Recently, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights iris scans in refugee camps and artificial intelligence-driven installed at international borders. Social media is being used to refugees and citizens. from the US Department of Homeland Security uses an AI called Babel X, which connects a person’s social security number to their location and social media. , autonomous robots that can move on four or even two legs, are being as force multipliers on the Mexico–US border. These are just a few of the unregulated, uncontrolled experimental initiatives that are quickly taking root. Technological advancement makes migration more nightmarish than ever before.

Frontex aerial highlights the life-saving potential of drones and aircraft, which can help those in maritime crises. Saving lives at sea ought to be the priority; a startling 25,313 have perished in the Mediterranean since 2014. As it turns out, however, these deaths were caused by Frontex’s , which “is in service of interceptions, not rescues.”

More than 7,000 international students may have been unjustly due to a flawed algorithm by the UK government. They were erroneously accused of cheating on English language exams, with no evidence provided against them.

How can human rights professionals improve the dignity of individuals crossing international borders? How can they expose the reality of this terrible situation? How do migrants oppose these experiments? This piece examines some of the profound effects of ABG technologies on human rights with a human rights-based (HRBA).

ABG militarization and border AI

Racist and xenophobic sentiments against , asylum seekers, migrants and stateless persons are increasing. These can be fuelled by the AI-driven of borders and border governance. This involves tactics and policies that violate human rights, like pushbacks, extended immigration detention and refoulement. are operations that prevent people from reaching, entering or remaining in a territory. is the practice of detaining migrants, especially those suspected of illegal entry, until immigration authorities can decide whether or not to let them through. is the practice of deporting migrants, often refugees or asylum seekers, back to their country or another.

UN agencies provide a wealth of information about the grave injustice and threats to human rights that migrants at international borders. Threatened rights include freedom of movement, prohibition against collective and , the right to seek and many others. In these situations, borderless algorithmic are used to further security goals. They highlight and create new avenues for human rights problems.

The goal of ABG must be to respect human rights. This strategy should be based on two main objectives. First, it should comprehend how poorly-planned algorithmic of border movement management may result in unprotected human rights. Second, it should evaluate how newly-emerging technology may exacerbate pre-existing issues.

States use new algorithmic to identify individuals in transit near land, maritime and external borders, such as the and the . This technology includes ground sensors, surveillance towers, aerial systems, drones and video surveillance. AI has enabled tasks like movement detection and between people and livestock. New ABG initiatives have repurposed technology for military or law enforcement applications, creating robodogs. States and regional bodies are using AI to forecast migration , processing information from social media, Internet searches and cell phone data.

However, these efforts are primarily focused on stopping border crossings rather than assisting migrants. This has raised among civil society groups, academia and international agencies. When used in a securitized to border regulation, these AI could potentially human rights, like the right to asylum or the ability to leave one’s country of origin. The UN Working Group suggests that for maritime can help detect and maintain a safe distance from search and rescue activities, allowing to reach secure harbors.

In 2021, the on the human rights of migrants released a highlighting the use of as a form of punishment, deterrent or targeting system. Migrants face significant danger at borders due to pushback policies, , physical barriers and advanced monitoring technology. EU-funded pilot like focus on automated deception detection , face-matching tools, biometrics and document authentication apparatus. The program offers real-time behavior that could uncover hidden intent through on-site observations and open-source mining.

Internalized borders and algorithmic risk assessments

As part of a goal to borders, some states are attempting to identify individuals with irregular through digital . This can happen years after the individual’s initial entry into the nation. Investigative journalists show that some immigration agencies have databases of other state institutions, which are typically protected from law enforcement by firewalls. These agencies have attempted to identify people with irregular immigration statuses, putting them in danger of or .

Certain states allegedly utilize data brokers to obtain information about things major and minor: prior employment, marriages, bank and property records, vehicle registrations, even phone subscriptions and cable television bills. Academics and civil society organizations have demonstrated the chilling that digital border may have on individuals exercising their rights. These include rights to housing, healthcare and education. If they are discovered, migrants may face severe repercussions.

According to , many migrants abstain from using record-keeping services that are essential to their family’s wellbeing, including child welfare, and legal systems. They avoid these out of concern that law enforcement may access their information and use it to detain, prosecute and deport them.

Algorithmic risk are used in border , such as assigning higher risk to applications and referring them to human . These assessments are also used in states to decide whether to detain migrants. Concerns about human rights arise when AI are applied in detention decisions.

Algorithms need large datasets to train. They may contain and information due to overrepresentation or underrepresentation of certain groups, particularly the categories of , race and ethnicity. The ’s weighting of input data and the results it generates also contribute to algorithmic . Researchers in the US have found that some may lean toward high-risk classifications in detention , potentially leading to the detention of low-risk migrants. This is because algorithms’ apparent impartiality and scientific character may corroborate human officers’ prejudices, which can lead to against certain groups and stereotypes.

States may use technology like and reporting software, digital ankle and electronic to substitute traditional methods. However, the on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families notes that these automated may have unfortunate consequences. They could further stigmatize migrants, lead to burdensome requirements, cause detentions and prompt a growth of algorithmic detention . Specific methods may impede people’s freedom of movement and enhance monitoring, even if they are not considered confinement.

Role data and the future

AI technologies and those employed generally in the ABG context rely heavily on . Input data is entered into them directly, and additional data is produced as a byproduct of its deployment. The data many states store and use include and obtained for and ; data from social media accounts; automated border control like and smart tunnels; monitoring health data; educational records and employment status. Commercial corporations, international organizations and other states too may gather shared data.

The to Regulate Artificial Intelligence aims to exclude current on criminal records, immigration and from the usual safeguards offered for high-risk AI . Access to these facilitates immigration databases with data gathered for criminal . This raises several potential human rights risks, like violations of the rights to equality, privacy and freedom from discrimination. Rights to life, liberty and security are in jeopardy as well if indiscriminate leads to detention and deportation.

There are few formal regulations governing the design and deployment of digital used at borders. AI is broadly unregulated as well. Despite this, the use of ABG technologies does not occur in a regulatory vacuum. States must uphold international human rights law. Governments and businesses must abide by the .

