The result is a war in which the heaviest economic consequences are being absorbed by those with the least influence over how it ends. That is not an unintended side effect. It reflects how modern conflict now interacts with an interconnected global system.

A war that moves through systems

The violence of the war may be concentrated in the Gulf, but the disruption is not. Pressure around the , which carries a substantial share of global oil and liquefied natural gas, is already translating into broader instability. Insurance premiums for shipping have . have been adjusted or delayed. Even limited disruptions have forced rerouting through longer and more expensive corridors. Energy markets have responded with volatility that reflects not only current supply risks, but uncertainty about how far escalation could extend.

These effects are not linear. They move through the same channels that sustain the global economy. Energy flows, maritime logistics, financial markets and supply chains react simultaneously, but unevenly. A disruption at one point in the system propagates outward, reshaping conditions elsewhere.

The Gulf states are encountering the first layer of this pressure. Infrastructure, once treated as secure, is now exposed. Oil facilities, ports and shipping terminals are at increasing risk. More critically, , which provide the majority of potable water in several Gulf countries, have emerged as potential vulnerabilities. Any sustained disruption to these systems would not only affect economic output but also the basic functioning of daily life.

These states are not directing the war, but they cannot distance themselves from it. Their exposure is structural, rooted in geography and infrastructure. Beyond the Gulf, the effects become less visible but more complex.

South and Southeast Asia are absorbing the next layer of impact. Countries such as , which rely heavily on imported energy, are particularly sensitive to even modest price increases. Currency pressure intensifies as import costs rise; inflation begins to move; governments face difficult trade-offs between stabilizing prices and maintaining fiscal discipline. These pressures do not appear all at once; they build gradually, often unnoticed at first.

Recent movements in global have already begun to translate into higher domestic costs across several Asian economies. Airlines face rising fuel expenses, manufacturing sectors dependent on energy inputs adjust output and households encounter rising costs that are not immediately traceable to the conflict, but are directly linked to it.

There is also a human dimension that remains largely overlooked. Millions of from South Asia are employed across the Gulf. Their income supports families and local economies back home. As uncertainty increases, their position becomes more precarious. Flight routes are disrupted; insurance premiums increase; mobility becomes more constrained at the very moment when flexibility is most needed. They are not participants in the conflict. Yet they are embedded within its consequences.

Further east, the constraints tighten. Japan and South Korea sit at the far end of the same energy chain, but with far less flexibility. Their dependence on Middle Eastern energy imports is not marginal; it is structural. A significant portion of their oil imports passes through the same contested maritime routes. When supply tightens, they are forced into competition for alternative sources, often at higher cost.

This has immediate effects: Industrial output begins to slow, petrochemical production adjusts, and financial markets react to uncertainty in input costs and output expectations. What begins as an energy shock extends into industrial and financial systems. The war is not expanding geographically in the traditional sense; it is expanding through systems.

The economies that carry the burden

The most consequential aspect of this dynamic is not simply the scale of disruption, but its distribution. The countries bearing the greatest economic pressure are not those setting the conflict’s trajectory. They are not determining strategy or shaping escalation. Yet their economies, infrastructure and populations are directly exposed to the consequences. What emerges from this is a structural imbalance that is difficult to correct.

The US, despite its central role, is relatively insulated from the immediate energy shock. As a major energy producer, it experiences price fluctuations differently. Domestic pressure exists, but it does not threaten systemic stability in the same way. Iran, for its part, is already operating under long-term economic constraints. Additional pressure intensifies existing challenges, but does not fundamentally alter the conditions under which it operates. Israel’s exposure is primarily security-driven, rather than rooted in systemic economic vulnerability of the same kind.

The most severe pressures are concentrated elsewhere. They are felt most acutely in economies that are deeply integrated into global systems, but lack the capacity to shape them. This is where the situation becomes more complex than it initially appears.

If energy prices continue to rise, governments across affected regions will be forced to respond. Subsidies may be expanded; strategic reserves may be drawn down; emergency fiscal measures may be introduced to stabilize domestic conditions. These responses are not cost-free; they shift pressure into financial systems.

Several large Asian economies hold substantial foreign-currency reserves, including . In periods of sustained stress, the liquidation of such assets can serve as a tool for maintaining domestic stability. If undertaken at scale, these actions would transmit pressure into global financial markets, affecting borrowing costs, liquidity and investment conditions.

A regional conflict begins to generate global financial consequences. At that point, the distinction between participant and observer begins to weaken.

A system that redistributes risk

What is unfolding is not simply economic disruption. It is a redistribution of risk across an interconnected system. Energy markets are beginning to fragment, as different regions experience different price pressures and supply constraints. are adjusting, but not uniformly. Some states are able to absorb shocks through reserves and diversification. Others face more immediate constraints. The longer the conflict persists, the more these differences widen.

Recent developments suggest that even limited escalation can have disproportionate effects. Temporary disruptions to shipping routes have already extended delivery times and increased costs. Insurance markets have adjusted faster than physical supply, amplifying the economic impact. Financial markets are reacting not only to current conditions, but to the possibility of further escalation.

Over time, this begins to resemble a feedback loop. Uncertainty drives cost. Cost drives policy response. Policy response introduces new distortions. The system does not stabilize quickly. It adjusts, but unevenly and often with delay. This is not a temporary disturbance that will dissipate once the conflict slows. It reflects a deeper shift in how war interacts with global systems. Conflict is no longer contained by geography. It is transmitted through connectivity.

The wrong economies

The countries most exposed to the economic consequences are not the ones making strategic decisions or defining objectives. Yet they are the ones managing inflation, stabilizing currencies, protecting supply chains and absorbing social pressure. They carry the cost without controlling the cause. This is increasingly how modern conflict operates. Power is exercised in one place. Consequences are distributed across many. The further a country is from the center of decision-making, the more likely it is to experience the conflict as an external shock rather than a controllable process. And the longer the war continues, the more entrenched this pattern becomes.

Wars are still fought between states, but their effects are no longer confined to them. They move through the systems that connect economies, societies and markets. And in that movement, the burden does not fall where power is concentrated; it falls where exposure is greatest. That is why this war is not just reshaping the balance of power; it is reshaping the distribution of vulnerability. And in doing so, it is placing the heaviest burden on the economies least able to shape the outcome.

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Economic toll

Unlike Iran, the other Middle Eastern states, especially the six members of the GCC, have strengthened their economic ties with the West. One major example of such economic ties is the one between the EU and the GCC. The 1989 has resulted in over $170 billion in exports and imports between the two sides in 2023.��

Over the past five decades, these countries have also worked hard to attract foreign investors, entrepreneurs, and even wealthy individuals seeking to invest in luxury real estate and opulent lifestyles. To name a few examples of such steps, Dubai a five-year multiple-entry visa for business trips in 2021, and the UAE began five-year residency and renewable 10-year visas to those who own real estate in the UAE valued at $5 million and $10 million, respectively. To attract foreign capital, both and have introduced Golden Residency programs that grant wealthy foreigners, including their families, long-term residencies of ten years or longer.��

States such as the UAE and Qatar have become reliable hubs for travelers reaching their destinations globally. In 2023, an 18.25% share of the UAE’s GDP was through aviation. In practice, this means $92 billion in revenue and 992,000 jobs. It is a similar trajectory for Qatar. In 2025, only Qatar Airways Group reported a 28% over the previous year, surpassing $2 billion. Qatar’s tourism revenue surpassed , up 25% from 2023.��

Saudi Arabia is another Middle Eastern power with considerable financial clout. Its economic reform for the post-oil Kingdom, known as , aims to sector to become not only self-sufficient but also an exporter and global hub for biotechnology. Within this project, other strategies include the mining sector with a focus on minerals, and even the gaming and Esports to host international tournaments, as well as attracting foreign companies to Saudi Arabia. The program is reliant on the non-hydrocarbon sector, comprising foundational pillars namely construction, tourism and tech, which are integral to Saudi Arabia’s economic growth, as the World Bank states, “the non-oil economy’s share of GDP grew from 60 percent in 2015 to 68 percent by 2024”.��

With the risks of collapsed tourism, damaged energy infrastructure and logistics disruptions growing manifold, the Gulf countries face an imminent crisis. Amid the worsening security crisis in the region, all of these countries face a heavy blow, with the looming threat of economic devastation, as they remain heavily dependent on such critical sectors to attract foreign investment and capital while diversifying away from oil exports. Their economic leverage rests on regional stability, which has been put under immense strain due to the volatile situation. 

More alarming is the emerging scenario in which large companies tend to act quickly to secure their assets and withdraw from a conflict zone; however, their return is a slow, cautious process. Consequently, if the war results in the departure of some foreign companies from the region within a few weeks, their return may take months or years, which would be detrimental to the economies of the GCC in the long term.

Ironically, Iran will not face such a risk, as the Islamic Republic has not been a destination for international firms due to sanctions and an inadequate environment that has not been conducive to foreign investment. 

Damaged reputation

Over the past few decades, the Gulf countries have built a reputation as a safe destination. This feature has attracted not only investors and foreign companies but also pensioners and those fleeing high taxation in their home countries. As their reputation is now tarnished by the escalating conflict, it will take a long time to rebuild it and recover from the damage inflicted. During the early stages of the war, Iran hit back hard. Missiles and drones were fired at numerous targets, including , and industrial complexes.��

One small example is the UAE. It to around 240,000 British expats. The US–Israel–Iran war has distressed the majority of expats living across the region. It has gone as far as being by some Western news outlets, such as tabloid Daily Mail, as “‘Dubai Is Finished’: Expats say they will leave and never come back as tax-free dream is shattered by war and officials begin prosecuting people for posting videos of missiles.”��

Worthy US alliance?��

Except for Iran and Yemen, the US is in some sort of alliance with all states in the region. The closest allies are Israel, followed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Jordan and others. Israel, for instance, has $330 billion in aid, both military and civil, from the US since its foundation.��

The alliance between the Gulf states and the US dates back to the 1940s, when, for instance, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Abdul Aziz Al Saud aboard USS Quincy in 1945. The result was access to Saudi oil for security assurance to the Kingdom. And other Gulf states suit and went into an alliance with the US.��

Fast forward to 2026, although the Gulf countries do not receive US military aid on the same scale as Israel and Egypt, their arms deals with the US are among the largest. Between 1950 and 2024, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE have $182 billion, $40 billion, $35 billion and $34 billion, respectively. These massive purchases have certainly helped these countries defend themselves against Iranian drones and missiles; however, the cost of munitions for them is considerably higher than for Iran, as a Shahed-136 drone costs under $50,000, compared with, say, Patriot interceptor missiles that cost per shot. The ineffectiveness of US military equipment to deter attacks, coupled with US’ waning commitment to uphold its allies’ defense under its security umbrella in the region, propels the Gulf countries to recalibrate their security ties with the US.��

After all, it was never their war to begin with, yet they face dire consequences simply for allying with the US (which now appears more to be a grave liability). Since the beginning of the war, Tehran has justified its attacks on Iran’s neighbors by claiming that any location in the region hosting a US military presence is a legitimate target. However, most of the missiles and drones thrown at the Gulf states were not precisely aimed at the American bases, either deliberately or due to a lack of precision, as it has been that the Circular Error Probable of Iranian missiles is between 20 and 500 meters. This makes it even harder for states such as the UAE to convince foreigners to stay or even consider returning, once the war is over. Expats, especially those who are attracted by luxury and 0% income tax rate, will hardly be willing to live in a place where even a one percent chance of missile penetration exists, should another round of conflict emerge.��

Post-war scenarios

While efforts were recently made to a peace deal between the US and Iran, with Pakistan acting as a primary mediator, the talks in Islamabad stalled; however, reports are now that the conflicting parties are expected to re-engage in negotiations soon.��

Regardless, for the Gulf countries, there are mainly two outcomes as of now. The first prediction is that the Iranian regime will be toppled and a new Iran will emerge. In this case, the Gulf states can simply claim that the old threat no longer exists. Hence, it will be relatively easier to convince expats and companies that departed in haste to return. And the Gulf states would emerge shaken but ultimately “victorious”, and their alliance with the US would be seen as worthwhile. Their domestic publics would also be less likely to question the rulers’ strategies and policies. However, this scenario appears very unlikely, given Iran’s position in surviving the war and transitioning to a ceasefire and negotiations, as well as the US stance shifting toward achieving a mere exit strategy.

A second scenario, which is the most likely one to consider, is that the  Iranian regime survives the war, in which case the main losers will be the Gulf countries. Iran, the US and Israel will all claim victory and, to an extent, those claims will be correct. The leaders of these three countries will be able to convince their publics that they have achieved their objectives, at least among those who support their governments’ policies. The new Supreme Leader, whether it is still Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei or a successor in case he is also killed, will claim that they have defeated the US plan to overthrow the regime, and the IRGC, Basij and regime supporters across all strata will buy it. President Trump will tell his MAGA supporters that he has “obliterated” the threat of a ballistic and nuclear Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu will tell Israelis, mainly his supporters, that Iran’s capability to attack Israel is diminished. 

However, for regional countries such as the UAE, there won’t be a victory narrative to pursue. They will not be able to convince their constituencies by claiming victory, as they have, at best, been defending themselves in a war that was not theirs. The public will be anxious about what the alliance with the US (and in the case of the UAE with Israel) will bring next. The Gulf states will face criticism from their people regarding the alliance with the US and any ties to the state of Israel. History bears witness to this, as public perception in Gulf states has often diverged from government narratives, and state decisions have not sat well with the public. 

The defiance was most noticeable in relation to the alliance between the US and Gulf state leaders, which does not always align with how the Arab public perceives the US and Israel. During the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, a reservations to customers who would like to enjoy their meals while watching Iranian missiles roaring towards Israel. A similar case happened during the Gulf War. On January 18, 1991, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq launched missile attacks on Israel. In his book, The Achilles Trap, Steve Coll writes that five Iraqi Scud missiles hit Tel Aviv and Haifa while Saudi officers and American counterparts were in the coordination center, C3IC, observing the attacks. The Americans were shocked when they saw the Saudi officers cheering the Iraqi strike with Allahu Akbar.��

Now, while the times may differ, similar sentiments persist. Gulf states have to tactfully handle public opinion while simultaneously preventing their economies from falling into the doldrums. Henceforth, the path for the Gulf states is certainly fraught with difficulties on multiple fronts. 

In the end, therefore, it is not the US that loses investors and entrepreneurs, nor is it Israel, which is a startup country with the most powerful military in the region. Iran will not suffer from the mistrust of foreign investors either, as the country has few or no foreign investors, especially Western ones, due to sanctions and an unfriendly environment for foreigners. Tehran has little involvement in the international trade community to worry about losing it. What Iran has never had will not be a loss to Tehran in the post-war period. The real costs will be borne by the Gulf states.

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The US has long-standing ties with the Kurds, which date back to the 1970s during the Kurdish rebellions against the Iraqi central government. Following the uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan in March 1991 and the creation of the over the Kurdistan region of Iraq, relations between the Kurds and the US have improved significantly. This relation with the regime change in Iraq in 2023 has further enhanced as the Kurdish fighters play a key role in helping the US open a new frontline in northern Iraq to topple the Saddam regime.����

Similarly, during the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, the US decisively supported the Kurdish figures in Iraq and Syria. The Kurds, with help from the US, played a key role in defeating ISIS in both countries. Hence, this historical partnership has laid the groundwork for Washington to publicly discuss the possibility of using Iranian Kurdish fighters as ground forces in a conflict against the current Iranian regime. 

Trump has sent mixed messages in this regard. On March 5, he argued that he would forces if they decided to launch a military offensive against Iran, describing the idea as positive. When asked whether the US would provide air support for the operation, he declined to give a clear answer, saying he could not discuss that.��

However, on March 7, Trump having Kurdish fighters join the war against Iran. In this regard, he said, “I don’t want the Kurds going in. I don’t want to see the Kurds get hurt, get killed. I told them I don’t want them. The war is complicated enough.”��

There is no clear answer whether the US will finally topple the regime or, at this specific stage, end this war. Hence, the key question is: Why has the Kurdish factor in Iran suddenly become an important topic in the US and Israel’s war against Iran?

In reality, there are many explanations for this. One possibility is that Israel and the US could move toward overthrowing the Iranian regime in Tehran. However, this has not yet been officially and clearly announced by the US. Moreover, Kurdish fighters could be viewed as an effective instrument in this context. In particular, the US and Israel seek to make western Kurdistan a platform for inciting and encouraging a general uprising in the rest of Iran.

Another possibility is that the US might have wanted to use Kurdish forces as a tool to pressure the current Iranian authorities and push them to make greater concessions to Trump’s demands. As he recently said, the aim of the war is “” of the Iranian authorities.��

Fear of abandonment: Kurdish demands for guarantees in any alliances against Iran

The Iranian Kurdish opposition parties are willing to seize the opportunity and ally with the US and Israel against Iran to achieve their historic ambition, manifested in establishing a federal or autonomous region in western Kurdistan. However, they have serious concerns about moving forward with such a policy without concrete guarantees of protection. In particular, the US doesn’t have a clear strategy, and it explicitly argues that the endgame is not regime change in Iran, but the destruction of Iranian military capacities. 

Furthermore, while the US has supported the Kurds at different times, it has also abandoned them on several occasions, leaving them to face existential threats. For example, following the Kurdistan in September 2017, the Trump administration allowed Iraqi federal troops and Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi militias — with direct support of Iran — to attack the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in Kirkuk and disputed areas. As a result, the Kurds lost roughly 40% of the territory that Peshmerga had held.��At that time, Trump said the US would not take a side.

In January 2026, even though the Kurds were key partners of the US in the war against ISIS in Syria, they were abandoned once again. The Trump administration allowed the former commander of Al Qaida al-Sharia, with his Damascus-led army, to attack the Kurdish forces and take the territory under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). As a result, on January 20, , US Special Envoy for Syria, declared that the Kurdish-led SDF’s role as the primary anti-ISIS force had “.”

This background indicates that Kurdish concerns are genuine, as they fear the possibility that the US could once again abandon them. Therefore, before taking further steps, they seek guarantees and assurances from the US. The key demands of the Iranian Kurds are a guarantee that they will not be abandoned in the face of an Iranian threat, in both cases, whether the Iranian regime collapses or remains in place.

This is a very important point, in particular, if the regime survives, it may again crush the Kurds and could even against them as it has done after 1979. Hence, in this case, establishing a no-fly zone in Eastern Kurdistan is crucial to ensure that the Kurdish people are protected. Further, the Kurds seek to convert their military achievements into political gains. Therefore, the US should back the Kurds by guaranteeing support both if the current regime collapses and in advancing their demands for some sort of autonomy.����

Between Iranian threats and proxy attacks: Kurdistan faces rising security risks

In fact, any cooperation between the US and Iranian Kurdish groups against the regime in Iran would have serious implications for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). It is clear that the KRG has sought to reassure Tehran that it would not pose a threat. However, increasing conflict with the US is pushing the Iranian regime to pursue a more aggressive policy in the KRG. In particular, Iran and its proxy militias in Iraq have frequently threatened and targeted the Kurdistan region.

Since the 2020 of Qasem Soleimani, an Iranian military officer who served in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran has essentially turned the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) into a battlefield, sending a message to the US, Israel and its allies. Following the of the young Kurdish-Iranian woman, Jina Mahsa Amini, and the outbreak of demonstrations across Iran in September 2023, the country has intensified its attacks against the KRI. As a result, the IRGC����the Kurdish-Iranian opposition groups.��

Iran blames the Iranian Kurds for instigating and sustaining the protests in Iran. Even the head of Iran’s elite Quds Force, , has����an unprecedented ground military operation against Iraqi Kurdistan if Baghdad does not disarm Iranian Kurdish opposition groups on Iraqi soil. Following the 12 days of with Israel in June 2025, Iranian proxies in Iraq hit oil fields and infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. These strikes targeted oil facilities, airports and some military locations.

With the start of the new military operation by the US and Israel against Iran beginning February 28, once again, the KRI turned into a battlefield, and Iran and its proxies are intensively targeting infrastructure in the Kurdistan region. These attacks intensified following reports that Trump spoke with Iraqi Kurdish leaders by phone, urging them to support the Iranian Kurdish opposition. 

In a statement, the KRG strongly reports suggesting the Kurdistan Region is taking part in a plan to arm and send Kurdish opposition parties into Iranian territory. Furthermore, the KRG emphasized that it would not be part of the current conflict, which could expand across the region.��It reiterated the Kurdistan Region’s stance of avoiding further conflict amid the current regional turmoil.

Hence, it can be argued that if the US pushes Iranian Kurdish opposition groups to participate in a war against Iran, the KRG could face serious and even existential risks, even if it rejects or refuses to support such a policy. 

The Iranian authorities are clearly sending a very serious warning and threatening the KRI in case Iranian Kurdish fighters are involved in the war. On March 6, Iran’s Defense Council released a statement that so far, Iran has only focused on US and Israeli bases in the region, as well as opposition political parties operating within the Kurdistan region.��

It added that:

“Should their continued presence and plotting be permitted, or should these groups or [Zionist] regime elements enter the borders of the Islamic Republic through the Region, all facilities of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq … will be targeted on a massive scale.”

Further, the Spokesperson of the Khatam Al-Anbiya, Lieutenant Colonel Ebrahim Zolfaghari, issued a to the Kurdistan region, stating that any attempt by the Kurdistan region to deploy hostile forces in the Iranian border strip will be met with severe action by the Iranian armed forces.��

Hence, in the case of involving the Iranian opposition Kurds in this war, the most dangerous scenario for the KRG would be if the political system in Iran remains in place and does not collapse, and if the US and Israel halt their attacks. There’s no doubt the KRG would face a serious threat, and Iran would do everything to undermine the KRG’s position. 

One of the key instruments that Iran could use, besides directly attacking the Kurdistan region, is using its militia proxies in Iraq and even the Iraqi government led by the Shia parties against the KRG. In particular, since the eruptions of the current war, the Shia militias have intensified their attacks against the Kurdistan region. According to Rudaw News, since the beginning of the war, more than 638 drones and missiles have the Kurdistan Region.��

Therefore, in any scenario where the US pushes Iranian Kurdish fighters to participate in a war against Iran, it should provide clear assurances and guarantees not only to the Iranian Kurdish groups but also to the Kurdistan Region, which could face serious security consequences from such involvement.

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From citizen judgment to constitutional right

Cavedon traces the jury’s origins to ancient Athens, where ordinary citizens collectively judged disputes as part of direct democracy. That tradition carried into medieval England, culminating in Magna Carta’s guarantee that no free person could lose liberty or property except “by a jury of their peers.” Over time, this principle hardened into a defining feature of common law.

By the 18th century, legal scholar William Blackstone had formalized the idea that a criminal conviction required the agreement of 12 peers. This tradition crossed the Atlantic, where American colonists embraced jury trials not only as a legal safeguard but as a political right. The Constitution enshrined this protection twice, in Article III and the Sixth Amendment, reflecting its centrality to the new republic.

Cavedon emphasizes that juries were never meant to be passive fact-checkers. Historically, they evaluated both facts and the justice of the law itself, exercising what some have termed “jury nullification.”

Revolution, resistance and jury autonomy

The American Revolution reinforced the importance of juries. Singh and Cavedon note that British attempts to bypass colonial juries — by shifting trials to admiralty courts or even to London — provoked widespread alarm. Cavedon describes this as an “absolute panic,” as colonists feared the loss of local accountability and community judgment.

Two landmark cases illustrate the power juries once wielded. In 1670, a jury acquitted Quaker leader William Penn despite judicial pressure; their case established that jurors could not be punished for their verdicts. In 1735, a New York jury acquitted publisher John Peter Zenger of seditious libel, even though the law offered no defense for truthful criticism of the government. In both cases, juries asserted their authority to interpret justice beyond strict legal instructions.

Singh contrasts this tradition with civil law systems, where judges and legal professionals dominate decision-making. In the Anglo-American system, by contrast, juries historically acted as a democratic check on state power.

The rise of the modern “assembly line”

Cavedon states that over the past century, the criminal justice system has transformed into what he calls a “utilitarian… assembly line to produce convictions.” He traces this shift to Prohibition in the 1920s and 1930s, which expanded federal enforcement mechanisms that persisted long after alcohol bans ended.

Today, the overwhelming majority of cases never reach a jury. Roughly 97% of federal convictions and 94–95% of state convictions result from plea deals. Prosecutors wield significant leverage through what is often called the “trial penalty” — the threat of much harsher sentences if defendants refuse a plea and lose at trial.

Cavedon also points to structural incentives that reinforce this system. Many judges are former prosecutors, and law enforcement funding can be tied to arrest and conviction rates. Grand juries, once intended as a safeguard, have largely become procedural formalities. As Cavedon notes, they are often seen as “rubber stamps” for prosecutorial decisions.

The cumulative effect, he says, is a system that sidelines ordinary citizens and concentrates power in legal institutions.

Blinding juries to context

Even when jury trials occur, Singh and Cavedon argue that jurors are often constrained in ways that limit meaningful judgment. Courts typically instruct juries to focus narrowly on factual questions while ignoring broader context, legal interpretation and consequences.

Cavedon highlights cases where this restriction leads to troubling outcomes. In one federal trial in California, jurors convicted a man for growing marijuana without being told he was part of a city-authorized medical program. In another case, a juror later learned that a defendant he helped convict received a 40-year mandatory sentence, prompting deep regret.

For Cavedon, such examples illustrate a broader problem: Jurors are excluded from considering the full moral and social implications of their decisions. He believes that this undermines both fairness and the democratic purpose of the jury system. “If people do not have confidence that ultimately it will be their neighbors and their peers who will make judgments,” he says, “then I think we have lost a significant amount of personal liberty.”

Can the jury system be reclaimed?

Singh and Cavedon conclude with a question: Can the jury’s original role be restored? Cavedon believes it can, but only through a cultural and educational shift. He describes the forthcoming Cato Institute initiative, “Your Verdict Counts,” as an effort to reframe jury duty as an active form of citizenship rather than a burdensome obligation.

He feels that jurors should see themselves as participants in a democratic process, bringing “their conscience and their values” into deliberations. This could revive the jury’s function as a check on state power and a protector of individual liberty.

Singh closes by considering the stakes. If juries no longer serve as a meaningful counterbalance within the justice system, then a key pillar of democratic accountability may already be eroding. The question is not just how the system functions today, but whether citizens are willing to reclaim the role it once gave them.

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Escalating violence across southern Yemen

According to Human Rights Watch, in a released on March 17, security forces “used excessive force against largely unarmed protesters,” in some cases firing directly into crowds. The events unfolded over multiple days and locations, pointing not to a single incident but to a pattern.

In February, protests intensified in Shabwa, where at least six demonstrators were killed when security forces opened fire, as also by The New Arab. Weeks later, in early March, similar scenes were reported in Hadramaut: In the coastal city of Mukalla, three demonstrators were killed during protests that witnesses insist were peaceful. Aden, too, saw repeated crackdowns throughout late February and early March, with arrests and injuries reported as security forces moved aggressively to disperse gatherings, a pattern reflected in broader coverage by .

Eyewitness testimony reinforces the findings of human rights observers and reveals the lived reality behind the numbers. One protester in Shabwa described the moment security forces opened fire: “There was no warning. They started shooting live bullets directly at us. People fell immediately. We were running, but they kept firing.” In Mukalla, another witness recalled, “We came out peacefully. We were chanting only. Suddenly, there was shooting — real bullets, not in the air. I saw a man next to me collapse.” In Aden, a resident described how the crackdown extended beyond the protests themselves: “They didn’t just stop the protest — they chased people, arrested many, and made it clear that any gathering would be punished.”

Taken together, these incidents raise serious questions about both the capability and the intent of government forces backed by Saudi Arabia. The repeated use of live ammunition across multiple governorates suggests more than mere weakness in crowd control. It points toward a deliberate strategy of deterrence — one that treats public protest not as a political expression but as a threat to be eliminated. As Human Rights Watch has in its reporting and in its broader Yemen documentation, the use of lethal force against protesters who do not pose an imminent threat violates international standards, which require restraint and prioritization of non-lethal means.

Political stakes and repression

The political context is crucial. These demonstrations are not isolated acts of unrest but part of a broader and long-standing movement calling for southern independence. The STC remains the most prominent vehicle for these aspirations, and the protests reflect continued popular support despite recent political and military setbacks. The response by authorities — live fire, arbitrary arrests and an expanding security presence — suggests an attempt not only to disperse crowds but to weaken the movement itself. In this sense, the crackdown is not simply about restoring order; it is about reshaping the political landscape of the south.

What is emerging is an atmosphere increasingly reminiscent of a police state, where fear replaces participation and where the cost of dissent may be death or detention. Yet history offers a clear lesson that appears to be ignored. Previous governments in Yemen attempted to suppress southern aspirations through force, detention and intimidation. They failed. The call for independence endured, adapted and re-emerged with renewed strength. There is little reason to believe that the current ruling authorities will succeed where others did not.

The killings in Shabwa, Mukalla and Aden are not just tragic incidents; they are politically consequential acts that risk deepening the very crisis they are meant to contain. Each life lost is not only a human tragedy but also a point of mobilization — fuel for grievance, anger and future resistance. Repression may silence voices temporarily, but it cannot erase the underlying demands that drive people into the streets.

Killing protesters will not restore stability in southern Yemen. It will entrench instability. It will harden positions, widen divisions and push the conflict into more dangerous territory. What is required is not more force, but a serious reckoning with the roots of the crisis — political exclusion, contested legitimacy and the enduring demand for southern self-determination. Until those issues are addressed, no amount of repression will bring lasting control. The previous regime could not crush the independence movement, and this one will not succeed by bullets either.

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As journalist Janan Ganesh recently in the Financial Times, “Trump is the one US president elected this century under whose watch Russia has not launched a foreign invasion. Putin attacked Georgia under George W Bush, Crimea under Barack Obama and Ukraine entire under Joe Biden.” The pattern is suggestive, if not conclusive.

Calculated unpredictability

Many observers have portrayed Putin as a deranged autocrat bent on restoring a lost empire, surrounded by subservient aides too intimidated to challenge him. Yet, over time, his behavior has come to seem grimly legible. His aims are extreme but comprehensible; his methods brutal but procedural. He is consistent — consistently malign, perhaps, but consistent.

Trump, by contrast, presents a different figure. He is erratic, self-contradictory and prone to sudden shifts in manner and position. Where Putin’s menace is intelligible, Trump’s is properly inscrutable. And that difference raises the possibility that not knowing someone may itself function as a form of power.

This is the essence of what Ganesh calls Madman Theory. More a strategy than a theory, it involves a political leader deliberately cultivating the appearance of irrationality so that neither adversaries nor allies can reliably anticipate responses. All they can do is act with caution. The leader need not be mad, but others must not be certain. The seed of doubt is crucial.

Ganesh illustrates this with former US President , who presided over the nation from 1969 to 1974, a period overshadowed by the Vietnam War. Nixon’s Secretary of State, , was tasked with negotiating American withdrawal. Nixon, with Kissinger, incubated a stratagem: to convey to North Vietnam that the president was unstable, beyond even Kissinger’s control. Thus, Kissinger could imply in negotiations that Nixon might take extreme measures — even nuclear ones — regardless of advice.

Picture it: After hours of high-level with Vietnamese negotiators Lê Đức Thọ and Xuân Thủy, Kissinger concludes, “Excellent. I’ll take this back to the president. But honestly—he might throw it in the trash.” The goal was simple: force concessions by making the consequences of resistance unknowable and potentially catastrophic.

This was Madman Theory in its purest form: calculated unpredictability. Nixon himself did not appear overtly unhinged to the American public, at least not before the Watergate scandal. But he wanted adversaries — and even allies — to believe that he might be. The performance of instability was designed to create leverage.

Yet even here, the results were ambiguous. The war dragged on; the costs were immense; the strategy failed to produce decisive gains. As Ganesh observes, the problem is built into the logic: If the threat is too extreme, it lacks credibility; if carried out, it becomes catastrophic.

Genghis Khan, Stalin, Hitler and Marcos

In the 1532 political treatise , philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli argued that rulers must sometimes act immorally, inconsistently and against expectation. It’s safer to be feared than loved, if one can’t be both. Appearances matter. Machiavelli understood the uses of terror, ambiguity and deliberate inconsistency. He admired deacon Cesare Borgia, whose ruthlessness and unpredictability helped secure his power.

While Machiavelli didn’t cite Genghis Khan, the latter embodies many of these principles. Khan’s backdrop was the tribal, wind-scoured steppe of Inner Asia in the late 1100s. His reputation for sudden, overwhelming violence was not incidental to his success — it was central. Cities that resisted could expect annihilation; those that submitted might be spared.

The effect was psychological as much as military. Opponents did not merely calculate their chances; they confronted the possibility of total destruction at the hands of a leader who seemed to operate beyond restraint. Whether Genghis Khan was irrational is beside the point; others behaved as if he might be.

operated in a very different setting: the bureaucratic, industrializing Soviet state of the 20th century, where power was exercised through institutions, purges and fear. As General Secretary of the Communist Party, he inherited the machinery of Vladimir Lenin but took it in a direction few anticipated. His Five-Year Plans transformed the economy at immense human cost, while purges eliminated enemies, real and imagined. Even fellow revolutionaries were not safe: Leon Trotsky was exiled and eventually assassinated.

Crucially, Stalin’s rule was characterized not just by brutality but by unpredictability. Decisions appeared arbitrary; loyalties could reverse overnight. No one could be certain of the limits, because there were none.

Adolf Hitler followed a different path but produced a similar effect. His rise depended on fusing charismatic authority with national identity. Once in power, he defied conventional constraints. His impulsive, ideological and often strategically baffling leadership confounded allies and enemies alike. There were assassination attempts, even from within his own ranks, yet he retained intense loyalty from figures such as Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief Hermann Göring.

In all of these cases, the pattern is evident: power reinforced by the perception that the leader might act beyond reason, beyond norms, beyond comprehension. The onus is on the leader to sustain that image — psychopath, megalomaniac, obsessive — but never a rational, calculating figure. Madman Theory doesn’t depend on whether the image is true or make-believe. What matters is that others believe it. And the others include followers, friends and, most importantly, enemies.

A more modern and very different case is Imelda Marcos, the former First Lady of the Philippines. She doesn’t belong in quite the same category as the great tyrants of the 20th century, nor did she wield power in the same way. Yet her public persona introduced a distinct, perhaps unique, form of unpredictability. Her rule, alongside President of the Philippines Ferdinand Marcos, was marked not only by abrupt interventions but by extraordinary extravagance. Where others projected menace through violence, Marcos added theater: excess itself became a signal, unsettling in its disregard for restraint. She famously owned pairs of shoes, bought perfume by the gallon and once splurged $7 million on jewelry.

This was not madness in any clinical sense: It was performative extravagance, an idiosyncratic form of power that kept her followers in awe. Madman Theory need not be fully realized; even its partial expression can shape how others respond.

Trump and the value of uncertainty

And so to today — and a plan that seems crazed, until it starts working. Trump has certainly unnerved the world. His expletive-loaded posts alone betray the lack of dignity and respect typically associated with world leaders. Then there is his penchant for fabrication, and his unfulfilled threats. Often, his hyperbole is excused as “,” but is that all it is? Trump’s impulsivity seems almost too outlandish to be genuine. Surely no human being, never mind an elected president could think and behave so preposterously. Surely.

To be fair, he is not the only political leader to unsettle observers. Putin’s prosecution of the Ukraine war has raised persistent concerns about escalation. North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, has long alternated between provocation and restraint, keeping adversaries uncertain whether they face calculated brinkmanship or something less controllable. Trump belongs, at least in part, in this company.

So, is Trump’s apparent madness real or strategic? His record allows for both interpretations. Allies are praised, then rebuked, sometimes in language that veers from jocular to incendiary. Even high-stakes diplomacy is reduced to the language of “deals,” as if geopolitical conflict were a used car sale.

Surely, other politicians suspect Trump’s departures from established norms are sometimes so aberrant that it’s hard to imagine he actually meant them. But even if they suspect design, they remain uncertain regardless.

It’s not difficult to imagine how this might shape decision-making in Moscow. Let’s return to the question raised in our opening paragraph. Picture Putin at his long table in the Kremlin, advisors gathered at a careful distance.

“We should anticipate what Trump will do,” he begins.

“Nothing,” one replies. Ukraine is not part of NATO.

“You think a technicality constrains him?” another asks. “He may arm them heavily. He may even place American missiles within reach of Moscow.”

“That would be crazy.”

“A�Ի�…?”

Silence.

That silence is the point. The problem with a “madman” is not that he will act, but that he might — and that no one can be sure how far he would go. Faced with such uncertainty, even a nerveless leader may hesitate.

This doesn’t mean Trump has consciously revived Nixon’s strategy. The simpler explanation that he is erratic rather than strategic remains plausible. Nor does it mean Madman Theory always works; history offers as many warnings as endorsements.

But it does suggest an answer to the opening question. Would Putin have invaded Ukraine if Trump had been in the White House? Probably not. Not because Trump would certainly have acted, but because Putin couldn’t have been certain that he wouldn’t.

[Ellis Cashmore is the author of .]

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Historical modesty warns us to view Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s stunning in Hungary last Sunday as only possibly another such historical inflection, not necessarily an actual turning point. Orbán could come back to power if the opposition fails to live up to its promises. Autocrats in other countries might see the situation in Hungary as a warning sign and crack down even harder on their populations. Nevertheless, his electoral defeat was important.

Orbán was not just a local strongman, but rather a central model and muse for an entire generation of nationalist right-wing leaders, including US President Donald Trump and his Make America Great Again (MAGA) imitators. If the architect of “,” as he boasted, can be routed, despite a captured media, tilted institutions and deep corruption, that raises implications far beyond Budapest.

We cannot yet know whether this is the beginning of a long global backlash against authoritarian nationalism or a localized setback. But several forces now converging — from economic strain and war fatigue to Trump’s visible physical and mental decline and the humiliation of his chosen lieutenants — suggest that the winds may finally be shifting against the nationalist right.

Orbán’s illiberal model

Orbán’s importance was never just about Hungary’s just under ten million citizens. Since returning to power in 2010, he consciously branded himself as the avatar of a modern form of illiberalism, democratic in form but authoritarian in practice. He tightened control over broadcast media and large parts of the press, channeled state contracts to cronies, reshaped the courts and electoral rules, and used xenophobia and culture-war politics as glue. 

For American and European populists, Hungary became a kind of nationalist TED talk convention. Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Budapest while former White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon, American political activist Tucker Carlson, Claremont Institute intellectuals and social-conservative activists paraded through Orbán’s orbit. Conservative activist, former FOX News commentator and lobbyist Matt Schlapp’s Center for Fundamental Rights approximately��€1 million (~$974,659) in 2022��and over��€2 million (~$2,173,913) in 2023��from state-funded Hungarian foundations to co-organize the CPAC conferences. There is substantial evidence of Hungarian government funding for CPAC events, primarily through state-linked foundations and think tanks.

Hungarian Prime Minister-designate Péter Magyar after his victory that Orbán diverted taxpayer money to fund CPAC as part of a “criminal offense” involving party financing. Magyar an immediate halt to taxpayer funding for CPAC and pledged to establish anti-corruption agencies to investigate these payments. Out in the open, meanwhile, Republican politicians from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to Vice President JD Vance to Budapest to pay homage to Fidesz and learn from what they openly espoused as a model for the US.

The rise of Magyar

Despite all the countervailing winds, Orbán did not merely lose; he lost badly. His party’s vote collapsed after years of seemingly unassailable dominance. He had designed a system to entrench himself and suffocate the opposition. Yet voters, mobilized by a new movement under Magyar, broke through. For American politics, the symbolism is powerful. The regime that MAGA elites openly admired as a blueprint has just been overthrown at the ballot box.

The story of ’s rise matters because it shows how to beat a deeply entrenched populist regime. Magyar is not a left-wing revolutionary. He is a center-right figure who came out of Orbán’s own party, roughly analogous to former US Representatives Liz Cheney or Adam Kinzinger, who finally, from inside the Grand Old Party (GOP), broke decisively with Trump. That background gave him credibility with voters who had once supported Orbán.

Magyar built a movement, not merely a party. Deprived of fair access to the media, he went directly to voters, especially in rural areas where Orbán’s media environment had been most suffocating. Magyar traveled relentlessly, holding town halls and rallies, using social media as a force multiplier. The opposition parties, including the left, swallowed their pride, thought strategically and accepted Magyar’s leadership, uniting behind him even though he was to their right on most issues.

Magyar notably rooted his campaign in everyday concerns, what we call the affordability crisis, health care, education and, above all, the cost of living, while still framing Orbán as a threat to Hungary’s democratic future and European orientation. He often the Russian invasion of Hungary in 1956 to arouse patriotic feelings and turn the citizenry against Russian domination and interference. Hungarians didn’t just tire of Orbán’s culture war and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s influence; they tired of stagnant living standards, demographic decline and the sense that neighboring countries were doing better.

During the Cold War, Hungary enjoyed “,” the highest standard of living within the Warsaw Pact. Today, the Hungarian economy (in terms of purchasing power) has fallen behind Romania, a significant blow to national pride. Hungarians look across their borders and see that their economic decline was not inevitable, but rather the product of bad, corrupt governance.

Magyar’s campaign promises to defend democracy and fix people’s material problems were crucial. The anti-Trump forces in the US should take note, however, that he did not exaggerate Orbán’s threat to democracy, nor did he concentrate on wedge-issue culture wars; instead, he focused on bread-and-butter issues. Liberal democracy won in Hungary not as an abstraction, but as a promise to improve daily life under an honest government.

The limits of populist governance

Trump’s rise in 2016 was part of the same global upsurge that lifted Orbán and fueled Brexit. Nationalist parties and leaders could channel legitimate grievances about migration, globalization and the failures of centrist elites into a politics of resentment. They could promise simple solutions and muscular “strongman” leadership without having to demonstrate competence.

But demagoguery governs badly. Orbán’s Hungary offers a case study. Once in power, strongmen face the same stubborn realities as democrats: pandemics, inflation, geopolitics and economic complexity. Populism cannot protect a domestic economy by erecting barriers against the entire globe. Populism cannot pretend to listen to the voice of the people while it silences any dissent. Populism cannot pretend to be defending the interests of the common man while enriching the already wealthy and powerful. After all the bluster, populist authoritarians tend to revert to crony capitalism, institutional hollowing-out and theatrical nationalism instead of sound policies.

Trump fits this pattern. Twice now, he has ridden anti-incumbent waves to power, first in 2016 against the Obama-era Democratic establishment, and again in 2024 against President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris amid post-COVID inflation. Americans who voted for Trump did so primarily because they believed he would turn the economy around for them. But Trump and his family have profited enormously, while the net worth of average Americans has stagnated. As of March 2026, Trump’s net worth has increased by approximately��$3 billion to $4.2 billion��since returning to office in January 2025, with estimating his total wealth at a record $7.3 billion, up from $4.3 billion in 2024.

Trump’s second presidency is already visibly failing on its own terms. His , launched impulsively and then managed erratically, has rattled oil markets, worsened an already acute affordability crisis and brought the Strait of Hormuz to the brink of closure. Gasoline prices, already a source of voter anger, have climbed further. Voters may not follow every twist of Middle Eastern diplomacy, but they understand six-dollar gas.

Like Orbán, Trump tries to distract from policy failure with melodrama: social-media tirades, personalized feuds and symbolic gestures designed for the base. But there are growing signs that the spectacle is wearing thin. Even many Americans who once voted for Trump now show signs of exhaustion and disillusionment. The man who once seemed, to his admirers, like an iconoclastic outsider now looks like a tired, angry incumbent.

Trump’s late-night screeds on his own Truth Social platform have become longer, more erratic and more self-pitying. At least on Twitter, he was limited to 140 characters. Posting an of himself as Jesus, not merely blessed by Christ, but��as��Christ, and lashing out at the pope is the kind of grandiose behavior that, in any other era, would raise urgent questions about a president’s fitness for office. The “stable genius” shtick is shading into something more disturbing.

Corruption and cronyism exposed

Corruption also lies in plain sight. Americans are increasingly aware that Trump governs as he does business, by enriching family, cronies and co-investors. From Middle East envoys with vast financial stakes in the region to cronies profiting from regulatory changes, the pattern is unmistakable. Special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner not only have no credentials to negotiate an end to the Iran War — they have no technical expertise in the details of nuclear weapons, nor any background in history and diplomacy, as is normally required of high-level negotiators — but they also have substantial business dealings in the region and the outcome of the war will personally affect their own self-interest. Orbán’s downfall reminds voters that crony corruption is not just “how politics works” but rather is what happens when populists with disdain for expertise run a government.

Vance embodies this problem. Once a bestselling critic of Trumpism, he reinvented himself as a loyalist and is now tied to Trump’s misadventures abroad and at home. He for Orbán just before the Hungarian strongman’s rout. The high mark of chutzpah was Vance complaining about foreign interference in domestic elections while he was actively on the stump for Orbán’s party. He then traveled to Islamabad to help sell Trump’s Iran policy and came home empty-handed as the war worsened. Even Trump’s treatment of Vance, sending him to do the dangerous, thankless work while Trump an Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) event with Rubio, underscores the dynamic.��

In any other presidency, a foreign war would take precedence over just about any other issue. But Trump thought it would be a good idea to take Rubio to watch UFC fake fighters put on a Vaseline-rubbed mixed-martial-art cosplay rather than deal with statecraft. This is not the behavior of a confident leader grooming a serious successor, but rather that of a flailing boss toying with subordinates.

Authoritarian decline and coalition fractures

Trump’s actions are reminiscent of late-stage authoritarian movements elsewhere, when once-feared lieutenants begin to look ridiculous, and being close to the leader starts to look like a political liability rather than an asset. Vance’s much-touted conversion to Catholicism now sits awkwardly alongside a with an American pope who embodies a morally serious, anti-authoritarian Catholicism, and who clearly wants nothing to do with Trump’s court. The Pope is also a savvy organizer, against whom Trump is flailing.

When US President Richard Nixon was behaving as erratically as Trump does now, as the consumed his presidency, there were similar worries about whether the chief executive was mentally capable of carrying out his duties. The (which addresses presidential succession and the temporary transfer of power) was seriously considered. But in Trump 2.0, there is no adult backup in the White House or conscientious generals in the military — such as former Secretary of Defense James Mattis, retired Lieutenant General Herbert Raymond McMaster or retired General Mark Milley — to guide us through such a constitutional crisis.

The clash with the pope matters politically because it exposes a fissure inside Trump’s own coalition. For years, many white evangelicals and conservative Catholics offered elaborate rationalizations for their support of Trump, casting him as a flawed but necessary instrument in a larger culture war. Many believed God had chosen him to lead America. They accepted his insults, his affairs and even his boasts about sexual assault as the price of power.

But many of those voters are recoiling from the imagery of Trump as a quasi-divine figure and from direct attacks on a pope who speaks in recognizably Christian terms about peace, human dignity and the perils of idolatry, with a Chicago accent. When rank-and-file evangelicals and Catholics criticize Trump openly on these grounds, they offer what political scientists call “,” the cues elites give their followers to take unpopular stances. These kinds of changes do not happen overnight.

In Hungary, Orbán retained impressive support on paper until quite late. But once a critical mass of respectable figures begins to defect, or simply to speak candidly about a leader’s failings, momentum can shift quickly. Voters suddenly feel they are not alone in their misgivings. What was once unthinkable, breaking with “their” leader, becomes, at first, possible, and then inevitable.

Historical parallels and future implications

History does not repeat itself, or even rhyme, as the old cliché goes, but it does offer patterns. The current moment has resonances with several earlier inflection points in liberal democracies. The Progressive Era marked a reaction against the corruption and inequality of the Gilded Age. Reformers did not overthrow capitalism, but they imposed constraints, antitrust laws, regulation and social insurance, which made it survivable for ordinary people.

The civil-rights movement equally represented a profound moral and political break with the “respectable” segregationist laws of the mid-20th century. For years, it was unclear whether the cause would prevail. Then, abruptly, the combination of movement pressure, political leadership and cultural change produced a new consensus and a new generation of leaders that would have been hard to imagine in the 1950s.

The Thatcher–Reagan era then saw a turn away from postwar social democracy and activist government toward market liberalism and limited government. For young conservatives at the time, UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 victory, soon followed by US President Ronald Reagan’s in 1980 and the emergence of Pope John Paul II in the Vatican, created a sense that history’s momentum had shifted in their favor.

Orbán’s defeat, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s resistance in Ukraine and Magyar’s emergence in Hungary may play a similar galvanizing role for defenders of liberal democracy today. Two leaders from small countries with big megaphones in Central and Eastern Europe are showing that it is still possible to both resist Kremlin-linked illiberalism and speak convincingly to their citizens’ immediate material needs. Their example should put to rest the idea that only a nationalist strongman can channel popular frustration or that only the far left can credibly oppose inequality and corruption. A broadly liberal, anti-authoritarian politics can be tough on borders and security, serious about economic grievances and uncompromising on democratic norms.

If Orbán’s defeat offers lessons for the US, they are not about importing Magyar’s precise policy platform. They are about coalition, leadership and moral clarity. In Hungary, long-time liberals and leftists accepted a center-right, ex-Orbán figure as their standard-bearer because he was the candidate best positioned to win. In the US, that translates into a willingness among Democrats, moderates and anti-Trump conservatives to unite behind candidates, sometimes imperfect ones, who are serious about defending democratic norms, fighting corruption and improving living standards. Above all, it means jettisoning purity tests and focusing on the issues that matter to regular voters instead of to the loud fringe.

Voters respond not to ideological checklists, but to leaders who seem to understand their lives and can explain in plain language how things can get better. The most effective Democratic voices today are those who treat affordability, education, safety and the border as real problems, not as talking points to be brushed aside, while drawing a bright line against authoritarianism and bigotry.

