Actually, the Egyptian writing system is a fascinating combination of both pictographic and alphabetic writing systems. It is also far easier to read than most people imagine. To really appreciate Ancient Egyptian, we have to understand how the Ancient Egyptians wrote their language. To do that, let’s look at some dirty chain texts first.

A friend of mine recently sent me an emoji-filled holiday chain letter. This is an entire genre of spam texts. In case you haven’t been exposed to these wonderful messages, here are some examples:

Generally, these emoji-filled exhortations are text messages, usually wishing you a happy holiday, promising you sex if you forward it to another person and cursing you with a lack of sex if it isn’t forwarded. These messages are usually littered with ham-fisted sex puns.

Emoji chain texts also happen to be the most perfect modern analogy for the writing system of Ancient Egypt that I’ve ever encountered.

The Rebus Principle: a literary equation

Let’s consider an example. From the first chain text:

Consider the function of the “4” emoji. This is nominally a pictorial representation of the number “four,” using the Arabic numeral system. However, in American English, the pronunciation of “four” coincides with the pronunciation of the preposition “for.” Hence, the pictogram “4” can be used to mean “for.” This is an example of the rebus principle, in which words are represented by pictograms that sound the same. Here’s another of the rebus principle, from the Egypt Exploration Society’s webpage:

A picture of a bee followed by a picture of a leaf would be pronounced “bee-leaf,” a homophone of the word “belief.” Thus, the bee and the leaf symbols, together, represent the totally unrelated concept “belief.”

The Ancient Egyptian writing system is based on the rebus principle. Originally, the “mouth” hieroglyph represented the concept of “mouth,” and was pronounced something like r.

Not long after the invention of Egyptian writing, the mouth glyph was assigned the phonetic value of r. A set of these signs was standardized, creating the hieroglyphic alphabet. Here’s the (Middle) Egyptian alphabet:

These signs are used to spell out the sounds of Egyptian in the same way that the Roman alphabet is used to spell the sounds of English. Mostly. In Egyptian, like a lot of Semitic languages (Hebrew, Arabic, etc.), vowels tend not to be explicitly written out. Only the consonants were written down, along with pseudo-vowels like i, sometimes called a “weak consonant.” This lack of vowels in writing leads to a lot of homophones in Egyptian, words that sound (or at least are written) the same but have different meanings.

Semantic determinatives as seen through Earth emojis

Let’s now consider a second example, from the second chain text:

Here, consider how the emojis following the word augment its meaning. It begins with “Happy Earth Day,” followed by an emoji of a plant and three of the Earth. The compound noun “Earth Day” is composed of two words written in the Roman alphabet. The individual characters (a, p, y, etc.) tell the reader how the words are pronounced. This is the hallmark of an alphabetic system; an individual character d represents the sound of a single consonant, and multiple characters representing distinct sounds, like d a y, are placed in sequence to form a word with lexical meaning, “day.” The characters tell you how the word is pronounced, and collectively form a written representation of both the concept “day” and the sound “day.”

The sound-signs forming the word “Earth Day” are followed by a picture of a plant and three pictures of the planet Earth, indicating that “Earth Day” is a concept associated with living, growing things and the planet Earth. In other words, the pictograms following the alphabetic characters add shades of meaning to the phrase “Earth Day,” clarifying the category of concept to which this word belongs.

This is precisely how Egyptian words are formed. Paraphrasing from James Middle Egyptian Grammar, Egyptian words are commonly spelled out alphabetically, but also followed by an additional sense-sign, called a determinative, that adds context and meaning to the sound-signs.

For example, the word ra is written as:

It consists of two alphabetic signs, the mouth hieroglyph, pronounced r, and the arm hieroglyph a, pronounced something like the Arabic ayin. The word ra is followed by this circular determinative, which indicates the meaning of the word ra.

Can you guess what ra means from the determinative sign? You probably can: ra means “sun,” and the determinative is a picture of the sun. The image of the sun clarifies the meaning of the sound-glyphs r and a.

Disambiguation by means of eggplants and seated gods

Let’s consider a third illustrative example. From the third chain text:

The emojis clarify the meaning of “Hot Dog.” The compound noun “Hot Dog” is followed by a peach and eggplant emoji, commonly used to mean “butt” and “penis” respectively. Here, the eggplant and peach emojis serve an important semantic function — they clarify the ambiguity in the sentence “I Want To Eat Your Hot Dog” by explicitly informing the reader, using the eggplant determinative, that “Hot Dog” is a euphemism for “penis.” Thus, instead of the sentence indicating a desire to eat a delicious, all-beef frankfurter, it indicates a desire to perform oral sex.

Ancient Egyptian uses determinatives in exactly the same way as the chain text uses the peach and the eggplant. Returning to our example of ra, consider these two examples of Egyptian words, both spelled ra:

The first word is followed by the “sun” determinative, and thus refers to the concept of the sun, i.e., the ball of fire in the sky. The second is followed by the seated god determinative, and instead of referring to the sun itself, it refers to the sun god Ra. The determinative serves to clarify which concept, both spelled ra, is being referred to in the text.

The determinative is extremely important to understanding written Egyptian, due to the number of homophones in the written language.

Lesson 4: Illustrative Examples

We also notice that in these emoji chain texts, the short, common words without really concrete meanings (like “is” or “to”) are not followed by emoji determinatives, whereas nouns like “Patriotic Daddies” and “COCKtober” are followed by one or two determinatives indicating their meaning or associations in the context of the sentence. 

Egyptian follows the same pattern. Short, common words, like m, meaning “in” or “with,” are composed of alphabetic signs alone, without determinatives.

However, nouns and verbs usually consist of a series of alphabetic signs that indicate the pronunciation of the word, followed by a semantic determinative that indicates its sense, category, or associations.

Let’s consider the example of the Egyptian verb “beget,” meaning “to bring into existence”:

This word consists of five signs: three sound-signs and two determinatives. The first three signs are the coiled rope, pronounced w, followed by two loaf-of-bread signs, pronounced t. Thus, the word is transliterated as wtt and pronounced something like “wetet.”

The next two signs are determinatives and give the sense of the word. The first determinative is a hieroglyph that’s easily recognizable in any era.

It’s a penis, in case you didn’t notice. The penis glyph’s function in indicating the semantic meaning of “beget” is obvious. This sign is actually used in many Egyptian words, such as:

Yes, the penis hieroglyph can mean “thick” in Ancient Egyptian. I guess the priests who came up with this writing system wanted everyone to know a little something about their assets.

Now, back to “beget.” The second determinative in “beget” is the rolled scroll.

The scroll is often used for abstract concepts. This is because abstract concepts are often not easily represented by pictograms, but can be written down on, for example, a scroll.

Putting it all together, the combination of glyphs rope, bread, bread, penis, scroll produces a verb pronounced something like “wetet,” and meaning “to beget.”

Convergent evolution: Hieroglyphs are still used today

Here’s another fun fact about hieroglyphs. By pure chance, many modern emojis look nearly identical to their ancient counterparts. This has some wonderful examples of convergent glyph evolution, reproduced here for convenience.

And so, the next time one of your friends sends you a message like this:

I hope that you can appreciate it (syntactically, if nothing else) as a modern reinvention of an ancient form of writing.

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Origins and ideological foundations

Singh begins by explaining the Muslim Brotherhood’s historic context. Founded in 1928 by Egyptian schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna, the organization emerged during an era of imperial competition and political upheaval across the Middle East. Farahat argues that its roots extend further back, linking its formation to late 19th-century geopolitical strategies that sought to mobilize religious identity for political ends. She cites a German memorandum from 1882 that declared, “We will unleash Muslim fanaticism that borders on insanity.”

For Farahat, the Brotherhood is not simply a reformist or revivalist movement but a synthesis of ideological, political and militant strands aimed at establishing an Islamic caliphate. Singh introduces the conventional distinction between al-Banna’s gradualism and later radical thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb, often seen as the intellectual architect of modern Islamist militancy. Farahat rejects this divide, arguing that Qutb did not transform the Brotherhood’s ideology but rather systematized it. In her view, the movement’s foundational texts already contain the elements later associated with militancy.

Structure, strategy and global expansion

Singh and Farahat then turn to how the Brotherhood organized itself and expanded beyond Egypt. Farahat emphasizes the creation of the “Secret Apparatus,” an early paramilitary wing that she describes as central to the movement’s structure. She portrays the organization as combining hierarchical discipline with ideological cohesion, enabling it to operate across national boundaries.

Singh probes the extent to which the Brotherhood influenced or intersected with other Islamist movements. Farahat argues that many modern Sunni militant groups emerged from or were shaped by Brotherhood networks, pointing to historical overlaps in membership and ideology. This claim remains contested in broader scholarship, however.

Farahat also highlights the role of thinkers such as Syed Abul A’la Maududi, the South Asian Islamist intellectual who reframed Islamic political concepts in modern terms. She suggests that Maududi’s reinterpretation of governance and sovereignty helped make Islamist ideas more accessible, providing a vocabulary that later figures, including Qutb, could build upon.

Power, governance and the Morsi moment

Singh shifts the focus to the Brotherhood’s brief period in power following Egypt’s 2011 uprising. Former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi’s administration marked the first time the movement governed through electoral legitimacy. Singh raises the key question: Was this an opportunity for the Brotherhood to evolve into a democratic political actor, or did it reveal deeper ideological constraints?

Farahat argues that the movement’s time in power exposed its underlying agenda. She dismisses its use of democratic language as tactical, describing it as “putting lipstick on a pig.” She feels the Brotherhood functions most effectively when operating outside formal power structures, where it can balance political participation with ideological mobilization.

Singh counters by noting structural constraints, including tensions with Egypt’s military, judiciary and entrenched state institutions. Did the Brotherhood fail because of its own ideological rigidity? Or because it could not successfully navigate Egypt’s political system?

International networks and contested narratives

The final part of the discussion explores the Brotherhood’s international presence. Singh raises reports of internal divisions, such as the alleged split between London- and Istanbul-based factions. Farahat dismisses these as largely superficial, arguing that the organization maintains centralized ideological control despite operating across different regions.

She also identifies countries such as Qatar and Turkey as key hubs, while noting that Western states have at times provided space for Brotherhood-linked networks to operate. Singh situates this within a broader geopolitical context, where states balance security concerns with strategic interests.

While the Brotherhood has, in some contexts, presented itself as a nonviolent political actor, Farahat insists that such claims are inconsistent with its internal discourse and historical trajectory. Her argument reflects one side of a deeply polarized debate about political Islam and the boundaries between activism, governance and militancy.

An unresolved legacy

Singh and Farahat close by reflecting on the Brotherhood’s future. For Singh, the key issue is whether movements rooted in ideological certainty can adapt to pluralistic political systems. Farahat remains skeptical; meaningful transformation, she says, is unlikely without fundamental change.

Nearly a century after its founding, the Muslim Brotherhood continues to shape political debates across the Middle East, not only as an organization but as an idea that remains contested, influential and unresolved.

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The commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council (TSC), General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has continued to rely on Islamist “,” recruiters and financiers, which has placed him between a rock and a hard place. The has explicitly condemned the role played by Islamist factions. Additionally, the US could grow impatient and add to the extensive sanctions of TSC members and allies.��  

Al-Burhan recently he would not stop fighting until the rebels are defeated. Burhan was referring to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti,” a staunch of the Sudanese Islamic Movement, which comprises Muslim Brotherhood (Kizan) elements and remnants of the regime. Burhan has often used this in response to US and Quad statements pushing for a new round of peace talks, intentionally aiming to delegitimize the RSF leadership and echoing the position of Islamist leaders like Ali Ahmed Mohammed. Karti denounced the Quad’s “blatant interference in Sudan’s internal affairs,” calling it “unacceptable bias” following the explicit use of language against Islamist groups.

Islamist factions and the STC

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Sudan followed a path similar to that of the original organization in . Organized among university students in the 1950s, Hassan al-Banna’s ideology quickly spread under the guise of an Islamic Liberation Movement. Leaders like Hassan paved the way for the National Islamist Front (NIF), which helped bring Omar al-Bashir to power in 1989. The National Congress Party (NCP) is noted for having its origins in organizations led by al-Turabi, which kept Bashir in power until 2019. Remnants of the MB from the Bashir regime played a vital in the that brought al-Burhan to power and derailed the transition under the civilian-led transitional council.��

Since October 2021, when al-Burhan led a against the civilian-led transitional council, Islamist figures have worked arduously to pave the way for a to power. Following mass arrests of civilian officials, including then Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, al-Burhan established the STC. Bashir’s former ruling party, the National Congress Party (), has re-emerged behind the scenes as a pillar of Burhan’s power base and the SAF.

Sudanese observers have traced the formation of this new TSC and its composition to Islamist figures such as , NCP and former governor of North Kordofan, and , an extension of Hassan Turabi’s Muslim Brotherhood (Kizan) sphere. While initially behind the scenes — with Burhan as the façade of the new regime — other MB affiliates, such as Ibrahim Mohamed Fediel (the current Minister of Finance, by the US), have openly served alongside Burhan since 2023, when the armed forces split.

The RSF clashed with Burhan, primarily over the growing influence of the Kazan over the Council and the integration of military units. In April 2023, Hemedti split with Burhan and eventually dislodged the SAF and allies from Khartoum, making Port Sudan the base for the SAF and Kazan figures. Aside from Gebreil, other Islamist leaders eventually came to the forefront in the fight between SAF and RSF forces, leading military units, militia and acting as liaisons with new allies. Among these are al-Misbah Abu Zaid Talha (leader of the US- Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Brigade [BBMB]), Anas Omar, Hudhayfah Istanbul, Abu Aqla Keikel (leader of Sudan Shield Forces) and Abdel Hai Youssef.��

The TSC, seen as an instrument for Islamist re-emergence in the political and military spheres, has also facilitated expanding relations with allies like Iran and Turkey. The relationship with Iran and Turkey has been fundamental to SAF military strength and the growth of Islamist militia like Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Brigade and the Sudan Shield Forces. The militia have been to Burhan’s fight against the RSF in Khartoum, Darfur and now in the south. There is no hiding the between these Islamist militias and the SAF, as Sudanese observers have highlighted al-Misbah Abu Zaid Talha’s ties to MIS and the General Intelligence Service (GIS), particularly with Deputy GIS director Mohamed Abbas Al-Labib.�� 

Burhan and Islamists reject peace 

The imminent US listing of al-Kazan as an was the result of a gradual approach aimed at restarting peace talks between Sudan’s rivals. As part of the Quad, along with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, the US administration has made multiple attempts to bring parties to the table, specifically in , when members called for a humanitarian ceasefire prior to escalation across Darfur. In that statement, the Quad explicitly noted that “Sudan’s future cannot be dictated by violent extremist groups part of or evidently linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.” The warning was later followed by the sanctions against Fediel and the BBMB.

Following a number of overtures by members last year, Burhan made it absolutely clear that he would not engage in peace talks “with rebels” until the RSF was . As far back as 2023, the US has pointed to Sudan’s Islamists as major obstacles to peace, sanctioning for “actively obstructing efforts to reach a ceasefire.” Figures like rejected the Quad’s September statement as “blatant interference in Sudan’s internal affairs,” thereby forcing Burhan’s “hard no” on a number of ceasefire proposals.

In early November, just before the US-Saudi Arabia summit in Washington, DC, emerged that following Burhan’s rejection of the Quad proposal, it could not be “rule(d) out imposing it by force as violations and atrocities continue in a wide part of the country.” 

The latest round of sanctions by the US not only illustrates growing frustration but also a wider understanding of the conflict. The US sanctioned a number of MB in early January, but in Sudan, the US widened the umbrella to include “the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM) and its armed wing, the al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade.” The sanctions also linked Sudan’s Islamist to the Islamic Republic of and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).��

The Sudan Tribune highlighted that the US listing directly mention the NCP linked to al-Turabi’s sphere, or even the Popular Congress Party (PCP). This may be part of the gradual approach employed by the US, reserving such groups for a later time in order to measure Burhan’s reaction and that of Islamist figures within Sudan and abroad.

The SDGT listing by the US will also have an impact on Burhan’s relations with Turkey and Qatar, and may halt the agreement with for the delivery of weapons. The SAF has suffered a number of setbacks in recent months, and while Iran has scaled back military support for the SAF and militia since December 2025, Burhan and Islamist allies have opted to side with Iran during the ongoing conflict with Israel and the US, adding pressure on Port Sudan allies who may face consequences for their support of Tehran.

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From a distance, the message is unmistakable: Ethiopia is ascending.

Yet beneath the skyline, another story unfolds. One that is less visible, less photogenic, but far more consequential. It is a story not of towers, but of people. One of children who to read by age . Of hospitals . Of doctors earning than a month. Of a state that builds monuments faster than it builds .

This contrast is not accidental; it reflects a strategic choice about what development is meant to look like —  and whom it is meant to serve.

The human cost of Ethiopia’s development model

Despite its urban renaissance, Ethiopia invests strikingly little in the foundations of human development. Public health spending stands at roughly of GDP, far below the already country average of 1.2% and less than half the pledged under the African Union’s Abuja Declaration. Per capita health spending has in real terms, falling to around per person in 2024 as inflation and currency erode nominal budget increases. The result is a health system stretched to the edge of viability.

The workforce numbers tell the story starkly. Ethiopia has 1.2 health professionals per 1,000 people —  barely a of the World Health Organization’s minimum threshold for universal coverage. , diagnostic equipment, essential drugs and trained staff scarce across much of the country. Even in Addis Ababa, a city of five million, public health infrastructure thin. Outside the capital, access rapidly.

Education fares little better. Learning poverty —  as the inability of a ten-year-old to read a simple text —  around 90%. Primary school completion is roughly and adult literacy close to 50%, stark gender and regional disparities. According to the World Bank’s Human Capital Index, a child born in Ethiopia today is expected to reach only of their productive potential under current health and education conditions.

These are not abstract statistics; they translate directly into lost growth, weakened resilience and heightened instability. A young, undereducated and unhealthy population cannot anchor a durable middle-income transition, no matter how tall the buildings that surround it.

Infrastructure, debt and global comparisons

What makes this trajectory especially striking is how sharply it diverges from development experiences elsewhere. , , and more recently, all began from positions of deep poverty and institutional fragility. None started with skyscrapers. Each began instead with mass , primary and inclusion. In South Korea, universal preceded industrial take-off. In Vietnam, near-universal health insurance productivity gains. In Rwanda, community-based healthcare coverage rates above 90% long before Kigali’s convention centre reshaped the skyline.

In these cases, infrastructure followed human capital, not the reverse.

Ethiopia’s approach inverts that sequence. Billions of dollars —  much of it borrowed —  into high-visibility projects with limited immediate social returns. Chinese financing dominates, for roughly 60% of new investment projects, in transport, real estate and energy. restructuring agreements with Beijing since 2020 the strain this model imposes. Meanwhile, clinics go , schools are and frontline workers are demoralized.

Yes, Beijing’s checkbook builds skylines, not social contracts. If Horn states trade welfare for prestige projects, they hand strategic leverage to outsiders while hollowing out domestic resilience.

Future prospects and the importance of human capital

This imbalance has foreign policy implications that extend well beyond development metrics. Ethiopia sits at the of the African Union, diplomatic weight across the Horn of Africa. Its choices regional norms. A development model that spectacle over welfare risks, normalizing a version of “success” that is brittle and socially exclusionary. It also Ethiopia’s relationships with Western partners, multilateral lenders and humanitarian agencies increasingly on governance, equity and human security.

The contradiction becomes sharper when is factored in. The war in Tigray and ongoing instability in Amhara and Oromia have millions and already fragile social systems. Conflict health facilities, schools and vaccination programs. Yet even as reconstruction needs mount, capital to be channeled into prestige projects rather than systemic recovery.

There is a deeper irony here. Ethiopia’s ambition to be a regional power rests ultimately on people, not structures. Diplomatic influence, economic resilience and national cohesion all depend on human capability: Skyscrapers do not vaccinate children; smart corridors do not train midwives; airports do not repair trust between the state and its citizens.

None of this is to deny Ethiopia’s right to aspire, nor to dismiss the value of infrastructure. Roads, energy and urban renewal matter. But development is not an architectural competition. It is a social contract. When public resources are finite —  as they always are —  choices reveal priorities.

The current pattern risks entrenching inequality and eroding legitimacy. Urban elites benefit disproportionately, while rural and conflict-affected communities fall further behind. Health workers strike, teachers leave and young people emigrate. The social return on investment narrows even as the physical footprint expands.

There remains, however, a window for recalibration. Ethiopia possesses a large, youthful population, a strategic geographic position and deep historical legitimacy. Redirecting even a fraction of mega-project spending toward universal health coverage, quality schooling and social protection would yield dividends far exceeding those of any single tower. International partners stand ready to support such a shift, not as charity, but as a shared interest in a stable and capable regional anchor.

Development, at its core, is not about height. It is about depth. Ethiopia’s future standing —  at home and abroad —  will be determined less by how high its skyline climbs than by how firmly its people are supported beneath it.

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Airstrikes, sovereignty and the regional chessboard

The US airstrikes took place on December 26, 2025, in northwestern Sokoto State, a region bordering Niger. According to Fajusigbe, geography matters. After Niger’s 2023 military coup, US forces faced expulsion from a surveillance base that had monitored extremist movements across Africa’s northern Sahel region. Russian forces later occupied the same facilities, shifting the regional balance of power.

Washington and the Nigerian capital of Abuja offered different explanations for the strikes. Trump stated they were intended to punish those killing Christians, while Nigerian authorities described them as counter-insurgency operations aimed at destabilizing armed groups fueling regional unrest. The absence of a joint statement underscored the lack of narrative alignment and raised questions about consent, coordination and sovereignty.

Khattar Singh situates the strikes within Trump’s broader foreign policy posture, where military action increasingly doubles as strategic signaling. With Niger lost, Venezuela freshly destabilized and China expanding its footprint in Africa, Nigeria suddenly appears on a crowded geopolitical chessboard.

Yet Fajusigbe doubts Washington wants to open another major front. He warns that destabilizing a country of roughly 250 million people would carry continent-wide consequences.

Religion, violence and the danger of oversimplification

Nigeria is frequently ranked among the world’s most dangerous countries for Christians. Islamist groups such as Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province openly seek to establish a caliphate and have targeted Christians, moderate Muslims and traditional communities alike. The nation has seen churches bombed, priests kidnapped and villages attacked.

Simultaneously, Fajusigbe urges caution against reducing Nigeria’s violence to a single religious narrative. In the northwest and northeast, Muslims form the majority and are often the primary victims of kidnappings and killings. Many attacks are opportunistic rather than sectarian and religious identity is frequently layered onto deeper disputes.

As he explains, “it may be religious, but it’s underpinned by economic factors and land disputes.” Long-running clashes between predominantly Muslim cattle herders and predominantly Christian farming communities over grazing land have become deadlier as climate stress, population growth and weak governance intensify competition. According to Fajusigbe, a “minority of malcontents” benefits from framing every conflict in religious terms, inflaming tensions and attracting external attention.

This complexity is often lost in Western political discourse, where simplified narratives make military solutions appear more decisive than they truly are.

Governance, migration and the limits of military power

The conversation then turns to Nigeria’s diplomatic response. Facing scrutiny from Washington, Abuja hired a major lobbying firm to demonstrate its commitment to protecting Christians. But Fajusigbe insists rhetoric alone will not suffice. Quoting Nigeria’s defense minister, he notes that “military intervention will only solve about 30% of the current issues,” with the remaining 70% dependent on governance.

In remote regions where the state is absent, insurgent groups often function as de facto authorities, collecting taxes and enforcing order. Breaking this cycle requires arrests, prosecutions, territorial control and credible public services, not just airstrikes. Without tangible results, lobbying efforts in Washington risk ringing hollow.

US–Nigeria relations face additional strain from Trump’s 2026 travel restrictions, which placed Nigeria among 75 affected countries. While Washington cites illegal immigration and vetting failures, Fajusigbe calls the framing misleading. As the world’s most populous black nation, Nigeria naturally produces large migrant numbers. For him, the visa ban presents the deeper challenge that unless Nigeria improves domestic opportunity, people will continue to leave in droves.

The discussion closes on the question many Nigerians are now asking: Could Nigeria become the next Venezuela? Despite Nigeria’s oil wealth, Fajusigbe remains skeptical that Washington seeks another regime-shaking intervention. He cautions that foreign military action often leaves societies worse off and emphasizes local responsibility over external rescue.

Fajusigbe makes a stark conclusion: “We are on our own. Don’t look for a savior out there.” Sustainable peace, he believes, cannot be imposed from the air. It must emerge from within, shaped by Nigerians who understand the social, economic and cultural roots of their own conflicts.

[ edited this piece.]

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Allegations of chemical weapons use: crossing a red line

Evidence by independent experts suggests that Sudan’s national army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), may have used chemical agents, specifically chlorine gas, during the fighting. If confirmed, this would not simply add another war crime to the list. It would cross one of the firmest in modern warfare and push Sudan’s war from a humanitarian crisis into a direct challenge to one of international law’s most guarded taboos.

Chemical weapons usage is almost universally, and Sudan itself is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention () treaty. If a national army is found to have violated it, the issue moves beyond the battlefield and enters the realm of broken international obligations. For diplomats in Washington, Brussels and elsewhere, that distinction matters as it raises the political cost of engagement and narrows the room for compromise.

The evidence that has emerged so far, including imagery, open-source videos and expert chemical assessments, is not yet a formal legal ruling. That responsibility lies with international , such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (). Diplomacy, however, operates on a different threshold, and in political terms the bar has already been crossed.

What complicates the situation even further is who is accused of these atrocities. These are, after all, not members of some militia groups or rogue commanders operating at the margins, but forces that present themselves as Sudan’s legitimate . This contradicts the narrative that many governments had actually been relying on: that the SAF, however brutal it is, still represented the last institutional backbone of the Sudanese state.

Diverging international responses

The United States had been the most forceful in its response so far. After an initial cautious response, Washington has increasingly placed these allegations as part of a of behavior that makes the SAF’s political rehabilitation impossible without accountability.

Concerns that Islamist militias may have access to chemical weapons heightened the perceived stakes. In imposed earlier this year, the US government explicitly referenced chemical weapons and indicated the intent to cross a line that had been historically treated with care: accusing a government of using banned weapons without waiting for full multilateral consensus.

In contrast, the European Union’s response has been more temperate. So far, Brussels has the allegations into wider condemnations of atrocities and humanitarian law violations, showcasing the EU’s strong institutional preference for legal process and multilateral verification. OPCW verification indeed remains a for most European member states, especially Germany. However, European restraints do not mean being unaware: even unproven claims of chemical weapons usage disrupt the political math and raise the diplomatic price of engagement.

Diplomatic isolation and the future of peace efforts

Beyond the transatlantic divide, the charges also contribute to greater of the SAF at a moment when it has been constantly seeking recognition as Sudan’s legitimate authority. The allegations make it harder for African, Arab and European states to , whether military, intelligence or even humanitarian. Isolation deepens precisely when legitimacy matters most.

Peace efforts are also at risk. Chemical weapons accusations political space and shift attention from conflict resolution to accountability. Talks may slow, and diplomatic channels may narrow, yet for many, that is the point. Allowing negotiations to proceed as if nothing happened would send a dangerous signal: the use of mass-atrocity weapons cannot simply be set aside in the name of expediency.

The war in Sudan has already tested the international community’s tolerance for human suffering. Chemical weapons, on the other hand, test the underlying question of whether international red lines still mean anything at all. If the allegations are confirmed, the question will no longer be what happened on the battlefield, but whether the international community is prepared to act on the norms it claims to defend.

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�����������’s of the self-declared “Republic of Somaliland” is a neocolonial exploitation project of a complex, deeply divided region in northwestern Somalia. It is a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, political independence and territorial integrity, as Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud rightly declared during to a special joint session of the two Houses of Federal Parliament in Mogadishu. President Mohamud further noted how �����������’s controversial and unilateral decision was a “threat to the security and stability of the world and the region.”

Another senior Somali Cabinet official demanded that Israel “abide by international law,” as international and regional organizations, including the UN, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the African Union — all of which Somalia is a Member State — as well as the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), strongly to �����������’s decision.

The Israeli move was also across the globe, including in China, Nigeria, Pakistan, the UK and the US, where the State Department the US recognizes one Somalia “which includes the territory of Somaliland”. �����������’s tactical decision overlooks the inconsistency of its foreign policy, particularly when juxtaposed with �����������’s own refusal to recognize an independent Palestinian state. The UN called for an to discuss Israeli recognition of “Somaliland”, in a discussion entitled “Threats to International Peace and Security”.

No political observer of Somalia missed the underlying irony of �����������’s recognition of Somaliland. After 35 years searching for international recognition, Israel became the first and only UN Member State to recognize Somaliland, a sub-national entity in Somalia that unilaterally in 1991 after claiming that the former Barre dictatorship in Somalia committed the in the 1980s. The Isaaq are the predominant Somali clan group in the central regions of Somaliland, surrounded by Darod clan groups to the east and south and Dir clan groups to the west.

