquified natural gas flows. This makes the current crisis even worse than the two oil shocks of the 1970s put together.

This situation had its antecedent in the so-called Tanker War of 1984¨C1988, a critical phase of the , during which both sides targeted oil shipping in the Persian Gulf. As a result of Iraq¡¯s attacks on Iranian oil exports, Iran retaliated by targeting not only Iraqi shipping but also neutral vessels. Over 400 oil tankers and commercial ships were struck during that period, making the targeting of civil shipping a tool of war. More recently, as mentioned before, the Houthis carried out attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, in retaliation for events in Gaza.

Both cases show a worrisome pattern of maritime insecurity. Within it, state and nonstate actors exploit maritime chokepoints to exert pressure on global energy flows as an instrument of war. Maritime routes represent the ideal setting for asymmetric warfare, as they allow for weaker actors to exploit geography, cheaper technology and economic vulnerability to inflict maximum damage. Whereas in sea or on land, narrow paths have always been the perfect spot for the few to successfully confront the many. A good historical example in this regard dates back to 480 BC, when King Leonidas¡¯s 300 Spartan hoplites stopped for several days hundreds of thousands of Persian invaders, at the Pass of .

Current events in the Strait of Hormuz have become a perfect example of both the paramount importance and the extreme vulnerability of maritime routes. Especially so when there are no alternative routes involved, as in this case. Contrary to the closure of the Suez Canal in the 1960s and 1970s, which had an optional, although much longer shipping route around the Southern tip of Africa, the Strait of Hormuz presents no alternative. There is no other waterway, indeed, to go in or out of the Persian Gulf.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post The Strait of Hormuz and the Significance of Maritime Routes appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

It was a civics textbook written for 14-year-olds with a chapter titled ¡°The Role of the Judiciary in Our Society.¡± Among other positive aspects of the judiciary, it discussed judicial backlog and corruption. It cited data and actual quotes from former judges. But the Court ordered a complete ban: seizure of physical copies, removal of digital versions, which one can access and prohibition on publication ¡°through electronic media or alternative titles.¡±

Chief Justice Surya Kant described it as a ¡°deep-rooted, well-orchestrated conspiracy¡± to malign the Judiciary, where ¡°they fired a gunshot, judiciary is bleeding today.¡± Supposedly, a schoolbook is enough to make the judiciary bleed.

If the institution is so fragile that a book chapter can injure it, then the actual health of this institution is in dire conditions. This is truly a watershed moment because the Judiciary, for the second time in Indian history, decided that its institutional comfort mattered more than our constitutional rights.

But first, I will talk about the legality of as measured against the Constitution and contempt laws. But I really want to talk about the institutional dishonesty and cowardice being shown: the wholesale misrepresentation of what the chapter actually says by the Court; the language the Chief Justice has used; the role of the Bar in triggering this whole episode; and how representative institutions are kowtowing and falling in line without a word of resistance.

The Supreme Court cannot ban a book or blacklist a person

Let¡¯s see the legality of this order. It is important to note that the Supreme Court has not invoked contempt proceedings. They have not pointed to a specific defamatory falsehood and required its correction. It issued, from its own bench, a blanket order completely banning a textbook chapter. Such suppression and prior restraint, the Court itself has ruled unconstitutional .

However, talking from first principles, Article 19(2) of the Constitution permits restrictions on speech only through a ¡°law¡± made by the ¡°State.¡± Courts have long established that judicial decisions constitute ¡°law¡± for the purposes of Article 19, and that the judiciary constitute ¡°State¡± for the purposes of Part III violations. The logical conclusion from this is that the judiciary, in all its might, does not have the power to directly restrict speech.

When the Court engages in this unique form of judicial censorship, it bypasses the Parliament and the representative government completely. As Professor of law has pointed out, such actions ensure ¡°that the deliberative process envisaged by the Constitution when it requires the State to ¡®make a law¡¯ under Article 19(2) is rendered chimerical.¡± The Supreme Court only has the power of judicial review. But they have now inserted themselves into both roles simultaneously: restricting speech as if it¡¯s the Parliament and reviewing that restriction, too.

This is just judicial power-brokering where they have turned the machinery made to protect the rights of the citizen to protect their own reputation.

The Court has also that even temporary digital restrictions can have far-reaching chilling effects on speech. But clearly, this does not apply to the Court, it seems. Last year, the very same that free speech should be measured by the ¡°standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view.¡± They have failed their own test in a spectacular fashion. It is honestly so puzzling how forgetful and hypocritical this Court is when the critics shine a spotlight on it.

But, on March 11, the Court passed which went even further. The Court barred the three authors of the chapters (Professors Michel Danino, Suparna Diwakar and Alok Prasanna Kumar) from work associated with any publicly funded curriculum.

The Court said that it had ¡°no reason to doubt¡± they had ¡°deliberately knowingly misrepresented the facts.¡± The Court said this even before the authors filed their response. The punishment was delivered, and the invitation to respond came after.

has named this Order for what it is: a judicial bill of attainder. During the in England, the legislature sometimes assumed judicial powers and passed laws known as . These laws declared individuals or groups guilty of misconduct or crimes and imposed punishment without a trial.

When the US broke away from England, bills of attainder were under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution. This stopped the practice of ¡°trial by legislature,¡± and furthered the separation of powers in the Constitution. President James Madison simply explained the need for their abolition in . He said that these ¡°Bills of attainder ¡­ are contrary to the first principles of the social compact,¡± because modern society agreed that punishment should follow the . This very Court has previously held similar ex-post laws .

What the Supreme Court has now done is take the form of the bill of attainder and clothe it in judicial power. They are punishing by decree, without explicit statutory charges being mentioned, without any law, and without a hearing.

As a measure of caution, the order does invite the three authors to ¡°approach this court for seeking modification after tendering their response.¡± But this is against Article 21 of the Constitution and the procedural guarantees therein. It delivers the punishment first, then invites the individual to explain why they should not be punished. As Bhatia , ¡°if a government department fired an employee and then issued a show-cause notice, the Supreme Court would strike it down for violating administrative law.¡± Then how can the Court do the same?

It is genuinely sad that these three authors, who wrote that ¡°the Supreme Court is the watchdog of democracy¡± and that citizens must have ¡°confidence¡± that the judiciary will protect their rights, have now been punished by the very institution they had praised.

Who needs contempt laws? Magic court powers are enough

The question of contempt powers needs to be examined, especially since the Court is not invoking that power in this case. This is very odd.

Under the Contempt of Courts , Section 2(c) defines criminal contempt as any act that ¡°scandalises, or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court.¡± This definition is undoubtedly capacious. The word ¡°tends¡± does not require actual interference with justice; even the possibility of it is enough. Section 5 provides a defense for ¡°fair criticism¡± of a finally decided case, and the 2006 amendment allows truth as a defense if the person can show they were acting in the public interest. But the test is left to the court itself to determine whether the criticism was ¡°fair.¡±

It is an odd system where the Court, which has been ¡°scandalized,¡± is the judge in its own cause, going against the principles of (the rule against bias and the right to a fair hearing). It also has clear chilling effects on freedom of speech and expression. And precisely this was the reason why the UK, the US and many other modern democracies have deemed such laws as , except for India.

But there are those who say that without such laws, the judiciary will lose its reputation. Justice H.R. Khanna, the one judge who had the spine to dissent during the Emergency, directly: ¡°Contempt of court should not be used as a means to uphold our own dignity. This must rely on surer foundation ¡­ We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication.¡±

The UK, from which we adopted the Contempt of Courts Act, saw its last in 1931. In 2018, a , ironically headed by a former judge, set out to find whether such an archaic provision should be abolished. They said no. In all honesty, these provisions are a , which does not, in the least bit, ensure the dignity of our court. And its broadness leaves to silence the critics of the Court.

But here is the deeper problem. The Court has imposed punitive measures that go beyond anything provided for in contempt laws. And the contempt law is already too far. Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act provided that a contempt will be ¡°punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with a fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.¡± There is no other punishment for contempt.

But, through their March 11 Order, the Court effectively blacklisted these authors. That, too, without initiating any contempt proceedings or even hearing them. The Supreme Court has conjured up powers from thin air, detached from any statutory or constitutional basis, and has extinguished their Article 19(1)(g) right to practice their profession effectively.

How is any of this possible? Only Justice Surya Kant knows. As one of my professors puts it, this is an example of ¡°cosmic level thinking.¡±

Blatant misrepresentations of facts

Thanks to , we still have access to the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) chapter. We also have the order. Let¡¯s see what the Court actually said versus what the .

The 18-page-long chapter opens with an epigraph from the former US Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas: ¡°The judiciary is in a high sense the guardian of the conscience of the people as well as the law of the land.¡±

It opens with the Preamble to the Constitution of India, which promises social, economic and political justice, and that justice ¡°is the cornerstone of all societies.¡± It goes on to explain the three-tier court structure, criminal versus civil cases, the role of tribunals, the consumer forum system and other relevant concepts. It also brings to attention various landmark cases of the Supreme Court. For example, the Supreme Court¡¯s striking down of Section 66A of the IT Act and the Electoral bonds scheme as a victory of free speech and democratic accountability. It also profiles the doyen of the Bench, Justice Kuldip Singh, as the ¡°Green Judge,¡± whose usage of public interest litigation protected the Taj Mahal from industrial pollution and the Ganga from tannery effluents.

It then cited constituent assembly member Madabhushi Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, who said:

This [Supreme Court] is the institution which will preserve those rights and secure to every citizen the rights that have been given to him under the Constitution ¡­ The Supreme Court is the watchdog of democracy. It is the eye and the guardian of the citizens¡¯ rights

Approximately 14-pages into the chapter, it addresses ¡°Challenges Faced by the Judicial System.¡± In it, they discuss the case backlog and pending cases. They also discuss efforts at judicial reform: mobile courts, criminal law reforms, mediation mechanisms. And then, in the penultimate subsection, it has two paragraphs of around 350 words titled ¡°Corruption in the Judiciary.¡± These paragraphs open by explaining the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct and the internal complaints mechanism (CPGRAMS), and noting that between 2017 and 2021, over 1,600 complaints were received alleging judicial or institutional misconduct.

They then quote directly a statement made by the then Chief Justice of India (CJI) Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai himself:

Sadly, there have been instances of corruption and misconduct that have surfaced even within the judiciary. Such occurrences inevitably have a negative impact on public confidence … The path to rebuilding this trust lies in the swift, decisive, and transparent action taken to address and resolve these issues… Transparency and accountability are democratic virtues.

The chapter¡¯s own summary section lists several positive takeaways: that the judiciary is one of the three pillars of government; that it ensures justice is served and laws are made within the constitutional framework; that citizens must have confidence that their rights will be protected; and that citizens have a role in helping the judiciary by bringing social concerns to its notice.

Let¡¯s see what the Supreme Court said about this chapter in its Order:

Paragraph 6 of the states that the chapter ¡°washes off with one stroke of the pen, the illustrious history associated with the Supreme Court, the High Courts and the District Courts¡± and ¡°conspicuously omits the substantive contributions made by these institutions towards the preservation of our democratic fabric.¡± As I mentioned earlier, the chapter profiles Justice Kuldip Singh. It cites the Supreme Court¡¯s free speech victories. It quotes constituent assembly members on the Supreme Court as ¡°the watchdog of democracy.¡± Are these not celebrations of the Supreme Court, its judges and its contributions?

Paragraph 6 of the Order also states that the chapter ¡°fails to acknowledge the imperative role the Judiciary undertakes in upholding Constitutional Morality and the Basic Structure Doctrine.¡± 

First of all, bringing in explicitly legal and jurisprudential doctrines for Class VIII students studying basic social sciences is a bit too much. But, in words that could not be any more similar, the chapter does say that ¡°the judiciary ensures that laws and policies made by the executive are within the framework of the Constitution¡± and that ¡°without a strong and fair judiciary, democracy cannot survive.¡± If this is not an acknowledgement of the judiciary¡¯s role in upholding the Constitution, then what would satisfy the Court?

Paragraph 7 of the Order states that the chapter ¡°chooses not to delve into any of the transformative initiatives and measures pioneered by this Court towards overhauling legal aid mechanisms and streamlining the ease of access to justice.¡± The chapter explicitly mentions Public Interest Litigation. It explicitly mentions the National Judicial Data Grid. It explicitly mentions mobile courts, mediation and the government¡¯s procedural reform measures. Are these not mentions of ¡°legal aid mechanisms¡± and ¡°ease of access to justice¡±?

Paragraph 10 of the Order states that young students ¡°lack the perspicacity to appreciate the manifold and onerous responsibilities that are discharged by the judiciary on a day-to-day basis.¡± The Court has decided, in its grand old wisdom, that eighth graders, who are doing algebra and learning refractions, are simply too dumb to handle a basic civics chapter that spends 14 pages praising the judiciary and two paragraphs acknowledging its flaws.

The Court¡¯s order is an outrage against a chapter where there is supposedly only criticism and no praise. But such a chapter does not even exist. The chapter that actually exists praises the judiciary more than enough and, in the spirit of honesty, briefly mentions that the judiciary also has some problems.

There is corruption in the judiciary at all levels

Out of an 18-page chapter and the 350-word section titled ¡°Corruption in the Judiciary,¡± other than the quote from Gavai, there is exactly one sentence that actually asserts any form of corruption in the judiciary: ¡°Nevertheless, people do experience corruption at various levels of the judiciary. For the poor and the disadvantaged, this can worsen the issue of access to justice.¡±

I am not making this up. This is what made the Supreme Court bleed. The rest of the section is just explaining the judicial code of conduct, data from the grievance redressal process and how impeachment works. But sure, all this is very dangerous material. 

But the important question is whether this is an objective statement? Is there corruption at various levels of the judiciary? Short answer: Yes. That is what the data says.

The data on judicial corruption in India is not hard to find. It is literally everywhere. I made a of such news reports in 10 minutes.

Data from shows that over 45% of Indians believe the judiciary is corrupt, which is a view also shared by . In the 2024 , India scored 38 out of 100 and ranked 96th out of 180 countries, in the same bracket as nations the Court would find deeply unflattering to be compared with. These are not abstract data points.

In 2010, a former Law Minister in a Supreme Court filing that eight of the previous 16 Chief Justices of India were corrupt. In 2014, former Supreme Court judge Markandey Katju that three former CJIs made improper compromises to protect a corrupt High Court judge. Both Katju and former Union Law Minister Shanti Bhushan faced . No one conclusively disproved either allegation. In an , when it was asked, ¡°Are bribes for bail endemic now?¡± another former CJI, Vishweshwar Nath Khare, said the following:

There is no doubt about it. It is rampant. Corruption in the lower courts is no secret. Sometimes, in the high court as well, cases of corruption have surfaced, but in my experience while I was in the Supreme Court, I have not witnessed anything similar. In the lower courts, it¡¯s alleged that everything comes for a price. Rates are fixed for quick divorce, bail and other favourable verdicts. Cases in the media glare, constantly scrutinised, are different. Otherwise, it is very difficult for the common man. There are huge time gaps between hearings. Years are spent to get an order from the lower courts.

Is this not literally what was said in the chapter? In Paragraph 2 of the Order, the CJI said that the authors were ¡°picking a few words from the statement of a former Chief Justice of India, suggesting that the judiciary itself has acknowledged the lack of transparency, accountability and institutional corruption.¡± Suggesting? Suggesting how? It is not a suggestion. It is literally a quote from the former CJI. You cannot quote someone and be accused of suggesting what they said. And from what we have seen, the Judiciary indeed has acknowledged all these problems. Well, what do they do about it?

Parliament has a judge in India. Not for the lack of trying. Because under both the , 1968, and the opaque in-house , it is so cumbersome.

This is the usual process for removing a corrupt judge in India. First, you need 100 Lok Sabha Members of Parliament (MPs) or 50 Rajya Sabha MPs to sign a motion. Then, a three-member committee investigates. If they find the judge guilty, both Houses of Parliament must pass the motion by a two-thirds majority in the same session. Then the President removes the judge. You can an emergency and suspend the fundamental rights of 1.4 billion people for less.

But even this has a caveat. When cases came close to impeachment, the before the motion passed. There is a sinister reason for this, too.

For example, Justice Soumitra Sen , the Rajya Sabha the impeachment motion and he resigned before the Lok Sabha could vote. In a 2012 Right to Information , it was found that he walked away with full post-retirement benefits because no constitutional provision barred him from keeping them. Justice Paul Daniel Dinakaran had assets beyond his known sources of income, the Rajya Sabha an impeachment motion, and he, too, resigned mid-inquiry and with benefits. Justice Narayan Shukla was found by the Supreme Court¡¯s own in-house inquiry to have credibly a bribe. He refused to resign. His judicial work was withdrawn. He sat at home for over a year collecting his until he retired in 2020.

Sen, Shuka and Dinakaran are not anomalies. They fit a long, documented pattern. The backlog of pending cases means litigants bribe just to get a hearing date; the inefficiency feeds the corruption. And in those rare instances when corruption is found, the provide these judges with . It is a win-win situation for them.

More recently, a fire at Justice Yashwant Varma¡¯s residence turned up a large stack of . As one usually does. But the impeachment proceedings have , which will be taken to its natural conclusion: his resignation with full benefits. We literally have the of the burnt cash. I don¡¯t know what else to say. And to blacklist these authors for mentioning real problems is purely vindictive and a pathetic waste of public resources and time.

The more the judiciary tries to suppress discussion of its failures, the more distrust it generates. A strong institution answers its critics, and the weak one bans schoolbooks and witch-hunts academics. Maybe the contempt jurisdiction was purposefully not invoked because, if it were, it would be clear that what these authors said was the truth. One cannot be contemptuous if they speak the truth.

At this instance, I am reminded of this fitting by Justice Antonin Scalia of the US Supreme Court, wherein he said:

This Court has not been shy to enforce the First Amendment in recent terms. It has accorded robust protection to depictions of animal torture, sale of violent video games to children, and lies about having won military medals. Who would have thought that the same Court would today exert such heroic efforts to save so plain an abridgement of the freedom of speech? It is no great mystery what is going on here. The judges of this Court, like the judges of the Supreme Court of Florida who promulgated Canon 7C(1), evidently consider the preservation of public respect for the courts a policy objective of the highest order. So it is¡ªbut so too are preventing animal torture, protecting the innocence of children, and honoring valiant soldiers. The Court did not relax the Constitution¡¯s guarantee of freedom of speech when legislatures pursued those goals; it should not relax the guarantee when the Supreme Court of Florida pursues this one. The First Amendment is not abridged for the benefit of the Brotherhood of the Robe. I respectfully dissent.

These in-house secret procedures, the resignation escapes, the weaponization of judicial proceedings, are just the ¡°Brotherhood of the Robe¡± in full action.

Language of the Supreme Court or tyrants? Both

Sociolinguistics has that language can be a tool of social control, and that its use shapes how a society understands itself and its institutions.

When the highest court speaks, it is providing an example of what authority sounds like. It is teaching our society how power talks. This is true regardless of whether the specific words carry legal force. The words of the Chief Justice clearly have ¡°social¡± consequences, too. Their mere rhetoric can determine what citizens believe they are allowed to say, think, and question. Such asymmetry demands some discipline in their language. This Court has completely abandoned it.

Thanks to some , we have a rough transcript of the proceedings. These were the words of the CJI Surya Kant in an open court: ¡°We need to find out who is responsible. Heads must roll ¡­ There must be a deeper probe into this issue. Who are the persons behind this? We want to know. We won’t close the case.¡±

On September 25, 1930, at the Supreme Court in Leipzig, German Dictator used this precise vocabulary, ¡°heads will roll in the sand,¡± to threaten his political opponents once ¡°the Fascists have taken over control of the German nation and inaugurated the day of reckoning.¡± This is not the precedent they want.

But it continues its language of retribution and revenge. During the March 11 hearing, the CJI further : ¡°Some elements have acted and reacted irresponsibly on social media. We firmly believe in catching the bull by the horns¡­ No one will be spared ¡­ Even if they are hiding outside the country, I will not spare them.¡±

The Court has also directed the Union government to identify websites and individuals who had posted critical commentary, so that ¡°action could be taken in accordance with law.¡± What law? No one knows. Just a demand for names. This kind of blanket blacklisting and witch-hunting is judicial .

But, I am not at all suggesting that CJI Surya Kant wants what Hitler or US Senator Joe McCarthy wanted. What I am pointing out is something simpler and more important: Language has its own history, and institutions do get measured by the vocabulary they choose. When a constitutional court speaks like this, the institution is projecting fear. It does not produce respect. Even in the rare instances where it does, it is not the kind of respect that will last long. 

Such harsh language against its critics creates a chilling effect. People actually fall silent. Journalists and Academics self-censor their reports. Slowly, the marketplace of ideas would narrow to nothing, and then it would die. Because the Court sponsored its killing.

The Prime Minister abdicated his constitutional responsibilities

On June 9, 2024, Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi stood before the nation, placed his hand on the Constitution of India, and for a . He swore:

I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will faithfully and conscientiously discharge my duties as a Prime Minister for the Union and that I will do right to all manner of people in accordance with the Constitution and the law, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.

After the court passed the order, Modi reportedly his displeasure and directed that ¡°accountability be fixed for those who had approved the offending chapter.¡± Soon after, Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan that ¡°the moment it came to our notice, we issued directions to withdraw the book and stop its distribution. We have the utmost respect for the judiciary, and there was no intent to disrespect the judiciary.¡±

Maybe the words are sincere to show compliance. But this is not what the Constitution requires. The PM and the Education Minister have taken an oath to the Constitution, not to the judiciary. When the elected head of the executive responds with such docility, against an ever-encroaching judiciary, one has to ask: What, exactly, does he believe he was elected to do?

I am not asking the government to revolt. But the Constitution does not expect them to simply stand by either. It requires you to ¡°do right to all manner of people in accordance with the Constitution and the law.¡± When the judiciary goes against the Constitution, as it has here, one must resist with firmness through proper constitutional channels. That is why you are required to take an oath. This is not some ¡°cosmic level thinking.¡± There is behind the moral and political obligations that an oath demands.

The last time India saw the executive and judiciary moving hand in hand against the Constitution was in 1975. When PM Indira Gandhi declared the and suspended civil rights. This Court institutional comfort over the liberty of citizens. The Court did not have the spine to stand up to the executive when it mattered the most. And it was the closest India ever came to the of constitutional governance.

That time, it was a judiciary unwilling to resist the executive. This time, it is an executive who is unwilling to defend our right to speak the truth against a ¡°dictatorial judiciary.¡± The executive exists as one of three coequal branches. Today, they have decided to publicly castrate themselves before another.

How the Bar assisted the Court in this witch hunt

There is a final disgrace that I want to name, because it has been too carefully avoided in most commentary.

This whole issue was created out of thin air, on February 25, 2026, by two of India¡¯s most prominent senior advocates: Kapil Sibal and Abhishek Manu Singhvi. There was no concerned citizen or civil society group that petitioned the Court to look into this matter. Maybe because we know that what was written was true. Or maybe because all of us have better things to do.

But, according to , these two men appeared before the Chief Justice¡¯s bench and, with a newspaper article about the NCERT chapter, expressed their shock at its contents and literally invited the court to act. They primed the Court in this witch hunt. Let this sink in for a moment.

Kapil Sibal is a veteran politician, former Union Minister for Law and Justice, current Rajya Sabha member and one of the most experienced constitutional lawyers at the Indian Bar. Abhishek Manu Singhvi is his near-peer: a senior advocate, former Additional Solicitor General and a current parliamentarian.

These are their . Mr Sibal said that ¡°the reference to ¡®corruption¡¯, particularly in relation to the judiciary, seemed deliberate.¡± Mr Singhvi added that: ¡°It is as if there is no corruption in other organs of governance ¡ª Ministers, bureaucrats, the police, politicians.¡± And here¡¯s the thing: If they actually read the book, as some have done, the book does criticize everyone. There are cartoons of election candidates hurling abuse, getting caught by the police with bundles of cash. They also mention the pending criminal cases against legislators. The judiciary got the same treatment as everybody else.

That is not the end. The current Solicitor General of India, Tushar Mehta, was also doing in this witch hunt. As the Counsel for the Union Government, he said that: ¡°these people would never work with the UGC or any ministry. We stand by the institution. No one will get away scot-free.¡± He was so into this witch hunt that he was offended on behalf of the Court. He said, ¡°The entire chapter will be revised. There is another part about pendency ¡­ justice delayed is justice denied. We can¡¯t teach that justice is denied.¡±

What more can I say? Can we not teach the truth to kids anymore? Should education just contain approved knowledge? Is that even education or just propaganda?

The sad truth is that these doyens of the Bar, as we call them in Madras, walked into the Supreme Court, with half-baked knowledge, and triggered one of the most sweeping acts of educational censorship in history.

But their actions were driven by something simpler: members of a professional guild protecting the guild¡¯s reputation. In a lecture on the rule of law, Justice H.R. Khanna that ¡°there can, indeed, be no greater indication of the decay in the rule of law than a docile Bar.¡± This Bar has been worse than docile. It has gone hand in hand with the executive and judiciary, waging war against our right to free speech and expression. This is the ¡°Brotherhood of the Robe¡± in action again.

The apotheosis of the Judiciary has to stop

To speak of the Supreme Court as some beyond all reproach and criticism is to confuse an institution of men with gods. Institutions can be wrong. Institutions can be corrupt. And when an institution begins to ban the books that say so, you are no longer in a republic. You are in a theocracy of robes.