However, when using digital border , noncompliance with these duties creates protection . Firsthand accounts of those impacted by ABG technologies must be prioritized when implementing an HRBA framework for migration and ABG technology regulation. There need to be discussions between affected communities and policymakers, academics, technologists and civil society about the risks of using new technologies that protect human rights. Mobile communities should continue to have conversations about creating and using digital border technologies — before their deployment, not after.

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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As it happened, Nixon did win in 1968, and none of us moved to Canada. Still, I suspect my father’s confidence that, if things got too bad here, we could always head somewhere else (Canada? Israel?) was a mental refuge for him that fit his own background very well. It was, after all, what his father had done in 1910, when his family was attacked by Cossacks in what is now Ukraine. His parents had him smuggled out of town in a horse-drawn rig under bales of hay. He then walked across a significant part of Europe and took a boat from Antwerp, Belgium, to New York City. There, he was met by a cousin who brought him to Norfolk, Virginia. Eventually, my grandfather managed to bring his whole family to Norfolk, where he became, among other things, the president of his local Zionist club, fostering his dream of refuge. My father grew up in the haze of that dream.

In the shadow of the world wars

In fact, my father’s reliance on the guarantee that he could go “somewhere else” accorded well with the post-World War II international consensus that people in danger of persecution where they lived had a right to seek refuge in another country. Shortly after the formation of the United Nations, that view was codified in the 1951 Relating to the Status of Refugees.

The convention consolidated various treaties created by European nations to address the desperate situation of millions of people displaced by the two World Wars. It defined a refugee as a person who:

As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

More recent regional agreements have that definition to include people subject to external aggression, internal violence or serious disturbance of public order — people whose lives, in short, have become unsustainable thanks to various forms of systemic violence. The convention also laid out the obligations of nations receiving refugees, including providing housing, work permits and education, while recognizing that receiving countries might need assistance from the international community to meet those obligations. It also affirmed the importance of maintaining family unity (something blatantly violated by the Trump administration under its of family separation at the US–Mexican border).

With the phrase “events occurring before 1 January 1951” the Convention’s framers alluded to the two world wars of the preceding decades. What they didn’t foresee was that millions more refugees would be churned up in the second half of the twentieth century, much less what humanity would prove capable of producing in this one.

The trajectory was clear enough, however, when, the year before Nixon was elected, the to the convention removed limits on migration-producing events occurring after 1951 and geographical restrictions of any sort. No matter when or where people became refugees, they were now subject to protection in all 148 nations that signed on, including the United States, which signed and ratified both the original Convention and the 1967 Protocol.

Refugees everywhere

Twenty-first-century conflicts have already created millions of refugees. In fact, by mid-year 2023, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) put the at 36.4 million worldwide, a number that has doubled in just the last seven years. Three countries alone — Syria (6.5 million), Afghanistan (6.1 million) and Ukraine (5.9 million) — accounted for 52% of all external refugees in 2023.

And keep in mind that those 36.4 million refugees only include people officially registered with the UNHCR (30.5 million) or with UNWRA, the UN Works Relief Agency for Palestinians in the Near East (5.9 million). UNWRA was created in 1952, specifically to serve people displaced in the formation of Israel in 1948. Unlike the UNHCR, it provides direct service to registered Palestinian refugees and their descendants in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza.

And that figure doesn’t even include the majority of people fleeing war and other systemic and climate violence who are “internally displaced persons.” They are not counted as refugees in the legal sense because, while they’ve lost their homes, they still remain inside their own national borders. There were — take a breath — 62.2 million internally displaced persons when the UNHCR issued that mid-2023 report.

Where do we find the majority of internally displaced persons? More than 90% of them have been uprooted by events in seven key countries or regions: Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, various Latin America and Caribbean countries, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan and Ukraine.

Which countries are taking in refugees? According to the UNHCR, “Low- and middle-income countries host 75% of the world’s refugees and other people in need of international protection.” Furthermore, “the Least Developed Countries provide asylum to 20% of the total.” Despite Donald Trump’s about asylum-seekers pouring into the United States and “poisoning the blood” of this country, the United States is not, in fact, a major recipient of international refugees.

Nor is the United Kingdom, whose Tory government has come up with a perverse scheme to potentially any asylum seekers approaching Great Britain by boat to Rwanda for “processing” in return for financial support of various kinds. (In November 2023, that country’s supreme court the plan, but in December the government a new agreement with Rwanda, which it claims will satisfy the court’s objections to the agreement.)

In fact, Americans may be surprised to learn that the two countries taking in the most refugees at the moment are , at 3.4 million each, followed by Germany and Colombia at 2.5 million each and Pakistan at 2.1 million.

Let me highlight just two areas where, at this very moment, refugees are being created in enormous numbers with no apparent end in sight. One of them people around the world just can’t take their eyes off right now (and for good reason!), while the other seems almost entirely forgotten.

The first area is Gaza. Since Hamas’s vicious and criminal October 7 attack on targets in Israel, the world has focused intently on events in Israel-Palestine. The UNHCR’s 2023 report was compiled before the attack and Israel’s subsequent and ongoing of Gaza, which has seen the deaths of more than Gazans (a of them women and children) and the of more than half of its housing stock and of its 36 hospitals.

In one sense, Gaza’s residents are not new refugees. More than 85% of its pre-war population of 2.3 million are now “merely” considered internally displaced. Yes, they have been , deprived of and , by bombs and missiles falling on homes and temporary shelters from one part of that 25-mile-long strip of land to the other, and forced into an ever-shrinking area near Gaza’s southern border with Egypt. Still, for now they remain in Gaza with nowhere else to go.

It’s no secret, however, that the Israeli government intends to change that. On Christmas Day, 2023, Prime Minister Netanyahu the Israeli newspaper Hayom Daily that he is seeking the “voluntary migration” of Palestinians from Gaza. A week earlier, Trump’s former UN ambassador and now rival for the Republican presidential nomination, Nikki Haley, had that “the Palestinians should have gone to the Rafah crossing and Egypt would have taken care of them.” Even if Egypt were willing to accept more than two million displaced Gazans — which it is not — it would be hard to see such a migration as anything but a forced population transfer, which international law considers a .