In October 2025, a UN inquiry found that Israel had four acts of genocide in Gaza. A demonstrably ironic political act is that the proclaimed victims of the Isaaq genocide recognition from a state that committed genocide in Palestine.

�����������’s motivating factors

Somalia’s greatest asset has always been one of its greatest curses. The country’s geographic location, at the crossroads of global shipping lines that connect Africa, Asia and Europe, continues to attract regional and global competition for power. Even before �����������’s unilateral recognition of Somaliland, which did not come as a surprise to political observers aware of Somaliland’s long quest for Israeli validation as a sovereign state, Taiwan had recognized Somaliland and established a de facto embassy in . So, why is Israel interested in setting up a foothold in Somaliland? To unpack this, we must first understand the regional context.

In their response, international actors sought to emphasize the importance and relevance of international law, grounded in legal and political principles that aim to prevent the recognition of separatist states in Africa, which could lead to deeper instability, ongoing secessionist claims, and the undermining of order and political cohesion, thereby destabilizing the entire African continent.

In addition, Africa has never allowed an external actor, Israel or otherwise, to lead formal recognition of any new African state, including the only two nation-states to gain independence in post-colonial Africa, namely and South Sudan. In this respect, it is highly unlikely that African nations would follow �����������’s decision, which is motivated by its own strategic considerations, such as ongoing military conflicts with a number of regional actors, including Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, Iran and even the new leadership in post-Assad Syria.

In particular, Houthi maritime operations in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a strategic waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, forced shipping lines to around Africa, “driving up transit times, insurance premiums, and energy costs”. This is one of �����������’s top strategic objectives in recognizing the separatist Somali region. The strategic location of northwestern Somalia’s proximity to the Bab al Mandab Strait, across from Yemen, provides Israel a military foothold to confront and potentially neutralize Houthi forces who have targeted the Israeli economy through maritime military operations.

Second, as voiced by Somali government official Ali Omar, one of �����������’s is its pursuit of “the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza”. After two years of Israeli bombardment, targeted killings, and the destruction of critical infrastructure and the local economy of Palestinians in Gaza, leading to starvation, Israel proposed to to Somaliland as part of a wider strategy to forcefully dispossess Palestinians of their rightful homelands.

A third and equally important reason for �����������’s recognition of Somalia’s separatist region is to use Somaliland as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to join the Abrahamic Accords; recently, the Saudi leadership expressed openness to join the Accords, conditional on a “clear path” to the emergence of a . In future negotiations, it is entirely plausible for Israel to rescind its recognition of Somaliland if Saudi Arabia reverses its principled position in defense of a Palestinian state.

�����������’s decision also aims to use Somaliland as leverage against Turkish influence in Syria and East Africa. Türkiye has invested massively in Somalia since 2011, with Ankara and Mogadishu signing strategic military and commercial .

Fourth, Israel is also betting on capitalizing on existing infrastructure in the Port of Berbera, expanded under an investment agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2017, and on attracting American support by leveraging Berbera as a base to counter the Chinese in neighboring Djibouti. Others have proposed that can use Somaliland to also counter Chinese interests in Africa. Clearly, this is not about recognizing Somaliland as a self-governing “beacon of democracy” in an erstwhile volatile region, but rather as a pawn in a broader geopolitical war involving global and regional powers vying for strategic dominance, competing economic interests, and control over vital maritime routes and natural resources.

President Mohamud’s incoherent foreign policy has continually sent mixed signals to global capitals. While his administration maintains close relations with Türkiye and Qatar, unpredictable relations with Ethiopia, Egypt, the US, UK, EU and the UAE have been characterized by a lack of a principled and strategic foreign policy.

Somalia’s failed leadership

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud must resign in shame. A day before �����������’s unilateral recognition of “Somaliland”, President Mohamud’s administration organized the first direct , which occurred peacefully in Mogadishu for the first time in nearly 60 years, celebrating a major political milestone. Israel recognized Somaliland the next day, abruptly curtailing President Mohamud’s celebratory mood. Mohamud has served as President of Somalia for eight of the last 13 years, wielding significant influence over the country’s political trajectory, including its foreign policy. He was first elected in 2012 and re-elected in 2022 after losing to Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo in the 2017 election.��

In 2020, then-President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo was on the verge of arriving in Hargeisa to meet the Somaliland leadership as part of a led by the Ethiopian prime minister, Abiy Ahmed. The former Farmajo administration had offered a number of concessions to Somaliland, including constitutional reforms, of aviation and even the position of Prime Minister uncontested for a period of ten years.

Unfortunately, President Mohamud did not those efforts, which began in 2012 and were mediated by the UK, Djibouti and Türkiye during different rounds of political negotiations; instead, since 2022, President Mohamud chose to ignore Somaliland or use empty words about brotherhood and unity, without any substance. As such, President Mohamud will bear major responsibility for failing to lead Somalia and uphold the country’s fragile unity and territorial integrity.

Domestically, President Mohamud’s strategy of empowering Mogadishu and ignoring other domestic stakeholders, including Puntland, Galmudug and Jubaland states, further deepened the political fragmentation in Somalia that facilitated exploitation by foreign powers, at the expense of the Somali people. Instead of fostering a consultative national process and embedding federalism, President Mohamud’s Mogadishu-centric political approach alienated key domestic stakeholders and propelled clan competition. His administration mismanaged and utilized international donor support as a political tool to empower political entities that support him and weaken opposition domestic actors.

Political representation and accountability were severely eroded, as his administration co-opted the two Houses of Federal Parliament, nominated ambassadors along clan lines and used in an attempt to dismantle the Jubaland state leadership, a move that failed with catastrophic consequences.

President Mohamud also failed to capitalize on the Las Anod uprising, when the Somaliland military launched on civilian infrastructure in Las Anod in 2023, sparking an eight-month conflict that led to the defeat of the Somaliland army, including the capture of Somaliland prisoners and seizure of military equipment. Mogadishu later recognized the Northeast State in 2025, which reduced “Somaliland’s territory to about 45% of the former British Somaliland” and has considerably Somaliland’s claim to independence.

This was a moment for President Mohamud to reaffirm Somali unity, show the world that the territories Somaliland’s separatist leaders claim were not a monolithic entity, support pro-union forces in Las Anod, and condemn the military aggression and violence against civilians by the Somaliland forces. President Mohamud failed to make strategic decisions, remained indecisive, politically weak and lacked a clear vision on how to handle a national crisis, perhaps with his decision-making judgment clouded by political considerations and foreign influence. All these efforts weakened political cohesion, undermined the united front against armed extremist groups such as Al Shabaab, and deepened clan distrust and hostilities. 

Danger ahead

Israel does not understand the Somali people, nor can it be expected to. Israel reached a decision purely assessed through the prism of its own survivalist and security considerations, aiming to expand territorially through a process of violent colonialism in the name of self-defense. The Somalis are an ancient civilization that inhabits four countries in the Horn of Africa. There are conflicting historical, social, political, economic and security factors at play, both visible and invisible — not only within Somalia, but also within the boundaries Somaliland claims.

�����������’s narrow focus on the Bab al-Mandab, the Port of Berbera and regional powerplays fails to take a full view of the surrounding complexities: a legacy of dictatorship and civil war; clan boundaries; political conflicts; and extremist violence. Already, we are witnessing how global competitions, such as Ethiopia vs Egypt, China vs the US/India/Taiwan, Qatar vs the UAE and now, Türkiye vs Israel, just to name a few, are impacting and worsening internal rivalries. The loser on all sides is the Somali people, betrayed by a self-serving political class and blinded by ancient clan animosities.

This is not merely about Somaliland. This is about Africa and the principle that Somalia’s borders cannot be altered without the consent of its people and institutions. Upholding this principle is essential for long-term peace, national unity and democratic legitimacy — failure to do so risks creating new generations of radicalized youth, in Somaliland, most prominently. If not addressed correctly and urgently, we will witness worsening internal fractures and fragmentation, deeper economic decline and institutional instability unseen in the past 35 years.

The calls to defend Somalia’s dignity and boundaries are growing — being heard in every Somali-speaking household, that the enemies who seek to further divide and weaken this ancient nation are at the gates. This strategically failed approach undermines decades of US-led intervention learned and shaped through experience since the 1990s UN peacekeeping mission, founded on the policies of pragmatic engagement, tailored support and a hands-off approach to Somali internal politics, clan dynamics and balance of power.

Above all, the issue of “Somaliland” is a Somali issue before it is an African or regional issue. It is an unresolved, dormant volcano waiting to explode. Without a doubt, unless reversed, �����������’s move threatens to accelerate further instability, embolden clan violence, undermine regional security, and deepen radicalization and extremism unseen since the Ethiopian of Mogadishu in 2006. We cannot predict the future, but we are certain of one thing: Somalis will violently reject colonialist exploitation in all its forms, as they have done in the past.

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Protests spread to other cities such as Toamasina, Antsiranana and Toliara, and violent clashes with security forces left several injured and at least 22 people dead, to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights — figures the government denies.

Within days, frustration with daily hardships and a lack of freedom of expression escalated into an open demand that Rajoelina resign.

A decisive military defection

The turning point came on October 11, when the Corps d’administration des personnels et des services administratifs et techniques (CAPSAT) unit of the armed forces unexpectedly protesters at Antananarivo’s symbolic Place du 13 Mai — a square historically tied to several protests that ultimately led to the downfall of multiple governments since 1972. The move evoked memories of the 2009 crisis, when the military also sided with opposition-led protests.

One day later, President Rajoelina abruptly the country. While the presidency insisted he was on an overseas mission, foreign media reported he had been evacuated from Sainte Marie island aboard a French military aircraft. Speaking via social media from an undisclosed “secure location,” Rajoelina claimed he had received death threats.

Constitutional showdown

October 14 marked a chaotic escalation. The National Assembly announced it would convene to remove Rajoelina from office. In response, the presidency issued a dissolving the Assembly. Lawmakers — across opposition, independents and even the ruling party — ignored the decree and voted to remove him anyway.

Hours later, CAPSAT forces led by Colonel Michaël Randrianirina declared they were “taking responsibility” for the country. Rajoelina’s allies called it a coup; the military insisted it was a necessary intervention. The High Constitutional Court quickly validated the , declaring the presidency vacant due to Rajoelina’s “passive abandonment of power.”

With the Senate presidency itself in disarray, the court chose an unprecedented path: endorsing a military-led transition and effectively “inviting” Randrianirina to power, thereby giving his takeover a semblance of legality.

The “refoundation” begins

On October 17, Colonel Randrianirina was sworn in as President of the “Refoundation of the Republic of Madagascar,” launching a two-year . Among other reform measures outlined in a six-step plan, the new leadership pledged to conduct a national consultation, organize a constitutional referendum and hold presidential elections.

The concept of “refoundation” has become a rallying cry for breaking with decades of corruption, patronage and institutional fragility. Gen Z activists have demanded entirely new leaders across all institutions. But controversy erupted quickly. The of Prime Minister Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo — criticized for alleged ties to figures close to the former regime — raised doubts about how deep the renewal will truly go. By October 28, a of 29 nonmilitary members had been installed.�� 

Justice or political score-settling?

A wave of and searches targeting figures close to the former ruling circle has fueled growing unease. While the new authorities portray the moves as a fight against impunity, critics see echoes of past governments that weaponized the justice system against opponents. Once again, the line between accountability and political revenge is blurred.

This latest turmoil marks Madagascar’s major political crisis since independence — following those of 1972, 1991, 2002, 2009 and 2018. Unlike its predecessors, however, the 2025 revolt was driven not by political elites but by young citizens demanding dignity, opportunity and responsive governance — a development that has been driven by anger over the steady erosion of public services and civil rights.

The stakes are enormous in a country already struggling with severe social and economic . As evidenced by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (), Madagascar has witnessed a stark decline in the political and social realm over the past 20 years, with indicators such as freedom of expression (from 8 to 3) and commitment to democratic institutions (from 9 to 3) dropping drastically. Similarly, economic indicators such as market organization and liberalization of trade have stagnated at relatively low levels.

An uncertain international embrace

With regard to the current political situation, the international community appears divided. Although foreign diplomats attended Randrianirina’s swearing-in, the African Union Madagascar while simultaneously dispatching envoys to mediate. This ambiguity threatens the new regime’s access to international financing, making international recognition a top priority.

Diplomatically, the transition government has signaled openness to all partners but has notably leaned toward : The Russian ambassador was the first foreign official to meet Randrianirina after his inauguration, and the new National Assembly president, Siteny Randrianasoloniaiko, traveled to Moscow soon after.��

A crossroads: renewal or repetition?

All eyes now turn to the national consultation, expected to be convened by Madagascar’s influential Ecumenical Council of Christian Churches. The process is meant to chart the transition’s long-term political future, including the drafting of a new constitution. Yet skepticism is warranted.

Recent events — echoing findings from a recent show that while most Malagasy citizens support democracy and reject military rule, many are willing to tolerate military involvement when civilian leaders abuse their power. It’s a stance that, paradoxically, weakens democracy itself.

Still, forward-looking debates are already emerging: Should Madagascar remain a unitary state or move toward federalism? Should decentralization finally be strengthened? And when will a constitutional referendum be held before the return to elected leadership?

The answers will determine whether Madagascar can finally escape its cycle of instability — or whether this moment, like so many before, will slip into the familiar pattern of hope, upheaval and disappointment.

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While maternal mortality rates have declined over recent decades, the current trajectory remains inadequate to achieve by 2030. As AI reshapes sectors from finance to agriculture, it now also offers expansive potential for maternal health. The technology is capable of predicting fatal complications, extending specialized care to remote communities and supporting the health workforce across the region. However, unless deployed wisely, the inclusion of AI has the potential to widen rather than close inequalities.

The promise of AI in women’s health

Recent empirical evidence indicates that AI adoption significantly reduces maternal mortality, particularly in low- and middle-income countries, reducing annual maternal mortality trends by up to .

Recent AI programs across SSA are moving from promise to proven practice, with new programs showing measurable progress on the ground. Malawi offers a striking example: Continuous AI during labor has reduced stillbirth and neonatal deaths by 82%. Innovations extend beyond the delivery room in Ghana with an AI-enabled traffic prediction that maps travel times to emergency obstetric care to predict access gaps to help policymakers understand where access barriers persist. Meanwhile, across SSA, startups are using AI-powered technology to help healthcare providers quickly identify pregnancy risk factors, and innovation hubs are piloting to predict miscarriages.

Is AI helping or hurting?

By creating systems of dependency that displace local knowledge in favor of externally endorsed solutions, these technological advances risk repeating the most of prior global health interventions. Broadly, the focus on technological solutions can divert attention and funding from addressing fundamental structural issues: poverty, inadequate health systems and a lack of trained personnel. These are the of maternal mortality in SSA.

AI maternal health solutions risk creating hierarchies of care based on digital access. Women with poor network coverage, those who can’t afford smartphones and those who have low digital literacy could become excluded from potentially life-saving interventions. Even more concerning is algorithmic bias. AI systems rural women and marginalized groups in the Global South when those systems train with Western datasets and linguistic frameworks; this can potentially produce harmful and biased guidance, even errors. The sustainability question looms equally large — even well-intentioned tech pilots can collapse when donor funds end, leaving local health systems dependent on outside vendors with dashed expectations.

Preventing AI from widening Africa’s maternal health gap

Medical technicians will inevitably integrate AI into maternal healthcare globally. When they do, will we allow AI to deepen divides or equip it to bridge them? If AI is to serve women and children rather than repeat the well-intentioned but misguided that have long characterized global health interventions, we must develop safeguards to reenvision how these systems are developed, deployed and governed.

To deploy AI equitably, we must set safeguards that include these four interconnected domains:

1. Infrastructure development must prioritize local data centers to maintain data sovereignty, ensuring health information generated by communities remains under their control rather than flowing to foreign tech companies.
2. It is critical that local innovation receives funding, which supports African developers, researchers and institutions to create homegrown AI tools and datasets. This way, the AI solutions are culturally and contextually relevant.
3. These technical investments must be paired with governance reforms that mandate local ownership and engagement. That ensures women and healthcare workers shape AI maternity tools and pilots from production to evaluation.
4. Finally, all AI systems must be designed to function effectively in low-connectivity, resource-constrained settings, ensuring that AI innovations strengthen rather than deepen the digital divide.

AI is not the silver bullet for solving the maternal health crises in SSA, but it carries undeniable potential for reshaping the health landscape and the technology’s enticing innovations. As recent identifies, technology must strengthen rather than supplant health systems, amplifying rather than erasing the voices of local women and healthcare workers.

[Nikia Crollard contributed to this article in her personal capacity. The views expressed are her own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) or the United States Government.]

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Mass kidnappings in Nigeria

Khattar Singh opens by situating Nigeria’s kidnapping crisis within a wider landscape of insecurity. The country is confronting insurgents, militant groups and criminal networks simultaneously, particularly in the northwest and north-central regions. In November, insurgents abducted over 400 children, including the mass kidnapping of over 300 students and 12 teachers from St. Mary’s Catholic School in Niger State.

Fajusigbe explains that kidnappings have persisted for years with little deterrence. As a result, abduction has evolved into a low-risk, high-profit enterprise. Because ransoms are frequently paid and prosecutions remain rare, criminal groups see little reason to stop. As he puts it, kidnapping has become “a normal thing.”

While over 100 abducted students have escaped and others have been released, authorities have offered few details about how negotiations unfolded or whether perpetrators were apprehended. The lack of transparency fuels fear, especially when officials make public assurances without explaining how they intend to deliver results.

Why kidnappings happen

When asked whether ideology, poverty or governance failure is the primary driver, Fajusigbe argues that all three factors reinforce one another. Islamist groups such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province remain active, but many kidnappings are now carried out by loosely organized criminal gangs motivated primarily by profit.

Geography plays a critical role. Kidnappings are concentrated in border regions adjacent to Chad and other neighboring states, where porous frontiers allow fighters and weapons to move freely. Illegal arms trafficking and weak law enforcement presence make it easier for criminal groups to operate with impunity.

Poverty accelerates the situation as well. Fajusigbe describes how unemployment and lack of opportunity create a pool of recruits willing to take risks. Young men with little hope for the future may see kidnapping as a rational economic choice. Ideology, he argues, often dissolves under scrutiny. Greed is often the real motivation.

Are Nigerians unhappy?

The Nigerian public is extremely frustrated. Parents of kidnapped children say they receive little information from authorities. Communities feel abandoned by leaders who appear unable or unwilling to restore security. Fajusigbe speaks personally about the emotional toll, noting reports of parents dying from shock or medical complications after learning their children had been abducted.

Suspicion has deepened following reports that security personnel were withdrawn shortly before some kidnappings occurred, with no subsequent accountability for commanders involved. Nigerians increasingly question whether corruption or collusion is undermining security efforts.

The government has pointed to partial successes — hostages released, schools evacuated — but these measures feel inadequate. The decision to close dozens of schools indefinitely in affected regions struck many as an admission of defeat rather than a solution.

Options for Nigerians

As violence persists, Nigerians are exploring alternatives beyond federal responses. Southern governors are coordinating to prevent the spread of instability, while public debate over creating state-level police forces intensifies. Fajusigbe warns that talk alone is not enough, stressing that “the rhetoric is becoming too much” without concrete action.

Drawing on his experience in conflict resolution, he emphasizes dialogue as a tool for resolving communal disputes, particularly those rooted in land and resource conflicts. Traditional and religious leaders, he argues, are often better positioned than distant officials to mediate locally grounded tensions.

Yet dialogue has limits. Criminal kidnappers are unlikely to negotiate in good faith. In such cases, long-term solutions depend on strategic development to reduce unemployment and a restructured security architecture capable of disrupting criminal operations.

Genocide against Christians?

Khattar Singh raises US President Donald Trump’s claim that Nigeria faces a genocide against Christians. Fajusigbe urges caution with the terminology. Christians and other civilians are unquestionably being targeted, but he argues that debates over definitions distract from urgent realities.

Rather than focusing on labels, we should look at the underlying truth: People are being killed, communities terrorized and basic rights violated. Whether described as genocide or not, the failure of the state to protect its citizens demands immediate action.

For Fajusigbe, the priority is clear. Authorities must close border gaps, dismantle kidnapping networks, cut off funding streams and restore trust through visible accountability. Without those steps, Nigerians will continue to live in fear of abandonment.

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Dawood and the Sudanese Armed Forces

Dawood derived his importance within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) not because of personal ambition or political charisma, but because he was one of the few senior figures not strongly connected with Sudan’s Islamist networks. These networks are closely connected to the era of former President Omar al-Bashir, who was pushed aside after the 2019 uprising, but they now have as the war against the RSF intensifies. Their return has reshaped the SAF from within, particularly at the strategic and ideological levels.

There have long been two broad inside the Sudanese military. One consists of institutionalist officers, those who view the army as a national institution that must remain professional, structured and relatively detached from ideological politics.

The other consists of officers and allied Islamist militia leaders whose loyalties trace back to the al-Bashir — remnants of the former ruling party, the National Congress Party (NCP), which is affiliated with Sudan’s . These elements of the country’s Islamist movement believe the war offers an opportunity to reclaim a long-lost influence. As the conflict has evolved, this latter group has become increasingly assertive.

Potential shift in military power dynamics

Dawood’s possible departure could mark a significant shift in this internal power struggle. Institutionalists may lose another senior figure able to counter Islamist hardliners’ ambitions, ultimately giving more leverage to those fighting for the prolongation of the war. Prominent figures like Ahmed Haroun, Ali Ahmed Karti and Malik Agar — the Vice President of the Transitional Sovereignty Council — remain highly influential behind the scenes.

Their of the Quad initiative on September 12 came as little surprise, especially after the Joint Quad statement against the growth of influence by Islamist extremist groups and Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated leaders.

This internal shift would not only result in changes within Sudan but also across the wider region. Given that the war has become in the strategies of neighboring countries and Gulf powers, every actor has started pushing for its preferred outcomes. Members of the Quad have been diplomatic efforts for ceasefires, humanitarian relief and peace frameworks. However, the concerns among Quad members also extend to stability along the Red Sea, the future of political Islam and the balance of influence in the region.

In this regard, a more Islamist-dominated SAF leadership could make the Quad’s work considerably more difficult. Hardline officers are generally wary of outside mediation and often reject compromises that would dilute their influence. The trend could indeed be that, with Dawood having stepped aside and the hardliners consolidating their control, the SAF would drift toward being less open to the peace proposals US President Donald Trump is shaping. This places members of the Quad in a very difficult position, balancing the desire for a stable Sudan with deep mistrust of Islamist political currents.

Regional implications and diplomatic challenges

A strengthened Islamist presence inside the SAF might entrench fears that Sudan is moving in the wrong direction, given its long-term regional priorities. At the same time, members of the Quad cannot easily distance themselves from the SAF and allow others like Iran, Qatar or Turkiye to expand their influence and physical presence through Port Sudan.

Both Egypt and the US are actively engaged in mediation efforts and could also face similar challenges. Cairo does a strong Sudanese army and appears to provide military support, but not one fractured by ideology. Washington has , but an SAF leadership driven increasingly by ideological actors will be harder to influence through traditional pressure or negotiation.

For Sudan, a confirmed resignation by Dawood would further plunge Sudan into uncertainty at an already precarious moment. The war has become the humanitarian crisis, and every shift within military leadership affects the prospects for a ceasefire. A strengthened Islamist influence inside the SAF might make the conflict even more intractable, further reduce the chances of compromise and heighten the suffering of civilians caught in the fighting.

In a conflict of shifting front lines and fluid political alliances, the resignation of one minister may seem a minor event. Yet sometimes the most significant changes do not occur on the battlefield but in the quieter realignments inside the institutions that hold, or fail to hold, a country together. Dawood’s absence, if true, might be one of those moments.

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Materiality

The of this institution, in its modern sense, dates back to 17th-century Holland. Its main characteristics were a permanent share capital, publicly tradable shares, separation of ownership and management, limited liability for shareholders and a State charter granting it monopoly rights. It wouldn’t take long, though, before England emerged as a rival. The Glorious Revolution, which put the Dutch Stadtholder on the throne of England under the name of William III, was responsible for bringing these new notions to London.

, however, remained reluctant to the concept of publicly tradable shares. There, the company’s capital tended to be state-owned. This resulted from the resounding failure of its first major private company, which John Law at the beginning of the 18th century.

However, notwithstanding their publicly tradable shares, Dutch and English companies their aims at the service of the grand purposes of the State or the Crown. In this regard, they were not all that different from the French ones. They all became, indeed, implementing tools of the State’s mercantilist and imperialist policies.

In the case of Dutch and English companies, the conquest and colonization of overseas territories was entrusted to them through State charters that granted them commercial monopolies. To this end, these companies had their own armies and fleets, administered territories autonomously and waged war against rival countries and companies. All of this, while the State not only retained a significant share of the profits but also had its flag flying over the conquered territories.

The Dutch East India Company (), responsible for the spice trade with the Far East, was the first major global corporation. It boasted 150 ships, 40 large warships, 50,000 employees and a highly equipped private army of 10,000 soldiers. The English and the French East India companies would the VOC’s size some years later, and the three would vie for control over countries, raw materials and trade routes.

England would eventually reach the top of this competition, bringing this corporate vision of trade and international relations to its highest expression. By , Robert Clive, at the head of the army of the British East India Company (EIC), had conquered a large share of India.

Contrary to the Virginia Company and the Plymouth Company, dating back a century earlier — both English joint-stock companies chartered by the Crown to establish permanent English colonies in North America — the function of government in India remained in the hands of the EIC. Indeed, whereas in the former two cases the Crown retained government, it would take until for it to assume direct governmental responsibilities over India.

In the final years of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the British South Africa Company, a public joint-stock company headed by Cecil Rhodes, also had its own . With it, it conquered the territory of what was to be called Rhodesia (present-day Zambia and Zimbabwe). By Royal Charter, this company was entitled to raise its own police, exert control over taxation, make administrative regulations, grant land rights and establish courts. For all practical purposes, it like a private government very much in the same manner in which the East India Company had done before.��

If something characterized institutions such as the VOC, the EIC or the British South Africa Company, it was their sheer materiality. This means: armies, war fleets, territories and their capacity to wage wars. To an important extent, they represented the most visible manifestation of the power of their states.

Immateriality

Fast forward to the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st (100 years after Rhodes’s exertions in Southern Africa), the nature of the company as an institution changed completely. From its raw materiality, it had evolved into an increasing immateriality. Indeed, globalization led big corporations to divest from everything that wasn’t core to their business, making them more and more bodyless.

The assembly line, which since the time of Henry Ford had become the essence of the manufacturing process, reached such a point of specialization during the height of globalization that it got fragmented. The different components of a single final product came to be manufactured in numerous factories scattered across multiple countries.

Within this model, the large corporation focused on finding the lowest-cost worker for each constituent part of the manufacturing process. Wherever he could be found. But, at the same time, it went on the hunt for the most economical engineer, designer, accountant, financial analyst or customer service representative, also, anywhere in the world. This, of course, required targeting those countries where a higher level of qualifications and lower costs converged for each specific function.

As Thomas L. Friedman , with the global economy transformed into a level playing field of sorts, there was little impediment to having not only production, but also design, research or services, broken up and scattered around the world. All of the above, needless to say, implied a massive outsourcing of blue-collar and white-collar jobs.

This process not only involved outsourcing manufacturing and service operations to other countries but, even more significantly, outsourcing them to other companies. Increasingly, manufacturing and services were not performed directly by the multinational corporations themselves, but were outsourced to local companies in the countries involved. That is, smaller companies were scattered across the most diverse latitudes. As a result, big corporations were able to rid themselves of labor obligations that had traditionally burdened their finances.

Following this trend, the large corporation of the early 21st century tended to strip itself of everything that was not core to its business. Ultimately, the corporation jealously guarded brands and patents, its two fundamental assets, while outsourcing as many functions as possible. Hence, corporation’s notorious contrast with the Dutch or the British East Indian companies, whose materiality runs counter to the disembodiment hereby pursued. 

Materiality or immateriality?

Recent but fundamental changes, though, have brought back materiality into the life of big corporations. The resurgence of geopolitics, the disruption of global supply chains brought about by COVID, the reduction of production costs in developed countries driven by technology, and, most recently, US industrial policies and increasing tariffs, have profoundly undermined globalization.

Under these circumstances, divesting itself from noncore functions lost its meaning. Nowadays, companies are integrating vertically once again, strengthening themselves by adding functions and, above all, .

Is this newfound materiality, thus, the prevailing trend within the corporate world of our day? Not necessarily. Jointly with it, immateriality is the main characteristic of the most consequential technology shaping the future: Artificial Intelligence. A technology based on data, algorithms and computing. Meaning, soft assets that can be shared or duplicated without depletion. AI companies, indeed, do not depend on the accumulation of people or of huge assets, beyond those necessary to make their ethereal nature functional: energy, computer hardware, and networking and data storage infrastructures.

Let’s just consider the event that took place on , 2023, inside OpenAI, the pioneer of ChatGPT. Reacting against the dismissal of its President and founder, Sam Altman, by the board of directors, 70% of the company’s staff rebelled, threatening to resign. Indeed, 738 of the company’s 770 employees forcefully demanded the reinstatement of Altman and the departure of the board members. In other words, a company that was revolutionizing the modern economy had a workforce of fewer than 800 employees.