The centrality of anti-corruption and the need for action

As the Hungarian opposition showed, opposing corruption and illiberalism is not ancillary to economic progress; it is central to it. In the US, that means making clear that Trump’s crony capitalism is not an unfortunate side effect, but a primary reason why ordinary people keep losing ground while insiders thrive. It is important to resist two temptations. The first is despair, the conviction that Trumpism is an unalterable feature of American life. The second is complacency, the belief that history has now turned, that liberal democracy is once again “inevitable” and that our only task is to ride the wave.

The truth lies between. Orbán’s fall, the limits of Trump’s war and the visible fraying of his personality cult all suggest that we may be entering a period of backlash against nationalist authoritarianism. New coalitions are forming, new leaders are emerging and even some former loyalists are beginning to peel away.

But history offers no guarantees. Inflection points only become turning points when people act, when citizens organize, when parties make courageous choices, when leaders articulate a compelling alternative and when institutions prove stronger than demagogues.

Hungary’s voters have reminded the world that even a deeply entrenched illiberal regime can be defeated democratically. The question now is whether Americans, facing a weaker but still dangerous form of Trumpism, can learn from their example and seize the moment before it slips away.

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By contrast, I remembered once reading an with billionaire Laurene Powell Jobs, who described the world as atoms constantly shifting and moving. With intention and focus, she pointed out, you can move those atoms yourself, and so move the world. Baked into that worldview was a sense of interconnectedness, not to mention power.

Was such a perspective a luxury of the billionaire class? In fact, no. Lots of non-billionaires, including many young people, regard the world as so many moveable atoms and they’re acting accordingly. In the process, they’re piercing the isolation in their neighborhoods, schools and even workplaces, while occasionally quelling their own loneliness, too.

A party in the park

In December, when thousands of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents descended on Minneapolis, Minnesota, neighbors started checking in on one another. A woman I’ll call by the pseudonym “M” learned something new about her South Minneapolis intersection: Dozens of Ecuadorian families live within just a few blocks of her. She also learned that many of those immigrants were not going to work because they were too afraid to make the commute. As a result, their families were struggling to pay bills.

That was when a few people got onto a chat thread and organized a rideshare system for the neighborhood. The thread quickly grew and now, M told me, there are more than 200 people on a chat thread covering just a handful of city blocks. Neighbors use this thread to connect for rides that get adults safely to work and kids safely to school.

“Just in our little neighborhood, we’re fielding 20 to 30 rides a day,” M told me. We spoke after the official end of the Trump administration’s Operation , its local deportation-machine operation. ICE is, however, in the area.

Their rideshare effort brought some unanticipated changes to the community. Neighbors who previously hadn’t known each other at all now spend time together daily, chatting and learning about each other’s lives.

“This whole experience has rewoven who we consider our community,” M told me. “When this is over, we’re going to throw a big party in the park.”

Meanwhile, as Operation Metro Surge raged in the Twin Cities, some 1,500 miles away in central Florida, high school students were walking out of class in protest — not once, but over and over again, despite threats from administrators that they would be suspended or expelled.

“We have immigrants at this school, we have people who are afraid at this school,” a senior at Viera High School in Viera West, Florida, a reporter in early February. She was disputing her school administration’s position that the protests aren’t about a “school-based” issue and shouldn’t take place during class time. That same day, north of Orlando, a student at DeLand High School to a local news station that she felt a sense of community as she walked out with her peers to stand up for their classmates.

And central Florida is just one of many places where protesting ICE has become a community undertaking. Zoe Weissman was only 12 years old when she survived the 2018 in Parkland, Florida. She’s now a sophomore at Brown University, where she lived through a second this past December. She told me that many young people at her school and elsewhere are involved in anti-ICE protests, in part because they feel a responsibility for keeping each other safe. This distinguishes her generation from older cohorts, who assumed that they could rely on the authorities to take care of that for them. Indeed, this winter, kids in cities ranging from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Indianapolis, Indiana, to Phoenix, Arizona, and Reno, Nevada.

But Weissman has personally observed people of all ages and from all walks of life starting to come together, both to take action against ICE and to support gun control (for which she’s a vocal advocate). “I’ve been really happy,” she said, “about how many different types of people and age groups I’ve seen protesting.”

The homeschooled Luhmann brothers from a suburb in Chicago, Illinois, are a notable example of such protesters. They began volunteering as community patrollers during Operation Midway Blitz in September 2025, as ICE agents arrested of people across Chicago.

“We’re two white minors who have always had the privilege to live in America unbothered,” Ben Luhmann, 17, told a reporter in a that earned over 250,000 likes on TikTok. “I’m going to use that privilege that shouldn’t be here, and do the right thing,” said his brother, Sam Luhmann, 16.

Their mother, Audrey, worries about her sons’ safety while they’re out observing ICE. And yet, motivated by her Christian faith to look out for neighbors, she was aware that Chicagoans of color worry every day about their kids’ safety. Given that reality, she asked me, “Why should my life be normal? Why should my family get to be safe and comfortable and go on about our days and just ignore what’s happening?”

As Sam put it, “We just need numbers of people out there keeping an eye on our neighbors.”

“A long-term strategy for survival against a fascist regime”

“One of the instincts in moments like this is to get as small as possible, so that you don’t get hit by whatever might be coming,” said Jonathan Feingold, a law professor who studies racism at Boston University School of Law. Recognizing that getting small and staying quiet is not what he considers “a long-term strategy for survival against a fascist regime,” Feingold started talking with fellow professors who, like him, had been troubled by mounting repression on their campuses even before Donald Trump entered the White House a second time.

In the spring of 2024, as Feingold recounted, universities around the country militarized against student groups that were protesting Israel’s of tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza. Universities explained this use of force as a necessity to protect the safety of Jewish students, though such students were well represented in the ranks of the protesters. Now, in US President Donald Trump’s second administration, the federal government is using allegations of antisemitism and claims of securing Jewish safety to justify a broad on free expression on college campuses. It is also using these claims to legitimize ICE abductions of noncitizens like Columbia University graduate student Mahmoud Khalil and Tufts University student Rümeysa Öztürk, who spoke up for the rights of Palestinians or criticized Israel.

“Jewish academics understood how Jewish identity was being wielded in order to come after our students, our colleagues, our institutions in deeply dangerous ways,” Feingold told me.

That’s why, a year ago, he cofounded a called Concerned Jewish Faculty and Staff. Through that organization, he’s collaborated with colleagues both on his campus and elsewhere who decided that they needed to bring their religious background into today’s struggle for civil rights.

Feingold said their most significant achievement to date has been creating a community. “The way that life is structured in the United States is often isolating,” he told me, noting that the life of an academic can be particularly lonely. Today, however, he feels a sense of camaraderie with colleagues who are planning to meet to observe Passover for a second year in a row. As he put it, “On a personal level, it has created a source for me to reintegrate into Jewish communal life that I’m excited to be a part of.”

And he isn’t the only one who now feels excited. More than 1,400 people registered for the third Conference of the Jewish Left in Boston this February. I was among them. It’s true that, once upon a time, I often resented having to spend time working with other people in a shared effort to keep this world of ours from going completely to shit, even as I also felt lonely and didn’t know what to do about that. At some point last year, however, I realized I was starting to find the company I needed in the very sorts of gatherings I used to resent attending.

Indeed, I found it strangely enlivening to sit in a giant room with people so deeply motivated, even driven, to protect all our fundamental rights — so driven, in fact, that they were willing to show up on a frigid Thursday to form a new alliance to do so.

Breaking bread and pozole

Far from the Conference of the Jewish Left, in a warmer climate, the nonprofit supports the economic resilience of the working-class residents of northeastern Los Angeles, with a particular focus on people of color, non-native English speakers and undocumented immigrants. While the organization primarily works to preserve affordability in neighborhood housing — which, in Los Angeles these days, requires incredible financial creativity — it has also recently started operating an outdoor market in nearby Cypress Park.

That market began as a comparte, or “share:” a place where members could gather and swap or share goods the way that some of them had done in their home countries. Then, residents suggested that they cook the foods of their homelands and bring them and homemade crafts to the market to sell to the larger community. Over the past year, that idea has become a biweekly night market called Somos NELA (an acronym for Northeast Los Angeles).

“It’s more than a market, more than an exchange of money,” says Helen Leung, the executive director of LA Más. She pointed out that the food sold there is rooted in history, made with love and is outrageously tasty. The pozole (a Mexican soup) is her personal favorite.

Leung said that some people who used to be very social at the market are now staying home, seeing the way ICE has violently arrested community members. At the same time, she added, “We have seen more customers come out, customers who are showing up more and are spending more. They want to support the community members who are trying to make ends meet.”

Frequenting the Somos NELA market is one of an array of acts that people across the city have taken up to support one another. Leung, for instance, has been inspired by the formation of new collectives dedicated to helping families who have been separated, as well as emotionally and financially devastated, by ICE abductions. One group of eight women even took the striking step of renting a community space to offer support and mutual aid to families who have been harmed.

It’s not an official nonprofit like LA Más. “These are,” she told me, “people who are figuring out how to change the system by themselves.”

The world sometimes shifts

Hundreds of people filed into a church on a winter evening in Amherst, Massachusetts, where I live, to learn how to be effective bystanders during an ICE raid. So many showed up that they spilled out the doors and some had to be turned away, told to attend the next training session. Once the program began, staff from an immigrant rights organization offered practical advice and personal stories.

Here is just one of those stories: Upon noticing a vehicle with tinted windows idling in their neighborhood, a white citizen approached it, said a warm hello to those inside, and engaged them in polite conversation. “Where are you from? What brings you to the area?” they asked. In some cases, that has proven to be an effective, nonconfrontational way to communicate to ICE agents that they are being watched and encourage them to leave without abducting any residents.

In other words, sometimes you can change the way events unfold. Sometimes, you can even change the news.

The bystander training provided more than just practical advice. As I looked around, I saw plenty of neighbors I knew, but many more I didn’t. I was feeling something I couldn’t quite identify.

Political scientists have long understood that loneliness is a precondition for authoritarianism, which depends on people being isolated and mistrusting one another. Historian and philosopher Hannah Arendt wrote about that in her 1951 tome, The Origins of Totalitarianism, in which she loneliness as tantamount to “the loss of one’s own self” because we are social creatures who confirm our identity in the company of others.

The news hasn’t improved since I started working on this piece. Still, while doing so, I’ve found myself in the company of others — and that’s reminded me of something. When you go out into the world, however scary it might seem, and act to make it better, the world does sometimes shift. The atoms really do move.

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The world was waiting anxiously for his bombshell after the inconclusive talks in Islamabad. He didn’t take long to on his Truth Social: “Effective immediately, the United States Navy, the Finest in the World, will begin the process of BLOCKADING any and all Ships trying to enter, or leave, the Strait of Hormuz.” So, the US will now completely blockade the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran had only partially blockaded during the war.��

Another strategic misadventure

Trump is a very capricious old man who will shamelessly renege on any position he has previously taken. He is also quite capable of throwing out the baby with the bathwater and shooting himself in the foot by making rash decisions that undermine his own efforts. Therefore, we can’t really say what the outcome of this situation will be. We are already hearing that the blockade will be to Iranian ports. But, if he presses ahead with this military action and stays the course — inspired by the US’ past blockade successes in and — it is likely to prove to be another huge strategic miscalculation against Iran.

Iran, in my view, had initially attempted to take similar action, or at least wanted to. However, after the US and Western propaganda machine began to construct a narrative that Iran was disrupting global energy security and economy by closing the Strait of Hormuz, the country began to backtrack from its initial maximalist position. It the strait to ease international ire and pressure by projecting a sense of normalcy along the Hormuz route, but this did not extend to its enemies.

Trump and his many advisers, it seems, have still not learned that the Middle East is not South America, and it is definitely not the US’ backyard.

Imperialist grudge

Perfected in the colonies, the Western powers — claiming to be civilized rather than savage — established a legal framework for exploiting the subjugated peoples, their lands and their resources. These laws were made by the colonial masters, who invoked, interpreted and applied them selectively to further their own metropolitan interests. In the post-colonial world, this Western imperialist practice has been institutionalized within the geopolitical landscape and extended to the whole globe, creating the so-called rules-based order that has governed international relations ever since.

After taking of the Strait of Hormuz during the war, Iran intends to maintain this dominance and impose a levy on tankers transporting oil and gas for safe passage. Iran argues that this is necessary to rebuild its war-ravaged country and views it as reparations for an imposed war. So far, Iran has made no rules, and it is allegedly levying transit fees selectively, exempting certain countries while charging others.

The US resents Iran’s attempt to impose its will in the region, viewing it as a disruption to the established international order. Only the US has the right to impose its will on other nations at the expense of international order; Iran cannot equate itself with the US. Moreover, this approach is seen as crude and unsophisticated compared to the Western way of “legally” advancing vested interests, although by the selective and discriminatory interpretation and application of laws and rules. However, it actually mirrors Trump’s tactics, from whom the world is quickly learning about arbitrary actions and bullying.

A coalition of international disorder

Trump that the Hormuz blockade will involve unspecified “other countries,” but he has not revealed which countries these partners might be. The United Arab Emirates? Bahrain? Kuwait? Who else, if the US’s European allies continue to shy away from involving their countries in the Iran war?

Israel is unlikely to act beyond securing its own national interest, and its participation in any operation to blockade Hormuz is highly doubtful. Trump can, of course, bring on board leaders such as Argentinian President Javier Milei, El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar, and now acting Venezuelan President Delcy Rodríguez from his own hemisphere. He can also buy the participation of a few militarily insignificant countries in Africa, Oceania and Polynesia. However, if Trump’s Hormuz blockade coalition materializes, it will likely not represent the will of the so-called “international community.” Instead, it will harm more countries than it benefits, if it benefits them at all.

This US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz will negatively impact its own strategic partners, as well as strategic rivals and neutral countries. Disrupting the global economy will ultimately hurt the entire world. The blame for disrupting global oil and gas supplies will now fall on the US rather than Iran. After all, the Hormuz route was fully open before the Iran war. 

Businesses and governments would rather pay to cross the Strait of Hormuz than have the US close the strait indefinitely. They are already facing a serious energy crisis, and a complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz would significantly exacerbate the situation. Oil is deemed more important than equality, after all.

Given the importance of the Strait of Hormuz to global energy supply, the implications extend far beyond just the businesses and governments directly involved. As tensions rise and the US maneuvers strategically in the region, another major player finds itself in a precarious position: China.

The Chinese dilemma

China may find itself cornered after this US strategic move in the Strait of Hormuz. Its Venezuelan oil supply was choked by the US just a few months ago, and now the Hormuz blockade will stop Iranian oil, necessary for powering China’s vast economic empire.

But, instead of confronting the US, China may once again chicken out as it did in Venezuela. While it verbally challenges the US with enthusiasm and responds firmly to economic pressures, it does not engage the US militarily. It seems China is waiting for its military muscle to grow bigger than that of the US. As an emerging superpower, China understandably appears to lack the confidence to directly confront a century-old reigning superpower.

However, it already has considerable military muscle, and all it needs is to flex it in the US. The right moment to act will arise, potentially in the Strait of Hormuz — though this seems unlikely, given China’s immense strategic patience and a long-term perspective. The descendants of the famous Sun Tzu, who wrote , may strongly believe in his advice that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” and “the greatest victory is that which requires no battle.”

The Iranian response

Iran has been battered by the US and Israel’s bombing, while inflicting far less damage to its enemies. Despite this, it has won the battle of perception by staying in the fight and successfully positioning itself to negotiate directly with the US in a third country for a long-term peace agreement. Iran’s morale is high, and its image has improved significantly, surpassing that of Israel after this war. Iran has presented itself as a tough and steely nation. Israel earned a name for itself by carrying out assassinations and defeating weak Arab nations, but Iran has successfully fought both the reigning superpower and Israel. Iran has displayed its unparalleled sacrificial courage, insurmountable will to resist and inexhaustible military arsenal in an all-out war.

Iran has that it is quite capable of taking on the US militarily, and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has indicated as much after Trump’s Hormuz blockade announcement. Iran has other options, too. To make things worse for the world, besides the Strait of Hormuz, Iran can also block the Red Sea route involving the Bab Al-Mandab Strait with the help and support of its ally Ansar Allah (the Houthis). But what if Iran prefers to sit tight and see the world react? Then, in my view, this new US military venture is unlikely to last long because the entire world, already fed up and frustrated by Trump’s unending tantrums, would likely unite against the US and force it to withdraw.

On the other hand, if Trump is employing his trademark bullying tactic to extract maximum concessions from the other party and get the most favorable deal for himself, this approach is unlikely to work against Iran, as previous military threats and actions didn’t. This behavior only shows that he and his coterie of yes-men don’t understand the character of the Iranian nation. He seems to be a prisoner of his past pressure-tactic successes. A better strategy would be to reach out in good faith and with sincere intentions, treating Iranians as equals rather than trying to intimidate them into submission for a durable peace agreement. The US has recently bombed Iran twice in the middle of negotiations, and there is absolutely no reason why they should trust the US again.

Washington’s strategic incompetence

The Iran War and the ongoing crisis in the Middle East  — largely created by the US — highlight a severe strategic incompetence in Washington that is unprecedented in history. Ironically, this is the superpower with decades of accumulated collective experience in controlling the world and the best pool of geopolitical strategists, yet it finds itself in a dire situation. But what can these experts do if they are booted out, intimidated, forced to quit or altogether ignored by their government? This contradiction lies at the heart of the declining US empire, a decline that has been largely self-inflicted.

The disruption of an established order is the surest sign of the decline of a geopolitical power that had built and maintained that order. A new world order is born from the ruins of the old. The world dominated by the West is gradually realizing — and reluctantly accepting — that the locus of geopolitical power is shifting eastward, with China emerging as the new global superpower. Historically, incompetent rulers accelerate the decline of a fading empire and hasten the transition to a new power structure.

The stories we read in history about incompetent rulers at the end of a weakened empire differ from those of today in one fundamental sense: In the past, ordinary people had no say in choosing their rulers. In contrast, the US has a system in which citizens elect their leaders. Therefore, it is the citizens of the US — shaped by their educational and cultural systems — who must take responsibility if their country fades into mediocrity in the coming decades.

But who knows? Maybe I will be proven wrong, and this will not be the end of the US’ hegemony over the world. Maybe the people who voted for Trump really did want to “Make America Great Again.” The only problem with their desire is how do you make an already great thing great again? You can only make it greater, and that doesn’t seem to be happening in any sense right now, at least.

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For the historical record, Kenneth Woodward, the author of the 1990 book, , notes that over the span of time of the office of Promotor Fidei’s existence — from 1587 to 1983 — thousands of dossiers entered the preliminary stages but were “held up” indefinitely. Many are still gathering dust in the Vatican’s archives. Exactly 302 saints were canonized during that period.

I bring this up in the context of US President Donald Trump’s attempt this past week not just to canonize himself, but to “Christify” his public image on his social media platform, Truth Social. The world discovered the full extent of the president’s inflated ego when he posted an AI-generated picture of himself dressed in the flowing robes of Jesus in the act of healing the sick thanks to the power of heavenly light radiating from his caring hands.

Numerous American Christians, shocked by the commander-in-chief’s pretension, denounced the image as blasphemous. Most secular commentators recognized it as a perfect representation of Trump’s patented hubris and narcissism. 

Trump himself appears to be the only commentator cited in the media not to have noticed that the figure was meant to be Jesus. When questioned by the press, Trump insisted that it had nothing to do with Christian iconography. In his eyes, it simply represented the president in the role of a doctor working specifically under the auspices of the Red Cross. The actual Biblical reference this image brings to mind for anyone familiar with the Gospels is Jesus’s raising of Lazarus from the dead. Trump apparently believes in his supernatural therapeutic skills that have enabled him to Make America Whole Again. No need to confuse him with the Messiah. He’s SuperDoc.

You must believe… or laugh (whichever is most appropriate)

Trump may sincerely believe that. Nobody else was fooled. The New York Times: “Vice President JD Vance said on Fox News that a picture Mr. Trump posted on social media earlier in the day that depicted him as a Jesus-like figure was meant as a joke.” Divine humor, not blasphemy! If Trump is the only person in the United States who failed to see the reference to Jesus, then Vance may be the only person to have found the image amusing. Or did he mean “laughable,” like so much of Trump’s antics? Perhaps Vance also sees Trump’s decision to follow the lead of a wanted genocidal war criminal and launch an undeclared, unauthorized and unwinnable war that started with a sensational decapitation strike as just another of his president-entertainer’s amusing antics. Vance wants us to believe that was just Trump being Trump.

Alas, another of Trump’s Christian critics, this one an American who managed last year to become a vicar in Rome, focused his ire not on the image but on the war itself. He declared it urbi et orbi. This displeased Trump — who is not a Roman Catholic nor much of a churchgoer — to no end. Pope , like his predecessor Francis, is not fond of US presidents “who have the power to unleash wars” and exercise it willfully. Pope Francis dared to : “I believe it is time to rethink the concept of a ‘just war.’” Trump and even Vance seem ready to respond: “What’s the problem here? This is just war!” In other words, for a US administration, whoever the president may be, it’s just another day at the office.

Vance, a practicing conservative Catholic, made his position clear when he , “It would be best for the Vatican to stick to matters of morality.” One may wonder where the recently converted vice president did his catechism. Does he believe that making the decision to take other people’s lives and promising to destroy entire civilizations are not “matters of morality?” The same NYT that quotes Vance informs us that Secretary of State “Marco Rubio, another prominent Catholic in the administration, remained silent as Mr. Trump attacked Leo.”

In case Vance and Rubio need reminding, here are the very words of the :

“Sin is a personal act. Moreover, we have a responsibility for the sins committed by others when we cooperate in them: – by participating directly and voluntarily in them; – by ordering, advising, praising, or approving them; – by not disclosing or not hindering them when we have an obligation to do so; – by protecting evil-doers.”

These two high officials may argue that the fact that such decisions take place within a constitutionally defined national hierarchy removes the “obligation to do so.” No need to run to the confessional. Rubio’s silence would thus be deemed more justifiable than Vance’s daring reprimand of the pope for overstepping his authority. The irony is that most observers believe Rubio, a known interventionist hawk, is the one most likely to have endorsed the launch of the war. In a much noticed NYT on how the administration made the decision to go to war, White House reporters Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman noted that Vance was “the figure inside the White House most opposed to a full-scale war.”

Whose side are you on?

Poised between loyalty to his church’s moral teaching and the special moral code of the president he was serving, Rubio was, according to the article, “ambivalent.” Earlier this year, an with the title, “Trump Lays Out a Vision of Power Restrained Only by ‘My Own Morality,’” made it clear that the commander-in-chief had no time for traditional Christian morality. The logic and subtle reasoning contained in his “own morality” can presumably be found in Trump’s best-selling book, The Art of the Deal. Few theologians have ever deigned to cite Trump’s celebrated philosophical tome as a source. Others, however, have attempted to deal with that business-oriented topic. It’s a debate that Trump apparently has no interest in engaging in. That makes sense. If it’s already there, implanted in your brain, accompanied by the knowledge that the bright light of moral intelligence emanates spontaneously from your two hands (as depicted in the image of Trump the healer), why seek to articulate your ethics?

As for Rubio, his silence was short-lived. He eventually did speak up. Swan and Haberman explain that even though he preferred “to continue a campaign of maximum pressure rather than start a full-scale war,” he “did not try to talk Mr. Trump out of the operation, and after the war began he delivered the administration’s justification with full conviction.”

Then there’s the case of another faithful Catholic close to Trump, also mentioned in the NYT reporting Trump’s row with the pope. “Steve Bannon, a longtime Trump ally, argued that conservative Catholics were more likely to side with the administration than with the pontiff on issues such as immigration enforcement. Deeming Trump’s verbal assault “smart politically,” he concluded: “It is good in that it gets more of his conservative Catholic base energized.”

It may be time we consider the specific ethical question of what it means to get a political base energized. This could be done in the context of debating the morality of what I once described as Bannon’s mission that consisted of creating a “gladiator school for culture warriors.” The school would aim, as I described it in 2019, at “converting the ‘Judeo-Christian’ world of his imagination (basically, white civilization) to the global cause of anti-Islamic populism” while acting “as the anointed defender of the interests of ordinary, working-class people against a predatory elite.”

So what conclusions should we draw from all of this? Mr. Trump demonstrates that the very idea of a political leader acting as an incarnation of Jesus, or even as a common saint, can only be seen as a joke. Perhaps that’s the hidden meaning behind Vance’s dismissal of the AI generated image of Trump as Jesus.

As for these three prominent Trump loyalists known to be practicing Roman Catholics — Vance, Rubio and Bannon — each of them wields the status, thanks to their prominence in the media, that could earn them the privilege of a private audience with the pope. Leo has made it clear he has no interest in Trump, for reasons that have nothing to do with the fact that he isn’t a Catholic. But these three gentlemen, who have such clear ideas of how morality and ethics in our evolved democratic societies, might find it interesting to use such an occasion to clarify their understanding of the relationship between Christian ethics and the world of politics and geopolitics.

Or they might not.

*[The Devil’s Advocate pursues the tradition 51�Թ� began in 2017 with the launch of our “Devil’s Dictionary.” It does so with a slight change of focus, moving from language itself — political and journalistic rhetoric — to the substantial issues in the news. Read more of the 51�Թ� Devil’s Dictionary. The news we consume deserves to be seen from an outsider’s point of view. And who could be more outside official discourse than Old Nick himself?]

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Nationalism, strategy and electoral muscle

Chambers describes the vote as “a landslide victory for the forces of the right,” marking a sharp setback for progressive reformists. Early polling had favored the social democratic People’s Party, successor to the dissolved Move Forward and Future Forward parties. Yet a convergence of political forces shifts the outcome.

A border clash between Thailand and Cambodia in July 2025, which resulted in Thai casualties, fuels nationalist sentiment. A leaked phone call between then-Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and former Cambodian strongman Hun Sen, in which she spoke negatively about the Thai army, further intensifies public anger. Chambers argues that Anutin capitalized on the moment and used “nationalism to glide towards a victory.”

But nationalism alone does not explain the result. Chambers points to allegations of vote buying in several provinces, coordination among conservative parties to avoid splitting the vote and the strategic use of local power brokers. Bhumjaithai also benefits from access to bureaucratic networks while in office, helping channel resources through provincial structures. Legal and questionable tactics combine to produce a commanding win.

Urban–rural divide, not an ideological earthquake

The election reveals a stark geographic split. The People’s Party wins every district in Thailand’s capital of Bangkok and nearly all seats in the northern city of Chiang Mai. Rural provinces, particularly those near the Cambodian border, tilt heavily toward Anutin.

This pattern seems to reflect structural differences rather than a sweeping ideological realignment. Urban voters gravitate toward progressive platforms, while rural constituencies respond more strongly to nationalism and patronage networks. Chambers does not see the result as evidence of a permanent conservative turn, however. Instead, he calls it the “temper of the times,” shaped by border tensions and political mood.

He also criticizes the People’s Party’s internal weaknesses. Compared to its predecessors, it fails to organize effectively at the grassroots level and struggles to resonate beyond urban centers. The loss, then, stems not only from repression or manipulation but from strategic shortcomings within the reform movement itself.

Monarchy, military and managed democracy

The structure of Thai power serves as a major talking point. Chambers explains that King Rama X, the king of Thailand, stands above politics and democracy. He says Thailand operates through a partnership between the monarchy and the military, with the armed forces acting as guardian and junior partner.

The Senate, appointed rather than elected under the 2017 constitution, plays a decisive role in selecting the prime minister alongside the lower house. Parliament functions, but within strict boundaries. The lower chamber can debate budgets and investigate issues, yet it operates under the shadow of potential military intervention. Any serious challenge to royal prerogatives risks triggering a coup.

This framework shapes electoral politics. Even when progressive parties perform well, institutional levers remain firmly in conservative hands. Courts, oversight bodies and security forces collectively reinforce elite dominance.

Section 112 and the cost of dissent

The discussion turns personal when Chambers recounts his own prosecution under Section 112 of Thailand’s criminal code, the lèse-majesté law. The statute prohibits insulting the monarchy and carries severe penalties. He describes it as “a very ambiguous law,” one that allows broad interpretation and political weaponization.

In April 2025, Chambers was sentenced to 15 years in prison over a conference flyer stating that the king holds more power than the prime minister. Although he did not write or post the material, his name appears in connection with the event. He spent two nights in a rural prison before being released on bail. Charges were eventually dropped by the attorney general, but immigration authorities retained his passport until he boarded a flight out of Bangkok. “Yes, I had to flee,” he tells Khattar Singh.

His case is not isolated. More than 280 individuals face Section 112-related cases. Anti-monarchy protests between 2020 and 2023 drew thousands of young demonstrators. The state responds not only with arrests but with subtler tactics: visits to families, legal pressure and selective prosecutions. Prominent activist Arnon Nampa remains imprisoned. Such measures weaken the reform movement incrementally rather than through dramatic mass repression.

Constitutional reform at a crossroads

Alongside the election, voters support a referendum to begin drafting a new constitution to replace the military-backed 2017 charter. Reformers hope to curtail the appointed Senate’s power and restore a more democratic framework akin to the 1997 constitution.

Yet the path forward is steep. Three separate referendums are required to amend the charter. Chambers doubts the new government will push aggressively for further votes. With a fresh electoral mandate, Anutin can argue that voters have rejected sweeping change.

Meanwhile, judicial pressure intensifies. The National Anti-Corruption Commission forwards a case against 44 People’s Party members to the Supreme Court. If upheld, the ruling could strip them of political rights and potentially dissolve the party altogether. Chambers sees this as part of a broader strategy to erode progressive reformism bit by bit.

Thailand’s election thus reflects more than a partisan shift. It exposes the tension between popular demands for democratic change and a resilient alliance of monarchy, military and judiciary. Whether reformers can overcome institutional barriers or whether conservative dominance hardens further will shape the country’s political future and reverberate across Southeast Asia.

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The Military Service Modernization , which entered into force on , is an overdue correction. It rebuilds the state’s ability to register, examine and, if necessary, conscript young men for service in the Bundeswehr (the German armed forces). It also contains a controversial provision linking prolonged foreign travel for 17- to 45-year-old men to military registration — a rule that the government has now in peacetime after public backlash.

Critics see a creep toward authoritarianism and a betrayal of post-war Germany’s pacifist consensus. But if one takes both the state’s duty seriously to protect its citizens and the lessons of European history, the logic of the new framework is compelling. Germany needs a larger, more capable army. It needs legal tools to mobilize quickly if Russia’s war spreads, if NATO fractures or if new crises emerge. And it must build this power within a robust constitutional framework that guards against abuse.

Reforming Germany’s defense: the path to a modern conscription system

A Germany that refuses to arm itself adequately is not more moral. It does not make a society of Gutmenschen (virtuous citizens), but rather of weak and vulnerable people, much more dependent on others. Besides, the 2026 reform does not restore the blanket, open-ended draft of the Cold War era. Instead, it constructs the machinery that would make a genuine conscription system work if activated.

All males born in 2008 or later will receive a mandatory questionnaire on turning 18. They must disclose basic personal data, indicate their willingness to serve and list any additional nationalities they hold. Women can participate voluntarily, but the constitutional basis for compulsory service remains gendered.

After the 2011 of conscription, Germany stopped systematically collecting such data. Today, the Defense Ministry lacks precise knowledge of how many potential soldiers exist in each cohort, their health status and their skills. In a crisis, this ignorance would be crippling. Re-establishing Wehrerfassung — military registration — is a precondition for any credible defense posture.

Next will come the phased reintroduction of medical examinations (Musterung). Starting with volunteers in 2026 and expanding to all eligible 18-year-old men, the Bundeswehr will again conduct health checks to determine fitness for service. This moves Germany away from an abstract, paper-only draft and back toward a concrete understanding of who can actually carry a rifle, maintain a tank or operate a radar.

The new law further requires the creation of a needs-based conscription mechanism (Bedarfswehrpflicht). The law stops short of an immediate, general draft. Instead, it empowers parliament to activate conscription in targeted ways if voluntary recruitment falls short. The government’s is to increase the ���ܲԻ����ɱ���’s strength from about 184,000 active troops to between 255,000 and 270,000 by 2035. Without the option of compulsory service, this is unlikely to be achievable.

The exit-permission clause

The controversial “exit-permission” clause fits into this architecture. As amended, Section 3, Paragraph 2 of the nominally requires men aged 17 to 45 who are resident in Germany to obtain approval from a Bundeswehr Career Center before staying abroad for more than three months. An earlier version of the law limited such a requirement to declared emergencies. The new text extends it to peacetime.

On paper, permission is “to be granted” so long as full conscription has not been activated, and refusal must not impose “particular hardship” on the applicant. In other words, as long as military service remains voluntary, the state is not supposed to stop anyone from leaving. The provision is less about stopping travel than about maintaining an accurate conscription register: Who is where, and for how long. In a real mobilization, that information could be decisive.

The exit rule once it became widely known, months after the law was passed. The outrage has two main roots. The first is procedural. The provision was buried in cross-references in a long modernization bill. The Defense Ministry did not publicize or explain it, and when newspapers finally reported on it in April, Career Centers themselves lacked clear procedures. Young men technically had a legal duty to seek permission for multimonth trips abroad, but no functioning mechanism to fulfill that duty. That is bad lawmaking by any standard, and it gave critics an easy target.

The second root is Germany’s understandable obsession with civil liberties. Conditioning the right to leave one’s country on approval from a military office, even if approval is automatic, touches a nerve. Germany’s guarantees freedom of movement and general personal liberty. Traumatic memories of state control over travel are deeply embedded in political culture, from the Nazi era to 40 years of communism in the east and the division into two Germanies during the Cold War. Opposition parties and legal scholars argued that a peacetime permission requirement could not be reconciled with these guarantees.

Under heavy criticism, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius that as long as service is voluntary, there will be no practical permission procedures; an administrative directive will suspend implementation. In other words, the legal lever exists, but it is locked in a cabinet marked “break glass only in case of emergency.”

This outcome is actually a sign of a functioning constitutional democracy. Parliament legislated for worst-case scenarios; the executive scaled back the application to match current needs and rights guarantees; courts remain available as a backstop if the rule is ever used in earnest.

But it is also a reminder of the deeper tension Germany must navigate: how to arm itself seriously without sliding toward the abuses of its 20th-century past.

Assessing Germany’s military readiness

To understand why a strongly pro-armament stance is not warmongering but realism, one must begin with the Bundeswehr’s current condition.

For years, Germany spent well NATO’s notional 2% of GDP defense benchmark. Successive governments made lofty promises about European security while quietly allowing the armed forces to shrink and age. Training hours were limited by budget constraints and ammunition stocks. Soldiers complained of a lack of basic kit, from functioning radios to winter clothing. Key weapons systems — tanks, helicopters, aircraft — were often unavailable due to maintenance problems and spare-parts shortages.

The suspension of conscription in 2011 accelerated a cultural shift. Military service ceased to be a near-universal experience for young men and became a niche career path. Many draft-age men in the late conscription years had opted out of uniformed service by choosing community work instead. When the draft disappeared altogether, so did a major channel through which the Bundeswehr connected to society at large.

Meanwhile, the technological gap widened. Modern warfare depends on integrated air defense, cybersecurity, drones, electronic warfare and robust logistics. Germany’s procurement system proved sluggish and risk-averse. By the time Berlin announced its (“turning point”) in 2022 after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the gap between rhetoric and reality was enormous.

It is against this backdrop that the new law’s personnel focus must be judged. Without enough trained people, no amount of money for hardware will suffice. And without a functioning registration and mobilization system, Germany would be dangerously slow to respond to a sudden deterioration in its security environment.

The case for a stronger, larger German military is not abstract.

Germany’s role in European defense

Russia’s war against Ukraine demonstrates that large-scale mechanized warfare in Europe is not a relic of the 20th century. A revanchist Kremlin has shown itself willing to erase borders by force. So far, the front line has remained east of NATO territory, but there is no law of nature that guarantees it will stay there.

At the same time, the political foundations of NATO’s deterrent power have been shaken. US President Donald Trump America’s willingness to defend allies he deemed delinquent on defense spending. His rhetoric, including remarks suggesting Russia should be free to “do whatever” it wants to undermine allies, made explicit what European strategists had long feared: US security guarantees may not always be sacrosanct.

Even if future US administrations reaffirm their commitment, the message has landed in Berlin: Europe must prepare for a world in which the American shield is thinner, more conditional or, in the worst case, withdrawn.

In such a world, German weakness is dangerous. A militarily feeble Germany cannot anchor European defense. It cannot credibly deter aggression on NATO’s eastern flank. It cannot support vulnerable partners. Nor can it shape the security architecture that might emerge if NATO were to weaken or fragment.

The choice is not between armament and peace, but between responsible, democratic armament and the illusion that others will always fight Germany’s battles for it.

A strongly pro-armament stance in today’s Germany does not mean embracing militarism. It means accepting that the use or credible threat of force is sometimes necessary to defend a liberal order and building the capabilities to exercise that force under strict civilian, constitutional control. In this light, the Military Service Modernization Act is a step in the right direction. It treats defense as a national responsibility, not an afterthought. It restores tools, registration, medical examination and conscription triggers that every serious state with a conscription tradition maintains. It signals to allies and adversaries alike that Germany is no longer content to be a security free-rider.

Ensuring a responsible and transparent approach to military service in Germany

To make this project compatible with Germany’s history and civil-liberty commitments, some guardrails are crucial, beginning with transparency and parliamentary oversight. Any move from registration and voluntary service to actual compulsory service should require explicit parliamentary authorization and be accompanied by open debate. Hidden clauses and poorly communicated rules, such as the initial handling of the exit-permission provision, undermine trust and feed fears of a slippery slope.

A strong constitutional review will also be necessary. The Federal Constitutional Court should, if asked, scrutinize measures that condition core freedoms, such as movement, on military needs. A clear doctrine distinguishing necessary and proportionate wartime measures from disproportionate peacetime restrictions would help legitimize the system. Germany’s post-war success rests partly on the willingness of courts to place limits on state power; that must continue.

A set of meaningful alternatives but narrowly tailored protections for those who refuse to fight because of conscientious objections should also be included. A modern conscription system need not be purely military. Civilian service in critical infrastructure, disaster relief or social care can complement uniformed duty. Robust procedures for conscientious objection should remain in place. The key is not to force everyone into combat roles, but to make clear that citizenship in a vulnerable democracy entails obligations as well as rights. Within those guardrails, however, Germany should embrace a straightforward truth: Rebuilding the Bundeswehr is not just acceptable; it is necessary.

Germany’s shift towards military readiness and strategic responsibility

For too long, Berlin profited from a strategic environment shaped by others. It enjoyed cheap Russian gas, benefited from Chinese demand and was sheltered under American security guarantees. That era is ending. Like bankruptcy, it came gradually and now all at once. Germany now faces a world in which authoritarian powers are more assertive, alliances more contingent and the costs of military unpreparedness potentially catastrophic.

In that world, the new conscription framework is less a radical departure than a long-overdue normalization. It is what serious countries do when they acknowledge that they may, at some point, have to defend themselves and their neighbors without relying on someone else’s sons and daughters.

Yes, parts of the law were drafted clumsily. Yes, the travel-permission clause in its original peacetime form overreached, and the government was right to scale it back. But to use that misstep as a reason to reject the broader project would be to confuse procedural flaws with strategic necessity.

Europe needs a militarily capable Germany, not to dominate, but to stabilize. Germans who, with good reason, invoke history to argue for restraint should also remember a different lesson from their past: that power vacuums can be as dangerous as power excesses. A Germany that cannot defend itself invites either domination or dangerous dependence.

Arming responsibly, building a credible conscription-based mobilization system and embedding it all within the rule of law is not a betrayal of post-war Germany’s values. It is their logical extension into a more dangerous century. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once that the Germans are either at your throat or at your feet. That verdict was obviously too harsh. But a grain of truth resides in the witticism that Germans have shown themselves to be either too militaristic or too pacifist. It is high time for some common-sense middle ground.

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A working policy that lost support

Jenkins begins by outlining an apparent contradiction. Trump did what he said he would do. Border crossings dropped dramatically, with apprehensions falling by roughly 90% in early 2025 — reaching levels not seen in decades. Yet approval for his immigration policy fell just as sharply. Support declined from 59% at the start of Trump’s term to 39% within ten months.

Observers cannot explain this reversal simply by partisan opposition or isolated incidents. Even before the highly publicized shootings of protesters in Minneapolis, Minnesota, public opinion had already shifted. Democratic messaging alone did not drive the change, either. Instead, the explanation lies deeper, in how Americans think about immigration itself.

As Jenkins puts it, Trump’s policy became “deeply, deeply, deeply unpopular” despite its consistency and measurable results. The issue is not whether the policy worked at the border, but how people experienced it beyond it.

Two issues, not one

Crucially, Americans do not see immigration as a single issue. They distinguish sharply between border security and internal enforcement.

At the border, migrants appear as a large, anonymous group — what Jenkins describes as an “undifferentiated mass.” This framing raises citizen concerns about national security, economic competition and the rule of law. Many Americans, including legal immigrants, support stricter controls in this context.

Inside the country, however, the picture changes. Migrants are no longer distant figures but neighbors, coworkers and parents of children in local schools. They are individuals with names, families and stories. When enforcement targets these individuals, public sentiment shifts from anxiety to empathy.

This shift became visible when Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents deployed in cities across the United States. Arrests carried out in public spaces, often by masked officers, triggered widespread backlash. Jenkins says many Americans find these scenes “shocking and appalling,” not because the law has changed, but because its application now feels personal.

The human mind and the “group–individual” divide

To explain this pattern, Jenkins turns to history and social science. He highlights a 1930s study by sociologist Richard LaPiere, conducted during a period of overt anti-Chinese discrimination in the US. Although 90% of surveyed businesses claimed they would refuse service to Chinese customers, LaPiere and his Chinese companions were denied service only once in hundreds of real-world interactions.

The gap between stated attitudes and actual behavior reveals a persistent feature of human psychology. People often express hostility toward abstract groups while responding more generously to individual members of those groups they encounter directly.

Economist Thomas Schelling famously noted that “the death of one person is a tragedy; the death of a million is a statistic.” Psychologist Paul Slovic similarly showed that people are more likely to take moral action when they focus on a single identifiable individual rather than a large, faceless population.

Jenkins frames this as a tension between general rules and particular cases. Laws operate at the level of categories, but human judgment often operates at the level of stories. When the two collide, sympathy for individuals can override support for broad policies.

Political fallout and strategic uncertainty

This paradox has brought significant political consequences. Public backlash contributed to the resignation of the Secretary of Homeland Security and forced a partial retreat from aggressive enforcement tactics in some cities. Yet the broader policy direction remains uncertain.

Polling reflects this ambiguity. While a majority of Americans believe the immigration crackdown has gone too far, they do not see a clear alternative. Democrats have not consolidated support for their position, and Republicans retain a slight advantage on the issue. A large share of the public remains undecided, suggesting that opinions are still fluid.

Jenkins argues that both parties have struggled to grasp the full implications of the paradox. Republican policies resonate at the border but falter in communities. Democratic responses, such as calls to abolish ICE, risk alienating voters who still prioritize enforcement in principle.

“The jury is still out,” Jenkins concludes. Public opinion depends heavily on how immigration is framed. When presented as a matter of national security, enforcement gains support. When presented through individual cases, it provokes resistance.

The immigration paradox reflects a deeper feature of political life: the tension between abstraction and experience. Americans can simultaneously demand order at the border and compassion at home because these impulses arise from different ways of seeing the same issue. The future of immigration policy will depend less on ideology than on which of these perspectives dominates public perception at any given moment.

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I am 44, German, and have lived and worked in Vienna for over a decade. I found out about this provision the same way most people did: through a social media post. That alone should give pause.

A paragraph hidden in plain sight

The��Military Service Modernisation ��(Wehrdienst-Modernisierungsgesetz []) came into force at the start of the year as part of Germany’s broader effort to rebuild its defense capabilities. The policy rationale is straightforward: Germany wants to�� the Bundeswehr (German armed forces) from roughly 184,000 to over 260,000 active personnel by 2035, and it needs to know where its military-age population is in the event of mobilization. Germany is simultaneously��sending mandatory to all 18-year-old men��this year (voluntary for women), building a clearer picture of available manpower.

The legal mechanism requiring advance approval for extended stays abroad is not new.��A existed in German law since 1986. What changed on January 1 was the trigger: Previously, the rule only activated in a declared state of tension or defense. Now, it��, even in peacetime.

That is not a minor administrative tweak. It is a fundamental shift in how Germany defines the relationship between the state and citizens in the security domain. And it ended in a .��

The week that followed

Once the provision came to light, the reaction was swift and politically broad. From the Greens to the Alternative für Deutschland,��virtually every party in the Bundestag . Some comparisons made — Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance leader invoking the Berlin Wall — were overwrought. This is a democratic government, not an authoritarian one. But the breadth of criticism carried a signal worth taking seriously.

Within days, Defense Minister Boris Pistorius that “we are suspending the permission requirement as long as military service is voluntary,” adding that different rules would apply in a crisis or defense situation. What had been presented as a considered legislative measure was effectively reversed under a week of public pressure, without a substantive parliamentary debate.

The real problem is not the policy

Europe is remilitarizing. That sentence would have seemed alarmist five years ago; today it is simply a description of political reality. Estonia, Finland, Poland and Sweden — countries that never lost sight of what security requires — have been�� by a growing number of EU members reconsidering or reinforcing conscription frameworks. Germany, which�� mandatory military service in 2011, is trying to reconstruct the institutional muscle memory that others never let atrophy. Strategically, the direction is difficult to contest.

What this episode exposed, however, is a governance failure that could prove costly precisely because the direction is right. A provision�� of men entered into force on January 1, generated no public information campaign, produced no application infrastructure and was discovered three months later through a report by the . The Federal Ministry of Defence promptly confirmed the finding to the German news agency . When the legal basis for a significant restriction on individual freedom is enacted without public communication or parliamentary spotlight, trust in the very institutions that need public buy-in is eroded before policy can take effect.

A pattern worth watching

This is not uniquely a German problem. Across Europe, the logic of security preparation is outpacing the democratic conversation required to legitimize it. Governments are rebuilding defense frameworks that were deliberately dismantled after the Cold War, doing so at speed and under pressure, often in legislative packages that receive little scrutiny. From a planning perspective, the rationale is coherent. The process frequently is not.

For countries in Central and Southeast Europe — Poland, the Baltic states, the Western Balkans — the rearmament debate carries a different texture. These are societies where the memory of occupation and war, as well as the proximity of threat, have kept collective security in public consciousness. They have been making this argument for years. They were right. But being right about the destination does not make the journey automatic.

Germany’s stumble over a single paragraph of its Military Service Act is a small illustration of a larger risk: that Europe rearms its institutions without renewing the civic compact that makes those institutions legitimate. An army that citizens distrust is a weak army. A security policy that is quietly legislated, reversed under pressure, and poorly communicated rests on fragile foundations.

What should come next

The suspension of the approval requirement is a sensible short-term response. What is needed now is not just a public conversation, but a structured one. First, clarity: Who is affected, under what conditions and through which procedures? Second, visibility: Legal provisions of this scope cannot remain buried in technical legislation. Third, comparability: Germany should actively draw on models from countries where conscription has remained embedded in democratic practice.

The contrast with Austria, where I live and work, is instructive. Vienna never abolished conscription, and its approach to citizens living abroad reflects a different philosophy: notification, not permission. Under section 11 of the Austrian Military Act, men who relocate abroad for more than six months are required to promptly their regional military command and register with the nearest Austrian embassy or consulate. Those who permanently reside outside Austria are typically upon while abroad, and their obligation becomes relevant again upon return. No advance approval is required. The state stays informed; the citizen retains the presumption of freedom.

That distinction between a system built on notification and one built on permission is precisely what Germany’s critics have been pointing to. It is also what separates an accepted system from one that risks being contested. 

Europe’s security challenge is real. Meeting it requires not just legal frameworks and defense budgets, but governments willing to explain, justify and build genuine consent for the obligations they are asking their citizens to accept.

Hiding a paragraph in a 37-page bill is not how you do that.

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Bombshell articles in , and at pulled the covers off Epstein’s noxious racism. Reporters culling the most recently released Epstein files discovered numerous pieces of evidence in emails and other documents suggesting that he advocated the faux “science” of racial eugenics and held racist views not distinct from those Trump promoted for decades. Epstein built (or at least tried to build) ties and developed friendships with some of the most notorious eugenicists and white nationalists around the globe, including Nobel Prize laureate and geneticist James Watson, political scientist Charles Murray and artificial intelligence researcher Joscha Bach, among many others. He also circulated posts from white supremacist websites that promoted bogus, supposedly genetically-based intellectual differences between the races.

is the “race science” that was developed in the latter part of the 19th century to justify European slavery and colonialism. Proponents contended that humans were biologically and genetically separated into distinctly unequal “races.” Everything from intelligence, criminality and attractiveness to morality was, so the claim went, genetically determined. It should surprise no one that, in such an imagined hierarchy, whites were at the top and, in most configurations, people of African descent at the very bottom, with Asians and indigenous people somewhere in between. Those four (or five or six) categories were considered immutable. And it mattered remarkably little that, for a long time, social and natural scientists had overwhelmingly argued with irrefutable evidence that racial categories were social constructs invented by humans and distinctly malleable over time as political and social life changed.

The real-world impact of racial eugenics theory long shaped public policy, political status and life opportunities. In the United States, a belief in the genetic inferiority of blacks helped foster slavery and then Jim Crow segregation, and led to tens of thousands of African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans and individuals with physical and mental disabilities, as well as prisoners being sterilized. By 1913, 24 states and Washington, DC, had passed laws allowing . President Theodore Roosevelt was a in such eugenics and supported sterilization in order to prevent what he termed “racial suicide,” a perspective that echoes today’s “Great Replacement .”

In Nazi Germany, eugenics led not only to the sterilization of Jews, blacks and the disabled, but to the state-organized mass murder of of people. It was a core tenet of Nazism that all non-Aryans were genetically inferior and a threat to the white race. The Nazis railed against Jews “ the blood” of white Germans, a term Trump used in describing non-white immigrants from the Global South.