Citizens must understand that the judiciary is not a sacred temple. It is a governmental institution created by a constitution to protect our rights, funded by taxes paid by the people, and accountable to the people and our Constitution. It deserves respect. But respect is not given on faith. It is earned through conduct. All this kowtowing from the executive and the Bar is just idol worship of an institution that is slowly ceasing to deserve respect and faith.

There is a reason that democracies insist on the separation of powers. Because, without checks and balances, each branch will eventually prefer its own comfort over its true purpose. The historical record is clear about what happens when judiciaries lose this sense of proportion. In , after the 2016 coup attempt, over 4000 judges had to be removed or suspended on suspicion of links to the 2015 failed coup attempt. Similar stuff happened in , too.

But what we learn from history is that we do not learn from history. The pattern is always the same: The institution conflates criticism of itself with an attack on the state and uses state power to respond to the criticism. Each time, it begins with something small. A textbook. A social media post. A professor or a student who spoke some impolite truth. Something heretical to their theocracy.

What remains

These past few days have told us more about the Supreme Court as an institution than the textbook ever could.

It tells us that a chapter which mostly praises the judiciary, profiles a great judge, celebrates landmark judgements and calls the Court ¡°the watchdog of democracy,¡± is nothing but a ¡°deep-rooted conspiracy.¡± It tells us that quoting a former Chief Justice¡¯s words on corruption is ¡°deliberate misrepresentation.¡±

It tells us that the fundamental rights of three academics can be extinguished without any statutory or constitutional basis and without a full hearing. It tells us that critics can be listed and witch-hunted even from abroad. It tells us that the Court¡¯s own free speech rulings apply to everyone except the Court.

It also tells something about the broader institutional cowardice on display. It tells us that the Prime Minister thinks institutional dignity matters more than educated discourse. And that three of the most powerful lawyers in the country were perfectly comfortable priming a bench against a textbook they hadn¡¯t fully read.

The bench that struck down ADM Jabalpur understood that self-correction is the mark of a healthy institution. The bells, once rung, do not unring easily. But there is still time for the Court to restore itself. The order may be revoked; the individuals may yet be heard fully and fairly. 

And look, this isn¡¯t just about a textbook. The question belongs to all those who read something and ask whether they¡¯re actually allowed to have an opinion about it. How long will we wait before this Court remembers what it is?

It is not a god. It is not a monarch. It is not beyond reproach or truth.

And if we do not speak now, we must forever hold our peace.

[Rishi A. Kumar first published this piece on .]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post The Supreme Court of India Has No Spine appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

¡ª US President

Agriculture has long been, and remains, central to Chinese civilization; it is as crucial to China¡¯s future as any other single factor.

China 9% of the world¡¯s arable land while supporting 20% of the world¡¯s population, 50% less arable land per capita than the US. Between 2010 and 2020, China lost 15 million hectares of agricultural land to urbanization, an area larger than England. Urbanization, infrastructure and industry claim a further one million hectares each year. China has only 7% of the world¡¯s freshwater, 65% of which is used for agriculture:

We used to question China for storing so much grain until Trump¡¯s trade war in 2018. It accelerated the West¡¯s retreat from globalised trade, and we saw how vulnerable China was, and its obsession with food security began to make sense. Now the situation is even worse. China has trading partners, but no real allies, and the US is pressuring its many allies to help it keep a lid on China. Not many people know of China¡¯s history of natural disasters and famines. It has no choice but to increase its productivity and find reliable global suppliers.

¡ª US agricultural official in Shenzhen

Between 1959 and 1961, an estimated 30 to 45 million Chinese people in a famine resulting from Leader Mao Zedong¡¯s Great Leap Forward. Hundreds of millions of farmers were diverted from growing food to working in makeshift, mostly inefficient village furnaces, striving to increase steel output. Spoons and pots were melted down to meet quotas. At the same time, the state tried to expand agricultural production by breaking in unsuitable land.

Chinese agricultural officials experimented with schemes such as ¡°,¡± which involved planting seeds a meter below ground in the irrational belief they would produce hardier, higher-yielding crops. This was combined with ¡°close planting,¡± a pseudoagronomic Soviet theory of clumping crops close together to increase yields. Widespread crop failures resulted. The Chinese Government also confiscated grain for storage, in part to demonstrate to the US and USSR that its mass rural collectivization was effective. Millions starved to death, many at the gates of full granaries.

Westerners with no experience of hunger, let alone famine, are unlikely to understand why the Chinese Government stores such large reserves and why people focus so much on food in their daily lives. Most Chinese families have a relative who suffered from poor nutrition at some point in their lives or know of someone who starved to death.

The government understands that a core foundation of its power and legitimacy lies in, at a minimum, being able to feed the people.

Private risk, public good

Extreme straightness is as bad as crookedness. Extreme cleverness is as bad as folly. Extreme fluency is as bad as stammering.

¡ª Chinese philosopher Lao Zi, 5th century BCE

In the late , a handful of Anhui farmers, risking imprisonment or even death, triggered China¡¯s economic reforms by growing crops to meet market demand rather than just fulfilling state-mandated quotas. In doing so, they challenged what had become a core principle of communist agricultural theory: strictly planned, collectivized farming. Leader Deng Xiaoping subsequently endorsed the Anhui farmers¡¯ initiative, dubbing it the . To this day, the state¡¯s agricultural development strategies, aimed at securing China¡¯s future sustenance and security, are based on the Anhui farmers¡¯ principles of assessing supply and demand and ensuring investment returns. Today¡¯s private sector relies on the fact that local officials ¡ª on whom farmers depend for credit and the application of market regulations and commercial law ¡ª will ultimately respect the free market.

The state has a mixed track record in its attempts to mitigate risks, ensure commercial and social stability, and drive economic growth. Some decisions have appeared to make sense in the long term, but resulted in catastrophic commercial losses in the short term. In the quest for greater independence and food security, many agricultural subsectors are oversupply and deflation, including the berry, beef and dairy sectors. While these sectors are in the process of recovering, the damage inflicted on producers and farmers has been severe. Local officials must find a way to balance their longer-term mission of improving sustainable supply and resilience with the need to deliver short-term growth key performance indicators (KPIs) to their superiors, or risk failing at both.

Both Chinese and foreign analysts often attribute radical changes in the Chinese economy to single choices by powerful individuals like Deng, or today, President Xi Jinping. While these leaders have had the vision, and at times courage, to own often radical trends, the initiatives have invariably come from the grassroots of the economy.

Sufficiency

China has learned much from the past, and is ten years into an agricultural revolution that is reshaping international markets. China cannot become totally independent in many food categories; it currently buys of globally traded soya beans (100 million tonnes) and 25% of globally traded wheat (250 million tonnes) annually, more than the combined harvests of Britain, Germany and France. But China is working hard to reduce the degree of its dependence.

The positive impact of Chinese demand on food-exporting nations is already profound. Yet no food supplier to China can take its place in the market for granted. The Chinese government has been assessing the agricultural sectors most dependent on foreign imports, while expanding domestic production where possible to reduce that dependence, particularly in dairy and beef, as well as in animal feed such as alfalfa and soya beans. This effort to diversify away from the coercive, tariff-prone West has been ongoing since US President Donald Trump¡¯s first term and what China understood to be a clear and worrying trend of deglobalization.

Some of China¡¯s trading partners that enjoy preferential market access through free trade agreements ¡ª such as Australia and New Zealand ¡ª and others hoping to gain better access, like the UK, continue to align themselves with Washington and support American attempts to contain China. Small nations like New Zealand and even middle powers like Australia would be better off avoiding military alignment altogether, or risk alienating both great powers.

Global exporters dominant in domestic Chinese food sectors should be prepared to see their primacy challenged as Beijing deploys the same private-public sector partnerships it applied in its technology sectors to stimulate growth and forge greater autonomy. Beijing is trying to boost not only local production, but also support local companies establishing premium brands to serve the needs of the rapidly growing middle class. It is partly a matter of face for the government and the Chinese people that their best products and brands are world-class.

With the exception of staples such as bananas and citrus fruit, global fruit demand was sluggish in 2025, which drove all major producing regions to increase exports to China. This exacerbated existing Chinese domestic oversupply of high-end fruits such as blueberries and cherries, yet amid that disruption, established brands such as Driscoll¡¯s held their position as market leaders. Few fruit exporters to China have put in the time and investment needed to establish their brands, and many have underestimated the burgeoning power of local competitors.

Consumer rule

The pandemic accelerated the shift in food distribution from traditional retail to online sales. Online distributors¡¯ share of retail sales grew 30% in first-tier cities from 2021 to 2023. Most food exporters to China without teams in the market lost share and brand equity to competitors, both domestic and foreign. Companies need sufficient resources not only to manage distributors but also to make independent assessments of market demand and pricing, observe retailers and engage selectively with consumers.

The Chinese market no longer delivers quick profits and sales surges to new entrants as it once did, and has become more sophisticated and competitive than many foreign companies understand. The opportunities, particularly in the food and beverage sectors, are still good but take patience, resources and deep consumer insights to realize.

Our board wants a measure of predictability so they can plan more effectively, but China is so dynamic and tough to forecast. The key is to be flexible and quick to adapt. Our management come to China frequently, and even then it is hard for them to put themselves in the minds of our consumers or competitors. Local teams need to have the resources to know their consumers, adapt to changes and have confidence that their parent companies will respect the need for swift decision-making.

¡ª Sales manager, foreign produce company in Shanghai

African growers have begun taking counterseasonal advantage to sell fruit to China since Beijing all tariffs on African produce from the continent¡¯s less-developed countries. Driscoll¡¯s Zimbabwean-sourced blueberries commanded premium prices this year and helped the brand towards a more certain position to offer a 12-month supply ¡ª a necessary strategy to endure heavy local competition in the Chinese season.

Beijing identified apples, grapes, citrus (particularly navel oranges) and kiwifruit as categories for local government assistance in the next Five-Year Plan. The choice of kiwifruit was a surprise as the category is so much smaller than the other fruit mentioned, but it is indigenous to China and recognized as a nutrient-dense ¡°superfood.¡±

Imported kiwifruit will come under increased pressure as local supply expands and local competitors challenge foreign plant variety rights while asserting China¡¯s indigenous claims to a number of original cultivars. The need is deepening for all suppliers of scale to be able to offer fruit over their off-season and maintain their brands. Companies must either procure or grow their varieties in China to protect existing sales and compete with those who will have fruit on shelves.

Farmer robots

Whoever controls food controls the people.

¡ª Mao Zedong, 1963

Driven not only by a need for food security but also by a dwindling rural labor force, China is applying some of the world¡¯s most advanced farming techniques. Many are not of its own invention, but most are being commercialized at a scale that few markets have been able to meet to date. Chinese farmers deploy ten times the number of drones in agriculture than their US counterparts.

Privately-owned Shouguang Vegetable and Food Industry Group in Shandong produces nine million tonnes of vegetables per annum from 600,000 greenhouses, covering 60,000 hectares, dominating supply to Beijing, Shanghai and a significant portion of northern China. Between 2015 and 2025, China spent on agrotechnology the equivalent cost of building 53 Three Gorges Dams: $1 trillion. In Fujian, one hydroponic and aeroponic factory farm uses 95% less water than traditional farms and yields 10,000 tonnes of vegetables, 400 times that of traditional farming per hectare per annum. It employs 15 people. Vertical farming of this kind grew 40% in 2025 and is forecast to expand by over 12% for each of the next five years, and will come to characterize produce supply to China¡¯s wealthier cities in the future.

Global producers need not only to consider the impact of China¡¯s increasing agricultural prowess in respect of Chinese companies competing in domestic markets, but also these companies¡¯ impact on markets around the world. Toughened by unremitting local and interprovincial competition, Chinese entrepreneurs in the food industry will soon make themselves felt in global markets.

Collaboration rather than protectionism is key for foreign companies wishing to maintain their domestic and global markets and expand within China. Where collaboration is not possible, foreign firms need to become sufficiently local to compete. US and German companies were early leaders in foreign investment in China in the first three decades following China¡¯s reopening because they invested and formed strong partnerships. In the middle of the last decade, they began to fall behind Chinese competitors, due to domestic political and strategic impediments in their home markets, combined with an inability to grasp the impact of Chinese long-term industrial planning.

China¡¯s need, foreign investors¡¯ gain: knowledge and technology

China¡¯s lack of arable land and freshwater sets hard limitations, and Chinese businesspeople are constantly seeking to acquire new technology and know-how. It is a mistake for foreign investors to resign themselves to the idea that they cannot participate and compete in China now. Some harbor outdated views that intellectual property is widely stolen with little legal recourse. On the contrary, Chinese entrepreneurs and scientists have created a great deal of intellectual property in recent decades, spawning a commensurate legal and, by global standards, thorough arbitration system.

This evolution has finally established a credible basis for engaging China not only as a market for products, but also as a venue for structured collaboration around technology and know-how. Such business is unlikely to encounter the stiffening domestic competition felt in product sales, aligns with Chinese policy objectives and presents stable, long-term opportunities for profit generation.

Despite the unprecedented pace of China¡¯s agricultural revolution, much of Chinese agriculture and horticulture remains technologically backward, with horticulture in particular often taking place in remote, hilly and even mountainous regions that are ill-suited to the application of the unmanned vehicles and robotic systems in which China has specialized. Foreign companies may find excellent opportunities in places that lie outside of China¡¯s wealthiest cities, but still in the hearts of markets where demand is strong, and partnerships are welcomed.

The West is rich in agricultural technology and biotechnology, and, equipped with AI tools, will develop further each year. In many fields, the West is still more advanced than China. Coupled with building fresh food brands in China, Western companies need to consider how best to invest their technology and know-how in order to participate in and profit from China¡¯s ongoing agricultural and consumer revolution.

[ first published this piece as a business report.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post China¡¯s Neglected Agricultural Revolution appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

According to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the international system is undergoing ¡°intensified fragmentation and geopolitical polarisation¡± as competition among China, Russia and the US reshapes the global order. In this context, the behavior of states that are neither great powers nor small, dependent states is crucial to systemic stability.

Why the middle matters

Middle powers matter because they offer more than geographic or economic weight; they constitute a relational space that sustains cooperation even when the largest actors retreat into rivalry. 

Middle powers are not solely defined by material capacity but by their strategic behavior, which explains that these states ¡°leverage their resources through selective leadership, niche diplomacy and active engagement in specific issue areas.¡± Their influence arises not from overwhelming force but from credible, flexible diplomacy embedded in international networks.

Yet middle power behavior cannot be purely transactional. Unlike great powers, which can absorb reputational costs through sheer weight, middle powers depend on a consistent record of principled engagement ¡ª the moment their positions appear for sale, their value as mediators and bridge-builders evaporates. Strategic flexibility is only credible when it rests on stable principles.

Notably, some of the most effective middle power actors ¡ª Norway, Qatar, Singapore and Switzerland ¡ª formally present themselves as small states, yet their diplomatic footprint tells a different story. 

This capacity to function between poles gives middle powers a unique stake in stability ¡ª they thrive not by domination but by preserving openness and predictability in a world where rivalry threatens to narrow options for all.

The pressure to choose ¡ª and the value of autonomy

Great power rivalry today extends beyond security to trade, technology and supply chains. The pressure on other states to align is real. Yet for most, alignment is neither simple nor costless.

Kazakhstan, for example, openly maintains relations with Russia, China, the EU and the US ¡ª not out of indecision, but as deliberate diversification that enhances its strategic autonomy and flexibility. As Thomas Greminger, the author of the GCSP brief, explains, this diversification gives such states greater agency while preserving room to maneuver amid competing pressures. And, T¨¹rkiye offers an even sharper illustration: a NATO member that nonetheless purchased Russia¡¯s S-400 missile system, demonstrating that strategic autonomy is exercised not only outside alliances, but sometimes in deliberate tension with them. 

Scholars describe this as ¡°flexilateralism¡± ¡ª shifting coalitions across different issues and configurations ¡ª or simply ¡°multialignment,¡± where a state maintains simultaneous partnerships across rival blocs without fully committing to any.

Autonomy in this sense is not neutrality in a moral vacuum but a careful exercise of agency ¡ª preserving space for diplomacy, cooperation and engagement across rival blocs.

When geography constrains

Geography shapes middle power behavior, but does not determine it. A strategic location between major powers can amplify diplomatic options ¡ª Kazakhstan¡¯s position at the crossroads of Russia, China and Central Asia sharpens rather than limits its multivector diplomacy, while Qatar¡¯s contested neighborhood has pushed it toward mediation and strategic connectivity as survival tools. But geography can also become a trap.

Countries wedged between Russia and the West ¡ª Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine ¡ª cannot exercise middle power agency in the same way; their contested position pushes them toward bandwagoning rather than bridge-building. The difference between a middle power and an ¡°in-between country¡± is ultimately less about location than about the political space available to make independent choices.

Communication when giants drift apart

As great powers communicate less directly, middle powers often keep vital conversations alive.

The GCSP Policy Brief highlights that middle powers deploy a range of diplomatic strategies ¡ª including bridge-building, coalition formation and mediation ¡ª to bring parties into dialogue and cooperation. It points specifically to cases like Oman and Qatar playing roles in regional mediation, facilitating negotiations between actors that might otherwise lack direct channels.

This kind of facilitation rarely makes headlines. But preventing escalation matters. When crises do not escalate into conflict, when lines of communication hold even loosely, fragmentation is contained.

Coalitions without camps

Global institutions are under strain. Consensus is harder to achieve. Formal mechanisms stagnate.

In response, middle powers are forging issue-based coalitions that sidestep rigid bloc politics. Rather than insisting on universal agreements that exclude major disagreements, these coalitions generate functional cooperation on shared risks ¡ª climate, health, food security and technology governance.

The GCSP brief notes that by forming ad hoc alliances and working collectively, middle powers can help ¡°repair, adapt and stabilise the international order¡± precisely through these narrower but productive agendas.

This cooperation does not require full alignment on all strategic questions; it is rooted in practical outcomes and shared interests in avoiding collapse into zero-sum rivalry.

Greminger¡¯s most concrete proposal points in exactly this direction. During the Cold War, a group of neutral and nonaligned states ¡ª the so-called ¡°N+N¡± ¡ª played a quiet but decisive role in facilitating dialogue between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, contributing to the stable European security order that emerged from the Helsinki Process. He asks whether a similar coalition might be needed today: Should the current Ukraine conflict move toward settlement, reconstructing a European security order will require more than deterrence ¡ª it will need committed, credible states willing to facilitate risk reduction, confidence-building and arms control. Could that coalition include middle powers like Kazakhstan, Norway and T¨¹rkiye alongside traditional neutrals like Austria, Ireland, Malta and Switzerland, with Germany and Italy as cooperative security anchors? The question is deliberately open, but the precedent is real.

Economic connectivity as a stabilizing force

In a fragmented world, economic interdependence is not just a driver of prosperity. It is a buffer against division.

Middle powers often act as connectors, integrating regional trade networks and hosting platforms for economic cooperation. Financial and logistical corridors, middle powers help build complicated efforts to draw hard bloc lines in the global economy, reducing incentives for complete decoupling.

Even outside the GCSP brief, analysts note that middle powers can exercise influence by mobilizing coalitions and exploiting opportunities where great powers are indifferent or immobilized, essentially shaping cooperative spaces where larger players otherwise struggle to do so.

The risks of erosion

Stabilizing the middle is no guarantee. Strategic autonomy can be squeezed by coercive tactics. Economic levers can become tools of political pressure. Domestic politics may harden into pro-alignment rhetoric.

Here, the GCSP brief highlights that middle powers¡¯ agency depends not just on capacity but on political commitment and diplomatic skill, observing that countries like Norway, Qatar and Switzerland combine principled engagement with reputational credibility to act as effective bridge-builders.

These dual attributes ¡ª conviction and craft ¡ª are what allow middle powers to operate as stabilizers in fractured environments.

Holding the system together

The international system need not collapse, and rivalry among great powers will surely continue. Yet the degree of fragmentation the world ultimately experiences will depend not only on the behavior of the largest states, but on whether enough mid-level states sustain cooperation, connectivity and dialogue.

In this sense, middle powers do not just fill gaps left by great power abstention. They actively shape the contours of the emerging order ¡ª not by opposing or neutralizing superpowers, but by keeping diplomatic and institutional space open.

As the GCSP brief illustrates, middle powers are uniquely positioned to contribute to stability precisely because they do not seek domination but manageable, predictable cooperation in an unpredictable world.

Their success is not a function of overwhelming force, but of relational influence ¡ª a blend of credibility, commitment and strategic autonomy. Yet realizing this potential is not automatic. It requires coordinated action, long-term vision and the willingness to lead on principled yet pragmatic agendas. In this sense, the resurgence of middle powers may be the most viable path to sustaining a rules-based international order in an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world, if they choose to act collectively and in time.

[This is an op-ed, summarized version of the publication for the GCSP, where you can find all the sources.]

Roberta Campani had some follow-up questions for the author, which he answered. You can find their exchange below:

1. On Escalation and Structural Change

Roberta Campani: Your policy brief describes a fragmented but still manageable international order. Do the recent US-Israeli strikes on Iran represent a qualitative shift from fragmentation to open confrontation? Has the structural environment for middle powers fundamentally changed?

Thomas Greminger: The recent US-Israeli strikes on Iran have only further strengthened our perception of a polarized and fragmented world order where great powers choose to follow what they perceive to be their interests without any consideration of international law. This is not to say that I wouldn¡¯t condemn the way the Iranian regime has been treating its population. So, I see a further erosion of international law with unpredictable repercussions on regional stability and the global economy, but no fundamental changes of the structural environment for middle powers.

2. On Credibility and Negotiation

Roberta Campani: When major powers signal openness to negotiations and then rapidly escalate militarily, how does that affect the credibility of diplomacy itself? Does such behavior narrow the space in which middle powers can operate as mediators?

Thomas Greminger: It undermines the credibility of diplomacy and, more specifically, conflict mediation. Just imagine that the Omani Minister of Foreign Affairs, tasked to mediate between the US and Iran, was still reporting in Washington on what he perceived to be fairly successful negotiations in Geneva, when the decision to attack militarily was taken. Compare my comments to the :

3. On Strategic Autonomy Under Pressure

Roberta Campani: You argue that middle powers rely on strategic autonomy and diversified partnerships. In moments of acute crisis, does the pressure to align intensify to a point where autonomy becomes unsustainable? How resilient is the ¡°middle¡± under coercive conditions?

Thomas Greminger: Yes, this may well happen. We have, for instance, witnessed several cases where middle powers came under US tariff pressure and felt obliged to offer major concessions. I believe that resilience can be strengthened through regional alliances that offer stronger bargaining power.

4. On International Law and Norms

Roberta Campani: Many middle powers anchor their diplomacy in multilateral norms and international law. If great powers appear willing to bypass or reinterpret these frameworks, does that weaken the normative foundations on which the middle power agency rests?

Thomas Greminger: It does. At the same time, middle powers have an intrinsic interest to preserve and rebuild a predictable, rules-based international order because they don¡¯t dispose of the might necessary to impose right. The good news is that they can still rely on a large majority of states that continue to believe in international law. There is also still a large majority of states that continue to believe in addressing global challenges through international cooperation.

5. On the Risk of Systemic Fragmentation

Roberta Campani: Is the greater danger today the rivalry itself ¡ª or the erosion of trust in diplomatic signaling and institutional commitments? In other words, what threatens the middle more: power politics or unpredictability?

Thomas Greminger: I believe it is easier for middle powers to adapt to power politics that remain stable and thereby predictable over a certain time, as we have seen in the 19th century, than having to deal with the high degree of unpredictability that marks current times.

6. On Collective Action Among Middle Powers

Roberta Campani: Your brief hints at coordination among middle powers. Do you see realistic prospects for collective middle-power initiatives in de-escalation or crisis mediation in the current environment?

Thomas Greminger: We are seeing some initial signs of such alliances. An example is regional powers aligning in response to the war in Gaza. It is true that many mini-lateral structures have popped up in recent years that address specific challenges in a pragmatic, ad-hoc way, but most of them actually serve great power interests. Clearly, middle powers would have to aim for such alliances much more systematically. This would often also imply readiness to overcome regional differences.

7. On Switzerland¡¯s Role

Roberta Campani: Given Switzerland¡¯s diplomatic tradition and your own background, do you see particular responsibilities or opportunities for neutral or non-aligned states in preventing further fragmentation?

Thomas Greminger: Yes, absolutely! At the same time, Swiss foreign policy is very busy regulating its long-term relationship with the EU, dealing with the repercussions caused by the wars in Europe and in the Middle East, and responding to the challenges of the neomercantilist trade policies of one of its most important trade partners. There is therefore a need for a lot of political leadership and commitment for exploiting the opportunities offered to middle powers like Switzerland. It would like other middle powers also to look for creating new cross-regional alliances, perhaps similar to the Human Security Network operating successfully some 25 years ago.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post The Agency of Middle Powers in a Fragmented and Polarized World appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

To the world¡¯s shock, Iran¡¯s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, perished. Iran¡¯s future is now plunged into a state of uncertainty. The country has countered with on strategic locations across the Middle East, including some US facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

As a tiny country, Taiwan¡¯s government worries about these tensions. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese people find themselves in a tight situation as the Chinese navy the island. US intelligence and several think tanks that China will invade Taiwan by 2027 by multiple military units from any spot. After the delayed special defense budget meeting, Taiwan¡¯s Legislative Yuan approved the $40 billion purchase of armed units ¡ª mostly from the United States ¡ª to upgrade the country¡¯s readiness to face China.