Since then, OpenAI has somewhat grown. As of 2025, it has employees. Meanwhile, Anthropic, one of its main competitors, valued at $61.5 billion, has just employees. Mistral AI, with a reported value of $12 billion, has employees, while Thinking Machines Lab, also with a valuation of $12 billion, has even fewer personnel: just employees.

The main characteristic of companies like these is that they have very leveraged teams. Meaning, a small group of people that produces an unusually large amount of output, economic impact or value. Within them, each employee can generate high amounts in revenue, as, by its own nature, AI is scalable. That is, able to grow significantly without needing a proportional increase in costs or efforts.

However, the scalability of Artificial Intelligence is not limited to the companies that produce it. As countless corporations in other fields are in the process of engaging with AI for their own business purposes, jobs will undoubtedly be lost to it. The implications of this are clear: Increasing immateriality could be the sign of the corporate world of the future — a very costly immateriality, indeed, when measured in human terms.

The gigantic level of power that can be attained through immaterial algorithms (including machine learning or pattern-recognition ones) is something that Robert Clive, despite his soldiers, war fleets, weaponry and huge territories under his control, could never have imagined possible.

[ edited this piece.]

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The war in Sudan

Khattar Singh opens by asking how the war began. Carvajal links it to Sudan’s unresolved political rupture. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (better known as Hemedti), once coexisted uneasily within the post-coup transitional council. Their rivalry is rooted in the era of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir and intensified after the 2021 military coup crushed hopes for a democratic transition. From the perspective of Sudanese civil society, Carvajal says the coup “was really a betrayal of the December revolution” from 2018, when protestors demanded economic reform and Bashir’s resignation from office.

When the SAF and RSF fell out in April 2023, the struggle for power escalated into a destructive nationwide war. The prospect of a civilian-led transition receded further into the distance.

Who controls Sudan?

Carvajal stresses that Sudan’s battlefield is far more fragmented than the media portrays. Sudan is tribal, sectarian and sharply regional, with politics shaped by the east, south, center, Nile corridor and Darfur region. Tribal militias, Islamist brigades and local factions have taken sides or broken away entirely, often shifting loyalties based on survival rather than doctrine.

On the SAF side, hardline Islamist groups have reemerged as decisive actors. Many Sudanese analysts, Carvajal notes, “really credit the Islamist factions … as really being behind … the transitional council.” The RSF, meanwhile, has expanded across western Sudan, exploiting local grievances and the collapse of state authority. Both forces claim legitimacy, yet neither governs effectively or credibly.

The Darfur crisis

The western Darfur region now hosts the war’s most extreme violence. The RSF has seized major towns while the SAF leans heavily on Islamist militias and courted tribal defectors to expand its manpower. Sudan has become the world’s largest internal displacement crisis: more than 12 million people uprooted and nearly half the population needing aid. After two years of conflict, Carvajal says Sudan “unfortunately takes on that title,” surpassing Yemen as the worst humanitarian disaster.

Aid delivery has nearly collapsed. UN convoys have been struck, officials expelled and access blocked. Confusion over attacks, with SAF supporters alleging the convoys carried weapons and UN agencies insisting they carried food, has paralyzed relief operations. If the RSF continues consolidating the region, it will be forced to prove it can secure roads and airports, not merely win battles.

Role of the UAE and Egypt

Multiple foreign powers have deepened the conflict. Egypt has aligned with the SAF, supplying equipment and flights and, according to some reports, intelligence or drone support. The Egyptian capital of Cairo fears spillover violence and illicit weapons flows.

Saudi Arabia is alarmed by potential Houthi expansion along the Red Sea and is pressing Washington to accelerate a ceasefire before a vacuum enables Iran-linked forces to establish new coastal footholds. The United Arab Emirates backs the RSF, driven by economic interests in Africa and a desire to curb Islamist influence. Turkey and Qatar, though outside the Quartet, seek roles as alternative mediators, partly because Burhan believes they would reduce RSF legitimacy. Meanwhile, the United States struggles to lead a coherent peace process amid competing regional agendas.

The collapse of Sudan

Khattar Singh asks whether Sudan has collapsed. Carvajal tells the grim truth that the state can no longer deliver basic services, pay salaries or protect civilians. The Sudanese capital of Khartoum, Darfur and Port Sudan now function as rival zones; famine conditions are spreading; hospitals have failed; UN access is blocked and donor support has been terrible.

Washington has even at coercive measures, possibly peacekeepers, to secure humanitarian corridors if the parties fail to protect aid deliveries. Carvajal doubts the United Nations can mount such an effort without far greater funding.

Will Sudan break apart?

Despite fears of further fragmentation after South Sudan’s 2011 secession, Carvajal believes none of the major actors — SAF, RSF or Islamist factions — want Sudan to split. The country’s neighbors and Western governments also support unity, wary of a domino effect across already fragile borderlands. The Quad’s roadmap centers on reestablishing a civilian-led government in Khartoum and restarting constitutional reform, though the war’s trajectory makes stabilization difficult.

Still, if a credible peace initiative emerges — one not controlled by either warring faction — Sudan may yet avoid permanent fracture.

[ edited this piece.]

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Dollars for deportees

Khattar Singh opens by asking why the United States is deporting illegal migrants who are not from Eswatini to this tiny nation of 1.2 million people. Dlamini says a secret agreement allowed the US to fly deportees in without informing Parliament, the public or even most cabinet ministers. Eswatini initially received ten people, but reports indicate the kingdom may have agreed to take as many as 160 more.

What shocked Liswatis the most was how they learned about the deal: not through their government, but through independent media. Dlamini notes that deportees were taken directly to the country’s most secure facility, the Matsapha Correctional Centre, or to other undisclosed detention centers.

The heart of the controversy is money. Early reporting suggested the monarchy would receive the equivalent of 10 billion in Swazi lilangeni, the local currency. Dlamini has what appears to be a revised version of the agreement, indicating a payment of $5.1 million. The exact amount continually changes, reflecting political pressure and legal challenges.

Human rights organizations in Southern Africa have filed constitutional petitions against the deportation program, forcing the government to defend an agreement that has never been publicly debated. The shifting figures reinforce the perception of a deal negotiated behind closed doors for reasons that have little to do with national security.

Why was the deal signed?

Khattar Singh inquires why Ngwenyama (King) Mswati III and Eswatini Prime Minister Russell Dlamini agreed to the arrangement. Dlamini points to political alignment between the Trump administration and Eswatini’s monarchy. The US, he argues, is currently “in full support of the … current status quo,” and Trump’s style of governing strengthens ties with non-democratic regimes. These warmer relations made Eswatini a convenient partner in Trump’s effort to fulfill his promise of mass deportations.

Dlamini believes the talks likely occurred in the context of broader negotiations over trade tariffs, where an offer to take deportees could have been framed as a gesture of goodwill to Washington.

Is Mswati III benefiting?

For Dlamini, the most troubling aspect is personal enrichment. When he first learned of the deportations, he immediately suspected that Mswati III had gained a great deal of money from them — and this suspicion was later confirmed. Under Eswatini’s absolute monarchy, all major funds entering the kingdom pass through or are known to the royal family. Dlamini argues the deportation agreement ultimately serves to “enlarge the pocket of the king and his royal family,” not strengthen national capacity or public welfare.

Is Eswatini accepting criminals?

The conversation then turns to who exactly is being deported. Dlamini says the documentation shows they are dangerous criminals previously convicted of “rape, child rape and murder.” Their arrival has already triggered alarm in neighboring South Africa. South Africa’s foreign ministry that the move seeks to undermine the security of the entire region.

Eswatini does not have the resources to manage high-risk offenders from abroad. Housing criminals from multiple countries inside a small and politically fragile state raises serious safety concerns for the wider Southern African region.

Is the West dumping its problems?

Khattar Singh asks whether the US is outsourcing its immigration and security problems to weaker states. Dlamini says the pattern is unmistakable: Western governments are increasingly seeking to transfer migrants, detainees and even criminals to African, Asian or smaller European countries. He points to the United Kingdom–Rwanda and Italy–Albania plans, which involved sending asylum seekers to other nations for processing.

This must be understood through a wider geopolitical lens. The US, Dlamini suggests, often uses the movement of prisoners during periods of conflict or unrest to destabilize targeted regions, pointing to precedents in Syria and Mozambique. Whether intentional or not, sending high-risk deportees to Eswatini introduces volatility into the society.

Why are Liswatis silent?

Khattar Singh closes by asking why citizens are not openly resisting such an explosive policy. Dlamini describes Eswatini as being a deeply suppressed society where political parties have been banned since 1973 and where lethal force has repeatedly quashed dissent. For example, the 2021 pro-democracy protests ended when King Mswati III “unleashed the soldiers and the police to shoot and kill” protesters.

In a country where fear is woven into daily life, people rarely challenge the monarchy unless they feel personally threatened. Dlamini believes public opinion could shift only if a deported criminal were to escape and commit violent acts — an outcome he worries is entirely plausible.

[ edited this piece.]

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El Fasher under siege

Since May 2024, El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, has endured an RSF siege. SAF carpet bombing and famine conditions created a nightmarish scenario in the city, threatening the lives of civilians there. With its capture of the city, nearly all of Darfur is now under the control of the RSF.

Satellite imagery by Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) provides chilling evidence of mass killings. According to the HRL, “these observations are consistent with reports of executions … and the killing of people attempting to flee the city…”

The UN Human Rights Office has also against unarmed civilians. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said:

The risk of further large-scale, ethnically motivated violations and atrocities in El Fasher is mounting by the day. Urgent and concrete action needs to be taken urgently to ensure the protection of civilians in El Fasher and safe passage for those trying to reach relative safety.

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo leads the RSF and is the successor to the Janjaweed militias responsible for over . Sudan’s war, raging since 2023, has witnessed repeated rape, burning of villages and ethnic massacres in West Darfur. The deadly power struggle has resulted in 30 million Sudanese in need of immediate aid.

Amnesty International has attempted to make headway in resolving the crisis and getting aid to civilians. It has that the RSF halt its attacks and allow the opening of aid corridors. The UN has taken a different approach, urging pressure on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — an RSF supporter supplying drones and weapons. Unfortunately, the global community’s tepid response and disinterest in this region mean no aid or pressure is forthcoming.

The role of the UAE

The UAE has emerged as a pivotal actor in this devastating crisis as it remains of prolonging the conflict and exacerbating the atrocities taking place. The UAE has been accused of enabling RSF horrors, including the massacres and ethnic cleansing that took place in El Geneina, Masalit, Zaghawa and El Fasher.

Abu Dhabi had invested billions in Sudan’s agriculture, mining, and shipping industries, in the hope that it would open a corridor to African resources and serve as a buffer against regional rivals like Turkey and Qatar. But when the conflict erupted in 2023 between the RSF and SAF, the UAE took sides with the former. RSF leader Hemedti controls key gold mines of interest to the UAE. The conflict has become a proxy battle, with Saudi Arabia backing the SAF to balance UAE influence across the Red Sea.

UN panels and leaked intelligence reveal hundreds of cargo flights from the UAE to Chad and Somalia, from whence weapons, including drones, ammunition and armored vehicles, are then transferred to Sudan. The UAE is also accused of recruiting Colombian mercenaries to assist in the fighting.

However, the UAE has these accusations as “politically motivated” and even canceled meetings in the UK over UN criticism. The UAE also challenged Sudan’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) genocide complicity case earlier this year. In May, Khartoum ties with the UAE.

A call for international action

Today, with the RSF consolidating control over vast swaths of territory, over 260,000 civilians face imminent genocide. Amnesty International, the UN and other organizations are urging an immediate ceasefire, monitored by the international community. They demand the immediate opening of aid corridors to deliver food, medicine and fuel.

The UAE must be held to account for its complicity in the genocide. RSF gold refinery assets should be frozen, and the EU and US should place secondary sanctions on firms complicit in dealing with the RSF.

The US-Saudi-UAE-Egypt “Quad” should move to enforce a 90-day humanitarian truce, a nationwide ceasefire and a path to negotiations. The international community must refer the RSF to the International Criminal Court for genocide, and support Sudan’s ICJ case against the UAE for its complicity in the genocide. The UN must also send a fact-finding mission to document the El Fasher crimes to be used for prosecutions.

Chad, Libya and Somalia can assist by sealing their borders and preventing flights from the UAE from landing in the region. A no-fly zone should be enacted to further prevent such activity. In the UK, for instance, Members of Parliament should demand a halt in arms sales to the UAE.

The fall of El Fasher does not necessarily mean defeat. Instead, it should be viewed as a clarion call to the international community to act. Silence equals complicity, and — while yesterday was the time to act — it is still not too late to save those civilians whose lives are in imminent danger.

[ edited this piece.]

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This, despite intense international efforts to halt the fighting.

The “Quad,” which has been trying to resolve the Sudan crisis, consists of the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This coalition proposed a in September 2025 aimed at ending the conflict in Sudan through a three-month humanitarian truce, followed by a permanent ceasefire and then a nine-month transitional process to establish civilian-led governance. The Quad’s plan calls for an immediate ceasefire, a humanitarian truce to allow aid delivery and an inclusive political process.

There is little sign of progress.

Why the war can’t be halted — level one

The war, which erupted on April 15, 2023, has pushed millions to the brink of survival, according to the : “Over 30 million people now need urgent humanitarian assistance, among them 9.6 million displaced from their homes and nearly 15 million children caught in a struggle for daily survival.”

It has left most of western Sudan, bordering on Chad, Libya and the Central African Republic in the hands of Hemedti and the RSF. The center and much of the east is held by the SAF and al-Burhan.

In one sense, this reflects long-standing tensions: between the people living along the Nile, who generally look northwards to Egypt, and the people of the periphery, whom the Sudanese elite has traditionally marginalized.

Why the war can’t be halted – level two

If the war is horrific, it has also drawn in too many actors to allow a resolution. The SAF — and al-Burhan — rely on Egypt, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Egypt is a significant ally of the SAF, recognizing the Sudanese army’s leadership as the legitimate government, and is reported to have provided training for SAF pilots and supplied drones, although Egypt some of these claims.

Iran has to the SAF and seeks to use Sudan as a strategic logistical base related to its interests in the Red Sea region. Turkey has also the SAF with drones and various warheads, aiming to maintain influence and secure access to the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia leans toward supporting the SAF, given its interest in the region’s stability.

Hemedti and the RSF are backed by the warlord in eastern Libya, General . The area Haftar controls allows the UAE to fly vast quantities of aid — military and humanitarian — to Hemedti. The UAE is his most important backer. “The RSF is but one of the nodes in a network of non-state actors the UAE has curated over the past decade,” wrote Associate Professor and Strategic Risk Consultant .

Middle East Eye published a detailed outlining how the UAE flies in supplies via Puntland in Somalia, but other routes, including Uganda, have been used. In return, Hemedti pays the UAE from the gold he extracts from mines he controls along the border.

These gold mines have the RSF with a steady source of revenue, allowing it to buy weapons, pay fighters and sustain its military operations, thereby prolonging the war. Once a , Hemedti has become immensely rich. In the past, the Russians supported the RSF via the Wagner Group, but this appears to have fallen away.

There is also a racial element that underlies the RSF: African ethnic groups in the Darfur area are regarded by the Barggara, of whom Hemedti is one, as “enslaveable”.

The traditionally regarded certain African tribes in Darfur and surrounding regions as “enslavable,” particularly those groups who were non-Arab and often of darker skin and different cultural backgrounds. Key tribes that were targeted for enslavement by the Baggara included various Nilotic and other indigenous African groups in the region.

This such as the Fur (though also rulers of Darfur), Zaghawa and especially the Fur’s southern neighbors and more peripheral groups in Dar Fertit, who were often labeled as “Fertit” or people from the forest zone, seen as more vulnerable to enslavement.

The Baggara, as nomadic Arab cattle herders, traditionally practiced slave raids primarily targeting African farming and village communities, whom they viewed as inferior and socially subordinate. These were a longstanding practice connected to the economic system and social hierarchy of the region, reinforced over centuries by warfare, raiding and trade.

Thus, the “enslavable” groups were primarily African ethnic groups living in Darfur’s southern and peripheral zones, typically those who were non-Arab and who had less political power or military strength, making them vulnerable to capture and enslavement by the Baggara.

In this, the Baggara are little different from the , who are spread across much of the Sahel, and who founded the in Niger and Nigeria, which had at least two million slaves when it was finally destroyed by Britain in 1903.

There is strong that the RSF has taken out and butchered men and women purely because of their race.

Why the war can’t be halted — level three

If the West really wanted to end the war, it could. But many nations are too engaged with the UAE to take on the powerful families who control the emirates.

The UAE’s western allies, particularly the United States and the UK, have made several significant commitments and promises to the UAE centered around security, economic partnership and technological cooperation:

— The UAE is a close and capable for the United States in the Arab world. This includes deployments alongside US forces in coalition counterterrorism, stabilization and peacekeeping missions, provision of logistical support for US troops, aircraft and naval vessels, and hosting joint training exercises.

— The UAE hosts the Joint Air Warfare Center and contributes to combating extremist groups like Al Qaeda and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as well as supporting a peaceful transition in Yemen and fighting terrorist finance networks.

— The US-UAE defense cooperation agreement, renewed for 15 years, includes the stationing of thousands of American soldiers and massive arms contracts to enhance the UAE’s military capabilities.

— France also remains a significant military ally with a base in Abu Dhabi and arms supply relationships.

— The UAE-US bilateral trade is robust, $34.4 billion in 2024, supporting over 161,000 US jobs in sectors like aviation, healthcare and infrastructure.

— The UAE remains committed to the , promoting peace and cooperation in the Middle East, while condemning terrorism and extremism. It has taken a firm stance supporting peace initiatives in the region, including for a ceasefire and humanitarian aid in Gaza.

Britain and the UAE also have long-standing security and defense collaborations. Since the of a Defence Cooperation Accord in 1996, their armed forces have worked closely to ensure stability in the Arabian Gulf region. The UK provides military training, defense technology and intelligence-sharing, which bolster the UAE’s security capabilities.

In summary, Western allies have promised strategic military support, deepened economic ties, advanced technological cooperation and sustained diplomatic backing aimed at regional stability and prosperity with the UAE as a central partner.

Putting these ties at risk to pressure the UAE into ending its support for the RSF appears implausible. For all of these reasons, it is difficult to see the war in Sudan ending: too many forces are involved and too many futures are at stake.

[Martin Plaut first published this piece on .]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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This isn’t a lack of seriousness. It’s a new kind of seriousness, an “unseriousness”. Generation Z isn’t just protesting power; they are trolling it into irrelevance.

Look at the imagery. In the 2025 Nepalese , imagery is the closest you’ll get to a uniform. In , as Gen Z demonstrators demand education reform and accountability, their social media is a blend of protest footage and pop culture. This isn’t a coincidence. It’s a deliberate signal.

Using anime and meme culture creates an immediate visual language that sets them apart from the political establishments they reject. They’re fighting for a they feel has been stolen.��

Radicalization through shared language

The methods used to radicalize this generation are the same methods they use to organize. The pipeline isn’t through dusty political pamphlets; it’s through TikTok think pieces, virality and coded discussions in Discord servers and Telegram channels.

This generation is digitally native and globally connected (RIP ). They see Nepal’s fight against a TikTok ban not as isolated but as part of the same struggle they’re waging in Morocco for education or in dozens of other countries for climate justice. Algorithms don’t respect borders, and neither does their solidarity, so even someone like me, who’s never seen One Piece, knows what that hat means or what the flag looks like.

They’re not radicalized by one ideology but by a shared experience of broken systems. The methods are the same because the medium is the message. A viral meme explaining complex policy is both education and a call to action. A shared anime screenshot signals alliance faster than any slogan. This decentralized, culturally fluid approach makes them incredibly resilient. You can’t erase an idea if it’s dressed as a cartoon.

Tactical frivolity as shield and weapon

This unseriousness is their smartest tactic. When Moroccan youth stage a sit-in, they frame it with the same humor they use online. Nepalese protesters recreated couples’ trends in the midst of smoke. 

This does two things. First, it shields them psychologically. Facing police batons and a bleak future is crushing. Memes, music, shared aesthetics — they’re connections. They build community and keep morale alive under overwhelming pressure. “This is why we’re risking our lives to protest,” that the stakes are real, but they’re just being handled with jokes.

Second, it’s a weapon that confuses those in power. State security knows how to handle angry mobs but has no playbook for naked or dance challenges, so when violence starts, it looks absurd and unnecessary.��

The protesters aren’t just winning the streets; they’re winning the narrative by refusing to protest the way the state expects. Keep in mind, these are the same kids that dealt with recessions, school shootings and a whole pandemic. They’re told they are lazy and have it easy, and are often looked at as a joke, so they became the comedians, staging a global roast of the powerful. succeeded in forcing its now former President Andry Rajoelina to run away after facing crippling water and electricity shortages. has been in unrest since September, and built a revolution on Discord.

At the same time, Morocco’s Gen Z protesters, organized by an anonymous group called , used TikTok, Instagram and Discord to coordinate demands for education and healthcare reform. Their tactics spread to Kenya, Indonesia and the Philippines, decentralized, digitally coordinated, culturally rich and connected across borders. Why create a new game plan when those already worked?

The psychology of the frivolous fight

This shift runs deep. For a generation facing overlapping crises, old-school solemnity leads straight to burnout. Humor becomes a weaponized coping mechanism, a way to deal with the unbearable without being consumed.

It’s also a hard truth. In an attention economy, you must capture the algorithm to capture the moment. A grim speech might get a 15-second news clip. A brilliantly absurd street act or viral dance for a cause can garner a million views on TikTok. It’s a decentralized, self-spreading media strategy that old power structures can’t control.

The world is on fire. The old guard waits for a revolution that looks like those in history books, preparing for a fight of fists. But the new resistance wins with a dance. They’re proving the strongest way to challenge a broken system is to build a more compelling, more joyful world in its shadow.

[ edited this piece.]

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The founding of the UN

At the time of the UN’s founding, the post-World War II world order was dominated by a handful of victorious, allied nations that affirmed their status by fashioning a world order with themselves at the helm.

The UN Security Council, established in 1946, created a structured, formal mechanism to promote peace. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) the means to settle international disputes. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund the infrastructure to fund global development.

The UN has since expanded its mandate to include things like sustainable development, gender equality and inclusive governance to keep pace with global shifts in priorities. Despite this, the institution is not moving fast enough. And now, a mere 80 years later, it is time for a new structure.

The fractures and moral failings of the UN

Among international institutions, the UN’s name has near-mythic resonance. Yet, its ideals of global governance seldom translate into action, and the global superpowers at its helm are now beset by challenges.

US democracy is being dismantled at record . Hours after naming a new government, the French Prime Minister after less than a month on the job. By mid-October 2025, France has had Prime Ministers in two years, while the United Kingdom, still reeling from the fallout from Brexit, has seen Prime Ministers since it voted to leave the European Union.

The international structures were built on the assumption that a few leading nations would maintain order and stability, and are now, ironically, cracking under the weight of these same nations’ governance failures.

The UN Security Council’s veto power is a perfect manifestation of this. The UN instituted this mechanism to ensure the world’s superpowers refrained from warring with one another. But instead, it has become a legal contrivance that enables more powerful states to deny less powerful nations their sovereignty.

This imbalance of power is playing out in real time. For nearly two years now, we have watched as the United States measures to demand a ceasefire in Gaza. These actions are part of a larger historical pattern. Over the past five decades, the United States has over 50 Security Council resolutions critical of Israel. South Africa, on the other hand, has stepped up and the charge, bringing a case against �����������’s actions in Gaza to the ICJ.

The United States’ moral failing extends beyond the Security Council. In 2010, the United States abstained from on a UN resolution declaring water a human right — an act that evidenced an all-too-poignant truth: the current paradigm of the UN Security Council exists to buoy the material interests of the few and powerful. It is past time for the Security Council to reflect the true composition of all its 193 UN Member States.

Is the Global South the new future for the UN?

Earlier this year, the UN announced that, by 2026, major UN agencies like the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Women may to Nairobi, Kenya, signaling an end to the 80-year-long reign that the Global North has had over international institutions. And, as the veneer of Western liberalism begins to crumble under democratic backsliding, corruption, inequality and , maybe it is time.

Small Island Developing States have been on the frontlines of committing to a world with net-zero carbon. Meanwhile, the United States is on climate agreements, withdrawing grants and now refusing to acknowledge the existence of global warming. Our institutions’ constant capitulation to the short-termism of Western interests leaves us with systems so at odds with the values they purport to hold that the global order is now adrift.

The world is in the midst of the most conflicts since World War II, with a rudderless United States ceding its position of global leadership more each day. As the V-Dem Institute has asked so poignantly, has been trumped? If the measuring stick is the inability to act consequentially on climate change, gender equality and conflict, the answer is yes.

If the world’s major powers, with all their resources and might, cannot stand up and meet the myriad of crises befalling us, who will? The limited capacity of the UN and its Security Council impairs us all. A radical new architecture — whether inside the UN or beyond — will be needed for the future; let the Global South lead us into it.

[ edited this piece.]

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What are the Chagos Islands?

The Chagos Islands sit almost equidistant between Africa and Indonesia, directly south of India. This isolation, Vine explains, made them strategically appealing to imperial powers but devastating for their inhabitants. The largest island, Diego Garcia, now hosts one of the most important US military bases outside North America.

The islands were uninhabited until the late 18th century, when French settlers brought enslaved Africans from Madagascar and mainland Africa, followed by Indian indentured laborers. After the Napoleonic Wars, Britain took control of the territory, which remained tied to Mauritius until 1903. For generations, a small Creole-speaking population developed a self-sustaining society — until Cold War strategy intervened.

Strategic importance of Diego Garcia and UK-US takeover of Chagos

In 1965, Britain and the United States struck a secret agreement to build a base on Diego Garcia. The arrangement came with a $14 million payment — disguised as a military debt write-off — and the understanding that the local population would be removed. Between 1967 and 1973, British officials expelled roughly 1,500 Chagossians, forcing them onto ships bound for Mauritius and the Seychelles, an archipelago north of Madagascar.

Vine recounts how the US falsely told Congress that the islands had no permanent inhabitants. The displaced islanders were left destitute while the Pentagon built a massive air and naval complex on their homeland. This act of ethnic cleansing, carried out in secrecy, remains one of the darkest chapters in postwar Anglo-American relations.

For decades, Diego Garcia has served as a linchpin of US military operations, launching missions in the Gulf War, Afghanistan and Iraq. Singh notes that the island occupies a pivotal position in American strategy.

Vine challenges the claim that Diego Garcia is indispensable, arguing that national security is invoked reflexively with little evidence to support it. He adds that most conflicts launched from the island produced catastrophic consequences. Singh counters that some wars achieved their goals, but Vine identifies that even military success cannot erase the moral cost of war.

British vs. Chagossians

When the Chagossians sought justice, British authorities resisted fiercely. Their lawsuits were initially successful: In 2000, the High Court ruled their expulsion unlawful and recognized their right to return to all islands except Diego Garcia. Yet the government appealed, and in 2008, Britain’s House of Lords reversed the ruling.

Soon afterward, London announced a Marine Protected Area (MPA) across the archipelago, ostensibly for conservation. Leaked diplomatic cables later revealed that the MPA had been designed to prevent the Chagossians’ return — a cynical move that disguised political obstruction as environmentalism.

Despite decades of defeat, the Chagossians never gave up. Under leaders like Louis Olivier Bancoult and the Chagos Refugees Group, they organized protests, petitions and legal cases. Vine calls it a “David and Goliath story,” a small, impoverished community confronting two of the world’s most powerful states.

Their persistence paid off on February 9, 2019, when the International Court of Justice ruled that Britain’s 1965 separation of Chagos from Mauritius had been illegal. The UN General Assembly followed with a resolution demanding that the United Kingdom end its colonial administration. London, backed by Washington, ignored the verdict — showing, Vine says, the lingering arrogance of the empire.

Pro bono lawyers and resettlement plans

Behind this struggle stood a network of pro bono lawyers drawn to a simple moral case: a people unlawfully deprived of their homes. Their creativity turned a local injustice into a global precedent for decolonization and exposed how Cold War politics outlived their purpose.

After years of denial, on November 3, 2022, the UK announced it was reversing course. It began negotiating with Mauritius, culminating in a treaty transferring sovereignty while leasing Diego Garcia back to Britain for 99 years. The arrangement, backed by the US and India, marked what Singh calls a rare triumph of diplomacy and law.

Still, the treaty prevents Chagossians from resettling on Diego Garcia — a restriction Vine calls “a major flaw.” He points out that civilians live near other military bases and that large parts of the island are unoccupied. The agreement provides £45 million (over $60 million) for Chagossian welfare and £125 million (over $167 million) in development funds, but divided among 8,000 people, the payments are modest.

Resettlement studies suggest that rebuilding on smaller islands would be feasible. The possible industries would include fishing, coconut processing and ecotourism. Chagossians emphasize that they are the natural stewards of their environment and want to rebuild sustainably.