The second area is Sudan. While the world has watched Gaza’s decimation in horror, an even larger refugee crisis in the African nation of Sudan has gone almost unremarked upon. In 2019, a massive nonviolent movement of Sudanese civilians led to a military coup against longtime dictator Omar Bashir. While the military initially agreed to hand power over to civilian rule in two years, by October 2021, its leaders had to remain in power, while the United States, despite rhetoric supporting civilian rule, stood idly by. Since then, war between the military government and a paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces, 4.5 million or more within Sudan, while another 1.2 million have fled to neighboring countries.

Good “refugees” and bad “economic migrants”

Human beings have always moved around the world, beginning with our first forays out of Africa 60,000–70,000 years ago. However, it is only within the last two centuries or so that countries have attempted to control human transit across their borders. International law concerning refugees is even newer, first forged, as noted, in the critical period immediately following World War II.

One perhaps unintentional consequence of those laws, created half a century ago to protect refugees, is the relatively new distinction between them and “economic migrants.” Refugees able to demonstrate a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” have the right to seek asylum in any country that’s signed the UN refugee convention. Anyone else, however economically desperate or deeply endangered from, say, increasingly fierce climate-change-induced weather extremes, has no actual right under international law to move to a safer country.

That legal reality hardly makes the existential desperation of such migrants any less genuine, as evidenced by the fact that they risk — and lose — their lives daily in or thousand-mile treks like the one that passes through Central America’s deadly in a bid for survival. At present, however, international law offers them no special protection.

This will have to change, and quickly, as global warming makes ever more parts of the world increasingly uninhabitable, often in the very areas that are for the actual burning of fossil fuels. We all live on one planet, and no country or , no matter how rich, can hope to remain insulated from the ever more devastating effects of the of fossil fuels and the desperate overheating of our planet.

Bad news at the border

My father was pretty sure that the Canadians would be glad to receive him and his kids in the event of Nixon’s election. I don’t know what the rules were back then, but today Canada “Express Entry for skilled immigrants,” presumably including people from the US wishing to cross that country’s southern border.

It’s not so easy, however, for immigrants, skilled or otherwise, hoping to cross the southern border of the United States these days. Despite our signature on the convention on refugees, people seeking refugee status in this country now face almost insurmountable barriers. And those designated mere “economic” migrants have little hope of ever gaining legal residence in the United States.

Despite his to take “immediate actions to reform our immigration system,” three years after his election and the defeat of the man who had promised to build that “big, fat, beautiful ” on our southern border, President Biden has done little to alleviate the situation. While he did end the Trump family separation plan and Covid-era restrictions on migration to expire, he’s kept in place a version of another Trump policy: in the United States to migrants who fail to first request it in another country they’re passing through on the way to this one.

So, as many as 10,000 immigrants a day now into the United States. Since May, almost half a million of them . At time of writing, 11,000 are living in camps on the Mexican side of the border, having applied for asylum using the Biden administration’s cell phone app. No one knows how long they will be there while this country’s overburdened asylum system limps along and election 2024 fast approaches (along with Trump’s proposed plans to create vast border ).

To be fair to Biden, with the exception of President Obama’s creation of a for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status for immigrants who entered the US illegally as children, no administration or Congress has done much of significance over the past 40 years to address immigration issues in this country. What institutions do exist, including immigration courts, remain desperately underfunded, leading to staggeringly lengthy waiting times for asylum applicants.

The situation at the frontiers of wealthy countries like the US will undoubtedly only get worse. Nations like ours can’t hope to keep the human urge for survival forever bottled up on our borders.

My father said he’d go to Canada if Nixon were elected. Recently, I’ve heard a few friends echo that intention should another dangerous authoritarian — Donald Trump — regain the White House in January 2025. If that were to happen, people around the world, citizens and migrants, the sheltered and unsheltered alike, can expect things to get so much worse. For us in the United States, emigration won’t be an option. Like it or not, we’ll have to stay and fight.

[ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Meanwhile, China has engaged in intense diplomatic negotiations with the Myanmar military junta, urging them to address the Rohingya crisis to avoid potential repercussions from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where Myanmar faces charges, brought by the Gambia, of genocide against the Rohingya ethnic minorities. The UN described the genocide of the Muslim Rohingya as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing,” which Myanmar has repeatedly denied.

An exodus of millions

The genocidal campaign sparked the worst refugee crisis in South Asia, forcing a million to flee from the restive Rakhine state in Myanmar. Bangladesh has struggled to shelter 1.2 million Rohingyas in squalid camps in the southeast of the country.

The Rohingya: When the Land You Love Burns

An estimated 3.5 million Rohingya have dispersed worldwide, of whom a large percentage are in Bangladesh. Others are in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Pakistan. An estimated 600,000 Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State are victims of the Myanmar security forces’ , deliberately confined 140,000 to guarded camps and villages without freedom of movement, and access to adequate food, health care, education, and livelihoods for more than 10 years.

Bangladesh, unfortunately, does not recognise these stateless people as refugees and instead describes them as “forcibly displaced Myanmar nationals.” Dhaka has yet to ratify the UN’s 1951 Refugee Convention, which protects the rights of asylum seekers. HRW has that Bangladeshi authorities are also intensifying restrictions on work, movement, and education, creating a coercive environment designed to force people to consider premature returns.

Myanmar’s “all-weather friend” China stands beside the regime as it tries to weather a series of economic sanctions from the West, which slammed it after its persecution of Rohingyas and ouster of the country’s former democratically-elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been under house arrest since the military coup in February 2021.

China has been pushing the junta to initiate a so-called “family-based repatriation” project, aiming to repatriate nearly a thousand refugees in the first phase.

Myanmar has an untrustworthy plan

Myanmar’s military junta wishes to appear as if it has undergone a sudden change of heart, ostensibly displaying compassion by committing to repatriate 6,000 Rohingyas by the end of the year. Myanmar has deemed these individuals foreign intruders or “illegal migrants,” denying them citizenship and subjecting them to abuse and discrimination.