Despite this history, Epstein came to deeply believe in eugenics and genetic determination, as has Trump. To that end, Epstein sought to connect with the notable race theorists of his day.

Epstein on race

Perhaps the most notorious in the modern era advocating a racial basis for intelligence and a social hierarchy that places whites on top and blacks at the bottom was The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life by Charles Murray and the late Richard J. Herrnstein, published in 1994. Since then, in multiple and articles, the research behind that book has been thoroughly debunked and overwhelmingly rejected by scholars in the social and natural sciences.

Yet, at the time, many Republicans and some Democrats embraced its racist argument in order to contend that the US government should cut back on its welfare programs. Murray aligned with Republicans in giving to Congress in the 1990s that blamed the morality of poor people for their poverty (as a debate unfolded around the future of programs).

According to the Epstein files, Epstein himself repeatedly tried to correspond with Murray. However, Murray claims he never received (or remembers receiving) any emails from Epstein and did not correspond with him. Regardless, it’s pretty clear that Epstein was writing because of Murray’s notoriety for his work on race and genetics. This was in 2018, more than a decade after The Bell Curve had been published and Murray had become famous for it.

Epstein, according to , was reportedly provided with Murray’s email address by Watson. He and Francis Crick had, of course, discovered the of DNA in 1953. Nine years later, they and Maurice Wilkins won the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine.

Around 2000, Watson’s regressive views on race began to surface. That year, he told an audience that “dark-skinned people have stronger libidos,” leaning into a centuries-old racial stereotype. In 2007, according to a former in the London Sunday Times, he said that he was “inherently gloomy about the prospect of Africa” because “all our social policies are based on the fact that their intelligence is the same as ours — whereas all the testing says not really.”

Epstein also had ties to a number of other researchers and scientists, including Bach, who received from the convicted felon and was hired at MIT’s Media Lab with his help. In one exchange in 2016, Bach wrote to Epstein, stating that African American children “have slower cognitive development” and “are slower at learning high-level concepts.” With the release of those files in January, Bach tried to explain why his statements were not racist and that “scientific discussion about the heritability of traits… [is] very complicated and not my area of research.”

Epstein also spent time on hardcore white supremacist websites. For example, he sent a link to a racist article entitled, “Race and IQ: Genes That Predict Racial Intelligence Differences,” to left-wing scholar Noam Chomsky. The article came from the outright white supremacist website The Right Stuff, according to The Atlantic. Chomsky, over email, expressed his disagreement with Epstein about race science.

According to , the two had a “close friendship.” There is no evidence that Chomsky participated in or witnessed any of Epstein’s sex crimes, and Valeria Chomsky, his wife, admitted that the couple made “serious errors in judgment” in maintaining ties to him. While the vigorously denounced Epstein’s offenses, there was no mention of his racist behavior, which few focused on in all those years.

The “great gene” president

Epstein’s eugenicist views are in line with the longstanding genetic determinism of Trump. I believe there is no bigger racist science believer than the current occupant in the White House.

For decades, he has bragged about his genetic superiority relative to the rest of humanity. The examples are endless:

• “, I think I was born with the drive for success because I have a certain gene. I’m a gene believer.”
• “You have to have the rights — the right genes.”
• “Do we believe the gene thing? I mean I do.”
• “I have great genes and all that stuff which I’m a believer in.”

And, of course, in opposition to Trump’s “right genes” are those with the wrong kind. From the president’s perspective, that would include migrants. In an discussing them, he opined, “You know, now a murderer — I believe this — it’s in their genes. And we got a lot of bad genes in our country right now.”

Over the years, Trump has also shown little empathy for individuals with disabilities. He famously reporter Serge Kovaleski, who has arthrogryposis that affects his joints, by twisting and contorting his body to make fun of him. He also did not want to be around physically disabled soldiers, according to his former White House Chief of Staff John Kelly.

Trump often speaks with a strategic ambiguity so that he can later deny that he was disparaging migrants, people with disabilities or wounded soldiers. He fools no one.

It’s notable that one of Trump’s go-to insults is to call someone “.” In nearly every case, his target turns out to be a black person and disproportionately female ones. Examples include his opponent in the 2024 presidential election, Kamala Harris, and Congressional Representatives Maxine Waters, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Al Green, Jasmine Crockett, House minority leader Hakeem Jeffries, radio host Charlamagne tha God and New York Attorney General Letitia James, among others.

Trump has been careful, at least publicly, to not explicitly say that black people are genetically predisposed to criminality. However, he has endlessly attacked black-led cities as crime zones, without ever labeling white-dominated cities or states the same way. He also posted supposedly demonstrating that African Americans commit crimes at a higher rate, with the clear implication that race is the driving factor.

Trump’s racism and US immigration

His eugenicist views are most manifest in his immigration policies and dreams. Theoretically, he is not able to run for president again, so he has little incentive to hide his true feelings. After spending years denying it, in December 2025, he proudly admitted that he had referred to nations in Latin America and Africa as “shithole” countries back in 2018. In a speech he delivered in Pennsylvania on December 9, 2025, he plugged for white — and implicitly white only — immigration to this country:

“Remember I said that to the senators that came in, the Democrats. They wanted to be bipartisan. So they came in. And they said, ‘This is totally off the record, nothing mentioned here, we want to be honest,’ because our country was going to hell. And we had a meeting. And I say: Why is it we only take people from shithole countries, right? Why can’t we have some people from Norway, Sweden – just a few – let us have a few. From Denmark – do you mind sending us a few people?”

In January 2026, Trump essentially halted almost all refugees coming from Africa. The administration stated that it would admit only total refugees from around the world in 2026, the lowest number on record. This meant near-zero for black Africans.��

At the same time, the Trump administration sought to process white South African refugee applications per month starting in January. The president also Executive Order 4204 in February 2025, falsely claiming that whites in South Africa were being mistreated and deserved an expedited process to become permanent US residents. The new target, contained in a previously unreported document from the State Department dated January 27 and by Reuters, signals a push to ramp up admissions from South Africa, while refugee applications from other areas have been severely curtailed.

Racial genetics is Trump’s defining worldview (full stop!). That he thinks of Barack and Michelle Obama as less than human should surprise no one who has followed his statements on race over the decades. A compilation of Trump’s views on the former president over all these years boils down to this: Barack Obama is an radical ( of ISIS) and socialist who was not born in the US, but engineered a conspiracy involving thousands to pretend that he was (or maybe he ), then assumed the presidency. He should now be arrested for and on the Trump White House. And no matter what your eyes and brain tell you, he is not as and healthy as I am.

A black woman’s contribution to medicine

Beginning in the early 1950s, real science, as opposed to the fraudulent versions embraced by Epstein and Trump, was able to make life-changing breakthroughs as a result of access to what became known as . Those cells would be responsible for understanding and creating vaccines and treatment for polio, cancer, HPV, Parkinson’s, measles, HIV, mumps, Zika and Covid-19, among other diseases. They would lead to the creation of the field of virology. It is highly unlikely (and would likely have been mortifying) that either Epstein knew, or Trump knows, that those cells came from an African American woman named Henrietta Lacks. They were cynically named HeLa, combining the first two letters of her first and last names.

In 1951, when she was admitted to Johns Hopkins hospital in Baltimore, deathly ill with cervical cancer, doctors took cell tissues from her body without her or her family’s permission. That unethical theft — legal at the time — would lead to countless billions in profits for pharmaceutical corporations. After the publication of Rebecca Skloot’s , The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks, in 2010, her story became well known and family-initiated lawsuits proceeded. In 2023, the family reached a with Thermo Fisher Scientific, and, in February 2026, settlement with Novartis, a Switzerland-based pharmaceutical mammoth.

I argue that Trump is easily the most intellectually incurious, ill-informed, unread, vacuous and petulant president in US history. He will never acknowledge or even understand that his rise to power was not due to his having any extraordinary talents, skills or genetically-based genius. It was, without qualification, the result of a lifetime of perpetual race, gender and class privilege.

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The complications of reality

There are, however, four very basic counterarguments to this myth.

Firstly and historically, winning is usually based on power, not on goodness. There are many examples of bad winning over good, of the powerful winning over the weak. For centuries, slave traders won over the slaves, the imperialists won over the colonized and men won over women. 

Secondly, it is largely the victors who get to tell their stories to the world, and they naturally position themselves as the good ones. Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill is famous for transparently saying, “History will be kind to me, for I intend to write it.” And he did, because he was an excellent writer and a powerful man. Other powerful men of yore asked others to write for them. Nowadays, they can simply the media. The result is that we see and hear the spin that the powerful want us to.

Third, not everyone has bought into these fairy tales, even to begin with. While the winners saw themselves as good and righteous, others did not. Ask the indigenous peoples of North America and Australia, who had their lands taken away from them, and now largely live in isolated reserves with little basic resources. Ask the millions of Africans who were brought to the New World as slaves, and never saw their families or homes again. Ask the multitudes in the Global South who were subjugated by colonialism for generations and did not see any justice in their lifetimes. Ask the countless women who have been killed due to domestic abuse and can no longer tell their stories. They certainly did not see the winners as good.

Fourth, to complicate things further, good and bad are not static states; sometimes good guys turn into bad guys. The individual does not necessarily change, but the story about them changes — either because of new evidence, hearing the voice of previously marginalized groups, shifting moral standards or the long-term consequences of their actions becoming clearer. 

Falls from grace

History abounds with such individuals whose images have changed from good to bad. In some instances, the fall happened in their own lifetimes — as with Roman Emperor Julius Caesar and British Major General Benedict Arnold. In others, it took longer. While some still view Italian explorer Christopher Columbus as a brave discoverer, many now see him as a symbol of colonialism. While English politicians still love to compare themselves to Churchill, historians now look at him with more doubtful eyes, knowing his views on the colonized and his role in the , which killed some three million people.��

The present also offers many examples. Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi fell sharply from grace after her refusal to stand up for the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar. Football star O.J. Simpson’s murder of his wife and her lover ruined his reputation and sent him to jail. Blade-runner and Paralympic poster-boy Oscar Pistorius was convicted of murdering his girlfriend. Entertainer Bill Cosby, darling of the media and Dr. Huxtable to all, was disgraced and jailed after multiple sexual assault incidents surfaced. Successful financier and sex offender Jeffrey Epstein was courted, supported and forgiven by the global elite until his papers were released.

Even Hollywood can sometimes reflect reality — the most famous example being the fall of ’s Michael Corleone, who journeyed from a young war hero surrounded by a large, loving family to a murderous, aging mafioso who died all alone.��

Falls from grace not only apply to individuals; they can also apply to countries and peoples.

Who’s good in this war?

This current war between Israel and America on one side and Iran on the other gives us a chance to apply these counterarguments.

Firstly, since the powerful win, we like to believe that power confers goodness. But are America and Israel good because they are more powerful militarily and economically? Are America and Israel good because they have nuclear arms? Because Jews were persecuted during World War II (WWII), is Israel now so good that it is exempt from international rules of conduct? Are America and Israel good because they are largely white and Judeo-Christian countries? Is Iran bad because it is a Muslim country, it has been consistently the long-persecuted Palestinians and yet have nuclear arms? It may be important to ask these questions.

Secondly, the stories we hear about the war largely favor the West. Often, the powerful place the mantle of good on their own shoulders — even if they are the ones who started the war or effected the regime change. They claim to have done so only out of humanitarian concern — only to free a people from tyranny, to restore their human rights and to bring them democracy. Or to protect the rest of the world from imminent danger. They also claim that is on their side — and God would only be on the side of the good.

As Ambassador Chas says, “the physical war is accompanied by an information war”. Who is good and who is the winner is strongly influenced by propaganda. Currently, from much of the mainstream Western press, we get pro-American and pro-Israeli, but anti-Iranian, perspectives. And therefore, our evaluation of good, bad and the situation at large is skewed. To get more balanced and complete news and analysis, we also need to hear independent media voices (e.g., Glenn Diesen, Jeffrey Sachs, Alexander Mercouris, Yanis Varoufakis, Douglas Macgregor).

Third, many are no longer buying into the American-Israeli propaganda — not even their erstwhile . Americans and Israelis think they are undoubtedly on the side of good. They see Iran as not just bad but downright evil: ‘the biggest danger to world peace’. However, much of the world, and especially the Global South, does not agree with this presentation. They see Iran as a revered ancient civilization that has been manipulated, robbed, interfered with and for decades by the West — and a country that is now retaliating in response to repeated attacks from Israel and the US.

And fourth, the characters are changing. America and Israel have fallen from grace. They no longer hold the moral high ground. Since WWII, the world has seen Israel occupy Palestine, displace Palestinians, perpetrate a in Gaza and currently persecute Muslims in the West Bank. It has noted Israel’s numerous , repeated in the region, of civilian targets, as well as its ambitions far beyond its borders. The world has seen America give Israel arms, diplomatic coverage and unconditional support in all its ventures. It has learned how America has instigated wars and effected in multiple countries for its own advantage. As Italian journalist Michele Serra quipped, “Americans are very lucky — because wherever they go to bring freedom, they find oil.”

The comforts of fantasy

Of course, most of us know that there are, by and large, no innately good or bad people; only our circumstances (i.e., skin color, religion, nationality, economic condition, suffering, etc.) and our actions make us so.  

But despite knowing the complicated reality, we prefer to revert to our simplistic fantasy. We like fairy tales and Hollywood movies because there is no ambiguity. We like to know who to love and who to hate. And if someone else can tell us that, that’s even better. We want a grand yet quick battle where we are not injured, a definitive victory and flawless heroes to celebrate at the end.

Maybe it soothes our souls, eases our conscience, and appeals to our innate intellectual laziness to assume that good always triumphs and therefore, those who triumph are good. That way, we don’t have to spend time and effort rummaging through the dirty gray areas, trying to judge individual actions, dealing with the messiness of the ambiguous and feeling unsettled by it all. We don’t have to question the “winner,” the process or the results because good always wins. Right?

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The political nature of counting casualties

My 2018 , “Grieving, Valuing, and Viewing Differently: The Global War on Terror’s American Toll,” demonstrates how the US has historically managed the visibility of its war dead. Focusing on Vietnam to Global War on Terror (GWoT) era policy and practice including the “,” my research illustrates how consecutive US Administrations (on of the aisle) worked to move dead and suffering soldiers out of public view, not because they were unimportant, but because they were politically sensitive due to threatening a biopolitical facade of care and protection and ultimately threatening the ability for America to wage long-term wars.

This is the key insight: Visibility is not accidental — it is governed.

The Novara article suggests that casualty figures are being obscured or selectively reported, but my work helps us understand why. As I have argued, soldiers are simultaneously treated as a “” within an intensely militarized political economy and yet rendered invisible in death, their suffering managed through practices that limit public exposure and political accountability.

What we are seeing today is not just the undercounting of casualties — it is the continuation of what I have identified as a broader system of statecraft that regulates how death is seen, counted and felt.

Grievability and the differentiation of lives

My research also highlights that the politics of counting is inseparable from the politics of valuing. The issue is not only whether deaths are recorded, but how they are framed, delayed, categorized or excluded altogether. Moreover, as author Thomas Gregory has recently pointed out in the case of produced by American wars, counting becomes a technique of governance: It shapes public perception, moderates dissent and ultimately enables the continuation of war.

This is where my continued emphasis on contested becomes especially relevant. If some lives (and deaths) are made and more readily recognized as more grievable than others, then the act of counting is never neutral. It is a process of differentiation. Some deaths are made visible, others are obscured; some are mourned publicly, others are quietly absorbed into statistical ambiguity.

The politics behind transparency and alternative narratives

The Novara report sits squarely within this logic. The discrepancy between official and estimated casualty figures is not simply a data problem — it is a political one. It reflects ongoing struggles over who has the authority to count, whose counts are recognized and what those numbers are allowed to mean.

Importantly, attention to grievability also reminds us that these processes are never uncontested. Even in the face of state efforts to suppress visibility, alternative forms of counting, witnessing and memorialization emerge. Families, journalists and researchers continue to demand recognition — to insist that these lives are not reducible to managed figures or bureaucratic categories.

That tension is still present now, as the search for the missing airman continues.

So rather than asking whether the US military is hiding casualties, a more productive question is this: What kinds of deaths are allowed to appear, and under what conditions?

Until we confront that question, debates about transparency will remain superficial. Because the issue is not simply that the numbers are wrong. It is that numbers themselves are part of the machinery through which war is made acceptable.

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These groups, which have formed an advocating the end of the Islamic Republic and the establishment of a federal, democratic Iran, have long been treated by Tehran not just as external adversaries but as potential catalysts of internal uprising. The concern extends beyond Kurdish regions alone to the possibility that unrest could spread into other marginalized areas, including Baloch, Ahwazi, Azeri and others.

Following the announced by US President Donald Trump on April 7, Tehran intensified pressure on Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to these Kurdish parties, accusing them of links to the US and Israel. While framed publicly as a security measure, the underlying concern remained the prevention of these groups from becoming focal points for internal dissent and political mobilization within Iran as they have done during past political upheavals.

Iran’s domestic repression and surveillance campaigns

During the war, Iranian intelligence services and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) conducted a sustained campaign to deter Kurdish involvement in the conflict, according to sources that spoke to . Inside Iran, Kurdish civilians faced waves of threatening text messages warning against cooperation with foreign powers, followed by surveillance operations targeting satellite communications. These measures escalated into house raids conducted by IRGC officers in both urban neighborhoods and rural border areas suspected of links to opposition networks.

At the same time, Iran has maintained a broader and long-standing pattern of repression against other marginalized communities. Human Rights , and the for Human Rights in Iran have documented repeated arbitrary arrests, executions and violent crackdowns in Baloch and Ahwazi regions, particularly during periods of political unrest. Iran Human Rights has further recorded recurring waves of executions and security operations in Sistan and Baluchestan, reinforcing a wider pattern of coercive state control across multiple ethnic regions.

Cross-border military pressure and regional impact

Across the border in Iraq, Tehran applied direct pressure on the KRG, warning that Kurdish forces near the border would face attacks if they did not withdraw. Despite compliance by Iraqi Kurdish authorities, Iranian drone and missile strikes continued to hit Kurdish offices, compounds and training bases, killing fighters and civilians and destroying infrastructure previously believed to be secure. According to monitoring, the Kurdistan Region has been struck by more than 638 drones and missiles since the start of the war, underscoring the scale and intensity of Iran’s campaign. Many of these attacks were carried out by Iranian-backed militias operating inside Iraq, illustrating Tehran’s willingness to project force across borders to prevent internal mobilization.

IRGC deployments during this period were extensive and deliberate. Intelligence indicated the presence of forces stationed in forests, mosques, schools and even hospitals, reflecting a strategy of embedding within civilian environments to monitor, intimidate and deter potential uprisings. Senior commanders also personally oversaw operations in border regions while strikes continued against Kurdish exile offices and training bases in Iraq.

The Kurdish alliance and the threat of wider resistance

Although the Kurdish alliance does not currently field a large enough military force to conduct a major ground offensive, it has historically mobilized thousands in past uprisings and rebellions. Its networks extend across Iranian Kurdistan and carry the potential to inspire wider resistance in other marginalized regions, including Baloch and Ahwazi areas. Tehran fears this greatly because it is aware that previous waves of unrest, most notably the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, in Kurdish regions before spreading across the country and gaining international reach.

This historical precedent shapes the regime’s calculations and actions against Kurdish opposition forces both inside and outside of Iran. Local uprisings have previously diverted security forces and exposed the fragility of state control in peripheral regions. The concern is not simply rebellion in one area, but the possibility of coordinated unrest across multiple regions simultaneously.

The regime’s strategy and future outlook

Whether the ceasefire holds or collapses, the Islamic Republic continues to act with ruthless precision to maintain control. From threatening civilians to deploying forces in civilian locations, conducting drone and missile strikes, and pressuring the Iraqi Kurdish authorities, Tehran’s strategy illustrates a singular objective: to prevent the formation of organized opposition that could spark an internal uprising. The regime’s fear of losing control across Kurdish, Baloch and Ahwazi regions, and potentially beyond, drives both its internal repression and its external military operations into Iraqi territory.

The next phase of Iran’s internal conflict is likely to be shaped by this persistent fear. Historical precedent and recent events suggest that if the population is left with no safe avenues for protest, the potential for armed resistance may rise, not because citizens desire conflict, but because the Islamic Republic has left them no other options for meaningful change.

The regime’s approach ensures that Kurdish, Baloch and Ahwazi communities remain under constant pressure, illustrating its strong reliance on suppression to prevent revolt and highlighting why Tehran views these opposition movements as an existential threat to its grip on power. Regardless of what happens with the external war and negotiations, it is only an internal uprising that stands a chance of toppling the Islamic Republic and bringing about meaningful change for the people.

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Cybersecurity, particularly in jurisdictions such as the US, has traditionally been framed as a defensive discipline, preventing intrusion, restoring systems and limiting disruption. That framing no longer captures new forms of exposure. The most consequential cyber risks facing private banks emerge when nothing visibly fails.

This exposure becomes critical in areas where private banks within regulatory frameworks that increasingly emphasize the traceability, justification and suitability of financial decisions. In such contexts, the integrity of decision-making is not only an operational concern but a matter of regulatory and fiduciary accountability.

As long as platforms remain online and business continuity plans operate as designed, no immediate financial loss is typically recorded. Yet the informational in which regulated decisions were formed may have shifted in subtle but material ways. In that scenario, the institution remains operational. The question is whether it remains .

Modern private banks extensively on automated and semiautomated processes to generate regulated such as risk classification, sanctions screening, transaction monitoring, suitability , credit and surveillance controls. These systems are engineered for continuity. They are designed to avoid abrupt breakdown. When upstream data quality , when dependencies introduce distortion or when external conditions change in ways not fully anticipated, the machinery rarely collapses. It continues to produce outputs that appear coherent and compliant.

The governance gap: fiduciary accountability in the age of automated logic��

From a governance , this is precisely the danger. An institution may remain procedurally compliant and technically resilient while becoming substantively exposed. With being delivered on time and documentation in a timely way, the assumptions underpinning those decisions may nevertheless no longer hold with the same strength. If the informational premises were compromised, the reasoning based on the observation that “the was running” does not answer the fiduciary question of whether the decision truly served the client’s best interest.

In such cases, fiduciary accountability is tested . Across major financial jurisdictions, expectations are converging toward greater scrutiny of how decisions are formed. Institutions are required to demonstrate not only that processes functioned, but that the underlying reasoning remained reliable, explainable and aligned with client interests. It arises when regulators reconstruct the file, when clients question outcomes or when litigation forces explanation. At that moment, system is irrelevant. What matters is whether the institution can that its judgment was formed on reliable foundations. Whenever decision-making becomes embedded in data pipelines, model calibrations and third-party integrations, cyber risk ceases to be a peripheral operational concern. It becomes a structural condition of governance.

Moreover, automation a familiar asymmetry. Responsibility remains anchored to the institution and its leadership. Causality, however, is dispersed across complex technical , data configurations, integration logic, vendor , model behavior and design assumptions made long before any specific decision is rendered. When are challenged, explanations often fragment across technical, contractual and procedural boundaries. Each may be accurate. None alone resolves whether fiduciary standards were met.

The architecture of trust: securing the soul of the decision

Private banking adds a further dimension. Its value rests on continuity, discretion and reasoning across decades. A visible breach can be repaired and . A silent erosion of decision integrity is more corrosive. It undermines the bank’s capacity to explain itself convincingly. Credibility, once weakened, is difficult to restore.��

Given this context, we need to acknowledge that judgment in a digital private bank is no longer solely a human . It is embedded within infrastructure. When that infrastructure is , failure does not always translate as downtime. It resembles doubt.

In conclusion, cybersecurity in private banking is only about operational resilience; it is about fiduciary credibility. And fiduciary credibility is harder to rebuild than any system. The institutions that will distinguish themselves are not only those that demonstrate strong perimeter defense or rapid recovery, but those capable of clearly and demonstrating that the integrity of their decision-making remains intact even when the informational environment is under strain. This shift is visible across both the US and European regulatory environments, where the ability to defend decisions is becoming as critical as the ability to execute them.��

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In other words, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) allowed a prisoner to die of a toothache. His name was Emmanuel Damas. He was 56 years old and a father of two.

And we can only expect medical treatment at ICE centers to deteriorate further. As Judd Legum at Popular Information in January 2026: “ICE… has any third-party providers for medical care for detainees since October 3, 2025. Last week, ICE posted a notice on an obscure government announcing it will not begin processing such claims until at least April 30, 2026. Until then, medical providers are instructed ‘to hold all claims submissions.’”

Damas’s unnecessary death would be outrageous enough, were it the only one of its kind. In fact, people died in ICE custody during 2025, the most in two decades. Another six died in January 2026 alone at Camp East Montana detention center in El Paso, Texas. Among them was Geraldo Lunas Campos, a Cuban father aged 55.

Although ICE initially claimed Lunas Campos had attempted suicide, the American Immigration Council that “the El Paso County Medical Examiner ruled his death was a homicide arising from asphyxia due to neck and torso compression.” Of course, it’s pretty hard to strangle yourself to death. Witnesses, however, described his murder this way: “Mr. Lunas Campos was handcuffed, while at least five guards held him down and one guard squeezed his neck until he was unconscious.” At least one other man has died at the Camp East Montana detention center, where and measles are also spreading.

Damas and Lunas Campos were among the roughly people whom ICE currently holds in a tangle of sprawled across the country. And more centers are under construction. Many of them are former warehouses designed to function, as ICE acting director Todd Lyons it last year, “like Amazon Prime for human beings.” (Like many of US President Donald Trump’s appointees, Lyons has not received Senate confirmation. His actual , according to ICE, is “Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.”)

What is a concentration camp?

Taken together, this network of prisons or, more accurately, concentration camps, constitutes an American gulag. “” is not so much a word as a Russian initialism that came to stand for the Soviet Union’s concentration camp program, originally developed under dictator Joseph Stalin. The term stands for “Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Camps” and originally referred to the officials running the camps. Later, “gulag” came to indicate the camps themselves, which were a central instrument of Soviet political repression. Most Americans first learned about those camps through Russian author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s 1973 internationally bestselling , The Gulag Archipelago: An Experiment in Literary Investigation.

As Andrea Pitzer, of One Long Night: A Global History of Concentration Camps, has written, such institutions are a relatively recent phenomenon. While human beings have long contrived ways to isolate groups they identify as enemies — for example, in the enclosed Jewish of medieval Europe — the modern concentration camp evolved thanks to two key inventions: barbed wire and the machine gun. That pair of technological advances made it possible for a small number of guards to control and contain a large number of people in one place.

Concentration camps have a number of defining features:

• Concentration camps exist outside regular legal structures. The people they hold are not prisoners, but detainees. So, we find people of all ages, from infants to seniors, in concentration camps. In most cases, they have not been tried or convicted of any crime. Rather, they are held because of their status, for example, as non-citizens, or in the case of Japanese-American citizens during World War II, because of their ethnicity or national origin. This is true for the people held in ICE detention today. Their alleged offenses are against US civil, not criminal, law, and their detention exists outside of any court system, including the immigration courts run by the Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review. Immigration judges, who are really administrative employees, can’t order anyone detained. That’s up to ICE and its umbrella agency, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

• Concentration camp inmates are civilians, not soldiers, which places them conveniently outside the strictures of the Geneva Conventions. That’s why the US has never recognized as prisoners of war the men it has held and, in the case of 15 prisoners, to hold in the US prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. In the 1990s, almost a decade before the naval station at Guantánamo was first used to house detainees in the “Global War on Terror,” the US held immigrants there, including as many as 50,000 Haitians and Cubans. Trump’s January 29, 2025, executive order entitled, “Expanding Migrant Operations Center At Naval Station Guantánamo Bay To Full Capacity,” directed the Defense and Homeland Security departments to prepare to hold as many as 30,000 migrant detainees there. As of July 2025, the camp held detainees from Africa, Asia, Europe and the Caribbean.

• Concentration camps are associated with authoritarian regimes. They function both as a direct form of repression and, no less importantly, as a warning to the rest of the population about what could happen to those who resist the regime. In this sense, concentration camps are very much like another tool of repression, institutionalized state torture, about which I wrote in my , Mainstreaming Torture. Like state torture, concentration camps perform a kind of national security theater, made all the more entrancing by its quasi-secret nature. In the case of ICE detention camps, the DHS has made a show of or members of to enter those facilities. But such detention centers can’t fulfill their full repressive function if people don’t know anything about what goes on in them. So, we have the spectacle of a hearing in which a congresswoman asked then-DHS secretary Kristi Noem about a double amputee who “has to crawl through mold and feces and bodily fluids just to take a shower.” Knowing that this is happening to people who have almost no recourse is intended to have a chilling effect on political action.

• Concentration camps are not death camps, but people do die there. Many Americans tend to think that all German concentration camps were sites of direct extermination. In fact, the Nazis constructed six camps specifically designed for the industrialized murder of their inhabitants. But for a decade before the first death camp was even opened, prisoners had already been concentrated in thousands of “labor” camps. In fact, they were not there to be killed directly, but to be removed from society. As the National World War II Museum in New Orleans , “Initially, the population of these concentration camps were not usually Jews, but Communists, socialists, Roma and Sinti, Jehovah’s witnesses, gay men, and ‘asocial’ elements (alcoholics, criminals, people with mental disabilities, the poor).” Notably, like undocumented people in the United States today, these were groups who then received little sympathy from the larger German population. The conditions they encountered — lack of food and medical care, crowding and unsanitary conditions — sickened and killed as many as a of those who passed through them.

A brief history of US concentration camps

The Soviet gulag was not the world’s first concentration camp, although such institutions are, in fact, a relatively recent phenomenon. Early Americans sought to isolate their enemies, such as enslaved Africans and the native peoples of this continent. Indeed, when the Cherokee nation was from its lands under the 1830 Indian Removal Act and forced to travel the “Trail of Tears,” officers kept many of them for some time in “emigration depots” in Alabama and Tennessee.

Almost everyone in this country has heard of Nazi Germany’s camps, but the history of the modern concentration camp really began at the end of the 19th century. As Pitzer in a recent interview, Americans first became aware of such camps in the 1890s, when Spain instituted a policy of ���𳦴DzԳ���Գٰ�������ó�� in its efforts to put down a rebellion in Cuba. As has happened in ICE detention camps today, malnourished men, women and children were shoved into holding camps there, where crowded conditions and poor sanitation led many to perish. News of the horrifying conditions in Cuba led Americans to organize material aid for those being held.

The US then dispatched the USS Maine to accompany the ships carrying relief supplies to Cuba. When the Maine sank in Havana harbor under murky circumstances, the US government had the pretext it needed to mount a military campaign against the remnants of Spanish colonial control in the Americas and the Pacific. That relatively short war ended with the US in possession of most of Spain’s remaining colonies, including the island of Puerto Rico, and what would eventually become the nation of the Philippines. Almost immediately, the new American colonizers reproduced in the Philippines the kind of they had supposedly gone to war to eradicate in Cuba. In another parallel with the 21st century, it was during the occupation of the Philippines that US forces invented the form of torture we call “waterboarding.”

Most Americans know about President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1942 executive order creating ten concentration camps to hold people of Japanese descent, about two-thirds of whom were US citizens mostly living in the western US. Over 120,000 men, women and children were interned for the duration of World War II. Many lost their homes, farms, businesses and other property (often seized by their non-Japanese neighbors). A much smaller number of Italian and German nationals were also interned, as Germans had also been during World War I.

The Japanese camps were constructed by the Works Progress Administration (WPA), the same federal agency that provided mass employment for millions during the Great Depression under Roosevelt’s New Deal program. Few Americans know that, in addition to building roads, schools, dams and the occasional zoo, the WPA also built the barracks and strung the barbed wire that enclosed World War II internees.

ICE’s predecessor agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), ran about of those camps, primarily ones imprisoning Japanese, German and Italian non-citizens. Three of them were built in Texas to hold people from those countries who had been deported from Latin America. (Most of them were Japanese from Peru.) Those camps were guarded by the Border Patrol, rather than the military police. In other words, ICE and US Customs and Border Protection have a long history of running the US version of concentration camps. They’re used to it.

The American gulag

It’s no exaggeration to say that ICE detention camps now threaten to become a central instrument of repression under the Trump administration. As many as people have died in them since Trump returned to office in January 2025. And those are only the deaths that have been publicly acknowledged.

If Camp East Montana is the biggest ICE camp in the country, the most notorious may well be the Florida site in the Everglades that has come to be known as “Alligator Alcatraz.” over just a week, according to Amnesty International, it “houses” people in horrific conditions:

“Inside, people are crammed into overcrowded cages around bunk beds with little room to move. Food is spoiled and maggot-infested. Mosquitoes swarm constantly, showers are scarce, and extreme heat and humidity make the center unbearable. There appear to be almost no reliable or confidential means for detainees to communicate with their attorneys or family members.”

That description is echoed in the testimony of people held in ICE detention camps nationwide. A complete report on the conditions at all of those camps would run to hundreds of thousands of words. Indeed, it’s hard to get a handle on the full scope of ICE’s concentration camp program, since reports on the number and size of such camps change quickly as new ones are proposed or come online. The organization Freedom for Immigrants maintains an interactive immigration detention which identifies at least 200 separate locations where immigrants (and the occasional US citizen) are detained. And the Trump administration is not done. According to The Guardian, DHS plans to spend “upgrading” 24 existing warehouses to implement ICE Acting Director Todd Lyons’s dream of treating immigrants like human widgets.

And that brings us back to the point of all this. Concentration camps exist to support and expand the power of an authoritarian regime. They make everyone afraid of being treated like the current targets of the regime. Like state torture programs, concentration camps accelerate the process of dehumanizing groups of people in the public imagination. Such a process often begins by describing the target group as non-human, as “” or “” — as Trump has, of course, done. Ironically, the very act of placing people in inhumane conditions can amplify the public’s perception of their inhumanity. After all, would genuine human beings submit to such treatment? Would our good nation treat genuine human beings that way?

One other significant aspect of all this is the enrichment of a few corporations. Trump’s “Big Beautiful Bill” gave ICE upwards of $45 billion to spend on those camps, which meant that there was a lot of money to be made. Today, two private prison companies, CoreCivic and the GEO Group, most of them. The Bill also allows the Department of Homeland Security to that money-making by using the US Navy’s Supply Systems Command program, which serves as an end-run around the usual bidding process for federal contracts.

This morning, I asked my partner whether she thought that the Trump administration could make the transition from concentration camps, where people die as a “side effect” of their internment, to actual death camps. “I think it’s possible,” she responded. And so, horribly, do I.

It’s possible, but not yet inevitable. To date, local actions have provided the most effective means of resisting the creation of the American gulag our federal government is constructing. These have included organizing to oppose siting camps in specific communities, efforts to leverage local zoning laws to stop them, and attempts to generate state-level political opposition to them. (The Washington Post had an excellent of recent efforts in one county in Maryland to block such a camp.)

We know what’s at stake. We know we can dismantle the American gulag, because some of us are already . It’s time for the rest of us to get to work.

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The UN chief bureaucrat, António Guterres, positioning himself as the drum major in front of everybody, in February the Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence — the AI Panel. ��As UN groups go, they routinely miss the “gee,” which is the case here, as well.

It’s a bold move, but this parade needs more than a drum major. It is missing its grand marshal to deal with the gee-force. And this is where a pre-existing High-Level Expert Panel on Artificial General Intelligence, or the AGI Panel, could step in to harness the G factor before it harnesses us.

The UN’s AI panel: good intentions, troubling gaps

The UN’s AI Panel aims to bring order by gathering experts to assess risks and offer guidance. Yet critics of the AI Panel — governments, tech leaders and concerned citizens — see troubling gaps. The UN AI panel’s mandate is broad, its structure vague and its political context tangled.

The UN is already juggling climate change, development and peacekeeping. Can it really steer AI governance without slowing innovation or diluting scientific independence?

UN advisory frameworks easily accumulate outsized influence, shaping expectations and political pressure.

AI — the gateway to AGI — isn’t just a gadget; it’s a pillar of national security and economic strategy.  So, many are concerned about sovereignty and fragmentation. Attended by states with very different digital governance models, the AI Panel risks becoming a battleground for competing visions: open societies versus state-centric control. Without strong safeguards, neutrality will be hard to maintain.

Further, critics worry that the AI Panel’s recommendations could create obligations that clash with domestic priorities and market realities moving at lightning speed. Tech-heavy nations fear global oversight will hobble their competitiveness. And industry would take little notice of it in any event.

Practical questions abound: How were the AI Panel’s experts chosen? If it becomes “a thing,” will industry, academia and civil society have a real say? Can the AI Panel be independent from political blocs? And what happens to its recommendations?

Without clear pathways for its findings, the risk is that the AI Panel produces reports that are cited widely but acted upon narrowly. If the UN sets one standard while democratic alliances and industry groups set others, we could end up with parallel governance tracks — fragmentation that slows innovation and complicates cross-border cooperation.

For these and other concerns, Washington the AI Panel and did not support its establishment. But none of this even acknowledges that AI concerns are secondary because AGI is already developing faster than the number of unpaid parking tickets around the UN.

AGI will act if we don’t

Worries about AI bring to mind the fabled Y2K (Year 2000 Problem) realm — we’ll get past it. AGI, however, pushes humanity to and beyond.

Here’s the real issue: AGI is not just another float in the parade. If we don’t do something, it pulls rank over the drum major and becomes the grand marshal, determining the world’s narrative, direction and pace. AGI will solve novel problems (good), rewrite its own code (not so good) and then pursue objectives beyond human control (bad).

AGI is not just a smarter version of today’s AI — it’s a leap from humans to machines for solving problems old and new, rewriting their own code and pursuing goals beyond human guidance. AGI’s powers and risks far exceed those of ordinary AI, compelling us to make it our central target for urgent action.

Chasing opportunity, big tech is investing into AGI: history’s largest investment. Early forms are already out of the test tube, and advanced versions are likely within a few years, if not sooner.

Thought leaders like Bill Gates, Demis Hassabis, Stuart Russell, Yoshua Bengio, Sam Altman, Elon Musk and Geoffrey Hinton warn that the risk is real and urgent.

This isn’t science fiction; it’s a clear and present danger.

The risks are existential — if unregulated, AGI could threaten human civilization itself.

A grand marshal ready to wave us in the right direction

Recognizing the gap, the nonprofit Council of Presidents of the UN General Assembly established last year a High-Level Expert Panel on AGI. This “AGI Panel,” composed of top experts, produced the “Governance of the Transition to Artificial General Intelligence (AGI): Urgent Considerations for the UN General Assembly.”��It clearly documents that the looming AGI is distinct from today’s AI, and its benefits and risks must be urgently addressed.

But where to be addressed and by whom? Yes, the UN General Assembly is a legitimate place for this global discussion — but not through the Secretary-General’s AI Panel as currently organized. Why not? Because the AI Panel is an abacus, whereas the G threat is using angstrom-class semiconductors.

The AI Panel is a parade without a grand marshal, lacking the leadership and urgency AGI demands. The High-Level Expert Panel on AGI offers a clear route forward.

This AIG Panel reveals that the maiden AI Panel is unaware of the power of AGI under its feet as it dallies on its path to the “Great Oz.” So, the AGI Panel recommends concrete steps in lieu of yellow bricks: a global observatory, international certification and an agency dedicated to AGI. And it calls for an emergency UN General Assembly session, given the forecast of much bigger tornadoes on the horizon.

Second best

At least the UN Secretary-General should refit his AI Panel by (1) making AGI its key focus with urgency, (2) distributing the AGI Panel’s report to all parties and (3) tapping the only AGI expert on his panel, Joshua Bengio, to start a working group on AGI. And he should push for that emergency General Assembly session to put measures into play, harnessing AGI for humanity by minimizing its risks while realizing its benefits.

Otherwise, the drum major should move to the end of the parade with a big shovel. Why? To sort through the many elephant-sized catastrophes that humanity would have to endure indefinitely.

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Ongoing repression and daily fear

and independent monitors report the in the tens of thousands, though precise figures remain difficult to verify amid severe reporting restrictions. Morally and psychologically, the number changes little. Families are shattered.�� continue to emerge of threats, executions, enforced disappearances, and individuals identified from protest footage later or abducted.��Demonstrations, including children, were met with overwhelming and often .��Yet beyond headlines and geopolitical analysis, something deeper is unfolding: a nationwide trauma response that almost no one is naming.

Since the beginning of the year, the Islamic Republic has called protestors rioters and that they must be put in their place. Iranians have witnessed scenes more often associated with combat zones: live ammunition fired into civilian crowds; citizens attempting to carry away the injured only to be shot themselves; nighttime raids pulling people from their homes; and entire communities severed from one another during prolonged communications blackouts.

from international human rights organizations describe mass arrests, torture in detention and bodies documented under coercive conditions. There have been accounts of marketplaces set ablaze during crackdowns and refrigerated facilities containing victims’ remains by fire under unclear circumstances. Funerals have been prohibited, and families have been for the bullets used to kill their loved ones. Medical staff have been threatened or detained. Journalists have been . Grieving families have been and arrested. The UN fact-finding mission’s has recognized the state of Iranian civilians’ lives to be caught between that may amount to crimes against humanity.

And these decades-long patterns of repression have not ended. For most Iranians, the�� of fear and coercion continues daily; a reality exacerbated by a catastrophic�� of global health governance��that has left civilians without even the most basic protections of international law.

Trauma does not start with one event

The outbreak of the US–Israel–Iran war has brought Iran back into the center of global discussion. Television panels debate escalation, deterrence, and regional alliances. Social media is filled with arguments about sanctions, military strategy and international law. The world is debating Iran while largely overlooking the psychological devastation unfolding inside it.

The uprising that preceded the war and the violence used to suppress it have already begun to fade into the background of geopolitical analysis.

The and restrictions on reporting are not incidental to the violence; they are part of it. When information is , uncertainty grows. Families cannot confirm who is alive. Rumors fill the gaps left by silence. In human rights investigations, access to verified information is often the first casualty of repression. But the psychological impact of that uncertainty is profound. It destabilizes trust, not only in institutions but in shared reality itself.

The cumulative psychological impact is unmistakable. As trauma scholars have long observed, prolonged exposure to systemic violence erodes basic assumptions about safety, trust and the predictability of power. When violence becomes chronic and institutional, populations adapt to a worldview in which vulnerability feels constant and authority appears unrestrained. This is how collective shock takes hold.

Iran is not only in a political crisis. Its population is exhibiting signs of collective nervous-system .

Inside the country, people are living under sustained threat. Many describe sleeping in fragments, waking at small sounds, struggling to breathe evenly. Anger surfaces quickly and just as quickly gives way to numbness. These are not abstract political reactions. They are physiological responses to sustained threat. When violence becomes routine, the nervous system does what it is designed to do: It prepares for survival.

The massacre did not land on neutral ground. It struck a population carrying decades of accumulated trauma: a revolution that hardened into theocratic authoritarianism; a devastating war scarred by chemical attacks; sanctions that strained ordinary citizens while consolidating power among elites; and repeated protest movements met with imprisonment and execution.

Collective trauma rarely disappears with time alone. It accumulates, shaping how new events are interpreted and remembered, especially in societies that have experienced repeated cycles of repression.

When a new shock arrives, it reactivates what is already stored. To those living through it,����did not feel unprecedented. Instead, the����and total digital isolation felt like a grim��confirmation of a of repression. The state’s playbook of repression, refined over decades, was being executed once again.

Resilience runs deep in Iran’s cultural memory, but it should not be romanticized. In the context of 2026, this��endurance signifies not a lack of harm, but a state of����where the nervous system has adapted to a “hum of fear” just to survive.

What is unfolding now is not only grief but destabilization: a constant hum of fear, hypervigilance and a sense that the ground itself is unreliable. When a state deploys overwhelming violence against its own population, trust collapses not only in institutions but also in the future, further intensified by the absence of a meaningful global response. This is what externalized collective trauma can feel like.

The diaspora carries the trauma too

Outside Iran, another layer of trauma is taking shape. Across Europe, North America, Australia and Asia, the��diaspora watches in a state of externalized . It is a psychological weight that defies geography, where survivor’s guilt collides with moral urgency. This results in a�� of the collective psyche��as the social bonds that connect individuals to their homeland are systematically targeted. It is a state where survivor’s guilt collides with moral urgency, creating a vicarious trauma that is further weaponized by the state’s��. Many feel compelled to act constantly by posting, organizing and protesting because they feel that rest is a betrayal.

As large demonstrations unfold globally, many continue to experience a painful sense of invisibility. With��independent verification , skepticism often replaces empathy from the world. The diaspora experiences a as it asks for its collective reality to be witnessed. Casual suggestions that the numbers must be exaggerated, that the footage cannot be trusted or that it is better to stop watching the news, land as a dismissal rather than neutrality.

For the Iranian diaspora whose families remain in Iran, the crisis is not distant geopolitics. It is a daily negotiation between professional life here and fear for relatives there. When global attention shifts and reporting becomes sporadic, that distance deepens. In a democratic society that values civic participation and freedom of expression, the psychological well-being of diasporic communities is not peripheral. It is part of the civic fabric.

What is missed in these exchanges is the psychological cost. For Iranians, this minimization deepens isolation. It signals that their lived histories of repression and brutality are treated as uncertain, exaggerated or politically inconvenient. When suffering is questioned, identity itself feels destabilized.

, the temperature rises. Social media rewards outrage and punishes nuance. Political identities harden. Divisions sharpen. In private, there are tears and exhaustion. In public, fury.

This is what collective trauma does. It narrows cognition and collapses complexity. In times of threat, the brain seeks certainty, and black-and-white thinking feels safer than ambiguity. It is also why calls for rescue have intensified. Iranians inside and outside the country openly debate foreign intervention. When you are drowning, you do not ask who designed the life raft. When survival feels uncertain, people reach for whatever promises relief. Desperation reshapes judgment.

Why collective trauma matters politically

Recognizing that psychological reality does not mean endorsing every political conclusion that follows. Trauma can push societies toward extremes, toward savior fantasies, rigid ideologies and the belief that only overwhelming force can end overwhelming force. It also sharpens divisions, reducing complex differences to a binary of friend versus enemy and narrowing the space for democratic thinking.

History offers few simple answers. Peaceful uprisings succeed only when power fractures from within. rarely unfold as intended��, and the lack thereof deepens mistrust. But none of that erases the emotional truth: Iranians feeling abandoned and exhausted, searching for any sign that the nightmare might end. What makes this moment especially dangerous is not only state violence; it is the perception that the world is speaking about the geopolitical entanglement with Iran while rarely speaking about the Iranians themselves.

The January massacre risks being absorbed into the background noise of permanent crisis and another headline in a saturated world. The��February 2026 and executions��of protesters have been largely ignored. But collective trauma does not dissipate when attention shifts. It embeds. It shapes political culture. It alters how communities trust, organize and imagine the future. If this����goes unrecognized, its consequences will not remain confined within Iran’s borders. Trauma reverberates across generations and across diasporas. It influences how societies polarize, negotiate power and respond to instability.

A rupture that will last decades

Recognizing is not an exercise in sentiment. It is necessary to understand how political behavior shifts under sustained threat. It insists that what is unfolding is not merely strategic conflict but a social reconstruction of meaning and mass psychological injury. Iranians do not need saviors. They need solidarity that respects and empowers their agency. They need humanitarian support that reaches civilians. They need platforms that amplify their voices rather than reduce them to geopolitical talking points.

Despite the����in political science, sociology and historical literature that military interventions rarely lead to effective regime change, a growing number of civilians are now vocalizing a desperate plea for their own country to be bombed. On a human level, intellectualizing the failure of foreign intervention does little to address the immediate agony of those living under the boot. To understand this shift, the world must recognize the��, which is the cumulative and systemic wear and tear that occurs when an entire population is subjected to chronic institutional coercion. When this state of fear becomes unbearable, the collective psyche shifts into a mode of defensive dominance where even catastrophic violence is viewed as a����to an agonizing status quo.

When people become desperate enough to call for foreign intervention, it is not ideology speaking but an existential survival mechanism. It reflects a population that feels cornered and recognizes its very existence is under threat. For decades, Iranians have protested through strikes, demonstrations and civil resistance, often at enormous personal cost. Many have lost friends, family members or colleagues to imprisonment or violence. When peaceful protest is met with live ammunition, people are fighting a war without weapons. Thus, their request, which goes against the scholarly evidence, is an emotional response to collective trauma that is not being witnessed. They also need the world to understand that collective trauma, once unleashed at this scale, does not simply disappear and only intensifies.

The Islamic Republic regime’s��2026 of civilians��will be remembered for its brutality and for the that followed. It should also be remembered for the courage of millions who risked their lives for freedom, and as the moment a nation’s psychological threshold was breached. Iran is in a political crisis, but it is also living through decades of��overlapping ��and a profound psychological rupture that will shape its political future long after the violence fades from headlines.

Collective trauma at this scale does not remain confined within national borders. Through migration, digital networks and transnational families, its psychological consequences travel outward. Democracies that fail to recognize this risk misunderstand both and the long-term political consequences of sustained state violence.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Rohan Khattar Singh, 51�Թ�’s Video Producer & Social Media Manager, speaks with Kuber Chalise, a journalist for Nepal Khabar, about the election that has upended Nepal’s political order. At the center of the discussion is the rise of Balen Shah, a 35-year-old engineer, former rapper and former mayor of Kathmandu, who has become prime minister after the Rashtriya Swatantra Party’s sweeping victory. Khattar Singh and Chalise explore why traditional parties collapsed so quickly, why young voters turned so sharply against the old guard and why Nepal’s new leaders now face a harder test in government than they did at the ballot box.

A revolt against the old parties

Chalise presents the result as a long time coming. Nepal’s established parties, including the Nepali Congress and major communist factions, lost public trust over years of corruption, nepotism and poor governance. These parties had once expanded rights and shaped the post-monarchy political system, but they failed to adapt after the 2015 constitution.