What’s next for Chagossians?

While the treaty marks a milestone, the fight for full justice continues. Some Chagossians support the sovereignty deal, hoping it will enable return and reconstruction. Others, wary of promises, demand an independent Chagossian administration or full Mauritian rights. Internal divisions, often reinforced by colonial manipulation, still complicate unity.

Vine concludes that the Chagos story is not just about geopolitics but about racism and the theft of a homeland. The British and American governments built a base for power projection; the Chagossians built a moral case for dignity. Their decades-long campaign has already changed international law, and they are determined to make sure it also changes their future.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Although Sharia law, an Islamic that outlines divinely ordained ethics for practicing Muslims, advocates for circumstantial Christian rights, some extremist groups understand it as justifying . Therefore, while the SAF’s present conflict with Commander Mohamed “Hemedti” Hamdan and his Rapid Support Forces (RSF) cannot be entirely blamed for the evident abuses of religious minorities, Al-Burham’s ignorance around why over have been attacked following the start of Sudan’s third civil war in April 2023 does warrant skepticism. Considering their nation has a population of around people, of which identify as Christian, implies this violent pattern may be more than coincidental.

Escalating violence and the erosion of religious freedom

The July 8 attack on the in Khartoum’s El-Haj Yousif district illustrated how vulnerable Christians have become. Witnesses vehicles belonging to SAF and police were present, allowing extremists to act with impunity. Since 2023, churches have been bombed in and , airstrikes have killed worshippers in Wad Madani and mobs have harassed communities in Shamaliya. Clerics warn that Christians are increasingly forced into secret gatherings, as the collapse of constitutional protections has in religious freedom achieved after Bashir’s removal.

The deterioration of religious rights is inseparable from the strengthening of Islamist militias allied with the SAF. such as the Al-Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade and the Sudan Shield Forces (SSF) openly reject peace efforts and embrace jihadist rhetoric. The Al-Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade, now estimated at 20,000 fighters, has integrated itself within SAF ranks while carrying out attacks on civilians, churches and even an International Committee of the Red Cross () convoy.��

Its leaders — many tied to the dissolved National Congress Party and Muslim Brotherhood networks — embody the return of Bashir-era Islamists under Burhan’s watch. Across contested areas like the Nuba Mountains, describe girls being raped, boys abducted to be trained as fighters and villages terrorized for their Christian identity.

International organizations have warned that these attacks not only threaten Sudanese minorities but also obstruct peace negotiations. Both ACT Alliance and Caritas Internationalis that global aid cuts and unchecked impunity are pushing Sudan further from reconciliation. The bishops of Sudan and South Sudan have likewise called for the primacy of human life, restraint and dialogue, though their pleas remain unanswered.

In fact, the Al-Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade, known for similar since the third Sudanese civil war began, is rumored to contain from now-dissolved al-Bashir loyalist organizations like the Popular Defence Forces and National Congress Party, respectively. Should these articulation politics go on appeased, so too will rage a slow battle for Sudan’s religious freedom. These issues have no simple solution; all we can do is pray for peace to find all parties as soon as possible. Hopefully, someone will hear our cry.

[ edited this piece.]

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With a production forecast expected to top 288.2 billion Birr ($200.8 billion), Ethiopia faces a decisive choice: steward the world’s irreplaceable Arabica gene pool into a high-value national industry or remain a low-margin raw-bean supplier.

Coffee as a strategic national asset

The underpinning that urgency are stark. Ethiopia is Africa’s coffee producer and, in the marketing year 2025/26, production is forecast to roughly 11.6 million 60-kg bags (~694,000 tonnes), with exports projected to climb to nearly 7.8 million bags as direct-export reforms take hold.��

Exports have surged: in the first ten months of Fiscal Year (FY) 2024/25, Ethiopia shipped some 5.9 million bags and earned about $1.87 billion — an 87% revenue rise year-on-year — and if current trends , coffee exports will $2 billion for the year. These are not just good headlines; they are the hard currency and rural incomes on which millions of households depend.��

Yet the sector’s remarkable potential coexists with systemic . Most production is , smallholder-based and sold as green beans. The average yield is much lower than in Latin America, and there’s very little processing or added value done locally. The vast majority of farms (some 4–4.5 million households) operate on tiny plots and capture a low share of the final retail dollar, while around 40–50% of output is consumed (a cultural boon that complicates export policy).��

Climate change, pests such as coffee leaf rust, aging trees and limited access to improved planting material . Ethiopia’s current yield profile and infrastructure gaps mean the country risks becoming a growing raw material supplier rather than the coffee world’s arbiter of quality and price.

Another threat is regulatory: the global move towards “greening” supply chains is both inevitable and uneven. New EU rules and private-sector traceability create what ODI Global (a global affairs think tank) terms a “green squeeze”, where smallholders in least-developed countries are exposed to trade barriers they cannot meet unless receiving targeted support.��

If Ethiopia cannot demonstrate traceability and deforestation-free sourcing at scale, buyers may favor origins, which could lead to shrinking market access and harm rural livelihoods. This could leave Ethiopian smallholders excluded from key markets unless they receive targeted support to meet these new sustainability and traceability standards.��

This is a global policy problem, but it has a local remedy. There needs to be public action to meet international standards, not retreat from them. 

A “coffee lighthouse” strategy

If the challenge is threefold, then the policy response should be integrated and ambitious. Ethiopia needs a national “Coffee Lighthouse” strategy that conservation, science, value-addition and tourism under one institutional roof. The lighthouse is both literal and programmatic: a flagship Coffee Observatory and Cultural Centre, located near Kafa and linked to research hubs in Jimma and Addis Ababa, would host germplasm banks, cupping labs, processing demonstration units and visitor facilities.��

It would be a hub where new coffee are developed and shared with farmers. Smallholders would get better seedlings, training and access to modern processing facilities. That model is already feasible. Ethiopia’s research institutions have dozens of improved Arabica cultivars, and a World Coffee Research partnership signals scope for accelerated breeding and quality trials.��

Complementary measures must be policy-tight and financing-clear. First, policymakers need to scale up public research and development (R&D) efforts to at least match those of global peers. Ethiopia’s agricultural R&D intensity is and must rise to support varietal improvement, pest resistance and post-harvest processing. Second, Ethiopia needs to expand access to processing and roasting through incentives, such as tax breaks, concessional loans and public-private co-investments. This is so that a larger share of exports leaves the country as high-value roasted and specialty products.��

Third, Ethiopia should pursue fast-track traceability and sustainability programs with donor support and market partners to meet the European Union Deforestation Regulation and buyer standards. International climate finance and trade facilitation funds should be explicitly harnessed to underwrite smallholder compliance. Fourth, the country needs to invest in rural tourism and coffee cultural branding. UNESCO’s current move to register the coffee ceremony creates an entry point for a coordinated coffee-tourism route that directs tourist dollars to producer communities. 

There is precedent for impact at scale. Ethiopia’s Commodity Exchange and reforms direct exporters that market architecture matters. Better market institutions link farmers to buyers and improve price transmission (though much remains to be done to ensure equity and access for remote micro-producers).

Learning from those institutional gains, the Coffee Lighthouse should coordinate across ministries, including the agriculture, trade, tourism, and education ministries, and international partners (World Coffee Research, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), UN agencies, donors and private roasters) into concrete workstreams. A coffee science faculty at Jimma University, tied to practical demonstration farms and an industry fellowship scheme, could produce the technical cadre Ethiopia needs.��

The Coffee Lighthouse should be governed by a multi-stakeholder steering committee chaired by the Ministry of Agriculture. It should representatives from the Ethiopian Coffee & Tea Authority (ECTA), Jimma and Addis research centers, private exporters, cooperatives and donor partners. A dedicated technical secretariat would manage investments, monitor progress and support market linkages.

Finally, policy must respect coffee’s social meaning. Coffee ceremonies and the country’s unique flavor typologies are not marketing frippery; they are national capital. Packaging culture with science, such as UNESCO , curated coffee routes, agritourism lodges and museum-grade visitor centers, will raise brand equity and extend tourist stays into rural Ethiopia.��

That cultural enhancement must be designed to channel revenues back to cooperatives and women-led enterprises, avoiding elite capture. The goal is structural: move Ethiopian coffee from being a vast raw basket to a diversified, resilient, high-value industry that employs, exports and teaches the world.

Momentum and the leadership imperative

Ethiopia’s window is open. exports, robust producer interest and growing specialty demand create favorable momentum. Global genomics research points to opportunities for breeding resilience into Arabica, and international development institutions are prepared to support transitions to greener markets. But momentum will dissipate without leadership.

Furthermore, a Coffee Lighthouse isn’t vanity.  It is a strategic tool to protect genetic heritage, support livelihoods, meet new market regulations and increase the share of the coffee dollar domestically. For a nation whose culture, ecology and economy are so closely connected to the bean, this is the policy mission of a generation.

[ edited this piece.]

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According to a report, up to 30% of children ages 12-18 in Kenya’s coastal areas of Malindi, Mombasa, Kalifi and Diani are involved in transactional sex with tourists. While this figure is outdated, reporting by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and journalists suggests that child sexual exploitation remains endemic, particularly in areas popular with tourists.��

Kenya’s sex trafficking crisis

Coastal communities in Kenya are among the country’s poorest, despite their popularity with European tourists. While tourism has brought some employment opportunities to the area, significant earnings have not trickled down to locals, maintaining the region’s impoverished state. 

Such poverty, coupled with a relatively high level of social normalization, increases the local children’s vulnerability to exploitation. For instance, the states that many children will first sell sex in bars to local men and from there will enter the tourist market, meaning that exploitation often begins locally before extending to foreigners as demand increases during the high season.

For the children, few avenues exist to provide psychological, financial or social support. While a handful of provide critical aid to victims and work to combat exploitation, the issue overwhelms their resources. At the same time, state-level prevention, enforcement and accountability mechanisms are underdeveloped. While training includes a brief section on children’s rights, there is usually no subsequent refresher,and pursuing wealthy foreign offenders in particular remains a pertinent issue.��

Meanwhile, European governments frequently fail to hold their citizens accountable for crimes committed abroad. For example, while the Swiss government the “Campaign to Protect Children and Youth against Sexual Exploitation Tourism” in 2010, the project focused more on raising awareness than on genuine governmental cooperation to facilitate convictions of offenders. Yet amid this governance gap, a promising infrastructure is emerging through bilateral agreements.

Bilateral agreements: flawed, yet promising

In 2024, Germany and Kenya a Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement (MMPA), one of several such bilateral agreements developed as part of European states’ external migration agendas. These agreements are designed to manage migration flows, address European labor shortages, and facilitate the return of unauthorized migrants. Crucially, they represent a growing form of interstate cooperation that brings together legal, political and development tools under a shared framework of responsibility.

Within these agreements, there is often some reference to addressing human trafficking, but it is usually limited to labor exploitation. Since tourism falls outside of the scope of MMPAs, they do not acknowledge the link between international tourism and child sexual abuse, let alone develop or propose concrete measures to combat it. Yet, greater labor migration and interstate cooperation between the two states will likely also increase tourism flows. 

Currently, Germans are the group of European tourists visiting Kenya, after the British. As diplomatic ties strengthen and mobility increases between the two countries, the risk of predatory behavior emerging without sufficient oversight also grows. Although the MMPA between Kenya and Germany is not specifically centered on tourism, it already stresses combating human trafficking and exploitation. Thus, these clauses could be expanded to include child protection measures.

For instance, the MMPAs provide mechanisms for cross-border law enforcement cooperation, which could also be adapted to include joint investigations into child sex tourism cases, information-sharing protocols about suspected offenders and mutual legal assistance agreements that enable prosecution across jurisdictions. 

Additionally, MMPAs offer a regularized diplomatic platform that requires consistent communication between state representatives. This could institutionalize discussions on child sexual exploitation and ensure political accountability. Interstate cooperation on this issue is not merely desirable; it is necessary. The crimes against children span borders, involving higher-income perpetrators from one country and lower-income victims in another. 

Without bilateral structures to close legal and enforcement gaps, the result is near-total impunity. In the current framework, European states have little political incentive to prosecute their citizens, while may hesitate to prosecute foreigners for fear of destabilizing the profitable tourism industry. Bilateral migration partnerships, backed by mutual interest and regular coordination, offer a path through this stalemate.

The precedence of bilateral cooperation for child sexual exploitation 

Using bilateral cooperation to counter child sexual exploitation has some precedents. For instance, have ratified international commitments to counter child sex tourism. Additionally, of the Canadian Criminal Code provides extraterritorial jurisdiction to Canadian authorities to convict tourists exploiting children abroad.��

Theoretically, this means Canadian tourists are held accountable for their crimes, although in practice, convictions . However, the cases that resulted in successful prosecutions were the product of effective cooperation between the Thai and Canadian authorities through legal assistance and extradition treaties.

The MMPA between Germany and Kenya lays the foundation for similar collaboration, with the potential for higher conviction rates if applied effectively. of the MMPA outlines that areas for cooperation between the states will include “preventing and combatting forced labor, exploitation of labor, and human trafficking as well as protecting victims.” Following the Canadian-Thai model, this clause could be expanded to specifically include child sexual exploitation, as not only is it an illegal form of labor, but it also usually involves trafficking.

The German-Kenyan agreement presents a compelling case study, but the challenges and opportunities are far broader. The expanding network of MMPAs and similar bilateral agreements by European states creates the foundational governance infrastructure necessary to tackle transnational child sexual exploitation.

What is now required is a political vision to extend their mandate. These agreements already consolidate multiple domains, including labor, development, return and capacity-building, under a shared framework. Embedding child protection into this framework would reorient existing tools towards a more holistic understanding of human protection.

Europe cannot credibly present itself as a responsible actor in global migration governance and bilateral cooperation while turning a blind eye to the harms committed by its citizens abroad. Equally, African states, eager to benefit from international tourism, should not be forced to accept child exploitation as a trade-off. 

[ edited this piece.]

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Independent field investigations summary executions in villages and towns, house-to-house gang rapes and widespread looting of homes, hospitals and World Food Program (WFP) warehouses. These are patterns that indicate organized combat units operating with command awareness rather than random acts committed by undisciplined fighters.

A human toll that is stark and verifiable 

In the Chenna Teklehaymanot area, investigators and local hospital teams documented roughly 120 to 125 corpses after a five-day occupation in late August through early September 2021. Human Rights Watch () and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission () reported multiple extrajudicial executions there, while Amnesty dozens of sexual assaults in and around the same period.

In Kobo, on September 9, 2021, investigators at least two dozen summary executions and numerous additional killings discovered in mass graves. Amnesty and HRW fieldwork that victims were executed in and around schools and homes. By late October, in Kombolcha, reports more than 100 young men taken from communities and killed during a brief occupation. Additionally, the UN and WFP confirmed a large quantity of humanitarian food stocks were , forcing the suspension of life-saving distributions in Kombolcha and nearby Dessie.

Sexual and gender-based violence was not marginal but pervasive. Amnesty’s field teams dozens of gang-rape accounts in multiple towns, with one locality reporting between 71 and 73 women raped during a ten-day occupation. Medical interviews recorded severe physical injuries and repeated accounts of assaults carried out in the presence of children and family members. These repeated, ethnically charged abuses — described by survivors as part of a campaign of humiliation and theft — carry the hallmarks of when considered in aggregate.

Multiple domestic and international bodies have concluded that serious violations occurred on a significant scale. Reporting and the joint ������–O����� enquiry on extrajudicial killings, sexual violence and large-scale looting across Amhara and Afar in 2021. The UN’s successive expert reviews have likewise there were “reasonable grounds to believe” different parties committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in the conflict.

These parallel findings matter: they establish a credible evidentiary baseline that any transitional justice architecture must address.

Uneven public narrative and policy response

Global coverage has often foregrounded the siege of Tigray and the suffering there, rightly so, while paying comparatively less attention to the contemporaneous atrocities inflicted on Amhara civilians during the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) advance. These reporting imbalances risk skewing accountability and undermining reconciliation. Survivors in Amhara require the same truth, reparation and protection as survivors in Tigray. The records and corroborated by independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and UN offices make clear that recognition and remedy cannot be selective.

From a legal and policy perspective, Ethiopia’s obligations are . Domestic law criminalizes murder, rape and looting, and Ethiopia is party to key international treaties — including the and covenants — that prohibit targeting civilians and pillaging and attacking healthcare or humanitarian operations.

Customary international law and the jurisprudence of international tribunals that widespread or systematic attacks on civilians can amount to crimes against humanity, and that pillaging humanitarian supplies and sexual enslavement of civilians are . These are not just abstract technicalities; they define the minimum threshold for any credible justice architecture.

The road to justice in Amhara

Policy for Addis Ababa and the international community are urgent and practical. First, Ethiopia must ensure genuinely independent, well-resourced investigations into the most serious incidents in Amhara, including Chenna, Kobo and Kombolcha, and make findings public subject to due process. The Pretoria Peace Agreement’s explicit to craft a comprehensive national transitional justice policy provides a legitimate vehicle for such investigations. Still, domestic design must incorporate international best practices and third-party verification to secure credibility.

Second, transitional justice must be . This means providing safe mechanisms for testimony, prompt medical and psychosocial assistance for survivors (especially sexual-violence survivors), urgent reparations for material loss (including replacement of looted humanitarian stocks and restitution where practicable) and legal aid for prosecutions.��

Donors and UN agencies should prioritize funding for survivor services and forensic and investigative capacities that preserve evidence for future prosecutions. The suspension of WFP distributions after the Kombolcha looting why protecting humanitarian supply chains must be part of accountability and relief planning.

Third, the international community should adopt a calibrated mix of engagement and conditionality that supports national justice while keeping external incentives aligned with accountability. Where national mechanisms falter or are credibly partial, the AU, the UN, the Human Rights Council and willing states should be prepared to hybrid judicial options or international cooperation regarding prosecutions and evidence preservation.

The aim should not be the punitive marginalization of Ethiopia, but a pragmatic program that ensures nonimpunity while bolstering domestic rule of law. The of mandates for UN expert bodies in the past underscores the danger of political drift when the international community fails to coordinate sustained oversight.

Fourth, reconciliation a concerted narrative and civic strategy to counter hate speech and ethnic scapegoating. Policymakers must invest in community-level dialogue, support traditional dispute resolution mechanisms where appropriate and reform media and education to reduce the political currency of dehumanizing rhetoric. Prosecutions alone will not rebuild social trust. The must therefore criminal accountability with truth-telling, memorialization and institutional reforms that address the root drivers of violent identity politics.

Finally, practical safeguards for humanitarian action are nonnegotiable. Humanitarian agencies operating in conflict zones must have firm guarantees of safety, rapid reporting and secure logistics. Donor nations should require incident investigations and security improvements as a condition of resumed large-scale programming when looting or intimidation disrupts life-saving assistance.��

The Kombolcha suspension was not merely a logistical problem. It was a humanitarian catastrophe that could have been with stronger protective measures and rapid international engagement.��

Ethiopia’s long-term stability depends on inclusive politics of accountability and recognition. The Amhara atrocities of 2021–22 — as documented in the file and corroborated by , , and reporting — are an inescapable part of the country’s recent history and must be addressed with the same seriousness afforded to other victims of the conflict. A balanced, transparent justice process that protects survivors, prosecutes the guilty and invests in social repair offers the only plausible path to a stable, multiethnic Ethiopia in which “never again” applies to everyone.

[edited this piece.]

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This transformation has not emerged in isolation. This is not just the result of governance failures, but of historical grievances rooted in colonial legacies, the spread of jihadist ideology through regional conflicts, the repeated failure of external actors to adapt their strategies to local dynamics and of narrow geopolitical interests. The US, turning a blind eye to the security vacuum in Sahel, is making the same mistake it made in Afghanistan.

The colonial echoes

The Sahel region was colonized by France in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, significantly shaping its development. The French solely on resource extraction and exploitation, neglecting its governance. When they drew the borders of the Sahel, they drew them arbitrarily, dividing ethnic groups across different countries and weakening national cohesion.��

After independence in 1960, frustration grew among nomadic and tribal groups as the already limited governance began to fail, marking the start of extremism and rebellion. This rebellion and violent tendencies escalated when the Sahel was hit by famine and (especially the 1968-73 drought), and escalated further in the 1980s, with issues such as banditry, kidnapping, extortion and the killing of French citizens.

The beginning of jihad in the Sahel 

The Sahel region practiced moderate Sufi Islam, but the North African region soon saw the first signs of jihadi conflict — specifically the outbreak of the Algerian civil war in 1991, when the government out of fear that Islamist forces might gain power.��

Islamist forces quickly capitalized on growing public disillusionment with the state, leading to the creation of radicalized armed groups. The military’s intervention and subsequent coup escalated the conflict into a civil war, creating a political vacuum that enabled Islamist groups to establish a foothold. 

Concurrently, in 1992, Osama Bin Laden relocated to Sudan, where he set up Al-Qaeda’s training camps and business operations. This move signaled Al-Qaeda’s growing interest in the region and its strategic potential. The of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania underscored how North and East Africa had become increasingly integrated into Al-Qaeda’s transnational agenda.

By 2007, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group had pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and rebranded itself as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (). From there, AQIM expanded southward into Mali and Niger, using smuggling and banditry to finance its terror activities. This southward shift gained further momentum after the 9/11 attacks, as the US-led war on terror displaced jihadist networks from the Middle East and South Asia, pushing them to seek new bases of operation in regions like the Sahel — where porous borders and unstable governments offered strategic opportunity.

As the mid-2000s approached, a distinct jihadist landscape had begun to take shape in the Sahel, one that would be further reinforced after the of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 2011.

Expansion of the jihadi landscape

The fall of Gaddafi created a political and security vacuum that Al-Qaeda was quick to exploit, especially in Mali. With the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime, significant of weapons spilled into the region.��

Among those freed were Tuareg who had served as mercenaries under Gaddafi. These fighters later aligned with AQIM, strengthening Al-Qaeda. Their alliance was further shaped by the Tuaregs’ separatist desire for autonomy in Mali’s Azawad region, sparking a rebellion in 2012 that quickly took on a militant Islamist character.��

By April that year, Islamist forces had seized control of key northern cities in Mali, marking a fresh surge in jihadist activity across the region.

Consolidation of  the jihadist wave 

By 2013, Western governments began acknowledging the growing terrorist threat in the Sahel. France launched to oust jihadist groups from northern Mali. The mission succeeded in dislodging militants from major urban areas — but it pushed them deeper into the countryside and across national borders, allowing them to regroup and destabilize the region more.��

France followed this with between 2014 and 2022, aimed at regional stabilization. But progress stalled. French troops encountered resistance not just from insurgents, but from local populations with deep-seated resentment linked to France’s . As these military interventions struggled to deliver long-term security, political instability, poverty and governance failures deepened, creating conditions that Islamist groups readily exploited to recruit and radicalize.

A dangerous convergence: jihadist unity and coups

ISIS made its into the Sahel in 2015, prompting a breakaway faction from AQIM to pledge allegiance and form the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). Two years later, Al-Qaeda responded by consolidating its presence. AQIM merged with Ansar al-Dine and al-Mourabitoun to form Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a powerful group that is now the behind jihadist operations in the region.

The political environment further deteriorated from 2020 onwards, as swept through the Sahel, weakening already fragile governments. These conditions enabled ISGS and Al-Qaeda to entrench themselves further.��

As criminal activities increased, these terror groups adopted banditry with jihadist motives, creating what is called “”, encouraging criminal groups to adopt jihadist ideologies and migrate into terrorism. This has significantly bolstered Al-Qaeda and ISIS’s presence in the Sahel in recent years.��

The consequences have been staggering: in 2023, Sahel accounted for of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide, a number that grew to in 2024. Burkina Faso alone recorded fatalities in 2022, making it the world’s most terror-affected country.

Narrow geopolitics and limited attention 

Africa has steadily become central to global geopolitics and geoeconomics, particularly due to its of rare earth minerals and gold. Yet, in the Sahel, these resources remain largely untapped, overshadowed by an entrenched security crisis and volatile political environment.��

After France’s military withdrawal, the region saw the arrival of Russia’s , a private mercenary or paramilitary force. The Sahel’s military juntas welcomed Wagner for the short-term promise of security support and the political leverage it offered through alignment with Moscow. However, Wagner’s presence has not translated into lasting stability. Its activities have remained largely focused on securing Russian interests and gold mining operations, rather than providing a serious or coordinated response to the region’s security challenges.��

Despite the presence of Russian forces and the persistence of jihadist activity, the United States has kept the Sahel at a strategic priority.

Washington has avoided deeper engagement, the absence of a direct or immediate national security threat. But a primary reason is that the US likely considers involvement in African conflicts risky, given its haunting past with the Somali crisis, where it faced one of its biggest failures: . But the operation failed due to overconfident and patterned operational planning with a lack of contingency and strong communication on the ground, none of which are unavoidable in future operations.�� 

During the 90s, Sahel did not emerge as a direct threat, and the US focus remained on security issues in East Africa and Al-Qaeda. 

However, the Sahel region has gradually become a direct threat to the US after the 2011 Libyan , and the threat increased greatly by 2017, when ISIS cadres in Africa gained strength. The 2017 Tongo Tongo in Niger, where ISGS fighters killed four US Special Forces soldiers, underscored the growing threat to US personnel in the region.��

The apprehension was echoed by General , head of US Africa Command, who warned in 2024 that Sahel-based terrorist groups could develop the capacity to strike the US homeland if left unchecked.

While the US did maintain a surveillance and reconnaissance in Niger for some time, this was withdrawn in 2024, alongside France’s broader . The departure of Western forces, combined with Russia’s limited effectiveness, has left a fragile security landscape in which terror groups are once again finding space to operate.

A recurring blind spot in US counterterrorism

The United States’ counterterrorism strategy has repeatedly failed to anticipate the evolution of jihadist networks, particularly when they have emerged from outside conventional theaters of war.

The 1998 embassy bombings were orchestrated from Afghanistan, exploiting a blind spot in US regional threat assessments; the US grossly underestimated Al-Qaeda’s transnational reach. Similarly, during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s, the alignment between Algerian Islamist factions and Al-Qaeda to form a secret jihadist revolution in Africa went largely unacknowledged by US intelligence, despite clear that they were building contacts with the global terror network. In Somalia, the US once again the regional Islamist force, Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, while focusing on humanitarian operations. This misjudgment contributed to the emergence of Al-Shabaab, now a dominant Al-Qaeda affiliate in East Africa.��

The list doesn’t end here; the US also failed to act when ideological convergence between jihadist groups and narcotics cartels grew in Colombia (a country with which it shares strong security cooperation on narcotics issues), which led to cartel bombings in 1998. A now sustains Al-Qaeda’s operations in the Sahel, with JNIM heavily depending on a drug smuggling network.��

Yet, Washington’s strategic assessments have continued to downplay this growing narco-terror convergence.

The threat of resurgence is now common; the real danger is that terror groups are acquiring the capabilities necessary for transnational terror attacks. Without a shift in strategic posture — one that moves beyond narrow geopolitical interests and accounts for the full complexity of threats — another major wave of global jihadists may be inevitable.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Following the overthrow of government in 2019, SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his followers claimed that Sudanese Prime Minister had a to lead in Bashir’s place, allied with the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated National Congress Party (). As of 2023, the US the SAF for detainee torture, humanitarian aid interference, civilian mistreatment, starvation and chemical weapon proliferation. RFS leader Mohamed “Hamedti” Hamdan Daglo, considering these ongoing abuses, has emphasized that Sudan deserves its own , as life there is becoming increasingly difficult.

This infighting has gone on over 14 million people, 3.3 million of whom have inadvertently threatened neighboring country stability by fleeing across the Sudanese tri-border region into Libya, Chad and Egypt. While RSF elements have recently taken of the Libya-Sudan boundary, eager to stop via its roots, worsening tensions between Israel and Iran only further complicate their effort. If Sudanese allies go on between the SAF and Tehran, bloodshed from all parties could extend as far as the , leaving every nation in the Horn of Africa a victim to violence.��

or sanctions alone, therefore, may not deliver Sudan what peace it deserves. The African Union, US and UK must use more active diplomatic measures to bring al-Burham and Hemedti together as soon as possible. If these leaders cannot find common ground soon, hope for the Sudanese is all but uncertain.��

[ edited this piece.]

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Jazz, empire and the Cold War

To protest Lumumba’s assassination, jazz drummer Max Roach and his wife, singer Abbey Lincoln, in a demonstration at the United Nations in New York. Soundtrack reaches its crescendo when Max Roach and Abbey Lincoln perform “Freedom,” as protesters storm the United Nations Palace shortly after news of Lumumba’s assassination breaks.

Soundtrack to a Coup d’État brilliantly examines how jazz artists became involved in the Cold War and the CIA’s geopolitical agendas. Grimonprez’s captivating documentary uses Patrice Lumumba’s assassination as a starting point for an electrifying of jazz politics in the 1950s and 1960s — a vital chapter in history: the process of decolonization. It offers a dynamic account of , colonialism and the larger Afro-Asian struggles of the era.��

The film presents a breathtaking, idea-packed journey that links American jazz to the complexities of geopolitical scheming. This is more than just a — it exposes the Cold War and the brutal legacy of African colonialism.