In March, a delegation of Myanmar officials visited refugee camps in Bangladesh to conduct interviews and carry out a “verification” process for the pilot repatriation initiative.

“The figure of 6,000 Rohingya is a drop of water in an ocean,” says Asif Munier, a Rohingya refugee expert. The repatriation is a face-saving project of Myanmar amid country-wide embattlement with ethnic rebellions and economic crises that have worsened after economic sanctions by the United States, Canada and several European countries.

A delegation of Rohingya refugees, along with Bangladeshi government officials, toured the Hla Poe Kaung transit camp and Kyein Chaung resettlement camp in Rakhine State’s Maungdaw township on May 5. After the day-long “go and see” visit, the delegation expressed their dissatisfaction over the arrangements and facilities made by the Myanmar authorities.

Rohingya and Bangladeshi representatives seem to have two different interpretations of what they saw there. Bangladesh’s Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner Mohammed Mizanur Rahman, who led the delegation, opined that “repatriation is the only solution to end the refugee crisis.” Rahman said Myanmar authorities did indeed prepare settlements for Rohingya under a pilot project. There are homes, employment opportunities and schools for Rohingya children as described by Myanmar officials.

The junta claims in the booklet that the UN Development Program, the UNHCR, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will be involved in the pilot project  Altogether 3,500 Rohingya will be accommodated in 15 villages, says Rahman.

The delegation, however, found that their villages have been erased from the map and instead security forces occupied their lands and erected military and police barracks, outposts and check-posts. The authorities “even changed the name of my village in Rakhine,” a frustrated member of the delegation complained. Rohingya refugees are reluctant to return to Myanmar to “be confined in camps” again. They will only repatriate voluntarily if their security is guaranteed and they will be granted citizenship.

The Other Ethnic Crisis in Myanmar

Rohingya don’t want to return to their country to be placed in glorified cages. They want to return to their own villages, from which they were forced to flee during the ethno-religious strife of August 2017. “Myanmar is our birthplace and we are citizens of Myanmar and will only go back with citizenship,” said refugee Abu Sufian, 35, father of three children told Reuters. It is not enough to move the refugees from one temporary camp in Bangladesh to another, concrete one in Myanmar. Without freedom of movement and guarantees of citizenship rights, the program is a non-starter.

Second-class citizenship for Rohingyas, if that

Refusing full citizenship to the ethnic minority, the authorities offer the Rohingya a consolation prize: a national verification card (NVC), which Rohingya refugees regard as insufficient protection. The draconian Citizenship Law of 1982 requires individuals to prove that their ancestors lived in Myanmar before 1823, and refuse to recognize Rohingya Muslims as one of the nation’s ethnic groups or list their language as a national language.

“We don’t want to be confined in camps,” Oli Hossain, who was among the refugees who visited Rakhine State in early May. He said they will never accept the NVC, which would effectively identify Rohingya as foreigners.

“Myanmar officials said that the confirmation of citizenship is a long process and would take more time to complete. Therefore, Myanmar won’t provide citizenship to the Rohingya people who want to repatriate under this pilot project,” Rahman told Turkish news agency Anadolu.

The booklet “Resettlement of Displaced Persons on their Return under the Pilot Project,” dated April 2023 and written in Burmese, English, and Bangalee, states that returnees will be housed at the Hla Poe Kaung transit camp for up to two months, then relocated to one of two resettlement camps with prefabricated houses or a land plot in one of 15 “designated villages,” where they can build a home through a cash-for-work program.

Since the crisis, Bangladesh has been trying to repatriate displaced Myanmar citizens with rights and dignity. Several attempts to repatriate the refugees fell flat in 2018 and 2019. After the failed attempts, Bangladeshi authorities echoed the UN Refugee Agency catch-phrase of safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable repatriation of 1.2 million Rohingyas.

In April, in a crucial tripartite parley between senior Foreign Minister officials of Bangladesh, China and Myanmar in Kunming, China, the parties decided to expedite the repartition process to avoid further . Whether this will see any effects on the ground remains to be seen.

An official team from Myanmar arrived in Bangladesh for the second time in three months to build confidence among Rohingyas in early June. After the return of the Myanmar delegation from the camps in Cox’s Bazar, the refugees have been agitating to cancel the piecemeal plan, calling instead for ensurance of a dignified and sustainable repartition.

The UN Refugee Agency, after the visit of diplomats from eight ASEAN countries including Bangladesh to Rakhine State last March, said that “conditions in Rakhine State are currently not conducive to the sustainable return of Rohingya refugees,” adding that no refugee should be forced to return. Bangladesh’s hopes that the UN may be able to bring about a quick solution to the quagmire by going along with Myanmar’s pilot plan have been frustrated due to ongoing western sanctions against the military regime.

Why Joe Biden Must Act on Myanmar

In a flurry of diplomatic consultations in Dhaka in early May, Bangladesh’s foreign minister sought the opinion of several European and North American diplomats, as well as the UN Refugee Agency. The diplomats insisted that Myanmar should restore the citizenship of Rohingya and ensure safety, security, and access to livelihood, education, healthcare and freedom of movement which were restricted after they were declared “alien” more than 40 years ago.

Western, Bangladeshi, Myanmarese, Chinese, and UN officials are all pushing for a resolution to the crisis, but the path forward remains unclear. What is certain is that no one wants a resolution more than the Rohingya people; still, they will not sacrifice their safety, liberty, or dignity for the sake of speed.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Bangladesh’s Patience is Waning for Rohingyas in Need appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Was the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Mother of All War Crimes?

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So, when on November 30, 2021, a court in Frankfurt, Germany, handed down a life  to an Iraqi man who joined the Islamic State (IS) group for genocide against the Yazidi minority — the first time a former member of IS had been convicted of genocide and the first verdict for genocide against Yazidis — it was celebrated as a landmark case in the fight for justice and accountability. Taha al-Jumailly was found guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity resulting in death, war crimes, aiding and abetting war crimes, and bodily harm resulting in death.