That failure created a widening gap between political elites and the public, especially younger voters. Chalise says the old parties behaved as though politics could continue as usual even after their original mission had ended. Public frustration deepened over stagnant leadership, weak performance and a closed political class dominated by insiders.

Khattar Singh places the election in the context of the September 2025 Generation Z protests, which erupted over these frustrations and forced the resignation of then-Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. Despite the unrest, the subsequent vote was peaceful. Chalise calls the election’s conduct “a miracle,” given the violence that preceded it.

The scale of the political shift

The results show how decisively voters turned away from the traditional order. Chalise explains that the Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) dominated the lower-house contest and is expected to hold 182 of 275 seats. By contrast, the Nepali Congress fell sharply. The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist), led by Oli, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre), associated with former Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal (or Prachanda), were reduced to minor roles.

For Chalise, the message is clear. The public has handed the RSP a workable majority and the chance to govern for five years, but not a mandate to rewrite the constitution. Because the party lacks upper-house representation, it cannot change the constitutional framework alone.

The result also breaks a longstanding assumption that no single party could secure a stable majority. Khattar Singh notes that Nepal has seen 32 governments in 35 years. Still, Chalise warns that a majority alone is not enough. The real question, he suggests, is majority versus maturity.

Why Shah rose so fast

The discussion then turns to Shah. His rise began with his victory as mayor of Kathmandu, which gave voters a chance to judge his performance. His reputation rests largely on contrast. In a system associated with financial scandals, Shah emerged without a personal corruption case.

That clean image becomes his main political asset. Chalise describes it as Shah’s “USP,” the unique selling point that distinguished him from many local leaders facing corruption allegations. He also notes Shah’s unusual style. Unlike many senior leaders, Shah speaks sparingly. Chalise calls him “a very mysterious character,” and Khattar Singh notes that this unpredictability can appear both as strength and weakness.

The youth dimension is equally important. Chalise argues that for decades, Nepal’s young people drove political movements but were sidelined once power was distributed. This election reflects a democratic revolt against that pattern, with younger voters choosing to take power through the ballot.

A party with power but no identity

Even after its landslide, the RSP remains politically unsettled. Chalise says the party lacks a clear ideological identity and has not yet held its first convention. Its elected members come from varied backgrounds, including democrats, leftists and some with monarchist leanings.

Its appeal rests on delivery rather than doctrine. Khattar Singh suggests that voters increasingly prioritize jobs, prosperity and competence over ideology. Chalise agrees, noting that the party’s commitment paper points toward liberal economic instincts and a role for the private sector, though he stops short of calling it ideologically defined.

That ambiguity creates risk. If the new government performs, it may dominate Nepal for years. If it fails, support could collapse quickly. From a political science perspective, Chalise says, the RSP is “not yet a party.” It must evolve while governing.

The real test starts now

The conversation concludes with the challenge ahead. Khattar Singh points to Nepal’s difficult geography, limited state capacity and dependence on India and China for trade and energy. Nepal cannot insulate itself from regional instability or global shocks.

Chalise agrees that foreign policy may prove decisive. Nepal’s next government must navigate shifting regional dynamics and domestic expectations simultaneously. Shah’s nationalist symbolism, including the “Greater Nepal” map seen in his office, adds uncertainty. Chalise returns to the same point: Shah is unpredictable, and whether that becomes an asset or liability depends on how he governs.

For now, voters have rejected the old political class and chosen youth, anti-corruption politics and the promise of delivery. But protest energy and electoral success are only the beginning. The real test starts with governing.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Foucault believed Western society had grown stagnant due to bureaucracy. In Tehran in 1979, he saw what he called the birth of a “”, a rare moment of collective revolt in which a nation attempted to shed its old identity and reinvent its soul. While Foucault was mesmerized by the collective revolt, critics argue that he focused on the drama of rebellion. This article explores that fundamental tension: how a thinker dedicated to unmasking the mechanisms of oppression could so passionately embrace a movement that, shortly after his writings, established a rigid, absolutist theocratic system.

An unlikely convergence

Pairing Iranian Supreme Leader and Foucault seems unusual at face value. Yet they intersected at a decisive moment in 1979, a historical juncture where political Islam hijacked the Iranian revolution, transforming a national event into a global phenomenon.

Today, as the Iranian theocratic regime faces pressure, interest in this case has grown again. To understand this interest, we must briefly revisit the history that forged this connection. At the time, Foucault’s influence among the Liberal-Left intellectual circles of  Europe was at its zenith. As Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s fall approached, Foucault was contracted with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera to cover the Iranian revolution. 

The pillars of Foucault’s illusion

Foucault visited Iran twice, first in September 1978, after which he visited Khomeini in his exile near Paris. He returned to Iran in October. During his second visit, Foucault’s reports were met with a mixture of shock and loathing by the West, in stark contrast to his immense popularity among Khomeini’s supporters at Tehran University, who translated his articles and plastered them on campus walls.

Foucault centered his analysis on the concept of “political spirituality.”��He sought a form of politics rooted in the organic beginning between man, religion, and politics — a connection he felt Modernity had severed. After the failed in France and disillusionment with the Soviet model, Foucault sought alternatives. He saw in the “anti-imperialist” discourse of the Iranian movement a way to overlook the specificities of Islamism in favor of a spiritual alternative.

Foucault drew parallels between the 16th-century��Anabaptist��movement in Europe and 1970s Iran, seeking an “inspiring alternative” for a Western audience. His reading of Khomeini proved deeply flawed. In����(1978), Foucault described Khomeini’s role in the Iranian revolution, “It is the same confrontation … between the master of the kingdom and the saintly man, the man of the armed power and the luckless exiled, the tyrant against the man who stands bare-handed and is cheered by a people.”

He portrayed Khomeini to Western readers as a legendary, unarmed figure representing a love for politics and spirit, divorced from the evils of “modernity.”

The historical blind spot

Foucault’s dismissal of Khomeini’s political history revealed a profound lack of contextual scrutiny. He turned a blind eye to the specific social and political alternatives that Khomeini had already outlined in his published books. Furthermore, he seemed unaware that Khomeini was imprisoned in his youth for opposing land reforms that reduced clerical power.

Foucault also overlooked the broader political context. Namely, the of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh, who foreign powers such as the US and Britain sought to remove due to his nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. All of this historical data did not deter Foucault’s support. It appears he was either entirely ignorant of this history or chose to exist solely within the “illusion of the present moment.” In his reports, one finds a man “defending” a project he had long been searching for. : “But one can also dream of another movement … a movement that would allow the introduction of a spiritual dimension into political life … so that it does not become the obstacle to spirituality, but its container, its opportunity.”

Without hesitation, he produced texts in a romantic style reminiscent of Greek epics to describe a volatile political event. He treated the revolution as a kind of epic transformation while framing it as a search for spiritual renewal in political theory. 

Criticisms and excuses

Some scholars defend Foucault.����(2009) argues that Foucault acted as a journalist, suggesting his errors stemmed from a lack of information. However, his writings suggest something deeper: the use of Iran as a validator for his own political theories. This obsession led him to ignore other actors in the revolution. He wrote:

When I walked through the streets of Qom and Tehran, I carried the question “What do you want?” in my head … I avoided asking this question of professional politicians … instead, I had long discussions with religious leaders, students, and intellectuals.

While Foucault focused on the “spiritual” actors, he ignored the fact that 70% of a strategic city like Isfahan was controlled by workers’ councils (shuras), and that in Kurdistan, peasants were reclaiming land. The political Islam movement hijacked the terminology of the Left (e.g., “Republic of the Poor”), a reality Foucault systematically ignored.

The dream of the Iranians or the dream of Foucault?

Foucault believed the world and revolutionary theory were at a “point zero.” He saw the Iranian revolution as a new path beyond modernity. He formulated this as a question: “What is the mystery of this search for something that we ourselves have forgotten since the Renaissance and the great crises of Christianity: a political spirituality?”

He relied on the assurances of clergy members who claimed that “water and land” would belong to no one and that minorities would be respected. Yet, within a month of the revolution’s success, the political spirituality manifested as the invasion of Kurdistan and the execution of “immoral” women, none of which appeared in Foucault’s reports. Foucault was not pursuing the Iranians’ dream; he was pursuing his own troubled dream. At the end of his , he wrote: “I can already hear the French laughing. But I know they are wrong.”

In the end, his involvement in the Iranian Revolution became a cautionary episode. It showed how theory can distort judgment, and history has treated this moment with both criticism and irony.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Today’s situation, with the loss of Venezuelan energy support, is somewhat reminiscent of Cuba’s experience with the devastating economic impact of the Soviet Union’s in the 1990s, and it may be tempting to draw comparisons between the two periods. At that time, the Castro regime was forced to confront similar challenges: material shortages, isolation and civil unrest. However, today’s reality is characterized by new factors: the physical absence of Fidel Castro and Raúl Castro; the widespread use of social media; resumed flights to and from the US since 2016; and increased liberalization and warmer diplomatic relations.

No matter how valuable ending the longest-running communist government in the Americas may seem, US President Donald Trump seems to be trying out a new for foreign intervention: decapitating regimes while keeping the establishment intact. This model clearly prioritizes business opportunities over democratic values. However, it’s not only uncertain whether it could be applied to Cuba, but also whether this is actually the plan. All of which makes it particularly difficult to imagine what could happen next.

Historically, international observers have oscillated between fascination and outrage towards Communist Cuba. In the early years of the revolution, this fascination was understandable. Cuba was a potent for activists in the 1960s and for the global civil rights movement. However, as the revolution shifted toward military autocracy rather than democratic ideals, the initial romanticism faded. This group of observers, largely comprising European baby boomers who rebelled against post-World War II imperialism, has seen its initial fervor tempered by time. Reflecting a broader evolution in leftist thought, they continue struggling to reconcile Cuba’s social achievements with its authoritarian political regime and the continuous, increasing and deepening impact of the US trade on these revolutionary ideals since 1962.

The Cuban Revolution officially began with the 1953 of the Moncada Barracks by a group of revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro, who was relatively unknown at the time. The uprising aimed to overthrow ’s illegitimate military dictatorship and the systemic corruption and poverty it fostered. Specifically, the movement demanded economic independence from US imperialist interests and the restoration of political liberty through an armed uprising of the working class.

After the attempted coup, Castro, a trained lawyer, was tried and imprisoned by Batista’s regime. During this trial, he delivered an iconic defense speech that ended with the famous words, “History will absolve me.” Indeed, he was pardoned after 22 months due to a general amnesty and went on to lead Cuba for life. However, total absolution by history is doubtful and yet to come.

After his release from prison, Castro adopted July 26 — the date of the attack on the Moncada Barracks — as the name of his revolutionary movement: the Movimiento 26 de Julio. By January 1, 1959, the rebels, including the iconic Comandante Ernesto “Che” Guevara, had successfully overthrown the dictatorship. In response to Batista’s pro-US regime, the revolutionaries had campaigned with slogans such as: “Cuba sí, yanquis no!” (“Cuba yes! Yankees no!”) and “Yanquis, vayanse!” (“Yankees, go away!”).

Shortly after Castro and his group took control, the US intervened militarily in 1961, but was defeated at the Bay of Pigs. This defeat solidified the first self-proclaimed communist revolution in the region, which would become the longest-standing regime of its kind in the Western world. It is now approaching its seventh decade.

The revolution as an unfinished process

After years of rumors that he was dead and that his government was keeping him alive to prevent a political collapse, Castro died on November 25, 2016, at the age of 90. Following Castro’s illness in 2006, his younger brother Raúl assumed provisional power. By 2011, Raúl had solidified his position as leader of both the presidency and the Communist Party. This appointment communicated a strong stance on hierarchy and kinship. Yet, Raúl ultimately delegated governance in 2019, eight years later.

Miguel Mario Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, Cuba’s current president, is a direct descendant of the Castro regime, having been personally appointed by Raúl Castro. Born in Villa Clara Province on April 20, 1960, Díaz-Canel was born one year after the Cuban Revolution of 1959. Although Díaz-Canel holds onto the revolutionary ideals of his predecessors, he is facing unprecedented times. Amid escalating instability and unrest, he called for dialogue on Monday, March 23, while not capitulating on the Revolution, stating:

We don’t want war; we want dialogue. But if that space isn’t provided, we are ready. I tell you this with the deep conviction that I hold, which I have shared with my family, that we would give our lives for the Revolution.

Díaz-Canel said this in a conversation with Pablo Iglesias, the Spanish founder of the left-wing political party Podemos, and former vice president of Spain. Iglesias arrived in Cuba on March 24, 2026, as part of the humanitarian convoy. There, he Díaz-Canel on behalf of his media organization, Canal Red. With the support of figures like Iglesias and British politician Jeremy Corbyn, the Nuestra América mission delivered 20 tons of aid, including solar panels, to help alleviate the island’s severe energy crisis.

The convoy’s name invokes the legacy of (1853–1895), the “Apostle of Cuban Independence” and a foundational figure in the development of the nation’s identity. In his influential 1891 essay, Nuestra América, or “,” Martí contended that Latin American nations should develop governance systems grounded in their unique social realities instead of imitating foreign models. By warning against “the giant of the north” and calling for cultural sovereignty, Martí’s manifesto remains a powerful symbol that the modern mission seeks to reclaim. In fact, both Díaz-Canel and Iglesias reiterated Martí’s accusations that the US is responsible for Cuba’s structural problems of the past several decades, that the 1959 Revolution eliminated “all miseries and evils.”

The blockade of all trade and diplomatic relations with the US, coupled with the nationalization or expulsion of the private sector, did not stop the steady stream of tourists, primarily from Europe, from arriving on the island. Despite the gradual disenchantment of many, a sense of mysticism about Cuba as an oasis outside of capitalism began to emerge.

For as long as I can remember, I have heard the same tropes in stories by foreigners who visited the island in the ‘90s and ‘00s. One recurring theme was the idea that Cuba was “suspended in time.” People often mentioned the old cars, which were rare in other urban landscapes. In a dimmer note, Fidel, who had once that Cuba would no longer be the “brothel of the Western Hemisphere,” later used that same imagery in a 1999 speech, infamously , “Cuba has the cleanest and most educated prostitutes in the world.”

In his 1965 work, , Virgilio Piñera famously referred to “the curse of being completely surrounded by water.” Writing from a first-person perspective while sitting in a café in Havana, Piñera captured an insular reality that visitors, often distracted by the island’s tropical allure, could never truly grasp. This metaphorical curse reveals a less paradisical side of the nation, grounding its international isolation in a bittersweet reality.

Piñera’s sentiment mirrors the devastating truth in Fidel’s later remarks about the island’s “cultured” prostitutes. Both the poet’s verses and the leader’s words acknowledge a reality that, despite its high ideals, remains trapped by its circumstances. Piñera’s image remains profoundly expressive today, as Cuba faces renewed media attention and political turmoil, making this sense of cursed isolation feel as relevant as ever.

Following a period of diplomatic warming that began in 2015, US–Cuba relations shifted from a hopeful path toward greater understanding to extreme hostility under the Trump administration. By 2025, Marco Rubio, a former senator from Florida and Cuban American, had become one of the loudest advocates for this shift. A Gen Xer, Rubio belongs to the first generation of diaspora children who have historically migrated to Miami. This group has traditionally been fiercely opposed to the regime they fled.

Today, many of them see the current moment as the opportunity they’ve been awaiting for decades. Hispanic outlets Univision and Telemundo Miami have the various demonstrations, many of which were led by Cuban activist Ramón Saúl Sánchez, who on the exile community at the iconic Cuban restaurant to support the protests occurring on the island. The Free Cuba Rally, which through Washington, DC, featured slogans such as “Trump” and “Cuba Next!” calling for US action.

Founded by Cuban exiles in Valencia, Spain, in 2014, the news outlet Cibercuba has been a relevant source that divulges information from inside the island. It has extensively covered the protests of the last few weeks against constant outages and the growing precarious situation. According to Cibercuba, there have been pot-banging , fires started in the middle of roads, and people taking to the streets regardless of the significant military and police presence.

Though their demands are diverse and sometimes conflicting, protesters in Cuba and the diaspora are united in their response to the same lack of coherence embodied by an unfinished revolution and an authoritarian regime. Unlike the diaspora, protesters on the island largely US intervention. They call for freedom and anti-authoritarianism, yet they never question their own autonomy. They correctly believe that their future is in their hands, more on immediate needs than on challenging the entire economic system. Despite its flaws, the revolution’s accomplishments should be recognized, such as ensuring that and remain for all. 

Taking all of this into account, it’s reasonable to conclude that Cuba is experiencing its most severe economic and social crisis in decades. Nevertheless, Díaz-Canel has taken a defiant position against Washington, considering the one-party political system and the decades of cultural and structural revolution that sustain him. Even as it prepares for potential American aggression, the Cuban government refuses to negotiate its political system and its national sovereignty.

Perspectives from the Island: the case of Beto

I traveled to Cuba for the first and only time in January 2018, spending the first eight days of the year in Havana. I flew from Miami, a route that had only direct service in December 2016. I remember the other passengers, most of whom were not tourists, rushing to stand up as soon as the plane landed. Their urgency seemed to reflect the extraordinary experience of taking a direct flight after decades of needing to take indirect routes, such as via Cancún, or of being unable to travel at all due to visa or the risk of state retaliation for those in exile.

Coming from a place where unlimited internet access was the norm, the intermittent service during that short trip felt unusual. Access was a luxury; you had to go to a hotel or somewhere with Wi-Fi, or buy a $5 data card that lasted 30 minutes. For the majority of Cubans, this was a significant expense, as average monthly salaries among the lowest in the world. According to a 2025 , this digital divide persists as Etecsa, the national telecommunications enterprise, continues to restrict and raise the price of monthly data top-ups.

This atmosphere of restricted access and slow change makes the current shift in US foreign policy feel like a long-awaited opportunity. However, the notion of a tipping point once again reveals its tantalizing and procrastinatory nature. To understand how this pivotal turning point was perceived beyond the official headlines, I reached out to my Cuban friends living abroad.

One of them is Beto, a chef and owner who has lived in Madrid for over 20 years. When he responded on Monday, March 16, he was visiting family in Cuba, 30 minutes outside Havana. He stayed in touch throughout his week-long trip, and I am fortunate to be able to share some of his insights here.

Beto began his testimony by recounting how difficult it was to move around the island. His brother had to buy fuel on the black market just to pick him up from the airport, paying between eight and ten dollars per liter. Beto could only afford this expense because of his life in Spain. This corroborates reports of a severe decline in fuel supply, despite Beto’s testimony that money was circulating. 

On the drive from the airport to his hometown, which usually takes place on a busy highway toward Havana, there were no other cars. In a video he , the empty horizon could be seen in both directions, interrupted only by a car that eventually passed them. According to Beto, the airport itself also felt empty. His Iberia flight, designed to carry over 200 passengers, landed with only 60 people on board. The rental lots were empty, yet filled with cars no one was renting. “Havana doesn’t even have fuel for the planes,” Beto explained. He noted that his flight had to detour to the Dominican Republic just to refuel for the return trip to Madrid. He added that due to limited resources, tourism and travel for non-urgent matters have become extremely difficult these days.

This perception of a shortage is indicative of a broader energy crisis in which access to electricity depends on having the right technology. This takes us back to Diaz-Canel’s recent with Pablo Iglesias. Overall, the Cuban President’s tone was optimistic. Diaz-Canel mentioned that even amid an intensified blockade, Cuba is on the path to energy sovereignty. He highlighted the importance of solar panels, electricity generated from sugarcane fields and the increased use of electric motorcycles for various services, describing all of it as a form of “creative resistance.”

Overall, listening to Beto confirmed both Diaz-Canel’s description of advancements in renewable energy and the fact that it is insufficient. During the most recent national blackout, Beto said that only people near power plants or with solar panels were able to power their electronics. This was the case in his father’s village. To cope with the heat, he said he used a battery-powered fan for up to five hours at a time in his father’s house. A tropical storm on Monday night also helped cool the air.

Based on what he saw and experienced on this trip, the state-run food supply system, which used to equitably distribute food despite its imperfections, has nearly vanished. A new reality has emerged in which private enterprises import food and sell it at higher prices than in Madrid. Beto also shared photos of solar energy kits and kerosene stoves being sold on social media. The flyers provide contact information and state that payments must be made in cash in US dollars, and that delivery is available for an additional cost.

In addition to the photos of electronics, Beto shared a video with me depicting the unique blend of eras and economic systems found on Cuban streets. In the video, bicycle-powered taxis rattle past an old Polish Fiat, an iconic Soviet-era car, that has been modified to include a solar panel on its roof. The car was parked outside a bar called Tómatela Fría, where reggaeton music played from a speaker. During my short visit in 2018, I noticed that music, mostly reggaeton, was always playing on the streets. Seeing that it’s still the norm gave me a sense of reassurance that other reports didn’t.

Throughout the week, Beto and I were able to communicate with each other more than twice a day, albeit intermittently. He relied on airport Wi-Fi or Etecsa offices for internet access. There, you can pay 40 cents an hour for a connection to their Wi-Fi, which is powered by generators. When he described this situation to me, he paused and said it was all a “strange, high-speed transformation caught between socialism and capitalism.” As citizens increasingly take to the streets, Beto’s ambiguity sums up the reality of existing in the long-term middle ground between the two systems that polarized the second half of the 20th century.

As proof of the exceptional circumstances due to intensified protests and government dissent in the days prior, Beto sent a picture showing military helicopters circling overhead and armored vehicles moving through his father’s neighborhood. While the townspeople attempt to maintain a facade of normalcy by selling everyday goods in private stalls, intermittent electricity and the shadow of helicopters serve as constant reminders that the country is transforming into something entirely unknown.

Against this backdrop, Beto told me that when people in Cuba talk about the importance of money from family members abroad, they often ask each other, “¿Tú tienes fe?” While “fe” means “faith” in English, it actually stands for Familiar en el Extranjero, or “family member abroad.” This refers to receiving remittances from places such as Miami or Madrid. The double meaning of faith speaks to the concept of the hybridity of the two systems that Beto mentioned earlier. The anecdote also conveys a sense of truth when considering that faith may be the only unifying factor among the different positions, regardless of the indeterminate results.

The curse of being completely surrounded by water

The curse of being completely surrounded by water condemns me to this café table. If I didn’t think that water encircled me like a cancer, I’d sleep in peace. In the time that it takes the boys to strip for swimming, twelve people have died of the bends … The eternal misery of memory. If a few things were different and the country came back to me waterless, I’d gulp down that misery to spit back at the sky … The uniform of the drowned sailor still floats on the reef. It makes you want to jump out of bed and find the main vein of the sea and bleed it dry.

— The Whole Island, Virgilio Piñera

In closing, I would like to return to Virgilio Piñera’s poem and his words: “The curse of being completely surrounded by water.” In the poem, he also speaks of finding “the main vein of the sea and bleeding it dry,” building to a crescendo of intensity. Following the success of the Revolution, Piñera was one of many intellectuals who initially supported the movement. However, the revolutionary promise soon turned into systematic censorship. Piñera was arrested at the beginning of a period of state repression that intensified throughout the ‘60s and ‘70s.

In his posthumous memoir, (1993), Reinaldo Arenas, a writer of a later generation, explains how he, like Piñera, was imprisoned because of his homosexuality and his stance as a dissident public writer. The title, Before Night Falls, refers to how he had to write by the last rays of sunlight while hiding in parks as a fugitive. It wasn’t until 1980 that the Cuban state stopped homosexuals criminal figures, and the Ley de Ostentación Homosexual was repealed.

However, prosecutions due to sexual orientation didn’t stop overnight (it was not until 2019 that a new constitution was approved in Cuba that included regarding gender rights, and it wasn’t until 2022 that same-sex marriage was legalized). Arenas was able to flee during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift , which began when a bus crashed into the Peruvian embassy, causing a massive refugee crisis. To be granted permission to leave through Mariel, Arenas had to “” his homosexuality. He eventually settled in Miami and then New York, where he died by suicide while awaiting death from AIDS in 1990. In his suicide note, he explicitly blamed Fidel Castro for his death.

It’s hard to reconcile heartbreaking stories like Arenas’s with the continued loyalty of other prominent figures. As I have striven to convey in this piece, we find ourselves in limbo, torn between disillusionment and faith. Silvio Rodríguez, a renowned musician, exemplifies the latter. The government recently him a Kalashnikov rifle in recognition of his loyalty. Interestingly, in his popular 1993 song “,” or “the fool,” Rodriguez sang that deciding what the world deems foolishness may also be a stance: “Could it be that foolishness was born with me?/The foolishness of what now seems foolish/The foolishness of embracing the enemy/The foolishness of living without a price.”

On March 16, the day I spoke with Beto, Trump escalated his rhetoric, he could “take Cuba in some form” and do as he pleased there, adding that such a thing would be “an honor.” Once again, when we bring together the rhetoric of Rodríguez and Trump, we feel as though we are traveling in time. As the “giant of the North,” in Martí’s words, confronts Cuba, the island remains caught between the remnants of communism and an emerging informal capitalism. Cubans are resisting creatively, as they always have, even when struggling in the context of an accentuated decades-long blockade. Currently, their system of governance is holding strong, albeit while being cornered in their search for a path forward.

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The commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council (TSC), General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has continued to rely on Islamist “,” recruiters and financiers, which has placed him between a rock and a hard place. The has explicitly condemned the role played by Islamist factions. Additionally, the US could grow impatient and add to the extensive sanctions of TSC members and allies.������

Al-Burhan recently he would not stop fighting until the rebels are defeated. Burhan was referring to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti,” a staunch of the Sudanese Islamic Movement, which comprises Muslim Brotherhood (Kizan) elements and remnants of the regime. Burhan has often used this in response to US and Quad statements pushing for a new round of peace talks, intentionally aiming to delegitimize the RSF leadership and echoing the position of Islamist leaders like Ali Ahmed Mohammed. Karti denounced the Quad’s “blatant interference in Sudan’s internal affairs,” calling it “unacceptable bias” following the explicit use of language against Islamist groups.

Islamist factions and the STC

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Sudan followed a path similar to that of the original organization in . Organized among university students in the 1950s, Hassan al-Banna’s ideology quickly spread under the guise of an Islamic Liberation Movement. Leaders like Hassan paved the way for the National Islamist Front (NIF), which helped bring Omar al-Bashir to power in 1989. The National Congress Party (NCP) is noted for having its origins in organizations led by al-Turabi, which kept Bashir in power until 2019. Remnants of the MB from the Bashir regime played a vital in the that brought al-Burhan to power and derailed the transition under the civilian-led transitional council.��

Since October 2021, when al-Burhan led a against the civilian-led transitional council, Islamist figures have worked arduously to pave the way for a to power. Following mass arrests of civilian officials, including then Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, al-Burhan established the STC. Bashir’s former ruling party, the National Congress Party (), has re-emerged behind the scenes as a pillar of Burhan’s power base and the SAF.

Sudanese observers have traced the formation of this new TSC and its composition to Islamist figures such as , NCP and former governor of North Kordofan, and , an extension of Hassan Turabi’s Muslim Brotherhood (Kizan) sphere. While initially behind the scenes — with Burhan as the façade of the new regime — other MB affiliates, such as Ibrahim Mohamed Fediel (the current Minister of Finance, by the US), have openly served alongside Burhan since 2023, when the armed forces split.

The RSF clashed with Burhan, primarily over the growing influence of the Kazan over the Council and the integration of military units. In April 2023, Hemedti split with Burhan and eventually dislodged the SAF and allies from Khartoum, making Port Sudan the base for the SAF and Kazan figures. Aside from Gebreil, other Islamist leaders eventually came to the forefront in the fight between SAF and RSF forces, leading military units, militia and acting as liaisons with new allies. Among these are al-Misbah Abu Zaid Talha (leader of the US- Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Brigade [BBMB]), Anas Omar, Hudhayfah Istanbul, Abu Aqla Keikel (leader of Sudan Shield Forces) and Abdel Hai Youssef.��

The TSC, seen as an instrument for Islamist re-emergence in the political and military spheres, has also facilitated expanding relations with allies like Iran and Turkey. The relationship with Iran and Turkey has been fundamental to SAF military strength and the growth of Islamist militia like Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Brigade and the Sudan Shield Forces. The militia have been to Burhan’s fight against the RSF in Khartoum, Darfur and now in the south. There is no hiding the between these Islamist militias and the SAF, as Sudanese observers have highlighted al-Misbah Abu Zaid Talha’s ties to MIS and the General Intelligence Service (GIS), particularly with Deputy GIS director Mohamed Abbas Al-Labib.����

Burhan and Islamists reject peace��

The imminent US listing of al-Kazan as an was the result of a gradual approach aimed at restarting peace talks between Sudan’s rivals. As part of the Quad, along with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, the US administration has made multiple attempts to bring parties to the table, specifically in , when members called for a humanitarian ceasefire prior to escalation across Darfur. In that statement, the Quad explicitly noted that “Sudan’s future cannot be dictated by violent extremist groups part of or evidently linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.” The warning was later followed by the sanctions against Fediel and the BBMB.

Following a number of overtures by members last year, Burhan made it absolutely clear that he would not engage in peace talks “with rebels” until the RSF was . As far back as 2023, the US has pointed to Sudan’s Islamists as major obstacles to peace, sanctioning for “actively obstructing efforts to reach a ceasefire.” Figures like rejected the Quad’s September statement as “blatant interference in Sudan’s internal affairs,” thereby forcing Burhan’s “hard no” on a number of ceasefire proposals.

In early November, just before the US-Saudi Arabia summit in Washington, DC, emerged that following Burhan’s rejection of the Quad proposal, it could not be “rule(d) out imposing it by force as violations and atrocities continue in a wide part of the country.”��

The latest round of sanctions by the US not only illustrates growing frustration but also a wider understanding of the conflict. The US sanctioned a number of MB in early January, but in Sudan, the US widened the umbrella to include “the Sudanese Islamic Movement (SIM) and its armed wing, the al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade.” The sanctions also linked Sudan’s Islamist to the Islamic Republic of and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).��

The Sudan Tribune highlighted that the US listing directly mention the NCP linked to al-Turabi’s sphere, or even the Popular Congress Party (PCP). This may be part of the gradual approach employed by the US, reserving such groups for a later time in order to measure Burhan’s reaction and that of Islamist figures within Sudan and abroad.

The SDGT listing by the US will also have an impact on Burhan’s relations with Turkey and Qatar, and may halt the agreement with for the delivery of weapons. The SAF has suffered a number of setbacks in recent months, and while Iran has scaled back military support for the SAF and militia since December 2025, Burhan and Islamist allies have opted to side with Iran during the ongoing conflict with Israel and the US, adding pressure on Port Sudan allies who may face consequences for their support of Tehran.

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For many watching around the world, it was the first time they had heard Manipur described so plainly — not through the lens of conflict bulletins or political briefings, but through the voice of an artist simply asking to be seen.

But what exactly is happening in Manipur, and why has this small state in India’s Northeast — along with the wider region — long been described as neglected and underrepresented? And, crucially, what can be done to solve this problem?

For the past few years, Manipur has been torn apart by communal violence between the Meitei and Kuki ethnic groups, with hundreds of deaths and around 60,000 . Despite the scale of the situation, Prime Minister Narendra Modi only visited the state two years later, a move that has been sharply criticized. The leaders of the opposition Congress party his visit as a “farce” and argued that he should have visited much sooner.

The government has also been criticized by human rights groups, such as . which has claimed inaction on the part of the authorities in Manipur.��The government did implement Presidential Rule in the state, and the Parliament voted on a resolution to it further, but many felt this was too little and too late.

So, why wasn’t more done for Manipur? Most importantly, why do people in India’s North-Eastern states continue to feel neglected by the centre?

A structural imbalance at the heart of Parliament

This sense of neglect is not new. India’s Northeastern states, home to numerous Indigenous communities, have long felt sidelined by New Delhi, both politically and culturally. Addressing this requires more than reactive governance; it calls for institutional reform that ensures regions have a meaningful voice in national decision-making.

India has a two-house Parliament: the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and the Rajya Sabha (Upper House/Council of States). One of the most practical and impactful reforms lies in rethinking the Rajya Sabha.

Currently, representation in both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha is based on population. While this method works for the Lok Sabha, which is meant to reflect the will of the people, it limits the Rajya Sabha’s ability to represent the states equally.

As a result, large states dominate both houses of Parliament, leaving smaller states, especially those in the Northeast, with limited influence. 

What the Upper House was meant to be

In the Lok Sabha, larger states naturally have more members, while smaller states have fewer. For example, Uttar Pradesh has to reflect its large population, while northeastern states like Meghalaya and Manipur with much smaller populations, have only two seats each. This is fair, as the Lok Sabha is supposed to be proportional.

The Rajya Sabha, or Upper House, on the other hand, is supposed to represent the states. This should act as a countermajoritarian body that gives equal representation to each state so they can have a voice in government. However, here too, the number of seats depends on the population. This means that bigger states end up with far more representation than smaller ones. Uttar Pradesh holds 31 seats in the Rajya Sabha. In contrast, the small Northeastern states such as Manipur, Nagaland and Meghalaya each have only one seat. Large states dominate both houses of Parliament, leaving smaller states, such as those in the Northeast, with very little influence in national decision-making.

A reformed Rajya Sabha could create more balance. India could adopt a system where each state is guaranteed a minimum level of equal representation, similar to models seen in other federal systems. 

What India can learn from other federal systems

In the US, every state has equal representation in the regardless of population. This means that California, with a population of nearly 39 million, has the same number of Senators as Wyoming, with just 600,000 people. The purpose of this system is to balance the voices of both large and small states, ensuring that no region feels neglected or overshadowed.��

Similarly, the EU balances representation through a dual-threshold system. Each member state has equal representation in the Council of the European Union, which operates similarly to the Upper House of the legislature. A “” process is used for many important decisions, where a proposal needs the support of 55% of EU member states representing at least 65% of the population. This prevents big states from dominating, but also stops a few small states from blocking decisions on their own.

Reimaging representation in India

India could apply a similar idea. Instead of allocating seats purely by population, each state could be guaranteed an equal base number of seats in the Rajya Sabha and major votes could require two thresholds. For example, the support of at least half of all states and representing at least half of India’s population. 

Such reforms would increase the influence of smaller states in national decisions. But, more importantly, equal representation in the Rajya Sabha would force politicians to take smaller states seriously because neglecting them would carry a real political cost. Today, the situation is very different.

Take Manipur, for instance. It currently has only two seats in the Lok Sabha and one in the Rajya Sabha, a pattern found across much of the Northeast. With such limited numbers, their voices are easily drowned out by larger states. 

This creates a dangerous imbalance. Major political parties and lawmakers have little incentive to prioritize the concerns of small states, because focusing on bigger states with more seats simply offers greater political rewards. Hence, regions like the Northeast are often overlooked.

Ensuring every region counts

If every state had equal representation in the Upper House, this dynamic would change dramatically. National parties would no longer focus primarily on larger states for electoral gains, as smaller states would also carry a great weight in the legislative process. Neglect would no longer be consequence-free.

Equal representation in the Rajya Sabha would not only strengthen democracy but also ensure that no part of the country is treated as an afterthought. It would ensure that democracy in India does not simply mean “rule of the majority,” but a system where every region matters equally — whether it’s the political powerhouse of Uttar Pradesh or a small Northeastern state like Manipur.

When politicians know they cannot afford to neglect Manipur — or any state — then real change will follow.

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The , signed on June 3, 1947, created far more conflict than it solved. In October 1947, barely two months after partition, Pakistan launched a brazen of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Pakistan used Pashtun tribesmen and soldiers disguised as tribesmen to invade J&K.

The conflict continued through the winter of and into 1948. Indian forces showed great tenacity, especially in Srinagar, Uri and Kargil, and made steady territorial gains during 1948.�� However, political developments of 1948 altered the geographical control, military requirements and strategic planning.

UN, ceasefire and the cartographic negligence

In early 1948, Prime Minister , acting on the advice of British statesman and admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, referred the Kashmir dispute to the UN. In his extraordinary book War and Diplomacy in Kashmir: 1947–48, Indian civil servant, diplomat and writer unearths a great deal of archival evidence. He suggests that the political misjudgments and presence of the British military officers resulted in India losing control over large parts of J&K.

The UN process led to a formal ceasefire that came into effect on December 31, 1948, with hostilities ceasing on January 1, 1949. Over the following months, several resolutions were debated in the UN. These efforts culminated in the signing of the on July 27, 1949.

The agreement attempted to demarcate a ceasefire line (CFL). The of 1972 renamed the CFL as the Line of Control (LoC). The CFL extended approximately 740 kilometers, starting from the Jammu division. It ran “up to point NJ9842, beyond which the terrain is heavily glaciated.” Point NJ9842 corresponds to the last mapped point of the CFL. It lies to the southwest of the Saltoro Ridge.

Over the years, several controversies have erupted over the legal right to the Saltoro Ridge. However, the Karachi Agreement was very clear on the Indian ownership. The agreement, in Paragraph B, sub-clause D of the declaration, states that from point NJ9842 the CFL goes “thence north to the glaciers.” This gave India legal control of the Saltoro Ridge.

Simultaneously, clause C of the agreement specified that the CFL would be drawn on a one-inch official map. It was also required to be verified by local military commanders of India and Pakistan. However, this verification process was never completed. As a result, the northern sector beyond NJ9842 remained undefined on official maps. This Indian negligence in not delineating the boundary created a strategic vacuum. This was later exploited by Pakistan, culminating in India’s Operation Meghdoot of 1984.

Operation Meghdoot

In the 1950s and 1960s, the issue of the Saltoro Ridge was rarely discussed. The bigger picture in that era was the western front with Pakistan and the northern and eastern front with China. India’s China policy ended in disaster, culminating in a humiliating defeat in the . Pakistan, after seeing India humiliated in 1962, “gifted” to China in 1963. Pakistan, at the time, also started to lay the groundwork for , which it executed in 1965.

The issue of the Saltoro Ridge could have been solved peacefully by the Shimla Declaration. However, the declaration merely reiterated the position laid down in the Karachi Agreement. It did not provide for any on-ground verification. This failure to establish a clearly delineated boundary, even after the massive military victory in the , was a diplomatic blunder for India.

This was exploited by Pakistan during the 1970s and 1980s. Pakistan began issuing permits to foreign mountaineers for expeditions in the , which forms part of the Saltoro Ridge. These activities alarmed Indian policymakers. Intelligence assessments coming from 1983 revealed that Pakistan was planning an offensive named “.” Operation Ababeel was planned to be launched from Skardu in the Baltistan Division.

Confronted with this threat, the Indira Gandhi government finally acted decisively. In 1984, India launched , occupying the passes of the Saltoro Ridge and securing its dominant position. Today, the Indian troops control Sia La, Bilafond La and Gyong La — all three major passes of the Saltoro Ridge. The Pakistani troops, on the other hand, are at the bottom of the ridge. The planning of Operation Meghdoot was done by then General officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Northern Command, a saint-soldier, Lieutenant General Manohar Lal Chibber.

The geographical significance of the Saltoro Ridge

Geographically, the Saltoro Ridge occupies an extremely sensitive position in the northern frontier. To its north lies the Baltistan region of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. To the northeast is the Chinese-occupied Shaksham Valley. To the West lies the Skardu air base in the Baltistan division, an important logistical and operational hub of the Pakistani military. The southern extremity of the ridge feeds the system.

The strategic value of the Saltoro Ridge is further reinforced by the cushion it provides to critical Indian military installations. It lies to the North of the Daulat Beg Oldi () sector and the (where South Asia meets Central Asia). The DBO, along with hosting an advanced landing ground (ALG), lies just eight kilometers south of the (KK) and nine kilometers Northwest of Chinese-occupied .

The ridge’s geographical advantage is further strengthened by its proximity to the KK, just a few miles east. To its south lies the adjoining (SSN), the frontline region of Indian military planning against adversaries. Control over the ridge line allows India to maintain maximum deterrence with minimum military presence in the frontier.

Thus, the greatest geographical significance lies in the fact that the Saltoro Ridge constitutes the only natural geographical barrier separating the on-ground Chinese and Pakistani military coordination. As long as India controls the ridge, the possibility of physical military coordination between the two is slim. This provides India with a decisive geographical advantage in any future contingency.

Second, Indian control over the ridge denies both adversaries access to dominating heights. Currently, even from the most forward Pakistani military positions, the Siachen Glacier is not visible, giving India a clear-cut advantage.

In mountain warfare, the possession of high ground, on most occasions, determines the outcome of a conflict. Pakistan has repeatedly sought to alter this balance. Some war veterans have argued that the of 1999 was ultimately aimed at India from the Saltoro Ridge.

The Indian negotiations

The Saltoro Ridge is an inhospitable region marked by extreme weather and logistical nightmares. Soldiers deployed in Siachen face grueling challenges. Drawing on the experience of his brother, this author is very well aware of the faced by soldiers. Many soldiers during their deployment develop lifelong medical complications. They require periodic medical attention. It takes a heavy toll on families.

Due to this, several Indian scholars and diplomats have argued for the withdrawal of Indian troops. A famous in International Relations even wrote, “the strategic value of Siachen is at most ambiguous.” However, the most vocal among this school of thought is the former Foreign Secretary (FS) . Saran headed the Ministry of External Affairs between 2004 and 2006. In his book, “How India Sees the World”, he wrote that as FS, he successfully negotiated the withdrawal of Indian troops from Siachen. However, then National Security Advisor (NSA) “launched a bitter offensive against the proposal,” and the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General backed the NSA. The NSA categorically said “Siachen shall be taken off the table,” effectively torpedoing the negotiations. The FS was aghast at this.

Negotiations under Musharraf: a hoax

Pakistan too has consistently sought the withdrawal of Indian troops from the ridge. Pakistani sides often say that it will be a great exercise in confidence-building. It will build trust and usher in an era of peaceful coexistence. Former Pakistani President General initiated negotiations with former Indian Prime Minister Dr. to make Siachen a “.”

Interestingly, as a Brigade Commander in 1987, Musharraf made a dash to capture the Bilafond La. India, in response, launched and outsmarted Musharraf. Musharraf failed to achieve military and political objectives. But, he gained firsthand experience of the terrain and the geographical advantage of controlling the ridge.

The negotiations under the aegis of the continued even after the removal of Musharraf. However, ultimately, they failed to produce any substantive outcome. The negotiations, from an Indian perspective, reflected a pattern in which diplomacy took far more heft than military planning.

The major reason for failure was the extreme difference of opinion. While India negotiated with a view to helping its soldiers and building trust, the Pakistani side was negotiating to keep its Eastern front (Indian border) calm while it was involved with the US in Afghanistan.

Major , a military historian and Pakistan Army veteran, aptly captured Pakistan’s negotiation strategy in 2011. He :

Utopians in India are jubilant that Pakistan has made peace with India. Nothing in reality can be farther from the truth. The Pakistani apparent shift is merely a tactical response to extreme confrontation with the US over perceived US view that Pakistan is playing a double game in Afghanistan. This is similar to Musharraf’s flirtation with India from 2000 to 2007, which in reality was a gambit to prevent a two-front war with Afghanistan occupied by the USA and a hostile India in the east. The real picture of true intentions of the Pakistani military will emerge when the US withdraws from Afghanistan.

More than a decade later, Major Amin stands vindicated.

Peace with India was never the desire of the Pakistani military. The negotiations on Saltoro Ridge were only meant to bring temporary relief to the constrained Pakistani military.

Why must India maintain a military presence on the Saltoro Ridge?

The first and most compelling reason as to why India must maintain control of the ridge is strategic irreversibility. If India were to withdraw and Pakistan were to subsequently occupy the ridge, any attempt to reclaim it would require a major military offensive. Such an operation would entail heavy casualties and enormous financial costs, with no guarantee of success. No doubt it will also be a political disaster.

Currently, only one Brigade is present on the Siachen Glacier. However, if India withdraws and then tries to capture it, it will require more than one Brigade. In addition to this, a large military build-up at SSN would be required with the mobilization of a mountain division, multiple armored regiments, artillery systems and special forces.

Thus, vacating a hard-won and strategically dominant position would therefore amount to voluntarily surrendering a vital advantage and creating the conditions for a future conflict under threatening circumstances.

Second, China’s expanding military infrastructure in and the Shaksgam Valley has further enhanced the ridge’s importance. Given the close strategic partnership between China and Pakistan, coordinated operations cannot be ruled out. Indian military assessments during last year’s have indicated that China shared of the movement of Indian troops with Pakistan. , given the presence of numerous glaciers on the ridge, has its own designs. A withdrawal from the Saltoro Ridge would open physical and strategic space for China to exploit.

Finally, with the signing of the on October 26, 1947, the whole state of J&K became part of India. Thus, the Indian presence on the Saltoro Ridge is on Indian territory. Why should India negotiate the withdrawal of troops from its own territory? Does the Indian government ask Pakistan to remove corps from Bahawalpur, Lahore or Gilgit? Or does the government ask China to stop building military infrastructure in Tibet? Thus, maintaining presence on the Saltoro Ridge must remain contingent on Indian security requirements, not on confidence-building measures with China and Pakistan.

The enduring power of geography in national security

Throughout the long history of warfare, geography has continued to dictate national security. For India, the lessons of geography are even more important. India faces two hostile nuclear-armed neighbors and the vast Himalayan landmass along its northern and eastern frontiers.

The Saltoro Ridge represents one of the few geophysical configurations that strengthen the Indian position. It enables India to maintain the status quo in eastern Ladakh. It reduces long-term financial and military costs. In addition to this, it prevents the possibility of coordinated China–Pakistan military operations.

Any alteration to the existing arrangement would certainly trigger a military showdown on the world’s highest battlefield. Pakistan’s historical conduct and the psychology of its military establishment provide ample evidence of this risk. Under these circumstances, maintaining control of the Saltoro Ridge remains a strategic necessity for India’s long-term security.

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A mountain of evidence, a moving target

Rohan opens with the scale of the release. Roughly 3.5 million pages have been made public, with an estimated three million more still to come. The files include emails sent to more than 1,000 individuals, images, video material and victim testimonies provided to the FBI. Independent media outlets are combing through the material daily.

Peter cautions that the story is far from settled. “We know more and more every day,” he says, emphasizing that the volume of material makes reaching definitive conclusions difficult. The disclosures are less a single revelation than an evolving mosaic. As he describes it, observers are assembling a “jigsaw puzzle,” starting with the frame before gradually filling in the center. The real significance may lie in the structural patterns emerging from the whole.

The files were released under the Epstein Files Transparency Act, which Trump signed after bipartisan pressure from US Representatives Thomas Massie and Ro Khanna. The law permits limited redactions, but only in narrowly defined circumstances. Yet many names and details remain obscured, fueling suspicion that something larger is being protected.

Trump, transparency and political blowback

Rohan presses Peter on Trump’s role. During his 2024 campaign, Trump promised transparency on unresolved national controversies, including the infamous assassination of US President John F. Kennedy and the Epstein trafficking case. Peter argues that this pledge helped consolidate Trump’s image as a leader willing to challenge entrenched power structures.

But the release has placed Trump in a precarious position. In a now-notorious cabinet meeting exchange, Trump reportedly dismissed the files as “old business,” angering parts of his own electorate. The very transparency he championed has generated political turbulence.

Peter suggests Trump miscalculated. By aligning himself with disclosure, he raised expectations he could not fully control. Now that millions of pages are public with more pending, the administration faces an unpredictable political environment in which allegations touch figures across party lines, including both Trump and former US President Bill Clinton.

A club of the compromised

Moving beyond partisan politics, Peter adopts what he calls a sociological lens. Drawing on analyst Simon Dixon’s framework, he proposes that the Epstein network reflects not a simple blackmail ring but a broader culture of elite mutual compromise.

In his formulation, influence operates through belonging to an exclusive circle. “To get into the club, you have to be compromised,” Peter explains. Rather than classic blackmail, the logic is reciprocal vulnerability. The more compromised individuals are, the more securely they are bound into a system of shared silence and protection.

He likens it to organized crime structures in which mutual exposure ensures loyalty. Within such a system, power is distributed across finance, politics, intelligence and business, with occasional sacrifices when exposure becomes too costly. Whether or not one accepts the full thesis, the files appear to expose dense interconnections among influential actors across sectors and continents.

Media silence and editorial risk

Rohan highlights a striking disparity in coverage. British outlets such as The Guardian and the BBC prominently feature the story, while major US newspapers appear comparatively restrained. In India and parts of East Asia, coverage is also limited.

Peter attributes this to institutional caution. Large outlets operate within established editorial frameworks and may hesitate to amplify allegations that could disrupt long-standing narratives or implicate powerful interests. The sheer scale of the data also poses practical challenges: responsible verification takes time.

He describes mainstream media as “diffident” and at times “cowardly,” suggesting that some organizations may hope public attention fades before deeper scrutiny becomes unavoidable. Independent platforms, less constrained by legacy structures, have moved more aggressively.

Atomized America and the midterm test

Why, Rohan asks, are Americans not protesting en masse if the files implicate their political class? Peter offers a bleak assessment of civic cohesion: “There is no ordinary American.”  He describes a society fragmented into individualized identities. In his view, cultural and ideological shifts have weakened the capacity for unified moral movements.

As for Trump’s future, Peter is cautious but skeptical. Impeachment appears unlikely, given bipartisan embarrassment and prior failed attempts. However, he predicts political damage. “Most people think he will be humiliated in the midterms,” he says, though what that humiliation would mean in practice remains uncertain.

With both major parties potentially implicated and media institutions hesitant, the Epstein saga may continue to unfold primarily through independent journalism and social media. The files, Peter suggests, are a mirror held up to the structure of power — and the reflection is still coming into focus.

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Under the shadow of economic sanctions imposed by the US and its Western brethren, Venezuela’s oil remained largely buried after nationalization. The country’s oil fields couldn’t be upgraded or developed due to a lack of investment, and whatever could be exploited still couldn’t be sold freely at the best price. The US thus successfully contained Venezuela’s strategic oil wealth, ensuring that no other country could challenge or alter the US’s will.