The film explicitly shows how the CIA used unwitting jazz musicians as distractions to obscure political meddling in countries around the globe — including legends like Louis Armstrong, Dizzy Gillespie and Nina Simone. It also tells the remarkable story of Andrée Blouin — Lumumba’s adviser, speechwriter and a women’s rights activist. The Italian newspaper ��’A������Ծ����� recently published an remembering how Lumumba appointed Blouin as his top adviser when he formed his short-lived post-independence government in 1960.��

To Western diplomats and journalists, her presence in the government signaled Congo’s alleged turn toward communism. A few years earlier, she had with the leader of the Guinean Democratic Party, Ahmed Sékou Touré’s, independence movement from France. At the time, she was seen as “a beautiful but also dangerous woman, perhaps the most dangerous woman in all of Africa,” as The New York Times , quoting a Belgian official. The international press even suggested she was “the courtesan of African heads of state.”

Grimonprez a frenetic editing style, presenting history as a scribbled manuscript filled with footnotes and quotations, lending the film a satisfying visual and stylistic eccentricity. In tackling such a delicate subject, he makes a brilliant choice: he intertwines history with the story of jazz, starting with two equally important elements — the United States’ use of jazz as an ambassador of American culture (sending musicians like Louis Armstrong to perform abroad, including in Congo during that time), and jazz’s role in the Afro-American civil rights movement and its support for African liberation. Through this evocative framing device, Grimonprez constructs a fascinating Soundtrack to a Coup d’État, telling a story through music that must not be forgotten.

Lumumba, Congo and the global stakes of decolonization

Indeed, one of the film’s central themes is the strategic deployment of jazz and Black American jazz musicians as instruments in the US imperial arsenal. Dizzy Gillespie toured the Middle East in 1956 to honor the Shah of Iran. He , “I would be a better emissary than Kissinger.” Later, Louis Armstrong traveled to the Congo to perform for thousands — a concert that served as a smokescreen while the CIA plotted Lumumba’s assassination.

Soundtrack decolonization, neo-imperialism, cultural and economic exploitation and political murder. Centered on the former Belgian Congo, the film blends news clips, TV broadcasts, home movies and headlines into a dense collage, with jazz — both American and African alike — providing the tempo. This gloomy yet exhilarating history lesson opens with the percussive fanfare of legendary bebop pioneer and bandleader Max Roach.��

Its chronology begins with the held in Indonesia in 1955. That event brought together leaders of newly independent nations from Africa and Asia — including Egypt’s Nasser, India’s Nehru, Indonesia’s Sukarno and China’s Zhou Enlai — and established a new international order of non-aligned countries.

In an interview, Grimonprez , “This took four or five years of research, and the editing was four years.” He recounts several unexpected findings, such as the role of William Burden, whom the US appointed as ambassador to Brussels shortly before Congo’s independence. Burden had close ties with CIA Director Allen Dulles. In audio memoirs featured in the film, Burden says, “Belgium is toying with the idea of assassinating Lumumba, and I think it wouldn’t be a bad idea either.” He continues, “Patrice Lumumba was such a damn nuisance, it was pretty obvious to go for a political assassination.”

The film at the Sundance Film Festival in the US at the beginning of 2024, sparking growing interest. Grimonprez compiles a remarkable archive of Cold War-era documents. His documentary features figures like Patrice Lumumba — Congo’s independence leader — and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, who championed a United States of Africa alongside leaders like Nasser, Nehru and other voices from the non-aligned movement.��

The film alternates their voices with those of Western and Eastern leaders, prominently featuring Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. One scene shows Khrushchev his shoe on the UN desk, seizing global attention. During those UN sessions, Africa took center stage alongside debates about the roles of international powers and major mining companies, which were determined to block Congo’s independence and Lumumba’s nationalist vision.��

As the film reminds us, Congo the uranium used for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. The US had no intention of letting this strategic resource fall into Soviet hands. Today, Congo remains rich in cobalt, coltan and other minerals essential for electronics, electric vehicles and the global energy transition.

In discussing the UN, Grimonprez the story of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. “He’s a person who is suffering, and you can read it in his face. In the General Assembly, the Global South community was pushing for a United Nations force against the colonial powers. Hammarskjöld was siding with the Global South. But he had his back against the wall. And the United Kingdom and the United States were both threatening to withdraw their funding.” He continues, “An important source for the film was Ludo De Witte’s The Assassination of Patrice Lumumba, published in 1999. He was able to gather a lot of evidence in United Nations cables and Belgian correspondence that pointed to the fact that, indeed, Dag Hammarskjöld was complicit and involved in the downfall of Lumumba, as was the Belgian monarchy.”

The legacy of a revolution — and its soundtrack

In 1960, when Belgian authorities a roundtable on Congo’s decolonization in Brussels, Congolese politicians demanded Lumumba’s release before independence. Congolese musicians celebrated this moment. While staying at the Plaza Hotel, they “Independence Cha Cha” — a song that quickly became an anthem of liberation across Africa.

On June 30, 1960, Congo declared independence. Lumumba colonial and Western interests, sealing his fate and that of the nation. At Léopoldville’s Palais des Nations, a packed hall of Congolese and foreign dignitaries listened first to King Baudouin, who paternalistically recalled Leopold II’s colonization of Congo. Next up was Joseph Kasa-Vubu — the first president of an independent Congo — who spoke calmly, and then Lumumba took the stage.

Facing Belgium’s king, Lumumba , “Our wounds are still too fresh and too painful to be driven from our memory. We have known sarcasm and insults, endured suffering and torture. We are proud of the struggle that led us to this moment.” He reminded the world that the Congolese did not receive freedom as a gift — they fought for it.

Lumumba’s bold speech accused Belgians of racism, theft and oppression. Days later, the army , Belgian settlers fled, Katanga seceded and Lumumba traveled to New York to address the UN. US President Eisenhower refused to meet him. Instead, through Ambassador William Burden, he gave tacit approval to act against Lumumba. In early September, Lumumba Kasa-Vubu, who had just fired him. UN troops arrived, and Army Chief of Staff Joseph Mobutu seized power, dissolved the government and placed Lumumba under house arrest — leading to his eventual assassination.

Soundtrack to a Coup d’État offers a powerful historical analysis of the early years of African independence and the brutal machinery of Western imperialism. America’s interest in the Global South during the Cold War needs little explanation. What makes Grimonprez’s work so compelling is how it shows that American emissaries of art and culture acted as influential tools of empire, as effective as any spy network or military intervention.

“ most of the film takes place in the halls of power and explores covert espionage against the newly independent Congo, Soundtrack’s final message functions as a rallying call for global mass mobilization. Better late than never.”

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I joined Ocean Viking in mid-April. In the following weeks, we conducted four rescue operations, saving a total of 234 people. Survivors shared harrowing accounts of torture, forced labor, and sexual abuse in Libya.

Talking to survivors onboard, it became clear that an inhumane and profitable system operates with protection in many parts of Libya. Extortion and torture are common elements in the process of obtaining freedom. Many survivors reported being forced to work long hours without pay. A masked man entered their rooms daily and forced them to call their families to demand money. The message was simple: no money, no freedom.

For years, Libya has served as a key transit point for people seeking safety in Europe. Many begin their journey in other countries, misled by the promise that a boat from Libya will take them directly to Italy. That promise is false.

Once in Libya, migrants are frequently captured by militias or organized groups. These groups extort, torture, and enslave them. Survivors described widespread rape, arbitrary detention, sexual slavery, and murder. Both militias and state-affiliated groups participate in these abuses.

Since 2014, more than 31,000 migrants have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. It remains the deadliest migration route in the world. In the Central Mediterranean, where state-led rescue operations are largely absent, civilian ships conduct most rescues. Instead of support, many face criminal charges for their efforts.

A man who asked to be called “Lamunn” said he had applied for visas in Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy several times, but never received a response. Armed men in Libya forced him to witness sexual assaults and subjected him to repeated rape. After going three days without water, he asked for some — but because he didn’t speak the local language, the guards beat him. “Trauma is the only word,” he said. “I would rather die at sea than spend another day in Libya.”

Rebecca, Medical Team Leader for SOS Méditerranée, said, “Part of my role onboard is not only to provide medical care but to support people psychologically. Sometimes it’s through basic psychological first aid. Sometimes we connect them to organizations on land that can give them the long-term support they need. To see people withdraw into themselves and disassociate from the world — because that is their only refuge — is devastating. We do what we can while they are with us, if only to show that there is still kindness and a gentle touch.”

Rebecca added, “In four years of work onboard, I have seen many survivors of the brutal conditions in Libya. The scars are not only on the body — unhealed wounds, burns, broken bones — but also in the mind.”

The United Nations report Abuse Behind Bars: Arbitrary and unlawful detention in Libya, published in April 2018, concluded that thousands of people are held in unlawful detention by armed groups, including state-affiliated groups. These people are routinely tortured, raped, and enslaved.

Libya’s detention system is designed to profit from human suffering. Its network reaches across borders. In Libya, authorities allow this system to persist. The EU funds and supports the Libyan government’s efforts to curb migration. At sea, the EU provides funding and training for the Libyan Coast Guard. This group has been accused of violently intercepting rescue operations and forcing migrants back to Libya, where they reenter the cycle of abuse.

[SOS Méditerranée is a humanitarian maritime organization founded in May 2015 in response to the rising death toll in the Central Mediterranean and the failure of the EU to act. It operates through a European network based in Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland. From February 2016 to October 2018, SOS Méditerranée operated the rescue ship Aquarius. Today, it continues its mission with the ship Ocean Viking. Since 2016, SOS Méditerranée has rescued 42,052 people at sea.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Last October, Mozambique held its seventh multiparty election since the end of the country’s civil war in 1994, but the results have been controversial. Local and international , including teams from the Episcopal Conference and the , noted that irregularities marred the process. However, the country’s apex court nonetheless declared Daniel Chapo of the ruling FRELIMO  the winner with 65.2% of the vote, revised down from the initial results of nearly 71%.

His closest opponent, with 24.2%, was Venâncio Mondlane, leader of the Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique (PODEMOS), which has moved from the fringes of the political landscape to become the main opposition party in the Southern African state. The party, founded by former members of FRELIMO, gained traction by tapping into the youth’s anger against the government. FRELIMO, previously a Marxist-Leninist organization, claims it has long changed ideology to democratic socialism, but many remain unconvinced.

Following the election, in cities such as Maputo, Beira and Nampula. Estimates suggest the post-election violence has now claimed over lives since October. Tensions were running high after the killing of a Mozambique opposition lawyer and a party official after unidentified gunmen fired multiple rounds at a car while the results of the ballot were still uncertain, .

Since then, authorities have arbitrarily detained more than 2,000 people and have imposed internet restrictions, as confirmed by from the group Access Now. In the midst of the political chaos, 1,500 inmates from a Maputo prison in December.

“The deployment of tanks and heavily armed officers has turned Maputo and other cities of the country into a de facto conflict zone, sparking widespread alarm among the citizens,” Adriano Nuvunga, director of the , a prominent Mozambican think tank, told a local paper.

Youth discontent rises, protests continue

FRELIMO has been at the helm of affairs in the country since its independence from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975. The party’s critics and civil society leaders say it has kept its grip on power through electoral manipulation and running an authoritarian state that quashes dissent and encourages crony corruption.

Many have cited similarities between the protests with those in and over the last five years, as more youths express their frustration with democracy and its failure to improve the quality of life or to protect citizens’ fundamental human rights.

Analysts noted that a key difference was the lack of a singular, charismatic leader in Nigeria and Kenya, where police brutality and a cost-of-living crisis sparked the protests. Instead, the movements there were organic and led by young people rather than by civil society or opposition politicians. Nonetheless, as in Mozambique, they were spearheaded by a similar demographic: the youth.

Eventually, the protests turned into looting, evidence of high-level opportunism in a country with multiple issues: rampant corruption, 80% youth underemployment, the continued impact of , and jihadism.

Mondlane urged more protests while defending his supporters from accusations of looting and damaging infrastructure by the authorities.

“It’s the policemen who are prepared to rob the stores, set fire to the banks and break into the warehouses,” he said during a live broadcast earlier this month. “You saw the images of policemen telling the population to come in to get food. People come in because they are hungry.”

Mozambique in contrast with Kenya and Nigeria

But some aspects of the recent uprising are specific to Mozambique. The very nature of FRELIMO’s dominance, its deep entrenchment in the state apparatus, and its control over key sectors of the economy created a sense that their grip on power was inevitable. Unlike the more fluid political landscapes of Kenya or Nigeria, where opposition voices can maneuver and remain vocal, Mozambique tightly controls its political terrain, which limits the scope for dissent. Under the immediate past president, Filipe Nyusi, some improvement was seen compared to his predecessors, but the progress was minimal.

According to the by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, authorities often interpret information by civil society groups about their protests, a right enshrined in the constitution, as an obligation to seek authorization. That, the report notes, has led to a clampdown on demonstrations except those by groups allied to FRELIMO.

Overall, the ranked the country a “moderate autocracy,” giving it a democracy status of 4.1, out of a possible ten points. That figure was down from 6.1 points ten years earlier, reflecting a steady erosion of democratic freedoms. “In Mozambique, economic growth does not trigger development as policies lack coherence and coordination, and legal frameworks are insufficiently implemented,” BTI authors concluded.

In southern Africa, ruling parties such as FRELIMO, alongside South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and Zimbabwe’s Zimbabwe African National Union — Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), are the same nationalist movements that fought against settler colonialism. The median age in many countries ranges from 18 to 23, meaning that many citizens were not born during the days of nationalist struggle and therefore do not share the nostalgia of those times, or their forefathers’ solidarity with these liberation movements that evolved into political parties. Thus, their is growing fast.

For a long time, there was the lingering trauma of the , a conflict that pitted brother against brother and left deep psychological wounds. The fear of a return to violence, the memory of the brutal years of conflict, acted as a powerful deterrent, muting the voices of dissent and tempering the urge to take to the streets. But the youth, who lack such memories, are taking to the streets as their frustrations reach a boiling point.

This was a point taken advantage of by Mondlane, a populist with the gift of reading his audience. Rather than negotiate with FRELIMO in a bid to share power, he rallied his supporters to continue the protests. As pockets of protests continue in Mozambique, it is clear that the balance of power is shifting and that Mondlane will be waiting for another opportunity to get young people on the streets again in his bid to wrest power away from a party now associated with state failure.

The post Public Anger Mounts Following Mozambique’s Contested Election appeared first on 51�Թ�.

However, the current President, Paul Biya, have long maintained that the Anglophone “” Foncha discusses does not exist and that the government rather “has often tried to the Anglophone-Francophone divide by highlighting the existence of a common identity under German colonial rule and the official recognition in all the post-colonial constitutions of the bilingual and multicultural nature of the Cameroonian nation.” Nevertheless, despite the denial, the Cameroon government has resorted to “intimidation, corruption and repression” to dispel the Anglophone population’s demand for independence or autonomy, suggesting that a problem does in fact exist. This suppression has led to a bloody language war.

Historical Background

Until the end of the First World War, Cameroon (formerly Kamerun) was a German protectorate. However, following Germany’s defeat, it was divided by the League of Nations between Great Britain and France. The territory under the British was further divided into two administrative regions: Northern Cameroon and Southern Cameroon. While the British pursued a policy of indirect rule that conferred a large degree of autonomy to their part of the territory, France constructed a highly centralized colonial territory.

Following the Second World War, Great Britain and France began to relinquish their colonial territories. In the referendum that took place on February 11, 1961, British Southern Cameroon was confronted with the decision to either join Nigeria (which was joined by British Northern Cameroons) or the newly emerging Francophone La République du Cameroun (the Republic of Cameroon). South Cameroon chose the latter, but their hope “to preserve their cultural specificity” as part of French Cameroun was .

The origin of the Anglophone problem

The Anglophone problem has its origins in the Foumban Constitutional Conference of . The Conference, held in July 1961, created a constitution for the new Federal state consisting of the British Southern Cameroon and La République du Cameroun. It also set the stage “for the birth of the Federal Republic of Cameroon on October 1, 1961, which reunited two pieces of the former German Kamerun, both with very distinct political cultures.”

The conference is, however, remembered as a turning point where the promise of a truly bilingual and bicultural federation began to fall apart. Anglophones, representing 9% of the total population, were forced to accept a highly centralized system of government and administration. This laid the groundwork for many of the ongoing tensions between the Anglophone and Francophone communities.

An amendment was made to the Constitution in 1984, which has only served to exacerbate the Anglophone problem further. The 1984 amendment changed the country’s official name from the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon. This alteration was not merely symbolic. It marked a shift from the federal structure enshrined in the 1961 Constitution, which had recognized and protected the unique identity of British Southern Cameroons (later known as West Cameroon). By adopting the new name, the amendment effectively erased the legal and cultural distinctions of the Anglophone regions.

Today, the Anglophone community demands the restoration of West Cameroon’s cultural identity and the implementation of the articles of the Constitution that had once pledged to safeguard the values and institutions that British Southern Cameroons had brought into the Union in 1961.

Linguistic and economic hegemony

As Mufor Atanga declares, “the Federal Republic of Cameroon came into being in 1961 as the first ‘bilingual’ federation in Africa.” However, Atanga notably put the bilingual descriptor in quotation marks. Although the Foumban Conference declared that both French and English were Cameroon’s two official languages, the latter has been significantly marginalized since. From the inception of the unified state, French has been established as the language of administration and official communication. Government institutions, legal proceedings and public services are primarily conducted in French, which not only centralizes administrative power but also creates barriers for those who are more comfortable in English or local languages. As a result, the Francophone elite today holds disproportionate power. This linguistic preference of the French is not by any means accidental; it is a deliberate policy designed to solidify a single national identity, one that aligns with the cultural legacy of French colonial rule.

The educational system further illustrates how the French language functions as a tool of domination. In many schools across Cameroon, the curriculum is predominantly taught in French. Textbooks, teaching methods and examinations reflect this orientation. In 2016, teachers in the English-speaking regions of North West and South West Cameroon went on strike, along with lawyers, protesting against the “francophonization“ of the English educational system. The teachers saw these measures as part of a broader pattern of state centralization and cultural assimilation. By mandating French as the language of administration and public discourse, the state has thus created a barrier that has effectively excluded Anglophone Cameroonians from full participation in public life and represents a clear instrument of control.

Economic exploitation has further kindled discontent. Francophone-dominated Cameroon has systematically the economic resources of the Anglophone regions whilst providing little infrastructural development in return. The Southwest and Northwest regions are rich in oil, timber and agricultural resources. Yet, it is these same areas that remain underdeveloped, with poor roads, failing schools and inadequate healthcare services. The Biya government has kept economic and social activities in the North West and South West Regions of Cameroon at bay, with serious socioeconomic implications on the local communities and the economic tissue of the regions.

Most of Cameroon’s crude oil, which accounts for approximately of the country’s GDP, is located in West Cameroon, off the coast of the South West Region. The state-controlled oil sector, SONARA (Société Nationale de Raffinage), is also ironically located in Limbe in the Anglophone region of Cameroon. The revenues from the oil industry, however, overwhelmingly benefit the Francophone elites, leaving local communities to bear the brunt of environmental degradation and economic neglect. Similar dynamics exist in the timber industry, where foreign corporations (often backed by the Francophone elite) extract high-profit resources with little reinvestment in local communities. This exploitation not only perpetuates regional economic disparities but also deepens the political and cultural alienation felt by the Anglophone community.

Systematic repression

Amnesty International’s in 2023 has exposed some of these human rights abuses in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions, where state security forces have been accused of arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, torture and rape. The report documents how these brutal tactics have been deployed against activists, journalists and civilians who advocate for greater autonomy and a federal system. As pointed out in the report, “Cameroonian authorities must act to end the violence against the population and conduct thorough investigations into the killings, acts of torture, rapes, burning of houses and other atrocities committed in the Anglophone region.”

Anglophone movements that aspire to federalism or secession have been the main targets of such repression. The introduction of multi-party politics in the early 1990s and the easing of restrictions on freedom of association led to the formation of various opposition parties and pressure groups. Among these, the Social Democratic Front (SDF) emerged as a significant voice for the Anglophone community and has articulated the frustrations of those who have felt sidelined by the centralized Francophone-dominated state. Members of these Anglophone movements, however, have been harassed by the security forces, threatened with arrest, and subjected to travel restrictions, forcing some to go into exile. The state has also repressed public demonstrations and protests organized by the SDF. This includes violent crackdowns during rallies, which are often characterized by the use of excessive force. For instance, in the protests that took place in 2016, security forces deployed tear gas, batons and live ammunition, killing . In addition to this, police crackdowns on gatherings and ghost town actions (shutting down a town as a form of protest) have been met with violent dispersals. 

The way forward

The Anglophone problem is not simply a vestige of a troubled past; it is a living crisis that continues to shape the nation’s destiny. In Cameroon’s case, the cultural wars have turned into a civil war. By favoring a Francophone elite, the state has not only undermined the cultural identity and rights of the Anglophone minority, but it has also fueled cycles of repression and conflict. Only by acknowledging and rectifying these systemic disparities can Cameroon hope to fulfill the promise of a truly bilingual and bicultural nation that was originally agreed on in 1961.

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The for 2025 estimates that over 24.6 million people across Sudan “face acute hunger nationwide.” At least 12 million have fled their homes, and 3.7 million have sought refugee status in neighboring countries. Despite these staggering numbers, international attention has faltered. Donor fatigue, compounded by political distractions abroad, has left humanitarian operations underfunded and overstretched.

Sudan’s response plan falls short

In August 2024, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) a proposed peace agreement. blocking a diplomatic breakthrough and ensuring the continuation of the war. With no ceasefire in place, aid agencies cannot reach large swathes of the population. Fighting between the SAF and its rival, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has already beyond Khartoum. Battles now rage in Darfur, South Kordofan and along Sudan’s western borders.�� 

Before Khartoum changed hands, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali the “High-Level Humanitarian Conference for the People of Sudan” in Addis Ababa. The summit, held alongside the , drew representatives from the United Arab Emirates (), , the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. The summit raised over $200 million for humanitarian aid in Sudan, pledged mostly by the UAE, far short of the $4.2 billion that say they need to address the crisis in Sudan and an additional $1.8 billion for neighboring countries hosting refugees.

Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders), one of the largest medical NGOs operating in the region, operations in multiple displacement camps after rising violence made it impossible to ensure staff safety. Other aid organizations have faced looting, armed obstruction and threats from both SAF and RSF fighters. UN officials who recently entered areas around Khartoum “unimaginable levels of destruction” and widespread trauma among civilians.��

Meanwhile, the situation continues to deteriorate on Sudan’s borders. Over Sudanese have fled to neighboring countries, with Chad bearing a heavy burden. Tensions between Chad and the SAF have escalated, with SAF officials to strike targets inside Chad. SAF General Yasir Al-Atta also accused South Sudan of harboring “traitors”, further straining relations with another neighbor.

In Darfur, fighting around the town of El Fasher threatens to draw regional actors into the conflict. A potential resurgence of the Zaghawa rebellion — an ethnic movement with roots in both Sudan and Chad — could deepen the violence. 

No peace in sight 

Efforts to mediate the crisis have so far yielded little progress. In 2024, both Chad and Ethiopia attempted to broker peace and facilitate aid delivery. Their initiatives stalled, as Sudanese generals refused to compromise. Talks scheduled for March 2025 quickly broke down after the SAF demanded for a ceasefire that RSF leaders rejected.

The crisis has also suffered from dwindling international aid. In the early weeks of his presidency, US President Donald Trump cut more than from the foreign aid budget, targeting programs run by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). These cuts basic assistance, such as vaccines, clean water and agricultural support, not only in Sudan but across several humanitarian zones in Africa. These programs could have played a vital role in preventing widespread malnutrition and disease.��

As of April 2025, UN agencies receiving less than 10% of their required funding for Sudan. Humanitarian officials have expressed deep concern that, without immediate and significant support, the crisis may spiral further. Cross-border violence, mass displacement and food shortages could destabilize the wider Horn of Africa and Sahel regions. The longer the war continues, the harder it becomes to contain its effects.��

Without a international response — and a credible commitment from Sudanese factions to pursue peace — the suffering of civilians will only intensify. Sudan’s war has already spread well beyond its frontlines. It now threatens to engulf the region.

[ edited this piece]

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The conflict has fragmented over time. Armed groups form and shift alliances. The March 23 Movement (M23), one of the most powerful rebel groups, emerged in 2012 and re-emerged in 2021. M23 fighters seized Goma, a key city in North Kivu, in early 2024. The fighters are primarily Tutsi, and Rwanda is widely suspected of supporting them. The Rwandan government denies involvement. The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which descends from the Interahamwe, remains active and opposes the Rwandan government. Various Mai-Mai militias, self-defense groups with local ties, also participate in the fighting.

Economic and ethnic tensions

The Congolese army (FARDC) struggles with corruption, poor organization and divided loyalties. Many officers were former rebels integrated through peace agreements, which weakens military cohesion. The Rwandan government’s role in the conflict is a point of contention. Rwanda benefits economically from mineral exports, though the country itself has few mineral resources. Smugglers transport coltan, gold and diamonds from eastern DRC, fueling Rwanda’s economy. International trade agreements facilitate these operations. Uganda has also been accused of involvement, though its current role is unclear.

Eastern DRC holds vast mineral wealth. The region contains deposits of coltan, gold and diamonds. Rebel groups, military officers and foreign networks control and profit from mining operations. The European Union has trade agreements with Rwanda for mineral resources, raising questions about indirect economic support for illicit mining operations. Multinational corporations rely on minerals extracted from conflict zones, perpetuating demand.

Ethnic tensions drive violence. Groups identifying as indigenous Congolese clash with the Banyarwanda, people of Rwandan descent who have lived in the DRC for generations. Land disputes fuel conflict. Farmers compete for agricultural land, and miners fight over resource-rich territories. The arrival of Rwandan refugees in the 1990s intensified these existing struggles.

How will the conflict play out?

M23 fighters hold Goma. The Congolese government struggles to reclaim control. Reports of massacres circulate, but casualty numbers remain unclear. The United Nations’ MONUSCO peacekeeping mission, active since 1999, has failed to prevent further violence. Humanitarian organizations work in the region but face security challenges.

International reactions remain minimal. Rwanda has faced scrutiny, but no major sanctions have been imposed. European nations express concern but take little action. Governments focus on conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza, leaving the DRC crisis in the background. Sanctions on Rwanda remain a possibility, but their effectiveness is uncertain.

The DRC has a history of resource-driven conflicts. Pre-colonial fighters clashed over ivory and slaves. Belgian rulers extracted rubber, leading to mass atrocities. Cold War leaders backed Mobutu Sese Seko to counter communist influence. �մǻ岹��’s war follows a familiar pattern. Local strongmen and external actors profit from instability.

The war in eastern DRC is unlikely to end soon. The Congolese government lacks the strength to counter rebel groups. Economic interests benefit from continued violence. The humanitarian crisis deepens. Millions live in displacement camps. Without major international pressure and structural reforms, the cycle of violence will persist.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The Sovereign Council appears to be power in Khartoum. Local militias remain outside its control. Analysts warn that this could lead to further violence, including events similar to the January 2024 massacre in Gezira.

Humanitarian groups have raised urgent concerns. to Amnesty International, the SAF arrested or killed civilians suspected of supporting the RSF earlier this year. The UN and other organizations have widespread crimes against civilians. As of early 2025, the war has more than 11 million people. Roughly 2.9 million have crossed into neighboring countries as refugees.

Fighting in Khartoum may soon shift toward al-Zurug base. The RSF has used this site during the 20-month war to supplies from Chad and Libya. The UN warned in late 2024 that the violence could expand beyond Sudan’s borders.

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) reports that civilians face frequent attacks and human rights violations. Sudan’s health care system has collapsed, and famine threatens many regions. Ethnic tensions, particularly between Arab tribes in Darfur, may as the conflict evolves.

Attempts at diplomacy have failed. The UN to broker a peace deal in August 2024, but the SAF did not attend. The US is currently focused on other global conflicts, including those involving Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Hamas, and Iran. Other global powers have also declined to initiate a peace process. Without foreign mediation, no ceasefire appears likely. Experts warn that both sides may continue fighting indefinitely unless external actors intervene.

“Sudan is forgotten!” Islamic State in its weekly publication, Al Naba. The group’s editor called for jihad and argued that Muslims in Sudan should take up arms under the Islamic State’s banner.

Experts remain pessimistic about the possibility of a ceasefire. They argue that without pressure or incentives, both the SAF and RSF will continue military operations. Ankara, which has previously served as a mediator, has not taken new steps to convene peace talks. Unless a workable peace plan emerges, the conflict is likely to escalate further.

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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As of November 14, 2024, at least people have been killed in Khartoum State, with 26,000 of those deaths directly attributed to the violence. The Sudanese Army’s recent push into Khartoum does not mark the end of the conflict, as General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the army, has shown no interest in peace talks. The army’s actions are also contributing to instability, not only in South Sudan but also in Chad and neighboring countries, further destabilizing an already volatile region.