In his speech, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te to allocate 3% of GDP to military expenditure and to reach 5% of GDP in 2030.

The new turbulence in the Middle East has significantly impacted Taiwan¡¯s position as a global player. Although Taiwan is far away from that region geographically, Lai ensures that Taiwan¡¯s interests are protected, at least for its citizens, economy and political awareness. In response to the catastrophe, he expressed in closely monitoring the situation and taking precautionary measures.

People first

Taiwan should not be recognized as a sovereign country by all members of the United Nations. As of early 2026, only 12 countries, primarily located in the Pacific, formally it. In terms of political influence, Taiwan lacks the capacity to act as a ¡°peacemaker¡± like Qatar or Norway, which have established experience in mediation.

The rising tensions are a clear indication for Taiwan to enter a state of heightened alert, necessitating an awareness of its precarious position. Taiwan must confront the stark reality of its situation. Compared to the key players involved in the current turmoil, including the US, Israel, Iran and others, Taiwan has significantly limited offensive capabilities. This creates an asymmetrical power dynamic.

Taiwan must urgently prioritize protecting its citizens. This requires effective coordination and communication among Taiwan¡¯s non-diplomatic offices in the Middle East. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has that 3,000 Taiwanese individuals in the region are safe. Additionally, the Taiwanese government has no immediate plans to its nationals from the Middle East, as Iran¡¯s retaliatory actions have primarily targeted US sites. However, given the volatility, the Taiwanese government should take further steps to ensure its citizens¡¯ safety.

Global economic fallout

The Iranian government is now shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. This strategic waterway serves as a vital maritime route for international trade, connecting the Middle East to Europe. The blockade would significantly disrupt the maritime route, as vessels bound for Europe would need to around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of South Africa. That takes longer and incurs higher operating costs.

This change of trade routes will likely affect the Taiwanese economy. of its oil is sourced from the Middle East, primarily due to its high sulfur content. Trade relations between Taiwan and Middle Eastern countries have been on the rise, with oil imports representing of Taiwan¡¯s total imports. Therefore, the significant dependence on that oil hurts Taiwan¡¯s energy needs.

State-owned oil suppliers CPC Corporation, Taiwan, and Formosa Petrochemical Corporation have announced an increase in fuel prices. Gasoline prices will soon by $0.20 New Taiwan dollar (less than $0.01) per liter, while diesel prices will increase by $0.40 ($0.01) per liter.

The situation also poses a risk to Taiwan¡¯s investment landscape. While Taiwan may carry less political clout, it experienced an ¡°¡± from the 1950s to the 1980s. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company stands as the world¡¯s leading producer of advanced technology, responsible for 90% of global production.

In the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, countries worldwide are compelled to embrace technology to foster progress across all sectors. In the Middle East, Taiwan has technological defense, such as drones, naval systems and surveillance equipment, to countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

What Taiwan needs

As a country under pressure from multiple sides, Taiwan needs to be ready to face global complexity. It requires a ¡°watching and preparing¡± approach, pursuing adaptive policies aligned with national measures to ensure that Taiwan remains responsive to the evolving geopolitical landscape.

In response to these tensions, Taiwan¡¯s national interest lies in safeguarding its people and upholding economic resilience. The country needs to implement decisive strategies that bolster economic stability and growth. Doing so would reinforce its position amidst geopolitical uncertainties.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post Taiwan Watches and Prepares Amid Global Uncertainty appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The economic consequences are immediate. Oil prices have already jumped as markets price in the risk of supply disruption and prolonged instability. Analysts that a prolonged conflict could push oil prices above $100 per barrel and intensify inflation across import-dependent economies.

For Indonesia, the war presents a clear danger. The country still relies heavily on imported crude oil and refined fuels. When global prices surge, Indonesia¡¯s fiscal burden through fuel subsidies and higher import bills. Yet crises often create opportunities for structural change. The current oil shock could become a catalyst for Indonesia to accelerate its long-delayed energy transition.

A global oil crisis should not be treated only as a short-term emergency. It should also be treated as a catalyst for a faster shift toward cleaner, more resilient energy systems. Indonesia, as well as the rest of the world, must invest in this change now before it is too late.

Renewable energy expansion

The most immediate step is electrification. Indonesia¡¯s transport and logistics sectors remain deeply on diesel fuel. Trucks, buses and delivery fleets vast amounts of imported petroleum. Electrifying these systems would reduce exposure to global oil volatility. Electric buses for urban transport, electric freight corridors for logistics and electric two-wheelers for urban mobility could significantly reduce oil demand. When electricity increasingly comes from renewable sources, the economic benefits multiply.

The power sector is equally important. Many regions across Indonesia still on diesel-fueled generators, particularly in remote islands. This diesel-based electricity generation is expensive and heavily reliant on fuel logistics. Replacing these plants with renewable systems would deliver immediate gains.

Indonesia also has enormous renewable energy . Solar energy alone could reach around 100 gigawatts through the large-scale deployment of panels across the archipelago. Wind energy has the potential to provide roughly 154.6 gigawatts of capacity, with hydropower resources potentially contributing another 89.3 gigawatts. The technology and human resources already exist; what remains is decisive government policy.

A major renewable expansion would also reduce the burden of energy subsidies. Diesel imports expose the state budget to global price spikes, and renewable energy systems operate without fuel imports once installed. The result is more predictable electricity costs and greater fiscal stability.

Government policy should therefore focus on accelerating investment in renewable energy, particularly in the power sector. Fiscal incentives can support the installation of solar panels, wind turbines and hydropower plants. Tax credits, concessional financing and long-term power purchase agreements would attract both domestic and international investors.

Indonesia has already set a target of at least renewable energy in the national energy mix. That level should be seen as a minimum threshold rather than a ceiling. The higher the renewable share, the stronger Indonesia¡¯s buffer against external shocks such as oil price spikes. However, not all policy responses move in that direction.

The environmental and energy security trade-offs

One frequently proposed response to rising oil prices is expanding biodiesel blending mandates. The idea of moving toward B50 ¡ª a 50% palm oil biodiesel blend with diesel fuel ¡ª is often as a solution to energy security. However, it is not an ideal solution, as palm oil blending still relies on petroleum diesel. The system continues to depend on imported fossil fuels. That is the policy¡¯s fundamental weakness. Blending reduces diesel demand, but it does not eliminate it.

Environmental consequences also deserve attention. Expanding palm oil plantations can worsen deforestation and ecological degradation. The recent flooding in parts of Sumatra has already raised concerns about the loss of natural water absorption areas linked to plantation expansion. Several companies whose permits were revoked were connected to plantation related environmental violations.

Further expansion of plantations could create new risks. In Papua, large-scale palm oil development raises fears of land conflicts with local communities and further deforestation. A cleaner strategy lies elsewhere: Solar farms, wind projects and hydropower installations reduce fossil fuel demand without triggering the environmental tradeoffs associated with large-scale plantation expansion.

Indonesia should also strengthen its international commitments to move away from fossil fuels. Joining the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation would provide a clear roadmap to reduce dependence on crude oil while accelerating investment in renewable energy systems.

The time to diversify

The war in the Middle East is a geopolitical crisis with global consequences. Oil prices are rising sharply; trade routes remain unstable; import-dependent countries are starting to feel the pressure. For Indonesia, the lesson is straightforward: Energy security cannot depend on imported fossil fuels vulnerable to distant conflicts.

The current war may destabilize energy markets, but it may also provide the political urgency needed to accelerate Indonesia¡¯s transition toward renewable power. Crises often force choices that normal politics would otherwise delay, and Indonesia now faces one of those moments. The only question now is whether Indonesia will seize this opportunity to diversify its energy supply or remain dependent on oil.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post The Middle East War Could Finally Push Indonesia Toward Renewable Energy appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The collapse of China¡¯s Iranian oil ecosystem

Iran supplied about 13% of all the crude oil China imported by sea last year, with more than percent of Iran¡¯s total oil exports flowing to Chinese refineries ¡ª most of it to smaller ¡°¡± operations along the coast that had quietly built their business models around sanctioned, discounted barrels. That ecosystem has now collapsed.

Chinese refiners have been pushed into global spot markets where they must compete for replacement oil at war-inflated prices, settling transactions in US dollars under close international scrutiny. The yuan-denominated shadow trade that sustained both Iran¡¯s economy and Beijing¡¯s dedollarization ambitions is gone, possibly forever.

Beijing spent the better part of a decade for precisely this kind of disruption ¡ª diversifying suppliers, building strategic reserves, accelerating its domestic renewables buildout, and establishing alternative pipeline routes through Central Asia and Russia. China will absorb this, but what it cannot so easily absorb is the lesson that the war broadcasts to every country that has built its security around a partnership with Beijing.

The limits of China¡¯s partnership model

The 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Iran, in 2021, was supposed to be the flagship of Beijing¡¯s alternative world order ¡ª proof that countries could anchor their futures to China rather than to Washington¡¯s alliance system. Iran was to receive investment, integration into Chinese-led institutions such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and de facto diplomatic cover through its association with Beijing. In exchange, Beijing took advantage of cheap oil ¡ª a critical node in the Belt and Road Initiative¡¯s overland corridors, and a geopolitical buffer against American power projection in the Gulf.

The problem is that China¡¯s version of partnership comes without a security guarantee. True to form, this has always been Beijing¡¯s calculated position ¡ª no entangling alliances, no forward military commitments, no meaningful positions that are not skewed to Beijing¡¯s advantage and no risk of being dragged into someone else¡¯s war.

Chinese analysts defend this as strategic wisdom, arguing it gives Beijing maximum flexibility and avoids the type of overstretch that has degraded American power. In practice, it means that when the US and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury, China¡¯s comprehensive ¡°strategic partner¡± had no one to call.

Strategic messaging meets strategic reality

Beijing¡¯s defenders will note that intervening militarily was never a realistic option. China is not going to fight the US over Iran. The issue is whether Beijing¡¯s entire framework for challenging American dominance ¡ª the Global Security Initiative, proclamations about a multipolar world order in which China is prominent, and solemn declarations that ¡°the East is rising¡± and that China stands for peace ¡ª means anything when tested by violence. The answer is no.

There is also the question of what China may have inadvertently contributed to the war¡¯s timing. that Beijing was supplying Iran with carrier-killer missiles ¡ª weapons that would have taken months to deploy but whose transfer narrowed the window for any diplomatic resolution ¡ª suggest that China¡¯s deliberate ratcheting up the heat may have accelerated the crisis it sought to avoid. It was a profound strategic miscalculation: China helped make the war more likely while lacking either the will or the means to prevent it.

Beijing¡¯s Calculus: business with Washington

For Chinese President Xi Jinping, the immediate calculus is clear. He is prioritizing the upcoming with US President Donald Trump in Beijing. He is protecting the trade truce that has given China room to breathe during a period of acute economic pressure. He is choosing business with America over solidarity with Iran. While being rational, it is also exactly what Washington always suspected China would do when forced to choose.

The longer game is harder to read. China will likely seek to expand its economic presence in Iran once the dust settles, positioning itself for the reconstruction contracts and the oil access that will eventually reemerge ¡ª just as it did following the end of the Iraq War. Beijing is already framing its restraint as proof of responsible statecraft ¡ª in contrast to American militarism.

But the countries that matter most to Chinese grand strategy ¡ª Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, the emerging economies of Southeast Asia and Africa, and the Global South more generally ¡ª are watching. They are watching China absorb a significant strategic loss, respond with only statements and wait. They are undoubtedly calculating what a partnership with Beijing would actually be worth in their own hour of crisis and need.

The Iran war has not ended China¡¯s rise, but it certainly has clarified its terms. While Beijing can offer markets, infrastructure and diplomatic cover, it will not offer security. That distinction may well prove to be the defining limit of Chinese power in the century ahead.

[Daniel Wagner is CEO of Country Risk Solutions and author of five books on China.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post What the Iran War Reveals About the Limits of Chinese Power appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

That is the core message you can read between the lines of the International Monetary Fund¡¯s (IMF) 2026 concluding statement: Japan has displayed impressive resilience, output is running above potential and inflation has been above the Bank of Japan¡¯s (BoJ) 2% target for an extended stretch ¡ª but the next phase will be defined less by ¡°escape velocity¡± than by?navigation. With the output gap positive and inflation expected to converge down to the target, the IMF argues that policy should be calibrated to sustain stability while rebuilding fiscal buffers and ensuring labor-market tightness translates into real wage gains. In other words: The liner is moving again; now it must pass through a narrow strait without scraping the rocks.

Goldman Sachs¡¯ harmonizes with that baseline but adds a market practitioner¡¯s edge: The fundamentals look steady ¡ª domestic demand, capex and a labor shortage-driven wage cycle ¡ª but the policy risks are rising, especially around the timing of BoJ normalization and the durability of expansionary fiscal choices. If the IMF writes like a harbor master, Goldman writes like a weather forecaster watching pressure systems gather. Same sea, different instruments.

A recovery with ballast

Start with what is working. Japan¡¯s growth, in the IMF¡¯s view, has been resilient: it exceeded potential in early 2025 and is projected to remain strong in 2026 even as external demand softens. Domestic demand has stayed firm despite elevated uncertainty and the of US tariffs. This matters because Japan¡¯s post-bubble history is littered with recoveries that depended on foreign tides. A cycle led by domestic demand is like ballast in rough water: it stabilizes the ship.

Goldman¡¯s narrative is similar, and more explicit: 0.8% real GDP growth in 2026, led by consumption and capex, with the economy structurally shifting toward persistent labor scarcity. In that frame, Japan is not merely enjoying a cyclical upswing; it is entering a new regime where labor shortages force wage-setting behavior to change ¡ª slowly, unevenly, but meaningfully.

Yet even here the metaphor has teeth. The engine is running, but the passengers are complaining. The IMF notes that nominal wages are rising at a historic pace, but persistent cost-of-living concerns remain because headline inflation has eroded purchasing power and real wages have continued to contract. That is the political economy of 2026: You can tell households the ship is moving again, but they will judge the voyage by how the cabin feels ¡ª warmth, food and the price of essentials.

Inflation: the fire in the hearth, not the fire in the walls

Japan¡¯s inflation story is both a triumph and a trial. After three decades of near-zero inflation, prices have been rising faster than the BoJ¡¯s target for three and a half years. For policymakers who spent years trying to light a fire under the economy, this is proof that the hearth is finally warm. But any homeowner knows: Warmth is welcome; smoke is not; and fire in the walls is a disaster.

The IMF¡¯s baseline is that inflation should moderate in 2026 and converge toward the target in 2027, helped by easing global oil and food prices, stabilization in domestic rice prices, and fiscal measures that contain prices. Core inflation, however, may remain more persistent than anticipated, partly because the fiscal stance is projected to be more accommodative.

Goldman¡¯s view is more pointed: Underlying inflation rises moderately amid continued wage growth in the low-3% range, while headline inflation decelerates mainly due to slower food prices. This is the key nuance. Japan may be shifting from a story dominated by imported inflation and commodity spikes to one where service prices ¡ª driven by wages ¡ª become the durable component. That is exactly the sort of inflation central banks treat as ¡°real,¡± because it speaks to domestic momentum rather than global weather.

The risk is not simply that inflation stays above target; it is that expectations and wage-setting begin to embed a higher inflation norm before the BoJ has fully regained conventional policy footing. In the metaphor, it¡¯s not the flames you see; it¡¯s the ember you forget, the one that catches later when the wind changes.

Monetary policy: walking the tightrope while the rope is still being strung

Both the IMF and Goldman agree that the BoJ is at a crucial stage. The IMF supports a gradual, data-dependent withdrawal of accommodation, moving toward neutral by 2027, and emphasizes uncertainty around where ¡°neutral¡± really sits after years at the effective lower bound. This is not cautious for its own sake. It is cautious because Japan¡¯s financial system, wage dynamics and inflation psychology are all being reconditioned at once. The BoJ is trying to tune an instrument while the concert is already underway.

Goldman, by contrast, argues for a faster cadence: shifting from annual hikes to semi-annual, reaching 1% with a 25 basis point hike in July 2026, and aiming for a terminal rate of around 1.5% ¡ª its estimate of neutral. It warns that the cost of delaying hikes rises as underlying inflation approaches 2%. Delay too long, and the BoJ might ultimately need to hike into restrictive territory.

These positions are less contradictory than they appear. The IMF is optimizing for stability under uncertainty; Goldman is optimizing for avoiding a ¡°behind-the-curve¡± catch-up. In metaphorical terms: The IMF says, ¡°Keep both hands on the wheel and don¡¯t oversteer in fog.¡± Goldman says, ¡°If you wait too long to turn, you may hit the pier.¡±

What matters most is credibility. The IMF explicitly welcomes Japan¡¯s flexible exchange-rate regime and stresses that BoJ independence and credibility help keep inflation expectations anchored. That independence is not a ceremonial banner; it is a structural beam. If it weakens, policy becomes more expensive: The market demands a premium, the currency becomes more volatile, and every rate move does less work.

Fiscal policy: the sugar rush versus the diet plan

If monetary policy is the tightrope, fiscal policy is the buffet table. The IMF credits Japan¡¯s post-pandemic consolidation ¡ª strong revenues and spending restraint ¡ª with a primary deficit in 2025 that is estimated to be smaller than in 2019 and among the smallest in the G7. But it also warns that near-term policy should refrain from further loosening, preserving gains in consolidation and explicitly advises against reducing the consumption tax ¡ª an untargeted measure that erodes fiscal space and adds to fiscal risks.

Goldman¡¯s analysis lands in the same neighborhood but uses a different street map. It argues that fiscal soundness has been maintained because Japan has enjoyed a ¡°bonus stage¡± in which nominal growth exceeds the government¡¯s effective interest cost. That makes the debt-to-GDP ratio easier to stabilize ¡ª even with deficits ¡ª because the denominator grows faster than the interest burden. But Goldman¡¯s warning is sharp: Permanent tax cuts and permanent spending increases can reverse the debt trajectory, and rising market rates eventually raise debt-service costs, making market confidence and debt management more important.

The shared conclusion is straightforward: temporary relief can be affordable; permanent promises are the real danger. A one-off cash transfer is like giving passengers a blanket during a cold night. A permanent tax cut without a funding plan is like removing the ship¡¯s watertight doors because they look bulky ¡ª fine until the storm hits.

The IMF¡¯s preference for targeted, temporary, budget-neutral support ¡ª and its openness to refundable tax credits ¡ª fits this logic. It is easier to steer with a compass than with applause. Fiscal policy should protect the vulnerable without locking in structural deficits that reduce room to maneuver when the next shock arrives.

Financial stability: The tide is rising, and so is the price of duration

Japan¡¯s financial system is broadly resilient, the IMF says, with strong capital and liquidity positions and improved profitability as rates rise. But the sources of risk have shifted. Higher yields can generate valuation losses, and structural vulnerabilities ¡ª mark-to-market securities positions, foreign exchange (FX) and cross-currency funding exposures, and pockets of weakness in commercial real estate ¡ª remain. Regional banks, in particular, appear more vulnerable due to weaker shock absorbers and demographic headwinds.

This is where normalization becomes real. For years, the BoJ¡¯s outsized participation in the Japanese Government Bond (JGB) market acted like a breakwater, damping volatility. As it reduces its balance sheet and market functioning improves, Japan gets price discovery back ¡ª but price discovery is not always gentle. The IMF calls for close monitoring of JGB market liquidity and investor positioning and suggests that the BoJ should be ready for exceptional, targeted interventions if volatility undermines liquidity, while communicating clearly to avoid impairing market functioning.

In plain terms: Japan is learning to sail without training wheels. That is necessary. It is also risky if communication falters or fiscal headlines spook investors.

Structural reform: turning labor shortages into real wage gains

If you want one policy ¡°north star¡± for 2026, it is real wages. The IMF highlights a stubborn reality: Despite labor shortages, real wage growth has been elusive, and the gap between productivity and wages has widened substantially since the mid-1990s. The diagnosis is institutional: Low mobility reduces competition for skills, weakens worker bargaining power and slows productivity-enhancing reallocation. The prescription is to raise mobility via job-based employment and merit-based pay, correct labor supply distortions, and expand active labor market policies and reskilling ¡ª especially to manage AI-driven displacement while capturing productivity gains temporally.

This is where Japan¡¯s macro story becomes a social contract story. An economy with a labor shortage can produce higher wages, but only if the system allows workers to move to higher-productivity areas and firms to compete for talent. Otherwise, you end up with tightness without bargaining power: a paradox that breeds frustration and invites populist fiscal fixes.

The big picture: a strong hull, but watch the steering

Japan in 2026 has sturdier fundamentals than many observers expected: steady growth powered by domestic demand, inflation no longer stuck at zero, corporate investment adapting to labor scarcity and a central bank finally able to move policy rates without fearing immediate relapse into deflation.

But the next test is not whether Japan can grow. It is whether Japan can govern the transition from extraordinary policy to sustainable normalcy. The IMF¡¯s baseline offers the roadmap: calibrate monetary tightening gradually toward neutral, keep fiscal policy from becoming permanently expansionary, rebuild buffers and undertake labor reforms so that real wages rise. Goldman¡¯s overlay adds the caution flags: if the BoJ delays too long, it may have to hike more sharply later; if fiscal expansion turns permanent, the debt trajectory and market confidence can change quickly.

Back to the ocean liner: Japan has regained forward motion. The engines are humming. The sea is not calm, but the ship is seaworthy. Now comes the narrow strait ¡ª where small steering errors matter more than raw power. If Japan keeps the wheel steady, uses fiscal policy like a compass rather than confetti and turns labor tightness into durable real wage gains, 2026 can be remembered as the year Japan didn¡¯t just sail again ¡ª it learned to steer in open water.

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While technology is important, it addresses only part of the problem. The largest source of environmental harm , in land clearing and peatland drainage. Forests are cut, carbon is released and ecosystems are fragmented long before palm oil reaches a mill. Financing biofuel projects without strict safeguards allows these impacts to continue, creating a gap between cleaner mills and destructive cultivation practices. This gap undermines any claims of meaningful sustainability.

Indonesia has already experienced the consequences of unchecked expansion. Between 2001 and 2023, the country millions of hectares of tree cover, much of it tied to agricultural development. In many cases, forests were intentionally cleared using fire, which not only destroyed ecosystems but also public health, displaced communities and strained regional relations. These patterns should not repeat in a country with one of the world¡¯s last large intact forest landscapes.

Indonesia¡¯s forests massive amounts of carbon and support biodiversity found nowhere else on earth, giving them extraordinary ecological value. Large-scale plantation development threatens to fragment these ecosystems and undermine indigenous land rights. Once damaged, such environments are difficult, if not impossible, to restore.

China¡¯s financial influence gives it leverage to prevent this outcome. As a major investor and energy consumer, China can set clear conditions for cooperation. Halting funding for biofuel projects associated with deforestation would send a strong market signal: that economic partnership does not require environmental compromise.

This is not an argument against cooperation, but rather an argument for better cooperation. China can redirect investment toward projects that increase productivity on existing plantations rather than expanding into forests. Supporting replanting programs, yield improvements and methane capture technology would reduce emissions without triggering new land conversion.

Practical steps

To make this approach practical, Chinese policy banks, commercial lenders and Indonesian regulators should anchor cooperation in four measures. 

First, lenders should require verifiable zero deforestation commitments as a condition of financing, backed by satellite monitoring and public reporting. Second, Indonesian authorities must secure indigenous and local community land rights before project approval, with lenders verifying compliance. Third, both governments should mandate full supply chain disclosure, including independent verification of emissions and sourcing. Fourth, financing contracts should include automatic suspension clauses when violations occur, enforced jointly by regulators and financial institutions.

These steps are also strategic. Global markets are imports of commodities linked to deforestation, and investors are screening portfolios for environmental risk. Projects that ignore these trends risk becoming stranded assets. For Indonesia, higher standards strengthen long-term market access while protecting livelihoods. Short-term gains from deforestation are fleeting; credible, sustainable practices ensure economic stability over decades.

The Low Emission Palm Oil Mills initiative can still play a constructive role if paired with firm upstream protections. Technology should complement conservation, not distract from it. Sustainability begins with decisions about where plantations are allowed and where they are not.

China and Indonesia can become a model?

Cleaner mills alone cannot prevent forest loss, but when integrated with strong land-use standards, transparency and community protections, they can reinforce sustainable production. The real test of progress is simple: forests remain intact, communities retain their rights and emissions decline across the full supply chain. If these outcomes are met, cooperation between Indonesia and China can become a model of green growth for tropical commodities.

Ending biofuel financing tied to deforestation is not a retreat from partnership. It is a commitment to responsible development, recognizing that once primary forests disappear, no mill, no matter how advanced, can restore them. Protecting forests, enforcing standards and supporting communities is the path to a palm oil industry that is both economically valuable and environmentally credible.

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When the army is restless and distrustful,

trouble is sure to come from other feudal princes.

¡ª , 6th century BCE

The in late January of General Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission, spawned rumors of a coup d¡¯¨¦tat, with fringe Western online showing AI-doctored videos of tanks purportedly in Beijing suburbs, and some even reporting gunfire around General Zhang¡¯s residence. Wherever political systems are shrouded in secrecy and opacity, conspiracies flourish. China¡¯s closed political culture, in particular, nourishes conspiracy theorists both domestically and abroad.

Debunking myths: understanding power dynamics within the Chinese Communist Party

The traditional Western commentariat has been somewhat constrained, yet it is still feeding the that Chinese President Xi Jinping is under pressure from party factions, and that the arrest of General Zhang was an example of Xi¡¯s struggle to retain presidential power through tenuous control of the military. Prominent US papers alleged Zhang was , selling officer commissions and even leaking nuclear secrets to the Pentagon.