As if all this were not enough, the US has militarily seized of Venezuela’s oil, effectively turning the country into an oil colony after abducting the intransigent “narcoterrorist” President Nicolás Maduro and either coercing or bribing its remaining ruling leadership into absolute submission.��This is how an empire works.

Asymmetric Western wars

Western wars are always asymmetric in many ways. The unmatched military power and immense resources available to these predominantly Caucasian nations give them a tremendous operational advantage in warfare. Their enormously destructive military technology and ability to strike from a remote safe distance limit their own casualties and material losses to just a fraction of what they inflict on their enemies. Their lineal brotherhood and strategic alliances — which provide a vast pool of military, financial and industrial resources — serve as a powerful force multiplier. Moreover, their tight control over the global economy and financial institutions allows them to influence the official reactions and actions of almost all other countries to their liking. Their highly dominant and sophisticated propaganda machinery shapes the international public opinion in their favor. 

This comprehensive domination enables them to bring war to other people’s homes while their victims cannot retaliate in kind. The best these victimized nations can do out of vengeance and frustration is to carry out occasional bombings and shootings in the homelands of the Western powers. These occasional incidents are dubbed as the most heinous crimes of cowardly terrorism, while the hundreds of thousands of defenseless people killed in other countries by the relentless aerial bombings and missile strikes of Western nations are glorified as acts of valor and heroism.

Western powers wage such imperialist wars repeatedly under various pretexts, many of which are , full of lies, and marked by brazen dishonesty and double standards. They remain unaffected due to their domination over the international order. In the end, they always get away with their illegal and immoral deception and destruction. Their hegemonic wars are deemed just, while any resistance from others is labeled entirely unworthy and immoral. Others are only expected to surrender and accept the will of Western aggressors.��

That is how things have largely been for a long time. 

In a matter of a mere month

After the implementation of US President Donald Trump’s , which caused almost every country except China to fall in line, and the swift and impressive US military operation in Venezuela on January 3 — which even made the Chinese that their People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was lagging far behind — Iran has managed to greatly diminish the US’s larger-than-life image in just one month.��

In the eyes of the world, this marks a sudden decline of the US from the zenith of glory achieved in Venezuela. The mythical and mighty B2 bombers, F35 stealth fighters, Tomahawk missiles, Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs), Patriots, THAAD systems and the Gerald Ford aircraft carrier were all proven ineffective. Trump’s much-trumpeted secret weapon, the “discombobulator,” which he was used in Venezuela, was nowhere to be seen. And the mockery of the Iranian, Russian and Chinese systems couldn’t be made.

The US’s acclaimed air superiority, along with its constant bombing and assassinations, couldn’t break the will of the Iranians. Nor could Western propaganda make pro-US Iranians march on the streets of Tehran. US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s animated bullying and Trump’s cold threats on camera and faceless warnings on didn’t work either. Iran has stayed firm and held on to its tit-for-tat military strategy unwaveringly from day one.

The US arms lobby also found little to celebrate beyond supply orders, as there was nothing mind-boggling about its technological advancements to attract global interest. In contrast, Iran’s unparalleled sacrificial courage and fearless conduct have captured the public imagination. Its sustained and effective has taken the spotlight, sidelining storied Western military technology for the first time in memory.��

Despite tall that the US has decimated Iranian missile capability and decapitated its political and military leadership, there is no let-up in Iran’s retaliatory strikes. There are no signs of the nation weakening, much less surrendering and capitulating.

War of attrition and will to endure

The myth surrounding technology and generalship often falls apart during a war of attrition. Scholarly inquiries such as Canadian historian Cathal Nolan’s dispel the powerful myths of “military genius” and “decisive battles” and rouse us to see that victory is achieved “by grinding rather than genius.” However, the heroic tales of Carthaginian General , King of Sweden , John Churchill, 1st duke of , Holy Roman Emperor , French Emperor , German military commander Helmuth von and even German Dictator are still widely told and believed, especially in military circles. Nolan explains this phenomenon:

Modern wars are won by grinding, not by genius. Strategic depth and resolve is always more important than any commander … Losers of most major wars in modern history lost because they overestimated operational dexterity and failed to overcome the enemy’s strategic depth and capacity for endurance. Winners absorbed defeat after defeat yet kept fighting, overcoming initial surprise, terrible setbacks and the dash and daring of command “genius.” Celebration of genius generals encourages the delusion that modern wars will be short and won quickly, when they are most often long wars of attrition … We might better accept attrition at the start, explain that to those we send to fight, and only choose to fight the wars worth that awful price … With humility and full moral awareness of its terrible costs, if we decide that a war is worth fighting, we should praise attrition more and battle less.

History tells us that there is no quick victory in wars that are fought against ideologically committed and determined nations. We have seen it in our own lifetime in Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan and Yemen. Iran, I believe, will be no different, given its conduct of warfare to date. And, it is not difficult to understand why.

Iran is neither Iraq nor Venezuela; it is neither Libya nor Syria. Iran is Iran, and its national honor and pride came out in its refusal to submit to Western money and military might. Today, it is evident to the whole world that the Iranian leadership, military and society are not corrupt like the Venezuelan government — they cannot be bribed — nor are they cowardly.

One cannot fight for long without absolute clarity and total commitment to one’s beliefs. Against sacrificial courage and an iron will to endure, bombs, missiles, death, destruction, duration, along with petty tariffs, are ultimately insignificant. The Iranian people have demonstrated their ability to withstand the world’s greatest military power. No empire can defeat this spirit. No technological superiority can subdue such people. Resistance is never a rational choice; it is always a moral imperative. Those who lead life pragmatically by calculating the costs and benefits of their decisions and actions can never understand why some people(s) resist against all odds.

Illusion of democracy and distortion of legitimacy

The conceit of politicians and intellectuals in democracies is well known. They strongly believe that only a democratically elected government is legitimate, even if the majority (opposition and abstentions) disapproves of their rulers. They are incapable of understanding that there could be other forms of government, backed by much greater majorities than Western-style democracies, due to the spontaneous convergence of minds shaped by shared ideologies and worldviews. 

This Western prejudice against Iran and its political system might have led Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and their advisers to believe that after decapitation strikes, the Iranian people would overthrow the Islamic Revolutionary regime themselves. Instead, powerful religious and nationalist feelings have rallied them all against the aggressors, making the regime more resolute than ever to take on the US, Israel and their hesitant nonwarring enablers in the Gulf and Europe. 

Emergence of doubt and erosion of morale

Whose wars are the imperialist wars? What if we were to arm all supporters of war — including politicians, generals, industrialists, scientists, intellectuals, journalists and their young sons — and send them to the front lines first, with professional soldiers only taking over afterward? In all likelihood, there probably won’t be any wars because most imperialist wars are their wars. Despite the rich and powerful being the main beneficiaries of national projects, they don’t fight wars. Instead, wars are fought by the young sons of ordinary people, who stand at the broad base of the national pyramid. In the name of the nation, these countless faceless commoners make all the sacrifices in wars they have no control over starting or ending. 

In normal times, when life is comfortable and manageable, soldiers, along with their families and friends, have no doubts. They are co-opted completely by the overwhelming nationalist propaganda and brainwashed thoroughly by the hegemonic nationalist ideology. At the beginning of a war, people rally enthusiastically behind the nation and credulously believe in the judgment of their political masters. 

However, the seemingly solid national consensus begins to fracture when the death toll continues to mount in a war of attrition with no end in sight. Everyone knows that inside the endless truckloads of coffins that arrive neatly wrapped in the national flags lie the mutilated dead bodies of healthy and handsome young men and women whose lives have been cut short, along with their dreams. Against this dreadful and sorrowful reality, no amount of loud and skillful boasting, bravado, slogans and propaganda makes much difference.

Past that point, the same people — civilians and soldiers — now begin to question, doubt, and recognize the unfairness of the world and the unnecessary nature of the wars. Their common sense reveals truths that scholars discern after years of research. 

Scholarly critique of nationalist ideology and wars of choice

Historically speaking, nations as communities did not naturally exist; they were invented. They are the product of mass politics and its accompanying mythology. Irish political scientist and historian Benedict Anderson, therefore, calls them “” in his famous book of the same name. Similarly, US historian Howard Zinn :

Nations are not communities and never have been. The history of any country, presented as the history of a family, conceals fierce conflicts of interest (sometimes exploding, most often repressed) between conquerors and conquered, masters and slaves, capitalists and workers, dominators and dominated in race and sex. 

British-Czech philosopher and social anthropologist Ernest Gellner also that “nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth” invented by nationalism. British historian Eric Hobsbawm that “nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round.” Then, he remarkably sums up the reality of this ideology in just one sentence: “Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not so.”

The problem with nationalism is that it not only seeks to make us believe in falsehoods, but it is an extremely hegemonic and intolerant political ideology. It claims absolute legitimacy and demands total loyalty from individuals it identifies as belonging to a nation. According to  Hobsbawm, nationalism “overrides all other public obligations, and in extreme cases (such as wars) all other obligations of whatever kind.”

On the topic of war, US psychologist Philip Zimbardo offers an interesting, yet often-overlooked, perspective when he , “Most wars are about old men persuading young men to harm and kill other young men like themselves.” In contrast, Nolan’s perspective is more inclusive and collective. He writes:

War remains the most expensive, complex, physically, emotionally and morally demanding enterprise that humans collectively undertake. No great art or music, no cathedral or temple or mosque, no intercontinental transport net or particle collider or space program, no research for a cure for a mass killing disease receives even a fraction of the resources and effort humanity devotes to making war. Or to recovery from war, and to preparations for future wars that are invested over years and even decades of always tentative peace.

And, we never seem to learn:

After every war we also write more heroic poetry and books preaching “the old lie.” We bury the dead while neglecting survivors. We mourn awhile … then write more war songs and speak of “pouring out the sweet red wine of youth” to another generation of boys breathlessly eager for war. We bury more dead, erect more granite statues, and write lists of soon-forgotten foreign place-names scored with acid in brass on stone. We admire oiled images of oafish, mounted generals in silk and lace who led armies to slaughter in endless wars over where to mark off a king’s stone borders. Perhaps most of all, we watch films with reassuring characters and outcomes which glorify war even while supposedly denouncing it.

We do all this without “a critical look at the societies and cultures that produced mass armies and sent them off to fight in faraway fields for causes about which the average soldier knew nothing.”

Humanity’s moral disengagement and characteristic human hypocrisy

Perhaps, the simplest and the best description of the grotesqueness of the Iran war and dispositional “Western hypocrisy,” or rather human hypocrisy, comes from the defense minister of Pakistan, Khawaja Asif, who on X, “The goal of the war seems to have shifted to opening the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before the war.”

Clearly, what is most important is the flow of oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz. Most deplorably, what is totally unimportant is the loss of countless human lives — least of all — and the immeasurable pain and suffering of all. We have just seen it in and are now seeing it in and Iran, too. Greed and power have made us all so dastardly pathetic and morally degenerate that we have lost the precious voice of human conscience completely.��

The disruptive Iran war and its geopolitical repercussions

Among the three geopolitical theaters where the US has established military bases — Europe, the Middle East and the Far East — the Middle East offers the least serious military challenge to the US. This is due to the absence of any great military power, such as Russia or China, there. Nonetheless, Iran has delivered a serious strategic blow to the US’s reputation as the greatest military and economic power in the world when it initiated an unprovoked imperialist war against Iran.

The war in Iran has disrupted the long-held awe associated with US military might, forcing a reconsideration of its ability to impose its will on others. While the US remains the largest economic and military power, retaining its global network of military bases and alliances, the real impact of the Iran War extends beyond material changes. The war has fundamentally altered global perceptions of the US, especially among nations dependent on US support.

In light of Iran’s resolute resistance, no reasonable person can have total trust in the so-called invincible and fabled military might of the US and its ability to protect anyone. Genuine skepticism has replaced the blind faith in the US’s ability to prevail over its enemy, which is militarily capable and determined to fight back. Above all, Iran has shaken the confidence of the US’s allies regarding the security offered by the US. And, in that sense, the global domination of the US is no longer the same as it was before February 28, 2026. 

Although the final word on the Iran war is yet to be written, I must say, it is impossible to believe that there has been no erosion of confidence of its dependent allies in the US, and that there will be no perceptible strategic repercussions. My theoretical understanding and limited foresight point to the following direction the world may take. 

In a rapidly changing world, the US may not have the luxury of time to restore the perception of its military superiority and magical invincibility, even if public memory shortens. Before China could do it, Iran has fundamentally changed the world forever.

The Greenland incident has also changed many things. After the US laid to Greenland, many in Europe and elsewhere, who had previously been vocal about wanting war without the means to fight it, fell silent, believing in the unwavering and formidable support of the US in their wars. European liberals, once too aggressive in their nationalist rhetoric, are more cautious and measured now; they have stopped roaring and begun to meow. And, the Nordic and Baltic nations are now thinking twice before flexing their infantile muscles to fight a great war.

If Greenland had called into question Washington’s reliability, Iran has cast a shadow on its capability. So, what now? Maybe, most US vassals in Europe, the Middle East, the Far East and Oceania will come to their senses. Perhaps, they won’t talk about war. Hopefully, many won’t follow in the footsteps of their domestic fascist competitors. Probably, those in South Asia, Africa and South America who are scrambling and groveling to get some shade under the crowded canopy of the US security umbrella will reconsider and go back to their sensible nonalignment. Possibly, nations will rely on good old diplomacy again, choosing sanity over madness; they will sit around and talk, give and take to resolve contentious issues, and make concessions to buy peace.

It’s easy to talk about war. It’s extremely difficult to fight one, especially a protracted war of attrition. 

Lessons of history and the magical powers of propaganda

I will be pleasantly surprised if the world becomes saner as projected above, perhaps wishfully, after learning lessons from the Iran war. But, I will not be surprised at all if Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci is proven right again, when he perceptively , “History teaches, but has no pupils.”

Throughout history, we have seen that while things may change, nothing actually does. The more things change, the more they stay the same. We know well that the two-and-a-half millennia-old Thucydides’ dictum — propounded in his work — which states that “the strong do what they can; the weak endure what they must,” continues to hold its ground, defying countless resistance struggles waged by the exploited and oppressed people throughout human history.

It is easy to believe that “I am okay, you are not.” It is easy to invent an enemy and sell its imaginary threat as real and imminent to the public. Dangerous enemies have always been there in the world — the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Iraq, Libya, Syria and so on. There are still plenty in our world — communist China, rabid Russia, nihilist North Korea, fundamentalist Iran, racist South Africa, terrorist Afghanistan, Yemen, Cuba, Colombia and more besides. Manufacturing a narrative around these invented enemies is not very difficult.

Propaganda is an organized and sustained misinformation campaign based on certain ideas, beliefs and, above all, lies, carried out for the purposes of capturing, securing or sustaining power. It is a political tool for manufacturing public opinion and rallying people behind a certain idea, ideology or individual. Propaganda tends to monopolize public discourse by discrediting competing narratives, punishing polemics and smothering dissent.

Propaganda has magical powers, and it is a great winner. It is said that a lie can travel halfway around the world before the truth can get its boots on. Imagine the fate of credulous and prejudiced masses with short memories when a million lies are bombarded from all directions and repeated endlessly. It can make them believe in anything. And, our beliefs and imagined realities can make us do and create anything. This fact is encapsulated in what is called . Propounded by US sociologists William and Dorothy Thomas, this theorem states, “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Khonoma is a village of Angami Nagas. The Angamis are a major Naga ethnic group who were the first of the Nagas to come into contact with the British. The Angamis are known for building terraced fields on hill slopes. Like most of Nagaland, most of them are now Christians, the vast majority now belonging to the American Baptist Church.

What I found remarkable, reading Charles’s book, is the success of Khonoma’s reconciliation process among clans and families in the village. Conflict began within the village with the British occupation of Nagaland and the subsequent handover to the Government of India in 1947. Some clans and families accepted British and Indian rule, started working with or in the state apparatus, while others resisted or rebelled. 

Nagas had obtained a promise from the British that their land would become autonomous, but that promise was lost when the Government of India took over. This caused a divide; some Nagas thought that they needed Indian support before they could create their own state and infrastructure, while others believed they should fight for independence from the start. This divide led to violence that engulfed the village. Fast forward to 2000, and over the course of ten years, the Khonoma Public Commission facilitated face-to-face meetings between perpetrators’ families and victims’ families. The reconciliation process addressed 22 of the killings, decades of blood feuds and deep clan divisions, leading to forgiveness, restitution and renewed unity. We asked Charles Chasie what made this possible.

Roberta Campani: Explain the conflict that happened in Khonoma and why this made the reconciliation process necessary? How did it begin? How did it unfold?

Charles Chasie: Khonoma had long been a warrior village whose clans were bound by codes of honor in which the duty of revenge passed down generations without time limit. This tradition of revenge tore apart the very fabric of the Naga national movement. When Angami Zapu Phizo and Theyiechüthie Sakhrie — both from Khonoma, both believers in Naga sovereignty — fell out over means rather than ends, the village found itself at the epicenter of a conflict that was at once political and intensely personal. When Sakhrie was abducted and killed in January 1956, this became the first fratricidal killing of leaders in the Naga national movement history, triggering ancient instincts and splitting the Khonoma into armed camps along clan and khel (cluster of clans) lines.

What followed were years of mutual siege, displacement and accumulating grief. The Indian Army burned Khonoma to the ground more than once. Those who went underground starved in the forests, and those who remained behind faced blockade and harassment. When the fighting subsided, the four khels did not return together but settled in separate locations, living effectively as four villages for nearly a decade. The wounds did not heal with time. It was only when a younger generation, tired of having their elders remind them of hatreds they had not chosen, asked to be given their future back, that the village resolved to face what it had buried.

Roberta Campani: What triggered Khonoma’s need for reconciliation after such a long and bloody conflict?

Charles Chasie: The immediate trigger for reconciliation in Khonoma was a request made by the young men of the village asking the elders to “Give us our future.” In the wake of the Naga National Movement — as the struggle for autonomy/independence from India came to be known — and the resulting division, many intra-village killings had taken place, which continued to poison the life of the village over many decades. Every time the young people wanted to do things together as fellow villagers, they were reminded of old enmities. 

Over time, the young became fed up with this continued bitterness and wanted the elders to heal these divisions. The village elders felt they could not ignore such a request from the younger generations. This led to a three-day seminar on the theme Healing the Soul of Khonoma. This seminar enabled the participants to take a frank look at where the village stood. The areas of division were drawn up, and the young men wrote to the village authorities to help heal these divisions. The authorities set up the Khonoma Public Commission (KPC) to go into each of these divisions with the objective of achieving healing and reconciliation through forgiveness so that the future of the village could be secured.

Roberta Campani: The KPC took on 22 cases of killings, plus numerous other instances of social divisions. What surprised you most about how people responded when they finally sat face-to-face after decades of enmity? Can you describe the process and the reconciliation sessions?

Charles Chasie: We, the members of the KPC, were representing our individual clans as well. We sat down with our clansmen who had either committed or suffered wrongs to hear their stories. In each case of wrongdoing, KPC members would examine the past with the involvement of clan members themselves. In other words, KPC members who met a victim’s family included those who were from the victim’s clan. Likewise, those meeting a perpetrator’s family included KPC members representing the perpetrator’s clan.

The NPC reviewed each case thoroughly, examining the background, the details of the events and the legacy passed down. Where actual perpetrators or victims were no longer alive — in some cases, about half a century had elapsed since the events — the stories relied on the testimonies of women and elders who knew what had happened in the past. In each case, the story would be reviewed minutely with the family concerned. Only with their readiness and full consent would the case be taken to the next step.

The KPC also met and reviewed each case to see if the stories from the two opposing families found commonality. In the event of common ground, expression of genuine sorrow and readiness to forgive, the KPC would proceed to set up meetings of the concerned families for reconciliation. Usually, the KPC would facilitate meetings in the family home of the victim. We prayed together before kicking off such meetings.

When families of victims and perpetrators met, each would tell their side of the story. Often, such a retelling was not necessary, as the KPC members would have informed each party of the other side’s story, and an expression of sorrow was enough. The perpetrator’s family would ask for forgiveness and the victim’s family, in turn, would pronounce forgiveness. The two families would then have a cup of tea together, which symbolized a full and proper reconciliation. In Khnoma’s social code, partaking of food or drinks together for the two families was taboo because of the family feud. A cup of tea in this context means much more than mere tea. In fact, it is an outcome of a peace process and symbolizes the end of a simmering feud.

At such meetings, both families signed a simple written agreement that was drafted by the KPC, declaring an end to the feud and a promise not to raise the issue again. KPC members representing both families/clans would vouch for their family/clan members and bring closure to the feud. Traditionally, one’s word was enough in Naga society. The KPC took the extra step of a written agreement to ensure the peace settlement was binding. We would end the meeting with another prayer together, asking God’s blessings for one another.

The process usually took many meetings, both at the family/clan levels and at the KPC level. Sometimes, the process took several years, especially when the concerned perpetrators/victims were dead and the fog of time had made their stories unclear. Yet what usually stood out in our reconciliation process was that everyone demonstrated goodwill. Once people sat face-to-face, there were usually no surprises, and the final formal act of reconciliation took place smoothly. They usually shook hands. Where those reconciling were Christians, they sometimes exchanged the Bible as well.

The experience was different for each reconciliation. For me, the genuine act of contrition and the deep desire of each family to leave behind a legacy of peace stood out, especially given the fact that these families had done unspeakable things to one another in the past. It took them tremendous courage to squarely confront past facts and painstakingly examine them to ensure a better future freed from the toxic legacies of bygone feuds.

Roberta Campani: You write about how the traditions of Khonoma Village made it almost impossible to reconcile issues such as clan feuds. But you mention other traditions that were helpful and how the KPC drew on these to begin the reconciliation process. What were some of these customs and traditions?

Charles Chasie: Although killings and clan feuds were never reconciled because vengeance was considered a filial duty, the notion of reconciliation always existed in Khonoma. As a community-based society, people in Khonoma practiced forgiveness in daily life. 

In Khonoma, social ostracism instead of laws or the police is the main way norms are enforced. The of being excluded from social, economic and civic life is very real. In the past, such was the high level of trust among the Angami Nagas of Khonoma that homes had no locks on doors, the village had no jails and family granaries were often outside village precincts because there was no fear of theft.

The Angamis lived for their progeny and future generations. The family tree was key, and people did what they could to keep that tree healthy. Angamis would inherit their home and fields from their father, but these were to be held in trust for future generations. The Angamis could not sell them. Villagers could use their homes and fields to make a living and feed their families. There was an expectation from Angami villagers to improve both their homes and their fields for the benefit of their inheritors. This sense of immovable multigenerational property not only gave Khonoma Angamis a sense of belonging but also identity. This strong sense of identity and community made reconciliation possible.

Furthermore, Khonoma Angamis are devout Christians, and religion forms the warp and woof of life. Villagers say the on a daily basis, in which they ask God to forgive their trespasses and promise to “forgive them that trespass against us.” This facilitated reconciliation as well.

In addition to their Christian faith, pre-Christian beliefs helped with reconciliation, too. Khonoma Angamis believe in life after death. Per tradition, those who live a good life are rewarded by becoming shining stars in the night sky. Living a good life has great rewards in the afterlife. So, forgiveness and reconciliation are good deeds. 

In a nutshell, a strong sense of community, the Christian faith and traditional beliefs all helped Khonoma Angamis achieve reconciliation. 

Roberta Campani: Traditional Angami culture required blood vengeance: “life for life” with no time limit. Yet Khonoma villagers broke this cycle. Did Christianity help in breaking this cycle of vengeance, which traditionally had been held to be a sacred duty?

Charles Chasie: It is true that traditionally, vengeance was considered sacred and a filial duty that was passed down the generations from father to son. British colonials compared the Angami blood feuds to Corsican vendettas or worse. 

[Roberta Campani’s Note: The Corsican vendetta was a deeply entrenched tradition of inter-family and inter-clan blood revenge on the island of Corsica, particularly in the 18th and 19th centuries. A killing obligated the victim’s family to kill in return, which would then oblige the other family to do the same, and so on. These cycles could persist for generations and devastate entire communities. The Corsican tradition became so notorious across Europe that the word “vendetta” (originally just the Italian/Corsican word for “revenge”) became synonymous in English with this specific kind of prolonged, hereditary blood feud. By the 19th century, it was a stock reference in European writing — Prosper Mérimée wrote about it and so did Alexandre Dumas — so very much part of the cultural vocabulary of British colonial officers.]

However, it is important to note that reconciliation did exist in Angami culture. It was extremely rare, though, and only occurred after the intervention of a third party, usually after both sides had exhausted themselves! 

As mentioned above, Christianity helped, but so did tradition. At the KPC, we drew on both faith and tradition to end the culture of vendetta.

Roberta Campani: You describe a crucial moment — the village-wide day of silence in August 2004, when even the animals seemed to fall quiet. What shift did that silence cause among the people of Khonoma that made reconciliation possible?

Charles Chasie: “Speak Lord, for Thy Servant Heareth” is the prayer of Samuel in the Bible. There is a certain quality to prayerful, or even reflective, silence that only practitioners understand. Explanations cannot capture the effect of reflective silence to those who do not cultivate the practice. 

In August 2004, we observed a day of silence, and it had a profound effect. “Even the animals seemed to sense something solemn was happening and had fallen quiet,” said one villager after another. 

There were cases of individuals being moved by the silence to put things right in their own lives, things that did not necessarily fall within the mandate of the KPC. For some, it was just a period of quiet repose and nothing more. For others, it was a time to renew their faith. People did not work in the fields, did not talk to strangers and spent time in communion with God. But what seemed clear was that this collective silence set a certain mood in the community, creating an openness where people were willing to do what was right instead of trying to find excuses or justifications for past actions. 

The apology of Sebi Dolie, the eldest son of the Dolie Clain, is a case in point. 

Roberta Campani: Tell us more about Sebi Dolie, an 88-year-old, nearly blind man taking moral responsibility for his clan’s role in the assassination of the legendary leader Theyiechuthie Sakhrie. Sebi’s apology on behalf of his clan was pivotal. What enabled him to do what political leaders often refuse to do?

Charles Chasie: Sebi Dolie’s time of quiet has already been described in the book, Healing the Soul of Khonoma, in his own words. On the morning of the period of silence, Sebi later told a younger friend, when he got up and opened his door, he noticed “the silence and the absence of the pigs, chicken, dogs, etc., usually scavenging for any eatables lying around. He felt goose bumps and his hair standing on end, and he thought God had surely come down to our village today.” With this thought, Sebi went to the nearby church to pray and reflect. He also decided to rededicate his life to God.

The relationship between Sebi’s clan, called Dolie, and the Sakhrie clan had become estranged ever since Theyiechuthie Sakhrie, or T. Sakhrie, was assassinated in January 1956. T. Sakhrie was the general secretary of the Naga National Council (NNC) while Phizo of Dolie clan was the president. The NNC fought for Naga self-determination. Sakhrie was widely acknowledged as the ideologue of the movement, while Phizo was the charismatic figure who managed to establish direct emotional touch with the people. 

Sadly, their beliefs in the means to achieve the Naga goal differed. Sakhrie was a staunch believer in nonviolence, while Phizo was more focused on keeping up the momentum of the Naga struggle by using arms to fight. At a meeting in the village, Phizo described Sakhrie as a hurdle to the Naga goal. Sebi, who had witnessed this as a young man, had felt Phizo had gone too far. When Sakhrie was assassinated by unknown gunmen, people recalled Phizo’s words. Phizo, even as the president of the NNC, failed to own his moral responsibility for Sakhrie’s killing. Sakhrie’s clan had already decided to forgive his killers, but the silence from Phizo and the rest of the Dolie clan prevented proper rapprochement between the two clans. 

Now, fifty years later, as the eldest in the Dolie clan, Sebi felt it was his responsibility to set things right. Note that Khonoma also has the institution of the khel, a cluster of clans, and comprises three khels. At a meeting of their khel, Sebi expressed that he would have felt exactly what the Sakhries had felt all this time. He not only apologized but also asked to be told, in friendship, of any unspoken hurts his clan may have caused. Sitting in the same meeting was the eldest person from the Sakhrie clan, who got up and said, “Sebi, I have to shake your hand. We have stopped thinking your side will say anything like this that you have said today.” 

This magnanimous gesture of shaking hands by the two eldest persons from the embittered clans and khels rolled away years of bitterness. Later, when the eldest person from the Sakhrie clan was asked about the incident, he replied, ��پ��ٳܳ���,” meaning that is exactly what happened.

What may need to be mentioned here is that the matter of Sakhrie’s assassination had also led to the first division among the Naga people and in the NNC. The rapprochement in the matter of Sakhrie’s killing, thus, was not only an inter-clan or intra-village matter but had wider ramifications. Later, Khonoma village put up a stone memorial for Sakhrie in the village, which was unveiled by the president of the Naga Hoho, a federation of Naga tribes from four Indian states, namely Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur and Nagaland, and some parts of Myanmar.   

Roberta Campani: You write that reconciliation worked in Khonoma but has failed elsewhere in Nagaland. What specific conditions or particular choices made Khonoma different?

Charles Chasie: There was nothing especially different about Khonoma except the collective determination of villagers to put the past behind them. Some other villages had also tried reconciliation in their own way, but most had failed. What made Khonoma succeed was that villagers completely rooted out the causes of hate and bitterness so that division and vendetta never reappeared again.

Today, Nagas are devout Christians, and Christianity is all about reconciliation between God and man. Sadly, Christians often have an inadequate understanding of reconciliation. One easy example is the saying, “forgive and forget,” which is often used as a mere punchline. By removing contrition and restitution, which are vital parts of reconciliation, this saying thwarts true reconciliation. For that, there has to be genuine forgiving and a clear sense of being forgiven. If somebody is not sorry, where is the point of forgiveness? 

As Nichaloas Frayling has pointed out, such forgiveness is bad theology and does not happen in real life. People can forgive, but they do not forget. Neither are they meant to. Instead, Frayling recommends “forgive and remember” (pardon and peace) so that the same mistake is not repeated.

Also, quite frequently, many who pray to God do little or nothing to further their own prayers. As I pointed out earlier, the Lord’s Prayer says, “forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us.” If you pray for peace and leave it to God alone, peace will not fall from heaven unless you do your part in putting right the wrong and upholding justice. The difference between Khonoma and other villages is the fact that people here had the courage to face the past and set things right so that future generations will not have to face the same problems again. Thus, a legacy of peace won the day.  

In Khonoma, we experimented with one more step. The people not only reflected upon the mistakes they made, or the wrongs they suffered, but they also reflected on when and how they might have provoked others to do wrongs to them. This exercise in empathy helped the people to walk in the shoes of the other person!   

Roberta Campani: Every conflict feels unique to those who are trapped in it, yet you suggest Khonoma’s experience holds lessons beyond Nagaland. What would you say to communities elsewhere, whether in Northeast India, Myanmar or beyond, who are trapped in cycles of revenge and counter-revenge?

Charles Chasie: True, every conflict is different, as are the cultures of the people who find themselves trapped in various conflicts. This is why we should be very careful about passing quick comments or judgments. But human nature is also the same everywhere. It is only the trappings of modernity or what have you that are different. I must be able to recognize that I have the same abilities to commit the heinous crimes that others have committed. Such realizations should make us humble. For instance, the colonial British came with their canons and ability to kill in great numbers from a distance, behaving as if everything belonged to them. Seeing our spears and daos (machete), they called us “barbaric” because they felt superior.

In the story of the British Empire, colonial forces trampled upon the rights of others and killed large numbers. Our people were killed indiscriminately with no sense of who or what was right or wrong. The of 1879 is a classic example of British oppression. Yet we Nagas have to remember that we have the same human capacity to inflict violence and oppression.

Whether it is Khonoma or Palestine or Ukraine, human suffering is the same. What worked here, I believe, will work elsewhere too. If you are willing to forgive and actually take steps to do so, you may find that your enemy, too, is only human! Sadly, the perspectives we see in the world today are topsy-turvy. People demand respect and subservience from others. The saying that there is enough in the world for everyone’s needs but not for everyone’s greed is almost a cliche, but, unfortunately, too real. It is this lust for revenge, power and greed that we have to avoid.

In the context of reconciliation, Maya Angelou’s message that “history despite its wrenching pain cannot be unlived” is true, but I would add that history faced with courage need not be lived again. This worked for us, the people of Khonoma. I am confident it will work for others, too, who are willing to try it.

I end with a poignant story about a man from Khonoma village, who had decided and even attempted to exact vengeance for his cousin’s killing. After agonizing for many months, he said, “If I can have the courage to kill a man, why can’t I also have the courage to love him enough to make him a different man?” This man then went to his intended victim and asked forgiveness for his bitterness. The two went on to become friends. In a nutshell, attaining the courage to forgive is the challenge for every man of good conscience.

The uniqueness of a grassroots-led reconciliation in Khonoma reconciliation

The Khonoma experience resonates within a broader global tapestry of truth and reconciliation efforts. Similar efforts include South Africa’s landmark Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) under Archbishop Desmond Tutu; Liberia’s post-civil war healing process; Rwanda’s community-based justice system, gacaca; and Colombia’s transitional justice mechanisms. 

Khonoma is unique when it comes to truth and reconciliation efforts because the village relied on a bottom-up, grassroots-led process. In South Africa, the TRC was state-sponsored. Almost all truth and reconciliation have been state-sponsored, even if they have community involvement. Khonoma pioneered a community-driven and a community-led truth and reconciliation process rooted in indigenous social structures. This process relied greatly on both the villagers’ devout Christian faith and intergenerational dialogue.

While national commissions often grapple with political constraints and institutional inertia, Khonoma demonstrates that meaningful reconciliation can emerge organically when ordinary people choose to confront their shared history with honesty and courage. The lessons from Khonoma complement, rather than replace, other frameworks for truth and reconciliation frameworks. In particular, Khonoma offers a model that is replicable in settings where formal institutions are absent or distrusted.

However, for this knowledge to truly serve as a blueprint for others, it must be documented, shared and critically examined alongside similar experiences. We invite other communities — whether in Northeast India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Rwanda, banlieues in France, inner cities in the US and elsewhere — to record their own reconciliation journeys. Are there other villages  —  grey zones, suburbs or any other living communities —  that feel stuck in broken cycles of vengeance or violence? What methods worked, and what failures taught hard lessons? By collecting these stories through interviews, oral histories and community archives, we can build a living repository of peacebuilding wisdom that transcends borders and cultures. 

To the readers of this interview: If your community has walked a similar path, we encourage you to share your experience. Your story may be the catalyst another village needs to find its own way out of the shadow of the past. As Charles Chasie reminds us, “history faced with courage need not be lived again” — but this is only possible if we take the time to listen, learn and pass on what we have learned from the past.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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A distinct identity, not a proxy pawn

The (Anṣār Allāh) are frequently labeled as Iranian proxies, but this characterization oversimplifies their nature. While Tehran has supplied weapons and technical know-how over the years, the Houthis are not a direct military arm of Iran and retain significant autonomy in their decision-making. Researchers that Iran lacks direct control over Houthi behavior, which is shaped by Yemen’s local dynamics as much as by transregional alliances.

Historically, the group emerged in the early 2000s from local grievances in northern Yemen long before any meaningful Iranian support, and its ideology — rooted in Zaydi Shi‘a traditions — differs from the Lebanese or Iraqi militias often described as Tehran’s “proxies.” 

1. Preserving diplomatic gains with Gulf powers

One central reason for the Houthis’ calibrated posture is their quiet diplomatic engagement with Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia. After years of brutal conflict in Yemen, mediated talks — often facilitated by Oman — have created openings for a potential political settlement that could legitimize the Houthis’ control in the north and expand their role in national governance. 

Escalating militarily in a broader regional war could jeopardize these fragile diplomatic advances by provoking Riyadh and its partners, putting at risk the limited détente that has allowed a relative lull in Yemen’s .��

2. Lessons from past military reprisals

Another powerful deterrent has been the memory of punitive strikes on Houthi positions by the US and Israel. During the Gaza conflict and its aftermath, heavy bombardments Houthi infrastructure and leadership, including air strikes that significantly degraded their military capabilities.��

Analysts argue that the Houthis are acutely aware of their limitations against the superior air power of the US and Israeli militaries. They may well fear that renewed escalation on behalf of Iran could invite another round of devastating strikes, further eroding their ability to hold territory and govern effectively. 

3. Economic fragility and domestic priorities

Yemen remains one of the world’s , and Houthi-controlled areas have been economically devastated by years of conflict. The group faces severe budgetary constraints, disrupted port revenues and widespread socioeconomic hardship among its population.��

With many public sector workers unpaid and basic services collapsing, escalating into a full-fledged regional war could inflict catastrophic economic damage on areas under Houthi control, eroding the regime’s legitimacy among its own people.

4. Strategic patience and timing

A recurring theme across expert analyses is that the Houthis may simply be waiting for the right moment to act. Their leadership has suggested readiness, their “fingers are on the trigger,” but stops short of committing to open conflict.

This “strategic patience” could be aimed at preserving military capability for when it matters most — not necessarily in defence of Iran, but to strengthen their bargaining power in any future regional settlement or negotiations over Yemen’s political future. Such a move, analysts suggest, could enhance their leverage at a critical juncture rather than diminish it prematurely.

A broader regional balance

Finally, the Houthis’ caution reflects a broader recalibration of alliances across the Middle East. Even other Iranian-aligned groups in Lebanon and Iraq have shown restraint, balancing ideological solidarity with considerations of domestic stability and geopolitical risk. 

The Houthis’ restraint should not be interpreted simply as indecision or weakness. Instead, it underscores the complex interplay of local interests, diplomatic maneuvering and strategic self-preservation that defines Yemen’s role in a wider regional conflict. As the war evolves, so too might the Houthis’ calculations — but whatever course they take, it will likely be driven first by Yemeni considerations, rather than solely by allegiance to Iran.

[ edited this piece.]

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The document was addressed personally to President Donald J. Trump of the United States, in keeping with what participants described as “standard diplomatic protocol for declarations of this nature,” though no officials could immediately confirm the precedent for that protocol when asked by reporters.

Among those present and signing were Chancellor Friedrich Merz of Germany, Prime Minister Keir Starmer of the United Kingdom, President Emmanuel Macron of France and Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland. Mr. Tusk, who arrived last and signed with what witnesses described as “a certain theatrical flourish,” was referred to throughout the proceedings by an unofficial honorific that spread quickly among the delegations: Polonius. Mr. Tusk was said to be aware of the nickname and to have taken it in good humor, though he declined to comment on whether he found it apt.

Viktor Orbán of Hungary was notably absent. His office issued a brief statement saying he had not been invited, which was confirmed by four officials with direct knowledge of the guest list, all of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to publicly confirm whom they had deliberately not invited.

“We wished to act with all appropriate urgency. This is why, having finalized the text in the final week of March, we waited until today to release it.”

The text of the declaration

The declaration, drafted over approximately four days by a working group of senior legal advisers, runs to slightly under two pages and opens with language that several historians of American constitutional documents described, when reached by telephone, as “familiar.” The full preamble reads as follows:

Excerpt — European Declaration of Independence, April 1, 2026

When in the course of European events it sometimes becomes necessary to think about who we are and how we live (without thinking about who we were in our colonial past) and to break the bonds that prevent us from being separate and equal powers trying to manage the global economy, a decent respect for our somewhat compromised dignity compels us to state the position on which we have hitherto remained silent.

To wit, we proclaim our equal and separate right to declare and wage our own wars in West Asia and elsewhere around the globe, as well as back the genocides of our choice, as befits any independent political entity. We regret any inconvenience this may cause to unfolding events, but we trust that your own precedent that took place 250 years ago will help you understand the urgency of this act.

Furthermore, we assert our sovereign prerogative to impose tariffs of our own devising, to conduct our own trade negotiations with parties of our choosing, and to organize our own security arrangements without prior consultation with or approval from Washington, Mar-a-Lago, or any other executive residence or golf property.

We hold these geopolitical truths to be negotiable, that all blocs are created with overlapping interests, that they are endowed by their treaties with certain inalienable prerogatives, that among these are the right to a unified agricultural subsidy regime, the unimpeded movement of professionals across member-state borders, and the pursuit of a competitive single market.

In testimony whereof, we have caused the seal of the European Union to be affixed to these presents, along with the signatures of such non-EU members as have been graciously permitted to append their names in a supplementary column to the right, formatted, it must be noted, in a slightly smaller font.

Reactions and context

The declaration was the culmination of a process, officials said, set in motion by the expanding scope of the United States-Israeli military campaign against Iran, which has reshaped strategic calculations across the continent. Several leaders, speaking to reporters after the signing, said the document had been in preparation since the final days of March — a timeline that, they were at pains to stress, reflected careful deliberation rather than impulsiveness.

“We did not wish to act in haste,” Ms. von der Leyen said at a brief press conference held in the castle’s Great Hall, beneath what is believed to be a reproduction of a sixteenth-century tapestry. “This is why, having finalized the text in the final week of March, we waited until today to release it.”

She did not elaborate on what had been gained by the intervening days. A spokeswoman later confirmed that the delay had allowed time for the document’s signatories page to be properly typeset.

Mr. Macron, who signed third and paused briefly to recap his pen before handing it to Mr. Starmer, said the choice of Elsinore had been intentional: “There is a question being asked here. It is not unlike another question famously associated with this place. We believe we have answered it.” He did not specify which answer Europe had chosen.

Mr. Merz said the declaration represented “the logical conclusion of a process that began some time ago and has been accelerating in ways that those responsible for accelerating it perhaps did not fully anticipate.” He added that Germany remained committed to dialogue, cooperation, and the rule of international law, and was simply choosing to pursue those commitments independently.

Mr. Starmer, for his part, noted that while the United Kingdom was not an EU member, the spirit of the declaration was one in which Britain could “wholeheartedly share, at least in this particular regard and subject to parliamentary review.” He signed in blue ink. All other signatories used black.

The White House had not responded to a request for comment by the time of publication. A spokesperson for the National Security Council said she was “not aware of any such document” and asked that it be sent over by secure fax.

Historical echoes and practical questions

Scholars of transatlantic relations were divided on the declaration’s legal standing, its diplomatic implications and, more fundamentally, its coherence as a framework for international action. “It’s a gesture,” said one professor of European constitutional law, who asked not to be named because his tenure review is pending. “A significant gesture, but primarily a gesture. The question is whether gestures, when signed at sufficient altitude in a sufficiently old castle, acquire the character of policy.”

Several signatories acknowledged that implementation would require further discussion. A joint working group was announced to address questions including, but not limited to: which wars Europe intended to wage, in what sequence, under whose command and whether a common European war would require a qualified majority in the Council or could proceed under enhanced cooperation. A subcommittee on genocide backing criteria was said to be meeting in Geneva next Thursday, with an indicative agenda circulated but not yet agreed.

Officials confirmed that Mr. Orbán had not been invited specifically because, as one diplomat put it, “the spirit of the declaration is that we are declaring independence, not that we are providing an opportunity to register objections to the concept of independence at length and then block the communiqué.”

“It is not unlike another question famously associated with this place. We believe we have answered it.”

The document ends with a provision — Article VII, Paragraph 3, footnote (b) — specifying that the declaration “shall enter into force upon ratification by the relevant national parliaments, a process estimated to take between eighteen months and the heat death of the current geopolitical order, whichever comes first.”

After the signing, participants repaired to a reception in an adjoining hall, where they were served smørrebrød and a locally produced sparkling wine. Mr. Tusk — Polonius — was seen in conversation with a senior Commission official near a window overlooking the Øresund strait. Asked later what they had discussed, he said: “The view. It is very fine. You can see Sweden from here.”

He paused. “We did not invite Sweden either, but for different reasons.”

The document was to be transmitted to the White House by courier, officials said, with a digital copy sent by encrypted email and a decorative framed version dispatched separately via registered post. It was unclear whether anyone was expected to respond.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The White House had warned that Iranian power plants and energy facilities could be hit if the Strait of Hormuz was not reopened. But by Monday, Trump had paused those strikes after what he called “productive” contacts, even as Iran any talks were taking place. Reuters also that the pause appears to apply only to energy sites, not to wider military targets. That is not a coherent strategy. It is a tactical retreat from one especially dangerous form of escalation.

The limits of military pressure and the tactical retreat

The most telling detail is why Trump pulled back. Reuters also that Gulf Arab states had warned Washington that strikes on Iranian power infrastructure could trigger severe retaliation against energy assets across the Gulf. In other words, the threat to hit power plants did not promise control; it threatened a wider regional breakdown. That matters because it changes how we should understand the original ultimatum. It was not a credible plan for reopening Hormuz. It was a way of shifting pressure away from a military bottleneck and onto civilian systems. When a government cannot quickly solve the problem in the water, it starts looking for leverage on land. Too often, that means ordinary life becomes the battlefield.

That shift should worry anyone who still believes strategy and restraint belong in the same sentence. The Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed, oil is still , and countries like Japan are reserves because the disruption has not ended.

The five-day extension: buying time, not solutions

The five-day extension did not reopen the channel. It bought time in the markets and perhaps time for mediation, but it did not change the underlying fact that the US has not found a workable way to force the strait open without risking . A threat against civilian infrastructure may sound forceful on television, but it does not move mines, widen shipping lanes or create political consent where none exists.

The military problem here is more stubborn than Trump’s rhetoric suggests. Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical , with about 20 million barrels per day of crude and oil products moving through it in 2025, or roughly a quarter of global seaborne oil trade. There are only a limited number of ways around it. That geography is why even some of Washington’s allies have being dragged into a rush to “unblock” it on Trump’s terms.

Allies’ reservations, geographic reality and humanitarian stakes

According to , several allies were unenthusiastic about providing military support, and some conditioned any role on de-escalation rather than war expansion. The problem is not a lack of threats; it is that threats do not solve geography.

This is also where the legal danger becomes impossible to ignore. International humanitarian law attacking or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. That principle matters everywhere, but it carries special weight in the Gulf, where electricity and desalination are not luxuries. They are part of how millions of people get water and keep hospitals, homes and public life functioning.

The EU’s leaders recognized the danger last week when they for a moratorium on strikes against energy and water facilities in the Middle East. That call was not a diplomatic decoration. It was an acknowledgment that this war is edging toward attacks whose civilian consequences cannot be brushed aside as collateral.

Trump’s defenders will argue that the threat worked because it created diplomatic space. Maybe. But even that claim looks thin. Iran publicly denied the existence of direct talks, and Reuters that Tehran has hardened its negotiating position and is demanding far more than Washington appears willing to accept. If so, the five-day pause is less a breakthrough than a holding pattern. It may for a few hours and allow intermediaries to shuttle messages, but it does not settle the central issue. A bluff against power infrastructure is not the same as a maritime solution. It is an attempt to compensate for strategic frustration by raising the civilian stakes.

The drift toward civilian targets and the erosion of strategy

That is what makes this episode larger than one deadline. The real story is not simply that Trump changed 48 hours to five days. It is that the war’s logic has drifted. The pressure is no longer confined to ships, missiles and naval patrols. It is being pushed outward, toward grids, pumps, ports and desalination plants, as if civilian vulnerability can succeed where military coercion has stalled. That is a familiar pattern in modern wars.

When leaders cannot deliver the outcome they promised, they do not always scale back. Sometimes they widen the pain until something breaks. The danger now is that what breaks first will not be the blockade. It will be the line separating war from the deliberate degradation of civilian life.

If the Trump administration were serious about reopening Hormuz, it would be investing its political capital in de-escalation, coalition diplomacy and a realistic assessment of what force can and cannot do in a narrow, mined, heavily exposed waterway. Instead, it flirted with the idea of turning energy and possibly water systems into bargaining chips, then stepped back only after Gulf allies warned that the costs could spiral beyond control. That is not strength; it is an admission that the original approach has failed. And once a war begins leaning on the infrastructure civilians need to live, it is usually a sign not that victory is near, but that strategy is running out.

[ edited this piece.]

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Their significance is linked to that of maritime transport itself, which represents the fundamental bloodstream of global trade. This transport carries of the world’s trade by volume, carrying vital crude oil and other raw materials, semi-processed goods or finished products. As such, it plays a fundamental role within international supply chains.

Different kinds of maritime routes

Maritime routes man-made or natural. Among the first group are the Panama and the Suez canals. Within the second, among others, are the Hormuz, Malacca or Gibraltar straits. In both cases, they represent funnels of high strategic significance. Some more than others, of course. Indeed, according to their strategic importance, they can be divided into primary and secondary chokepoints. The former refers to connectors that, if disrupted, could seriously impair global trade. The latter, on the contrary, represent support maritime passages that entail significant detours in the event of disruption. The best example of a primary chokepoint is the Strait of Hormuz, while the Strait of Taiwan, the Sunda Strait (between the islands of Java and Sumatra) or the Dover Strait are examples of secondary ones.

The top four

The top four maritime routes (or chokepoints) are the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal. The first of them represents the compulsory crossing pathway between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Beyond being a very important merchandise transit route, representing of the global seaborne trade, it is one of the world’s two main energy chokepoints. It is indeed the inescapable transit route for 20 to 21 million barrels of oil per day, representing of global oil consumption and 25% to 30% of global seaborne oil trade. At the same time, it is the passage route for 20% of the global liquified natural gas (LNG) trade. Some of the world’s largest hydrocarbons exporters — Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — rely on this route, as do the largest Asian consumers: China, India, Japan and South Korea.

The connects the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea (in the Pacific Ocean). It is the route through which 30% of global trade and 23.7 million barrels of oil pass daily. This includes two-thirds of China’s trade volume and around 80% of its energy imports. It is between the island of Sumatra (Indonesia) and the Malay Peninsula (Malaysia and Singapore). Around 29% of the global seaborne oil trade passes through the Strait of Malacca. In fact, to reduce its critical reliance on the Strait of Malacca, China has a major energy corridor through Myanmar. A corridor consisting of two parallel pipelines transporting crude oil and natural gas from the Indian Ocean coast of Myanmar to Southwestern China.