Over the past year, the UN Human Rights Office has numerous attacks by the Sudanese Army, leading to civilian casualties. UN experts have also highlighted disturbing reports of summary executions, particularly of young men.

The international community must step in

The horrendous killings, executions and massacres in Sudan should be reason enough to end the war, but the conflict’s implications go far beyond that. Its intensity has forced millions to flee both within and outside Sudan, overwhelming neighboring countries that are struggling to cope with the influx of refugees. A destabilized Sudan also creates favorable conditions for extremism to rise, potentially dragging neighboring countries such as Ethiopia and Eritrea into the conflict.

Sudan’s instability is providing fertile ground for jihadist groups in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel to establish networks and coordinate operations across porous borders.

The continuation of the war will have consequences for Europe, which is relatively close to the region. The violence in Sudan could obstruct critical maritime passages, disrupting the flow of goods between Europe and Asia, particularly the global maritime oil trade, which would endanger global energy security. The war in Sudan is also important for Europe due to the potential for a humanitarian crisis at its doorstep.

What can Europe do?

In times of great geopolitical turmoil, the EU must recognize that the war in Sudan has profound implications for all its member countries, with powerful actors such as the US, China, and Russia involved. Gaining a foothold and securing peace in Sudan is crucial to the EU’s interests and security. The most immediate consequence of the war’s continuation is likely to be a growing demographic crisis at Europe’s doorstep.

Mobilizing more funds for aid, especially as the United States draws down its international assistance, is crucial to winning hearts and minds. The EU must take its role as a mediator seriously and create a framework for peace talks. Resolving this humanitarian crisis is an absolute necessity. If left unresolved, it could become one of Europe’s greatest security liabilities.

The international community must also expand support for Sudan’s civil society. Strengthening civil society is essential for both ending the war and securing a durable peace. A strong civil society could offer a viable alternative to the warring factions and help guide Sudan toward lasting stability.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The strategic importance of SAIs

SAIs are crucial to upholding transparency and integrity in government operations. Their audits expose inefficiencies, irregularities and misappropriations of public resources. The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions that SAIs enhance governance by conducting independent audits and fostering accountability in the public sector.

Many SAIs face challenges, especially in corrupt systems. These difficulties include weak legal mandates, political interference and resource shortages. The United Nations against Corruption encourages states to empower SAIs with independence, access to information and adequate resources. To be effective, the institutions must also coordinate with anti-corruption agencies, law enforcement and civil society, building formal channels for the follow-up of audit findings.

Mauritius and the FCC

Mauritius has long marketed itself as a with investor-friendly regulations and tax advantages. However, this openness has also exposed vulnerabilities to illicit financial flows. In 2019, the investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists revealed how multinationals used the country to shift profits and reduce tax liabilities in African and Asian countries, often using shell companies and nominee structures facilitated by local PSPs.

In response, Mauritius implemented a series of anti-money laundering reforms and, in 2023, launched the Financial Crimes Commission () to consolidate anti-corruption and financial enforcement functions. The FCC’s asset recovery, money laundering investigations and coordination with the Financial Intelligence Unit and other regulatory bodies.

In April 2025, the FCC underscored the significance of this institutional strengthening when it former Minister of Finance Renganaden Padayachy and former Central Bank Governor Harvesh Seegolam in connection with an alleged embezzlement of 300 million Mauritian rupees (over $6.74 million) from the Mauritius Investment Corporation — a fund designed to support businesses during the Covid-19 pandemic. The arrests, which came after the newly elected Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam ordered an audit of public finances, highlight the evolving assertiveness of the FCC and its potential to enhance accountability, especially when previous administrations are accused of manipulating fiscal data to conceal public debt and deficits.

Perception, information and support for accountability

Recent by Daron Acemoglu et al. on the 2023 Turkish elections reveals that popular support for authoritarian regimes may be driven not by a genuine preference for authoritarianism, but misperceptions about the benefits of democratic governance and the costs of repression. Their study shows that many citizens underestimate the importance of democratic institutions, particularly media freedom and independent oversight, in addressing corruption and disaster response.

This finding is especially relevant in the context of Mauritius and similar jurisdictions, where public trust in democratic institutions and anti-corruption mechanisms is often undermined by complex financial systems and opaque enforcement. Efforts to strengthen SAIs and regulate PSPs may falter if citizens do not perceive these institutions as effective or necessary. In this light, improving public awareness about the value of transparent governance and independent oversight is not only a political or legal necessity but a strategic tool for reinforcing accountability.

Acemoglu’s findings suggest that reform efforts in Mauritius could be enhanced by parallel information campaigns targeting public understanding of the link between corruption, weak institutions and democratic erosion. Empowering citizens with accurate information can shift perceptions and build support for institutional reforms, increasing demand for stronger accountability frameworks.

The fight against corruption requires strong institutions, aligned incentives and credible enforcement mechanisms. SAIs play a fundamental part in public sector oversight, but their impact is amplified through partnerships with other stakeholders, particularly professional service providers. The case of Mauritius illustrates both the risks and opportunities in this domain: While PSPs may facilitate financial secrecy and abuse, they can also be powerful allies in promoting transparency if regulated effectively. Strengthening the role of SAIs and embedding PSPs into the accountability framework is crucial not only for national governance but for global financial integrity.

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The (AU) selected 2063 as the target year for its 50-year vision starting in 2013 with , which references the vision of its predecessor organization, the OAU. This strategy for Africa’s transformation includes five ten-year implementation phases. The (2013-2023) focused mainly on economic growth, integration, governance and peace. Key initiatives included the Single African Air Transport Market () and the initiative. According to the on the Implementation of Agenda 2063, some progress has been made, such as with the flagship project, the African Continental Free Trade Area (), which 54 member states have signed. The second ten-year plan (2024–2033) aims to accelerate progress and strengthen implementation. The AU envisions achieving its goal of a united, integrated Africa several decades from now, indicating that the continent still has a long road ahead.

Fragile progress

The continent has surged forward in various areas, as some of the world’s are in Africa. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) allow tech enthusiasts to work on groundbreaking solutions to local and global challenges. They have been thriving, allowing more people access to education and health services. Many areas have improved their infrastructure, including the emerging standard gauge railway . This will connect Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi.

While there is cautious optimism that better governance and democratization could improve the well-being of many African nations, concerns still exist regarding the fragility of this progress.�� According to the , many African countries perform weakly in the governance dimension, as well as in political transformation and economic transformation. Looking at the African continent immediately reveals political instabilities, a decline in freedoms and setbacks in democracy.��

The coexistence of progress and stagnation is particularly evident in countries the index classifies as moderate, such as . President William Ruto’s administration drives promising developments in the rule of law, economic growth and climate policy, as reflected in the corruption and high national debt offset these gains. In 2024, further tested the country, culminating in the storming of the parliament.

Many people on the continent still yearn for administrations that can better manage resources, conduct affairs transparently, and uphold human rights. So, can regional integration be a tool for better governance in Africa, a continent of 1.4 billion people in 54 countries?

Approaches to successful integration

Agenda 2063 captures the aspiration for a fully integrated continent by focusing on economic cooperation (such as the ), promoting democratic governance, and resolving conflicts. The final aspect of integration is the establishment and strengthening of continental institutions. One of the most practical benefits of an integrated Africa is an environment where people can move freely across borders, bringing knowledge, goods and services.

There are good examples of integration on the continent. The has successfully integrated countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and more recently Somalia. Institutions have evolved, including the East African Legislative Assembly, a common customs union and a common market. Countries also usually find a familiar voice in continental and international matters.

Furthermore, the EAC allows the free movement of people, goods, services, labor and capital among its members. The community has set up conflict resolution mechanisms to ensure peace and security in the region.

Particular interests and powerless institutions

On paper, the AU has clearly articulated its aim to expand such approaches to successful integration. Its leaders often speak about the need for an environment where people can move freely across borders, thus accelerating integration.

Yet the process has been slow, if not stagnant, as African governments have limited interest in further integration. One reason for this is that many countries are focused on their own internal political, economic and social challenges, overlooking the bigger picture.

These governments have not developed effective agreements or harmonized legislation to facilitate free movement or integration. At the same time, frequent border disputes further challenge the movement of people, goods and services. Travelers often encounter security checkpoints and roadblocks at national borders and within countries. Wars and political instability frequently disrupt existing arrangements as well. 

Whereas AU member states have often agreed on protocols, regulations and directives, their governments have been sluggish in adopting these decisions for implementation or do not implement them at all. There is also a form of protectionism in which member states want to keep their independence.

One example is the AU protocol on the of persons adopted in 2018 by the AU. The agreement aimed to allow citizens of member states to move and work freely across borders, but many countries have not ratified or implemented it. One such country is , where the government emphasizes the need to meet specific prerequisites before implementing free movement, including strengthening integrated border management. Other states are concerned that could place greater strain on their labor markets and social systems.

Meanwhile, the AU bodies are poorly funded as they rely on contributions from member states, which are often delayed or unpaid, leaving the institutions in severe financial distress. The AU receives financial assistance from international donors such as the EU, the UN and non-governmental organizations and foundations. Still, that assistance has faced challenges due to ongoing global economic problems. To foster successful integration and improve governance, the AU must ensure adequate funding for its institutions. In recent years, the AU has tried to strengthen its financial autonomy — for example, by introducing a on imports in member states to increase self-financing.

Substantial progress is needed

Another key obstacle to realizing the vision of successful integration lies in the structural constitution of the AU. Although it includes institutions like the, the and the , authority rests with the assembly, which gathers heads of state. Thus far, they have refused to delegate authority to the AU’s organs. As a result, the Pan-African Parliament does not exercise binding legislative powers.��

To implement the AU’s vision of a united and prosperous Africa, it is essential to urge member states not to cling to their self-interest but to work towards effective agreements or legislative harmonization that facilitate the movement of people, goods and services. Furthermore, the AU must work harder to end wars, conflicts and disputes among its members. To this end, it would be helpful if the AU had greater capacities for peacekeeping — for example, in the form of peacekeeping troops modeled after the UN peacekeepers nicknamed “Blue Helmets.” Without overcoming selfishness and implementing more effective structures, the vision outlined in Agenda 2063 will remain a distant future goal.

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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A Turbulent Donald Trump Second Presidency

US President Donald Trump won the election by promising more secure borders and higher tariffs. Now that he is in office, he will clamp down on immigration. Trump and his team believe in protectionism and isolationism. The underlying idea is to bring back manufacturing jobs to the US. So, expect higher tariffs. Lower immigration is likely to lead to economic harm. Tighter labor markets, higher costs for businesses and increased inflation are likely to follow.

As an issue, immigration has created a divide within Trump’s camp. The trigger was his selection of Sriram Krishnan as senior adviser for AI in his administration. Krishnan is a Tamil Brahmin (Tam Brahm) who was born in India. He did his undergrad at SRM Institute of Science and Technology (SRMIST) and is a general partner of American venture capital firm Andreessen Horowitz. This high-achieving Tam Brahm heads the firm’s London office and is pals with both former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Tesla and X CEO Elon Musk.

Krishnan’s appointment led to a backlash from the Make America Great Again (MAGA) base. Laura Loomer, a MAGA political activist and Internet personality, took issue with it. Vivek Ramaswamy and Musk, the two co-chairs of the newly proposed Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) rode out to Krishnan’s defense. So did former PayPal executive David Sacks, whom Trump has tapped to be White House AI and cryptocurrency tsar. The war of words played out on X, the new bastion of free speech.

The MAGA crowd argues that the tech industry imports Indian workers because they are cheap. These Indians put downward pressure on American wages. Trump’s finance and tech bros, on the other hand, argue that there are not enough Americans to do tech jobs and thus the tech industry needs to bring in foreign workers. This controversy will continue to divide Trump’s camp in the months ahead.

Trump’s tariffs will accelerate the creation of two contending economic systems. Such a situation existed during the Cold War, but since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global economy has become more integrated than ever. However, the American and Chinese economies have now grown increasingly separate from each other. This trend will accelerate.

Importantly, US global leadership will weaken. Trump will pursue unilateralist, isolationist and contentious policies. So, we will see increased fraying of international norms and weakening of US alliances in Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

The New Science and Technology Race Is Heating Up

In just the next decade — even the next five years — AI will be performing most tasks better than humans. It will also be more efficient. The shocking question our societies must answer now appears to be, “Who will be the master, AI or humans?” Even the profoundly cautious National Intelligence Council warns that AI may pose “existential threats … that could damage life on a global scale” and that “require the development of resilient strategies to survive.”

For the first time in ten thousand years of civilization, humanity faces an entity that will disrupt us, may control us and could even threaten our existence. Even if AI does not take over humanity, its impact on global employment, for both white- and blue-collar workers, could well disrupt societies and traditional ways of life.

In a poll of AI experts, 18% were excited at near-term prospects, 42% were equally excited and concerned and 37% were more concerned than excited about the changes in the “humans-plus-tech” evolution they expect to see by 2035. Numerous studies estimate that AI will eliminate the need for anywhere from seven to 48% of all jobs within 15 years. Kai-Fu Lee, one of the world’s leading experts on the subject, estimates that AI will eliminate the need for about 38% of all jobs by the early 2030s.

AI will also concentrate wealth in the few corporations and countries that have the financial and technical resources to develop and exploit this technology. Large AI firms in the US like Meta, Google and Microsoft will emerge as winners. So will Chinese companies like Tencent, Alibaba and Baidu.

Experts note, too, that wealth distribution will become even more unequal, with the top 1% of the population reaping most of the profits. Much of the rest of humanity will be in danger of losing its livelihoods. The US and China together are likely to capture 70% of the over $15 trillion that AI is estimated to add to the global economy by 2030.

In addition to an AI race, a new space race is also underway. Both the US and China are racing to go to Mars. The former expects to get there by 2027–2028, while the latter is planning for 2028. Space is becoming increasingly militarized as well. Surveillance satellites, missile defense and anti-satellite technologies are increasingly important.

Governments and private players will invest an estimated $1 trillion in the space sector. SpaceX is developing a fully reusable, two-stage super heavy-lift launch vehicle called Starship. At 122 meters (equivalent to a 35-story building), Starship can currently carry 90 metric tons and will soon double that. SpaceX has launched Starship six times and plans 100–400 launches annually within one to three years.

A third technological race is on in the renewable energy industry. The majority of solar panels and batteries currently come from China. Electric vehicles (EVs) in China cost a third less than in Europe and the US. China subsidizes EVs handsomely. Furthermore, the Chinese EV industry has technological and production advantages over its competitors.

Global EV sales are projected to grow by 30% in 2025 and reach 15.1 million. In 2024, 11.6 million EVs were sold. They comprise 13.2% of total vehicle sales. This market share is estimated to grow year-on-year despite the Trump administration’s lack of enthusiasm for EVs.

Demand for electricity is rising significantly. Increasingly, renewables are supplying this electricity. In 2025, renewables will surpass coal to become the largest source of electricity for the first time in history.

The Turbulent Middle East Will Cool Down a Bit

Israel has emerged as the big winner in the latest Middle Eastern conflict. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have weakened Hamas. In Lebanon, the IDF decapitated Hezbollah and destroyed the Shia militant group’s assets. In Syria, Sunni rebels have seized Damascus, and Baathist dictator Bashar al-Assad has fled to Moscow. During the upheaval in Syria, the IDF seized all of the Golan Heights. It also destroyed the country’s entire air force, almost all of its navy and most of its other military assets.

Previously, Syria was a key Iranian ally and fought many wars against Israel. The Assad family belonged to the country’s Alawite minority, which follows a form of Shia Islam. Now that Assad is gone, Iran stands weakened and cut off by land from its allies in Lebanon. So, the threat to Israel is greatly diminished. Turkey is back in the fray, though, and its influence has risen.

The Ottoman sultan was the caliph of all Sunni Muslims until the empire ended in the aftermath of World War I. Now, the fabled Umayyad Mosque in Damascus is back in Sunni hands. In the long run, a Salafist Syria might be a bigger threat to Israel than an Alawite one. By the time Assad fell, his regime had a very narrow social base, commanding only the loyalty of the Alawite elite. The majority of the Syrian population had turned against the Assad regime, which explains its rapid fall.

Now, Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa is in charge. He is better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. Backed by Turkey and some Gulf countries, Jolani has engineered an image makeover and is projecting himself as a moderate. Yet it is important to note that he was an associate of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and a formidable al-Qaeda operative. The US State Department long had a bounty of $10 million on his head. Already, his men are telling women to cover their heads. If Jolani manages to consolidate power and create a majoritarian state backed by other Sunni powers, that might cause Israel a greater headache than its erstwhile Shia foes. 

Note that the 1916 Sykes–Picot order is dead. The nation state experiment in the Middle East has failed. Tribalism and sectarianism are ascendant. Keeping Syria or Iraq or any of the states in the region united and functional will become harder.

In the meantime, the Kurds and Palestinians remain the losers of history. No great or regional power really backs them. In the case of Palestinians, every power in the region gives them lip service, but none of these Muslim states is willing to fight for them.

In 2025, conflict in the Middle East will diminish because it has clear winners. Israel now has the upper hand against its enemies, especially Iran. For the time being, the great powers are standing by and avoiding involvement in the region.

The Russia–Ukraine War Could End

Russia and Ukraine have been at war since February 24, 2022. Casualties have mounted, and economies are under strain. Russia has been slowly but relentlessly gaining Ukrainian territory in a battle of attrition. Western support for Ukraine has been wavering. Neither France nor Germany has a budget for 2025 partly because of political disagreements over Ukraine.

US President Donald Trump’s reelection changes the equation as well. He will not support Ukraine as strongly as his predecessor Joe Biden did. So, there will be pressure on Ukraine to sue for peace.

Former CIA officer Glenn Carle and 51�Թ� Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh disagree on their reading of Russia. The former sees the Russian economy as under strain. Russian foreign exchange reserves are decreasing and inflationary pressures are increasing. The country has overinvested in the military and other sectors are suffering. The ruble is tumbling. Carle estimates that Russia cannot prosecute the war forever.

Singh takes a different view. He points out that, while prices are rising, so are wages. Ironically, Western sanctions have benefited Russia by preventing capital flight. Money is no longer flowing out to buy yachts in Monaco or football clubs in London. Now, the capital stays home, creating a domestic multiplier effect. Sanctions have also forced Russia to reindustrialize. Besides, GDP figures can be deceptive. Western countries with higher GDP have a smaller manufacturing base than Russia’s. Also, sanctions have not entirely worked because developing country purchases have replaced European demand for Russian fossil fuels.

Given Russia’s size and resources, it can take greater pain than Ukraine. Ukraine’s economy has cratered, shrinking by as much as 30% according to some estimates. Ukrainian men have fled the country at higher rates than their Russian counterparts. Ukraine is simply running out of cash and men.

Unsurprisingly, Europe is losing its nerve. The German far-left and far-right both want the war to end and blame it — along with American protectionism — for deindustrializing their country. Traditionally, Germany has been a high-tech manufacturing powerhouse. Now, it is in crisis. So is France and so are many other European countries. Given these trends, Singh believes that some sort of peace or ceasefire deal should occur by the end of the year.

Will the Global Economy Muddle Along, or Is There Trouble Ahead?

Former CIA officer Glenn Carle and 51�Թ� Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh disagree on the global economy. Carle thinks the global economy will muddle through, while Singh thinks there is trouble ahead.

Carle takes confidence from official growth figures. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates global growth will be 3.3% in 2025. The US economy is projected to grow at 2.5%, the EU about 1%, China 4.8% and India 6%. These figures are relatively healthy and the global economy should be able to weather the shock of tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump.

Singh sees record global debt — as of December 3, 2024 — as well as protectionism and currency wars as big risks. Sovereign debt will continue to rise, increasing default risk. Both the German and French governments fell because political leaders could not agree upon a budget. Europeans will not accept cuts to their welfare states in order to save the money for Ukraine.

In Asia, China’s real estate bubble has burst. Rising labor costs weakened its export-led strategy, which faltered under the Covid-19 pandemic. Since 1978, China has industrialized at the cost not only of the West but also emerging economies like India and Brazil. It is betting on a new wave of industrialization in critical technologies like solar panels and batteries. State support for Chinese companies is common and well known. This is tempting many countries worldwide to raise tariffs, provoking retaliation and exacerbating inflation.

Donald Trump wants to weaken the dollar, yet simultaneously retain its status as the world’s reserve currency. He is inspired by former US President Richard Nixon’s abandonment of the gold standard in 1973 after the Vietnam War. Despite this abandonment, the dollar continued to be the global reserve currency. According to our Republican sources, there is no serious threat to the dollar given current economic crises in both China and the EU. Therefore, they are confident that the US dollar will continue to be the global reserve currency even after depreciation.

Economists at top investment banks believe that the Trump administration may also use tariffs as a tool to support depreciation, pointing to the 1985 Plaza Accord. In those Cold War days, allies with a trade surplus — France, West Germany, Japan and the UK — agreed with the US to depreciate the dollar. Our sources in the incoming Trump administration indirectly indicate that some of their colleagues are determined to bring back manufacturing to the US and see depreciation as a key policy measure. 

Other countries are anticipating Trump tariffs and dollar depreciation. The Swiss National Bank, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Canada have already cut interest rates, weakening their currencies. Others are planning to follow suit. However, if all major trading countries try to weaken their currencies simultaneously, none may gain from more competitive exports, but all could experience heightened exchange rate volatility.

Singh believes that the chances of a black swan event have increased because the structural economic and political problems are not going away. So, fasten your seatbelts and expect turbulence ahead.

Unstable Africa Drives Refugees North

In 2024, militant Islamist violence in Africa reached a . Fatalities have nearly tripled since 2020 to approximately 11,000. This violence has displaced over 45 million people, a 14% increase over the 2023 figure. Last year marked the 13th consecutive year in which this figure has risen.

Russia has now emerged as a major player in Africa, displacing France in many countries. Moscow has conducted multiple disinformation campaigns and sent mercenaries to many conflict zones, such as Mali, Niger, Libya and Sudan.

The implosion of Sudan is the biggest crisis in Africa today. It has exacerbated the tensions in an already fragile region, worsening conflicts in neighboring states and increasing political instability. The internal conflicts in Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Ethiopia are now further complicated by Sudan’s instability.

Foreign powers, most notably the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Iran and Egypt, are inflaming Sudan’s conflict. They have deployed drones, munitions and mercenaries. They also patronize the smuggling of resources. This scramble for influence risks Sudan fragmenting into a collection of client states, sidelining civilian voices and popular sovereignty.

Over 11.5 million Sudanese have been internally displaced, and more 2.3 million have fled the country since the civil war began in April 2023. Food shortages are estimated to be killing hundreds of people daily. An estimated three million people are facing acute food insecurity.

Experts point out that droughts and floods are a key reason for increased conflict. Climate change means that places lack rain for longer periods or get too much rain in too short a time. This means the land is less productive, even as populations rise. This explosive combination has led people to fight over water, pastures and land.

In 2024, an estimated 163 million Africans suffered from acute food insecurity, over 10% of the continent’s population. This figure is nearly triple that of five years ago. Many of these Africans are crossing the Mediterranean Sea to get to Europe.

Lee Kuan Yew, the late Singaporean statesman, once warned that if Europe did not export prosperity south, Africa would export people north. That is exactly what is happening.

Europe Faces a Tough Year Ahead

France and Germany are the two beating hearts of Europe. Both of them ended 2024 without a budget. Both countries face new elections in 2025.

France went through a tumultuous year. 51�Թ� Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson and 51�Թ� Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh explain the crisis in the French Fifth Republic in the piece embedded below. Traditional parties have imploded and new blocs have emerged. Marine Le Pen’s far-right Rassemblement national (RN) is on the ascendant. Although it won only 126 seats out of 577 in the French parliament, it received the most votes.

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Emmanuel Macron’s Embarrassing Hour of Reckoning

The left-wing Nouveau front populaire (NFP) won 193 seats while President Emmanuel Macron’s Ensemble won 159. The two parties oppose RN’s social and political far-right stance, but NFP and RN are closer on economic policy than either is to Ensemble. In 2024, the three parties could not agree upon a budget. Michel Barnier’s government fell, making him the shortest-serving prime minister of the Fifth Republic.

Germany’s traffic-light coalition — so-called because red, yellow and green are colors of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Greens, respectively — fell because the parties could not agree upon a budget. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government has proven to be indecisive and ineffective. The three parties could rarely agree on anything even as the German economy contracted for two consecutive years.

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Is the German Economy Now Destined to Decline?

The far-right Allianz für Deutschland (AfD) is on the rise, sending shivers down the spine of a country where the specter of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party remain strong. Yet the ineffectiveness of traditional political parties, a sinking economy and fears about immigration are fueling AfD’s rise. Repeated acts of terror by some Muslim immigrants have added to the fear.

In France, Germany and other EU countries, the clash of cultures between secular Europeans and religious immigrants is only too real. The fact that the latter are often poor and congregate around mosques makes them more Islamist than their countrymen back home. Note that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan gets a much higher percentage of votes in France, Germany and the Netherlands than he does in Turkey.

As problems mount, the French Fifth Republic is on the verge of collapse while Germany still suffers from a postwar crisis of confidence. The operative question is simple: Who will lead Europe?

In 2006, former CIA officer Glenn Carle told a group of German officials, “If Germany does not lead Europe, Europe will not be led.” These officials were horrified at having to assume the responsibilities they had long avoided so as not to be tarred as the new Nazis. Only Germany can lead Europe, and it may eventually be AfD that leads. What happens then?

Throughout Europe, the far-right is on the rise. Slovakia, Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands are some examples. Economic strain, fears of immigration and concerns about social cohesion are at play. None of these concerns are going away in 2025.

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The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Giorgio Musso lays out Sudan’s situation in clear terms. The country, one of Africa’s largest, has endured decades of conflict, shifting power struggles and outside interference. Colonial rule shaped its early history and the fight for independence led to long, brutal wars. Oil and gold made Sudan an economic prize, drawing the attention of foreign powers. Ethnic divisions and regional disputes fueled internal conflicts, with Darfur becoming a flashpoint for violence.

The split from South Sudan in 2011 changed the country’s trajectory but left unresolved issues. South Sudan took most of the oil fields, while Sudan kept the pipelines and export infrastructure. Border tensions flared and armed groups seized opportunities to expand their control. In Khartoum, military factions maneuvered for power. Foreign governments engaged in diplomacy but often prioritized their own interests over stability.

The current war began in April 2023 as a battle between two military leaders. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan heads the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, commands the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful paramilitary group. They were once allies, but disagreements over military integration and control of resources led to open fighting. Gunfire and shelling tore through Khartoum. Violence spread across the country, hitting Darfur especially hard.

Millions of civilians were caught in the middle. Cities were reduced to battlegrounds. Hospitals ran out of supplies. Food, water and medicine became scarce. Aid workers struggled to reach those in need. More than five million people were displaced and over twelve million faced hunger. Regional governments scrambled to deal with a growing refugee crisis. Ceasefire attempts repeatedly collapsed as both factions fought for control of key territory. Tribal groups joined the conflict, deepening the chaos.

The war also drew in outside forces. Russia’s Wagner Group maintained ties to Sudan’s gold trade. Gulf states had economic interests at stake. China, the US and other powers watched closely, each calculating its next move. Meanwhile, Sudan’s civilian movements, which once pushed for democracy, were sidelined. Activists called for an end to military rule, but both generals ignored them. Some local councils tried to fill the governance vacuum, but lawlessness spread.

International organizations stepped in with mediation efforts. The African Union and IGAD held peace talks, but neither Burhan nor Hemedti showed real willingness to compromise. Humanitarian groups raised alarms over atrocities, particularly in Darfur, where ethnic violence had resurfaced. The US labeled RSF actions in the region as genocide. Despite widespread condemnation, the fighting continued.

Musso argues that Sudan’s path forward depends on real negotiations and civilian leadership. Previous peace agreements ended past wars, but only when power-sharing and resource control were addressed. Sudan needs a government that represents its people, not just military factions. Regional organizations can help facilitate talks. International actors must support stability rather than back rival factions. Most importantly, Sudan’s civilians need a voice in shaping their future. Without that, the cycle of war will continue.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The selected films, How to Build a Library from Kenya and Khartoum from Sudan, emerge from a region historically starved of filmmaking infrastructure. While West Africa benefited from French colonial investment in cinema and access to financing schemes, East Africa’s former colonial powers, Britain and Germany, left no such legacy. After independence, pressing development needs further sidelined investment in the arts.

Changing the narrative about Africa

As an Emmy-nominated producer who writes and gives s about the impact of the creative industries on Africa’s economic future, I know that too often, the stories that circulate about places like Kenya and Sudan depict them in a biased light.

As the report “Africa in the Media” from the University of Southern California’s Annenberg school , television viewers are more than twice as likely to see negative depictions of Africa than positive ones and seven times more likely to see references to Europe on TV than any mention of Africa. Similarly, a recent by the narrative change advocacy organization Africa No Filter demonstrated that skewed reporting on the continent increases African countries’ perceived risk by investors, leading to higher borrowing costs that deprive Africa of $4.2 billion annually in foreign direct investment.