“T´Ç»ĺ˛ą˛â, ISIS member Taha AJ was convicted of genocide and sentenced to life in prison. This is the first genocide verdict against an ISIS member. This verdict is a win for survivors of genocide, survivors of sexual violence, & the Yazidi community,”  Nadia Murad, a 2018 Nobel Peace Prize winner and a Yazidi survivor of IS enslavement.

Universal Jurisdiction

The trial was also the first in Germany based on the principle of universal jurisdiction addressing crimes under international law committed abroad by a perpetrator who is not a German citizen and was only extradited on the basis of an international arrest warrant. Universal jurisdiction is the principle that some crimes are so serious that states should be allowed to claim jurisdiction over an accused person regardless of where they were committed or any other relation with the prosecuting entity. None of the crimes in the Jumailly case were committed in Germany, and neither the victims nor the suspect were German nationals.

Though universal jurisdiction has been practiced in just a few countries in recent years, it has become an increasingly important tool for achieving accountability and justice for the survivors and victims of international crimes. Hundreds of investigations are ongoing and dozens of convictions have been obtained.

The blossoming of universal jurisdiction is attributable to several factors, one of which is that the alternative route to prosecuting international crimes through the UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court (ICC) has effectively been closed by geopolitics. The Syrian conflict, for example, has never been appraised by the ICC because Russia backs President Bashar al-Assad.

The Pursuit of Cases

In recent years, there has been a greater capacity and willingness on the part of some domestic authorities to pursue cases involving international crimes, at least in certain circumstances. More and more countries have also passed laws allowing them to conduct the kind of landmark prosecution that took place in Frankfurt. More countries are following the Dutch  in setting up specialized units within the police, prosecution and even immigration services dedicated to identifying perpetrators of international crimes and bringing them to trial.

Another important factor in the power of universal jurisdiction is that victims and their advocates can contribute to investigations and prosecutions, and sometimes even influence the direction they take. In some countries, such as France and Belgium, victims and NGOs can initiate criminal proceedings. Even where this is not possible, victims and their advocates can still drive cases forward in other ways, such as by tracking perpetrators’ movements, sharing information with the authorities and exerting pressure on them to act.

Dutch authorities have even issued  for Syrians in the Netherlands on how to file a criminal complaint against other Syrians relating to violations in Syria. In February, after Germany’s top court  that war crimes committed abroad can be tried in the country, a court in Koblenz became the first court outside of Syria to rule on state-sponsored torture by the Assad regime when it sentenced a former member of the secret police to four and a half years in prison for being an accomplice to crimes against humanity. Another former Syrian intelligence officer is currently on  in Germany for  58 counts of murder and at least 4,000 cases of torture, rape or sexual abuse.

Many Challenges

Despite this recent progress, enormous legal, evidentiary and logistical challenges remain before international criminal cases can be brought to trial. Investigating and prosecuting international crimes in domestic courts is not straightforward, especially in a complex conflict such as the Yemen war where crimes have been committed over many years by different actors.

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Foreign investigators cannot easily gather evidence on the ground, so they have to rely on the cooperation of different parties to the conflict to build cases. UN bodies like the group of eminent experts, international organizations, local NGOs, and organizations such as Airwars assist with investigations.

Even if evidence linking an individual perpetrator to war crimes can be established, the suspect still has to be apprehended. In some countries practicing universal jurisdiction, those accused of committing war crimes do not need to be within reach of authorities for an investigation to be opened, but they need to be physically brought to court before any trial can take place.

Though international cooperation can be used to apprehend and extradite international pariahs like IS militants, pirates and slave traders, war criminals who are still serving members of Arab regimes are not about to be handed over. Only when they set foot in a country practicing universal jurisdiction — whether for work, vacation, claiming asylum or for any other reason — can they be arrested immediately, providing they do not benefit from immunity.

Jumailly’s conviction “sends a clear message,” Natia Navrouzov, a lawyer and member of the NGO Yazda, which gathers evidence of crimes committed by IS against the Yazidis. “It doesn’t matter where the crimes were committed and it doesn’t matter where the perpetrators are, thanks to the universal jurisdiction, they can’t hide and will still be put on trial.”

*[This article was originally published by , a partner of 51łÔąĎ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post How the Legal Landscape Is Changing for War Crimes appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

How Deep Are the Roots of Democracy in Southeast Asia?

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When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Min Aung Hlaing at the leaders’ summit back in October, it resulted in the quick of over 5,600 political prisoners. However, it also precipitated resistance to ASEAN’s plan for a non-violent ceasefire. This was characterized by the of the request by ASEAN’s envoy to Myanmar, Dato Erywan Yusof, to meet Aung San Suu Kyi and other detained leaders. With more verdicts , what will ASEAN’s next steps be?

Bitter Pill

It is easy to berate ASEAN for its delayed response to the February coup and to what has now become a , with nearly , 200,000 displaced and 3 million in need of assistance. However, the immediate move by the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom to enforce economic sanctions on Myanmar has not produced the hoped-for results.

Although economic sanctions affect many industries across the country, such as the military conglomerates Myanmar Economic Corporation and Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd, they have done little to nudge the military leaders toward a ceasefire. Instead, repression and bloodshed intensify by the day.

The inefficacy of economic sanctions is a difficult pill to swallow, but it forces us to confront two realities. First, the military leaders assign very low importance to economic growth vis-à-vis the pursuit of their political agenda. In this crisis, the main of the military leaders is to right what they believe is wrong, namely nurturing a “true and disciplined democracy” based on the claim that the landslide NLD win in November 2020 was rigged.

The verdict against Aung San Suu Kyi is an indicator that despite a persistent international backlash, the economy has taken a backseat and will continue to be compromised if it means that the junta can legitimize its position.

Economic and travel sanctions like those implemented by the , the , and the , among others, will limit the movement of the military leaders and hold businesses in a tight chokehold. As the fight for survival continues, economic sanctions will only cause the skyrocketing of prices on goods most people will no longer be able to afford. Along with the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, this will only help to drag half of Myanmar’s population into in 2022.