The , on its part, connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea, which leads to the Indian Ocean. Between 12% and 15% of worldwide trade and about 30% of global container traffic transits this route. Roughly 9% of the global seaborne oil flows (about 9.2 million oil barrels a day) and 8% of liquified natural gas (LNG) volumes use this route.

The connects the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. About 5% of global marine trade passes through it. Meanwhile, barrels of oil per day pass through this waterway. However, while the Suez Canal allowed for the transit of supertankers of up to 200 thousand tons, the Panama Canal was limited to 65 thousand tons and to a configuration adapted to its particular standards. The so-called Panamax standards. Since 2014, as a result of the expansion of the canal, the standard has applied, substantially increasing both capacity and tonnage — now reaching 120,000 tons.

Other maritime routes

In addition to the aforementioned big four maritime routes, the Cape of Good Hope and the Strait of Magellan must also be mentioned. While the former connects the Atlantic and the Indian oceans at the South of the African continent, the latter links the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans through the Southern seas of South America. The Cape of Good Hope has much greater strategic significance, not only because the economic emergence of China and the Indo-Pacific sphere has enhanced its relevance, but also because the Strait of Magellan has lost much of its significance in the last few decades. This was a result of the 1980s transcontinental , which allowed for the massive transport of containers between the US’s East and West coasts.

However, the Strait of Magellan could have better days ahead if climate change keeps affecting the Panama Canal. Indeed, lack of has hampered canal operations in recent years. In 2023, the El Niño climate phenomenon, which impacted rainfall, caused water levels to plunge in the lakes that feed the canal, leading to a forced reduction in vessel crossings.

Of much relevance, as well, are the Strait of Gibraltar, the Turkish straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles) and the Danish straits (Kattegat and Skagerrak). They respectively connect the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea (through the Sea of Marmara), and the Baltic Sea with the North Sea. 

As a result of global warming, two additional major maritime routes are opening in the Arctic — the North-East route (bordering Canada) and the North-West route (bordering Russia). While they are considered interior waters by both Canada and Russia, the US asserts that they are international straits conferring open transit rights. The US, indeed, both countries’ claims as illegitimate. The geopolitical and economic significance of the Arctic routes may be enormous, as they could represent new active passages between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. This would diminish the geostrategic importance of the Strait of Malacca and, as a consequence, that of Singapore as a maritime hub.

Highly sensitive geopolitical spots

Needless to say, in addition to their economic relevance, or precisely because of it, maritime routes are highly sensitive geopolitical spots. The Suez Canal has a longstanding history in this regard. In 1956, after Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser the canal, an invasion by Britain, France and Israel took place. For several months, the canal remained closed, significantly disrupting global shipping and trade. Ten years later, in 1967, the Suez Canal was again closed, as it became the frontline between the combatant forces of Israel and Egypt, during the . Following the conflict, this waterway remained shut for eight years, adding around 8,000 to 10,000 kilometers to trade shipping routes that depended on the canal.��

At the opposite end of the waterway that connects with the Suez Canal — in the Southern tip of the Red Sea that joins the Indian Ocean — there have also been recent problems. In the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden, the Iranian-backed Houthis of Yemen have been commercial shipping since the end of 2023. This is in retaliation for Israel’s war in Gaza.

Although the Strait of Malacca is not a contentious international spot, its adjacent South China Sea remains one of the world’s most disputed maritime areas. Stepping over the claims of several South East Asian countries, as well as over the normative of the on the Law of the Sea and the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, China asserts its rights over 90% of the South China Sea.

Moreover, in 2010, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi that the sea represented a “core national interest” for his country, while telling his Southeast Asian counterparts at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting that “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.” Additionally, in order to assert control over this waterway, China has built and militarized to the teeth 27 within it.

China’s claims are not only rejected by its South China Sea neighbors but also by the US and a significant part of the international community. The US and many Western nations assert a right of free passage through this sea, challenging China’s claim by periodically sailing its warships through it. Although 80% of China’s crude oil imports and the bulk of its exports sail through this waterway, the same happens to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, it is a vital trade route for the 620 million people who inhabit Southeast Asian countries. A trade of more than takes place annually in those waters, representing more than one-third of the world’s maritime traffic.

The Panama Canal has also become a sensitive geopolitical spot in recent times. By asserting American rights under the Monroe Doctrine, US President Donald Trump has to take it, while forcing Chinese interests out of the canal. Indeed, Hong Kong’s company CK Hutchinson, which controlled two ports within it, was as a result of Washington’s pressure and forced to sell such assets to the American BlackRock group. However, the represented by Trump’s threat of taking possession of the Panama Canal has not disappeared.

Geopolitical significance of the Strait of Hormuz

The previous geopolitical issues provide the background for the current state of belligerence in the Strait of Hormuz. America’s bombardment of Iran, being the result of a war of choice, led to what should have been anticipated — Tehran’s blockade of the strait. This has led to an in oil prices that, amid fluctuations, have reached up to 40% above pre-crisis levels, while halting about 20% of global oil and liquified natural gas flows. This makes the current crisis even worse than the two oil shocks of the 1970s put together.

This situation had its antecedent in the so-called Tanker War of 1984–1988, a critical phase of the , during which both sides targeted oil shipping in the Persian Gulf. As a result of Iraq’s attacks on Iranian oil exports, Iran retaliated by targeting not only Iraqi shipping but also neutral vessels. Over 400 oil tankers and commercial ships were struck during that period, making the targeting of civil shipping a tool of war. More recently, as mentioned before, the Houthis carried out attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, in retaliation for events in Gaza.

Both cases show a worrisome pattern of maritime insecurity. Within it, state and nonstate actors exploit maritime chokepoints to exert pressure on global energy flows as an instrument of war. Maritime routes represent the ideal setting for asymmetric warfare, as they allow for weaker actors to exploit geography, cheaper technology and economic vulnerability to inflict maximum damage. Whereas in sea or on land, narrow paths have always been the perfect spot for the few to successfully confront the many. A good historical example in this regard dates back to 480 BC, when King Leonidas’s 300 Spartan hoplites stopped for several days hundreds of thousands of Persian invaders, at the Pass of .

Current events in the Strait of Hormuz have become a perfect example of both the paramount importance and the extreme vulnerability of maritime routes. Especially so when there are no alternative routes involved, as in this case. Contrary to the closure of the Suez Canal in the 1960s and 1970s, which had an optional, although much longer shipping route around the Southern tip of Africa, the Strait of Hormuz presents no alternative. There is no other waterway, indeed, to go in or out of the Persian Gulf.

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Despite his conviction, Judge Juan Merchan him to an “unconditional discharge” with no consequences like prison, probation or even fines. The judge that this was the “only lawful sentence” that avoided infringing on the authority of the presidency. Had that been Trump’s first encounter with the law (which, of course, it wasn’t), it would have been a stark lesson in impunity.

It’s no surprise then that, in an last year with television journalist Kristen Welker on Meet the Press, when asked about his obligation to uphold the Constitution, Trump responded, “I don’t know.” He also defied a Supreme Court decision that ordered the return of immigrant Kilmar Armando Ábrego García from El Salvador, who had been deported thanks to what the Trump administration termed “an administrative error.” Blaming the deferral of that decision on Attorney General Pam Bondi, the president that he was “not involved in the legality or illegality” of the case.

Despite his seemingly ambivalent feelings in that interview, he has emphatically asserted his position with respect to the law elsewhere, especially when it came to him. For example, on February 16, 2025, he on X, “He who saves his Country does not violate any Law.” Nonetheless, outright violations of the law have been a signature characteristic of his administration writ large.

For example, last March, when Chief Judge James Boasberg ordered the return of planes carrying migrants being deported from the United States to El Salvador’s CECOT prison — which is known for its brutality — Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem the two flights to continue in clear violation of the court order. The Justice Department would subsequently argue in a that the administration hadn’t violated the judge’s order because the flights carrying the migrants were no longer over US territory when the ruling was issued.

In short, although the attitudes of Trump and his administration toward legality have been guided by the belief that their power is in no way meaningfully constrained by the law, it would be a mistake to assume that they’ve governed through lawlessness alone. Focusing solely on lawlessness would minimize the way the president and his administration have simultaneously relied on and weaponized the law itself to legitimize their violence and their violations. They have pursued an America First that has centered on the expansion of executive power and the protection of narrowly defined national interests, while tossing aside human rights and international legal norms.

To fully grasp the depths of the Trump administration’s violence, lawlessness must be examined alongside the strategic use of the law to manufacture a sense of legality and a façade of legal legitimation.

Legalizing boat strikes to “save Americans”

On September 2, 2025, on Trump’s order, US military forces conducted an against a boat that the administration claimed belonged to the Latin American gang Tren de Aragua, which he had previously designated a terrorist organization and described as “narcoterrorists.” Since that first strike in the Caribbean Sea, the US has led 46 subsequent boat in both the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific Ocean, killing 147 people.

Despite legal experts’ view that such strikes are illegal extrajudicial killings, the Trump administration has insisted on their legality. In late November, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth on X that “our current operations in the Caribbean are lawful under both U.S. and international law, with all actions in compliance with the law of armed conflict — and approved by the best military and civilian lawyers, up and down the chain of command.”

The approval Hegseth referred to came in the form of a memorandum from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel. Although that memo has not been made public, sources familiar with its contents report that it frames the strikes as acts of collective self-defense undertaken in the interests of the US and several Latin American countries. The memo also that, because the US is in an armed conflict with the drug cartels, the strikes don’t require Congressional approval, being both in the national interest and sufficiently limited in scope, nature and duration not to qualify as war-making. Experts have that memo in numerous ways; some insist that the legal arguments are not only flawed, but were put together to legitimize a political decision already made by the White House.

In the last quarter-century of the War on Terror, weaponizing the label of terrorism has been repeatedly invoked to justify repressive interventions. As law professor Sirine Sinnar , “Through invoking terrorism, the Trump administration targets its political enemies, pushes an openly racist and xenophobic agenda, and flouts international law more brazenly than its predecessors. But it can do all this so easily because the concept of terrorism has long been selective, political, and racialized, and because Congress and the Supreme Court have largely shielded counterterrorism from accountability.” The designation of individuals as “narcoterrorists” reflects the enduring currency of this post-September 11 framework, demonstrating how the language of terrorism can be redeployed in new contexts through strategically constructed threat narratives.

The spectacle of “American [In]Justice”

In a on January 3, 2026, Trump announced the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores de Maduro, via Operation Absolute Resolve. He accused them of conducting a “campaign of deadly narco-terrorism against the United States and its citizens,” and insisted that “hundreds of thousands — over the years — of Americans died because of him.” Further justifying his capture, Trump also the Venezuelan leader had been sending members of the Tren de Aragua gang to the US to spread drugs and terror.

As it happens, though, not only was there a lack of evidence of that, but the claim wasn’t even mentioned in the Justice Department’s indictment of the Venezuelan president. The Maduros, Trump asserted, would “soon face the full might of American justice and stand trial on American soil.” Despite such a projection of power and the assumed superiority of “American justice,” the Trump administration’s entire governing strategy has proven that just as legality is malleable, so too is justice.

have the Trump administration’s capture of the Maduros as simply lawless, but the administration’s officials didn’t act without considering the law (in their own lawless fashion). They even requested that the Office of Legal Counsel produce an opinion on whether the president could legally direct military forces to support law enforcement in seizing Maduro and bringing him to the US for prosecution — without, of course, any congressional action.

A heavily redacted version of the memo to that, dated December 23, 2025, released on January 13, 2026. It frames the sending of US special forces and air power into the Venezuelan capital of Caracas to capture the Maduros as a law-enforcement action to arrest a fugitive, not a military invasion (despite all the Venezuelans who died). It argues that, because of the limited duration and narrow scope of the operation, the action falls under the president’s constitutional authority and isn’t an act of war that would require congressional authorization. Although the memo did avoid making a definitive argument that the operation didn’t violate international law, it essentially tried to make that determination inconsequential by deeming the actions legal under domestic law.

Performing legality, producing impunity

While the contents of the memo are certainly important, it’s no less critical to understand the purpose and function of such memos to begin with. Like other such “legal” documents, memos from the Office of Legal Counsel are designed to offer a version of “legality” that minimizes scrutiny, enables repetition and contributes to normalizing state violence in its many forms.

Some have the boat strike memos to the torture memos drafted under the administration of former US President George W. Bush. John Yoo, one of the infamous authors of those memos, argued that, for abuse to rise to the level of torture, the result had to be nothing less than organ failure or death. So, consider it ironic that he actually criticized those boat strike memos, despite their similarity to the torture memos’ form of impunity. In fact, when asked if he regretted the decisions he had made, Yoo , “The only thing I regret was just the pressure of time that we had to act under.” But he also added that he “would probably do the same things again.”

Yoo nevertheless expressed skepticism about the Trump administration’s rationale for the boat strikes, saying about those supposed drug boats: “They’re not attacking us because of our foreign policy and our political system…They’re just selling us something that people in America want. We’re just trying to stop them from selling it. That’s traditionally, to me, crime. It’s something that we could never eradicate or end.”

Yoo, of course, neglected to mention that, while justifying the most brutal forms of torture at the Bush administration’s prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and in CIA “black sites” globally, the torture memos provided impunity for anyone involved in creating that torture regime in the wake of the September 11 attacks. And no court ever formally ruled those memos illegal, while Yoo, like all the other Bush administration officials involved in sanctioning the torture apparatus, never faced the slightest accountability.

Even when a report on those memos was released by the Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility in 2009, recommending that Yoo and an associate of his be disciplined, it was by Associate Deputy Attorney General David Margolis. He viewed the memos as resulting from poor decision-making rather than unethical behavior. Like the torture memos, then, the boat strike memos are meant to offer a façade of legality, while ensuring impunity.

Yoo’s critique also conveniently overlooks that legal memoranda like the torture memos don’t just interpret the law. Instead, they offer a threatening “legal” reality to justify certain all-too-grim interventions. Under the Bush administration, this included the denial of Geneva Convention protections based on the argument that the US was fighting a new kind of war with non-state actors who don’t abide by the laws of war. According to their logic, if the enemy does not follow the laws of war, the US is not required to extend full protection. This discursive was used to disregard the fact that adherence to Geneva protections is non-reciprocal.

Those memos also exploit perceived gaps in existing legal frameworks to manufacture ambiguity, while, above all, staging a performance of legality. Like the torture memos, the memo authorizing Maduro’s capture was designed to be a buffer against legal, political or diplomatic challenges, minimizing the vulnerability of the Trump administration to judicial scrutiny and congressional action.

In his Érudit , “Citizen in Exception: Omar Khadr and the Performative Gap in the Law,” author Matt Jones writes about the consequences of such performances of legality. He argues that “the law’s reliance on continual performance interventions means that gaps in the law may in fact become enshrined in law if a given authority, such as a judge, recognizes them as legitimate within the jurisprudential history of past performances.” In other words, challenging state actions as illegal, whether the conduct occurred as a result of sheer lawlessness or unsound legal rationales, can actually end up rendering the behavior legal.

Legal rationales like those provided in the torture memos also offer an administration the opportunity to act as if its behavior were legal. As Jones , when it came to Guantanamo Bay, for example, “the Bush administration’s creative interpretation of the law allowed them to operate ‘as if’ their behavior were legal, knowing that, by the time the law’s reality caught up, the strategic tasks they wanted accomplished in Guantanamo would have long been completed.”

To this day, Guantanamo Bay remains open and there has never been the slightest accountability for anyone involved in past crimes there or the indefinite institutionalization of that infrastructure of state violence.

The architecture of hyper-legality and the law’s double-edged sword

To understand why the Trump administration has not always chosen to completely violate or disregard the law, it’s useful to consider the concept of hyper-legalism. In her , “International Refugee Law, ‘Hyper-Legalism’ and Migration Management: The Pacific Solution,” author Claire Inder, special assistant to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, suggests that hyper-legalism “implies a commitment to lawfulness and rule-following, with an underlying disingenuousness in the understanding of ‘legality.’ It suggests that the applicability of the rules themselves is infinitely malleable by the actor purporting to comply.”

Although Inder focuses on refugee law, hyper-legalism’s relevance to a broader spectrum of governing policies is clear when it comes to Trump and his administration, where a performance of legality has often been considered sufficient to allow them to pursue their ultimate objective of justifying whatever intervention they may deem necessary. However, that doesn’t mean that Trump and members of his administration don’t understand the limits of hyper-legalism.

As Daniel Ghezelbash, director of the Kaldor Center for International Refugee Law, has , some actions are so egregious under international law that no amount of formalistic sophistry can legitimize them. And when that’s the case, states can resort to obfuscation as a tactic. “Obfuscation,” as he puts it, “is achieved through secrecy about what actions the government is taking and deliberate silence as to the purported legal justifications.”

The Trump administration’s refusal to release the Office of Legal Counsel memo that has provided it with supposed legal cover for those boat strikes in the Caribbean and the Pacific is emblematic of hyper-legalism and its limits. More broadly, the fact that its officials are using the law to justify egregious conduct while rejecting any semblance of transparency makes such legal arguments difficult, if not impossible, to challenge in the immediate moment. That, in turn, risks the further institutionalization of sanctioned violence, while, of course, providing legal rationales for future acts of state violence.

In his article, “,” legal scholar Nasser Hussain questions common assumptions about the operation of emergency laws and the idea that the measures implemented are temporary deviations from the norm. Although he focuses on the United Kingdom, his analysis is distinctly relevant to Trump’s America. He argues that antiterrorism legislation in Great Britain hasn’t just functioned as a short-term, reactive response to crisis, but has produced structural and enduring transformations in the legal order.

And that’s just what’s now happening in the US. The latest “emergency laws” and defenses of exceptional interventions are helping to create legal frameworks and blueprints that will, in the future, only strengthen and entrench the ability of the state to enact egregious violence. In short, while the violence of the Trump administration may seem exceptional, the historical trajectory of the War on Terror should be a reminder that what we are witnessing isn’t new and isn’t likely to disappear in the future.

In analyzing the Trump administration’s governing strategy, it’s important to remember that, as Hussain , “the rule of law is and has always been capable of accommodating a range of repressive but legal measures.” In other words, even as the Trump administration’s remarkable disregard for the law in so many cases poses urgent challenges, the malleability of the law, as demonstrated throughout the history of the US, should offer a warning against the seemingly commonsensical response of simply instituting more rules, regulations, conventions and laws. After all, the law’s primary function is to preserve the state, not deliver justice.

All too often, the law operates as a double-edged sword: It can secure rights and constrain power, but it can also legitimize repression, exclusion and harm. Our task, then, is to understand how to wield the law strategically to challenge the violence and power of the state, and to demand justice and accountability.

Whether the Trump administration cloaks its actions in legal rationales or disregards legality altogether, communities at home and abroad continue to resist. Recognizing that the law alone will not save us is not a call to despair but a call to organize and build our power. Because nothing has ever altered the course of injustice except the organized power of the people — and nothing else ever will.

[ first published this piece.]

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Of course, such personal exposure inevitably brings both insights largely inaccessible to foreigners and also potential biases. Such biases are not necessarily problematic but merely reflect the fact that personal exposure is likely to add to an outsider’s knowledge and also modify their understanding of why they are as they are and see the world as they do. Gaining such cultural insights greatly aids communication. Of course, acquiring such insights by “” is not the same as necessarily agreeing with whatever is revealed. I was a kind of opportunist “barefoot ethnographer,” a participant observer, not a “disciple.”

Nevertheless, with this unusual level of access and understanding over such a long period, I confess to having become somewhat conflicted — the more so over recent years since President Donald Trump first came to power in the US in January 2017 and took a decidedly aggressive stance against Iran, and his subsequent unrestrained joint military attacks with Israel on Iran in 2025 and 2026. On the one hand, who would not want a freer, unrepressed and more prosperous life for Iran’s 94 million population and both national and regional security and peace for all nations in the Middle East (including Iran and Israel)? But, on the other hand, has the increasing belligerence of Israel and the US towards Iran, culminating in their joint unprovoked mass bombing of Iran in February and March 2026 (an undeclared but de facto imposed war) delivered — or ever likely to — those desirable objectives?

Iranians are conflicted

Having endured decades of imposed wars, international sanctions, economic decimation, pariah status, great hardship, authoritarian government and a suffocating lack of personal freedom, those still in Iran desperately crave a normal, safe, peaceful and hopeful life for themselves and their families. But, does the recent US and Israeli military onslaught against Iran really herald such a change, or is it fools’ gold offered by devils-in-disguise?

The present Iranian population, inside and outside Iran, is very conflicted. Some of their reasons are broadly similar to my own, outlined above. In addition, most Iranians, including, I would gauge, a majority of those thirsting for a change of governance, are also angered not only by being relentlessly bombed but also by the sheer “might is right” arrogance and the megalomaniacal and bloodthirsty anti-Iranian rhetoric and vilification emanating from Trump, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and others in the White House coterie. The Times, noted for its right-leaning pro-US editorial worldview, ran a on America’s Iran War, which noted that Trump’s White House had twisted British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s famous maxim that “Jaw, jaw is better than war, war” to now mean “Jaw, jaw is better for war, war.” Providing copious examples of quotes by Hegseth, Trump and others, the article opined, “You’d be forgiven for thinking that Donald Trump and his staff’s salvoes were culled from a Bond villain.” More on Team Trump’s psycho-dramatics later.

A profile of Iran’s population

The Iranian population today comprises three discernible main worldview groupings. Group 1 are ultra-conservative die-hard Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) regime supporters. One subgroup, amounting in total to some 10% of the adult population, incorporates the vast majority of state and municipal officials, judiciary, senior and middle-ranking military officers, most of the Shia clergy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including their Baseej enforcers. In addition, a larger subgroup includes the relatively uneducated and conservative masses in low-income jobs. The latter sub-group is estimated to be some 20% of the adult population. Following the targeted killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini by US-Israeli bombing on February 28, 2026, vast celebrated the succession of his son, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khameini, as Iran’s Supreme Leader on March 9, 2026.

Group 2 comprises well-educated, Western-oriented 18–35-year-olds, typically living in the Tehran-Karaj conurbation of some 12 million people or in other large cities across the country. This group, which accounts for an estimated 40% of the adult population, are desperate for substantive liberal change in Iran’s governance, economic reform and rapprochement with the US. They have provided the majority of street protesters against the IRI regime. These have been going on for several years, during which large numbers of protesters have been killed or wounded on the streets by armed IRGC/Baseej forces, or have been jailed, and some even executed. Reported beatings, torture, sexual assault and even murder of arrested protesters are legion. The most egregious period of regime crackdown so far has been over several weeks from December 2025 to February 2026, when many thousands of protesters were reportedly .

Group 3, amounting to an estimated 30% of the adult population, comprises over 35-year-olds with rents, mortgages and families to provide for or elderly parents to look after in an ongoing hyperinflationary economy, all of whom value safety and economic and political stability. These include large numbers of middle-aged veterans of the 1979 Revolution and Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) who survived firstly the hardships and privations of that era and then the decades of Western economic sanctions up to the present. Most of this group, while fed up with years of international sanctions, chronic corruption and economic mismanagement, and yearning for change, veer away from actively deposing the IRI regime unless it is done by nonviolent means and does not involve interference from external forces or interests. Like Group 2, they would greatly welcome a change to a liberal, competent and noncorrupt regime, but not by their openly challenging the IRI regime or engaging in its violent overthrow.

Why aren’t Iranians rising to depose the IRI regime?

As if to demonstrate the Trump regime’s appalling ignorance of Iran’s long history and its contemporary reality, in the days before the US and Israel’s joint blitzkrieg on Iran started in February 2026 and while bilateral negotiations between Iran and Washington were still proceeding, Trump’s Special Envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, made an astonishing . With a puzzled facial expression and language, he said that the President was “curious” as to why Iran was “not capitulating” to his demands to give up immediately and cease forever all nuclear ambitions and activities (military and civil) and cease backing and using armed proxies to terrorise the region, while having to accept that all US economic sanctions against Iran would remain in place. Or else!!

Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi gave his own succinct and telling : “Curious to know why we do not capitulate? Because we are IRANIAN.” In other words, Trump and Witkoff appeared unaware of a core national characteristic of the cultural and psychological makeup of Iranians, namely an absolute resistance to foreign threats and bullying or any kind of attack on their national identity, sovereignty, territory and self-determination. Such national pride, patriotism and “unto death” stoic resistance served them well during the eight years of the Iraqi-imposed Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) in which Iraq was backed and armed by the US and other Western countries.

With vastly superior military equipment and US backing, Saddam Hussein said he expected to win this war in a few weeks or months, but after eight years, he had to concede a stalemate ceasefire. The same stoic and tough resistance has characterized Iran’s response to subsequent decades of increasingly harsh international economic sanctions, largely orchestrated by the US. With a 7,000-year history and national survival of Persia ingrained in their culture, today’s Iranians are unlikely to be impressed or swayed by the threats, swagger or attacks (military or economic) from the 250-year-old neophyte USA. Defiance and resistance will be their defining response.

The common reaction to Witkoff’s and Trump’s puzzlement, from the bevvy of seasoned political analysts, historians, Iran watchers, journalists, etc. (e.g., ), was one of initial incredulity at the breathtaking ignorance and naivety of these two most senior representatives of the US government regarding Iran’s history and US–Iran relations. This was then quickly followed by unrestrained guffaws at such an embarrassing display.

Further embarrassing puzzlement has been expressed by Trump and White House grandees about why the Iranian population has not heeded to rise up and sweep away the IRI regime. In addition to the police, the IRI regime has established an extremely well-organized, well-armed and ruthless internal security system (IRGC plus Baseej militias) to keep the population in line. In contrast, anti-regime protesters and the general population are unarmed, unorganized and lacking in any identifiable national or even local leaders. It is amazing that so many unarmed protesters have nonetheless persisted in challenging the IRI regime for so many years. Many have already paid the price with their lives or serious injury, but to seek to overthrow the regime by force without any weaponry or organization would be doubtless suicide.

In addition, as outlined above, most of the estimated 70% of the adult population who want regime change shy away from engaging in violent overthrow or else recognize its futility without leadership, organization and weaponry. The detailed analysis of the thirst inside Iran for regime change, and the percentage likelihoods of the various scenarios for it happening, provided by my colleague James Denton’s 51�Թ� article in early 2023, is still highly relevant. 

In addition, when Iranians hear Trump imploring them to rise up and overthrow the IRI regime, they scoff cynically at the notion that he would ever provide them with any tangible assistance to achieve such an outcome. Even in Trump’s first presidency, he and his then White House team were keen on regime change in Iran. As I wrote in 2018 (pages 234-235) in a on The Alt-Right Anti-Iran Project, “they envisaged this resulting from a popular uprising inside Iran” but failed to understand that, just as when US-backed Saddam Hussein launched his unprovoked war on Iran in 1980, the whole population including those disaffected by the IRI regime responded with zeereh parcham (rally to the flag) patriotism. 

As recently as January 2026, the US Department of Defense (unofficially now Department of War) issued a new National Defense Strategy , which contains (paragraph 2) the following statement: The Department will “no longer be distracted by interventions, endless wars, regime change and nation building.” Iranians ask themselves why, in less than two months, Trump has radically changed his mind, or was this new doctrine intentionally a complete fiction?

Iranians also vividly remember US President George H.W.Bush in 1991, the Iraqi population to rise up against Saddam Hussein with implied promises of US military assistance. No such help materialized, and the Iraqi Marsh Arabs, Shia anti-Ba’athist insurrectionists in Najaf and Karbala, and Kurds in northern Iraq, in particular, suffered . Iranians today take full note of how glib and duplicitous US Presidents can be in sacrificing foreign populations from the safety of the White House. It is unsurprising, then, that they would not be persuaded by Trump’s implied but doubtful promises of practical assistance to overthrow the IRI regime. 

Lack of a credible leader

What about the lack of any political group or popular leader in Iran who could replace the Islamic regime and its Supreme Leader? It is unsurprising that any potential contenders fail to make themselves known, since to do so would invite rapid detention or elimination by the current regime. 

Ah, but have no fear, there is surely a ready-made leader-in-waiting in the person of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, son of the last Shah, who has been living in comfortable exile in the USA for much of the time since 1979. He was then still in his teens. He has never held any government office or responsibility, but has established a and well-oiled publicity campaign for his return to Iran as the next Shah. The campaign has essentially been to reestablish the Pahlavi monarchy and to reintroduce an imperial style of semi-feudal governance like his father’s. More recently, perhaps sensing such an outdated model just won’t fly with Iran’s population today, he has raised the possibility of his returning as a constitutional figurehead monarch “at an appropriate time.”

Crown Prince Reza appeals mainly to older Iranians, those old enough to remember the Pahlavi era before 1979. These are mainly Iranian emigrés abroad and a minority inside Iran who hanker after the pre-Revolution days. Although Reza is well educated, articulate and charming and receives much publicity and airtime in the West, his prospectus suffers from a number of handicaps. 

The outdated “reprise model” of his father’s pre-Revolutionary era is one handicap. Others include his lack of government experience and, apparently, a poor intellectual grasp of the extent and depth of state governance requirements for such a strategically pivotal country as Iran. However, perhaps the most damning criticism is a lack of self-awareness of his controversial personal attitude and conduct in public. In recent years, he has made no secret of his keenness for a post-IRI Iran to return to strong and friendly relations with Israel, which existed during his father’s reign.

While such sentiments are perhaps not in themselves outrageous, unverified videos and photos from 2023 of the Crown Prince and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with arms round each other’s shoulders and beaming faces (since deleted from internet sources), and Reza socializing with Israeli politicos and “big shots” in a Tel Aviv , have been received very badly among Iranians generally. Such behavior demonstrates a shallow regard for the sensitivities of the Iranian people and a preparedness to engage in what many see as inappropriate collaboration with Iran’s sworn enemy.

Even President Trump, while not unfriendly towards Reza Pahlavi and offering him words of encouragement and photo opportunities, has nevertheless that he does not regard the Crown Prince as a credible new leader for a post-IRI Iran. 

MAGA President Bluto Knuckledragger rules the world

“My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings. Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair.” This famous from Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poem in 1818 about the Egyptian pharaonic ruler Ramses II (Ozymandias in Greek) was intended not to idolize the greatness of Ozymandias but rather to warn of the vulnerability of leaders with inflated and narcissistic egos to unnoticed context changes over time and unforeseen developments and events that they cannot control.

Unsurprisingly, President Trump is widely thought of as an Ozymandias figure, given his unrelenting penchant for uttering grandiose and bombastic statements about his own superlative greatness and achievements, contrasted with equally bombastic assertions about the alleged worthlessness or bad character of — well — just about anyone and everyone, from foreign leaders, US politicians, judges, corporate leaders, dignitaries, celebrities, sports stars, film stars, pop stars, religious leaders, journalists, ethnic groups, non-Judeo-Christian religions, particular nationalities, disabled people, refugees etc.

Even a small fraction of such insults and invective would be unbecoming, unprofessional and unacceptable from any person holding even a minor position of responsibility or authority, let alone a President of the US. But, clearly, the Bluto Knuckledragger (the main antagonist of Popeye) personality of this King Ozymandias could not care less.

Trump’s vast array of pet hates, targets for disparaging remarks and petulant Executive Orders naturally includes anyone who dares to disagree with, contradict or challenge him in any way, or simply stand their ground on what they regard as their own national best interests. So, unsurprisingly, Iran has long been a candidate for his angry invective, petulance and threats, culminating in his 2025 military strikes and current 2026 Operation Epic Fury, otherwise known as the War on Iran.

In the past ten years, there have been many published analyses and commentaries on the source of Trump’s often bizarre emotions and behaviour. For example, Professor Tim Wilson’s in 2026 on Trump as a dangerous liability suggests that his childlike tantrums stem from an arrested development, whereby his adult personality is locked into a permanent state of infantile perception, attitude and behavior. 

The Dangerous Charisma by Professor Jerrold Post, psychiatrist and political psychologist, examines the psychopathology of Trump and his followers, which is highly relevant to his wide-ranging neoimperialist aggression, unsupported territorial claims and bullying against several countries, mainly traditional allies of the US. Most countries trading with the US have also capitulated to his bizarre aggression. Countries (e.g., Canada, Greenland, Denmark, Panama) confronted by his potential land-grab rhetoric are still attempting to negotiate a way out. Venezuela’s historically anti-US authoritarian dictatorship has been left in power following the US short-lived invasion, the extraordinary rendition of President Nicolas Maduro to await trial in the USA and the US effectively taking control of Venezuela’s vast oil industry. Meanwhile, Trump has now an oil blockade of Cuba and threatened to end its 67-year-old communist regime.

However, confronted by an Iran that is not just uncooperative, resistant and noncompliant to US demands but also steadfastly defiant, Trump’s narcissism, delusional paranoia, and fragile and easily wounded ego finally responded in 2025 to Netanyahu’s persistent urging for the US to join Israel in a massive unprovoked and on Iran’s nuclear and other facilities in June 2025 (the Twelve Day War). The further unprovoked preemptive attack in February 2026, but on a much larger scale (Operation Epic Fury), is still ongoing. However, Trump’s apparent ignorance about Iran and its post-World War II history, his lack of grasp of military matters (or perhaps his deliberate dismissal of good advice from the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]), his inadequate war planning, his frequent and often contradictory changing and expansion of the war’s objectives, and contradictory statements from Trump and his Cabinet colleagues have been .

Also characteristically, Trump has continued with his narcissistic, grandiose hyperbole regarding the current war on Iran. Almost every day, he has issued formal statements in such language, or similar statements on his Truth Social online platform or at press conferences or public events, for example, , and his triumphant, if premature, claim “We won! We won!” on . Trump also appears to be unconcerned when US or Israeli missiles inflict mass civilian casualties on Iran’s cities (e.g., a in Minab). At a Republican conference, he even gloated in “gallows humor” style over the death of nearly 100 sailors when, without warning, the US sank an Iranian warship in open waters off Sri Lanka, some 3,400 kilometers from Iran, with a smirk, “It’s more fun to sink ‘em” than to capture them.

But what about all the sycophants and “yes men and women” that Trump has surrounded himself with as his White House Cabinet and entourage? These, too, fall under the scope of Jerrold Post’s political psychological assessment. Two top officials in particular evidently share Trump’s penchant for displaying a narcissistic, aggressive, bullying, self-congratulatory style: Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who has unilaterally and without Congressional approval retitled his post to that of Secretary of War. 

The armchair comic book warriors

Hegseth has been especially vocal about the Iran War, giving regular briefings extolling the US’s military supremacy, predicting a quick and overwhelming victory, and dismissing Iran’s military capabilities with contempt. In many ways, Hegseth’s wild anti-Iran has far upstaged that of Trump. For example:

“They are toast, and they know it.”

“We will hunt you down without apology and without hesitation, and we will kill you”.

“This was never meant to be a fair fight; we are punching them while they are down, as it should be”.

The Iranian leaders are “rats in hiding,” and the newly elected Supreme Leader has been “disfigured” by US/Israeli bombing.

On day 13 of Operation Epic Fury, gave a lengthy one-man public statement and press briefing on the war’s progress, seeking to convince an increasingly skeptical American public that early victory was assured with a complete annihilation and capitulation of Iran, and to soothe domestic and global anxieties and markets about growing economic damage. Reaction inside the US and globally has been cool and largely unconvinced.

It is not just Hegseth’s self-aggrandizing, triumphalist language, his repeated exaggerated assertions of Iran’s crushing imminent defeat (now stretched already from one week to four–six weeks or longer) and his bloodthirsty, undiplomatic words that cause increasing skepticism and alarm. Just as telling are his physical presentation, body language and stage performance.

Hegseth always appears immaculate and well-groomed, perhaps reflecting his grounding as a Fox News TV presenter. Although this may be a potential advantage for audience acceptability, in his case, it seems excessive. Rather than cutting the gravitas figure of a cabinet secretary, his square-jawed, clean-cut, lightly tanned, play boy visage makes him look much more like a telegenic model for TV adverts for male grooming products, toothpaste or tanning lotion. Add to this his uncontrolled habit of looking overly earnest and sincere, his dramatic turns of phrase, his dogmatic assertions, his aggressive evangelical delivery and his constant emphatic hand gestures, and he falls naturally into the genre of crusading “hard sell” politico-religious televangelists so popular in the US.

Another unmistakable trait is Hegseth’s barely suppressed, constant bubbling anger. This anger seems to be caused by deep frustrations, particularly relating to his strongly held Christian fundamentalist beliefs and agenda (set out in his book of that name) that he would like to see fulfilled, but which so far seems to elude him. His on this issue involves his seeking to impose on the Pentagon an “onward Christian soldiers” culture that normalizes exclusively Christian ideology and language from a bygone era and sanctifies using America’s military might to achieve notionally superior Christian subjugation or elimination of non-Judeo-Christian religions and nations. The US war program against Iran, which started in 2025, has become Hegseth’s major launch pad for his and fixation to ensure a Messianic return, a second coming of Christ, through declared US supremacy and, as necessary, intimidation, conquest and subjugation of “the other.”

His ethnocentrist, religiocentrist and politically partisan superiority beliefs, agenda and actions also apply to the US Military and the US population overall. This directly rejects the equal rights of all citizens guaranteed by the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution. Hegseth’s White House Colleagues, President Trump, the Republican Party and many of their supporters have raised no complaints or objections about this flagrant rejection of the Constitution that Trump and all his Cabinet have sworn under oath to uphold.

For Hegseth, his knowledge of the history of Iran and its relationship with the US appears to start with the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the “evil Ayatollahs.” No apparent recognition of the CIA’s orchestration (with British involvement) of the against the Shah’s Prime Minister Dr Mohammad Mossadegh, which relegated the Shah to the role of Washington’s puppet — and sowed the seeds of the 1979 Revolution. As the distinguished has put it, “The coup revealed America’s influence and malevolent ambitions in Iran. The immense sense of betrayal that was felt – and cultivated for later generations.”

Deep mistrust of the US government stemming from the 1953 coup continues today, seared into the psyche of every Iranian, and accentuated by Trump’s that any new national political leader of Iran must meet his approval. Trump, the suzerain imperator, sees Iran’s future only as a US vassal state, and Hegseth seeks to oblige.

Hegseth exudes a juvenile, immature attitude towards governance, international affairs, international conflict and the prosecution of war. His gung-ho jingoistic fervor for battle whenever he addresses audiences betrays the excitement of a 13-year-old armchair “warrior” getting carried away reading Captain America comic books or playing video war games. His vicarious “fantasy hero” exposure to battle avoids him ever being in harm’s way, unlike all the American service personnel sent into the Iran War theater.

Vance also shares Hegseth’s barely suppressed bubbling anger. He rarely smiles and always looks possessed by inner demons and ready to explode. His outrageous televised against Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskiyy (a US ally) in the latter’s White House meeting with President Trump on February 28, 2025, with Trump and others egging him on, will surely go down in history as the most disgraceful display of undiplomatic bullying in modern times.

While less vocal than Hegseth on the Iran War, by Vance’s rhetoric and published , he nonetheless shares Hegseth’s militant worldview on Christian fundamentalist supremacy and the importance of the US government imposing this on its own population and the rest of the world. He is reportedly a supporter of the , namely that the state should actively advance Christian supremacy in US society via control of seven key spheres: government, religion, education, family, business, media, arts and entertainment.

Unlike Hegseth, who possesses a very high degree of certitude about his identity and divinely ordained Christian mission, Vance appears conflicted and unhappy with his identity. Born James David Bowman, he first changed his name in 1990–91 to JD Hamel and then again to JD Vance in 2013. It is rare for males to change their surname, although his first surname change appears to have a reasonable justification. However, more than one surname change is extremely rare. There is speculation that he may suffer from some kind of narcissistic delusion of grandeur condition that drives him towards gaining enhanced public and political approval and adulation by reinventing his name to something more memorable, attractive and high-powered.

Hubris, delusion and the illusion of total victory

As many seasoned military and statecraft experts and observers have noted, all the hyperbolic US triumphalism spewing out daily from King Osymandias’s White House regarding a total Iranian defeat may be a tad premature on several major counts.

Beware hubris. The US has failed repetitively to learn from its past strategic mistakes overseas regarding inflated false assumptions that its undoubted massive military superiority alone will guarantee total victory in all respects, e.g., the Vietnam War, Iraq Wars and Afghan debacle. Unleashing overwhelming military firepower may succeed in causing a target country great loss of life, economic and material damage, and even capitulation, but military victory alone cannot win hearts and minds or guarantee long-lasting peace. Total victory also requires ensuring that a defeated enemy retains sovereignty, builds stable governance, rebuilds a strong economy, ensures political and religious freedoms and human rights, and stays at peace with other countries.

When it comes to Iran, the Trump White House has failed miserably to acknowledge the old maxim “know your enemy but know yourself better.” The limited individual and collective self-awareness displayed has been as pitiful as their knowledge and awareness of the Middle East in general and Iran specifically. 

Destructive, damaged personalities and pathological traits also seem to pervade the Trump White House and negatively influence US policy towards Iran. Large-scale field and clinical studies (e.g., Fritzon, Brooks et al, ; and , pages 295–325 and 327–365) have revealed that compared to a normative expectation of some 3% of the general population exhibiting clinically raised levels of psychopathy, when it comes to boardrooms and similar power centers, the prevalence rises to 20%. Could it be even higher among the Trump White House Cabinet and entourage? And, what about the governing groups in Iran and Israel? Perhaps all countries should conduct “due diligence” clinical psychological evaluation of political leaders, just as is often already standard for police and military personnel. Such screening might then encourage “Jaw, jaw” rather than “War, war.”

Perhaps soon the long-suffering Iranian people might finally be able to chant with confidence the Persian New Year invocation “Sad saal beh, az in saalha” — (May the next) one hundred years (be) better than these years.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Although President Trump ultimately cooled his interest in acquiring European territory, Europe briefly faced a dire situation: For many staunch Atlanticists, the prospect of defending themselves against a US military land grab signaled the end of an era. Following the shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Europe now finds itself caught between an aggressive Russia and an unpredictable US.

For Germany, these developments are particularly worrying. A country that has long prided itself on its close relationship with the US, its major role in advancing European integration and its determination to build a constructive relationship with Russia now finds itself in a world turned upside down.

As Germany contemplates how to organize its defense in this altered security environment, , both within and outside the country, have concluded that, now allegedly bereft of American protection, Germany should acquire its own nuclear weapons. However, Berlin is not likely to go down this path. Even though the world has changed and Germany is now investing heavily in its conventional defense, the costs of a national nuclear option would far outweigh any potential benefits.

Breaking nuclear taboos

The German nuclear debate started during the 2016 US presidential campaign when candidate Trump questioned long-standing US policies of protecting allies. Some German observers that the loss of the US “nuclear umbrella” was becoming increasingly likely, which would force Germany to pursue a national nuclear option. However, when it became clear that President Trump did not intend to question the US’s nuclear commitment to Europe, the debate quickly died down.��

Still, Trump’s return to the White House, which resulted in an even more aggressive stance towards Europe, reignited the nuclear debate. Some German have commented on the need for alternatives to a fading US commitment, but have getting into specifics. The most vocal proponents of a German bomb are a few security experts in academia, as well as journalists. Parts of Germany’s conservative press, in particular, are fueling this discussion. Guest authors are regularly invited to write about the need for a German bomb. also seem eager to educate reluctant German decision-makers on the fundamentals of robust nuclear policy. Even the arts and culture sections of some newspapers are startling unsuspecting readers with by previously unknown authors portraying Germany as being in urgent need of its own nuclear weapons. These authors seem to relish their role as nuclear taboo-breakers.

However, closer inspection reveals that Germany’s self-styled taboo-breakers are at best reluctant arsonists. For instance, most German proponents of a national nuclear option rarely express their views unequivocally. Most are content merely to refer to the new security situation, in which one must now “think the unthinkable.” Only a few dare to go further. proposed that Germany should simply buy 1,000 nuclear warheads from the US, thereby becoming a nuclear power virtually overnight (while leading to the imminent collapse of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty []).

Others argue that the treaties committing Germany to permanently renounce weapons of mass destruction , as the conditions for these commitments no longer exist — “rebus sic stantibus.” This line of argument would enable Germany to withdraw from the Two-Plus-Four that paved the way for its reunification. It could then follow up by withdrawing from the NPT, which West Germany joined in 1969 as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Once these legal obstacles were removed, the argument goes, the path to the bomb would depend only on financial resources and technical know-how.��

Consequently, proponents of nuclear weapons argue that, like Japan and South Korea, Germany should invest in “nuclear latency,” i.e., the maintenance of the basic technologies necessary for a national nuclear weapons program. However, Germany’s exit from nuclear power generation has left the country with very little “nuclear latency.”

Moreover, as the British and French experiences demonstrate, the financial costs of a national nuclear program would be enormous. Developing a true nuclear option — which must include command systems (including satellites) and delivery vehicles (such as missiles or submarines) — would take 20 years or more, which seems too long to deter a belligerent Russia. 

Concerns from Germany’s neighbors��

Unsurprisingly, perhaps, those in favor of a German bomb tend to avoid the question of what would happen if Poland, Italy and other larger European countries were to follow Germany’s example and initiate their own nuclear programs. Even if Washington dropped any objections to allied countries acquiring nuclear weapons, a German bid for the bomb could trigger a major political earthquake with unforeseeable consequences.

If official government about Germany wanting to build Europe’s strongest conventional armed forces are already in Europe and beyond, what would happen if Berlin were to commit to a national nuclear weapons program? Old resentments among Germany’s neighbors, which have been kept in check until now, would resurface. Germany would make a tactical gain, but suffer a strategic loss.��

Germany’s withdrawal from several major international treaties would strike fear into many Europeans more than Moscow’s nuclear weapons would. Although the German public’s towards nuclear weapons remains fickle, the idea of their country developing its own nuclear arsenal would hardly be widely approved of.

In a speech in February 2026, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz that Berlin was engaged in talks with Paris on nuclear matters, but hastened to add that Germany was opposed to “different zones of security” in Europe. This message was intended to reassure Germany’s neighbors that Berlin was looking at the broader European context and not seeking a privileged position under a strictly bilateral Franco-German deterrence framework. In sum, whatever the reasoning behind a German nuclear arsenal, no German government would pursue it.��

Germany’s NATO Option

Germany has two options for organizing its nuclear protection. The first is NATO. Since the 1960s, NATO has had a system of “nuclear sharing” in place that balances Washington’s desire to maintain decision-making power over nuclear use with the interests of non-nuclear states in political and military consultation, without undermining the NPT. In practical terms, this means that Germany and several other NATO allies maintain specialized fighter jets and crews that could carry US nuclear warheads in times of conflict. Nuclear sharing is a laborious compromise, but it represents the greatest degree of nuclear cooperation possible between sovereign nation-states. 

Despite the Trump administration’s use of stark language to cajole European allies into increasing their defense budgets and conventional military strength, the US has not challenged its commitment to extended deterrence in Europe. As the US “nuclear umbrella” has effectively prevented allies from developing their own nuclear arsenals, the US would gain little but lose much by abandoning it. Therefore, as long as Washington does not openly raise doubts about the “nuclear umbrella”, neither will European governments.

While long-standing French calls for European “strategic autonomy” may sound more pertinent today than a few years ago, they only apply to the conventional realm. On nuclear matters, France would prefer to maintain the status quo, including a continued US nuclear presence in NATO Europe.

Germany’s European Option

All this explains why the NATO option remains Germany’s preferred solution. However, what if “Option A” were to fail, and the US were to withdraw its nuclear protection from Europe? In this case, Germany would seek to organize its nuclear protection within the framework of a nuclear-armed EU. West Germany explicitly mentioned this possibility when ratifying its accession to the NPT in 1975, stating that the NPT should not hinder the European integration process.  At that time, this was still purely hypothetical, but it demonstrated considerable foresight. Should the transatlantic security partnership collapse completely, the European option would become Germany’s “Plan B.” 

Clearly, such a “Europeanization” of nuclear deterrence would be extremely challenging. Setting aside the unusual proposal of one prominent German analyst to have a “” circulate among the capitals of major EU member states, the nuclear arsenals of the UK and France were designed solely to protect their respective national territories. These are traditional “sanctuary weapons” that were neither intended nor built for a pan-European extended deterrence mission.

While the UK has allocated its nuclear weapons to NATO, France has consistently emphasized its national sovereignty in nuclear matters and has even to join NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group. Furthermore, the UK is no longer an EU member, and its nuclear arsenal relies heavily on cooperation with the US. Although France and the UK have moved closer together on nuclear matters, neither is likely to unequivocally commit to providing extended deterrence for the rest of Europe. Complicating matters further, the two staunchly anti-nuclear EU members, Austria and Ireland, are likely to obstruct attempts to establish an EU-wide nuclear culture.��

Therefore, the most likely would be for interested European nations to establish a European Nuclear Planning Group similar to NATO’s and to participate more regularly in French and British nuclear exercises. Another option would be to strengthen existing consultation and cooperation agreements, such as the 2024 between the UK and Germany. French dual-capable aircraft could regularly visit air bases in other European countries, and major EU foreign policy documents could contain more references to nuclear issues. Taken together, these measures could project a semblance of European nuclear solidarity, though they could not fully compensate for a loss of US nuclear protection.��

Keep calm and deter

For all these reasons, arguing in favor of a German nuclear program remains largely an intellectual exercise. Germany’s reluctant nuclear arsonists aren’t actually setting fire, but merely playing with it. Many of them know full well that their calls will not translate into official policy. Nor will Germany’s commitment not to possess weapons of mass destruction be rendered meaningless by a few toughly worded op-eds. “Rebus sic stantibus” is not a magic spell from a Harry Potter movie that can set the world right again.