This is even as the International Monetary Fund that, by 2050, more than 25% of the world’s population will be African, and by the end of the century, 40% will be. Anyone not thinking about Africa as part of the future will be left behind.

Clichéd stories about Africa hurt us all by impoverishing our collective imagination and obscuring the many opportunities inherent in Africa becoming the largest source of global workforce growth. But when African filmmakers tell their own stories, the perspective shifts. Audiences gain access to visions of Africa that are rooted in solutions instead of just the problems.

When a film like How to Build a Library circulates widely, it begins to repair the harm done by hackneyed portrayals of Africa like overreporting on election violence and instead highlights local solutions that are in full bloom.

The film follows two Kenyan women, Shiro and Wachuku, as they rebuild McMillan Memorial library, a colonial library that was not designed with Kenyans in mind. Shiro and Wachuku have to navigate local politics as they work to raise millions of dollars to rebuild the library which is owned by the government but has been left neglected and in disrepair. Unexpected obstacles, including skeptical librarian staff who view the women as outsiders, test their resolve and threaten to dash their dreams — though their cheery disposition and charisma on camera make it difficult to believe there is anything these women can’t do.

The wife-and-husband filmmaking team of Maia Lekow and Christopher King captures the highs and lows of the journey, weaving archival materials of Kenya’s colonial past (stored in the library’s archives) with present-day portraits that reveal there is still a great deal of work remaining.

In a particularly poignant moment, the official charged with approving the extended lease that would allow Shiro and Wachuku to begin construction finds an old photo of his deceased mother in the archives of the library. Suddenly, it becomes clear that restoring the library is as personal as it is public, and that honoring the stories that may be lost to history — if not for intrepid individuals like Shiro and Wachuka — is an urgent task.

Similarly, Khartoum goes beyond the headlines about Sudan’s civil war. It reveals the resilience of ordinary citizens fleeing the conflict, who find creative ways to respond amid what the UN calls the world’s worst displacement crisis. Forced to leave Sudan after the war broke out, five citizens of Khartoum reenact their stories of survival and freedom. Among them are a civil servant, a tea lady, a resistance committee volunteer, and two young bottle collectors. Through their personal narratives, they reflect on their journey from dreams to revolution to civil war and, ultimately, to exile.  

Told through green-screen, animated dreamscapes and an ethereal musical score, this inventive documentary takes audiences on an emotional journey. It weaves together vivid sequences that capture what it felt like to live in Khartoum before the conflict — and what it feels like to live in exile now.

The Sudanese filmmakers Anas Saeed, Rawia Alhag, Ibrahim Snoopy and Timeea Ahmed, along with British director Phil Cox, create a space for their subjects to process traumatic memories with extraordinary love and care.

The film’s storytelling stands in stark contrast to news reports on Sudan. Its tone, depth and humanity highlight cinema’s power to transform consciousness. This is as far from “trauma porn” as a film can get.

Instead, it is cathartic. It takes audiences on a journey that delicately weaves together memory, story, and love. It visualizes the human bonds that remain intact, even in the face of tragic violence. Ultimately, it serves as a reminder that to remember may be the most human act of all.

African filmmakers achieve independence

The selection of these films at Sundance is particularly striking, given the neo-colonial dynamics that often constrain African filmmaking. Most productions on the continent still rely heavily on European co-production funding. This funding often comes with strings attached, subtly reshaping stories to fit Western expectations of victims in need of saving.

This form of can reinforce stereotypes rather than challenge them. A recent on inclusive production by the European Audiovisual Entrepreneurs Association highlights the changes needed to address these asymmetries. Key recommendations include acknowledging the creative team’s connection to or distance from the community being portrayed and ensuring that creative control remains with the original producers, even when financing comes from external sources.

Both of these films succeed in meeting those standards. Their narrative positioning and foundation are tied to local support, particularly from the Nairobi-based East African Film Fund. Docubox, a nonprofit whose funders include the Ford Foundation and the Global Community and Engagement Resilience Fund, focuses on stories that reflect a diversity of social, cultural, and political realities while also creating a thriving community for independent African filmmakers. The organization’s “no strings attached” funding allows filmmakers to tell stories that escape the usual tropes other financing schemes may favor.

Supporting independent African filmmakers leads to transformative results, with an impact that extends beyond cinema. When African storytellers control their own narratives, they help repair the psychological damage caused by decades of reductive storytelling. Their films act as a form of cultural medicine, addressing what Nigerian writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie famously called “the danger of a single story.”

Of course, two films alone cannot fix the widespread inequities in representation. But their success at Sundance signals something profound—the emergence of a more equitable global storytelling ecosystem. This shift is largely driven by local arts organizations that have been quietly doing the work for years.

It suggests that African perspectives no longer need to be filtered through a Western lens to reach international audiences. In a world where perceptions shape reality, these films offer a vision of Africa authored by Africans themselves. They serve as a reminder that the power to tell one’s own story is not a luxury — it is a necessity for building a more just global future.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In 2024, militant Islamist violence in Africa reached a . Fatalities have nearly tripled since 2020 to approximately 11,000. This violence has displaced over 45 million people, a 14% increase over the 2023 figure. Last year marked the 13th consecutive year in which this figure has risen.

Russia has now emerged as a major player in Africa, displacing France in many countries. Moscow has conducted multiple disinformation campaigns and sent mercenaries to many conflict zones, such as Mali, Niger, Libya and Sudan.

Sudan’s conflict is Africa’s biggest crisis

The implosion of Sudan is the biggest crisis in Africa today. It has exacerbated the tensions in an already fragile region, worsening conflicts in neighboring states and increasing political instability. The internal conflicts in Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Ethiopia are now further complicated by Sudan’s instability.

Foreign powers, most notably the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Iran and Egypt, are inflaming Sudan’s conflict. They have deployed drones, munitions and mercenaries. They also patronize the smuggling of resources. This scramble for influence risks Sudan fragmenting into a collection of client states, sidelining civilian voices and popular sovereignty.

Climate change has increased African food insecurity

Over 11.5 million Sudanese have been internally displaced, and more 2.3 million have fled the country since the civil war began in April 2023. Food shortages are estimated to be killing hundreds of people daily. An estimated three million people are facing acute food insecurity.

Experts point out that droughts and floods are a key reason for increased conflict. Climate change means that places lack rain for longer periods or get too much rain in too short a time. This means the land is less productive, even as populations rise. This explosive combination has led people to fight over water, pastures and land.

In 2024, an estimated 163 million Africans suffered from acute food insecurity, over 10% of the continent’s population. This figure is nearly triple that of five years ago. Many of these Africans are crossing the Mediterranean Sea to get to Europe.

Lee Kuan Yew, the late Singaporean statesman, once warned that if Europe did not export prosperity south, Africa would export people north. That is exactly what is happening.

[ and edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Divisions within the Tigrayan ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), are now so deep, and the accusations being traded so vitriolic, there is a real possibility of their differences being settled on the battlefield. To many outsiders, this may come as a surprise. Tigrayans have managed to endure hardship and war for generations but have a reputation for using careful, lengthy debates to settle internal disputes.

Tigrayan fault lines

The rifts within Tigray can be traced back to how the 2022 war ended. Although the Tigrayan forces were not defeated, they only held on by their fingertips. They ran low on ammunition and were driven out of key strongholds. Eritrean troops captured areas of northern and western Tigray, while Ethiopian and forces — indigenous people of Ethiopia’s central highlands — held parts of the south.

The signed in Pretoria and Kenya reflected the reality on the ground. The Tigrayan team handed responsibility for the security of all Tigray over to the Ethiopian army, and required its troops to surrender their heavy weapons and disband. Politician , the Tigrayan team leader, went on to head the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (). After such a bloody conflict, the peace agreement proved a bitter pill for Tigrayans to swallow. The agreement inevitably caused differences within the TPLF.

At the TPLF’s core was the Marxist–Leninist of Tigray. Though authorities said it was dissolved in 1991, few citizens believed it really was. The TPLF old-guard grew up with its principles of , which required all members to accept, without question, the decisions of the organization’s ruling body. Under the strain of divisions over the peace treaty and the outcome of the war party, unity is severely strained and the rifts are now public.

Two factions have emerged. , chairman of the TPLF, leads one side while Getachew and those involved in the TIRA lead the other. Author Gerrit Kurtz outlines the background to this clash in the publication :

“Long-simmering tensions within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) broke out into the open in August 2024. The party leadership around President Debretsion Gebremichael now stands apart from key TPLF officials in the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) around its President Getachew Reda. Each side considers the other an illegal entity. The division has stirred up fears of renewed violence in northern Ethiopia. The split occurs in a context in which the economic and social situation in the northern highlands remains dire, the legacy of the devastating war four years ago that was only stopped by the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa, in November 2022. … At the same time, it is unclear how much support the TPLF still commands among the population at large in Tigray. Last year, the TIRA violently on an opposition rally in Mekelle. As a legacy of the war, many people are traumatised and focus on their own survival, especially the almost internally displaced persons (out of a pre-war population of around six million). Tens of thousands of young people are leaving Tigray each year in search of better livelihoods, according to the TIRA. Others become criminals.”

As Kurtz concluded in his October 2024 article, “the status quo is untenable.” This has proved accurate. Both Debretsion and Getachew’s factions have released each other — unheard-of behavior in the ruling party. Both now attempt to win over public opinion in Tigray and the support of Tigray’s troops and officers. and the have done this in Tigrinya.

Major divisions threaten rehabilitation

Here are some of the issues that divide the factions:

• Debretsion’s faction tends to originate from northern Tigray and represents the party’s old-guard. Getachew is from the south and has more support in Tigray’s regional capital, Mekelle, as well as from younger technocrats.
• Senior military officials have become embroiled in a lucrative gold trade sold via Eritrea and Sudan. This trade undermines unity and encourages corruption.
• Substantial quantities of aid from the United States and other donors were diverted and sold on the open market. As a result, the United States Agency for International Development and the World Food Programme their assistance for several months in 2023.
• The TPLF leadership believed Getachew is too close to Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Debretsion is seen as having made his peace with neighboring Eritrea, a former enemy that still holds areas of Tigray.
• Senior members of the TPLF are determined to have federal authorities continue officially recognizing their party. This may seem like a technical issue, but it is considerably resonant. The party has valuable assets in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, and beyond that could be forfeited.

These differences come as Tigrayans struggle to overcome the aftermath of the 2020–2022 war. Hundreds of thousands remain displaced from their homes and in serious hardship. As news organization reported from Tigray, “Tigray’s regional interim administration has announced plans to facilitate the return of displaced people. However, the plan is estimated to require $2.1 billion and the political will to return the displaced people.” Any form of internal conflict, let alone a civil war, would put this rehabilitation at risk.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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However, this acclaim should not obscure �䲹���ٱ��’s presidency itself. Despite �䲹���ٱ��’s declaredly moral stance, his administration was marred by contradictory foreign policy decisions.

�䲹���ٱ��’s successes in and out of office

�䲹���ٱ��’s presidency did have several positive achievements. His human rights policies resulted in the release of political prisoners in several countries. His administration pushed for nuclear arms control, notably through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II) ; although it was never ratified by the Senate, it represented a significant step in reducing the threat of nuclear war. Carter also worked to with China, successfully the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 and avoided military conflict during the Iranian . Considering the tensions of the period, the latter was a remarkable feat. In 1978, he helped broker the Camp David between Egypt and Israel.

After leaving the White House in 1981, Carter embarked on a path of active diplomacy, engaging in peace talks and humanitarian projects around the world. He facilitated efforts to eradicate the horrific Guinea worm in West Africa and spoke out against human rights violations wherever they occurred. His efforts to affordable housing through Habitat for Humanity also demonstrated his long-standing commitment to social justice. This post-presidential work remains a cornerstone of his public legacy.

�䲹���ٱ��’s moral compromises as president

Despite his achievements, �䲹���ٱ��’s actions abroad during his presidency present a stark contrast to the ideals he later championed. His tenure from 1977 to 1981 was defined by a series of decisions that, though well-intentioned, often contradicted the principles of peace, international law and human rights.

Despite his moral rhetoric, his administration engaged in policies that enabled authoritarian governments and military dictatorships. �䲹���ٱ��’s decision to increase military aid to in 1977, for instance, is a glaring contradiction. Indonesia had invaded and annexed East Timor, and the Indonesian military was responsible for numerous human rights atrocities. Under Carter, US military aid to the Indonesian regime increased by 80%, with the provision of OV-10 Bronco counterinsurgency aircraft that killed tens of thousands of East Timorese civilians.

Similarly, �䲹���ٱ��’s for Morocco’s illegal annexation of Western Sahara and his efforts to military aid to Turkey after its 1974 invasion of the Republic of Cyprus stand out as decisions that were in direct defiance of international law and United Nations resolutions.

In addition to supporting authoritarian regimes, �䲹���ٱ��’s administration failed to act on numerous human rights abuses happening around the world. One notable example is his administration’s stance on apartheid-era South Africa. Despite of the regime’s racial policies, Carter multiple UN resolutions that sought to impose sanctions on the apartheid government. This failure to take meaningful action against South Africa’s occupation of Namibia and its apartheid system was a significant shortcoming of �䲹���ٱ��’s foreign policy. It was only after Ronald Reagan succeeded Carter that the US government shifted to a more robust against apartheid. The move gained broad bipartisan support in Congress.

�䲹���ٱ��’s of the Palestine issue further exemplifies the tension between his stated principles and his actual policies. Although he publicly supported the idea of a Palestinian homeland, he failed to openly support an independent Palestinian state and refused to even meet with Palestinian leaders. He failed to pressure Israel to stop expanding illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank, even after the Israeli government violated the terms of the Camp David Accords.

Instead, �䲹���ٱ��’s administration dramatically increased military aid to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s right-wing government. He dismissed calls for stronger action against Israeli occupation. In a particularly controversial move, Carter his ambassador to the UN, former Congressman and Civil Rights leader Andrew Young, after Young met with a Palestinian representative at the UN.

�䲹���ٱ��’s policy toward Central America also reveals a troubling disregard for human rights. In El Salvador, the military junta waged a brutal campaign against leftist insurgents and civilians. Carter continued to provide to the Salvadoran government despite widespread reports of human rights violations, including the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero. �䲹���ٱ��’s failure to recognize the severity of the situation and his continued support for the Salvadoran regime drew sharp criticism from human rights advocates.

Carter also authorized military aid to General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq in , King Fahd in and Ferdinand Marcos in the . Moreover, �䲹���ٱ��’s covert support for the mujahideen in Afghanistan, designed to counter Soviet influence, contributed to the rise of and laid the groundwork for decades of instability in the region.

As we reflect on his legacy, we should remember both the shortcomings of �䲹���ٱ��’s presidency and the extraordinary contributions he made to global peace and justice in his later years.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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After two and a half years of a troubled reign challenged by the “yellow vest” revolt, a global pandemic and the war in Ukraine, Macron profited from the confusion to win a second term in 2022, in the name of continuity. But with no clear majority in the National Assembly, the ride became rocky. The year 2023 ended in relative chaos, as Macron put in place a new government led by a carefully groomed youngster, Gabriel Attal.

The year 2024 became Macron’s . It began in controversy with the hotly contested passage of an ideology-laden law on immigration. Throughout the springtime, in the leadup to the European parliamentary elections, Macron spent most of his waking hours vainly devising tactics to prevent the inevitable: the humiliation of losing to the far-right in the June 9 election.

His reaction to that resounding loss surprised friends and foes alike. He dissolved parliament and called for a national reckoning through a snap election. The result in July added insult to humiliation. A quickly cobbled-together left-wing coalition came out on top. Macron’s already motley party was now reduced to political marginality. For the first time, a Fifth Republic president was struggling to keep the political system on life support.

After months of floundering, a vote of no-confidence in December obliged Macron to nominate a new prime minister, François Bayrou. Most experts expect he will meet the same fate as his predecessor, Michel Barnier, who managed to stay in office for 90 days, affording him the satisfaction of nearly doubling Liz Truss’s record of 49 days in the UK in 2022. In other words, stability is not the best term to describe French domestic politics at the start of 2025.

If the year was truly horrible on the homefront, some people believe France has a more solid footing internationally. One of those people is… Macron. Even in the face of a general catastrophe that has unfolded recently across Africa’s Sahel region, where a series of former colonies have invited the French military — stationed for more than a decade in the name of protecting them from terrorism — to pack their bags and go home.

In an address to the annual ambassadors conference, Macron now that all’s quiet on the African front. “No, France is not in decline in Africa, it is simply lucid, it is reorganizing itself. (« Non, la France n’est pas en recul en Afrique, elle est simplement lucide, elle se réorganise »).

�մǻ岹��’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Reorganize (oneself):

1. Reformulate the narrative of any humiliating defeat to represent it as a subtle and clever exercise of one’s authority.
2. Make obvious chaos appear to be a conscious imposition of order.

Contextual note

The tone as much as the rhetoric of Macron’s speech reveals much more than the actual words he employs, even though the language itself could serve as exemplary content for a masterclass in defensive self-justification.

It takes cojones (pardon my French!) to say: “We chose to change course in Africa … because we had to move.” (« On a choisi de bouger en Afrique … parce qu’il fallait bouger. ») Both verbs in the sentence are bouger. A literal translation of this would be: “We chose to budge in Africa because budging was necessary.” His tone conveys the idea that this was all about strategic planning, not about receiving marching orders from former colonies. He takes the opportunity to upbraid “a good portion of our press” for creating that “disinformation.”

But his impatience doesn’t stop there. Macron complains that those African nations fed up with France’s meddling “forgot to say merci.” At the same time, he reminds his ambassadors that these leaders owe their privilege “of managing a sovereign country” to France. They should be eternally grateful every time they collect their presidential paycheck. Some interpret these sentiments differently. Le Monde Chad’s foreign minister, Abderaman Koulamallah, who sees this as demonstrating Macron’s “contemptuous attitude towards Africa and Africans.”

As a side note, it’s worth pointing out what the French would call Macron’s “preciosity” of language when he , “we have looked at our past relationship, memorial, cultural, we factualize it and assume it, and tell ourselves the truth. And we yield nothing to disinformation.” Thank you, Emmanuel, for factualizing your history! Our Devil’s Dictionary still isn’t sure about how to define that verb.

Historical note

In 2016, Macron made the decision to enter the race to succeed François Hollande, the president who put him in the limelight by appointing him Minister of Finance in 2014. He thus had the opportunity to observe from the inside the Fifth Republic’s system built around the unassailable authority of a president who initially had seven years to wield his power. (That was later reduced to five under Jacques Chirac).

Such a system will inevitably be attractive to a personality with a narcissistic view of himself as a messiah or savior of the nation. Macron saw that such a system could never live up to its potential in the hands of a “normal” Frenchman, which is what Hollande claimed to be. Macron drew inspiration from Hollande’s predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, often the “hyperpresident.”

Elected at the age of 37, Macron felt empowered to redesign a nation clearly floundering in the routine of its political past. Two successive five-year terms in office would offer him a full decade of exercising supreme power in the flower of his youth. During that decade he would have the time to establish a new order and groom a generation of politicians who would follow his initiative and complete the transformation of France’s political culture.

The key would be to use the theoretically impregnable power of a Fifth Republic presidency to break with a sclerotic, complex hierarchical system inherited from the previous century dominated by Gaullists and Socialists. He would usher in a new republic based on the meritocratic, neoliberal and technocratic ideals that a generation of Western bankers, traders, entrepreneurs and innovators had redefined as the new universal norm. Oddly, he hadn’t noticed, and still doesn’t seem to notice, that the globalized world was already moving in a multipolar direction that called into question the logic of Western globalization.

Already in 2015, Macron had begun a changing political chessboard. “The great missing piece is the figure of the king” (le grand absent est la figure du roi.). This remark may surprise some observers who note that, in comparison to other Western democracies, a president of France’s Fifth Republic already exercises virtually regal powers. Macron went so far as to claim that the French regretted killing the monarch. It left “an emotional void in the collective imagination.”

In 2016, after announcing his candidacy, Macron the nature of the office itself. “France needs a Jupiterian president… not a simple god but the king of the gods.” In some sense, Macron was a disciple of Francis Fukuyama, who decades earlier had “the end of history.”

For Macron, now that history had stopped in its tracks, France could simply enjoy the royal privilege bequeathed to the nation by its noble past. The former Rothschild banker reasoned that to exercise its dynamic power, France simply had to consolidate its own economic contribution to the global order, alongside the other gods on the new Olympus. The old culturally complex social structures dear to the Gaullists and the Socialists of Mitterrand’s generation could now be replaced by a society defined essentially through purely economic relations.

Alas, Macron had failed to notice that, by 2017, Fukuyama’s updated Hegelianism had lost its luster. The drift of history since the beginning of the new millennium had already provided a few dramatic surprises to remind people it was still alive and kicking. Already a global pandemic and a war in Ukraine were in preparation.

As for Macron in 2025, after his annus horribilis, there can be little doubt that the worst is yet to come.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary.]

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The ISIS terror group took responsibility for the latter. However, in 2025, the terror dynamics have changed. This recent attack perhaps has indicated a dangerous shift in ISIS’s striking patterns. 

ISIS lone wolf attacks 

ISIS has a classic pair of striking patterns: Suicide bombings and lone-wolf attacks. The former has been the most frequent type since January 2024, as it was used in the January 3 in Kerman, Iran, and the March 22 Crocus City Hall in Moscow, Russia. ISIS has used high-intensity bombings ever since their capabilities began dwindling.

The last reported lone wolf attack in a metropolitan city took place last year in Solingen, Germany, where a Syrian ISIS member stabbed three men during a festival. Similarly, two lone wolf attacks took place on October 16 and December 2, 2023 in and , respectively. The assessment shows ISIS was not able to execute a deadly lone wolf in the West as it did in Nice, France on July 14, 2016, when a truck rammed a crowd celebrating Bastille Day, killing 86 people and injuring 434 more.

Most ISIS strikes have been recorded in Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East; these have mostly been suicide bombings or coordinated mass shootings. ISIS attacks in Western countries were fewer and limited to stabbing incidents; these can be viewed as multiple attempts to execute a lone wolf attack or coordinated lone wolf attacks on a large scale, like they did in Paris in the November 13, 2015 and Nice in the aforementioned 2016 attack.

Capabilities are limited, but resurgence is possible

Since 2017, ISIS’s capabilities started declining after the US intensified its counterterror operations. The nation’s ongoing has led to some notable success against ISIS, causing the group’s terrorist presence to dip substantially from 2017 to 2019. In 2019, ISIS was defeated in Syria and Libya. That October, US forces ISIS Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in . In 2023, the US killed senior leaders of ISIS and detained around 79 of its terrorists.

The greatest blow came when US forces Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the head of ISIS’s intelligence/foreign branch, Emni, on August 30, 2016. Adnani’s death crippled ISIS’s striking and recruitment capabilities. The terror group is now scrambled, with its capability to strike the West destroyed. ISIS’s presence is now limited to Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. For the past two years, high-intensity attacks have only been recorded in those regions.

ISIS is weakened, but perhaps its potential for resurgence has not been meaningfully considered. The patterns also suggest that whenever its influence is seen to be dwindling, it tries to send a message to the West by carrying out major attacks in West African or Middle Eastern countries.

The US-led coalition has intensified its operations against ISIS’s limited and fragmented presence for one year, leading to against the group since January 2024. According to reports, the US-led forces have killed 44 terrorists and detained around 166 others.

Despite an intensified operation, the outfit still holds a tight grip over its fragmented network and has attempted to capitalize on various opportunities to make a comeback. There are arguably three primary reasons why ISIS could see a strong revival: The first is the US’s shifting focus on Iran due to the Israel–Hamas conflict. The second is the increased destabilization in Syria and West Africa, and now the of the Syrian government. The third is the increasing freedom ISIS’s Khorāsānis — residents of the area of the Iranian Plateau — are finding to operate in South and Central Asia, especially in Afghanistan.

These have facilitated ISIS’s regrouping at the regional level, which has given the outfit occasional opportunities to carry out low-intensity terror strikes across the globe. The fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad government and the mobilization of various Islamic coalitions there have given ISIS, especially Khorāsānis, a to further resurge and increase their striking capabilities.

However, the resurgence factor is not the only thing to worry about; a possible shift in the ISIS striking pattern could help ISIS showcase its capabilities as well.

A shift in striking pattern

ISIS terror strikes can be classified into three patterns. The first is direct: ISIS directly carries out its strikes. The second is indirect: ISIS enables an attack and indirectly carries out its strikes by connecting to attackers through the Internet. An example of this was the Curtis Culwell Center attack in Garland, Texas on May 3, 2015 — one of the attackers who opened fire at the community center was in contact with ISIS through encrypted texts.

The third pattern is : Using online propaganda, ISIS inspires self-radicalized individuals to carry out lone wolf attacks on their own. An example is the 2016 Nice attack. Though the perpetrator, , acted on his own, ISIS later took credit for his actions. Conversely, there is the April 7, 2017 truck in Stockholm, Sweden, where a similar vehicle ramming incident took place. In this case, ISIS did not take credit for the self-radicalized man’s attack. The organization was under intense pressure at that time, and its presence and capabilities had been significantly damaged by US-led coalition forces; by the end of the year, ISIS was defeated in Iraq.

ISIS is once again , this time in Syria, thanks to US airstrikes. As it weaves an opportunity to resurge, some believe the group has resorted to enhancing online propaganda and carrying out inspired attacks without direct involvement. The reason for this possible change to its striking pattern is to ensure resurgence and keep limited striking capabilities intact without exposing itself. Additionally, it seeks to avoid instant retaliatory and offensive responses from the US, which could severely damage ISIS’s chances of resurgence in Syria and elsewhere.

If left unchecked, a new, lethal wave of inspired ISIS terror could emerge.

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Indeed, in May, we witnessed the first significant indication when, in South Africa,  the ruling African National Congress (ANC) lost its majority in May, making it necessary to form a coalition government. However, this did not depend only on the crisis of the ANC and the demands by some social and economic groups but also on the presence of other parties, such as the one headed by former President Jacob Zuma, which likely intercepted votes from poor and dissatisfied people, that is, those and social groups that the ANC is struggling to reach today.

Specifically, some consider the role of through some themes of debate: The first theme is “Jacob Zuma as Donald Trump,” the second is that uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) party’s strong performance can be explained by Zuma’s appeal to Zulu “nationalism,” signaling that they have successfully appealed to aspects of Zulu culture and history to get support. Third, MK’s rise may be the product of a “coalition of the aggrieved”: Those who have felt sidelined by the Ramaphosa government’s policies, as mentioned above.

October: Botswana and Mozambique

The two October elections in Botswana and Mozambique are interesting and, at the same time, have different elements.

Botswana differs from the regional context because, in this case, the nationalist party that led the country to independence in 1966 was not an armed liberation movement as in most cases in the region (Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa). The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) then remained in government as the dominant party for almost sixty years.

The opposition Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) has won a majority in parliament; its leader, Duma Boko, 54, a Harvard-educated human rights lawyer, the peaceful handover. “What has happened today takes our democracy to a higher level,” he declared.

The election outcome in Botswana highlights the need for renewal in a stable and democratic political system characterized by high levels of social inequality and forms of marginalization, which have somehow influenced the electoral results.

Indeed, when Botswana gained independence from Britain in 1966, it was one of the world’s poorest countries. However, economic planning and the discovery of diamonds allowed the ruling BDP to provide efficient services and maintain political stability. The nation of 2.5 million people held elections every five years. In 2023, Botswana had the highest GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa. For decades, was considered one of the best-run countries in Africa.

But things are partially different. The people of Botswana voted to replace the responsible for mounting economic grievances, particularly among young people. Unemployment and were the top concerns among most voters: The BDP had not delivered on its promises of social development, and the cost of living was very high.

The election results register the anger of citizens over economic stagnation linked to a decline in the diamond trade, on which the country’s economy depends. Botswana’s leaders have maintained inequality instead of spending on health, education and social welfare. A downturn in the global diamond market caused economic growth to plummet this year to a projected 1%, while unemployment rose to 28%. The new government will need to focus on reducing diamond dependency, stabilizing the economy and creating new jobs, especially for young people.

The has said he will try to contact De Beers as quickly as possible. He has also campaigned to raise the minimum wage and increase social grants.

Botswana is linked to other countries by elements of social marginalization and forms of crisis for some groups. According to UNDP estimates, Botswana remains profoundly unequal, with a significant Gini index that places it among the world’s top ten most unequal countries, together with South Africa and Namibia.

In Mozambique, there has been a significant demand for change, especially from middle-class and urban groups that do not see the old liberation movement — ​​Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo) — as an adequate interlocutor to solve the country’s economic problems. Despite accusations of electoral fraud and serious violence by government security apparatuses, the official results have confirmed Frelimo in power and its candidate Chapo, who does not belong to the old guard of liberation fighters, as president. Consequently, a new form of political and social battle has opened, even violent, in the search for renewal and the search for stability in a country where historical inequalities and political and regional diversity are still very strong and where the armed Islamist rebellion in the northern province is causing further forms of destabilization to which the government intends to respond firmly.

As mentioned, has followed the presidential and parliamentary elections in Mozambique. The current protests have been more sustained and widespread, especially in the capital, Maputo. At the same time, Mondlane actively calls for the of the elections.