Secondly, curtailing Myanmar’s dealings with global actors like the US, the EU and the UN is not as fruitful as many would like to think. To offset the newest round of sanctions, Myanmar’s military leaders have linked arms with superpowers on the other side of the political spectrum, like and . Therefore, the remaining challenge for ASEAN is to develop a that can bring a quick end to the bloodshed while making room for negotiations aimed at giving the people of Myanmar a say in their own future.

From 1988 to 2021

Despite the suppression of the , when a military junta again seized power, and the ensuing crackdown on civil rights, then-Burma was to ASEAN in 1997. The move was not without controversy, with continuing international pressure to make the admission contingent on democratic concessions from Yangon, but drove ASEAN’s decision. Unsurprisingly, Myanmar’s accession opened a new set of challenges for the bloc, especially vis-à-vis its non-interference principle.

The discourages states from intervening in the internal affairs of fellow members, including criticism of state actions against its citizens, and condemns those perceived to be in breach of the non-intervention principle. It also denies support to any rebel group seeking to destabilize the government of a neighboring state, providing political support and material assistance to members to counter disruptive activity. To put it broadly, the non-interference policy means that all member states tend to take a hands-off approach when it comes to the national affairs of their regional counterparts.

As a result, one of the main criticisms faced by ASEAN over the decades has to do with its in interfering in regional emergencies, like the 2015 Rohingya crisis that was later identified as by the United Nations. Thus, it was only by 2005 that ASEAN arrived at a to bar Myanmar from the 2006 chairmanship to void a by the West, with the US and the EU condemning the military’s refusal to implement democratic transition and release Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, who won the 1990 election but was placed under house arrest instead of assuming office.

The association’s silence on its member states has become a significant liability for ASEAN’s reputation. Seeking to enhance the bloc’s international standing and to attract financial support and foreign investment, ASEAN nations finally had a common cause to for the sake of regional stability. Myanmar’s eventual agreement to give up the chairmanship that year also meant the bloc was effective in keeping the military leaders updated on its incremental steps in having a more active approach for the sake of the social and economic stability of all member states.

Fast forward to February 2021, and both Myanmar and ASEAN find themselves in a near-identical predicament. After international criticism fueled lengthy discussions that lasted over two months, ASEAN reached the as its action plan. The surprise election of as the bloc’s special envoy for Myanmar outside the original list of nominees followed, demonstrating not only the internal divides within the bloc but also indicating that Yusof was the only sound choice for ASEAN to of all stakeholders and to make decisions with required caution.

These moves show that have been taken in order for ASEAN to reach a consensus with the Myanmar leaders and, more importantly, for ASEAN to ensure Myanmar was still included in the process. The Five Point Consensus is a gradual strategy that offers a way for ASEAN to begin negotiations with the Myanmar military through diplomatic engagement and respecting the hard-fought national independence of other member states.

Middle Ground

To find a middle ground, Yusof has proposed measured, non-violent strategies that would begin with humanitarian assistance and policy guidance through the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre, followed by a more substantive discussion with the junta in exchange for full . ASEAN is currently playing a calculated game of push-and-pull. The military leaders need their relevance in Myanmar politics to be acknowledged, which ASEAN has already indirectly provided; in response, the junta’s lack of cooperation and reciprocity to the consensus protocol provided room for ASEAN to plan its next step. 

In comparison to the economic sanctions, by barring Myanmar’s representatives from this year’s summit, ASEAN has taken a more calculative approach in allowing the junta to consider the consequences of non-cooperation. Simultaneously, ASEAN‘s secretary general, Dato Lim Jock Hoi, that humanitarian assistance “should not be politicised.” At the end of the October leaders’ summit, His Majesty Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah that “Myanmar is an integral part of the ASEAN family and their membership has not been questioned.”

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Despite repeated urgency for stronger action, ASEAN recognizes that coercive strategies are not effective in seeking a final resolution. As much as this is a race against time, it is also unproductive to rush political negotiations that can result in more harm than good. It is clear that ASEAN has moved beyond its non-interference principle and is exercising both caution and effort as the sole moderator in this crisis. Ultimately, continuous criticism can only achieve so much.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post ASEAN’s Myanmar Strategy, Slow But Steady appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin are also fueling this war rhetoric. Both countries are feigning concern about a perceived NATO troop concentration on the border with Belarus. According to reports, nuclear-capable Russian bombers have recently patrolled the Belarusian airspace. German policy should not fall into this trap of conjured-up militarization.

The Migrant Crisis on Poland-Belarus Border Is Lukashenko’s Revenge

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The frequent use of the term “hybrid warfare” fits in with a development that is increasingly shaping the discourse on security and defense policy in Germany and other EU and NATO states. It has become a commonplace belief that the boundaries between war and peace are becoming blurred.

War seems to be everywhere: There is talk not only of hybrid wars but also of information wars, cyberwars and economic wars. Almost every international dispute is interpreted in light of the ubiquitous paradigm of a “great power conflict,” with the potential for military escalation.

Not all of this is necessarily wrong, and much of it is not really new. But war is and remains at its core the organized use of military force for political ends. In the process, states and non-state actors have always used non-military means as a flanking measure to win the propaganda battle or to weaken the will of the opponent to divide their societies.

The technological and societal developments of the past decades have facilitated this enormously. Economic instruments such as sanctions and boycotts can also be threatened or used to augment military means. However, the basic definition of hybrid warfare is that it is the integrated use of military and non-military means or tactics within the framework of an overarching goal or plan.

The current situation on the Polish-Belarusian border does not meet this criterion. Even if this crisis was orchestrated by the Kremlin, it is far-fetched to speak of an integrated “deployment” of migrants in Belarus and of pro-Russian separatists and Russian troops in eastern Ukraine as part of an overall plan.

Calling the situation a hybrid war has concrete consequences because war justifies politically and legally different rules and means than peace. Using the term “war” increases the danger that it will be used to justify the mistreatment of refugees in violation of human rights. War creates a great urgency to act, while at the same time the political room for maneuver dwindles.