Even if Germany does not go nuclear, however, the debate holds an important lesson: The US “nuclear umbrella” is far more important than some analysts and politicians on both sides of the Atlantic dare to admit. It spares Europe a destructive debate on nuclear-driven renationalization and spares the US the prospect of having to deal with a multinuclear Europe. Therefore, both sides of the Atlantic should refrain from making reckless statements about the diminishing credibility of the US “nuclear umbrella” or the desirability of new national nuclear options. Perhaps those who boast about “thinking the unthinkable” should try “thinking the thinkable” first.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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It was a civics textbook written for 14-year-olds with a chapter titled “The Role of the Judiciary in Our Society.” Among other positive aspects of the judiciary, it discussed judicial backlog and corruption. It cited data and actual quotes from former judges. But the Court ordered a complete ban: seizure of physical copies, removal of digital versions, which one can access and prohibition on publication “through electronic media or alternative titles.”

Chief Justice Surya Kant described it as a “deep-rooted, well-orchestrated conspiracy” to malign the Judiciary, where “they fired a gunshot, judiciary is bleeding today.” Supposedly, a schoolbook is enough to make the judiciary bleed.

If the institution is so fragile that a book chapter can injure it, then the actual health of this institution is in dire conditions. This is truly a watershed moment because the Judiciary, for the second time in Indian history, decided that its institutional comfort mattered more than our constitutional rights.

But first, I will talk about the legality of as measured against the Constitution and contempt laws. But I really want to talk about the institutional dishonesty and cowardice being shown: the wholesale misrepresentation of what the chapter actually says by the Court; the language the Chief Justice has used; the role of the Bar in triggering this whole episode; and how representative institutions are kowtowing and falling in line without a word of resistance.

The Supreme Court cannot ban a book or blacklist a person

Let’s see the legality of this order. It is important to note that the Supreme Court has not invoked contempt proceedings. They have not pointed to a specific defamatory falsehood and required its correction. It issued, from its own bench, a blanket order completely banning a textbook chapter. Such suppression and prior restraint, the Court itself has ruled unconstitutional .

However, talking from first principles, Article 19(2) of the Constitution permits restrictions on speech only through a “law” made by the “State.” Courts have long established that judicial decisions constitute “law” for the purposes of Article 19, and that the judiciary constitute “State” for the purposes of Part III violations. The logical conclusion from this is that the judiciary, in all its might, does not have the power to directly restrict speech.

When the Court engages in this unique form of judicial censorship, it bypasses the Parliament and the representative government completely. As Professor of law has pointed out, such actions ensure “that the deliberative process envisaged by the Constitution when it requires the State to ‘make a law’ under Article 19(2) is rendered chimerical.” The Supreme Court only has the power of judicial review. But they have now inserted themselves into both roles simultaneously: restricting speech as if it’s the Parliament and reviewing that restriction, too.

This is just judicial power-brokering where they have turned the machinery made to protect the rights of the citizen to protect their own reputation.

The Court has also that even temporary digital restrictions can have far-reaching chilling effects on speech. But clearly, this does not apply to the Court, it seems. Last year, the very same that free speech should be measured by the “standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view.” They have failed their own test in a spectacular fashion. It is honestly so puzzling how forgetful and hypocritical this Court is when the critics shine a spotlight on it.

But, on March 11, the Court passed which went even further. The Court barred the three authors of the chapters (Professors Michel Danino, Suparna Diwakar and Alok Prasanna Kumar) from work associated with any publicly funded curriculum.

The Court said that it had “no reason to doubt” they had “deliberately knowingly misrepresented the facts.” The Court said this even before the authors filed their response. The punishment was delivered, and the invitation to respond came after.

has named this Order for what it is: a judicial bill of attainder. During the in England, the legislature sometimes assumed judicial powers and passed laws known as . These laws declared individuals or groups guilty of misconduct or crimes and imposed punishment without a trial.

When the US broke away from England, bills of attainder were under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution. This stopped the practice of “trial by legislature,” and furthered the separation of powers in the Constitution. President James Madison simply explained the need for their abolition in . He said that these “Bills of attainder … are contrary to the first principles of the social compact,” because modern society agreed that punishment should follow the . This very Court has previously held similar ex-post laws .

What the Supreme Court has now done is take the form of the bill of attainder and clothe it in judicial power. They are punishing by decree, without explicit statutory charges being mentioned, without any law, and without a hearing.

As a measure of caution, the order does invite the three authors to “approach this court for seeking modification after tendering their response.” But this is against Article 21 of the Constitution and the procedural guarantees therein. It delivers the punishment first, then invites the individual to explain why they should not be punished. As Bhatia , “if a government department fired an employee and then issued a show-cause notice, the Supreme Court would strike it down for violating administrative law.” Then how can the Court do the same?

It is genuinely sad that these three authors, who wrote that “the Supreme Court is the watchdog of democracy” and that citizens must have “confidence” that the judiciary will protect their rights, have now been punished by the very institution they had praised.

Who needs contempt laws? Magic court powers are enough

The question of contempt powers needs to be examined, especially since the Court is not invoking that power in this case. This is very odd.

Under the Contempt of Courts , Section 2(c) defines criminal contempt as any act that “scandalises, or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court.” This definition is undoubtedly capacious. The word “tends” does not require actual interference with justice; even the possibility of it is enough. Section 5 provides a defense for “fair criticism” of a finally decided case, and the 2006 amendment allows truth as a defense if the person can show they were acting in the public interest. But the test is left to the court itself to determine whether the criticism was “fair.”

It is an odd system where the Court, which has been “scandalized,” is the judge in its own cause, going against the principles of (the rule against bias and the right to a fair hearing). It also has clear chilling effects on freedom of speech and expression. And precisely this was the reason why the UK, the US and many other modern democracies have deemed such laws as , except for India.

But there are those who say that without such laws, the judiciary will lose its reputation. Justice H.R. Khanna, the one judge who had the spine to dissent during the Emergency, directly: “Contempt of court should not be used as a means to uphold our own dignity. This must rely on surer foundation … We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication.”

The UK, from which we adopted the Contempt of Courts Act, saw its last in 1931. In 2018, a , ironically headed by a former judge, set out to find whether such an archaic provision should be abolished. They said no. In all honesty, these provisions are a , which does not, in the least bit, ensure the dignity of our court. And its broadness leaves to silence the critics of the Court.

But here is the deeper problem. The Court has imposed punitive measures that go beyond anything provided for in contempt laws. And the contempt law is already too far. Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act provided that a contempt will be “punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with a fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.” There is no other punishment for contempt.

But, through their March 11 Order, the Court effectively blacklisted these authors. That, too, without initiating any contempt proceedings or even hearing them. The Supreme Court has conjured up powers from thin air, detached from any statutory or constitutional basis, and has extinguished their Article 19(1)(g) right to practice their profession effectively.

How is any of this possible? Only Justice Surya Kant knows. As one of my professors puts it, this is an example of “cosmic level thinking.”

Blatant misrepresentations of facts

Thanks to , we still have access to the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) chapter. We also have the order. Let’s see what the Court actually said versus what the .

The 18-page-long chapter opens with an epigraph from the former US Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas: “The judiciary is in a high sense the guardian of the conscience of the people as well as the law of the land.”

It opens with the Preamble to the Constitution of India, which promises social, economic and political justice, and that justice “is the cornerstone of all societies.” It goes on to explain the three-tier court structure, criminal versus civil cases, the role of tribunals, the consumer forum system and other relevant concepts. It also brings to attention various landmark cases of the Supreme Court. For example, the Supreme Court’s striking down of Section 66A of the IT Act and the Electoral bonds scheme as a victory of free speech and democratic accountability. It also profiles the doyen of the Bench, Justice Kuldip Singh, as the “Green Judge,” whose usage of public interest litigation protected the Taj Mahal from industrial pollution and the Ganga from tannery effluents.

It then cited constituent assembly member Madabhushi Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, who said:

This [Supreme Court] is the institution which will preserve those rights and secure to every citizen the rights that have been given to him under the Constitution … The Supreme Court is the watchdog of democracy. It is the eye and the guardian of the citizens’ rights

Approximately 14-pages into the chapter, it addresses “Challenges Faced by the Judicial System.” In it, they discuss the case backlog and pending cases. They also discuss efforts at judicial reform: mobile courts, criminal law reforms, mediation mechanisms. And then, in the penultimate subsection, it has two paragraphs of around 350 words titled “Corruption in the Judiciary.” These paragraphs open by explaining the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct and the internal complaints mechanism (CPGRAMS), and noting that between 2017 and 2021, over 1,600 complaints were received alleging judicial or institutional misconduct.

They then quote directly a statement made by the then Chief Justice of India (CJI) Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai himself:

Sadly, there have been instances of corruption and misconduct that have surfaced even within the judiciary. Such occurrences inevitably have a negative impact on public confidence … The path to rebuilding this trust lies in the swift, decisive, and transparent action taken to address and resolve these issues… Transparency and accountability are democratic virtues.

The chapter’s own summary section lists several positive takeaways: that the judiciary is one of the three pillars of government; that it ensures justice is served and laws are made within the constitutional framework; that citizens must have confidence that their rights will be protected; and that citizens have a role in helping the judiciary by bringing social concerns to its notice.

Let’s see what the Supreme Court said about this chapter in its Order:

Paragraph 6 of the states that the chapter “washes off with one stroke of the pen, the illustrious history associated with the Supreme Court, the High Courts and the District Courts” and “conspicuously omits the substantive contributions made by these institutions towards the preservation of our democratic fabric.” As I mentioned earlier, the chapter profiles Justice Kuldip Singh. It cites the Supreme Court’s free speech victories. It quotes constituent assembly members on the Supreme Court as “the watchdog of democracy.” Are these not celebrations of the Supreme Court, its judges and its contributions?

Paragraph 6 of the Order also states that the chapter “fails to acknowledge the imperative role the Judiciary undertakes in upholding Constitutional Morality and the Basic Structure Doctrine.” 

First of all, bringing in explicitly legal and jurisprudential doctrines for Class VIII students studying basic social sciences is a bit too much. But, in words that could not be any more similar, the chapter does say that “the judiciary ensures that laws and policies made by the executive are within the framework of the Constitution” and that “without a strong and fair judiciary, democracy cannot survive.” If this is not an acknowledgement of the judiciary’s role in upholding the Constitution, then what would satisfy the Court?

Paragraph 7 of the Order states that the chapter “chooses not to delve into any of the transformative initiatives and measures pioneered by this Court towards overhauling legal aid mechanisms and streamlining the ease of access to justice.” The chapter explicitly mentions Public Interest Litigation. It explicitly mentions the National Judicial Data Grid. It explicitly mentions mobile courts, mediation and the government’s procedural reform measures. Are these not mentions of “legal aid mechanisms” and “ease of access to justice”?

Paragraph 10 of the Order states that young students “lack the perspicacity to appreciate the manifold and onerous responsibilities that are discharged by the judiciary on a day-to-day basis.” The Court has decided, in its grand old wisdom, that eighth graders, who are doing algebra and learning refractions, are simply too dumb to handle a basic civics chapter that spends 14 pages praising the judiciary and two paragraphs acknowledging its flaws.

The Court’s order is an outrage against a chapter where there is supposedly only criticism and no praise. But such a chapter does not even exist. The chapter that actually exists praises the judiciary more than enough and, in the spirit of honesty, briefly mentions that the judiciary also has some problems.

There is corruption in the judiciary at all levels

Out of an 18-page chapter and the 350-word section titled “Corruption in the Judiciary,” other than the quote from Gavai, there is exactly one sentence that actually asserts any form of corruption in the judiciary: “Nevertheless, people do experience corruption at various levels of the judiciary. For the poor and the disadvantaged, this can worsen the issue of access to justice.”

I am not making this up. This is what made the Supreme Court bleed. The rest of the section is just explaining the judicial code of conduct, data from the grievance redressal process and how impeachment works. But sure, all this is very dangerous material. 

But the important question is whether this is an objective statement? Is there corruption at various levels of the judiciary? Short answer: Yes. That is what the data says.

The data on judicial corruption in India is not hard to find. It is literally everywhere. I made a of such news reports in 10 minutes.

Data from shows that over 45% of Indians believe the judiciary is corrupt, which is a view also shared by . In the 2024 , India scored 38 out of 100 and ranked 96th out of 180 countries, in the same bracket as nations the Court would find deeply unflattering to be compared with. These are not abstract data points.

In 2010, a former Law Minister in a Supreme Court filing that eight of the previous 16 Chief Justices of India were corrupt. In 2014, former Supreme Court judge Markandey Katju that three former CJIs made improper compromises to protect a corrupt High Court judge. Both Katju and former Union Law Minister Shanti Bhushan faced . No one conclusively disproved either allegation. In an , when it was asked, “Are bribes for bail endemic now?” another former CJI, Vishweshwar Nath Khare, said the following:

There is no doubt about it. It is rampant. Corruption in the lower courts is no secret. Sometimes, in the high court as well, cases of corruption have surfaced, but in my experience while I was in the Supreme Court, I have not witnessed anything similar. In the lower courts, it’s alleged that everything comes for a price. Rates are fixed for quick divorce, bail and other favourable verdicts. Cases in the media glare, constantly scrutinised, are different. Otherwise, it is very difficult for the common man. There are huge time gaps between hearings. Years are spent to get an order from the lower courts.

Is this not literally what was said in the chapter? In Paragraph 2 of the Order, the CJI said that the authors were “picking a few words from the statement of a former Chief Justice of India, suggesting that the judiciary itself has acknowledged the lack of transparency, accountability and institutional corruption.” Suggesting? Suggesting how? It is not a suggestion. It is literally a quote from the former CJI. You cannot quote someone and be accused of suggesting what they said. And from what we have seen, the Judiciary indeed has acknowledged all these problems. Well, what do they do about it?

Parliament has a judge in India. Not for the lack of trying. Because under both the , 1968, and the opaque in-house , it is so cumbersome.

This is the usual process for removing a corrupt judge in India. First, you need 100 Lok Sabha Members of Parliament (MPs) or 50 Rajya Sabha MPs to sign a motion. Then, a three-member committee investigates. If they find the judge guilty, both Houses of Parliament must pass the motion by a two-thirds majority in the same session. Then the President removes the judge. You can an emergency and suspend the fundamental rights of 1.4 billion people for less.

But even this has a caveat. When cases came close to impeachment, the before the motion passed. There is a sinister reason for this, too.

For example, Justice Soumitra Sen , the Rajya Sabha the impeachment motion and he resigned before the Lok Sabha could vote. In a 2012 Right to Information , it was found that he walked away with full post-retirement benefits because no constitutional provision barred him from keeping them. Justice Paul Daniel Dinakaran had assets beyond his known sources of income, the Rajya Sabha an impeachment motion, and he, too, resigned mid-inquiry and with benefits. Justice Narayan Shukla was found by the Supreme Court’s own in-house inquiry to have credibly a bribe. He refused to resign. His judicial work was withdrawn. He sat at home for over a year collecting his until he retired in 2020.

Sen, Shuka and Dinakaran are not anomalies. They fit a long, documented pattern. The backlog of pending cases means litigants bribe just to get a hearing date; the inefficiency feeds the corruption. And in those rare instances when corruption is found, the provide these judges with . It is a win-win situation for them.

More recently, a fire at Justice Yashwant Varma’s residence turned up a large stack of . As one usually does. But the impeachment proceedings have , which will be taken to its natural conclusion: his resignation with full benefits. We literally have the of the burnt cash. I don’t know what else to say. And to blacklist these authors for mentioning real problems is purely vindictive and a pathetic waste of public resources and time.

The more the judiciary tries to suppress discussion of its failures, the more distrust it generates. A strong institution answers its critics, and the weak one bans schoolbooks and witch-hunts academics. Maybe the contempt jurisdiction was purposefully not invoked because, if it were, it would be clear that what these authors said was the truth. One cannot be contemptuous if they speak the truth.

At this instance, I am reminded of this fitting by Justice Antonin Scalia of the US Supreme Court, wherein he said:

This Court has not been shy to enforce the First Amendment in recent terms. It has accorded robust protection to depictions of animal torture, sale of violent video games to children, and lies about having won military medals. Who would have thought that the same Court would today exert such heroic efforts to save so plain an abridgement of the freedom of speech? It is no great mystery what is going on here. The judges of this Court, like the judges of the Supreme Court of Florida who promulgated Canon 7C(1), evidently consider the preservation of public respect for the courts a policy objective of the highest order. So it is—but so too are preventing animal torture, protecting the innocence of children, and honoring valiant soldiers. The Court did not relax the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech when legislatures pursued those goals; it should not relax the guarantee when the Supreme Court of Florida pursues this one. The First Amendment is not abridged for the benefit of the Brotherhood of the Robe. I respectfully dissent.

These in-house secret procedures, the resignation escapes, the weaponization of judicial proceedings, are just the “Brotherhood of the Robe” in full action.

Language of the Supreme Court or tyrants? Both

Sociolinguistics has that language can be a tool of social control, and that its use shapes how a society understands itself and its institutions.

When the highest court speaks, it is providing an example of what authority sounds like. It is teaching our society how power talks. This is true regardless of whether the specific words carry legal force. The words of the Chief Justice clearly have “social” consequences, too. Their mere rhetoric can determine what citizens believe they are allowed to say, think, and question. Such asymmetry demands some discipline in their language. This Court has completely abandoned it.

Thanks to some , we have a rough transcript of the proceedings. These were the words of the CJI Surya Kant in an open court: “We need to find out who is responsible. Heads must roll … There must be a deeper probe into this issue. Who are the persons behind this? We want to know. We won’t close the case.”

On September 25, 1930, at the Supreme Court in Leipzig, German Dictator used this precise vocabulary, “heads will roll in the sand,” to threaten his political opponents once “the Fascists have taken over control of the German nation and inaugurated the day of reckoning.” This is not the precedent they want.

But it continues its language of retribution and revenge. During the March 11 hearing, the CJI further : “Some elements have acted and reacted irresponsibly on social media. We firmly believe in catching the bull by the horns… No one will be spared … Even if they are hiding outside the country, I will not spare them.”

The Court has also directed the Union government to identify websites and individuals who had posted critical commentary, so that “action could be taken in accordance with law.” What law? No one knows. Just a demand for names. This kind of blanket blacklisting and witch-hunting is judicial .

But, I am not at all suggesting that CJI Surya Kant wants what Hitler or US Senator Joe McCarthy wanted. What I am pointing out is something simpler and more important: Language has its own history, and institutions do get measured by the vocabulary they choose. When a constitutional court speaks like this, the institution is projecting fear. It does not produce respect. Even in the rare instances where it does, it is not the kind of respect that will last long. 

Such harsh language against its critics creates a chilling effect. People actually fall silent. Journalists and Academics self-censor their reports. Slowly, the marketplace of ideas would narrow to nothing, and then it would die. Because the Court sponsored its killing.

The Prime Minister abdicated his constitutional responsibilities

On June 9, 2024, Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi stood before the nation, placed his hand on the Constitution of India, and for a . He swore:

I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established, that I will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, that I will faithfully and conscientiously discharge my duties as a Prime Minister for the Union and that I will do right to all manner of people in accordance with the Constitution and the law, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.

After the court passed the order, Modi reportedly his displeasure and directed that “accountability be fixed for those who had approved the offending chapter.” Soon after, Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan that “the moment it came to our notice, we issued directions to withdraw the book and stop its distribution. We have the utmost respect for the judiciary, and there was no intent to disrespect the judiciary.”

Maybe the words are sincere to show compliance. But this is not what the Constitution requires. The PM and the Education Minister have taken an oath to the Constitution, not to the judiciary. When the elected head of the executive responds with such docility, against an ever-encroaching judiciary, one has to ask: What, exactly, does he believe he was elected to do?

I am not asking the government to revolt. But the Constitution does not expect them to simply stand by either. It requires you to “do right to all manner of people in accordance with the Constitution and the law.” When the judiciary goes against the Constitution, as it has here, one must resist with firmness through proper constitutional channels. That is why you are required to take an oath. This is not some “cosmic level thinking.” There is behind the moral and political obligations that an oath demands.

The last time India saw the executive and judiciary moving hand in hand against the Constitution was in 1975. When PM Indira Gandhi declared the and suspended civil rights. This Court institutional comfort over the liberty of citizens. The Court did not have the spine to stand up to the executive when it mattered the most. And it was the closest India ever came to the of constitutional governance.

That time, it was a judiciary unwilling to resist the executive. This time, it is an executive who is unwilling to defend our right to speak the truth against a “dictatorial judiciary.” The executive exists as one of three coequal branches. Today, they have decided to publicly castrate themselves before another.

How the Bar assisted the Court in this witch hunt

There is a final disgrace that I want to name, because it has been too carefully avoided in most commentary.

This whole issue was created out of thin air, on February 25, 2026, by two of India’s most prominent senior advocates: Kapil Sibal and Abhishek Manu Singhvi. There was no concerned citizen or civil society group that petitioned the Court to look into this matter. Maybe because we know that what was written was true. Or maybe because all of us have better things to do.

But, according to , these two men appeared before the Chief Justice’s bench and, with a newspaper article about the NCERT chapter, expressed their shock at its contents and literally invited the court to act. They primed the Court in this witch hunt. Let this sink in for a moment.

Kapil Sibal is a veteran politician, former Union Minister for Law and Justice, current Rajya Sabha member and one of the most experienced constitutional lawyers at the Indian Bar. Abhishek Manu Singhvi is his near-peer: a senior advocate, former Additional Solicitor General and a current parliamentarian.

These are their . Mr Sibal said that “the reference to ‘corruption’, particularly in relation to the judiciary, seemed deliberate.” Mr Singhvi added that: “It is as if there is no corruption in other organs of governance — Ministers, bureaucrats, the police, politicians.” And here’s the thing: If they actually read the book, as some have done, the book does criticize everyone. There are cartoons of election candidates hurling abuse, getting caught by the police with bundles of cash. They also mention the pending criminal cases against legislators. The judiciary got the same treatment as everybody else.

That is not the end. The current Solicitor General of India, Tushar Mehta, was also doing in this witch hunt. As the Counsel for the Union Government, he said that: “these people would never work with the UGC or any ministry. We stand by the institution. No one will get away scot-free.” He was so into this witch hunt that he was offended on behalf of the Court. He said, “The entire chapter will be revised. There is another part about pendency … justice delayed is justice denied. We can’t teach that justice is denied.”

What more can I say? Can we not teach the truth to kids anymore? Should education just contain approved knowledge? Is that even education or just propaganda?

The sad truth is that these doyens of the Bar, as we call them in Madras, walked into the Supreme Court, with half-baked knowledge, and triggered one of the most sweeping acts of educational censorship in history.

But their actions were driven by something simpler: members of a professional guild protecting the guild’s reputation. In a lecture on the rule of law, Justice H.R. Khanna that “there can, indeed, be no greater indication of the decay in the rule of law than a docile Bar.” This Bar has been worse than docile. It has gone hand in hand with the executive and judiciary, waging war against our right to free speech and expression. This is the “Brotherhood of the Robe” in action again.

The apotheosis of the Judiciary has to stop

To speak of the Supreme Court as some beyond all reproach and criticism is to confuse an institution of men with gods. Institutions can be wrong. Institutions can be corrupt. And when an institution begins to ban the books that say so, you are no longer in a republic. You are in a theocracy of robes.

Citizens must understand that the judiciary is not a sacred temple. It is a governmental institution created by a constitution to protect our rights, funded by taxes paid by the people, and accountable to the people and our Constitution. It deserves respect. But respect is not given on faith. It is earned through conduct. All this kowtowing from the executive and the Bar is just idol worship of an institution that is slowly ceasing to deserve respect and faith.

There is a reason that democracies insist on the separation of powers. Because, without checks and balances, each branch will eventually prefer its own comfort over its true purpose. The historical record is clear about what happens when judiciaries lose this sense of proportion. In , after the 2016 coup attempt, over 4000 judges had to be removed or suspended on suspicion of links to the 2015 failed coup attempt. Similar stuff happened in , too.

But what we learn from history is that we do not learn from history. The pattern is always the same: The institution conflates criticism of itself with an attack on the state and uses state power to respond to the criticism. Each time, it begins with something small. A textbook. A social media post. A professor or a student who spoke some impolite truth. Something heretical to their theocracy.

What remains

These past few days have told us more about the Supreme Court as an institution than the textbook ever could.

It tells us that a chapter which mostly praises the judiciary, profiles a great judge, celebrates landmark judgements and calls the Court “the watchdog of democracy,” is nothing but a “deep-rooted conspiracy.” It tells us that quoting a former Chief Justice’s words on corruption is “deliberate misrepresentation.”

It tells us that the fundamental rights of three academics can be extinguished without any statutory or constitutional basis and without a full hearing. It tells us that critics can be listed and witch-hunted even from abroad. It tells us that the Court’s own free speech rulings apply to everyone except the Court.

It also tells something about the broader institutional cowardice on display. It tells us that the Prime Minister thinks institutional dignity matters more than educated discourse. And that three of the most powerful lawyers in the country were perfectly comfortable priming a bench against a textbook they hadn’t fully read.

The bench that struck down ADM Jabalpur understood that self-correction is the mark of a healthy institution. The bells, once rung, do not unring easily. But there is still time for the Court to restore itself. The order may be revoked; the individuals may yet be heard fully and fairly. 

And look, this isn’t just about a textbook. The question belongs to all those who read something and ask whether they’re actually allowed to have an opinion about it. How long will we wait before this Court remembers what it is?

It is not a god. It is not a monarch. It is not beyond reproach or truth.

And if we do not speak now, we must forever hold our peace.

[Rishi A. Kumar first published this piece on .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Supreme Court of India Has No Spine appeared first on 51�Թ�.

According to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the international system is undergoing “intensified fragmentation and geopolitical polarisation” as competition among China, Russia and the US reshapes the global order. In this context, the behavior of states that are neither great powers nor small, dependent states is crucial to systemic stability.

Why the middle matters

Middle powers matter because they offer more than geographic or economic weight; they constitute a relational space that sustains cooperation even when the largest actors retreat into rivalry. 

Middle powers are not solely defined by material capacity but by their strategic behavior, which explains that these states “leverage their resources through selective leadership, niche diplomacy and active engagement in specific issue areas.” Their influence arises not from overwhelming force but from credible, flexible diplomacy embedded in international networks.

Yet middle power behavior cannot be purely transactional. Unlike great powers, which can absorb reputational costs through sheer weight, middle powers depend on a consistent record of principled engagement — the moment their positions appear for sale, their value as mediators and bridge-builders evaporates. Strategic flexibility is only credible when it rests on stable principles.

Notably, some of the most effective middle power actors — Norway, Qatar, Singapore and Switzerland — formally present themselves as small states, yet their diplomatic footprint tells a different story. 

This capacity to function between poles gives middle powers a unique stake in stability — they thrive not by domination but by preserving openness and predictability in a world where rivalry threatens to narrow options for all.

The pressure to choose — and the value of autonomy

Great power rivalry today extends beyond security to trade, technology and supply chains. The pressure on other states to align is real. Yet for most, alignment is neither simple nor costless.

Kazakhstan, for example, openly maintains relations with Russia, China, the EU and the US — not out of indecision, but as deliberate diversification that enhances its strategic autonomy and flexibility. As Thomas Greminger, the author of the GCSP brief, explains, this diversification gives such states greater agency while preserving room to maneuver amid competing pressures. And, Türkiye offers an even sharper illustration: a NATO member that nonetheless purchased Russia’s S-400 missile system, demonstrating that strategic autonomy is exercised not only outside alliances, but sometimes in deliberate tension with them. 

Scholars describe this as “flexilateralism” — shifting coalitions across different issues and configurations — or simply “multialignment,” where a state maintains simultaneous partnerships across rival blocs without fully committing to any.

Autonomy in this sense is not neutrality in a moral vacuum but a careful exercise of agency — preserving space for diplomacy, cooperation and engagement across rival blocs.

When geography constrains

Geography shapes middle power behavior, but does not determine it. A strategic location between major powers can amplify diplomatic options — Kazakhstan’s position at the crossroads of Russia, China and Central Asia sharpens rather than limits its multivector diplomacy, while Qatar’s contested neighborhood has pushed it toward mediation and strategic connectivity as survival tools. But geography can also become a trap.

Countries wedged between Russia and the West — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine — cannot exercise middle power agency in the same way; their contested position pushes them toward bandwagoning rather than bridge-building. The difference between a middle power and an “in-between country” is ultimately less about location than about the political space available to make independent choices.

Communication when giants drift apart

As great powers communicate less directly, middle powers often keep vital conversations alive.

The GCSP Policy Brief highlights that middle powers deploy a range of diplomatic strategies — including bridge-building, coalition formation and mediation — to bring parties into dialogue and cooperation. It points specifically to cases like Oman and Qatar playing roles in regional mediation, facilitating negotiations between actors that might otherwise lack direct channels.

This kind of facilitation rarely makes headlines. But preventing escalation matters. When crises do not escalate into conflict, when lines of communication hold even loosely, fragmentation is contained.

Coalitions without camps

Global institutions are under strain. Consensus is harder to achieve. Formal mechanisms stagnate.

In response, middle powers are forging issue-based coalitions that sidestep rigid bloc politics. Rather than insisting on universal agreements that exclude major disagreements, these coalitions generate functional cooperation on shared risks — climate, health, food security and technology governance.

The GCSP brief notes that by forming ad hoc alliances and working collectively, middle powers can help “repair, adapt and stabilise the international order” precisely through these narrower but productive agendas.

This cooperation does not require full alignment on all strategic questions; it is rooted in practical outcomes and shared interests in avoiding collapse into zero-sum rivalry.

Greminger’s most concrete proposal points in exactly this direction. During the Cold War, a group of neutral and nonaligned states — the so-called “N+N” — played a quiet but decisive role in facilitating dialogue between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, contributing to the stable European security order that emerged from the Helsinki Process. He asks whether a similar coalition might be needed today: Should the current Ukraine conflict move toward settlement, reconstructing a European security order will require more than deterrence — it will need committed, credible states willing to facilitate risk reduction, confidence-building and arms control. Could that coalition include middle powers like Kazakhstan, Norway and Türkiye alongside traditional neutrals like Austria, Ireland, Malta and Switzerland, with Germany and Italy as cooperative security anchors? The question is deliberately open, but the precedent is real.

Economic connectivity as a stabilizing force

In a fragmented world, economic interdependence is not just a driver of prosperity. It is a buffer against division.

Middle powers often act as connectors, integrating regional trade networks and hosting platforms for economic cooperation. Financial and logistical corridors, middle powers help build complicated efforts to draw hard bloc lines in the global economy, reducing incentives for complete decoupling.

Even outside the GCSP brief, analysts note that middle powers can exercise influence by mobilizing coalitions and exploiting opportunities where great powers are indifferent or immobilized, essentially shaping cooperative spaces where larger players otherwise struggle to do so.

The risks of erosion

Stabilizing the middle is no guarantee. Strategic autonomy can be squeezed by coercive tactics. Economic levers can become tools of political pressure. Domestic politics may harden into pro-alignment rhetoric.

Here, the GCSP brief highlights that middle powers’ agency depends not just on capacity but on political commitment and diplomatic skill, observing that countries like Norway, Qatar and Switzerland combine principled engagement with reputational credibility to act as effective bridge-builders.

These dual attributes — conviction and craft — are what allow middle powers to operate as stabilizers in fractured environments.

Holding the system together

The international system need not collapse, and rivalry among great powers will surely continue. Yet the degree of fragmentation the world ultimately experiences will depend not only on the behavior of the largest states, but on whether enough mid-level states sustain cooperation, connectivity and dialogue.

In this sense, middle powers do not just fill gaps left by great power abstention. They actively shape the contours of the emerging order — not by opposing or neutralizing superpowers, but by keeping diplomatic and institutional space open.

As the GCSP brief illustrates, middle powers are uniquely positioned to contribute to stability precisely because they do not seek domination but manageable, predictable cooperation in an unpredictable world.

Their success is not a function of overwhelming force, but of relational influence — a blend of credibility, commitment and strategic autonomy. Yet realizing this potential is not automatic. It requires coordinated action, long-term vision and the willingness to lead on principled yet pragmatic agendas. In this sense, the resurgence of middle powers may be the most viable path to sustaining a rules-based international order in an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world, if they choose to act collectively and in time.

[This is an op-ed, summarized version of the publication for the GCSP, where you can find all the sources.]

Roberta Campani had some follow-up questions for the author, which he answered. You can find their exchange below:

1. On Escalation and Structural Change

Roberta Campani: Your policy brief describes a fragmented but still manageable international order. Do the recent US-Israeli strikes on Iran represent a qualitative shift from fragmentation to open confrontation? Has the structural environment for middle powers fundamentally changed?

Thomas Greminger: The recent US-Israeli strikes on Iran have only further strengthened our perception of a polarized and fragmented world order where great powers choose to follow what they perceive to be their interests without any consideration of international law. This is not to say that I wouldn’t condemn the way the Iranian regime has been treating its population. So, I see a further erosion of international law with unpredictable repercussions on regional stability and the global economy, but no fundamental changes of the structural environment for middle powers.

2. On Credibility and Negotiation

Roberta Campani: When major powers signal openness to negotiations and then rapidly escalate militarily, how does that affect the credibility of diplomacy itself? Does such behavior narrow the space in which middle powers can operate as mediators?

Thomas Greminger: It undermines the credibility of diplomacy and, more specifically, conflict mediation. Just imagine that the Omani Minister of Foreign Affairs, tasked to mediate between the US and Iran, was still reporting in Washington on what he perceived to be fairly successful negotiations in Geneva, when the decision to attack militarily was taken. Compare my comments to the :

3. On Strategic Autonomy Under Pressure

Roberta Campani: You argue that middle powers rely on strategic autonomy and diversified partnerships. In moments of acute crisis, does the pressure to align intensify to a point where autonomy becomes unsustainable? How resilient is the “middle” under coercive conditions?

Thomas Greminger: Yes, this may well happen. We have, for instance, witnessed several cases where middle powers came under US tariff pressure and felt obliged to offer major concessions. I believe that resilience can be strengthened through regional alliances that offer stronger bargaining power.

4. On International Law and Norms

Roberta Campani: Many middle powers anchor their diplomacy in multilateral norms and international law. If great powers appear willing to bypass or reinterpret these frameworks, does that weaken the normative foundations on which the middle power agency rests?

Thomas Greminger: It does. At the same time, middle powers have an intrinsic interest to preserve and rebuild a predictable, rules-based international order because they don’t dispose of the might necessary to impose right. The good news is that they can still rely on a large majority of states that continue to believe in international law. There is also still a large majority of states that continue to believe in addressing global challenges through international cooperation.

5. On the Risk of Systemic Fragmentation

Roberta Campani: Is the greater danger today the rivalry itself — or the erosion of trust in diplomatic signaling and institutional commitments? In other words, what threatens the middle more: power politics or unpredictability?

Thomas Greminger: I believe it is easier for middle powers to adapt to power politics that remain stable and thereby predictable over a certain time, as we have seen in the 19th century, than having to deal with the high degree of unpredictability that marks current times.

6. On Collective Action Among Middle Powers

Roberta Campani: Your brief hints at coordination among middle powers. Do you see realistic prospects for collective middle-power initiatives in de-escalation or crisis mediation in the current environment?

Thomas Greminger: We are seeing some initial signs of such alliances. An example is regional powers aligning in response to the war in Gaza. It is true that many mini-lateral structures have popped up in recent years that address specific challenges in a pragmatic, ad-hoc way, but most of them actually serve great power interests. Clearly, middle powers would have to aim for such alliances much more systematically. This would often also imply readiness to overcome regional differences.

7. On Switzerland’s Role

Roberta Campani: Given Switzerland’s diplomatic tradition and your own background, do you see particular responsibilities or opportunities for neutral or non-aligned states in preventing further fragmentation?

Thomas Greminger: Yes, absolutely! At the same time, Swiss foreign policy is very busy regulating its long-term relationship with the EU, dealing with the repercussions caused by the wars in Europe and in the Middle East, and responding to the challenges of the neomercantilist trade policies of one of its most important trade partners. There is therefore a need for a lot of political leadership and commitment for exploiting the opportunities offered to middle powers like Switzerland. It would like other middle powers also to look for creating new cross-regional alliances, perhaps similar to the Human Security Network operating successfully some 25 years ago.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Agency of Middle Powers in a Fragmented and Polarized World appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The rich Gulf funds face the risk of the great liquidation

The most immediate threat to consumers is the price of petrol — gas in the US — at the pump. However, there is a bigger threat lurking in the shadows for Western economies. Over the years, the Gulf monarchies have used their oil and gas revenues to create sophisticated sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). By 2024, these Gulf SWFs were managing , representing 38% of all global SWF assets. 

Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) has $45 billion to become the anchor investor in the SoftBank Vision Fund, in addition to taking major stakes in Uber and Lucid Motors. In addition to technology, the PIF has made multibillion-dollar investments in gaming and sports, such as Electronic Arts, Nintendo and LIV Golf. 

The Saudis have attracted attention, but Abu Dhabi is the true leader of the Gulf SWFs. This emirate has two SWFs. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) invests to create diversified long-term wealth, while Mubadala focuses on strategic industrial partnerships. A cursory look at ADIA’s tells us that it invests 45–60% of its $990 billion capital in North America and 15–30% in Europe. ADIA’s investments range from equities and fixed income to hedge funds, real estate, private equity and infrastructure. Mubadala describes itself as a sovereign investor with an entrepreneurial mindset and has invested in US-based semiconductor chipmaker GlobalFoundries, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) and the Carlyle Group.

Qatar is known for its massive trophy investments from Al Jazeera, a top global news organization, to Paris Saint-Germain, France’s top football club. The SWF, Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), has a that includes London’s Canary Wharf, stakes in the likes of German automaker Volkswagen, British bank Barclays and Anglo-Swiss multinational commodity trading and mining company Glencore.

Even tiny Kuwait is deeply invested in US Treasuries. The SWF, Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), has aggressively invested in East Asia, but most of its assets are still in the US. Interestingly, KIA is a long-term major shareholder in Mercedes-Benz.

An oft-overlooked fact is that these Gulf funds have invested tens of billions of dollars in AI. Saudi PIF has a partnership with NVIDIA/AMD, Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala joined with BlackRock and Microsoft to create a $30 billion fund. This capital will fund massive AI data centers and the energy infrastructure to power them. Not to be left behind, the QIA invested in Anthropic’s $30 billion Series G round in early 2026.

After the 2007–09 Great Recession, the Gulf states have been global investors and creditors. They have been able to deploy capital in Western economies struggling with rising debt, stagnant wages and low growth. That may no longer be true. After the US and Israel attacked Iran, Tehran has blocked the Strait of Hormuz. No longer can these Gulf nations export oil and gas or import food. Note that these Gulf nations import almost all their food and depend on desalination for daily life. Gulf revenues have crashed and costs have soared. For the first time in decades, the Gulf states face a catastrophic resource crunch. 

It is important to note that these Gulf monarchies run extremely generous welfare states. The rather small number of locals are used to massive state subsidies. Expats perform most of the work, from pilots at Emirates or Qatar Airways to workers on oil rigs. Feeding the local and expat population is essential to avoid social or political upheaval. So, the Gulf monarchies would be compelled to cannibalize their global holdings to survive their liquidity crisis. 

Prima facie, we can expect the three following developments:

1. Equity Dumping: A massive drawdown of blue-chip holdings in the US and Europe as SWFs seek immediate liquidity, causing stock prices to fall significantly.
   
2. AI Winter: A sudden pause, if not a stop, in the funding of speculative tech and AI infrastructure, where Gulf capital has been a primary engine of growth, leading to the bursting of the AI bubble.
   
3. Treasury Volatility: Gulf SWFs cease purchasing American debt because of a shortage of cash, precipitating short-term interest rates to flare uncontrollably, just as US borrowing needs hit record highs.

Note that the US debt has $39 trillion, less than five months after it first hit $38 trillion in late October 2025. When US President Donald Trump first took office in January 2017, this debt was $19.9 trillion.​ Not only has US debt nearly doubled since 2017, but interest costs have also risen to over $1 trillion per year. This has provoked even in usually complacent Congressional circles. The most recent $69 billion auction of two-year Treasuries “ tepid investor demand,” and the ten-year yield jumped from 3.94% to 4.38%. The drying up of Gulf demand for US treasuries could not have come at a worse time.

Inflationary triple threat: from disruption to devastation

The recent war in Iran has unleashed a supply-side shock similar to those in the 1970s.

In October 1973, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) imposed a total oil against countries that had supported Israel at any point during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. This war began after Egypt and Syria launched a massive surprise attack to regain territories they had lost to Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War. This attack was unsuccessful, but the US paid heavily for its support of Israel. Note that OAPEC resented the persistent decline in the value of the dollar, which was no longer convertible into gold after August 15, 1971.

By the end of the OAPEC embargo in March 1974, the price of oil had risen by 300%, triggering a decade of stagflation. This is a scenario where low growth, i.e., stagnation, combines with high inflation to cause much economic pain. Output shrinks, unemployment rises, wages don’t rise and purchasing power goes down. As economic pain increases, social unrest and political upheavals follow.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution led to another energy . Although the global oil supply decreased by only 4%, oil prices more than doubled over the next twelve months. Major Western economies avoided prolonged stagnation thanks to increased oil production and greater energy efficiency. 

More recently, the world experienced an energy shock once the Russia–Ukraine War began in February 2022. Western sanctions forced Russian oil and gas off global markets. Because Russia has used a “dark fleet” to bypass Western sanctions and mitigate the supply shock to the global economy.

The current supply shocks are stickier than either 2022 or 1979. A synchronized spike of oil, gas and fertilizer prices threatens to cause sustained inflation. A third of the fertilizers shipped globally pass through the State of Hormuz, and they are no longer reaching their destinations. As a result, crop yields will fall. Prices have already by 30% in many parts of the world. Farmers have been fretting about fuel and fertilizer driving up food prices. Additionally, food scarcity will trigger a delayed, yet violent, jump in global food prices. 

This inflationary threat has come at a time when central banks have followed loose monetary policies, including quantitative easing (de facto printing of money to buy assets), for years. A supply shock at a time when excess money sloshes around in the economy threatens to unleash hyperinflation and a painful period of stagnation.

Asian economies that are dependent on Gulf energy are suffering. Japan over 90% of its crude oil from the Gulf. Rising energy prices are already “threatening factory closures, raising prices for consumers and halting wage rises that help drive consumption growth.” Japanese markets have tumbled. So have markets elsewhere, from South Korea to Thailand. Emerging markets are likely to suffer even more.

In a nutshell, Asian markets that are structurally dependent on Gulf energy will experience a more sustained asset price decline than is currently priced in by markets. We are no longer looking at a “V-shaped” recovery, but a protracted period of global stagflation.

The medium-term: from disruption to devastation

While the current market volatility is severe, the medium-term grey swan events — foreseeable high-impact, potentially catastrophic developments — are even more chilling. There is now a real question about the sustainability of the Gulf economies. Escalating risks might cross the sustainability threshold itself.

So far, Iran has largely spared the region’s water desalination and treatment infrastructure. If Iran abandons this restraint, the Gulf would lose access to clean water. It would become physically uninhabitable, and oil production would become operationally impossible.

A water crisis has not yet started, but a food crisis is imminent. Ships carrying food to Gulf ports cannot get through the Strait of Hormuz. The collapse of exports lowers earnings precisely at a time when imports cost more. In a region of generous subsidies, the Iran war will cause a fiscal squeeze in Gulf monarchies. This squeeze would erode the social contracts of Gulf monarchies, increasing the risk of instability and regime collapse. The prospect of the current leadership in Gulf countries giving way to factions less interested in maintaining energy flows is very real.

Finally, Israel/US and Iran are firmly climbing up the escalatory ladder. Neither Israel nor the US is designed or has the stomach for a long war. The US is running short of interceptor missiles and spending a lot of money on a daily basis. Israel is suffering constant attacks and has been at war against Hamas and Hezbollah for over two years. Recently, Iran struck the towns of Arad and Dimona near the Shimon Peres Negev Nuclear Research Center in response to an Israeli attack on its Natanz nuclear facility in Isfahan province. As the kinetic conflict exhausts Israel’s traditional defenses and its capacity for endurance diminishes, the probability of an Israeli nuclear strike on Iran has moved from the unthinkable to the probable.

The Iran war has unleashed the 2026 Hormuz Crisis. To Stefan Angrick, Japan economist at Moody’s Analytics, “There is no Goldilocks scenario where the conflict ends, and everything just snaps back to the way it was.” The crisis will inexorably cause a structural realignment and very possibly a global stagflation. This is a time to prioritize liquidity, hedge aggressively against general inflation, and pivot away from dependencies on high-risk markets. We are entering a cycle where the cost of energy, together with the cost of political survival, will rewrite the rules of the global economy.

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Such a closure should have been anticipated by US planners and administration officials well before launching the first wave of attacks on February 28. The security of the Persian Gulf and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz have been a fundamental principle of US policy in the Middle East since at least the administration of Jimmy Carter in 1979.

But the administration either heed or discounted warnings from those who would have known. Trump’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, specifically Trump that a closure attempt was a real possibility. The president erroneously reasoned that once the Americans and Israelis took out the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, the Iranians would capitulate. As the administration has come to realize, this was a major failure in judgment.��

For decades, Iran has threatened to close the Strait if attacked. During the so-called phase of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Iranians tried to close the Strait but ultimately failed. Additional attempts and/or threats were made in 2011–12 and 2018–19. During the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, the Iranian parliament to close the Strait, but Tehran eventually backed off. Professional American diplomats, intelligence officers and military planners of the State and Defense (now War) Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would most certainly have known this and communicated the information up the chain.��

The US administration and its Israeli allies now face a conundrum. Even if Trump decides to declare victory and end the US attacks, Iran appears determined to maintain closure of the Strait until certain commitments are made, including a pledge not to renew attacks in the future, closure of US bases in the Middle East and payment of war reparations. There is zero chance of the US or Israel accepting such terms, and even if accepted, they would be meaningless. Tehran is certainly aware of that but seeks to save face and use such commitments as “proof of victory” to their public in a war in which they’ve suffered devastating and humiliating losses.

An avoidable problem but still hope

Trump appealed to NATO allies to commit vessels to secure safe passage in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Unsurprisingly, NATO countries with the means to do so the request. Having been left out of the planning for the attacks, NATO members were understandably reluctant to commit their forces to an operation to secure the Gulf and Strait without prior planning for such an undertaking.��

A more farsighted US administration would have reached out to NATO members well before the attack launch to propose that they support freedom of navigation operations in the area in the event the Iranians attempted closure. That would have allowed for planning and mobilization in advance. It is also the way NATO has operated throughout most of its nearly 77-year history.

Of course, it has not helped that, dating back to his first administration (2017–2021), Trump and others in his administration have used nearly every opportunity to insult, denigrate, disparage, demean and humiliate NATO members and the NATO organization. His contempt for America’s most important and oldest alliance is hardly a secret. It is also a stain on America’s image as a reliable global superpower.

There may still be hope yet for persuading some NATO allies to lend support. After all, Europe needs the Strait to be open to normal tanker and shipping traffic at least as much as the US does, and probably more. Moreover, the Gulf Arab countries also do. The administration should consider ending its rhetoric and discreetly consult NATO and Gulf countries about securely opening the Gulf and Strait. Others with similar interests, in Asia, for example, might also be persuaded. But it will require respectful, urgent and serious diplomacy. 

Such help would be most welcome as the war taxes the US military and its diminishing stocks of munitions and other critical supplies. The president has US ground forces to the region, including US Marines, and may be considering adding the elements of the US Army’s 82nd Airborne Division. While the exact purpose isn’t known, speculation suggests the US may be planning to seize Iran’s principal oil terminal and port, Kharg Island, responsible for 90% of the regime’s oil exports, or to capture or neutralize the estimated 400–440 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium stored in underground bunkers in Isfahan, but also perhaps Natanz and Fordow. These operations are fraught with challenges and risks and would be highly complex and costly for the US in terms of lives and expense, irrespective of the outcome.

Declare victory and end the war?

In addition to failing to anticipate the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the US administration and its Israeli partners failed to fully consider the commitment, fervor and resolve of Iran’s regime. It is one deeply immersed in the righteousness of their political-religious mission. To capitulate and deny that mission would be to deny their identity and betray the fundamental principles of the Islamic revolution. Married to Iran’s dominant Shi’a religious faith, which glorifies martyrdom for the faith, this revolutionary resolve takes on a dimension and depth not fully appreciated in the West. It gives the leadership and its followers, especially among the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an almost mystical or spiritual determination to defend the regime, whatever the costs and in spite of overwhelming losses and the unpopularity of the regime.

This reality leaves the US administration with few options. It may continue to wage this war and inflict ever more destruction on the country’s defenses and perhaps even economic infrastructure. The regime and the Iranian people will suffer, but the leadership will not capitulate short of annihilation. 

The US could also negotiate. But it should not expect more than short-term, tactical concessions made after extended negotiations spent haggling over microscopic details. The regime won’t negotiate itself out of existence. Its threat against the Strait is one way to demonstrate its remaining capability in the face of incalculable military and political losses. They have found the Americans’ Achilles heel: oil and the global economy. They won’t give up the Hormuz card without concessions from the US and Israel.

President Trump can also declare victory and end the US role in the war. Israel might go along. But the Iranians have a say, too, and might choose to continue threatening shipping traffic in the Gulf and Strait. It might also decide to begin enriching its remaining 400 kilograms of enriched uranium (provided it still possesses the requisite number and type of centrifuges, which is unknown). Therefore, the war does not end, though this “first phase,” if it may be called that, may. At that point, the US must decide when and how to re-engage with Iran to end Iran’s effective siege of the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. It becomes the very “forever war” against which Trump so vigorously campaigned in running for office.

There is one final alternative. But it’s one Trump and the formidable war machines of the US and Israel have little control over. It’s the Iranian people and their abiding resentment of the regime.

The war is a disaster for the regime

However the Hormuz predicament is resolved, it should not distract anyone from the country’s current state. Iran has been irreparably weakened. The Hormuz closure is a ploy intended to show that the regime still has leverage. It does indeed, but it can’t sustain a regime that’s lost its navy and air force, seen its regional proxies reduced to gun-toting tunnel dwellers and suffered significant losses in its ballistic missile capabilities. 