No outsider can truly know what takes place within the labyrinths of power in the Chinese Communist Party (the Party), let alone the military, but the causes of General Zhang¡¯s demise are more likely his strategic and tactical differences with President Xi, and his determination to pursue his own line, supported by a number of other senior commanders. This represented a faction or, at least, the seeds of one. That Xi moved against a figure as powerful as Zhang so swiftly and without tanks in the streets of Beijing demonstrated his power, not his vulnerability.

There is a China of common reality and a China of the foreign imagination. In the latter, the economy is always on the brink of collapse, and the government, led by recalcitrant communists, is mired in factional conflict. In reality, while social change over the decades has been radical, the day-to-day experience of both civil and public life is largely stable and predictable. The Party and government are stronger and more integrated with society than at any stage in modern Chinese history, and the People¡¯s Liberation Army () is obedient to the Party as never before, even more than under Mao Zedong.

Transforming the PLA: challenges, reforms and strategic aspirations

In 2013, a year after his ascension to power, Xi a series of military reforms. Former Chinese Leader Deng Xiaoping also drove military reforms in the , a time when units of the air force still practised formation flying with little models of Mig fighter jets in their gloved hands, moving in unison around basketball courts. China¡¯s military had come a long way from the post-revolutionary, post-Korean War army, but was still backward, running exercises that were largely performative. Rivalry between the various branches of the armed forces was rife, and corruption was endemic. Commissions were traded widely, affecting advancement for even the lowest ranks and disrupting the meritocratic principles upon which the PLA was based. In 2013, the PLA still functioned much like a giant, inefficient state-owned enterprise, with more soldiers employed supplying food, uniforms and equipment than in fighting units.

China¡¯s last significant military action was a limited incursion into Vietnam¡¯s border provinces in , in which both sides suffered heavy casualties, and after which both claimed victory. The US and Indian armed forces, on the other hand, have fought in a number of engagements, creating an experienced officer corps and competence in deploying modern weaponry. The of the PLA has been informed by China¡¯s close observation of recent conflicts, particularly the Russia¨CUkraine War, yet the modern PLA remains untested in combat.

Despite this, observers would be mistaken to assume that Chinese soldiers lack the logistical skills needed for combat, for the PLA is for disaster relief and has consistently met practical and leadership challenges, while winning the widespread respect of the people.

President Xi¡¯s proposed changes to the PLA seem rational: the formation of small, flexible brigades that can respond to crises quickly and deploy mobile missile capabilities. He has the Marine Corps to more than 50,000 soldiers to support China¡¯s increased, largely defensive naval capacity and has invested heavily in drone and unmanned-submarine development. As the Ukraine¨CRussian conflict is , drones are now a critical factor in battle, and China already has the capacity for the deployment of unmatched massed drone swarms.

It is significant that General Zhang was the last serving senior military commander with actual battlefield experience, which he gained in the 1979 war. His removal seems to undermine Western that Xi plans to invade Taiwan next year. After a succession of , the Central Military Commission, chaired by Xi, has only two of the mandated seven members left. As much as he will need to establish a political succession plan should he take a fourth term, Xi now needs to appoint the next generation of military leaders to fill the vacancies his purges have created.

Rethinking Western strategies: a diplomatic approach to China¡¯s military evolution

The West¡¯s sense of exceptionalism and attendant lack of humility means that its policymakers and commentators alike often fail to appreciate the experimental nature of China¡¯s political and industrial evolution and the scale of development across all parts of Chinese society. The Chinese military is no exception. The US and its allies will need to do better than invest in the poor science fiction that is , or rely on the chimera that is to counterbalance China. They would benefit from reconsidering their conventional approach of holding annual war games in Chinese sovereign waters, which amount to sound and fury, signifying little and increasingly damaging diplomatic trust and trade relations.

There is little any power can do to stop China from continuing to develop a military commensurate with its demographic, geographic and economic scale. But the US and its allies¡¯ actions can and will impact China¡¯s perceptions of strategic and military threat. Unlike the US, China can point to its track record of avoiding military deployment outside its borders (with the exception of peace-keeping missions) for nearly 50 years, and it is unlikely to discard this record casually.

[ first published this piece as a business report.]

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Over the last decade, the American and European architects of the rules-based global order disabled it step by step, believing they would lose their centuries-old political dominance in competition with China.

More recently formed entities and forums, such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), are the pre-eminence in Asia of such institutions as the US-dominated World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The economic influence of the US Government itself is receding. China does not need to confront the US in order to establish its authority in the region; it just needs to stand back and allow the US to continue disempowering itself.

Initially a diplomatic coalition of relatively non-aligned nations, the 10 BRICS nations are forging deeper commercial links each year, with applying to join in 2025. BRICS operates a renminbi-backed Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), allowing to bypass the dollar-dominated trading system. Trump¡¯s and weaponization of the US currency leave America¡¯s friends and foes alike little choice but to seek alternatives to the dollar, or risk being ensnared in random sanctions and trade embargos. Washington and war by non-military means against 30 countries today.

The includes China, Russia, much of Central Asia, India and Pakistan, with Iran, Afghanistan and Mongolia as observers. Despite the fact that some members are unnatural allies and even adversaries, the SCO is becoming a regional platform for establishing Asian and Central Asian economic and trade norms.

It is as innate for humans to collaborate as it is for them to compete; governments in the pursuit of economic self-interest can manage these opposing motives. There is no better demonstration of this than the Chinese-seeded Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which meets needs in Asia unfulfilled by the Asian Development Bank and the IMF. India, China¡¯s frequent adversary, is the AIIB¡¯s largest debtor.

When I joined the AIIB, not being a China specialist, I was unsure whether I could deal with its culture. The office culture can be a challenge sometimes; it is very Chinese and so different to what I have known. But the investment strategy is more objective than similar organisations I have worked for in the West. In fact, as we grow and bring in more members, Chinese influence reduces. It was designed this way. ¡ª AIIB manager

By purchasing power parity, Asia accounts for roughly of global GDP and 40% of consumption. Approximately of the world¡¯s population lives in Asia, while roughly 23% of Asians still live in relative poverty. As China has demonstrated, governments that can promulgate effective development policies while allowing entrepreneurs to flourish can unlock a potent economic resource, one which is driven by the collective aspirations of their underdeveloped citizens.

Cooperation or conflict

From the early 1990s, policymakers and economists in Washington and most Western countries were sure their systems would prevail over China¡¯s, and that as China accepted the principles of free-market economics, full regime change in Beijing would follow. Most Western attempts at regime change in the last 50 years have nevertheless failed, and continual US attempts since 1945 have been a primary cause of the weakening of the American empire.

US President Donald Trump¡¯s New Year¡¯s of Venezuelan President Nicol¨¢s Maduro and his wife was a direct assault on international law and upon the interests of not just China, but any nation depending on international law to guarantee its security. For more than ten years, China has been vital to Venezuela¡¯s economic survival. In 2024, Venezuela sold of its oil to China, amounting to 480,000 barrels a day, paid for in renminbi. China invested $50 billion in Venezuelan infrastructure over the last decade, and Caracas holds $60 billion in Chinese loans, collateralized by oil.

Nations with respect for international law now need to speak out and distance themselves from Washington, or accept that their silence is complicity. Many Western nations have already stood by while Trump Canadian, Mexican and Danish sovereignty; in Gaza; Iran, Yemen, Somalia and Nigeria without declarations of war; and Venezuelan seafarers in the Caribbean because they might have been drug traffickers.

Washington¡¯s actions over the past year will likely force a reassessment of assumptions within those countries that trade with China and yet have taken care not to undermine their loyalty to what they saw as the more law-abiding US. As the world becomes more multipolar and competitive, countries have more to benefit from trading freely with all, and more to risk and potentially lose from partisanship.

Block Quote:

Some of the infrastructure China built here was poor, and I think Beijing needs to govern private contractors on Belt and Road projects better. But overall, we prefer Chinese aid and investment because it comes with skilled engineers, know-how and good technology. They don¡¯t lecture us on how we should manage our islands, which cannot be said for Australia and New Zealand. The US talked about doing more in the Pacific. But they threaten they will do less if we deal with China. ¡ª Pacific island official

Further conflict is inevitable unless the West realizes it must work with Beijing and acknowledge the changing global order, in which regional nodes of power interact within agreed frameworks. European and US leaders seem unable to see that the right partnerships with Beijing could help stem their nations¡¯ economic declines, while increased attempts to isolate and contain China will most certainly accelerate them.

For its part, China must think more deeply about how to work with its major trading partners beyond sparring through tit-for-tat tariffs or flooding their markets with goods. China has already demonstrated it can strengthen the economies of geographical neighbors through trade and investment. This was and remains one of the motives behind the project. China¡¯s over the last 20 years have largely benefited both Beijing and African states. Although different historically and in terms of level of development, Washington and Brussels could work with Beijing to agree on principles of trade and entente if they so wished.

Boundaries

In the 1980s and 1990s, when China was still weak, it imposed conditions on foreign investors, limiting ownership in businesses and excluding selected industries. Rather than erecting tariff barriers to staunch the flow of electric vehicles and renewable energy technology into their markets, Western governments would create greater trust and achieve more balanced trade if they required Chinese firms to form joint ventures to manufacture and share their technology.

When managing regional conflicts, China has less to gain than ever from trying to exact retribution for historical injuries. When Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi recently made alluding to a military alliance with Taiwan, Beijing would have projected more strength with a short, dismissive admonition rather than vociferous outrage.

The history of Japan¡¯s invasion of China is taught in schools and most families have a relation who suffered at the hands of the Japanese. I know the West thinks we should just ¡®get over it¡¯. But it¡¯s not that simple, and one who has not suffered doesn¡¯t have the right to tell someone who has what to feel. You wouldn¡¯t dare say ¡®just get over it¡¯ to a Jewish person whose family suffered in the Holocaust. ¡ª Chinese doctor 

The US and its allies use Taiwan to provoke China in the hope that it will destabilize and weaken it. Few Western politicians understand the history and contemporary dynamics of Taiwan; even fewer care for the people of the island, and none are likely to risk the lives of their soldiers to support its independence. The best situation for all is to accept the discomfort and quasi-stability of the status quo and encourage Taibei to renew dialogue with Beijing. Unfortunately, Washington fears China too much to let go of what it imagines, falsely, as its key instrument restraining its rise.

China¡¯s advantage in this conflict is patience. Absent an unlikely direct US military escalation, Beijing will wait for American regional influence to wane, so it may negotiate with Taiwan when tensions are lower. In the meantime, Taiwan is well shielded from coercion by any power, not because of its military might but because of its microchip production, which constitutes of the global supply and therefore the Mainland Chinese supply. Neither Beijing nor Washington can risk disruption to the supply, let alone its destruction from an invasion.

China¡¯s leaders¡¯ objectives are to secure domestic economic balance while reducing dependence upon those conspiring to contain it. It would be folly for the West to provide China with any cause to take a more radical, militant path in pursuit of its security.

Given the likelihood that China achieved 5% GDP growth in 2025 and laid the groundwork for similar growth in 2026, its economy is, with some caveats, recovering well. Beijing has shown resolve in engaging, without overreacting, to US trade coercion, restoring a substantial degree of public confidence in the process. But Beijing still needs to do more if it is to stabilize and strengthen its domestic economy, retain public trust over the long term and deal with an unpredictable geopolitical environment.

The country continues to experience persistently high , and unemployment among urban professionals is increasing. This is due in part to industrial automation and AI replacing white-collar processing, data management, accounting and service sector jobs, but companies are also continuing to retrench in the generally sluggish economic environment amid trade uncertainties. Yet, overall unemployment is still in single digits, with millions of manufacturing job vacancies. Some experts are noting an absence of clear signals from Beijing on regulatory policy as a key factor in subduing business confidence.

We know it is only a matter of time before business picks up. I don¡¯t know what will trigger that. I travel to Japan and Europe, and see business confidence is low. This is not a Chinese phenomenon, but I do know China is well placed for a stronger recovery than Europe, and I expect the US, too. We¡¯re still developing, and people are hungry for success. In Europe, there is a sense in the air of complacency, even defeatism, despite the fact that it has many good companies. ¡ª Technology marketing manager in Shenzhen

Balance at home

To reduce irrational domestic competition and overproduction, Beijing could reduce its local officials¡¯ GDP targets further. For over a decade, Beijing has combined officials¡¯ key performance indicators (KPIs) with sustainability objectives and anticorruption aims, but the imperative to deliver raw economic growth still dominates. Western policymakers are often too focused on GDP growth, but many of their counterparts in China are enthralled by it as the ultimate indicator of national success. However, GDP indicators reflect an economy¡¯s temperature, but seldom its underlying health and long-term productive sustainability. Resetting local officials¡¯ goals would help to stem deflation and expand consumption; it would also reflect better the values and aspirations for greater life-work balance and physical, even spiritual, development of the younger generation.

Having exceeded most industrial nations in the quality of its supply chains, logistics, smart manufacturing and robotics, it is logical that 30% of global manufacturing should be undertaken in China, a nation that is home to of the world¡¯s population. The Chinese middle class also offer considerable consumer growth potential for imported raw materials, ingredients and brands, despite the current lull in domestic consumption.

While Western industrial companies are cautious about entering the Chinese market, global portfolio managers are less so. Interest in listed Chinese tech companies is rising in London, Europe and the Middle East, with the Hong Kong stock exchange, an early beneficiary, growing in 2025. Australia¡¯s treasury estimated that China accounted for 19% of global GDP in 2024 and the United States for 16%, and by 2035, China will likely account for 24% while the US will be 14%.

There is no reason why the West cannot compete while still collaborating with China on the leading edges of manufacturing technology. China¡¯s rise cannot be stopped, but it is not a rise driven by the rudderless juggernaut of the Chinese Government, bent on the destruction of its competitors¡¯ markets, as Western media casts it. It is the essential dynamo of an emerging global economic order in which there will be many nodes of power and prosperity, and interwoven networks, which could bring greater common wealth and stability to China, the Global South and also, despite diminished primacy, sustained prosperity in the West.

The handshake that may change history

Indian President Narendra Modi attended the SCO meeting in Tianjin last year. He and Chinese President Xi Jinping discussed border disputes, expanding trade and future Chinese investment in Indian infrastructure.

Triggered by Trump¡¯s imposition of a on most Indian exports to the US and his condemnation of the Indian economy as ¡°dead¡±, China seized the opportunity for rapprochement. China has many reasons to form deeper economic relations with India. With a population of 1.43 billion, it is the only country with the potential to compete directly with China. It has a young, well-educated population, controls the Indian Ocean ¡ª through which of China¡¯s oil imports pass ¡ª and is a founding member of the Quad, Washington¡¯s performative attempt to create a military coalition to contain China in Asia.

India increased its high-tech exports by 400% over the last five years, reaching $23 billion, and accounted for of US smartphone imports last year. The Indian economy grew by more than 7% in 2025, anything but dead. The meeting between Modi and Xi may turn out to be as significant as Former US President Richard Nixon¡¯s to China in 1972.

Together, Xi and Modi¡¯s initiative may change a relationship marred by strategic and commercial conflict into an economic alliance no other nation or trading bloc can rival.

[ first published this piece as a business report.]

[ edited this piece.]

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What is striking is that amid all this chaos, the Presidential Regulation governing the program was only on November 17th, almost an entire year after MBG had already been implemented. Yet despite these glaring issues, the government has repeatedly framed MBG as a ¡°¡± to tackle malnutrition, strengthen food security and boost the local economy. But there is one crucial element at risk of being overlooked, one that could determine whether this ¡°magic bullet¡± truly hits its target: the role of young women in Indonesia¡¯s agrifood system. The voices of women farmers need to be amplified, especially in light of the momentum created by the launch of the International Day of Women Farmers , highlighted in the report of the World Food Forum.

Overlooked and underserved, women in agriculture

The role of women in the agri-food system is inextricably linked to the issues of nutrition and food security. Women contribute between of total food production in developing countries, not only through planting and cultivation but also through ensuring that families and communities have access to sufficient food. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in , women comprised approximately half of the agricultural labor force in Southeast Asia. Yet despite this contribution, their roles are often marginalized, trapped in irregular, informal, part-time, low-skilled and labor-intensive work.?

For young people, the picture is even more pressing. Eighty-five percent of the world¡¯s youth in low- and lower-middle-income countries where agrifood systems are central to livelihoods. The inclusion of youth, especially young women, has the potential to generate a trillion-dollar impact on the global economy. According to Indonesia¡¯s Central Statistics Agency (BPS), in , agriculture employed 28.5% of the national workforce, more than any other sector, including trade and manufacturing. Yet much of this workforce remains informal, with of agricultural workers classified as informal labor in 2024. However, the true figure may be much larger when informal, unpaid or unrecorded contributions are considered.

The presence of women in the agrifood system (AFS) naturally raises expectations that they will benefit from the MBG program, especially given the program¡¯s stated commitment to involving local farmers, small shops, and actors within the local economic ecosystem. These partnerships are effectively controlled by large vendors, sidelining smallholders, especially women farmers. Indonesia has women farmers, most of whom work as casual laborers or unpaid family workers in rice cultivation, livestock, and vegetable farming. It is therefore unsurprising that this group sees little to no gain from the MBG program.

Why does Indonesia need gender-sensitive policies?

Women in the AFS across generations face distinct and persistent challenges that require tailored approaches and policies. Young women face structural and cultural barriers in entering and sustaining livelihoods in agriculture. Access to land and credit remains heavily skewed in favor of men, while inheritance practices often disadvantage daughters. Social norms expect women to prioritize unpaid domestic and care responsibilities, reducing the time and energy available for agricultural entrepreneurship. When they do enter the agri-food system, they often find themselves in the , such as subsistence farming, food processing or informal market sales.

If the status quo continues without meaningful change, the consequences will intensify. Despite agriculture¡¯s significant contribution to the national workforce, few young people are entering the sector. In 2023, the number of farmers from 31.7 million in 2013 to 29.34 million. Startlingly, only 3% of agricultural graduates choose to become farmers. Yet there is no reliable national data that specifically captures young women in the agri-food system, rendering them invisible in both statistics and policy debates.?

Strengthening feedback loops and designing effective interventions

To ensure that the MBG program becomes both effective and fiscally responsible, its targeting must be refined. Rather than applying a universal model, MBG should prioritize school-aged children in 3T areas (parts of Indonesia that lag behind other regions in terms of geographical, social, economic and cultural development, including underdeveloped, frontier and outermost regions), with persistently high stunting rates and communities experiencing extreme poverty. With more precise targeting, the overall budget could be significantly reduced, allowing resources to be reallocated toward strengthening agricultural systems, particularly those involving women.

In Indonesia, funding for agriculture remains inadequate and gender-blind, as evidenced by studies showing that women, especially young women farmers, have far less to land (only about 17% hold secure land rights), capital, training and state support than men, reflecting a neglect of their needs despite their growing participation in the sector.

The 300 billion Indonesian Rupiah incentive scheme for young farmers cultivating large plots to address the structural barriers faced by young women, many of whom lack access to land, credit and formal ownership required to qualify. Without gender-responsive design, such initiatives risk deepening existing inequalities rather than alleviating them.?

Moreover, agricultural programs remain narrowly focused on production, overlooking the diverse roles women play across the entire agri-food system, from processing and trade to nutrition and household food security. When viewed alongside the MBG budget, the imbalance becomes even more pronounced. In 2025, the government allocated Indonesian Rupiah for MBG, more than 3.5 times the Ministry of Agriculture¡¯s effective budget.

By 2026, the disparity widens dramatically, with Indonesian Rupiah designated for MBG, around 15 times the 22.36 trillion Indonesian Rupiah allocated for agriculture. This disproportionate emphasis on consumption-oriented programs over structural agricultural investment risks undermining long-term food-system resilience and continues to marginalize women¡¯s contributions within it.

The Indonesian government needs a set of strategies to strengthen the inclusion of young women in agri-food systems so they can own and invest in productive assets. Expanding youth-responsive social protection (especially for young women), particularly in addressing challenges such as unpaid care responsibilities, health risks and income insecurity. Finally, implementing targeted nutrition policies can strengthen the link between young women¡¯s agricultural contributions and the overall well-being of their communities.

[Tara Yarwais edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

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Alongside early-harvest and launch tracks with the , and the Eurasian Economic Union (), plus a revived Early Progress Trade Agreement () with Canada, a clear picture of India¡¯s new trade architecture is emerging. New Delhi is building high-quality, rules-based bilateral arrangements, phased where necessary, with partners that complement, rather than compete with, India¡¯s strengths and priorities.

A pragmatic partnership with New Zealand

On one level, the India-New Zealand FTA is a straightforward extension of this ¡ª a pragmatic deal between two economies whose bilateral trade, while steadily growing, currently stands at a minuscule , thus leaving plenty of potential to unlock. On the other hand, it tells us something broader about where India is headed and how it intends to build prosperity, with people, not just products, at the center.

For decades, commentators have reduced India¡¯s trade strategy to a binary: open the gates and risk import surges or stay cautious and forgo the scale and opportunity that the global economic order offers. That false choice collapsed when India refused to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (), and instead rewired its negotiating posture around complementarity.

This shift in strategy has been made possible by a wave of internal reforms that reached a new peak in 2025. Major changes, most notably the rollout of Goods and Services Tax this year, alongside other key reforms under Prime Minister Narendra Modi¡¯s tenure, including the simplification of foreign direct investment () norms, expanded production-linked incentive () schemes, digital governance and the implementation of the Labor Codes, have all contributed to investor confidence.

It is this transformed, future-ready India that now approaches trade negotiations from a position of strength. New?Zealand fits that map. It is a high-income, rules-based economy that doesn¡¯t compete head-to-head with India in mass manufacturing; instead, it welcomes Indian services, talent and consumer goods under transparent and fair terms.

Tariff liberalization, sectoral protections and prioritizing people?

Those terms are striking. New?Zealand has granted access to all Indian exports. Not ¡°most,¡± not ¡°nearly all¡± ¡ª all. For India¡¯s labor-intensive sectors ¡ª textiles and apparel, leather and footwear, gems and jewelry, marine products, toys, handicrafts ¡ª this is a once-in-a-generation opening; the kind you build upon to broaden value chains. Small exporters who dreaded duties and nickel-and-diming at the border can now quote with confidence, contract with certainty, ship with speed and expand their operations thanks to cash flows freed from tariffs.

India, for its part, has offered tariff liberalization on about of tariff lines, covering of bilateral trade value. This has been done through a calibrated blend of immediate cuts (sheep meat, wool, coal, most forestry and wood), phased reductions (oils, select machinery, wine) and carefully managed tariff-rate quotas for a handful of sensitive horticulture lines (honey, apples, kiwifruit).

But these concessions have been meticulously crafted to ensure that India¡¯s most sensitive sectors remain protected. Dairy is the most prominent ; it is entirely ring-fenced. The shield extends further: animal products (other than sheep meat), key vegetables, sugar, some oils and strategic nonagricultural sectors such as gems and jewelry, copper and aluminum are all from tariff concessions.

This is an unmistakable signal that India will write modern, liberal trade rules, but it will do so while securing farmer incomes, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) resilience, and food security. This is not protectionism; it is democratic prioritization for a country where agriculture is a livelihood for and not just another sector to be casually bartered away.

The agreement¡¯s spine, however, is not goods but rather services and mobility. New?Zealand¡¯s services commitments are its most ambitious to date, Indian firms broad access across IT and IT-enabled services, professional and business services, education, finance, tourism and construction.

Crucially, the agreement includes a Most-Favored-Nation () clause: if New Zealand offers better terms to another partner in the future, India automatically receives the same benefits. For India¡¯s already globally competitive services sector, this means new opportunities to establish a presence in Oceania, recruit local talent and scale operations in a stable, rules-based environment.

But the real innovation is the Temporary Employment Entry Visa, a for up to 5,000 Indian professionals at any given time to live and work in New Zealand for up to three years, targeted at skill shortages (IT, engineering, healthcare, education, construction) and specialty roles (yoga instructors, Indian chefs, music teachers). Paired with the fact that the removes numerical caps on Indian students, guarantees 20 hours/week of work during study, and extends post-study work to 3 years for science, technology, engineering and mathematics graduates and 4 years for doctorates, as well as a 1,000-place Working Holiday scheme, and you¡¯ve stitched the ¡°living bridge¡± of a 300,000-strong Indian diaspora into the economic fabric.

Critics ¡ª some inside New Zealand¡¯s politics ¡ª have that these mobility channels ¡°give too much away.¡± That is an entirely incorrect framing, though. Global trade today is not a container-ship contest; it is a talent distribution contest. When shortages hobble , and sites, partnering with a country that supplies trained professionals under transparent, targeted and time-bound rules is not a concession for New Zealand; it is capacity building.

For India, talent mobility is not brain drain but instead brain circulation. Earnings, networks and know-how will eventually come home, while remittances in the interim can help stabilize families. Far from ¡°giving away¡± jobs, this agreement allows New Zealand to fill gaps that its own workforce cannot meet. At the same time, the pathways it opens enable Indian professionals to gain global experience and return with skills that strengthen India¡¯s economy ¡ª further enhancing India¡¯s international reputation as a source of reliable, high-quality talent.