The question also arises as to who is waging war against whom. Is it Belarus against Poland, so that there is a NATO Article V case for collective defense? Or is it Russia against NATO? The expansion of the concept of war also dilutes the respective areas of responsibility of internal security forces and armed forces. Shouldn’t the Bundeswehr then also be deployed on the German-Polish border, and shouldn’t NATO send its rapid reaction force to the Polish-Belarusian border?

The fact that the boundaries between war and peace are becoming increasingly blurred is not only due to abstract security policy developments and structural international changes, but it is also very much the result of the language and actions of political actors, including in the West. Politicians, therefore, have a responsibility to continue to define the boundaries between war and peace.

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The migrant crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border is not yet a war. It cannot safely be ruled out that it will not escalate militarily. However, politicians in Germany and the EU should not rhetorically pave the way for such a development and should not respond to corresponding provocations from Minsk and Moscow.

They should meet the challenge posed by migration and refugees with political means — also and especially when a state uses them as a means of pressure. In addition to further economic sanctions by the EU against Belarus, the establishment of a functioning asylum policy in the European Union would be an essential step in this direction.

*[This  was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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This is a from the border between Belarus and Poland, the EU’s eastern frontier, on November 8. People who are trapped between security forces pushing them back and forth had been flying from the Middle East to Belarus in the past weeks, unaware that they were being used by President Alexander Lukashenko for his personal vendetta against the European Union.

One Step Further

The current crisis has its roots in the aftermath of a highly contested election in August 2020 when Lukashenko was proclaimed president of Belarus for the sixth consecutive time since 1994. Neither the EU nor the US recognized the result because the vote, like almost all preceding ones, was assessed as neither free nor fair by the . Electoral fraud triggered widespread demonstrations across the country that were brutally suppressed by the regime. By November, some 25,000 have been , including 477 , with widespread allegations of torture in detention.

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In response, the EU imposed that include a travel ban and an asset freeze against those associated with the regime and which, as of June this year, extend to 166 individuals and 15 entities. Relations became further strained in May when Belarus used a false pretext to a plane flying from Greece to Lithuania and arrested a dissident journalist who was onboard.

Consequently, sanctions were tightened, and an infuriated Lukashenko with reprisal: “We were stopping drugs and migrants on our Western border. Now you will eat drugs and chase people. … Because of your sanctions, we have no money to take care of this.”

Lukashenko had seen how the migration crisis of 2015 polarized EU member states, with Visegrad Group countries — Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland — opposing non-EU migration and refusing relocation of asylum seekers. From Turkey, the Belarusian president may have learned how to use refugees to put pressure on the EU. But Lukashenko, whose authoritarian rule earned him the moniker “the last dictator of Europe,” went one step further, intentionally flying in thousands of people to Belarus to use them in his game against the EU.

Already in June, Lithuanian border guards observed a sudden surge in illegal crossings by people from Africa and the Middle East. Until early July, tried to enter Lithuania’s territory illegally — 12 times as many as in the whole of 2020. Soon it became obvious that it was no coincidence: The number of flights from Middle Eastern countries to Minsk, the capital of Belarus, had intensified. Passengers were taken by buses and taxis to the border and assisted by Belarusian border guards; local travel agencies were also apparently involved.

It is estimated that at the moment, between 800 and 1,000 people from the Middle East every day, with German media reporting up to 40 flights a week from Istanbul, Damascus and Dubai planned by March next year.

Lukashenko’s regime targeted people from fragile countries and lured them with a prospect of easy and legal entry to the EU. This was a endeavor. Depending on the port of departure and destination, the price per person amounted from $6,000 to $15,000. Many migrants seem to have believed that Minsk was just a layover and that they would soon board a plane to Germany. They traveled with their entire families.

Hybrid Threat

As the number of attempts to cross the border illegally was increasing disproportionally fast, Lithuania declared a on July 2. Lithuania and neighboring Latvia, with populations of 2.8 million and 1.9 million respectively, feared that they would not be able to cope with a sudden influx of migrants. In mid-July, Lithuania’s foreign minister asked the EU to take more decisive steps against Lukashenko, a “hybrid threat” and suggesting refugees being used as a “political weapon.”

Latvia declared a state of emergency on August 10; Poland, with a population of 38 million, on September 2. All three states began building fences along their borders.

But all these measures did not halt the pace of illegal crossings. The statistics published by the Polish Border Guard Office show that in August, nearly 2,900 people tried to ; between early August and November 4, the numbered 30,000.

On November 8, as the situation at the Poland-Belarus border escalated, an 3,000-4,000 people were in the vicinity of the border. A column of hundreds of people marched toward an official border crossing in , but most were diverted by Belarusian forces to the nearby forest.

Polish forces used tear gas to stop some of the migrants from cutting the fence. As passing was impossible, hundreds set up makeshift camps along the border. Polish official sources that there may currently be as many as 15,000 migrants in Belarus — the same as the of Polish troops to protect the border.  

No Media, No Frontex

Although all affected countries implemented similar measures, Lithuania and Latvia allowed the media to enter emergency zones, under certain restrictions. Poland barred non-resident civilians, including journalists, from the zone and restricted access to public information, a move by Reporters Without Borders and other press freedom organizations.

All information from the Polish state of emergency zone (SEZ) is provided by the authorities, local residents or, perhaps ironically, the Belarusian regime. Considering that journalists are almost always present in most active war zones and conflict areas, this is quite an unusual situation.

From the outset of the crisis, Poland has been carrying out pushbacks, a practice of forcing migrants to return to Belarus. According to UNHCR, pushbacks are a of international law, but the Polish parliament them in October. Lithuania initially placed migrants in detention centers but soon then followed Poland’s example. In mid-August, more than 4,000 people were in , with 1,500 people were in in early October in Poland.

The affected countries differ in their cooperation with Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency headquartered in the Polish capital Warsaw, which controls borders in the Schengen Area. Frontex deployed its personnel to Lithuania and Latvia, but Poland repeatedly refused help because, as it claims, it had enough troops to protect the border. Polish officials that Frontex Director Fabrice Leggeri was “impressed by the means deployed to secure the border” in Poland.