Its economy was already on the brink of collapse before the war started. Its currency is worthless; punishing economic sanctions will continue. It has no allies willing to come to its aid. Soon, it won’t be able to feed its people, pay public employees or conduct the most basic public services. A greater number of Iran’s middle class will slip below the poverty line. It will lack energy to cool homes and offices in Iran’s fast-approaching searing summer heat. Water shortages, which have plagued the nation for years, will worsen. The regime was helpless to resolve any of these problems before the war. It will end the war in a much worse state.

Iran’s security forces have been weakened but remain largely intact. Morale has reportedly suffered as rank-and-file IRGC forces and their paramilitary militia, the Basij, and regular armed forces, the Artesh, have helplessly watched the nation’s defense and security infrastructure systematically destroyed. Some troops aren’t getting paid, and desertions have been . Potentially worse, have begun to appear between the better-funded and more politically powerful IRGC and the larger but less supported Artesh.

Worst of all for the regime, the Iranian people will know all of this, having witnessed much of it firsthand. They and the regime know the regime is at its weakest point in its 47-year history. Oppression will increase, and the system necessary to maintain it will be more costly. There may not yet be outward signs of another uprising of the sort we saw in January. But perhaps when the war dust settles and Iranians feel safer from the war itself, they will emerge to challenge the regime again with renewed vigor, hope and rage.

When they do, it is likely to be ugly. Updated estimates of the number killed by regime security forces in January now reach more than . The next round will be worse as the regime struggles for survival against its own citizens. Should the people prevail, regime elites know their fate. Rank-and-file troops of the Artesh and police may feel hard-pressed to defend a regime they know is on life support and cannot provide for the most basic needs of government and the people. Will they be motivated to attack their own people?

If and when that happens, the world will know the Islamic Republic has reached its well- deserved end. That may be Mr. Trump’s best hope, but it’s out of his hands.

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Reports that is considering arming Iranian Kurdish groups point toward a familiar and dangerous strategy of proxy regime change — one that rests on a fundamental misreading of Iran’s demographic and political realities and carries potentially catastrophic risks not only for the US, but for the wider region and beyond.

A geographic misunderstanding 

To begin with, the strategy appears poorly informed about Iran’s internal political and demographic realities. Iran’s Kurdish population represents a relatively small minority of the country’s roughly 90 million people. Most place their numbers between 8% and 10%. 

They are concentrated largely in the mountainous northwest of the country along the borders with Iraq and Turkey, hundreds of miles from the political and economic center of gravity around Tehran. By contrast, the majority of the population is ethnically Persian, around 60%, with a long and deeply rooted sense of national identity stretching back more than two millennia. Two factors further make the idea even more problematic. 

First, most Iranian Kurds are Sunni Muslims in a country where more than of the population is Shia. That sectarian divide is not trivial. Sunni–Shia tensions have shaped Middle Eastern politics for centuries and continue to structure alliances and rivalries across the region. Arming a small Sunni Kurdish minority in the hope of toppling a Shia Persian state suggests a fundamental misreading of the country’s ethnic and sectarian realities by US national security advisers.  

Second, the largest Kurdish population in the region is not in Iran at all but in southeastern Turkey, where Kurdish groups have fought a bitter against Ankara, in the capital of Turkey, for more than 40 years. During the Syrian Civil War, the US armed and supported forces as part of its campaign against the Islamic State. 

Once that mission was largely accomplished and American support began to recede, Turkey intervened militarily to weaken those same Kurdish forces, fearing they would embolden its own Kurdish minority. In other words, Kurdish proxy strategies rarely remain neatly contained within national borders.

Poor strategizing and underestimating 

There is also a broader strategic risk. Attempts to overthrow regimes from the outside often produce the opposite of the intended effect. Rather than weakening the government in Tehran, overt foreign support for insurgent groups could encourage Iranians, many of whom are critical of their own leadership, to rally around the flag in the face of . 

Iran also possesses far stronger state cohesion than many outsiders assume. While the regime faces significant domestic dissent, as evidenced by the in recent months, the Iranian state itself has proven resilient, a war with Iraq, decades of sanctions and sustained external pressure.

The alternative scenario may be even worse. Iran is a country of 90 million people, geographically larger than Texas and California combined, with a complex ethnic mosaic and a long history of regional power politics. If the state were to fragment into civil war, the conflict would almost certainly draw in outside powers. Russia and China, both of which maintain with Tehran, could support competing factions to counter American influence.

History offers few examples where external powers successfully engineer regime change through minority proxies. Far more often, such strategies produce fragmentation, civil war and prolonged instability. Pursuing that path in Iran risks turning one of the Middle East’s largest and most historically cohesive states into the next Syria, only vastly larger and far more dangerous. 

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When impeachment becomes routine

Geurts begins by explaining that presidential turnover in Peru has become normalized. “It has become a kind of a folkloric event to change presidents,” he observes, capturing how this otherwise extraordinary situation has become routine. The immediate triggers may vary, from corruption allegations to political maneuvering, but the underlying mechanism is clear.

Congress holds the decisive lever. With 87 out of 130 votes, lawmakers can remove a president, and since 2016, they have repeatedly exercised that power. Geurts traces this shift to a narrow election that year, when a razor-thin presidential victory collided with a hostile congressional majority aligned with former autocratic President Alberto Fujimori’s political legacy. That confrontation set a precedent. Once Congress realized it could unseat presidents, it began using impeachment as a tool of political strategy rather than a last resort.

From 2000 to 2016, presidents often governed with minority support but survived by negotiating with Congress. That political culture has now eroded, replaced by constant brinkmanship between the two branches.

Presidency weakened, Congress empowered

The result is a system in which the president formally controls the executive but operates under persistent threat. Geurts argues that, in practice, Congress has emerged as the dominant force. Political parties within it act less as coherent ideological blocs and more as shifting alliances, often driven by short-term interests.

This fluidity produces what he describes as a “cat and mouse game” between Congress and the executive. While the president retains the theoretical power to dissolve Congress after repeated votes of no confidence, lawmakers have strong incentives to avoid such outcomes. Many benefit materially from their positions, while others maintain ties to powerful local or even illicit economic networks.

The removal of interim President José Jerí in February illustrates this dynamic. Although the allegations against him — contacts with lobbyists and questionable appointments — were relatively minor by local standards, Congress found a procedural workaround to remove him without the required supermajority. The episode illustrates how politicians often bend legal mechanisms to serve political ends.

Fragmented politics and the 2026 test

Looking ahead, the electoral landscape offers little immediate reassurance. With dozens of parties and candidates, Peru’s political system is highly fragmented. Many parties function less as enduring institutions and more as vehicles built around individual candidates or narrow interests.

Geurts bluntly notes that some of them are backed up by lobbies of informal, sometimes even criminal, sectors. Such fragmentation makes it easier for outsider or disruptive candidates to reach the decisive second round of presidential elections, often without broad-based support.

Still, reforms tied to the 2026 elections may begin to reshape the system. A new electoral threshold will require parties to secure at least 5% of the vote and representation across multiple districts to enter Congress. This could reduce the number of parties and encourage more stable coalitions.

Simultaneously, Peru will return to a bicameral legislature, reintroducing a Senate abolished in the 1990s under Fujimori. In theory, a second chamber could improve the quality of legislation by adding scrutiny. In practice, public skepticism runs deep, with many Peruvians viewing the Senate as little more than an expansion of political patronage.

Peru’s economy defies the chaos

One of the most striking aspects of Peru’s situation is the disconnect between political instability and economic performance. Despite constant leadership changes, the economy has remained relatively stable. Strong institutions, particularly an independent central bank, have insulated monetary policy from political turbulence, while high commodity prices have supported growth.

Geurts recounts a telling remark circulating in the region: “The real president of this country is the president of the central bank.” This reflects both the strength of economic governance and the weakness of political leadership.

Yet this stability has limits. Without a functioning government capable of investing in infrastructure and addressing rising crime, economic growth remains constrained. Analysts suggest that Peru could grow significantly faster under more stable political conditions.

Public frustration without revolt

For ordinary Peruvians, the constant churn in leadership has produced a mix of frustration and resignation. Citizens express dissatisfaction not only with politicians but also with public services, from healthcare and education to infrastructure. Rising crime, particularly extortion in poorer urban areas, has deepened the sense of insecurity.

And yet, widespread unrest has not materialized. Geurts attributes this to a combination of economic resilience and daily necessity. Much of the population works in the informal sector, relying on daily income to survive. As he explains, “They have no time to go to the streets because every day they go to the street, there is no income.”

This tension between dissatisfaction and survival helps sustain the status quo. Peru’s political system may be unstable, but it persists because the conditions for large-scale upheaval have not fully coalesced.

Incremental reforms and institutional adjustments offer some hope for the upcoming elections. But as Geurts cautions, these remain aspirations rather than guarantees. For now, Peru continues to navigate a fragile equilibrium, where political disorder coexists with economic continuity, and where stability remains an open question.

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At present, of course, our society is one in which US President Donald J. Trump is the quintessential seeker of power, a man who needs power the way most of us need food. And as it happens, he has at his beck and call not just the entire military establishment, but the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency. With him in the White House, power is distinctly in fashion.

Personal power

Married and with children, my brother, who was a veteran, kept guns in his basement. “To hunt,” he told me when I objected. But he didn’t hunt, not in Nassau County, New York, where he lived. He didn’t take part in a sport that cost money he didn’t have to travel somewhere, get licenses and who knows what else. Did he keep guns because he felt afraid? Absolutely not, he insisted. Was his neighborhood one with many break-ins? No, he assured me. So, why did he need weapons in his basement? He couldn’t say, except that it was important to him to own them.

Why? I kept asking him. As a soldier, he reminded me, he had been taught that without his gun, he was in danger of being killed.

Had he been a man of means, that inculcation wouldn’t, I suspect, have been as powerful, but he wasn’t and never did feel empowered. He’s gone now, but his world isn’t. Guns remain as much a staple in the United States as potatoes.

Well-off families keep guns, too — I hope in locked places — and have the money to buy hunting rifles, licenses and whatever other paraphernalia they need. But in the US today, all too many guns, sometimes even untraceable “,” aren’t locked in boxes, but carried by young people on the streets and even sometimes into schools. Many of the guns on the streets of inner cities, in rural areas and even in some suburbs are unlicensed, stolen ones. And a desire/need to be seen/known/heard frequently leads to someone shooting others with one of those weapons in a , or .

Nearly people died from gun-related injuries in this country in 2023 alone. Such shootings occur more often in the US than in any other nation. Why?

Under the Trump administration, when more is taken away from people than given to them, guns offer those who carry them a reprieve from a sense of powerlessness over their daily lives and futures. Many of them are young people alienated by a society that cares little about their well-being. With a gun in hand, they experience steadiness, security and, yes, hope (however false it may prove to be).

With a weak social safety net, a gun offers a false sense of personal power and security. Should anyone come too close and aggravate the anger that may be boiling inside, however, that gun could go off. And who wouldn’t be angry? Too many young people in working-class families today are unsure where they might be headed and fear the dead-end jobs that they know lie in their future.

The Trump administration, of course, offers such young people little or nothing. And if they weren’t born in the US, they face the everyday menace of fear, degradation and deportation. In America today, immigrants have become the scapegoats for such unvarnished racism that it takes one’s breath away. And don’t imagine that this is about so-called borders. Not a chance! Rather, it’s part of the alleged cooked up by Trump and his advisor, Stephen Miller, to rid the country of as many people of color as they can, with the end result being white supremacy.

Though guns should be difficult if not impossible to obtain, like narcotics, they are, in fact, available around more or less any corner in the most impoverished areas of any state. To stop the acquisition of guns, we would need more than enacted laws. We would also need to strengthen hope and offer a deeper belief in the daily safety of those who don’t for a moment feel taken care of in the world’s most powerful country.

And there’s no hiding from those in need how power is used to procure more and more money for the already wealthy, the of our world.

Why should some, but not most of us, have an equal chance to do more than survive? For too many, their present and future safety becomes their personal problem. Meanwhile, Trump and crew are busily engaged in pursuing military and imperial power to gain yet more wealth for themselves and other billionaires, none of which enhances the power of the American people. And don’t forget that Trump’s toxicity is a vile infection that spreads daily from the Oval Office.

From toy guns to machine guns to tanks

From toy guns to actual machine guns, the US offers a constant example of how to express power through weaponry. There are the guns of war, the guns of intimidation and the guns used against countries whose governments we choose to assault.

Take Venezuela, where a recent US military sneak attack untold numbers of civilians and snatched its president, Nicolás Maduro, to imprison him in the US. That, I say, is one hell of a lot of nerve. I sincerely doubt Trump did that to make life better for the Venezuelan people, but to that country’s oil riches, which he plans to use for the benefit of US oil companies.��

And with that in mind, let me head into the past for a moment. In 1968, when riots erupted to protest the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., first appeared on the streets of American inner cities — big, bulging, heavy vehicles, much like the ones being used in the Vietnam War that was raging concurrently.��

That moment could be seen as the public start of the militarization of this country’s police — the start but far from the end of it, which we see today, 77 years later, in states like Minnesota. There, masked, gun-carrying Border Patrol and federalized ICE agents have invaded, terrorizing and innocent civilians and pulling people out of their cars to deposit them in deportation camps. Such scenes not only increase the frustration and fear of so many Americans, but also the desire to carry licensed (or unlicensed) guns to protect themselves.

ICE is the most recent incarnation of weaponization in this country, in which the agents themselves have become the weapons.

Such macho terrorizing actions as in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota; Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles, California; and other cities, involving the rounding up of immigrants, are all too much like the 1930s in Nazi Germany rounding up Jews. The way I see it, such use of terror is not only sanctioned by the Trump government but also encouraged by racists like Miller. He is the quintessential representation of where this country is headed, if not quickly stopped.

In addition to guns, ICE agents other weapons of war: fire suppressers, lasers, accessory mounts, dump pouches, magazine wells — and they use drones. They even use pepper spray and other debilitating substances against those who protest their terror.

War is now being waged against Americans on the streets of our country. This is not only antithetical to all our laws, but distinctly unconstitutional and, of course, immoral to the nth degree. Such weapons are perfected for one reason: to kill.

Unsurprisingly, the Trump administration is spending ever more money on the Defense Department (now the of War), instead of on health, education, science and so much else. And Trump wants to far more. Guns before butter is an old , which we simply must not accept.

The people’s power

In Minnesota, ordinary people organized against ICE’s cruel actions. Their resistance was not only brave, but an important example of the ways in which the people have chosen good over the actions and behaviors of a bad government, president and the Millers of this world. As demonstrated there, we Americans have refused to go quietly into ICE’s nightmare. We wouldn’t stand for such injustice and intuitively began organizing to meet the needs of our neighbors and those who are being treated horribly. Ordinary citizens organized watch groups, food groups, school groups, even singing groups, inspired by an innate sense of justice and hatred of injustice.

The struggle of Americans during the siege of Minnesota has indeed had results. The Department of Homeland Security, Trump, Miller and their cohorts have lost some credibility and perhaps some of their ability to frighten people into obedience. It’s more than unfortunate, however, that, in the process, children did and will the unjust power exhibited by ICE and Trump.

The use of guns will undoubtedly continue to be a staple of Trump’s war of intimidation. As the outline illustrates, his followers are laying the groundwork for the few to rule the many at the cost of our freedom.

The Russian playwright Anton Chekhov once that, if you introduce a gun in Act One, make sure to use it by the end of the play. In other words, unless stopped, what the Trump administration has been doing will only grow more brutal. Its attempt to militarize this country goes beyond the Department of War to other government departments like the Department of Homeland Security. Its plebeian belief that might is the only right (and only its right) is also its way of opening a road that could lead to an authoritarian government, where voting itself would become endangered.

We’re living through an exceptionally dark time where tyranny and lies at home, and the rapidly accelerating destruction of our planet (with a distinct from Trump), are happening in tandem. Our elected representatives have shown themselves to be spectacularly ill-prepared in the face of such threats.

But neither the president nor his government owns the people. We the people have power, too. There is power in knowledge, power in organizing and power in resistance, all of which can be used to halt the brutality and lies of this administration. Moreover, the people have the numbers. I confidently believe that if we wish not to be overtaken by an authoritarian government in whose hands many more will suffer, it’s important to resist now.

We the people know how to do that. We have done so throughout history. We have rallied and demonstrated. We have called on our neighbors, friends and families. We have called on our local media. We have called on members of Congress. We have written letters and posted signs and billboards. We have sat in protest, walked in protest and even gone to jail in protest. And we weren’t to be stopped. We made our voices heard across society. We appeared in thousands of towns and cities across America.

The history of this country has shown countless times that people together resisting and fighting for justice, even without guns, can win. It was how we won Social Security, ended child labor, stifled the military’s pursuit of the Vietnam War, and that’s just to start down a long list of examples. In January, on MS Now, television host and political analyst Lawrence O’Donnell : “The protestors always win. It takes longer than it should, and people die, but the protestors always win.”

History proves O’Donnell right.

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Given these constraints, the of approximately 55% in participating constituencies is relatively high for a country affected by widespread displacement, armed violence and political polarization. The military authorities presented the elections as a step toward restoring political order and ending open hostilities, though critics remain skeptical about their inclusiveness and intent.

The political process was also closely watched by neighboring countries, including India, as the situation in Myanmar is increasingly shaping not only border security and refugee flows, but the geoeconomic ambitions of regional players, as well.

Consolidation of power

The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), closely associated with Min Aung Hlaing’s military regime, won the majority of the contested seats. The USDP now has a majority in both chambers of Parliament. They secured 232 of the 263 seats in the lower Pyithu Hluttaw and 109 of the 157 seats announced so far in the upper Amyotha Hluttaw. Combined with the constitutionally mandated allocation of 25% of parliamentary seats to unelected military appointees, this outcome gives the military junta effective control of the legislature and forecloses meaningful parliamentary opposition. In practical terms, the election has reinforced existing power structures, lending formal political cover to continued military authority rather than altering the balance of power.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to certify or endorse the election, stating that conditions for a credible and inclusive process were absent and confirming that no ASEAN observer mission would be deployed. Meanwhile, neighboring states that have direct security and economic interests in Myanmar took a more pragmatic position.

China publicly welcomed the completion of the election and reiterated its support for stability and continued bilateral cooperation, framing the vote as part of a domestic political process. India had previously support for Myanmar’s plan to hold elections in a “fair and inclusive” manner and sent monitoring teams. These actions and rhetoric reflect New Delhi’s priority for stability and sustained engagement over diplomatic isolation. Vietnam and Cambodia also sent observers, signaling a willingness among some regional actors to maintain channels of contact with Naypyidaw despite broader international skepticism. This position reflected longstanding divisions within the bloc regarding engagement with Myanmar’s post-coup authorities.

Myanmar’s instability and India’s security

For New Delhi, developments in Naypyidaw are directly related to domestic security concerns. The Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram share a 1,643-kilometer border with Myanmar. The conflict in Myanmar has intensified since 2021, creating instability in weakly controlled border regions, such as Mizoram and Manipur.

Indian law enforcement agencies have reported an increase in cross-border crimes, including weapons and drug smuggling, militia infiltration and the establishment of insurgent training camps. In Mizoram’s Champhai, Saiha and Lawngtlai districts, operations have led to the seizure of explosives, weapons and narcotics. Between September 2025 and January 2026, the value of confiscated illegal substances $15.5 million. Further north, Manipur authorities 22 drug smuggling cases and 12 arms trafficking cases in the first quarter of 2025 alone.

The instability in Myanmar, caused by conflict between the junta and the NUG as well as deep internal divisions between local national insurgents fighting on the side of opposition forces, creates conditions for a growing number of refugees and causes civil and ethnic unrest.

In mid-2025, clashes between the Myanmar militia groups Chin National Front (CNF) and Chin Defense Force (CDF) up to 4,400 people to flee to the Indian state of Mizoram. By March 2026, the number of officially registered Myanmar nationals in Mizoram had 28,355. Of these, 27,574 had passed biometric registration. The total of Myanmar asylum seekers in India is more than 86,000. Despite the deep ethnic kinship between the majority Mizo people in Mizoram and the Chin people in Myanmar, this prompted the deployment of additional police and Assam Rifles units.

The influx of Myanmar refugees has led to growing tension amongst the locals due to the increase in competition for limited job opportunities as the state grapples with rising youth unemployment, which is to be around 12%. Furthermore, the situation is worsening due to the rising crime rate. In June 2025, Mizoram Home Minister K. Sapdanga that more than 50% of criminal cases in the state were linked to individuals who had entered the country illegally or as refugees.

The rising cost of internal strain

While Mizoram is more tolerant of refugees from Myanmar, neighboring Manipur is notorious for ethnic violence. On May 3, 2023, a dispute between the Meitei majority in Manipur and the Chin communities over Scheduled Tribe status escalated into a . Rooted in territory and identity, the situation was significantly exacerbated by the influx of approximately 10,000 refugees from Myanmar, resulting in at least 260 deaths and the displacement of over 60,000 people. Meitei groups also the growth of new settlements and a 30% increase in poppy cultivation as evidence of a “narcoterrorist” threat from Myanmar. This the Indian government to scrap the Free Movement Regime, which allowed local tribes to travel freely without visas, and to start construction of a border fence in February 2024.

This situation poses a significant threat to India’s domestic security and challenges its geoeconomic ambitions. Regions affected by conflict, such as Manipur in India, which borders Chin state, one of the three regions bordering India, are of particular concern as they are along the India–Myanmar–Thailand . This route is a flagship connectivity project under India’s Act East policy. New Delhi has invested over $250 million in the project directly and has extended more than $1 billion in credit lines for broader ASEAN connectivity initiatives.��

Studies on ASEAN-India cooperation that extending these corridors to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam could generate up to $70 billion in additional regional GDP and create around 20 million jobs by the middle of the decade. India is to benefit from this expansion through increased trade and development in its northeast region. However, persistent insecurity in Myanmar and its derivatives continues to construction, raise costs and cast uncertainty over the project’s long-term viability.

Elections in the border regions

Ahead of and during the electoral process, the junta pursued local negotiations with ethnic armed organizations to secure ceasefires or tacit noninterference, thereby enabling limited polling, particularly in border areas. These efforts yielded mixed results. Chin State was almost entirely excluded from the electoral process because resistance forces linked to the NUG and local People’s Defense Force units retained significant territorial control there. These armed groups rejected the vote outright, preventing the establishment of conditions for polling.

In Sagaing and Kachin, the situation was similarly fragmented. Armed actors repeatedly attempted to disrupt the election by targeting logistics and security deployments. In Sagaing, 11 of the 34 townships were from voting due to security concerns, and clashes were reported in seven others during the election. In Kachin State, elections could not be held in four townships and additional incidents were recorded in two more.

While areas immediately adjacent to the Indian border remained relatively calm during the initial phase, security conditions deteriorated further inland as the process continued. Myanmar Witness over 150 conflict-related incidents in townships that were officially designated as “active” or “stable” for voting. Insurgent groups sought to derail the process by threatening officials and voters, attacking supply routes and otherwise intimidating people.

An unsettled outcome

Although the junta held elections in most accessible areas and established institutional control, stability remains elusive because the NUG and affiliated insurgent groups have invested significant resources in preventing ceasefires and disrupting electoral activity rather than facilitating political de-escalation.

The elections showed that the war in Myanmar won’t stop in the short term and that political dialogue is the only way forward. All foreign actors should assist in this dialogue, and the idea of “isolation” should not be supported. The election was a reminder to all critics of Min Aung Hlaing’s military regime that the USDP has its supporters, even if their number is less than the official electoral statistics indicate. It’s impossible to ignore this part of the population and their interests. Otherwise, the situation will be mirrored, and the NUG will become another totalitarian regime.

The stance of key international actors, such as India and China, has reinforced the rationale behind taking a calibrated and pragmatic approach to Myanmar. India’s strategy prioritizes stability, dialogue and reducing violence over ideological positioning, aiming to achieve tangible results. New Delhi continues to engage with the authorities in Naypyidaw, not to endorse military rule, but to preserve border security, sustain humanitarian access and maintain channels for political de-escalation.

This stance contrasts with that of several ASEAN members, whose refusal to engage with the junta has enabled opposition forces to reject ceasefires and disrupt the electoral process through armed conflict. Only a change in approach among ASEAN countries and mediation could bring peace closer. Without offering feasible political solutions, isolating the Naypyidaw authorities could prolong the conflict and have regional consequences, including human casualties and destroy Myanmar’s economic potential for years. Moreover, it will affect neighboring countries with escalating refugee crises and ethnic tensions, as well as undermine projects that would promote social and economic growth in Myanmar and throughout Southeast Asia.

[ first published a version of this piece on February 6, 2026.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Myanmar’s Elections and the Future of India’s Act East Strategy appeared first on 51�Թ�.

As we write this, the world is in turmoil, and you have many matters of international importance that need your attention. Be that as it may, it is equally our Dharma (“duty”) that we speak frankly to you about the decision of your government to introduce the Indian University Grants Commission (UGC) — the country’s statutory body for the coordination, determination and maintenance of standards of university education. These regulations, notified on January 13, 2026, and meant to “promote equity in higher education,” also risk deepening social division. The fact that the honorable Supreme Court took quick cognizance of its implications and granted an interim until March 19, 2026, suggests that something is seriously amiss.

Just as you consider yourself Bharat’s (India’s) Pradhan Sevak (“prime servant”), we consider ourselves Janata Janardhan (the public is god), who have the responsibility to raise our voice against policies we believe to be wrong, not just at the election hustings but directly and promptly before they cause irreparable damage to society. We hope this letter reaches you, perhaps magnified by the mainstream press or conveyed by those who have access to you.

Beyond the politics: a call for course correction

We confess we do not know the specific processes, personalities, politics, ambitions, jealousies, political calculations or pressure groups, whether open or covert, national or international, that together led to the issuance of these regulations. That is now behind us.

However, it seems fairly certain that if the damage caused by these regulations is not addressed promptly, widespread social discontent may follow, which can also have unfortunate repercussions for the Indian diaspora in the US. Many questions arise. You speak of getting rid of the colonial mindset. Why then borrow the Marxist binary of oppressor and oppressed classes and ignore the complex and nuanced ground realities of an aspirational society?  

We are comforted by the fact that you have the political courage to reverse a decision and course correct when necessary. We appeal to you to do so at the earliest. The long-term impact of the UGC regulations could aggravate conflicts within Sanatan society and may undo much of what you have achieved in rekindling civilizational confidence.

The leadership moment: clarity before the court

Having said that, it is not for us to suggest specific steps. However, one thing is clear: You must speak on this issue so that the nation knows your mind before the Supreme Court hearing. It is not for the Supreme Court to run the country; that responsibility lies with the elected government. As Pradhan Sevak, your voice carries decisive moral and political weight.

We request that you address the nation and clarify your stand on this issue by March 19, 2026. We believe reverse discrimination is discrimination. We oppose any measure that increases divisions, regardless of its stated intention. We are firmly against hate, abuse or discrimination of any kind. We support meritocracy while genuinely helping the socially marginalized, as mandated by the Constitution. We also suggest that the dissolution of caste consciousness be explicitly adopted as a national goal. 

We look forward to hearing you speak to Bharat before the Supreme Court gives its decision.

Dhanyavad (“thank you”),

Mohinder Gulati

Ex Chief Operating Officer, 

UN Sustainable Energy for All, and Advisor, World Bank (Retired)

Rahul Sur

Indian Police Service (Retired)

UN (Retired)

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post An Open Letter to Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the New UGC Guidelines appeared first on 51�Թ�.

These achievements are politically because they concern not only Spanish as a language, but also what the language, music and the artist himself represent. In light of the of violent racism and civil rights against Hispanic, Latinx, Latin American and immigrant individuals in the US, both in and in , recognizing and representing these groups is of the utmost importance.

A cultural moment that challenged national narratives

Bad Bunny’s popularity speaks to the resilience of the Latinx diaspora and the undeniable truth of a multilingual, multicultural and multiracial America. It’s safe to assume that almost every person of Caribbean, Latinx or Latin American descent who watched the halftime show felt emotional and experienced a much-needed sense of pride.

However, US President Donald Trump as a “slap in the face to our country” on his social media account. Based on this characterization of the show, I infer that the president recognizes the halftime show as a challenge to his idea of the nation.

Indeed, it was a slap in the face when considering what Bad Bunny’s masterful performance challenged. The reason for the slap is not because it was “terrible” nor because “nobody understands this guy,” as Trump alleged. No, the performance was a slap in the face because it challenged the long-held beliefs of those who support colonialism and white supremacy.

For a country whose greatness is tied to the dispossession of indigenous populations and immigration, it served as a reality check and a historical reminder. Negating the significance of the performance shows an inability to recognize the large Spanish-speaking population in the US and a lack of insight into the shared history of the Americas.

This collective history includes the fact that indigenous populations in the Americas, including parts of the US, were by Spain before the US existed. Spanish was once a colonial language, but today, it is also a symbol of cultural rebellion against Anglo-imperialist ideals of homogeneity, especially given the racialization and criminalization of Spanish speakers.

In the same social media post mentioned earlier, Trump added that the performance “made no sense.” However, the performance struck a chord precisely because it resonated with a large global audience and was deeply relevant to history.

From viral artist to symbol of the Americas

Through this spectacular production, Bad Bunny showed the world that America has multiple meanings and identities — and that more than one person can define them. Since he first went viral in 2016 with his SoundCloud hit “”, and going from working in a supermarket in San Juan to the multimillionaire he is today, Bad Bunny’s artistic persona reflects the multifaceted, complex and intersectional character of the Americas.

In one of the songs from his 2023 Nadie Sabe Lo Que Va A Pasar Mañana (No One Knows What Tomorrow Will Bring), called “,” Bad Bunny tells the story of how he went from humble beginnings to attending the famous Monaco Formula 1 Grand Prix. As he says in , he is hanging out with actors like Leonardo DiCaprio and Brad Pitt, discussing topics that only billionaires can understand. During the performance hosted by the NFL, when “Monaco” was playing, he delivered a message in Spanish directly to the camera that said, “I never stopped believing in myself. You should also believe in yourself. You’re worth more than you think. Believe me.” Minutes later, he took a moment to whisper, “Puerto Rico, never stop believing in yourself.”

The above parallel between his own journey and that of Puerto Rico is just one example of the many tributes he has paid to his homeland since he began making albums. Bad Bunny’s massive representation has always occurred alongside his public denunciation of Puerto Rico’s involuntary dependency on the US.

For example, “,” a 2018 hit, was the first of many protest songs and Puerto Rican anthems written by Bad Bunny. The song alludes to the messages that Puerto Ricans sent to their loved ones in the diaspora after the caused by Hurricane Maria, which exposed the island’s structural neglect. These anthems, along with some of his public statements and at protests, are a lesser-known aspect of his fame. His unique, melodic, gravelly voice and his ability to blend depth and emptiness in his lyrics with Afro-Caribbean rhythms sometimes overshadow his activism. However, his cultural relevance has caught the attention of academics. Numerous panels, and have been developed around him.

In addition to taking a political stance on Puerto Rico, many of his greatest hits, such as “” and “,” focus on the freedom to express gender and sexuality, central themes to his popularity. All of these songs were featured in the halftime show. However, his latest album, Debí Tirar Más Fotos, was the key focus in the show’s production. This is noteworthy because the album on the disputed history of Puerto Rican sovereignty. Given the resurgence of imperialism under the Trump administration, the fate of Puerto Rico becomes particularly relevant. This resurgence is evident in Trump’s renewed territorial expansionist efforts, such as his interest in and his interventionism abroad, as seen in .��

Puerto Rico has remained the last occupied Spanish-speaking territory since Italian explorer Christopher Columbus set foot on the island in 1492, and the US the island from Spain in 1898. After invading the island, the US made Puerto Rico a free-associated state, granting some rights but taking many others away. These include the right to vote in US elections and, most importantly, the right to national sovereignty. In this regard, the “Lo que le pasó a Hawái” or “What Happened to Hawaii” is one of the most powerful in Debí Tirar Más Fotos, as it conveys the hope that Puerto Rico won’t suffer the same fate as Hawaii and be forced into US statehood.

The nation’s is a contested subject in Puerto Rico and the US Congress. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, for instance, has been one of the most advocates of the Self-Determination Bill, and Puerto Ricans have held displaying the complexities and divisiveness of existing in the ambiguity between statehood and self-determination. As I mentioned earlier, Bad Bunny has long advocated for Puerto Rican independence. For example, he has publicly that he “would never want to see Puerto Rico become a state.”

Cultural pride and memory on the halftime stage

Another major theme of Bad Bunny’s Super Bowl performance was his tribute to and recognition of the Puerto Rican, Latinx and Caribbean communities in the US. Through props and imagery, the production not only denounced a long history of resistance to cultural homogenization and erasure but also honored the profound influence of the diaspora on the US’s cultural heritage and social fabric.

For example, Bad Bunny brought the iconic Highland Park Mexican in Los Angeles to the stage, while also paying homage to the importance of the Caribbean in New York City and to the development of Latinx music genres based there, such as salsa. During his halftime performance of “,” the stage was designed to resemble a classic New York street, featuring a bodega next to a Dominican barbershop. The song opens with a remix of “Si te quieres divertir, solo tienes que vivir un verano en Nueva York” by the El Gran Combo de Puerto Rico, which translates to “If you want to have fun, you only have to spend one summer in New York.”

With all eyes on him during the performance of “Nuevayol,” Bad Bunny sang about one of the city’s attractions, “Un shot de cañita en casa de Toñita,” as Toñita, the octogenarian heart and soul of the last Caribbean in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, handed him a drink. As he gradually became the global phenomenon he is today, Bad Bunny made rare appearances at this small social club, located in a Nuyorican neighborhood on the verge of , in the heart of trendy, homogenized Williamsburg.

Bringing Toñita to center stage at the halftime show in San Francisco embodies the struggle of Latinx and Caribbean diaspora communities against gentrification, developers, and other forms of attempts at erasure. Just as the Caribbean Social Club provides a physical and symbolic space for the hispanophone immigrant community, the opening scene of the original “Nuevayol” music video features the Puerto Rican flag flying atop the Statue of Liberty — a well-known entry point for immigrants. In line with the overall sentiment of the song, this tribute to the 1977 Puerto Rican Nationalist of the statue also signals the legitimacy of the immigrant presence in the US.

Bad Bunny’s portrayal of the Nuyorican experience is part of the broader history of the Puerto Rican diaspora’s grassroots activism and art. The first large wave of Puerto Rican immigration to New York in the 1950s. This set the stage for a vibrant second generation of Nuyorican artists and activists who flourished in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, the Nuyorican Poets established a groundbreaking hub for slam poetry in the Lower East Side, and the Young Lords was a pivotal civil rights group. One of the Young Lords’ most notable protests against the lack of public services in their neighborhoods occurred in 1968 when they took over a Methodist church in Harlem and converted it into a daycare center. Given this history, Bad Bunny’s proud representation of Boricuas in the US cements his position within the long tradition of Latinx artists and activists who have fought against the neglect and of their communities while raising awareness through protest art.

Similarly to how Bad Bunny made his way into the most popular American sporting event despite the longstanding institutional exclusion of those he represents, Nuyorican and Latinx communities have historically forged numerous artistic and cultural paths. As previously mentioned, the confluence of rhythms and ethnicities in New York City’s cultural landscape laid the groundwork for the creation of salsa, the most globally influential Latinx genre to date. Although salsa rhythms originated in Cuba and Puerto Rico, the genre did not become established until the founding of the Brooklyn-based , which made 1960’s New York central to its formation.��

In Bad Bunny’s Debí Tirar Más Fotos, salsa takes center stage as he blends orchestral salsa with Puerto Rican , as well as his upscale reggaeton and dembow production styles. Of all the songs on the album, “,” meaning “unforgettable dance,” stands out because it reinterprets and reestablishes the genre. During the halftime show, “Baile Inolvidable” followed Lady Gaga’s performance of a salsa-inspired version of her hit “Die with a Smile.” Bad Bunny danced to “Baile Inolvidable” with Lady Gaga, symbolizing a sense of binational and bilingual unity through rhythm and dance. In several early , before achieving (and maybe even surpassing) Gaga’s global fame, Bad Bunny Lady Gaga as his biggest idol. Their Super Bowl collaboration sends a message of unity and serves as a testament to Bad Bunny’s success story.

A moment of justice: Ricky Martin and the politics of language

His second guest was his fellow Puerto Rican, Ricky Martin. Martin is an iconic Latino artist from a previous generation who “La Copa de la Vida” at the 1999 Super Bowl. The National Football League made him translate the song to “The Cup of Life.” Because Ricky Martin wasn’t allowed to sing in Spanish in the ‘90s, his a cappella performance of “Lo que le pasó a Hawaii” during Bad Bunny’s halftime show has been called an “.” This moment of vindication alone conveys the symbolic intensity of the entire show.

Right before Ricky Martin’s emotional performance, we saw Bad Bunny give his Grammy to a young child and whisper, “Puerto Rico, cree siempre en ti.” The camera stayed on the child for a moment, allowing us time to reflect. Some that the boy represented either Bad Bunny’s past self or Puerto Rico. Others speculated that he was Liam Conejo Ramos, the five-year-old boy who was infamously detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and later . Although the child was an actor, the speculation sheds light on what was on people’s minds as they watched the performance.

Shortly after the shot of the child holding the Grammy Award, Martin’s voice is heard singing the chilling words: “Quieren quitarme el río y también la playa, quieren el barrio mío y que abuelita se vaya. No sueltes la bandera,” which translates to “They want to take my river and my beaches. They want my neighborhood and my grandma to leave. Don’t let go of the flag.” Soon after, Bad Bunny is seen holding a large Puerto Rican flag in the middle of a sugarcane field. The flag is light blue instead of the official darker shade. Incidentally, this flag was from 1948 to 1957 due to laws intended to suppress Puerto Rican nationalism. This moment of him in the field holding the unofficial flag resonates, as stated, with his long-term making of protest anthems.

One such protest anthem is the hit “” (or “The Blackout”), in which a female voice states the same sentiment as in “Lo que le pasó a Hawaii” with the words “No me quiero ir de aquí, que se vayan ellos,” or “I don’t want to leave, let them be the ones to go.” Furthermore, the official video of the song features a short documentary on the human impacts that foreign interests have had on the island.

The song “El Apagón” also has its own epic moment in the Super Bowl. As dancers dressed as sugarcane workers climb electric posts, Bad Bunny sings, “Everyone wants to be Latino, but they lack flavor, energy and reggaetón.” The 2022 version of the song is a testimony to the long-lasting aftermath of Hurricane María in 2017 and the insufficient US aid that left the island without electricity for days. “El Apagón” immediately became an anthem and a form of historical memory for the island’s neglect.

In addition to exposing the unequal and racialized distribution of public aid, the song unveils a centuries-long, systemic colonial worldview. Both “Lo que le pasó a Hawai” and “El Apagón” epitomize what groundbreaking Black feminist scholar Bell Hooks termed “imperialist nostalgia” in her 1992 Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance. This concept describes the paradox by which imperialism destroys and enslaves conquered territories while simultaneously idolizing and mystifying them as paradises to be exploited and visited, or as fashionable aesthetics to be imitated. Thus, the idea that “everyone wants to be Latino” carries significant implications.

“Seguimos Aquí”: identity, sovereignty and the power of presence

Toward the end of the halftime show, a group of flag-holders takes the stage and surrounds the , a signature prop from his latest world tour. From the overhead camera view, we see all the flags being raised. First is the US flag, followed by the Puerto Rican flag and then the flags of all the other nations in the Americas. Throughout the show, we have seen flags emerge as a recurring theme in the symbols employed to vindicate national identity and self-determination. After focusing on the flags, the camera moves to Benito, who is grabbing a football.��

Holding the football, he begins, “God bless America.” Then he continues, “Be it Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and so on.” Bad Bunny made a point of acknowledging all the countries in the Americas. He did so with a traveling shot, walking toward the viewer while continuing to carry the football and looking into the camera the entire time. In the still photo of the larger composition, the flags surround him in the background. Further back, a neon sign reads, “The only thing more powerful than hate is love.” These are the same words he when he received the 2026 Best Album Grammy, directly addressing ICE’s actions toward immigrants and protesters. In addition to what the larger frame shows, listing all the nations asserts their identities and their right to be recognized as sovereign entities with horizontal relationships with one another.

Though not at the top, the US was included on the list of countries stretching from south to north, appearing just before Canada. After finishing the list, he held up the football he had been holding and displayed a message written on it. He then read the message aloud: “Seguimos aquí,” which means “We are still here.” By making a touchdown gesture with the ball, a symbol of victory, Bad Bunny physically expressed the same message written in “Seguimos aquí,” which encapsulates the unwavering presence of Latinx communities in the face of ongoing supremacist, colonial and imperialist endeavors.

The triumphant touchdown momentarily resolved the debate over whether the halftime show was an affront or a source of pride. For at least one cinematic moment, Benito and those he represents claimed victory. “Seguimos aquí” is written in the present tense, expressing the idea of always having been there and a sense of continuity. The surrounding the halftime show ultimately serves as a reminder of historical power struggles over narratives, such as those concerning the use of Spanish and the right to occupy spaces of representation. Despite the government and armed forces’ attempts to undermine indigenous sovereignty and fundamental civil rights, Bad Bunny’s halftime performance shone as a much-needed moment of beauty and vindication.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post Bad Bunny’s Record-Breaking Popularity Proves That Latinos are Paving the Way in the Americas appeared first on 51�Թ�.

One of the most consequential provisions involved the release of approximately prisoners. While the agreement conditioned their release on their refraining from combat, within weeks, these fighters ranks, reinforcing insurgent capabilities across Afghanistan. Prior intelligence assessments had warned of this outcome, highlighting structural weaknesses in the agreement’s enforcement mechanisms.

Counterterrorism commitments and regional security risks

The Doha Accord obligated the Taliban to prevent Afghan territory from being used to threaten the security of the US and its allies. In practice, however, this provision has proven largely ineffective. The Taliban’s tolerance and facilitation of transnational militant groups, including al-Qaeda and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), constitutes a clear violation.

, the leader of al-Qaeda, reportedly lived openly in Kabul before being killed in a US drone strike in 2022, nearly a year after the Taliban assumed power. His presence in the Afghan capital raised questions about the effectiveness of counterterrorism assurances. Additionally, reports that members of Osama bin Laden’s family continue to reside in Afghanistan fueled debate over whether the Taliban have fully met their commitments.

These developments extend beyond Afghanistan. They complicate border insurgencies and compel regional powers to rethink their security arrangements.

Khalilzad’s advocacy and selective framing

Former US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad’s portraying the Taliban as ready to engage constructively with regional actors, including Pakistan, echoes a familiar pattern of misrepresentation. Khalilzad presents the group as cooperative and compliant, claiming any agreement would prevent extremist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and TTP from using Afghan territory to threaten others, with third-party monitoring. In reality, the Taliban’s record under the 2020 Doha Accord tells a starkly different story: promises of intra-Afghan dialogue were ignored, and the group marched unopposed on Kabul, exposing the failures of Khalilzad’s diplomacy.

Khalilzad’s repeated framing of the Taliban as reasonable actors overlooks the broader regional consequences and security risks, while his renewed advocacy for agreements modeled on Doha risks repeating past strategic mistakes where enforcement mechanisms were lacking and accountability is absent. Despite no longer holding a US government position, Khalilzad continues to in Afghan affairs, raising serious questions about his motives, judgment and credibility. The pattern is clear: overstatement, miscalculation and self-serving maneuvering consistently undermine meaningful conflict resolution, leaving the region to grapple with the consequences.

Multiple Pakistan–Taliban agreements

Over the past three years, Pakistan and the Taliban have engaged in several rounds of security dialogue. These efforts included a bilateral agreement guaranteed by the United Arab Emirates, promises made in backed by Turkey and Qatar, as well as follow-up discussions in Istanbul.

Despite repeated diplomatic engagement, none of the agreements yielded the expected results, thereby indicating the Taliban’s continued inability or unwillingness to fulfill their commitments.

Recent Saudi-mediated in Riyadh reportedly stalled when the Taliban rejected the proposed verification mechanisms, reinforcing a consistent practice of demanding recognition and legitimacy without taking responsibility. Pakistan has emphasized the need for enforceable monitoring frameworks, drawing lessons from earlier agreements: trust cannot be extended based on words alone; it must be secured through actual performance.

Regional fallout and security implications

The Taliban’s noncompliance has broader for South and Central Asia. Neighboring countries — including Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian states — face heightened risks of cross-border attacks because of the unregulated movement of militants. Activities linked to the anti-state Pakistan-based militant group were facilitated by the areas under Taliban control, while the presence of al-Qaeda in Kabul complicates regional counterterrorism coordination, exposing significant fault lines in regional cooperation.

Instability also affects economic cooperation. Trade corridors, humanitarian assistance channels and regional integration initiatives depend on predictable security conditions. As a result, the shortcomings of the Doha Accord have become a matter of transnational concern.

The Doha legacy

The Taliban’s consolidation of power also carried significant humanitarian consequences. Communities protesting coercion, resource seizures and governance abuses have faced violent repression. These actions highlight a governance model prioritizing power consolidation over human life, exacerbating instability within Afghanistan.

The Doha Accord failed because it lacked compliance and transparency, illustrating the importance of enforceability in diplomatic agreements. Verification is not a procedural luxury; it is essential for credible security cooperation and sustainable regional stability. Agreements that rely primarily on trust risk creating gaps between formal commitments and actual behavior, allowing the Taliban to consolidate power while projecting an image of compliance and perpetuating insecurity both inside and outside Afghanistan.

The Doha legacy is defined by strategic failure and its cascading effects on regional security. Taliban violations, internal repression and facilitation of militant networks have undermined intra-Afghan peace prospects and South Asian stability. Future diplomatic efforts depend on prioritizing enforceability, transparency and accountability frameworks with measurable performance to prevent further erosion of trust and mitigate the political, security and human costs that have defined the past three years.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Doha Legacy: Strategic Failure and the Rise of Regional Instability appeared first on 51�Թ�.

The Rohingya: an endless exodus

The Rohingya, a Muslim minority from Myanmar’s Rakhine State, were stripped of citizenship and rights by a . Victims of what the described in 2017 as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing,” over 740,000 people to Bangladesh. Today, approximately one million of them in the Cox’s Bazar district, home to Kutupalong, the world’s largest refugee camp. The 2021 shattered any hope of repatriation, fueling a desperate, multi-stage journey toward Southeast Asia.��

This hell begins in Teknaf, on the coast of Bangladesh. There, refugees brave the deadly currents of the Naf River on small, overcrowded boats that frequently . Those who survive fall into the hands of traffickers, who clandestine departures toward the Andaman Sea from hidden mangrove inlets, packing hundreds of people onto fishing vessels to evade the Coast Guard.

Welcome aboard the “ghost” ships

Once at sea, the operational phase known as the “Ghost Protocol” begins. This involves the Automatic Identification System (AIS) — a tactic technically referred to as “going dark.” By switching off these electronic transponders, traffickers eliminate all traceability of the vessel’s route and position. By becoming invisible to radar, the vessels into floating prisons. Deprived of Wi-Fi, traceability and legal protection, refugees are ammassed in fish holds. This lack of connectivity is not a technical limitation, but a deliberate strategy by smugglers to prevent the reporting of abuse and torture used to extort money from families.��

In this technological limbo, the crews themselves invisible slaves, recruited through deception and forced into months of sailing without pay. The of going dark eliminates any chance of assistance: In the event of a breakdown, no signal exists to guide rescuers. Data from 2025–2026 confirms the lethality of the Andaman Sea route: One in five people is missing or dead. With over 600 victims in the past year, the true toll remains tragically uncalculable.

The Junta link: the ship-to-ship operations fueling the airstrikes

Myanmar’s instability has transformed the Andaman Sea into a military corridor disguised as a migration route. The networks Rohingya south toward Malaysia and Indonesia are often the same ones that, through ship-to-ship (STS) operations in international waters, the military junta with sanctioned fuel (Jet A-1). Without these maneuvers, the regime would be unable to power the Chinese-made jets and drones responsible for bombing civilians. Precisely because it is prohibited, the junta must rely on STS operations to bring fuel into the country while concealing its origin.��

Large “mother ships” loaded with crude oil from the Russian Federation or Iran — countries officially under international sanctions — transfer their cargo on the high seas to the Burmese shadow fleet, which operates on behalf of the junta. Once there, the fuel is “” by falsifying documents to make it appear to have originated from legitimate Southeast Asian ports: a proven mechanism that finances authoritarian regimes through these invisible fleets.

Justice at sea: the cynical game of bouncing and reflagging

The tragedy is amplified by “.” In the absence of a coordinated Search and Rescue (SAR) system, such as the one in the Mediterranean, boats are bounced between the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Extreme abuses have been documented, including refugees forced to into the open sea and swim for miles back toward Myanmar under armed threat. Despite the High Seas Treaty () entering into force in January 2026 — adopted by the UN — the protection of human life in Southeast Asia remains a mirage.��

While the treaty aims for transparency, Myanmar’s instability and the region’s fragmented sovereignty allow shipowners to bypass all oversight. By changing flags () with staggering speed, vessels mask their maritime criminal records. By exploiting “shadow states” like the Comoros, Panama or the Cook Islands, they operate within a bureaucratic gray zone. Small island nations become involuntary accomplices in a system that guarantees impunity. International authorities find themselves chasing not physical ships, but “ghosts” that switch identities every time they approach a new port or a refueling operation, making their capture nearly impossible.

While the International Court of Justice in the Hague with the genocide case against Myanmar, the Rohingya tragedy in the Andaman Sea remains the result of a criminal architecture that exploits the physical and digital geography of Southeast Asia. As long as the world permits the existence of a ghost fleet beyond any rules, the sea will continue to be a place of silent violations. To save lives, we must first turn on the radars, enforce on-board connectivity and recognize that every deactivated AIS signal is a potential crime against humanity. Breaking the cynicism of the “bouncing game” is the only way to restore dignity to these people that the world has left invisible for too long.

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