However, as mentioned by sociologist Ruth Castel-Branco, on the eve of the October general election, Podemos opposition was a without a candidate, who found in Venâncio Mondlane a candidate without a party. He is a charismatic leader who managed to ride the wave of youthful indignation. A gospel preacher, Mondlane preaches about tyranny and corruption, development and prosperity, peace and unity. But he inclines toward authoritarian populists. It is unclear whether Podemos and Mondlane can deliver a new dispensation through their marriage, as Mondlane intertwines his theological views with a neoliberal economic agenda. Although Podemos has “socialist” roots, it does not have the political and organizational coherence to influence Mondlane’s political base. And it has become increasingly clear that there will be no peace in Mozambique if there is no justice.

Certain requests for change in Southern Africa depend on the historical context. The old liberation movements are in crisis, and today, they no longer seem able to control the social and political transformations in the era of liberalism, even if they try to respond to contemporary challenges.

November, Namibia

In Namibia, these elements have shaped the political debate, but the results of the November elections reaffirm the substantial status quo, solidifying the old party/movement’s hold on power. What is certain is that the candidacy of a woman for the presidency by the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) — something far from widespread and obvious in Africa — has probably given the ruling party an extra opportunity, an element of “positive” novelty. Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, born in 1952, is a former activist of the SWAPO youth league and belongs to the party’s old guard. In a country where the opposition’s requests for change are still unmet, she reverses a regional trend in which some social sectors seek political change.

“The Namibian nation has voted for peace and stability,” said. Her victory cements the SWAPO party’s 34-year hold on power since independence from apartheid South Africa in 1990, while opposition parties have rejected the results after including shortages of ballot papers and other issues, marred the election.

Many regarded her as a seasoned diplomat untouched by the corruption scandals that engulfed some other members of SWAPO. Her triumph also signifies that Namibia defies a trend where restive younger voters in southern Africa punish incumbent .��

The admitted to failures in organizing the vote, but the chairperson rejected all allegations of fraud. “I urge all Namibians to embrace the results with the spirit of unity, diversity, understanding and reconciliation,” she said.��

In conclusion, we must recognize the search for change in the Southern African region’s political and social history. Many of its voters come from poverty and unemployment.

Former have emphasized their past armed struggles to provide historical legitimacy and to build popular support. However, the liberation narrative seems to be vanishing for the populations governed by these movements. They face the challenge represented by a new, younger, more urbanized electorate, for whom past successes in achieving independence from colonial powers are less relevant than those of their parents and grandparents. The electorate’s demand for change to address problems such as unemployment and social injustice is growing, along with a demand for a more significant fight against corruption.

Regardless of the outcome, the election results in the region should warn ruling parties that they must deliver on the economic they made to their electorates. Furthermore, they cannot expect to rule in perpetuity.

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The extremist groups threaten to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and spread instability across Africa. This is terrible for Africa and poses significant security and financial risks for the United States and Europe as well. Of the over three million refugees and internally displaced people in the Sahel, one in five needs humanitarian assistance. That’s around 16,000 victims in 2022 and 19,000 in 2023. Indeed, this conflict has taken a heavy toll.

This escalation of violence is mainly linked to competition between the region’s two main jihadist groups: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP), which are affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, respectively. Jointly with other groups, they have taken advantage of the great instability in the region to launch indiscriminate on government forces and civilians.

Coups and rebellions escalate the violence

Experts attribute the expansion of violent extremism in the Sahel to weak governance, high corruption, democratic deficits and human rights violations combined with poverty and social marginalization. State power tends to be concentrated in urban regions while rural and northern areas, such as Mali, remain underdeveloped and ripe for exploitation by extremist groups. Simultaneously, the jihadist collective has sought to the increase in violence across the central Sahel, positioning itself as the defender of local communities and obtaining their support.

Moreover, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger experienced many military coups since independence. Recent military coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023 have redefined the political landscape.

Current instability is associated with the collapse of the Libyan state in 2011, which led to the proliferation of weapons and armed fighters in the region. In 2012, the influx of extremists into northern Mali reignited the dormant  — the Tuareg minority, organized under the Azawad National Liberation Movement, sought an autonomous state and aligned with multiple Islamist groups.

On September 17, 2024, Islamist armed fighters attacked two symbolic sites for the security in the Malian capital of Bamako: a gendarmerie school and a military base, causing about 77 casualties and hundreds injured. JNIM, the main jihadist group active in Mali, quickly claimed responsibility for the double attack. This follows a pattern of escalating violent incidents in the Bamako area in the past two years by the JNIM coalition, primarily the Macina Liberation Front.

This growing pressure on Bamako reflects a broader deterioration of security in Mali under the military junta. Recently, militant Islamist groups have demonstrated an to expand their into southern Mali from their fortifications in northern and central Mali. The Malian government intends to operations against the jihadists.

Do these attacks mark a turning point in the jihadists’ strategy? This is not an easy question to answer. The scale and impact of the September 27 operation show that JNIM now has the capacity not only to strike secondary urban sites, but to shake up the Malian forces in Bamako by expanding military operations to the state’s center.

Western withdrawal from the Sahel

This instability has had a major effect at the international level. In 2022, the definitive breakdown of diplomatic relations between France and Mali prompted French President Emmanuel Macron to announce the withdrawal of French troops from Malian territory. That November, the French military mission Opération Barkhane, which had deployed in the Sahel since August 2014, officially concluded. This profound revision of the region’s French military apparatus is in turn causing a for the entire security framework built by the international community over the last decade.

The US has also provided coordination and advisory support. The US military has increased its presence in the Sahel in the last decade, deploying approximately 1,500 troops to the region — particularly Niger. However, after making an agreement with a Nigerien military junta in May 2024, the US withdrew from Niger in September.

In June 2023, Mali’s government demanded the departure of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the UN peacekeeping force. The UN agreed to withdraw within six months, doing so in December 2023. This development raised of a power vacuum and setbacks for Mali’s transition to civilian rule.

The July 2023 coup in Niger dealt a severe blow to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts in the Sahel. Despite pressure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), including sanctions and the threat of military intervention, the coup leaders refused to cede power and declared a new government. In response, the African Union �����������.

However, some of the sanctions were recently lifted or eased as ECOWAS pushed for a new dialogue. Military regimes in Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali have backed the Nigerien junta, with the latter two considering a possible military intervention in Niger to be a “declaration of war.” In September 2023, the military leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger signed a mutual defense pact — the Alliance of Sahel States — solidifying, in recent months, their alliance against external intervention.

Russian movement into Africa

This “authoritarian epidemic,” which the Italian Institute for International Political Studies characterizes by the seizure of power by the military, is mainly due to the persistence of the security crisis. This has delegitimized civilian governments that are demonstrably incapable of responding to growing security pressures. Jihadist escalation and the authoritarian and nationalist drift of local governments have finally created the ideal conditions for an influential increase of other international actors in the region, starting with Russia. These military regimes have strengthened ties with the Asian power, which has moved in to fill the void.

The most obvious element of this Russian entry is the presence of mercenaries belonging to the private security company . The government in Bamako uses them to conduct counterinsurgency operations increasingly characterized by indiscriminate brutality committed against civilians.

Russia’s “African renaissance” seems able to increase, based on an economic and military diplomacy that exploits anti-French and anti-Western sentiments. It seduces part of the African elite, attracts old and new partners, winks at coup-plotting juntas and has supplanted France as the gendarme of countries in turmoil in its historic pré carré — “own little corner.” Russia’s representation is that of a just ally eager to create egalitarian ties with African countries, capable of emancipating them from the relationship with European powers. The opposition to “imperialism” present in Russian rhetoric creates further common ground between the country and the Sahelian military juntas.

The presence of the Wagner group, and now of the Russian , initially called to operate against the jihadists, now has the function of supporting the coup juntas. The numerous internal and external involved in this conflict, as well as the competition between global powers to increase their influence in Africa, make finding a solution extremely difficult.

In this framework, Ukraine’s involvement in the crisis is experiencing an increasingly pronounced setback. In August 2024, the three Sahelian military juntas wrote to the United Nations Security Council to allegedly denounce Kyiv’s intervention in Mali to support Tuareg rebellion. After Mali and Niger diplomatic relations with Ukraine, the Asian country received yet more confirmation that its image had been damaged: Andriy Yusov, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian military intelligence services, Kyiv had provided information for the JNIM and Tuareg rebels’ attack on the Malian army.

Learning that Ukraine is collaborating with its enemies, purely in an anti-Russian function, has raised concerns even outside the Sahel. Despite being amid a diplomatic crisis with the three coup juntas, ECOWAS has spoken out against any form of foreign interference.

Excessive militarization has proven counterproductive. In fact, local populations affected by repeated human rights violations have all confidence in international intervention as well as in international institutions.

The French era seems to have passed in what was once its African “backyard,” substituted by the Africa Corps that serves as the engine of Russian military penetration in Africa. The geopolitical revolution engulfing the Global South is redrawing global spheres of influence. Will this lead to a strategic downgrading of the West?

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In October, the prime ministers of the UK and Mauritius announced the decision to transfer sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius. Diego Garcia now stands at the center of a Byzantine nexus of colonialism, indigenous dislocation and contemporary geopolitics.

Settlement and colony

The native population of Diego Garcia, known as Chagossians, descended from enslaved Africans brought by French colonists in the late 18th century. The French were the first European power to lay claim to Diego Garcia, using the island primarily for coconut plantations. They brought enslaved people to the island who worked in agriculture and established a small, thriving community. 

After the abolition of slavery, these populations mixed with other ethnic groups and formed a Creole-speaking community with a unique . However, in 1814, Britain took control of Mauritius and its dependencies under the Treaty of Paris — including Diego Garcia. For most of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the island and its Creole culture remained relatively isolated as it served as an obscure outpost of the British Empire’s Indian Ocean territories.��

The strategic importance of Diego Garcia only came to international attention during the Cold War. At the time, the US was searching for military base locations to counter communist influence from the Soviet Union and China. Diego Garcia’s location made it an for a major military installation.

This was a watershed episode in the island’s history. In 1965, in anticipation of the establishment of a US military base, the British government separated Diego Garcia and the other islands of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius. This was part of the creation of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), under which Chagos became the in Africa. Under this agreement, the British leased Diego Garcia to the United States for use as a military facility.��

Mauritius, then still a British colony, was subsequently compensated ($3.8 million) for the transfer of the Chagos Archipelago. Based on an average inflation rate of 4.9%, that amounts to £50 million ($63 million) in today’s currency. This arrangement was made as part of the broader context of Mauritius gaining its independence, which finally occurred in 1968. However, critics claim the payment was inadequate. They state it took too long to reach Chagossian pockets, and that only awarded to Mauritius actually went to the exiled Chagossian islanders.

More disturbingly, the entire arrangement was completed without the sanction or knowledge of the Chagossian peoples themselves. This planted the seeds for future disputes over the legal status of Diego Garcia and the rest of the Chagos Islands. It also laid the groundwork for the indigenous population’s deportation.

The expulsion of the Chagossians

One of the darkest days in the history of Diego Garcia was the forcible removal of the Chagossian population to make way for the US military base. Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing into the early 1970s, the British government undertook a systematic campaign to remove all the inhabitants of the island. The exact number of people displaced is disputed, but range from 1,000 to 2,000 individuals.��

The British justified this removal on the basis that Chagossians were only “,” not indigenous inhabitants. Declassified UK Foreign Office documents outline the extent of the falsehood which was utilized to deliberately justify British actions:

A small number of people were born there and, in some cases, their parents were born there too. The intention is, however, that none of them shall be regarded as being permanent inhabitants of the islands ().

On this spurious basis for eviction, namely length of historical settlement, one could similarly have argued that the entire Pakeha population of Aotearoa New Zealand should be removed given that they have lived for less time on their islands than the Chagossians have on theirs. Regardless of the illogicality, as a result of this fiction, the Chagossians were forcibly transferred from their homes to Mauritius and the Seychelles, often under the pretense of “resettlement.”

Instead of resettlement, these communities were effectively abandoned in foreign lands where they faced extreme economic hardship. In his book Island of Shame, David Vine describes that the exiles often lived in “slums or temporary housing, struggling to adapt to life in an unfamiliar environment without the means to sustain themselves.” The difficulties plagued Chagossians in Mauritius and the Seychelles alike.

The battle against displacement

The exiled Chagossian population, including the descendants of the original displaced community, was estimated in 2016 to be around . While scattered across several countries, many still reside in Mauritius. Despite the passage of time and their continued displacement, the Chagossians have maintained their identity and culture, and many still hope to return to their ancestral lands.��

For decades, the various displaced Chagossians dispersed across the world have fought legal battle after legal battle for the right to return to their homeland and for compensation for the injustices they had suffered. As a result of this pressure, the British government finally offered an additional sum of ($5.1 million) to Chagossians in 1982, but this too was insufficient.��

Most significantly, this compensation did not address the right to return. A British Court of Appeal in 2000 did, however, make a start on that by deeming the expulsion of the islanders illegal and granting them the right to visit their homeland for the first time in thirty years. However, Diego Garcia itself, the largest and most habitable island, was to remain to them still for security concerns.

Considering that the other atolls in the archipelago were concurrently , and with Diego Garcia itself still off limits, this ruling was merely a Pyrrhic victory. To borrow Tim Marshall’s term, Diego Garcia and the Chagossians remained “.” 

Calls for for the return of Diego Garcia 

Unsurprisingly, the status of Diego Garcia has remained an ongoing subject of international legal disputes. In February 2019, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a that Britain’s occupation of the Chagos Islands, including Diego Garcia, was illegal and that the islands should be returned to Mauritius.��

The court concluded that the detachment of the Chagos Islands from Mauritius in 1965 as part of the BIOT was unlawful and that the process of decolonization was incomplete. Whilst the court’s ruling was non-binding, it carried significant moral and political weight. 

Following the ICJ’s decision, the UN General Assembly then passed a resolution calling for the UK to return the Chagos Islands to Mauritius. However, the government refused to comply until this past October, citing the continued strategic importance of Diego Garcia for defense purposes. The US had also expressed opposition to any changes in the status of Diego Garcia until recently, when President Joe Biden reportedly for a transfer of sovereignty.

History repeating itself

There is a sad irony at play with the recent willingness of the UK Government to comply with the ICJ’s decision. While the UK has agreed to hand over power, the judgment now gives control of the islands to Mauritius, not to the Chagossian peoples themselves. One very distant colonial power merely seems to have been replaced by another, less distant one. 

This recent development mirrors the events of when negotiations were brokered solely with the incoming Mauritian government of the day rather than the Chagossians themselves. To add further injustice to this recent political development, today’s agreement will continue to see Diego Garcia remain under US and UK jurisdiction for the next . This again is reflective of the when it was made clear that Mauritius’s independence would not be granted without the annexation of Diego Garcia.��

History is repeating itself. Today, the only difference is that instead of being hidden in secret Foreign Office memos, this handover is being celebrated openly as the culmination of justice. 

The path forward

Some Chagossians see it as an event worth , at least according to the Mauritius Government Information Service. In the British press, the transfer of control is likewise being described as “.” Meanwhile, international pundits are claiming that the agreement is a “‘ moment in international relations.”

Nevertheless, there is a flip side to this halcyon perception, namely the danger that the British, with UN connivance, are enabling Mauritius to rule an island group and its peoples some 2000 kilometers plus away without the consent of the entire indigenous population. 

Peter Lamb, the Labour MP for Crawley where a Chagossian community 3,000 strong resides, has been publicly critical of his own leader’s recommendation to hand the islands to Mauritius without their consent. He that “the decision… belongs [to] the Chagossian people, it’s not for the UK to bargain away.” Other Chagossians are similarly , referencing indigenous rights.��

Wherever they reside, all Chagos Islanders deserve to have a say in their political future. Even with the return of the islands to Mauritius, little financial compensation is likely to reach the displaced Chagossians directly. Not to mention that base lease rights and payments notwithstanding, the entire archipelago has a potential exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of an astounding 640,000 km². It remains unclear if, and how, the Chagossians will regain independent rights to these zones and their resources. But the UK and US governments are not alone in bearing responsibility. The UN is also at fault in this dire situation, as the organization played a significant role in influencing the decision to return the atoll without the consent of the indigenous population. 

As the treatment of the Chagossian population in Diego Garcia demonstrates, history continuously repeats itself when it comes to the story of empire. As long as indigenous voices continue to be overlooked, the ghosts of the colonial past will haunt the present.

[ edited this piece.]

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Plaut then goes on to explain the rise of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1912 as a unifying force for black South Africans against the increasingly oppressive white regime. Key figures like Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo emerged, advocating for more radical tactics and forming alliances with the . 

The 1960 Sharpeville massacre in which police fired at unarmed protestors after a stray shot from the crowd fired up resistance to the apartheid regime. Many ANC leaders opted for armed resistance, which was utterly ineffectual but led to a crackdown by the apartheid regime. It banned the ANC and jailed its leaders.

After a few quiet years, the 1970s saw a resurgence of resistance, with white students, including Plaut, supporting the formation of labor unions and the United Democratic Front. These organizations, along with international pressure and the ANC’s armed struggle, contributed to the eventual downfall of apartheid. However, the ANC’s tendency to consolidate power and control other organizations came to the fore, raising concerns about its commitment to truly democratic principles.

To its credit, the ANC represented all ethnicities and stood for equality for all. It opposed discrimination and championed democracy. The post-apartheid South Africa has had many challenges, but the values of democracy, rule of law and freedom of expression run strong. The history of a prolonged independence struggle against colonialism makes South Africa resilient and gives us reason for optimism regarding the future.

[Peter Choi edited this podcast and wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The war’s impact on Europe has been significant. Heightened energy prices have affected countries heavily reliant on Russian gas, such as Germany. European nations have also diverted resources and attention toward Ukraine and away from other crucial areas like social spending and healthcare. Most fundamentally, the war has shattered the last remnants of trust between the East and West, leading many European nations to up their defense budgets in anticipation of a potential direct conflict with Russia.

Switzerland in the middle of an increasingly anxious Europe

Reflecting this defensive attitude, EU High Representative Josep Borrell that Europe is a garden and the rest of the world is a jungle. Germany has closed its borders, apparently to avoid the jungle taking over the garden. Switzerland takes a more moderate approach. While acknowledging migration and integration challenges, the country emphasizes the need for proactive and inclusive migration policies.

Right-wing leaders are in charge in many parts of Europe, like Robert Fico in Slovakia and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party is on the rise, and in France, the National Rally party made a decent dent in the latest parliamentary elections. Switzerland finds the rise of right-wing, anti-immigrant populist movements across Europe to be a cause for concern. Unlike other European countries, though, Switzerland is a decentralized confederation. This offers a degree of resilience against nationalist trends that would seek to dominate politics at the countrywide level. Yet Switzerland remains uneasy about the deeper political and social crises of which the rise of the far right is a manifestation.

Switzerland the investor

In lighter news, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway a free trade agreement with India in March. Swiss diplomat Ralf Heckner has received the credit for achieving what the EU, the UK and the US failed to do. The secret of Swiss success is the country’s independent position. As a non-member of major trade blocs, Switzerland has greater flexibility in forging agreements with emerging markets. Additionally, India’s status as a rapidly growing economy and Switzerland’s political commitment to strengthening economic ties played crucial roles in the successful negotiations.

Switzerland is looking east for economic growth, with China and India among its top export markets. However, the country has adopted a cautious approach toward China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy, economic slowdown and challenges faced by private actors. 

Switzerland the peacemaker

As a famously neutral territory for peace talks, Switzerland hosted a summit to resolve Sudan’s ongoing civil war. Yet Sudanese General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces, to sit the talks out. Despite his absence from recent negotiations, Switzerland remains committed to facilitating dialogue and humanitarian access.

Switzerland has faced more than one setback in Africa in recent times. The cocoa crop in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana is facing its third tough year in a row. Chocolate-loving and chocolate-producing Switzerland may need to diversify its cocoa supply chain and include more suppliers from Latin America, with which it maintains cordial relations.

Finally, remaining in the Western Hemisphere, Switzerland views the current state of American democracy with concern, particularly regarding the deep political polarization and potential challenges to the peaceful transfer of power. The US is the preeminent global superpower, and uncertainty about its future direction adds to instability everywhere.

To manage these risks, Switzerland has adopted a flexible and open-minded approach, maintaining communication channels with both major political parties in the US. This proactive strategy ensures continued cooperation and stability in its relationship with the global superpower, regardless of the election outcome.

[Peter Choi edited this podcast and wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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At the heart of the conflict is the , a hydroelectric project on the . Ethiopia’s dam construction has angered Egypt, which sees it as a threat to its water supply. The Nile is crucial for Egypt, providing nearly all its water resources. While Ethiopia argues that the dam is solely for electricity generation and won’t significantly impact water flow, Egypt still needs to be convinced. This dispute has deep historical roots, reflecting long-standing power dynamics between the two nations.

The region’s history is marked by conflicts and shifting alliances. In the 1970s, Cold War dynamics played out in the Horn of Africa, with the United States and Soviet Union supporting opposing sides. The between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977–1978 was a significant event, resulting in a Somali defeat that still resonates today. These historical conflicts have shaped current relationships and tensions between countries in the region.

Countries of the Horn of Africa. Via Zeremariam Fre (CC BY-SA 4.0).

Ethiopia’s Prime Minister has ambitious plans for his country, including rebuilding the capital and reestablishing Ethiopia’s access to the sea. This vision includes developing a port in a move that has angered Somalia. Ethiopia’s potential recognition of Somaliland has further complicated regional dynamics. Meanwhile, Eritrea’s relationship with Ethiopia has cooled.

Involving outside powers adds complexity to the situation. Egypt has begun providing military support to Somalia, potentially countering Ethiopia. The United Arab Emirates plays a significant financial backer in the region, though its exact strategy remains unclear. Other external powers, such as Turkey, India, China and the United States, also have interests in the area, further complicating the geopolitical landscape.

Precarious stability and the global implications of African tensions

The ongoing civil war in Sudan and the instability in South Sudan contribute to the region’s overall volatility. These conflicts have drawn in various international actors, each with their own agendas. The situation in Sudan, in particular, has the potential to impact the broader regional dynamics, especially given its strategic location and historical ties to both Egypt and Ethiopia.

Despite having a significant military presence in Djibouti, the United States is currently preoccupied with other global issues. This relative disengagement from the Horn of Africa’s tensions could allow other actors to fill the power vacuum. A solid mediating force is necessary to avoid escalating regional conflicts.

The situation in the Horn of Africa resembles the complex alliances and tensions that preceded World War I. The interconnected nature of the conflicts, the involvement of multiple regional and global powers and the potential for rapid escalation are concerning parallels. The region’s strategic importance, particularly in maritime trade and geopolitical influence, makes these tensions globally significant.

Looking forward, the stability of the Horn of Africa remains precarious. The combination of historical grievances, current political ambitions and resource disputes creates a volatile mix. The role of external powers, particularly China and the United Arab Emirates, will be crucial in shaping future developments. As global attention remains focused on other crises, the risk of overlooking the simmering tensions in this critical region could have far-reaching consequences for regional and global stability.

[Peter Choi edited this podcast and wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Making Sense of Rising Tensions in the Horn of Africa appeared first on 51�Թ�.

In the from 1954 to 1962, France committed unimaginable atrocities against Algerians in both Algeria and France. Algerians who cooperated with French forces were often captured and killed by their countrymen fighting for independence. Many escaped and sought asylum in France, where they were then put in camps and denied basic human rights and access to education. Those in Algeria fighting against the French were subject to horrific crimes such as systematic torture, which often resulted in deaths that were labeled as suicides.��

In 1961, a year before Algeria gained independence, thousands of Algerians peacefully protested in Paris. In this event that became known as the , French police killed of the demonstrators, shooting some and throwing others into the river. The French government covered up such atrocities by censoring the media and destroying archival evidence.��

On September 20, 2021, President Macron condemned the “massacre of Algerians in Paris.” He issued an apology to the Algerians who fought alongside the French forces and to the families of those whom the Algerians captured as traitors and killed during the fight for independence.  

Over the course of the conflict, the French colonization of Algeria is estimated to have cost up to Algerian lives. In 1962, an was finally reached calling for a cease-fire, and Algeria gained independence after 132 years of French rule.

The shaping of Algeria

For the last five hundred years, Algeria has had a turbulent past. Around the turn of the seventh century, first conquered the region today known as Algeria. At the time, it was home to an indigenous group called the Berbers, known for their bravery and independence. However, that conquest was short-lived, and upon a second attempt, the Arabs were defeated by a Berber warrior queen named .��

In 705, the conquest finally succeeded. Arabs settled in the region and Berbers gradually became Muslims, adopting Arabic as their language. In , Berbers joined the Arabs in the conquest of , present-day Spain and Portugal.��

In 742, the Muslim Berbers rebelled against Arab rule and succeeded. By 907, much of North Africa came under the control of the Fatimids, a Shia sect. Over time, local rulers began to follow Sunni Islam and from that event to the 15th century, the area lived in turmoil. 

Then, the Europeans arrived. In 1471, the colonization of Africa began with the Portuguese taking some of the Moroccan coastlines. In the early 16th century, Algeria came under the Ottoman Empire. 

Although Algeria was under the Ottomans, that did not stop colonists from attacking it. The French invaded Algeria in 1682, the Dutch in 1715, the Spanish in 1775 and the US in 1815, to name a few. In 1830, the French conquered Algeria and it eventually became a French colony. 

The colonization of Algeria

When the French invaded again in 1830, it took them nearly 20 years to conquer Algeria. The occupation was bloody and brutal, resulting in a substantial reduction in the local population. Some even consider the conquest genocide. 

As the French struggled to gain control, they deliberately killed, raped, tortured, and buried unarmed civilians alive. Out of a population of three million, French forces caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Algerians, some occurring as the result of disease and famine. Around civilians were kept in prison camps. French officer Lucien de Montagnac, who was sent to assist in the colonization effort, that the French must “annihilate all that will not crawl beneath our feet like dogs.”

The legacy of colonization in Algeria goes far beyond mass killings. The French stole religious endowments, restricted movement and confiscated fertile lands which they then gave to settlers. The French also plundered gold, iron, coal and other minerals, some of which are still in France.

Over the next century, France struggled to maintain control of Algeria. In 1911, a group of upper-class Muslims labeled themselves “” and demanded representation in the French National Assembly, which was duly declined. Not long after, when France began drafting Muslims to fight the Germans in WWI, many Algerian Muslims took up arms and resisted the law. In the following decades, tensions continued to boil over between Algerians and the French.

The Algerian War

By 1945, encouraged by the 1941 Atlantic Charter, Algerians demanded full independence. When Nazi Germany accepted defeat, Algerians gathered in large numbers to not only celebrate the fall of the Nazi regime but also to garner attention during the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. They wanted the delegates to know that Algeria existed and was ready to be an independent nation. In May, after the conference commenced, mass protests broke out in cities across Algeria.

Like all other mass protests, some violence occurred. The French reacted with aggression, and by the end of June had massacred several thousand Algerians. Many of those Algerians had fought side-by-side with France against Germany.

From their experience in 1945, Algerian patriots realized the only way to gain their freedom was through armed struggle. In 1954, unable to make progress, young Algerian patriots formed the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (). They tried to unite the Algerians to fight the French and liberate their country. The CRUA created the National Liberation Front (FLN) to direct the Algerian War of Independence, which in turn created the National Liberation Army (ALN). So began the Algerian War.��

Protests continued throughout the country, and as France suppressed uprisings, violence broke out. French brutality angered more peaceful civilians to join the revolutionaries, and the movement grew. 

In 1958, France offered Algerian Muslims an opportunity to become equal with the French settlers. After so much bloodshed, it was too late, and revolutionaries rejected the offer and asked for independence. By March 1962, the French agreed to grant independence after the 132-year struggle.

Make wrongs right

Despite admitting their atrocities, the French maintain that they will not offer any “repentance or apologies.” To regain some respect, France could acknowledge, apologize and make reparations for the crimes against humanity they committed during colonial times. Importantly, reparation payments should go directly to victims and their descendants, not to the coffers of the Algerian government. To compensate for the ravages of colonization, the French could additionally allocate a sum for education and infrastructure. 

Support should also be offered by organizations like the UN. Despite its mission to support peace and security, the UN has consistently failed to stop genocide, prevent ethnic cleansing or sufficiently support victims such as those in Algeria. Consider the ongoing example of the innocent Palestinian men, women and children being butchered daily by US-backed Israel. From Cambodia to Sudan, the UN has let down countries and communities across the world. 

In the case of Algeria, the UN heard the cries but failed to provide justice. Even with denials and cover-ups, evidence of the French atrocities were overwhelming. To right these wrongs, a UN organized International Tribunal for Algeria (ITA) would be a good first start. Just as victims of the have been compensated, Algerians must also receive compensation.

While no sum of money can ever erase the suffering of Algerians, reparations are an important step. First, victims get justice. Second, poor countries and victims get valuable financial support. Third, they set an important precedent for holding colonizers accountable. France must take responsibility and action to rectify the country’s dark history in Algeria. 

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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