Implementation and future prospects

The FTA also does the dull yet decisive things right. Customs modernization commits India to release windows at the border. That single clause can save exporters more money than many tariff cuts, because time itself can act as a shadow tariff. The pact hardwires cooperation on and rules and creates Agri-Technology for kiwifruit, apples and honey. These plans mean both countries will collaborate on sharing best practices ¡ª needless to say, India will be the beneficiary.

Additionally, the agreement requires New Zealand to update its Geographical Indications () framework, thereby granting India the same rights as the EU to register wines, spirits and other goods, ensuring full parity in GI protection. Regulatory access for pharmaceuticals, medical devices and organic products has also been streamlined, reducing duplication and accelerating approvals.

There is also long-term capital behind this agreement: New?Zealand has $?20?billion in investment in India over the next 15 years. The scale of this commitment signals confidence in India¡¯s economic trajectory and its potential as a global growth engine. The agreement also includes a rebalancing that allows India to take remedial measures if the delivery of investments falls short of its commitments. India has learned that FTAs without real capital and capability often disappoint; this one addresses both, the kind of long-term backbone that many earlier agreements lacked.

Of course, no agreement is without its challenges. The FTA will require careful implementation and timely ratification, efficient visa processing, and real delivery on its various Agri-tech and customs commitments.

But from an Indian perspective, the fundamentals are solid: the deal is structured to maximize opportunity while safeguarding core interests. It is precisely the template India should look to replicate ¡ª combining asymmetric access to goods that favors MSMEs with ambitious services and talent mobility. It is bilateralism that looks beyond tariffs, focusing instead on people, productivity and a true sense of partnership.

India¡¯s new trade architecture is not merely about opening doors but about building bridges among economies, nations and, above all, people. In that vein, the India-New Zealand FTA is a blueprint for how the next decade of Indian trade can and should be built.

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A handful of racist gestures posted by Miss Finland and members of the Finns Party ¡ª East Asian facial features through a slanted-eyes trope ¡ª triggered an international backlash of remarkable speed and scale. Within days, Finnish embassies in China, Japan and South Korea formal apologies. Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo publicly the state from the conduct of its own parliamentarians, stating unequivocally that racism had no place in Finnish society. The response was swift, but the damage was already measurable.

Finnish airline Finnair of consumer backlash in Asian markets. Finland¡¯s Minister for Economic Affairs acknowledged reputational harm to tourism and trade. Chinese and Japanese media the episode not as a fringe scandal but as a test of Finland¡¯s values. In Brussels, Finnish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) cautioned that diplomatic capital built on trust can evaporate far faster than it accumulates. Soft power, once dented, does not rebound easily.

This was not merely a domestic political embarrassment. It was a foreign policy event.

When domestic failures become diplomatic liabilities

In an era of instant amplification, internal social failures migrate rapidly into the international arena. For countries such as Finland ¡ª newly inducted into NATO, deeply reliant on rules-based multilateralism and economically intertwined with Asia ¡ª moral credibility is not ornamental. It is strategic. When a state¡¯s brand is on inclusion, any contradiction resonates louder abroad than at home.

The deeper discomfort lies in the fact that this did not emerge in isolation. Amnesty International has repeatedly that Finland struggles with structural racism, describing it as among the most racist countries in Europe in terms of lived experience. Surveys cited by Yle show that nearly of Finns now recognize racism as a serious societal problem, a sharp increase over five years. Black residents report some of the levels of harassment on the continent. These realities sit uneasily beside Finland¡¯s global reputation for fairness.

The contradiction exposes a familiar illusion in advanced democracies: that high development immunizes societies against prejudice. It does not. Racism adapts. It becomes quieter, coded, sometimes joking, sometimes dismissed as childish. Yet when projected through the megaphone of social media, even casual prejudice acquires geopolitical weight.

Racial innocence and the limits of Nordic exceptionalism

History matters here. Finland, like much of Europe, has often imagined itself outside colonial entanglements. Yet historians increasingly note Finland¡¯s participation in movements and its absorption of racial hierarchies in European modernity. The idea of racial innocence has functioned less as truth than as comfort. The scandal cracked that veneer.

Comparisons across the Nordic region reinforce the point. Sweden¡¯s with far-right normalization, Denmark¡¯s cases and Norway¡¯s debates over Indigenous all reveal similar tensions beneath progressive surfaces. Globally, France and the UK continue to grapple with colonial legacies that complicate their human-rights advocacy. Finland¡¯s experience fits into this wider pattern: development without deep reckoning leaves unfinished business.

What distinguishes this episode is its international reverberation. Asian reactions were not symbolic. Commentators in Beijing and Seoul the scandal as indicative of a broader European blind spot toward anti-Asian racism. For Asian publics, gestures that echo a century of humiliation resonate deeply. Trade figures and diplomatic alignments do not insulate against cultural insult. On the contrary, economic interdependence amplifies sensitivity.

This is where the foreign policy lesson sharpens. Values are not merely proclaimed; they are performed. For small and middle powers, particularly those that rely on coalition-building and normative leadership, domestic conduct becomes external messaging. Every parliamentarian, every public official, becomes an informal diplomat.

From apology to accountability

Finland¡¯s response has been earnest. Ministers have undergone anti-racism training. Parliamentary leaders issued strong condemnations. The Finns Party signaled internal disciplinary measures. Finland remains by the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the EU¡¯s anti-racism action plans. These frameworks matter, but credibility depends on implementation, not signatures.

Study increasingly links social inclusion with sustainable development. Studies published in argue that racism economic resilience, institutions and corrodes trust ¡ª the very foundations of sustainability. The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization¡¯s (UNESCO) Global Alliance Against Racism discrimination as a systemic risk, not a moral footnote. In that sense, addressing racism is not ancillary to development; it is central to it.

There is an opportunity here, albeit born of embarrassment. Finland possesses the institutional capacity, educational depth and international goodwill to turn this episode into a demonstration of democratic self-correction. Genuine curriculum reform, empowered equality watchdogs and enforceable political codes of conduct would signal seriousness. More importantly, sustained engagement with Asian partners ¡ª through cultural exchange, academic collaboration and honest dialogue ¡ª could transform apology into partnership.

Across the Asia¨CPacific, the lesson lands with particular force. This is a region stitched together by migration, memory and mobility, where history travels alongside trade and identity moves faster than policy. Societies from Northeast Asia to the Pacific Islands have learned, often painfully, that cultural slights are never contained within borders. They echo through shipping lanes, student exchanges, defense dialogues and boardrooms. 

Diplomacy in Asia-Pacific is sustained not only by strategy papers but also by acknowledgement, dignity and a quiet assurance of mutual respect. As a result, it is vital to establish an effective accountability unit to investigate officials¡¯ misconduct, as well as to implement mandatory anti-bias training throughout the government. In addition, consider a focused cultural diplomacy and investment package based on a recovery in partner trust, trade and tourism.

Dignity as strategy in a post-insulated world

When racism surfaces ¡ª whether in Europe, North America or within the region itself ¡ª it unsettles far more than domestic politics. It shakes confidence in partnerships painstakingly built over decades. In a region where trust is cumulative and memory is long, moments of disrespect are not quickly forgotten. Strategic alignment may open doors, but cultural empathy keeps them open. Without it, even the strongest alliances begin to feel brittle, exposed to the slow erosion of credibility and goodwill that no amount of economic interdependence can fully repair.

The age of domestic insulation has ended. A gesture in Helsinki can unsettle boardrooms in Shanghai and ministries in Tokyo. Foreign policy now begins at home, in the mundane ethics of everyday conduct. States that fail to grasp this reality will find their influence shrinking in ways that statistics cannot immediately capture.

Finland¡¯s moment of reckoning is therefore not uniquely Finnish. It is a mirror held up to all societies that pride themselves on progress while underestimating the persistence of prejudice. The question is no longer whether racism damages international standing. The evidence is conclusive. The question is whether moments of exposure become catalysts for renewal ¡ª or merely footnotes in a longer pattern of denial.

In a world bound tightly by perception as much as power, dignity has become a strategic asset. Once lost, it demands more than an apology to recover. It demands transformation.

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A party enforcer at the helm

Apart from other high-profile roles serving the CCP in multilateral institutions, Zou as Deputy Secretary-General of the Chinese People¡¯s Political Consultative Conference (), one of the CCP¡¯s core instruments for enforcing ideological discipline and manufacturing consent. Despite its benign-sounding name, the CPPCC is not a debating society or a pluralistic forum. It exists to align elites, interest groups and public opinion with party doctrine, ensuring that major policy decisions are not merely implemented but legitimized. Its role is coordination and control, not consultation in any Western sense. In short, she is an enforcer, just like her predecessor for a decade, Jin Liqun.

That pedigree matters because leadership in a multilateral development bank is not just about capital allocation or project appraisal; it is about institutional direction, norms and credibility. A president steeped in party discipline is not likely to treat the AIIB as an independent lender guided by developmental additionality, transparency and borrower need. She will undoubtedly use it as a strategic instrument ¡ª just as her predecessor did ¡ª one more lever in Beijing¡¯s expanding toolkit of economic and political statecraft.

Deepening alignment with China¡¯s Belt and Road Initiative

Under Zou, the AIIB can be expected to continue, and likely deepen, its alignment, since its inception, with China¡¯s Belt and Road Initiative (). The creation of both was hatched by the CCP at exactly the same time in 2013. Despite repeated assurances from management that the AIIB is distinct from BRI, the practical overlap has long been evident: shared corridors, synergistic priorities and cofinanced projects that advance China¡¯s geopolitical reach while diffusing financial and reputational risk. The AIIB offers Beijing something the BRI alone cannot: a multilateral veneer that softens political resistance and draws in the capital and legitimacy of advanced democracies. That is why countries like the US and Japan chose not to join.

In this sense, Zou is the perfect candidate. Like Jin, she combines international polish with unwavering loyalty to the party line. The continuity is not accidental. The CCP does not leave strategically important institutions to chance, especially those that intersect with global finance, infrastructure and influence. Leadership succession at the AIIB has followed the logic of absolute loyalty to the Party.

The complicity of non-Chinese shareholders

What is equally troubling is the acquiescence of AIIB¡¯s non-Chinese shareholders. Countries such as Australia, the UK and India , their taxpayers underwriting projects that often advance China¡¯s strategic objectives more than their own national interests. This persistence reflects a combination of foreign influence, elite capture and bureaucratic inertia: once inside the tent, exit becomes politically awkward, diplomatically uncomfortable and institutionally resisted. 

Canada is even considering rejoining the AIIB after concerns were first raised by the Bank¡¯s former head of Communications, Bob Pickard (a Canadian), in 2023 about a subterranean management cabal run by the CCP within the Bank, resulting in a ¡°toxic culture.¡± Canada took the allegations very seriously and with the Bank then, but this week, Prime Minister Mark Carney was essentially kissing the ring while visiting Beijing.

The justification offered is familiar. Staying in allows these countries to ¡°shape from within,¡± to promote high standards and to prevent the Bank from becoming a purely Chinese instrument. Yet years of experience suggest that this influence is marginal at best. Governance remains heavily weighted toward Beijing. Strategic direction tracks Chinese priorities. And leadership selection ¡ª arguably the clearest signal of institutional ¡°independence¡± ¡ª has remained firmly under Chinese control.

Meanwhile, participation carries real costs. Membership lends credibility to projects that may undermine debt sustainability, distort regional power balances or crowd out genuinely independent development finance. It normalizes a model in which multilateral institutions are repurposed to serve the geopolitical goals of their dominant shareholder, eroding the very norms that postwar development banks were designed to uphold. The AIIB is not the only guilty party among the multilaterals, of course, many of which are similarly highly politicized and experience oversized influence from their leadership overlords. What distinguishes them is that the CCP is not a benevolent force in the world ¡ª it is malignant.

Zou¡¯s appointment should therefore be read not as a routine personnel decision, but as a strategic inflection point. It confirms that the AIIB is entering a phase of tighter political alignment with Beijing at a time when China¡¯s external posture is becoming more assertive, not less. For democracies that continue to participate, the question is no longer whether the Bank might drift toward serving Chinese interests. That drift occurred from its inception. The question is whether their continued involvement makes them complicit ¡ª and it does.

Multilateral legitimacy captured

Multilateralism only works when institutions are more than instruments of the powerful. When leadership is drawn directly from a ruling party¡¯s ideological enforcement apparatus, claims of neutrality ring hollow. The AIIB under Zou Jiayi is unlikely to surprise anyone who has been paying attention. It will be efficient, disciplined and outwardly cooperative ¡ª while quietly reinforcing the expansionary objectives of the state that controls it.

At some point, member countries will have to decide whether symbolic influence is worth substantive compromise. If the answer remains yes, Beijing will have learned an important lesson: multilateral legitimacy, once captured, is remarkably easy to keep.

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A Chinese diplomat in Japan, as everyone by now knows, memorably and vulgarly to ¡°cut off that dirty neck¡± ¡ª presumably Takaichi¡¯s and Japan¡¯s. The Chinese foreign ministry excoriated the Japanese ambassador, that Takaichi was ¡°playing with fire.¡± Then, on December 29, Beijing Taiwan with actual fire from missiles and aircraft, disrupting the flights of upwards of two hundred thousand air passengers. These were China¡¯s largest military exercises since 2022, when another obstreperous n¨¤ ge n¨·r¨¦n (ÄǸöÅ®ÈË), the then US Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, Taiwan.?

The Chinese are, indeed, reacting in anger to Takaichi¡¯s restatement of Japanese vital interests. Any comment a Japanese leader makes about Taiwan is charged with risk. I suspect, however, that the prime minister¡¯s advisors share my assessment that Beijing¡¯s frenzied response to Takaichi¡¯s off-the-cuff and rather benign comment is also addressing strategic objectives in Washington, Taipei and Beijing itself. 

Is Takaichi right?

Seen from abroad, Prime Minister Takaichi has had a successful first few months in office. The Japanese public views her , and she had a summit with the mercurial and always imperious US President Trump. She is Japan¡¯s defense budget, and she has continued Japan¡¯s progressive return as a major and activist force shaping Asian strategic affairs. I am indebted to Thomas Reilly, in his , Understanding China¡¯s Overreaction to Takaichi¡¯s Taiwan Comments, for this synopsis of China¡¯s multiple strategic concerns.?

These steps are all direct responses to the increasingly imperious diktats emanating from the new Middle Kingdom superpower about Taiwan¡¯s ¡°¡± absorption back into China, and to increasingly aggressive acts to assert Chinese sovereignty everywhere in the South and East China Seas. Like any imperious and unilateral power, though, the Chinese view Takaichi¡¯s policies and successful first months as threats to Chinese hegemony, not as responses to Chinese threats. Beijing needs to show the insolent Takaichi, therefore, the costs of her impudence.?

Swift was China¡¯s irritation at Takaichi¡¯s remarks; China also opportunistically aimed its military exercises around Taiwan at Washington. President Trump and General Secretary Xi, in recent months, have been attempting to ease US-China tensions in preparation for their upcoming in April, about which the Chinese have ¡°speculated¡± about the chances for a ¡°grand bargain¡± for ¡°a concert of power¡± between the world¡¯s two superpowers. For weeks, the US remained nearly mute about Takaichi¡¯s comments, seeming to prioritize Beijing¡¯s sensitivities to supporting the US alliance with Japan.?

But on December 18, Trump seemed to contradict himself and directly countered China¡¯s threats to Taiwanese sovereignty by announcing the sale of $11 billion in arms to Taiwan, the largest single arms deal between Taiwan and the US in history. The aid package is in keeping with America¡¯s longstanding commitment to defend Taiwanese sovereignty, but also clashes with Trump¡¯s oft-stated isolationism and distaste for any military commitment beyond ¡°America first.¡± China expressed its wrath eleven days later by its performative and menacing military exercises around Taiwan and by completely cutting off Japan¡¯s air and sea links to Taiwan for three days. China¡¯s maneuvers served as the latest stick to the dangled carrot of a China-US ¡°grand bargain,¡± while dressing down Japan and attempting to neutralize any independent strategic role Japan might play.?

China was also responding to what it characterizes as any challenge to its sovereignty over Taiwan by continuing its policy of slowly increasing its incursions into Taiwan¡¯s or Japan¡¯s territorial space, and asserting its sovereignty over recognized international waters. China takes any challenge to its positions about Taiwan and regional sovereignty, therefore, as an occasion to shift the ¡°norms¡± of behavior towards its ultimate aims. ¡°×ñÖ¼¡± (z¨±n zh¨«), ¡°I obey the imperial command¡± ¡ª China¡¯s traditional way to signal deference to the imperial center ¡ª is the only correct response anywhere within what China decides is its writ. 

China¡¯s response may be overzealous theater

Internal strife and even institutional rot also seem to be at play in Beijing¡¯s overheated denunciations of Prime Minister Takaichi and in its pressure campaign against Taiwan and Washington. Some of China¡¯s aggressiveness may be performative in order to mask that China¡¯s military remains incapable of seizing Taiwan, and is struggling with corruption, inefficiencies and growing pains. Xi has or removed dozens of senior officers for corruption or unspecified malfeasance. The removals, combined with the overheated response to Japan challenging China¡¯s conception of regional order, paradoxically indicate a degree of Chinese insecurity about its capabilities or of not being able to impose its will internationally, even as Xi completely dominates China¡¯s national security establishment and policies, and as China grows in military power.?

The Chinese Communist Party, in one of the perverse ironies of history, regularly has fanned the flames of nationalism whenever internal strife or corruption has threatened the stability of the legitimacy of the state. Nationalism, manifest as anti-Japanese sentiment and ¡°anti-colonial¡± xenophobia; the absorption of Taiwan; and making money have become the specious pillars of Chinese Communist legitimacy. As Chinese Communism has decayed into a totalitarian Cult of Xi that espouses the suppression of individual rights to state supremacy and the exaltation of a national-security state, officials easily seized on Prime Minister Takaichi¡¯s remarks as ways to divert attention and blame the historically reviled ÙÁ¿Ü (·É¨­°ì¨°³Ü) ¡°dwarf pirates¡± of Japan. These reflexive postures justify Takaichi¡¯s comment and Japan¡¯s policies but form a volatile and dangerous combination of domestic and international cross pressures. 

How to avoid conflict with China

Analyzing what China or any nation is doing and why is the devilishly difficult work that intelligence officers and diplomats do. Yet that is the easy part of the job. As President Eisenhower told President Kennedy shortly after the Bay of Pigs in 1961, when a ¡°covert¡± US operation to overthrow Castro had collapsed in an ignominious public catastrophe, only hard problems reach a leader¡¯s desk.?

China¡¯s reaction to Takaichi¡¯s comments is a symptom of Japan¡¯s strategic dilemma and the ¡°hard problem¡± Japanese leaders must confront: How to defend Japanese sovereignty in a region where China¡¯s power is rising, the US commitment is uncertain, the risk of miscalculation is high and Japan may find itself progressively isolated in a world defined by might alone? Successive Japanese governments, and so far Takaichi, too, have pursued the most coherent strategy and policies possible, although sometimes too slowly and timidly.

Japan¡¯s overarching strategy to avoid a clash with China must be, first, to prepare to live in a sphere-of-interest world dominated by China in Asia, the US in the Americas and Russia and the European Union in the western reaches of Eurasia. Second, Japan must deter China from taking steps harmful to Japan¡¯s national interests by raising the prospective costs of such actions. Third, Japan must seek to offer enticing alternatives to other states in the nascent Chinese domain (and, of course, beyond), so that they will contribute to counter-balancing China¡¯s growing influence. 

Japan has pursued increased diplomatic engagement with a range of states in the Western Pacific, Asia and South Asia. When Trump killed the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, which would have been the single strongest diplomatic step to counter China¡¯s rise in Asia, Japan initiated the Free and Open Indo-Pacific in its stead. Japan has been instrumental in the ¡ª what Russian propagandists have denounced, and I have praised, as a potential aspirational NATO in Asia. Japan has sought closer bilateral defensive ties with other states in the region, notably and . Japan has aggressively expanded its engagement with Pacific island nations through the summits (Pacific Islanders Leaders Meetings), precisely where China has been most actively seeking to supplant US and Australian diplomatic primacy.?

Japan has also significantly enhanced its efforts to foster multilateral trade agreements and has engaged in expanded economic aid programs. Takaichi¡¯s mentor, Abe Shinzo, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans?Pacific Partnership as a replacement for the destroyed TPP. Japan has vastly increased its economic development aid in Africa to counterbalance China¡¯s ambitious Belt and Road .?

It is the military sphere, of course, that Japan has drawn the most attention and drawn China¡¯s particular ire. Takaichi has aggressively, and so far, adeptly, continued her predecessors¡¯ efforts to increase Japan¡¯s military capabilities, and, at last, to free Japan from its post-World War II hobbling as a sovereign nation in military affairs. Takaichi has announced a increase in Japan¡¯s defense budget, continuing Japan¡¯s five-year plan to double defense spending, and to obtain potentially offensive weapons for the first time in eighty years, such as the near billion-dollar purchase of Tomahawk missiles Japan is from the United States. Japan is developing de facto aircraft carriers. And, most important of all, Takaichi has continued Japan¡¯s doctrinal shift by reiterating that an attack on Taiwan is possibly an existential issue for Japan ¡ª the very position that has caused China¡¯s recent apoplexy.

Japanese autonomy is integral to counter regional aggression

The objectives of all these policies are to, one, raise the prospective cost of any hostile actions to Japanese interests by China (or any state) and, critically, two, to offer other Asian and Pacific states attractive counterbalancing alternatives to Chinese diplomatic, trade and military initiatives, all in the context of a post-Pax Americana world. 

Each of these steps, as China invariably and angrily points out, increases the stakes and risks in the event of a conflict. But they complicate China¡¯s equation for any aggressive action, which is their objective. They may not succeed. A clash ¡ª war ¡ª could come even if no party wants it, and no policy Japan or any state can pursue can compensate entirely for the withdrawal of the United States from a full strategic, diplomatic, economic and military commitment to a free and open Asia. 

Japanese leaders have, in general, been too slow in adopting these policy changes, although the responsibility lies as much with a reticent public that places hopes above hard decisions concerning how to avoid war by preparing for it. Japan¡¯s leaders have struggled most in deepening relations with South Korea, a vital ally; but Seoul is probably more responsible for these delays than Tokyo. Some degree of accommodation with China is almost inevitable, whatever Japan does, as China and Japan fill the void of America¡¯s relative withdrawal from or decline in the region. Nonetheless, Japan has acted strategically and coherently to strengthen Japanese autonomy and sovereignty in response to China¡¯s rise in power and aggressiveness. 

Not too long ago, a senior Japanese official asked me how I thought Japan should respond to the changing geopolitical environment in Asia. Hold America as close as possible, I replied, but Japan should count only on itself. So far, Prime Minister Takaichi has taken strategic and coherent steps, too.

[ first published this piece.]

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The basin¡¯s survival depends on dismantling unilateral ¡°hydro-hegemony.¡± We must move beyond regional finger-pointing. Instead, a new trilateral framework must be established. This framework should recognize the residents of Ghor and Herat as the primary custodians and sovereign stakeholders of the river.

Climate shifts and hydrological collapse

Climate change has fundamentally decoupled the Harirud from its historical snow-melt cycles. Average temperatures in the basin have?increased by 1.7¡ãC?(3.06¡ãF) since 1980. Rainfall has declined by roughly 150 millimeters. The Baba Mountain glaciers serve as the basin¡¯s ¡°water tower.¡± They have experienced a?nearly in surface area over four decades.

The basin is currently enduring its sixth consecutive year of drought. Surface water resources have decreased by 29%. This represents a loss of approximately 1 billion cubic meters of available water. Even during the spring thaw, the riverbed remains dangerously low. It fails to meet the minimum ecological flow requirements for regional biodiversity.

Geopolitical misconceptions and the ¡°single-source¡± myth

A primary hurdle in regional diplomacy is a false narrative. Many believe the water of the Harirud is solely the responsibility of Afghanistan. In reality, the catchment area is . Afghanistan accounts for 39.5%, Iran for 43.7% and Turkmenistan for 20.9%. Although the headwaters are in Afghanistan, critical tributaries, such as the Kashafrud River in Iran, join the system.

This ¡°single-source¡± myth allows downstream states to evade responsibility. Downstream nations demand ¡°customary rights¡± from the headwaters in Afghanistan while often obstructing secondary branches within their own borders. This selective focus distorts the diplomatic narrative.

This situation highlights a critical water management disparity. Afghanistan utilizes only about 40% of its potential surface water resources due to conflict-damaged infrastructure. Meanwhile, neighbors Iran and Turkmenistan heavily exploit their resources, even exceeding sustainable limits. This causes aquifer stress and water scarcity, impacting agriculture, drinking water and regional stability.

The infrastructure imbalance: diversion to Mashhad

A technical comparison of reservoir capacities debunks claims that development in Afghanistan is the sole cause of downstream scarcity:

• The Doosti (Friendship) Dam: Built jointly by Iran and Turkmenistan in 2004 without consultation with Afghanistan. It has a massive capacity of  cubic meters (m?). Critically, this dam functions as a mechanism for interbasin water transfer. It diverts water out of the Harirud system to supply Mashhad, Iran¡¯s second-largest city.
• The Pashdan Dam: Inaugurated in , this project in Afghanistan has a capacity of 54 million m?. It irrigates 13,000 hectares of Herati land. This represents only 4.3% of the total volume of the Doosti Dam.
• The Salma Dam (Afghanistan-India Friendship Dam): This project has a capacity of 633 million m?.

The Salma Dam is situated nearly 480 kilometers upstream of the Doosti Dam. This vast distance means the Harirud passes through hundreds of kilometers of arid terrain and irrigation zones before reaching the border. The storage deficit at the Doosti Dam is clearly driven by systemic losses and the 180-kilometer pipeline diversion to Mashhad, which sits outside the natural flow of the Harirud River.

Furthermore, Salma is not a ¡°new¡± infrastructure. The project was initially conceived in , and construction began in 1976. For four decades, its completion was a known factor in regional hydrology. The current collapse of the Doosti reservoir is a result of the 1.7¡ãC temperature rise, not upstream impoundment.

Ghor and Herat: the epicenter of custodianship

The residents of Ghor and Herat are the frontline victims. Ghor is the ¡°water tower¡± where the river begins. Herat was the most productive agricultural hub of the basin, but multi-year droughts have displaced thousands of  in western Afghanistan.

Survival depends on local stewardship. The ancient irrigation ¡°blocks¡± of Herat follow the 16th-century by Qasim Haravi. This manuscript remains a legal reference for water conflicts today. Modernizing this traditional system with lined canals could reduce water losses from seepage by . This would directly benefit the families who have protected this river for generations.

The path toward a basin-wide plan: a strategic framework

Addressing ¡°water bankruptcy¡± requires a multidimensional approach that balances high-level diplomacy with grassroots custodianship:

1. Establishing trilateral data transparency and a joint monitoring body: The first step toward stability is the creation of a permanent, trilateral technical committee involving Afghanistan, Iran and Turkmenistan. This committee must facilitate the transparent exchange of real-time data on all tributaries. This includes the Kashafrud River and other secondary branches originating in Iran. By establishing a common hydrological baseline, the three nations can move away from political rhetoric and toward evidence-based allocation and joint drought forecasting.

2. Modernizing local custodianship through integrated management: We must bridge the gap between ancient wisdom and modern technology. We must modernize community-led irrigation by integrating pressurized systems and satellite-monitored soil sensors. These upgrades should be managed directly by the local Mir Abs (Water Masters). Empowering local stakeholders ensures ¡°buy-in¡± and compliance that top-down treaties often lack.

3. Addressing interbasin transfer inequities through benefit-sharing: Negotiations must confront the unsustainable practice of interbasin transfers. The Doosti Dam¡¯s primary function ¡ª supplying Mashhad at the expense of the Harirud¡¯s internal ecology ¡ª is a major driver of regional scarcity. Treaties must prioritize the basin¡¯s ecology over external urban demand. Downstream nations must invest in internal recycling and desalination rather than further depleting the Harirud. A ¡°basin-first¡± policy could be supplemented by a? in which downstream gains contribute to upstream water efficiency.

4. Legal harmonization and accountability: Regional water management must be codified within a robust legal framework of ¡°equitable and reasonable utilization.¡± This requires harmonizing national water laws with international standards. By moving toward a unified basin-wide plan, the Harirud can transform from a source of conflict into a model for regional cooperation and climate resilience.

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The post Beyond the Flow: The Fight for Survival in the Harirud Basin appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The scale of the analysis adds weight to the finding. The ESR covers 30 of the world¡¯s largest economies, representing about of world output. It concludes that much of the 2024 widening reflects what the IMF calls : external positions that deviate meaningfully from what country fundamentals and policy settings would warrant. Thus, the concern is not merely that surpluses or deficits exist, but that their magnitude and persistence signal underlying distortions in saving and investment behaviors.

To strengthen causal clarity, it is worth noting that these spillovers arise through interest-rate channels, exchange-rate movements and global liquidity cycles that amplify the asymmetry between surplus-driven capital exports and deficit-driven capital absorption.

Macro-financial risks reemerging

This resurgence of economic divergence reawakens familiar risks that have long characterized global macro-financial cycles. Economies with sustained current-account deficits remain vulnerable to abrupt reversals in capital flows, sudden increases in borrowing costs and the pressures of forced adjustment. Conversely, economies with persistent and sizable surpluses may inadvertently suppress global interest rates, channel excess savings abroad and weaken aggregate demand in deficit economies. These opposing dynamics reinforce each other: Liquidity constraints in deficit nations coexist with excess savings in surplus economies, magnifying volatility and mispricing of risk.

The IMF¡¯s ESR 2025 stresses this dual-risk framework, warning that ¡°delaying macro-economic adjustments to correct post-pandemic domestic macro-imbalances could result in continued current-account divergence in major economies.¡± Moreover, the report that ¡°such rapid and globally sizable increases in excess current-account balances can generate significant negative cross-border spillovers,¡± underscoring that imbalances on either side of the external ledger contribute to systemic fragility and threaten the cohesion of the international monetary system.

The IMF research, notably under the direction of IMF Chief Economist Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, reinforces this perspective by demonstrating that external surpluses are not inherently the ¡°safe side.¡± His paper that large, persistent surpluses can depress global equilibrium interest rates, entrench savings gluts and exacerbate liquidity traps in an interdependent world economy. In this framework, creditor nations export their safe-asset status and, in doing so, inadvertently heighten global fragility. This finding directly aligns with the IMF¡¯s concern that systemic risks arise not only from deficit economies, but equally from those with sustained surpluses.

A structural break, not simply a rebound

The year 2024 marked not a cyclical rebound but a structural inflection in global current-account dynamics. What distinguishes this episode is not only the magnitude of the widening but its asymmetric composition and global reach. Major surplus economies ¡ª particularly China and parts of East Asia ¡ª expanded their surpluses, while major deficit economies, led by the United States, deepened their shortfalls.

The IMF¡¯s ESR 2025 estimates that about two-thirds of the widening in global current-account balances was ¡°excessive,¡± meaning inconsistent with countries¡¯ structural fundamentals or cyclical positions. When these excess balances are excluded, the underlying widening falls to roughly 30% underscoring how far the current trajectory diverges from equilibrium drivers such as demographic trends, fiscal stances or commodity prices.

Although the pattern resembles the mid-2000s surpluses and deficits, today¡¯s environment differs crucially ¡ª China¡¯s reserve accumulation is smaller relative to GDP, macroprudential regulation is stronger and global capital is shaped more by risk-management frameworks than by unregulated financial intermediation. These differences caution against overly direct comparisons while still supporting the argument that the widening is structurally driven.

The composition of these shifts reveals the extent of renewed structural divergence. China¡¯s external surplus expanded by about 0.24% of global GDP, the US deficit deepened by 0.20% and the euro area added roughly 0.07%; together, these factors account for the of the global imbalance. This pattern evokes the mid-2000s configuration, when Asian and commodity-exporting economies accumulated surpluses as the US ran record deficits ¡ª a prelude to the global financial crisis. Although today¡¯s context differs ¡ª our current world is marked by subdued trade elasticity, altered capital flows and evolving reserve accumulation motives ¡ª the reemergence of excess balances suggests that global saving and investment asymmetries have again become entrenched.

The policy implications are sobering. The ESR 2025 that raising tariffs or erecting trade barriers, though politically expedient in deficit economies, does little to narrow external gaps and may instead distort resource allocation, dampen productivity and intensify inflationary pressures. Durable adjustment will require deeper rebalancing: fiscal consolidation and higher household saving in deficit economies, coupled with stronger domestic demand and financial liberalization in surplus economies. The 2024 widening thus represents a structural reassertion of global asymmetry, one that challenges both the resilience of the international monetary order and the credibility of its adjustment mechanisms.

A structural break in the global balance

The year 2024 marked a turning point in the world economy, a structural rupture in the global balance of payments. The sharp widening of global current-account gaps revealed deep-seated asymmetries: Surplus economies expanded further, while deficit countries fell deeper into shortfalls. This divergence reflected enduring mismatches between national saving and investment patterns rather than temporary business-cycle fluctuations. Data from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Tracker that these disparities accounted for a significant share of world GDP, with surplus and deficit economies drifting further apart in 2024 ¡ª an imbalance shaped more by structural saving-investment behavior than by short-term trade trends.

At the root of these imbalances lie persistent domestic distortions. In surplus countries, precautionary saving remains elevated, social safety nets are underdeveloped and investment is overly concentrated in export-oriented sectors ¡ª constraining the transition toward consumption- and services-led growth. In deficit economies, dependence on external financing is reinforced by weak private saving and structural fiscal laxity ¡ª not in the sense of countercyclical stabilization, where temporary deficits play a productive role during downturns, but as a persistent feature of policy shaped by political economic constraints rather than macroeconomic necessity.

As in CFR¡¯s commentary, the global pattern of imbalances increasingly reflects excess precautionary savings and limited policy adaptation in major economies. Europe continues to lag behind the US in productivity and investment dynamism, China¡¯s consumption-driven transition remains incomplete and the US has delayed credible fiscal consolidation despite mounting debt pressures.

True rebalancing, therefore, requires structural reform, not external confrontation. Stronger social insurance systems could moderate excess saving; higher domestic investment could support innovation and productivity; and credible fiscal rules could anchor sustainability. Yet political responses have often moved in the opposite direction. The recent revival of tariffs and industrial policies in advanced economies a turn toward visible but misguided remedies. Such measures function economically as negative supply shocks ¡ª raising costs, discouraging investment and compressing real incomes ¡ª without improving the external balance. Protectionism, rather than correcting global asymmetries, risks amplifying domestic inefficiencies and undermining long-term welfare.

To avoid overgeneralization, it is important to distinguish investment-oriented industrial policy (which can raise potential output) from protectionist industrial policy (which typically functions as a negative supply shock). The latter is the source of imbalance-worsening dynamics.

At the multilateral level, policymakers have begun to acknowledge that external divergences are no longer adequately explained by bilateral trade flows, but by macro-financial incoherence across a fragmented global system. As capital flows become increasingly regionalized and supply chains realign, systemic fragility grows. Without coordination, what begins as national adjustment failure could evolve into global dislocation. To avoid this will require coherent fiscal, monetary and structural policies that recognize the spillovers of domestic choices on the international system.

The international monetary system, still anchored by the US dollar, remains stable but faces . Its dominance is challenged by shifting , the proliferation of digital and concerns over US fiscal sustainability. While confidence in dollar liquidity and institutions endures, global fragmentation risks raising transaction costs and financial volatility. The widening current-account imbalances of 2024 thus stand as a warning: Without domestic reform and renewed cooperation, the world risks turning structural distortions into systemic fault lines ¡ª testing both the resilience of the global order and the political will to sustain it.

The three pillars of domestic reform

While the IMF¡¯s ESR Report diagnoses the reemergence of global current-account imbalances, the IMF¨CWorld Bank Annual Meetings helped to define the policy response. A consensus emerged around three domestic pillars: fiscal sustainability, public investment and productivity, and social insurance with demand rebalancing. Each pillar is supported by IMF analysis and cross-country policy assessments.

Deficit economies must restore fiscal space to reinforce confidence and resilience against shocks. The IMF¡¯s Fiscal Monitor (Annual Meetings 2025) that ¡°starting from too high deficits and debt, the persistence of spending above tax revenues will push debt to ever higher levels, threatening sustainability and financial stability.¡± The report stresses that fiscal consolidation and the rebuilding of buffers are essential to ¡°prepare fiscal space to use in case of severe adverse shocks.¡± In practical terms, this means strengthening fiscal rules, prioritizing high-quality expenditure and improving tax efficiency. Fiscal frameworks that demonstrate medium-term discipline, rather than ad-hoc austerity, are the for credible adjustment and reduced external vulnerability.

This distinction is important because excessive reliance on temporary or politically motivated fiscal expansions has historically weakened policy credibility, especially in high-debt advanced economies like Japan¡¯s.

Surplus economies with ample fiscal capacity are encouraged to channel excess domestic savings into productive investment at home ¡ª particularly in infrastructure, digital transformation and green transitions. The IMF ESR 2025 notes that countries such as Singapore and Japan should ¡°raise public investment and strengthen social safety nets to reduce external surpluses by lowering net saving in both public and private sectors.¡± Specifically, Japan is advised to ¡°implement policies focused on structural reforms and fiscal sustainability through a credible and specific medium-term fiscal consolidation plan,¡± and to ¡°shift the drivers of the economy to one driven by the private sector, raising potential growth through labor-market and fiscal reforms that support private demand, digitalization, and green investment.¡± Likewise, Singapore is urged to ¡°execute planned high-quality and resilient infrastructure projects and continue strengthening social safety nets to help reduce external imbalances,¡± while ¡°increasing public investment to address structural transformation brought by aging and the transition to a green and digital economy.¡±

Furthermore, the IMF Managing Director¡¯s Global Policy Agenda (Fall 2025) that ¡°countries need to restore their depleted policy buffers¡± while pursuing ¡°fiscal measures that promote medium-term growth through innovation and green investment.¡± Together, these recommendations imply that global rebalancing depends as much on the productive absorption of savings as on fiscal prudence ¡ª transforming surplus positions into engines of sustainable domestic growth.

Japan approach: responsible stimulus or fiscal risk?

Japan¡¯s fiscal trajectory under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has emerged as one of the most revealing case studies in the post-pandemic evolution of macroeconomic policy. In sharp contrast to the consolidation trend prevailing across advanced economies, Tokyo has embarked on a renewed phase of large-scale countercyclical intervention ¡ª a fiscal package exceeding (approximately 2.4% of Japan¡¯s GDP; $88.9 billion) aimed at alleviating cost-of-living pressures, accelerating real-wage recovery and revitalizing corporate reinvestment.

This deliberate pivot toward fiscal expansion is both pragmatic and experimental, reflecting Japan¡¯s long-standing struggle with chronic deflation, rapid population aging and structural underinvestment in productivity-enhancing sectors. Yet these same structural forces that justify fiscal activism may also constrain its long-run effectiveness, raising questions about sustainability and market confidence. A central challenge is that Japan¡¯s stimulus increasingly serves multiple objectives simultaneously ¡ª short-term support, structural transformation and political stabilization ¡ª which complicates the task of maintaining a coherent medium-term fiscal anchor.

The fiscal deficit for 2024 is estimated to be than projected in the 2024 Article IV Consultation, as robust corporate earnings have buoyed tax revenues while pandemic-related transfers to households and small and medium-sized enterprises have been largely phased out. Nonetheless, the deficit is expected to widen moderately in 2025, reflecting new expenditures for defense, family-support measures and industrial-policy initiatives.

Given constrained fiscal space and mounting political pressures on the minority government, any additional expansionary measures must be fully offset through corresponding revenue gains or expenditure rationalization elsewhere in the budget. This offsetting requirement is especially important because repeated reliance on discretionary stimulus, without equivalent medium-term consolidation, risks weakening long-run fiscal credibility even if short-term financing conditions remain benign.

Public debt, while declining marginally in the near term as nominal GDP growth exceeds the effective interest rate, remains among the globally. In fact, it is projected to resume an upward trajectory by 2030. This rise is driven by a growing interest burden and escalating social-spending commitments related to healthcare and long-term care. Ensuring debt sustainability and restoring fiscal buffers will therefore require a credible and granular medium-term consolidation strategy anchored in durable institutional frameworks and transparent fiscal rules. The absence of such a framework increases the likelihood that future fiscal adjustments will be abrupt, procyclical or politically disruptive.

A coherent fiscal framework should prioritize:

1. Expenditure rebalancing toward productivity-enhancing and socially efficient categories by eliminating poorly targeted subsidies, particularly energy subsidies, while safeguarding high-quality public investment. Enhancing the targeting and cost-efficiency of social security programs is indispensable to manage demographic pressures without eroding welfare quality.
   
2. Revenue restructuring to strengthen equity and efficiency. Policy options include expanding taxation of financial income for high-income earners, broadening the property-tax base, streamlining income-tax deductions and gradually unifying and raising the consumption-tax rate. Any new deductions, such as the proposed personal-income-tax reforms, should be budget-neutral, supported by compensatory revenues or savings.
   
3. Restricting reliance on supplementary budgets, whose repeated and partial execution dilutes fiscal discipline and transparency. Such budgets should be confined to genuine, unanticipated shocks beyond the scope of automatic stabilizers. Medium-term expenditure commitments, especially in industrial policy and the green transition, must be incorporated into the regular annual budget process.

As domestic interest rates normalize, the cost of servicing public debt is projected to roughly double by 2030, underscoring the urgency of a robust debt-management strategy. With gross financing needs expanding and the Bank of Japan (BoJ)¡¯s balance sheet contracting, sovereign issuance will increasingly depend on renewed demand from foreign investors and domestic institutional holders. This shift in the investor base heightens the importance of maintaining fiscal credibility, as foreign participation tends to be more sensitive to perceived sustainability risks.

IMF perspective and the Takaichi strategy

The IMF¡¯s evolving stance represents a subtle yet significant departure from its pre-pandemic orthodoxy. Rather than advocating procyclical austerity, the Fund now distinguishes between productive fiscal stimulus ¡ª which enhances potential output and facilitates structural rebalancing ¡ª and generalized expansion, which risks eroding policy credibility and market confidence.

In its working paper, economists Sam Ouliaris and Celine Rochon that Japan¡¯s diminished fiscal multipliers stem from the persistent elevation of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Despite historically low interest rates, the accumulation of debt has deepened structural deficits and heightened the likelihood of future fiscal adjustment through higher taxes or expenditure restraint. This dynamic underscores a critical policy constraint: the efficacy of fiscal policy declines as debt-sustainability concerns become endogenous to private-sector expectations.

Consequently, stimulus is most effective when directed toward productivity-enhancing, innovation-driven investment that raises potential output and reinforces fiscal credibility over the medium term ¡ª rather than measures that merely boost transitory demand. This interpretation helps reconcile an apparent paradox: While Japan¡¯s borrowing costs remain low, the marginal impact of new stimulus on growth is declining because private agents increasingly expect future consolidation.

In our interpretation of the same paper, we contend that the reduction in multipliers reflects not temporary cyclical weakness but structural saturation ¡ª the upward trajectory of government debt relative to GDP. Despite persistently low interest rates, it has expanded Japan¡¯s structural deficit and increased the likelihood of eventual fiscal consolidation through reduced expenditures and higher taxation.

Japan, however, remains in a uniquely permissive financial environment. Exceptionally low government-bond yields, the predominance of domestic debt ownership and deep institutional trust confer an unusual degree of fiscal latitude. Yet, as the IMF warns, such conditions are not inexhaustible; they hinge on continued market confidence in future consolidation and structural reform.

Empirical studies reinforce these structural headwinds. Researchers Jiro Honda and Hiroaki Miyamoto that population aging weakens the output effects of fiscal stimulus, as older households exhibit lower consumption multipliers and weaker labor-supply responses. Similarly, at the Baker Institute for Public Policy, economist Russell Green and I that Japan¡¯s long-term stagnation stems from entrenched rigidities ¡ª persistent deflation, sluggish productivity and delayed institutional reform ¡ª that constrain the effectiveness of conventional fiscal responses.

These findings highlight the demographic and institutional limits of demand-side stimulus in an aging economy. These demographic limitations mean that stimulus measures relying heavily on household demand are particularly constrained in their effectiveness, reinforcing the urgency of more targeted, productivity-oriented investment.

Prime Minister Takaichi¡¯s economic program, as ¡°responsible and proactive fiscal policy,¡± thus blends near-term social relief with longer-term strategic investment. Her fiscal package integrates income transfers and energy subsidies with industrial support for semiconductors, defense technologies and innovation ecosystems, combining short-term stabilization with supply-side resilience. This approach partially aligns with the IMF¡¯s three-pillar framework for sustainable fiscal policy:

1. Strengthening aggregate demand through expanded social protection,
   
2. Enhancing productivity via targeted public investment and
   
3. Maintaining a credible fiscal anchor to ensure long-term debt sustainability.

Yet the alignment remains partial and fragile. The IMF that durable fiscal credibility depends on a medium-term framework explicitly linking current stimulus to future consolidation. Takaichi¡¯s strategy, by contrast, prioritizes growth-first sequencing ¡ª the conviction that economic expansion will itself generate the fiscal space necessary for subsequent discipline.

This sequencing creates a logical vulnerability: If growth underperforms, the fiscal anchor does not automatically tighten, leaving consolidation perpetually deferred.

Between resilience and reckoning

This divergence reveals a deeper philosophical tension. The IMF envisions discipline preceding growth; Japan is testing whether growth can restore discipline. Both perspectives seek the same macroeconomic equilibrium ¡ª a self-reinforcing cycle of wage growth, investment and productivity ¡ª but diverge in temporal logic. The IMF¡¯s caution is grounded in cross-country evidence that prolonged fiscal expansion in high-debt contexts can erode market confidence. Japan¡¯s experiment, however, suggests that with credible institutions and domestically anchored financing, fiscal activism may delay the limits imposed by debt dynamics.

In this sense, the ¡°Japan Approach¡± is neither a repudiation of IMF orthodoxy nor an uncritical adherence to it. It represents a contextual reinterpretation ¡ª fiscal policy as an instrument of national resilience, calibrated to domestic realities yet framed within the Fund¡¯s broader logic of credibility through productivity. Japan¡¯s policy debate epitomizes the central dilemma confronting mature, high-debt democracies: whether fiscal sustainability can be achieved not through retrenchment, but through revitalization.

Absent credible medium-term consolidation and productivity reform, however, Takaichi¡¯s growth-first experiment risks collapsing under its own weight. Should it succeed, it may offer a blueprint for reconciling stimulus with sustainability in advanced economies. If it fails ¡ª as structural evidence increasingly suggests ¡ª it will reaffirm the IMF¡¯s enduring caution: that even Japan¡¯s exceptional fiscal insulation cannot permanently defy the gravitational pull of debt dynamics.

Beyond Japan: global imbalances and the return of structural asymmetry

The revival of global current-account imbalances has once again become a defining feature of the post-pandemic economy. Despite the cyclical recovery seen across major regions, the world economy continues to exhibit deep structural asymmetries: persistent US deficits, renewed Asian surpluses and increasingly fragmented trade and capital flows. These patterns suggest that global adjustment will not occur spontaneously as the aftershocks of the pandemic dissipate. Instead, they point to enduring distortions in the distribution of savings, investment and demand ¡ª distortions that call for deliberate, coordinated policy action.

For economists and policymakers alike, the message is unambiguous: external-sector dynamics must be reintegrated into domestic macroeconomic frameworks. Fiscal sustainability, productivity enhancement, social insurance and financial stability are not discrete policy domains, but mutually reinforcing components of a single adjustment architecture. Neglecting imbalances risks not only abrupt crises, but also prolonged secular stagnation or, in the worst case, a fragmentation of the international monetary system that has underpinned globalization for half a century.

Correcting these imbalances demands more than short-term macroeconomic management ¡ª it requires patient, coordinated structural reform rooted in fundamentals rather than expedience. The 2024 BIS Bulletin that trade protectionism and industrial policy realignment act as negative supply shocks, raising prices and depressing investment without materially improving external balances.

Thus, the task of global rebalancing is inherently collective. Surplus economies must expand productive investment and social spending to absorb savings domestically, while deficit economies must rebuild fiscal buffers and national savings without undermining growth. Exchange-rate flexibility can cushion shocks, but only structural reforms in innovation, human capital and infrastructure can sustain adjustment.

Global imbalances have returned, but their structural weight is heavier and their political management more fragile than in the past. The challenge now is to forge a credible and cooperative roadmap that addresses the roots of these distortions, strengthens international institutions and preserves the integrity of the global monetary order anchored by the US dollar. The time for complacency has passed; the window for collective action is narrow but not yet closed.

Japan¡¯s path to resilience

The best prescription for Takaichi is to transform her current stimulus package from a short-lived, demand-support measure into a structured transition strategy designed to rebuild Japan¡¯s fiscal and macro-financial resilience. This requires three mutually reinforcing pillars.

First, fiscal expansion must shift decisively toward targeted, productivity-enhancing investment ¡ª in semiconductors, digital infrastructure, human capital and industrial innovation ¡ª so that public spending raises potential growth rather than merely cushioning cyclical weakness. Researchers Koji Nakamura, Sohei Kaihatsu and Tomoyuki Yagi that Japan¡¯s productivity slowdown stems from two structural frictions: the inefficient utilization of accumulated technologies, capital and labor within firms, and weak reallocation of these resources across firms.

Fiscal policy should therefore prioritize investments that not only strengthen frontier technologies but also enable firms to reorganize production processes, adopt digital tools, upgrade research & development capacity and redeploy labor and capital more flexibly in response to technological and demographic shifts. By anchoring stimulus in areas that enhance both technological capability and resource mobility, Japan increases the likelihood that debt-financed spending today generates durable productivity gains and greater fiscal space tomorrow. This approach aligns with empirical evidence showing that productivity-oriented investment delivers larger long-run multipliers than generalized transfers or subsidies, particularly in aging, high-debt economies.

Second, Takaichi must introduce a simple, credible and binding medium-term fiscal rule that gradually moves the primary balance toward sustainable territory. Establishing such a framework is essential because Japan¡¯s chronic deficits and rising debt burden have weakened long-run fiscal resilience, even as government bond yields have remained artificially low. Researchers Takeo Hoshi and Takatoshi Ito that Japan¡¯s low Japanese government bond yields are sustained by structural factors ¡ª high domestic savings, home bias among institutional investors and stable long-term expectations. Yet they warn that these conditions will erode as the population ages and the investor base contracts.

As demographic aging reduces national savings and risk tolerance, markets may reassess Japan¡¯s fiscal trajectory, making policy credibility and transparency increasingly vital to preventing sudden increases in borrowing costs. A well-designed fiscal rule helps anchor expectations, mitigate concerns about future taxation and inflation and signal a commitment to gradual consolidation without imposing immediate austerity.

This approach is consistent with evidence that Japan¡¯s fiscal policy has historically been insufficiently responsive to rising debt, as well as with international that credible fiscal rules can support orderly, growth-friendly consolidation without triggering abrupt austerity. By adopting a transparent and enforceable medium-term anchor, Takaichi can reinforce confidence in Japan¡¯s fiscal management and limit the probability of a sudden rise in borrowing costs as structural conditions evolve.

Third, and most critically, any normalization of monetary policy must be paired with an explicit, institutionally coordinated strategy to resolve zombie firms ¡ª the structural legacy of decades of ultra-low interest rates. Researchers Ricardo Caballero, Hoshi and Anil Kashyap that zombie firms depress investment, productivity and the healthy reallocation of credit by tying up financial, managerial and human resources in inefficient firms that survive due to banks¡¯ evergreening practices. With the BoJ gradually shifting toward a more normal interest-rate environment, these firms represent a major transmission risk: Even modest rate hikes could expose the fragility of heavily indebted, low-productivity firms, prompting bankruptcies, credit contractions and a sharp decline in business investment.

To prevent this outcome, a coordinated policy architecture is essential. The BoJ must adopt a gradual, predictable normalization path; financial regulators should provide targeted flexibility that facilitates restructuring rather than indiscriminate tightening and policymakers must expand programs supporting corporate restructuring, mergers, divestitures and the reallocation of labor and capital to more productive firms. Such an integrated strategy ensures that monetary normalization strengthens the business sector rather than destabilizing it, while accelerating long-delayed structural adjustments necessary to raise long-term productivity and growth potential.

Strategy, not complacency

The reemergence of global current-account imbalances marks not a cyclical deviation but a structural disequilibrium rooted in fiscal fragility and institutional asymmetry. Persistent excess savings in surplus economies and entrenched deficits in others reveal a deeper malfunction in global adjustment mechanisms ¡ª where fiscal policy, monetary credibility and capital-market integration have become progressively decoupled.

As economist Ricardo Reis , modern macroeconomic equilibrium is sustained by institutions that internalize imperfections: fiscal authorities that anchor expectations, central banks that preserve credibility and financial systems that intermediate risk without distortion. When these stabilizing institutions erode, imbalances do not self-correct; they amplify through feedback loops of mistrust, inflation drift and policy inertia. In this sense, fiscal and monetary credibility have into global public goods ¡ª forms of institutional capital whose degradation in one major economy transmits volatility across borders, destabilizing liquidity conditions and constraining the global supply of safe assets.

In particular, when fiscal authorities fail to provide credible medium-term anchors, private agents increase precautionary saving and shorten investment horizons, reinforcing the very imbalances policymakers attempt to correct.

This logic reframes global adjustment as an institutional equilibrium problem, not merely a policy coordination failure. The erosion of credibility in one jurisdiction increases precautionary demand for safe assets, compressing yields and propagating financial fragility elsewhere. Conversely, credible fiscal anchors and independent central banks generate positive externalities, stabilizing expectations and lowering the cost of global liquidity.

Hence, credibility today functions as an endogenous source of international stability, no longer confined within national borders. This point is especially vital for Japan. If domestic fiscal credibility weakens, the resulting rise in precautionary demand for Japanese safe assets could paradoxically depress yields in the short term while increasing long-term sustainability risks.

Correcting these distortions demands strategy, not complacency. Tactical stimulus or ad-hoc tightening cannot restore equilibrium. What Japan needs is patient, coordinated institutional reform that aligns domestic objectives with systemic coherence ¡ª strengthening fiscal frameworks, enhancing productivity and renewing the architecture of macro-financial governance. Adjustment, as Reis argues, is a deliberate act of institutional design, rebuilding the trust architecture that allows disequilibria to unwind without crisis.

The challenge before policymakers is therefore both intellectual and operational. To sustain globalization under stress, nations must reconcile short-term flexibility with long-term credibility, viewing fiscal prudence and monetary independence not as opposing doctrines but as complementary pillars of collective resilience.

The central lesson of this new era makes itself clear: Stability will not arise from market self-correction alone but from the credibility of the institutions that govern it ¡ª the very institutions that now constitute the world¡¯s most fragile and indispensable public good.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post Once an Economic Giant, Japan Now Tests a New Fiscal Path ¡ª and the World Is Watching appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Responses from Beijing and Jakarta

Beijing¡¯s reaction was swift and unequivocal. It the US operation as a violation of international law and called for dialogue over unilateral action. Chinese officials framed the capture as an erosion of the international legal order and reiterated China¡¯s opposition to external intervention, consistent with its long-standing diplomatic positions.

Indonesia a more restrained tone. Jakarta urged all parties to pursue a peaceful resolution, emphasized respect for international law and called for de-escalation, while avoiding direct criticism of Washington. The carefully calibrated language reflected Indonesia¡¯s preference for neutrality and its effort to preserve diplomatic space.

Together, the two responses revealed differing diplomatic styles, but also a shared emphasis on stability and legal principles.

How the episode shapes China¨CIndonesia engagement

The significance of the Maduro episode lies in how it may influence Indonesia¡¯s reading of China¡¯s broader diplomatic posture. Beijing¡¯s emphasis on sovereignty and nonintervention aligns with themes that resonate in Indonesian foreign policy. At the same time, Jakarta places a premium on consistency and predictability in its external partnerships.

The Maduro incident directly impacts how China interacts with Indonesia on multiple fronts. First, the episode reinforces Indonesia¡¯s preference for steady and measured engagement. While China¡¯s position underscores its normative stance, Jakarta¡¯s focus remains on maintaining balanced relations with all major powers. This places importance on continuity in China¡¯s approach to Indonesia rather than shifts driven by external crises.

Second, the incident also draws attention to how principles are applied across different contexts. Indonesia closely observes China¡¯s behavior beyond rhetoric. The contrast between Beijing¡¯s defense of sovereignty in Venezuela and its near Indonesia¡¯s Natuna Islands continues to shape perceptions. Although Indonesia is not a claimant to the Spratly Islands, it has consistently rejected China¡¯s maritime claims where they overlap with Indonesia¡¯s exclusive economic zone near the Natuna Islands, making Chinese activity in those waters a sensitive issue in the bilateral relationship.

Taken together, these factors suggest that China¡¯s engagement with Indonesia is shaped not only by shared positions on international law but by how those positions are reflected in regional practice.

Economics as a stabilizing pillar

remains the foundation of China¨CIndonesia relations. Trade, investment and large-scale infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative anchor the partnership and provide resilience against political uncertainty. The Maduro episode may encourage Beijing to emphasize the economic dimension of the relationship more strongly, providing tangible benefits while avoiding overtly confrontational rhetoric. Economic ties are a key lever in ensuring Indonesia remains a partner in Southeast Asia, particularly as Jakarta balances US security cooperation and regional leadership ambitions.

Indonesia¡¯s importance magnifies this dynamic. As Southeast Asia¡¯s largest economy and a leading Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member, Jakarta plays a central role in China¡¯s regional strategy. Beijing¡¯s ability to accommodate Indonesia¡¯s preference for neutrality and multilateral engagement will influence both bilateral ties and China¡¯s broader standing in Southeast Asia. Careful management of economic cooperation remains essential to sustaining trust.

A stress test for engagement

The US capture of Maduro is unlikely to trigger an immediate shift in China¨CIndonesia relations. Instead, it functions as a stress test for how external developments interact with existing dynamics in the relationship.

For Indonesia, the episode reinforces the importance of strategic autonomy and balanced diplomacy. For China, sustaining engagement with Indonesia will depend on aligning its global positions with regional expectations, while maintaining economic cooperation and sensitivity to Indonesian concerns. Maritime conduct near the Natuna Islands remains a quiet but enduring reference point.

Viewed this way, the Maduro episode illustrates how developments far from Southeast Asia can influence the context in which China and Indonesia manage their relationship ¡ª not through rupture, but through careful adjustment and sustained engagement.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post How the US Capture of Nicol¨¢s Maduro Impacts China¡¯s Engagement with Indonesia appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

A unfurled when an Afghan asylee was arrested for the November 26 shooting of National Guard members in Washington, DC. The Trump administration extrapolated the actions of one suspect to an entire group of people, while ignoring the easy availability of guns.

But for white men, who, relative to their population, commit mass shootings in the United States, there is neither extrapolation to their entire demographic (nor, of course, policy prescriptions to reduce the availability of guns) ¡ª only ¡°thoughts and prayers.¡±

So untouchable is gun control in the United States that some even double down, saying restricting firearms would lead to because victims wouldn¡¯t be able to defend themselves against perpetrators, never mind that in the case of the Bondi Beach massacre, an tackled the gunman with his bare hands, ensuring more lives would not be endangered. If guns truly made people safer, the US, which has than people, would have among the lowest rates of gun violence in the world.

But the is true. In 2023, the latest year for which statistics are available, more than in the US lost their lives as a result of gun violence, which is also the of death for children and teenagers. Every day, an average of are killed in the US because of the easy availability of guns, their blood and bodies swept under the rug, hidden from view.

But perhaps we need to see the bodies in order to end our love affair with guns.

The stark reality of gun violence: Australia vs the US

Gun violence is so appallingly prevalent in the US that it is akin to a nation ¡°experiencing .¡± There were mass shootings in 2025 alone, one of the most recent taking place on the campus of on December 13, where two people who escaped death survived . Gun regulations barely featured in media coverage of the Brown University shooting. Instead, focused on the perpetrator being on the loose for days before being found. Such perverted attentions are symbolic of the pro-gun adage that ¡°guns don¡¯t kill people, people do.¡±

As horrific as the Bondi Beach massacre was, in Australia, a nation with strict gun laws, it was an outlier. It took a single mass shooting in 1996 for Australia to pass strict gun controls. Known as the , a shooter killed 35 people, after which the nation¡¯s politicians united to pass wide-ranging bans on assault rifles, shotguns and other types of firearms. Authorities bought guns back en masse from the public and melted down as many as 1 million guns.

The results were stark, especially compared to the United States, where right-wing factions seem to consider guns more sacred than human life. Australia¡¯s per capita rate of was 12 times lower than that of the United States, according to 2023 figures. For more than 20 years, there were no mass shootings in Australia. That record was broken in 2018 with a horrific murder-suicide, and then in December 2025 with the Bondi Beach shooting.

Closing the loopholes

If Australia¡¯s laws were already so strict, how could the Bondi Beach massacre in Sydney have happened? It turns out they weren¡¯t strict enough. in the nation¡¯s regulations allow individuals to stockpile guns, and gun club members in particular are allowed to purchase firearms using licenses for recreational use. One of the suspected shooters was a of such a gun club and had a recreational license for the gun believed to be used in the shooting.

Moreover, the gun used in the shooting required , because semiautomatic assault rifles, which automatically reload, are in Australia. They are in the US and have been used in horrific mass shootings, such as the in Uvalde, Texas, allowing shooters to spray bullets without pausing. That means the Bondi Beach massacre could have been far deadlier if Australia had the same lax laws as the US.

Australian lawmakers and advocates of gun laws are taking the logical next step to ensure that the lives of the Bondi Beach victims were not lost in vain and are actually working to the loophole that appears to have led to their killings. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese refreshingly announced ¡ª alongside protections for the Jewish community ¡ª greater .

Why the US can¡¯t quit guns

Gun laws work, and Australia isn¡¯t the only example. Within the US, those states with fewer gun restrictions have higher rates of gun-related deaths. A June 2025 in the Journal of American Medical Association (JAMA) Pediatrics found that ¡°states with the most permissive firearm laws after 2010 experienced more than 6,029 firearm deaths in children and adolescents aged 0 to 17 years between 2011 and 2023 and 1,424 excess firearm deaths in a group of states with permissive laws.¡± In contrast, ¡°four states had statistical decreases in pediatric firearm mortality during the study period, all of which were in states with strict firearm policies.¡±

A majority of Americans it is too easy to obtain guns in the US, and while most Democrats agree on basic regulations such as banning assault rifles, there is a majority bipartisan support for raising the minimum age for purchasing guns to 21.

So, why is it nearly impossible to pass stricter gun laws in the US? A large part of the problem is the stranglehold the has over the political system.

Additionally, the US is a nation tilting headfirst toward authoritarian rule, and gun owners, who are right-wing and white, are seen by the political establishment as far too important to alienate. Republicans are fanatically pro-gun, while Democrats are on gun control.

We also have a national cultural attachment to guns that borders on religious. For that, we can thank the around gun-toting pioneers who believed they were destined to colonize the nation. Our obsession with individual rights over collective well-being is not limited to a reticence against or . Individualism is at the heart of gun ownership, no matter the strong correlation between lax gun laws and gun violence.

Facing the true cost of gun violence

We are awash in stories that glorify guns, especially from the liberal purveyors of obsessively feeding us movies about ¡°good guys with guns.¡±

But the pain of gun violence survivors is rarely explored in nuanced ways on our television screens, newspapers or social media. If the Bondi Beach massacre had happened on US soil, there would be little focus on guns beyond the usual advocates calling in vain for stricter controls and gun activists shouting them into silence.

What if, instead of pixelating the images of gun victims ¡ª which quite literally renders them invisible ¡ª we were forced to face the ugliness of gun deaths?

In 1955, insisted on an open casket for Emmett Till to showcase what white supremacist lynch-mob violence did to her son and to force the nation not to look away. Perhaps the news media ought to start showing us what bullets do to a body.

In the 1970s, of the Vietnam War on nightly television news shows helped Americans see the impacts of massacres funded by their tax dollars and turned the tide of popular support against the war. Perhaps today¡¯s censors ought to stop shielding us from how a person¡¯s brains and guts spatter a campus sidewalk when an armed shooter has emptied the assault rifle.

In 2025, former President Barack Obama¡¯s speechwriter credited social media with ¡°smashing our young people¡¯s brains all day long with video of carnage in Gaza,¡± as a reason for why public opinion has moved against Israel over its genocide. Perhaps social media platforms ought to show us what victims of mass shootings really look like before they are buried or cremated.

Such imagery can carry the requisite trigger warnings to save those already traumatized by witnessing gun violence from being subjected to it again. But those who vehemently support deadly weapon ownership over the right to live free from fear ought to face the results of their dogma.

We should be haunted by the images of the dead. They should invade our dreams. Better to be traumatized by such savage visuals than to end up dead, or worse, lose a beloved to gun violence.

[This article was produced by , a project of the Independent Media Institute.]

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Leadership turnover and a faster diplomatic rhythm

Satoh opens by noting how leadership changes in Japan¨CKorea relations tend to generate ¡°anxiety or optimism,¡± and therefore unpredictability. South Korea¡¯s transition from President Yoon Suk Yeol to President Lee Jae Myung and Japan¡¯s rapid succession of prime ministers create both risk and opportunity: Bilateral ties can regress into grievance politics, or they can consolidate a forward-looking partnership.

Choo argues that Lee moves quickly despite the lack of a traditional transition period. In his telling, Lee signals seriousness by traveling early, attending key summits, and ¡ª most symbolically ¡ª making Japan his first stop en route to the United States. The two leaders also revive ¡°shuttle diplomacy,¡± emphasizing frequent contact and reciprocal visits. Choo frames Lee as someone who wants to de-escalate historical disputes and prioritize coordination with Japan and the US, describing Lee¡¯s posture succinctly: ¡°He¡¯s ready to move on.¡±

Satoh underscores the stakes of that choice. She sees earlier periods, especially when the ¡°history card¡± becomes the centerpiece, as costly for both sides. She suggests that personalities in Tokyo mattered as much as disputes in Seoul. Even so, both speakers treat the current moment as unusually conducive to rebuilding habits of cooperation.

Why the ¡°anti-Japan card¡± weakens

A major part of the conversation tests a common fear in Tokyo: that a leadership change in Seoul automatically means a turn back toward confrontation over comfort women, forced labor and related legal battles. Satoh suggests that past governments sometimes leaned too heavily on these issues, while also acknowledging that Japanese leadership choices affected the diplomatic room available.

Choo argues that recent court rulings have ¡°settled the score¡± in ways that make reopening certain disputes legally harder. Additionally, he claims the political incentive structure is shifting. Polling by Seoul National University¡¯s Peace Unification Institute shows that South Korean public sentiment toward Japan has generally been friendlier than toward China or Russia, with Japan typically ranking behind the US and North Korea. Without elite incitement, anti-Japan mobilization has diminishing returns.

That point matters because it reframes bilateral fragility. Instead of treating Japan¨CKorea ties as permanently hostage to historical memory, Satoh and Choo treat them as increasingly responsive to present-day strategic needs ¡ª especially economic security and managing China.

Trump 2.0 and the case for Japan¨CKorea leverage inside the alliance

Satoh and Choo diverge in tone on Trump. Satoh emphasizes the US president¡¯s transactional instincts and doubts that he is ¡°strategic¡± in a conventional sense. Choo, by contrast, reads Trump as capable of strategic calculation, offering an anecdote about his interest in the Bagram airbase in Afghanistan as evidence of China-focused thinking.

Despite this difference, they reach the same structural conclusion: Japan and South Korea have bargaining power because they sit at the center of any US strategy that aims to check China economically and militarily. As Choo puts it, ¡°Japan and Korea are actually quite lucky, because we are at the frontline countries.¡±

Now, if Washington is serious about rebuilding US manufacturing capacity, tightening supply chains and sustaining deterrence in East Asia, Tokyo and Seoul are indispensable partners. That dependency, Satoh and Choo argue, should be translated into concrete gains during negotiations, rather than accepted as a one-way demand for alignment.

Industrial security and rebuilding bureaucratic channels

The most detailed discussion concerns a division of labor across the US¨CJapan¨CKorea technology ecosystem: US raw technology, Japanese equipment and intermediary inputs, and South Korean manufacturing scale. Choo argues that China understands this structure and therefore pressures Seoul (and implicitly Tokyo) to negotiate constraints with Washington first ¡ª because many of the binding limits are US-imposed export controls and sanctions.

Semiconductors, which are a vital component in many consumer, healthcare and military technologies, are the test case. Choo describes US restrictions as a ¡°ceiling,¡± limiting the sale of advanced chips to China. He notes the knock-on effects for Korean-owned production in China. He recommends that Tokyo and Seoul coordinate by approaching Washington together, identify where restrictions are unnecessary or counterproductive and bargain for tailored easing that preserves core security concerns while reducing economic damage. As he says, the goal is to ¡°move the ceiling¡± through joint leverage rather than isolated pleading.

Satoh adds a governance angle: Japan and Korea need deeper, more routine policy coordination beyond foreign ministries ¡ª especially because this era is driven by industry and economic security. To conclude, Choo suggests the Asian nations revive the once-close working relationship between Japan¡¯s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and Korea¡¯s industry ministry, treating industrial policy cooperation as the backbone of a more resilient Japan¨CKorea partnership in an age of US¨CChina rivalry.

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No less curiously, the country visibly on the rise, China, is distinctly not acting like a typical imperial power of history (at least the history I¡¯ve known). In a world where the US still has or so military bases around the world, China, as far as I can tell, has at most just one (in ). While its economy has become significant globally (imperially significant, you might say), unlike essentially every from the Portuguese and Spanish in the 15th and 16th centuries on, it has no colonies and only the most minimal military presence abroad, though it does continue to build up its military power (and its ) at home.

Of course, it¡¯s worth remembering that we are distinctly on a different planet than the one any of those older powers inhabited. And even if America¡¯s great man (my joke!), President Trump doesn¡¯t seem to know it, but China¡¯s leader, Xi Jinping, certainly does.

Putin¡¯s version of imperial aggression is, at present, aimed at Ukraine in a war that will in the ¡ª and yes, I can hardly avoid the word! ¡ª end undoubtedly prove a disaster, not just for Ukraine but for Russia and the rest of the planet, too. Meanwhile, Trump¡¯s version of imperial aggression, which is likely (again, in the end) to prove disastrous, is for the time being (and, with him, you always have to add a qualifier) the Caribbean Sea, the Eastern Pacific Ocean, and (which he now seems intent on turning into an ), even as he prepares to build his own ¡°,¡± including ¡°¡± (old-fashioned) battleships.

On the other hand, China¡¯s major ¡°aggression¡± (and indeed, that word does have to be put in quotation marks!) is aimed ¡ª setting aside the island of Taiwan (which it claims not as a colony but as a part of China itself) ¡ª at the conquest of the future global green economy.

Or put another way, to give credit where it¡¯s due, despite the fact that China continues to coal plants in an unnerving fashion, its great-power desires are at least aimed at something ¡ª in fact, the thing ¡ª that truly matters on this distinctly beleaguered planet of ours. It is intent on becoming the Earth¡¯s global powerhouse when it comes to the sale of green energy and the ways to produce it. Consider that its imperial target, one unlike any other in history (though perhaps a comparison could be made to the industrialization of what became imperial Great Britain in the nineteenth century). Moreover, it¡¯s already green energy production units to countries globally, while anyplace else on this planet in producing electric vehicles (EVs).

At war with the world

Last year, China installed more wind turbines and solar panels than any other country, indeed more than the rest of the planet combined. And as The New York Times (The Times) earlier in 2025, ¡°Not only does China already dominate global manufacturing of solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, EVs, and many other clean energy industries, but with each passing month it is widening its technological lead.¡±

While Trump¡¯s America is putting so much of its energy (so to speak) and into coal, oil and natural gas production, China¡¯s government has been giving hundreds of billions of dollars in subsidies to wind, solar and electric car manufacturers. And it is now hard at work spreading the products for producing wind and solar power globally. As The Times also reported:

Block Quote:

Chinese firms are building wind turbines in Brazil and electric vehicles in Indonesia. In northern Kenya, Chinese developers have erected Africa¡¯s biggest wind farm. And across the continent, in countries rich with minerals needed for clean energy technologies, such as Zambia, Chinese financing for all sorts of projects has left some governments deeply in debt to Chinese banks.

And of course, China is unequaled in the production of electric vehicles. There are now at least selling such vehicles in China, and they are exporting more than one-fifth of their products globally, while Chinese companies continue to out-innovate those elsewhere on this planet.

On the other hand, Putin, who that global warming might be good for Russians because they could then ¡°spend less on fur coats,¡± at least now acknowledges its reality. Nonetheless, he only recently a decree that would allow his country, already heating up 2.5 times faster than the global average, to increase its emissions of greenhouse gases by 20% by 2035. And of course, the US is now led by a president who, all too bluntly, ran for office the second time around on the campaign slogan ¡°¡± and is making policy based on ¡° the green new scam.¡±

Only recently, in fact, his administration ¡°paused¡± the leases on and the building of five major wind projects under construction off the east coast of the US, supposedly due to ¡°national security risks.¡± In essence, Trump and crew have been doing their best to or get rid of anything in this country that might effectively impede climate change and the future broiling of Planet Earth. That is, in fact, the definition of his America, which is also the definition of decline on a scale that once would have been unimaginable. And remember, I¡¯m talking about the same president who, last fall, delegates from nations around the world at the UN that climate change was ¡°the greatest con job ever perpetrated on the world,¡± while insisting that, ¡°If you don¡¯t get away from this green scam, your country is going to fail.¡±

In the bluntest terms, the greatest imperial power of the past century, the US, is now in the Trumpian process of sending itself into a steep imperial decline on a distinctly beleaguered planet itself undoubtedly in decline. And part of the reason for that, Trump aside for a moment, is that we humans just can¡¯t seem to stop making war on ourselves. After all, in addition to killing and wounding staggering numbers of us and doing untold damage to (even destroying) whole regions of the planet, wars also release stunning amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, as do what still pass for ¡°peacetime¡± armies. In fact, the US military, even when not at war, more greenhouse gases than whole countries like Sweden or Norway. As it happens, it may be the single largest institutional emitter of such gases on planet Earth.

And worse yet, at such an increasingly dangerous moment in history, there are at least three significant wars underway on this planet of ours. In this distinctly post-modern age, there should be a term for such wars and the way ¡ª in addition to the hell on earth they have created since time immemorial ¡ª they are now helping produce an environmental hell through the release of greenhouse gases in vast quantities into the atmosphere. There is, of course, the never-ending war in Ukraine, the one (in partial ¡ª but ¡ª remission) in the Middle East and the brutal ongoing one in Africa. I¡¯m thinking of , of course. (And don¡¯t forget the more minor but still brutal one in the Congo.)

And when it comes to one conflict for which we have some figures on greenhouse gas emissions, The Guardian that, in the first 15 months of Israel¡¯s war in Gaza, those emissions were ¡°greater than the annual planet-warming emissions of a hundred individual countries.¡± It similarly reported that ¡°the climate cost of the first two years of Russia¡¯s war on Ukraine was greater than the annual greenhouse gas emissions generated individually by 175 countries.¡±

A long-term definition of suicidal on planet Earth

So, at a time (and what a time!) when we¡¯re experiencing one record hot year after another, ever fiercer forest fires, ever more horrific floods, ever more severe droughts and so on (and on and on) ¡ª at a moment, in other words, when it increasingly seems as if humanity is ever more at war with this planet, the old form of imperial power, the one involving wars, colonies around the world and global military bases, seems increasingly pass¨¦, even if the leaders of neither the US nor Russia seem capable of recognizing that reality.

And in that context, those two imperial powers of the last century aren¡¯t simply following the pathways of other imperial powers whose time was up. Yes, they are both distinctly heading downhill, but both of them, in an eerily purposeful fashion, seem (in climate-change terms) to be intent on taking down much of the rest of the planet with them. And none more purposefully (or so it seems) than Trump¡¯s America, which is distinctly focused on ensuring that, at least in the United States, wind power projects will be , solar energy projects avoided or , and ever larger areas from to more than a of ocean waters opened to the production of yet more fossil fuels. If you need a long-term definition of ¡°suicidal¡± at both a national and a planetary level, that obviously should be it.

And it¡¯s in just such a world that China, the rising power on this planet, is neither spreading its military might globally, nor creating military bases and seizing colonies around the world. Instead, its leaders are doing their damnedest to take control of the universe of green energy and so plowing new imperial ground by potentially becoming the unparalleled green-energy power on planet Earth.

Of course, it shouldn¡¯t really be a surprise that, on a planet changing before our eyes in the most basic fashion, the meaning of the very word imperial would change or that the old war-making, colonizing version of it would be left to the history books (and to the increasingly ancient and outdated great powers whose leaders can no longer seem to imagine the actual nature of our future).

And this brings me to myself. In some ways, in my 82nd year on this planet, I just can¡¯t believe the world I¡¯m in, nor could I ever have guessed that it would be quite this way. Trump, president of the United States ¡­ really? At a moment when it should have been all too obvious that humanity was in danger of creating an all-too-literal hell on earth, a of my compatriots elected (for a second time!) a man who not only refuses to faintly grasp what¡¯s happening but has made a clear and conscious decision to worsen our situation by promoting the further use of fossil fuels in every imaginable way.

All too sadly, though it¡¯s not normally used that way, the word ¡°suicidal¡± seems a reasonable description of his policies. I mean, what needed to be done really shouldn¡¯t have been all that complicated ¡ª not on a planet where the most recent years have been the hottest in human history, the last ten the , 2024 the hottest year ever (and unsurprisingly, when the final figures are in, will undoubtedly be right up there, too); not on a planet where Arctic ice is , sea levels and the weather (from to ) is growing ever more extreme by the year.

And yet, obvious as all that may be, Trump and crew have decided to actively intensify the ongoing disaster. And if that isn¡¯t the definition of a once great imperial power going down (and attempting to take the rest of us with it), what is? To the extent that great power global politics even matter anymore, President Trump is literally turning this world, economically and ecologically, over to China, lock, stock and rain barrel.

And all of that makes me wonder: How did I ¡ª how did any of us ¡ª end up here?

Yes, we¡¯re clearly entering a new imperial age with China potentially at the helm of a planet that, in weather (and human) terms, will be going down, down, down.

It may be hard to believe, but that¡¯s our reality ¡ª and I must admit that I find it painful to leave such a planet to my children and grandchildren. They truly deserved better.

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Trishul can be considered ambitious security theater

Trishul, which involves land, air and naval forces across a thousand-kilometer front, is the most joint exercise since . According to a press release from India¡¯s Ministry of Defense, the goal of Trishul was to bolster cooperation between the Indian Navy, Army and Air Force. Trishul was conducted near Sir Creek, a territory between India¡¯s Gujarat and Pakistan¡¯s Sindh province. By conducting Trishul near this strategically sensitive area, India seems to be showcasing its military readiness.

Strategic theorists frequently claim that when a state¡¯s defense preparations are heightened by spectacle, they gain an element of performative deterrence. American economist Thomas Schelling referred to this as the ¡°art of coercion and intimidation,¡± which involves exploiting visible capabilities to alter enemies¡¯ potential reactions. India¡¯s exercise fits that pattern perfectly. Trishul¡¯s time, scope and position project not only preparation but also a posture that signals to neighboring states where military power lies.

The language around Trishul provides more nuance. Indian commanders have of a ¡°new normal¡± in which any cross-border provocation may result in a full military reaction. That is a doctrinal shift with major geographical implications. Now, the escalation threshold appears to be more fluid. South Asia¡¯s security, which was already vulnerable to , is now working in a context that blurs deterrence and domination. This will undoubtedly lead to more security misunderstandings.

Issues arise with displays of military prowess

History offers useful caution. Across 2016 and 2019, India¡¯s carefully calibrated military to perceived threats were at home but unnerving across the region. Each instance, however brief, incrementally changed the bounds of what constituted acceptable military posturing. Exercises such as Trishul, therefore, may serve less as training routines than as symbolic gestures aimed to remind rather than reassure.

There is also a maritime complication worth mentioning. The Arabian Sea, once a trade channel, is now becoming a competitive arena. India¡¯s increased naval exercises, combined with its Indo-Pacific , indicate a shift from coastal defense to a role in deciding the trajectory of the region¡¯s security. For the wider region, such patterns can readily translate into worry ¡ª not from an impending threat, but from an inferred sense of power. British political scientist Barry Buzan once , ¡°In regional security complexes, proximity magnifies perception.¡± When a major power operates near contested or shared spaces, the neighbors are obligated to interpret purpose through action.

This is where India¡¯s challenge lies. It strives to be recognized as a responsible stakeholder in global security, yet its regional messaging frequently appears unilateral. The greater the prominence of its military footprint, the less room for diplomatic reassurance. Over time, frequent exhibitions of force, no matter how appropriate, risk instilling in smaller governments what cyber scholars refer to as . When the average user is faced with more online privacy choices than they can process, they often regard online security with resignation, leading to less secure online behavior. This idea can be applied to global security: When met with military prominence, states may consider discourse as unnecessary because deterrence has already determined the conversation.

India must be aware of its own limitations

It would be misleading to assume that India¡¯s aims are entirely coercive. The integration of its military forces, technological advancements and operational readiness are all indicators of a growing power¡¯s natural progression. However, how we demonstrate evolution is important. Strategic confidence is best judged by how a state handles perceptions, rather than how it demonstrates capacity.

Trishul may eventually prove to be a double-edged sword. It strengthens India¡¯s image as a capable, collaborative power, but it also highlights a growing disparity between its self-perception and regional reception. The exercise informs neighbors of India¡¯s capabilities, but not of its limitations. And in an area as rich in history and mistrust as South Asia, that divide might mean the difference between deterrence and supremacy.

If New Delhi wants to lead, the way forward is through softer guarantees rather than bigger displays. Even caution can be a sign of strength in the deterrent theater.

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This initiative is built on two pillars: the first taxing rights over highly digitalized multinational enterprises, and the second a 15% global minimum corporate tax rate. Of the two, the latter has gained greater momentum and made faster progress toward global implementation in recent years.

Holding up the pillar

From a progress perspective in Pillar Two, the tax advantages that fueled the ¡°¡± among nations no longer exist, fostering fair competition and leveling the playing field. Within the OECD-led international tax regime, China, as a , has actively contributed to global tax reform discussions from the early days.

In broader, positive terms, China¡¯s projected inclusion and contribution in global tax governance has pushed its interest and its global south interest, simultaneously. But, in the progress for Pillar Two, China seems , and is not yet taking consolidated global minimum tax (GMT) or tax legislation at home.

Politically intriguing, global tax reform faces significant complications under the Trump administration, which demands carve-outs for US multinational firms. China¡¯s to these US tax carve-outs from the global minimum tax have not altered Washington¡¯s position but remain noteworthy.

A global calculation

Turning to the core issue, the prospect of global tax reform, specifically Pillar Two, if fully implemented, will raise the tax burden on international investment activities and dampen the incentive for cross-border capital movements.

Under these circumstances, China¡¯s outbound investment momentum will face a critical challenge. One of the different positions, unlike OECD-capital-exporting countries, is that China has experienced the transition from a capital-importing to a capital-exporting economy.

From China¡¯s domestic institutional backbone, one finding warrants a stronger recommendation: China must secure a capital-related . This is due to China¡¯s growing outward investment momentum, which has coincided with the pace of international tax governance reform; China is no longer merely a destination for capital but has become a major capital exporter.

Technically speaking, China lacks the overseas income tax deferral clauses that Western capital-exporting countries usually use to help their firms remain competitive abroad. Through the lens of tax and investment relations, traditional tax incentives, under the GMT era, will be challenged, compelling developing countries and emerging markets to focus more on enhancing their nonfiscal investment capacity to attract capital.

In other words, China must be able to sustain its structural outbound investment to align with the rise of nonfiscal incentives in Belt and Road Initiative () countries, particularly in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This signals that China should pay closer attention to its outbound investment strategy in Southeast Asia, as ASEAN is a crucial partner in its capital-exporting ambitions. So, China would be wise to shift its investment orientation from tax incentives-seeking to capacity-building.

In this context, China must sustain and recalibrate its outbound investment in ASEAN by aligning its strategy with the region’s expanding nonfiscal incentive frameworks, such as energizing more investments in opportunity zones like Special Economic Zones (SEZs).

ASEAN, SEZs and economics

According to the ASEAN , Southeast Asia hosts over 1,600 diverse economic zones. From a public policy position, SEZs¡¯ strategy must be fully integrated with national economic development, both with its regional industrial policies and its broader economic development strategies.

Consequently, it can be said that SEZs increasingly function as magnets for Global Value Chain (GVC) integration, a role underscored by a decade of political economy discourse on how multinational enterprises optimize global production. By its legal character, SEZs are designed as unilateral national economic policies that reflect core principles of international trade and investment law, functioning independently or alongside the absence of multilateral/bilateral agreements.

Unsurprisingly, through the current discourse in the international political economy of SEZ, revealed that the big recommendation for SEZ is more in creating an attractive and conducive business environment, rather than relying on fiscal incentives like tax holidays.

Within for SEZs Development and Collaboration, tax holidays or exemptions are common but abused and limited to profitable ventures, failing to attract innovative investments. Through these guidelines, ASEAN will harmonize its policies with the G20 Development Working Group¡¯s guidance from the International Monetary Fund, the OECD and the UN on foreign direct investment incentive policies.

Moreover, the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) recommends reforming to better target sustainable development and clean energy goals. In that sense, countries are thus encouraged to rethink the tax incentives needed to attract renewable energy investments. In practice, green technology and strategic industries are no longer driven by a simple pursuit of low costs or tax breaks. Instead, capital is now flowing into ¡°strategic, ¡±, specifically electronic vehicles, semiconductors and green energy systems.

The rise of geoeconomics has transformed tax and investment policies into vital instruments of regional strategy, a shift accelerated by the advancement of tax multilateralism. As China remains a primary partner for Southeast Asian economies, it must recalibrate its tax-investment relation strategy to align with this new reality.

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And I found that a serpent was coming towards me. It was thirty cubits in length, and its beard was more than two cubits in length, and its body was covered with gold scales, and its eyebrows were of pure lapis lazuli¡­

And it opened its mouth to me, as I was lying flat on my stomach before it, and it said unto me, ¡°Who hath brought thee hither? Who hath brought thee hither, O miserable one?¡±

That is from the Tale of the Shipwrecked Sailor, the oldest complete story that has come down to us from antiquity. It was written in Hieratic during the Middle Kingdom of Ancient Egypt, and I read it in the original Egyptian from the comfort of my bed, four thousand years after it was written.

Reading an ancient story is an experience unlike any other. It is a glimpse into the mind of an alien ¡ª utterly foreign, yet oddly familiar. A yawning gap of time, culture and language divides me from the author, but I read his tale nevertheless, and I marveled when the sailor encountered the serpent god with eyebrows of lapis lazuli.

I¡¯ve often felt the pressure to better myself, and I occasionally crack a technical manual or a literary classic in my spare time in deference to that pressure. I¡¯ve known colleagues whose hobbies are essentially identical to their work ¡ª Nothing would depress me more, though I¡¯d probably be better at my job.

Instead, my hobbies are almost militantly useless. I write a blog in which I the hot-dog-ness of various sandwiches, and spin density waves if they were made of guinea pigs. The only foreign languages I speak are Latin and Ancient Egyptian, into which The House of the Rising Sun (so useful). The history books I love best are the furthest removed from my own time. In general, my delight in a hobby is inversely proportional to its utility.

But despite, or perhaps because of, the unavoidable pressure to be productive that pervades modern life, I feel that my useless hobbies are not only personally valuable, but essential to a life well-lived, and I think the ancient philosophers tend to agree with me.

Crawling in the mud: Zhuangzi and °Â¨²·É¨¦¾±

°Â¨²·É¨¦¾±, nonaction in accord with the natural flow of the universe, was praiseworthy to the Daoist sage Zhuangzi, born 2300 years ago in ancient China. Zhuangzi was renowned across China for his wisdom, and his counsel was greatly desired by the political elites of the time. When the duke of Qi, one of many desiring wise counsellors, invited Zhuangzi to become his chief minister, his messengers found the old sage fishing among the river reeds. Upon receiving this job offer, Zhuangzi did not look up from his rod and :

¡°I have heard that there is a sacred turtle in Chu that died three thousand years ago. The duke keeps it in a casket wrapped in cloth and has placed it in a temple. May I inquire whether the sacred turtle wanted to be dead and to have its bones venerated by man? Or was its intention to stay alive and crawl around in the mud, dragging its tail?¡±

¡°Naturally,¡± replied the messengers, ¡°it hoped to crawl around in the mud, dragging its tail.¡±

¡°Go home,¡± said Zhuangzi, ¡°I also want to crawl around in the mud, dragging my tail.¡±

The serenity of Epicurus

, too, understood the value of nonproductive pursuits. He was a Hellenistic philosopher who suffered from chronic pain all his life, and perhaps fittingly, developed a philosophy focused on pleasure and pain. To Epicurus, what is true pleasure? True pleasure is not the fleeting pleasures of wealth, rich food and debauchery, but a restrained, mental satisfaction that lingers, like heat from the embers of a hearth. True pleasure is the absence of pain and freedom from unnecessary desires.

This pleasure comes with freedom from the desire for wealth, freedom from the fear of death and of the gods, the bond of the tight-knit community and from pure intellectual exploration ¡ª this pleasure is serenity, ataraxia in Greek. The fear of death was simply one more pain to overcome in the life of Epicurus, and so his followers wrote thusly on their tombstones: Non fui, fui, non sum, non curo ¡ª I was not, then I was, I am no more, I do not mind. 

Epicurus reminds us that the pursuit of wealth does only so much to decrease the pain of life. For indeed, what shall it profit a man, to gain the world but lose his soul?

Aret? and the joy of useless excellence

But for me, there is still more to life than ·É¨²·É¨¦¾± and ataraxia, for there is pleasure too in purpose. Former US President John F. Kennedy, another great philosopher, spoke to this purpose when he of the Apollo moon mission that we choose to go to the moon not because it is easy, but because it is hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone and one we intend to win.

Indeed, to strive for one¡¯s excellence, for one¡¯s aret?, in any field of human endeavor, for no practical benefit whatsoever ¡ª this is the highest pursuit of man, his virtue par excellence, and his greatest good. To strive for mastery in a field, regardless of practical benefit and indeed in spite of it, is a noble and fulfilling pursuit.

So why do I waste my time? To exist in non-action, to be free of the burden of utility, to find ataraxia, to strive for something difficult, yet not lose myself in pursuit of material gain, and because ultimately, it is my time to waste.

In the words of Seneca, omnia aliena sunt, tempus tantum nostrum est ¡ª All else is foreign to us, only time is ours. And I intend to spend mine generously, spiced with those useless hobbies that bring me joy.

[Dylan Black first published this piece on .]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post In Defense of Useless Hobbies appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Just over three years on, Anwar¡¯s has defied the unforgiving math of Malaysian politics that felled his reformist predecessors ¡ª notably the PH administration that collapsed after only 22 months in 2020 ¡ª by holding together an unlikely government. This very survival, however, is now shaped by the unresolved politics surrounding former Prime Minister Najib Razak¡¯s corruption convictions and the challenge of managing an unstable, ideologically divided government coalition.

A constructive course correction is therefore no longer optional. If Anwar¡¯s so-called hopes to turn mere political survival into credible reform, the next two years will be decisive, as it demands tougher handling of corruption-linked politics and firmer control over a shaky governing coalition before Malaysia enters the runway toward the next general election due in 2028.

Razak¡¯s corruption convictions and the political cost of reform

As the President of the ruling People¡¯s Justice Party (PKR), Anwar rose to power on a reform-leaning, anti-graft platform, but his government¡¯s moral authority has been dented whenever rule-of-law principles appear hostage to coalition politics. Nothing captures this dilemma more clearly than the ongoing saga of Najib. He remains imprisoned for , but over the years, the party he once led, UMNO, has openly advocated .

Najib¡¯s corruption controversy began with the creation and control of the state-owned development fund 1Malaysia Development Berhad () to attract investment and drive economic growth, which later became the center of one of the world¡¯s largest financial scandals, exposing of more than $4.5 billion between 2009 and 2014. The former chairman of BN was convicted in July 2020 on multiple charges linked to SRC International, a former 1MDB subsidiary. He began serving a 12-year prison sentence in August 2022 after exhausting his appeals.

In February 2024, Najib was surprisingly granted a partial by then Malaysian King Abdullah of Pahang, with the Pardons Board halving his sentence to six years and reducing his fine from 210 million ringgit ($44.5 million) to 50 million ringgit ($10.8 million), though it stopped short of granting his release. Subsequently, Najib applied for in April 2024; the High Court rejected the request in July 2024, and the matter was appealed.

The issue came to a head in December 2025, when the High Court not only Najib¡¯s audacious bid to serve his sentence under house arrest but, days later, him in the main 1MDB trial of four counts of abuse of power and 21 counts of money laundering, sentencing him to 15 years¡¯ imprisonment and imposing fines totalling 11.4 billion ringgit ($2.8 billion).?

Although Najib has both his conviction and sentence, the rulings affirm that Malaysia¡¯s courts are prepared to hold even former prime ministers to account. Regardless, the political storm surrounding it highlighted the pressure on Anwar¡¯s unity government ¡ª and the perception of wavering commitment to reform.?

UMNO¡¯s reaction to its long-time president¡¯s courtroom defeat was , as several senior figures denounced the decision as an affront to Malay royal authority and called for the party to withdraw from Anwar¡¯s governing coalition. Such rhetoric laid bare the coalition¡¯s fault line that is rehabilitating its patronage networks, whereas Anwar¡¯s PH camp is rooted in promises of clean governance.

Now, fortunately for Anwar, pressure over Najib has not coalesced into a unified offensive from the main opposition. The National Alliance () ¡ª anchored by its core parties, Malaysian United Indigenous Party (Bersatu) and Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), and supported by smaller partners such as Malaysian People¡¯s Movement Party (Gerakan), and Malaysian Indian People¡¯s Party (MIPP) ¡ª has mixed positions and thus failed to form a coherent position on Najib¡¯s prosecutions.

Some leaders within PN have invoked regarding the royal prerogative, while others have been about any posture that could be read as defending a figure emblematic of 1MDB-era corruption. The divide arguably exposes a deeper clash between PAS¡¯s Islamist orientation and Bersatu¡¯s Malay-primacy nationalism ¡ª a party born of UMNO defections in 2016 ¡ª by unresolved questions over PN¡¯s leadership and prime ministerial direction that leaves the coalition unable to sustain a unified line on Najib.

The sharpest political pressure on Anwar, consequently, has come not from the opposition benches but from inside his , where latent tensions between and PH¡¯s Democratic Action Party () continue to test the limits of ideological coexistence over issues of reform priorities. And this emphasizes that Najib ¡ª after a nine-year Malaysian premiership ¡ª still over Malaysian politics. Yet, he serves not as a rallying cause so much as a fault line that reveals over accountability and power.

Caught in the middle, Anwar tried to the fray ¡ª reiterating that he does not interfere in court cases and that due process must run its course. He formally kept his , but his cautious silence on UMNO¡¯s was widely interpreted as ambivalence and not neutrality.

Many reform-minded Malaysians who voted for change in 2022 expected Anwar to firmly reject any backroom deals for Najib or other kleptocrats. Instead, they witnessed prosecutors under Anwar¡¯s watch drop or defer cases involving high-profile UMNO-related figures, most notably Deputy Prime Minister and BN Chairman and , the wife of Najib Razak.

Anwar, in reclaiming the reform narrative, must reassert an unambiguous doctrine of noninterference and institutional reform. The Prime Minister should publicly affirm that coalition politics will not dictate the fate of corruption cases ¡ª no matter who is implicated. Beyond statements, his government needs to accelerate structural changes that insulate the rule of law from political bargains.

The reality, however, is less forgiving. Reformist governments are judged most harshly when their own allies, rather than their opponents, put their principles to the test. For Anwar¡¯s administration, these commitments must therefore be implemented in the years ahead, specifically in 2026, if the Madani government is to regain some of the reformist credibility that the compromises of coalition governance have clouded.

Balancing power in a diverse, fragile coalition

Holding together a diverse coalition has been Anwar¡¯s most notable achievement, but it has come at the expense of reform momentum, as 2025 showed. The year saw the prime minister navigating a series of political aftershocks, from state election setbacks to cabinet infighting, which he addressed through tactical concessions that, to critics, looked more like than transforming it.

The clearest example came from the Sabah state election in November 2025, a regional poll that delivered a sharp to Anwar¡¯s federal alliance. PH ¡ª comprising PKR, DAP and the National Trust Party ¡ª along with its national partners, won only one of the 20 seats it contested in the Sabah assembly.

Voters in Sabah gravitated toward local parties running on ¡°¡± platforms that reflect grievances about neglect and unmet promises of autonomy. And although an Anwar-aligned local coalition, GRS, retained control of the state, it did so strictly on . The October 2025 Kota Kinabalu High Court only hardened these attitudes by giving legal weight to Sabah¡¯s claims of fiscal marginalization, turning autonomy demands into a concrete constitutional grievance that sharpened voter skepticism and raised the political cost for Anwar¡¯s federal government of deferring reform.

Anwar¡¯s response, thereafter, was a long-anticipated in mid-December 2025, framed as a refresh to improve economic delivery but ultimately amounting to coalition maintenance. Several vacancies had opened up after two Anwar prot¨¦g¨¦s ¡ª Economy Minister Rafizi Ramli and Natural Resources Minister Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad ¡ª in May 2025 following defeats in PKR¡¯s party leadership elections, while Entrepreneur and Cooperative Development Minister Ewon Benedick in November 2025 in protest over the federal government¡¯s stance on Sabah¡¯s revenue entitlement, giving the prime minister an opportunity to rebalance portfolios among coalition allies.

The reshuffle brought in a Federal Territories Minister, , from DAP ¡ª a predominantly Malaysian Chinese, urban-based party ¡ª likely to shore up the urban non-Malay base in the federal territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya, even as it drew from Malay nationalists.?

More notably, Anwar increased by appointing Natural Resources Minister Arthur Joseph Kurup, along with Sabah and Sarawak Affairs Minister Mustapha Sakmud, as part of following PH¡¯s poor performance in the recent 17th Sabah state election. Likewise, to consolidate support ahead of the 20th Sarawak state election, expected by early 2027, GPS now holds five cabinet posts and six deputy ministerial posts, in which Anwar¡¯s configuration is designed to project federal attentiveness to . Together with parallel adjustments involving Sabah and Sarawak, these moves strengthen Anwar¡¯s message that East Malaysian partners remain critical to keeping the coalition together.

Yet despite replacing more than a third of his cabinet, Anwar, as PH Chairman, was careful to keep each coalition partner¡¯s share of power intact. His original political home, UMNO ¡ª the Malay-centric party and strongman of Malaysian politics ¡ª retained , including several key ministerial portfolios, in return for its continued loyalty.?

Far from reset, the reshuffle amounted to little more than political , with changes largely confined to swapping positions rather than direction that prioritized coalition balance and stability, as well as projected confidence in Anwar¡¯s existing team, over any decisive shift in policy. This approach speaks to Anwar¡¯s overarching strategy since consolidating power in 2023, which prioritizes coalition survival over potentially divisive reforms. It has worked, insofar as the unity government still stands and even looks relatively stable heading into 2026.

What¡¯s next for Anwar Ibrahim¡¯s unity government?

As 2025 draws to a close, Anwar has demonstrated that the Madani government can survive the rough math of coalition politics, but it remains an open question whether it can inspire the confidence of a truly reformist government.

The next major tests of coalition cohesion ¡ª and by extension, the unity government¡¯s durability ¡ª loom over the next two years. The calendar opens with in January 2026, including the Sabah state seat of Lamag and the federal seat of Kinabatangan. These contests will then give way to full state polls, with the Sarawak state election due by 2027, followed by by February 2027 and by June 2027, collectively placing sustained pressure on the governing coalition as it defends its unity across multiple political fronts.

And for Anwar, the good news is that he enters this electoral cycle from a position of relative strength, as the opposition remains mired in . PN enters 2026 in disarray, following former Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin¡¯s (2020-2021) resignation ¡ª effective January 2026 ¡ª as the coalition¡¯s chairman, and the departures of several senior leaders, which together created a .?

The recent Perlis and unresolved arguments over leadership succession and ideological direction have aggravated rivalry between Bersatu and PAS. And that dysfunction sharply limits its capacity to challenge Anwar¡¯s government, which would tilt the political terrain in his favor ahead of the coming state elections.

Regardless of the opposition¡¯s weakness, Anwar¡¯s more immediate risk lies within his own coalition. Its internal contradictions have repeatedly slowed or blunted the reform agenda Malaysians were promised. Anwar¡¯s to reach the premiership has equipped him with political resilience, but staying power alone will not carry him through the next electoral cycle.?

If reforms continue to stall and state-level losses mount, partner confidence could erode, raising the political costs of inaction. With the 16th General Election due by February 2028 and political positioning accelerating by 2027, his legitimacy will hinge less on survival than on visible delivery.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯s own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯s editorial policy.

The post Malaysia¡¯s Anwar Ibrahim Struggles With Reform Politics in Unstable Coalition appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.