But Frontex does more than protect borders. It has developed a special code of conduct to protect human rights and created the role of a fundamental rights officer, who monitors border guards to reduce the potential for violations of the rights of migrants.

In their attempt to reach Poland, migrants often have to cross swamps and forests, facing adversarial weather conditions; temperatures in November drop below 0Ëš Celsius (32Ëš Fahrenheit). Most of them wander for days or weeks, pushed back and forth repeatedly. They cannot expect assistance from humanitarian organizations, NGOs or doctors because they are barred from the SEZ. Local residents are also prohibited from helping, but many that they do so regardless.

In order to offer assistance to the migrants, 14 Polish NGOs formed — Border Group — to monitor the situation close to the SEZ. They have documented many pushbacks, with in particular resonating with the public. The incident involved a group of 20 migrants, among them eight children, who in late September managed to reach MichaĹ‚owo, a small town outside of SEZ. They claimed that they wanted to seek asylum in Poland. Nevertheless, they were driven off to Belarus as the entire interaction was recorded by activists and journalists.

This led to protests in Warsaw and Michałowo, supported by three former Polish first ladies. The protesters chanted, “Where are the children?” and “The place for children is not in the forest.”

More Sanctions to Come

The EU unanimously Belarus for “deliberately putting people’s lives and wellbeing in danger” and “.” President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen that in response to the “hybrid conflict” sanctions on Belarus will be widened. However, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov stated that the EU should for stopping migrants.

Nevertheless, the EU is not open to such negotiation and relies on diplomatic international pressure and sanctions. Current attempts are directed at convincing the countries of origin to warn migrants against traveling to Belarus or to sanction the airlines who fly them. Turkish airlines already agreed to to Belarus while Iraqi authorities offered to fly back people who .

Demands for harsher sanctions and complete closure of borders can also be heard. Such a move would paralyze international trade routes and have an impact on Russia and China — Belarus lies on China’s New Silk Road — that use Belarus for . But sanctions are a double-edged sword, having a detrimental impact on those who impose them.

Lukashenko seems to have fewer ways out of the crisis, and many point out that he will have to surrender as the cost of his political gambling is becoming too high. There are also concerns that, in desperation and given his unpredictability, the Belarusian president may start an .

If Lukashenko wanted to divert attention from Belarus’ domestic affairs, he succeeded. In the past weeks, reports on the crackdown against the opposition have disappeared from international debate. If sanctions are tightened and borders closed completely, not only the regime but also civil society will pay the price as Belarus becomes even more isolated.

The situation at the Poland-Belarus border is very dynamic and, in some respects, resembles a proxy war. It is where the EU and NATO encounter Russia’s sphere of influence, with Polish politicians openly accusing Russia of the crisis.

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Whether legal or illegal, migrants should not be used as pawns or human shields in a geopolitical game. As desperate migrants look for other routes to enter the EU, the crisis may soon spill over into Ukraine, Belarus’ southern neighbor. Poland, Lithuania and Latvia have already joined Alexander Lukashenko as he plays with innocent lives.

But while the often-ridiculed Lukashenko managed to unsettle the EU, he has not so far succeeded in further polarizing it. Despite the breach of international law at its border, the EU stands firmly together behind Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Time will tell if this unity remains as the crisis evolves.

*[51łÔąĎ is a  partner of .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Migrant Crisis on Poland-Belarus Border Is Lukashenko’s Revenge appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

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In a fast-changing environment where international donors are less capable to meet funding requests from humanitarian organizations, the United Arab Emirates has taken a unique approach. The Gulf state’s method, which could be modeled on the logistics of major transnational corporations or a large military logistics operation, provides a glimpse into the future orientation of special humanitarian capabilities.

Establishing a Hub

The establishment of the first UAE hub in 2003 reflected a top-level and very strategic foreign policy judgment by the United Arab Emirates. It leverages the UAE’s highly developed status as a global node for airfreight and transit entrepot activity. It has gained an impressive list of committed partners — from UN agencies and major humanitarian organizations to charities and commercial suppliers of humanitarian-related services.

On this point alone, any regional replicant will find it difficult to duplicate the model exactly. The status of the international hub was reflected by being represented well after its launch and during its transition from a valuable strategic geographic location to an independent official humanitarian crisis response agency within the international community, according to a member of the royal family at the time of its founding. 

The EHC and its widening range of services, no longer only a regional storage hub for faster deployment of humanitarian supplies, but an expanding hub for humanitarian workers heading to the field, has also become more networked into international coordination mechanisms and processes. These national and often highly budget-driven and bureaucratic processes and their informal and formal international coordination are now well established in the EHC modus operandi, reinforcing it as a leading model for contemporary large and rapid humanitarian action.

An example of UAE pre-engagement with the club of donors was in the . The UAE, in 2015, through EHC predecessor institutions, flew selected humanitarian supplies toward the region following cyclone disasters over the past decade. The supplies proved less absorbable than expected. The transit stop was Brisbane, in Queensland, Australia, the location of the Australian government’s main South Pacific logistical base.

Following this natural disaster, the UAE recalibrated its approach. It recognized that even if it was able to act independently, beneficiaries’ interests and international coordination facilitate the path to effectiveness. Notably, aid to the region was used following the UAE’s diplomatic initiative in the South Pacific on climate change and its leveraging of gas and nuclear in the greenhouse debate.

By late February 2020, as the world began to address the spread of COVID-19, the UAE government set out to extend the role of the EHC. The aim of the directive by the Abu Dhabi government was to deploy the UAE’s “medical care capabilities at a time of crisis,” the Emirates News Agency . Its first task was to receive 215 citizens from neighboring countries evacuated from Hubei, China, as the began to interrupt international air travel. The EHC was to serve as a hub, receiving evacuees and providing necessary monitoring and preventive medical care, ensuring “privacy and dignity” throughout the process.

The EHC Today

Operations at the EHC now compliment an image of the UAE as a globalist and progressive international influencer through what some have called the world’s largest humanitarian hub. The additional success of the EHC in 2020 was a product of public and private sector cooperation that manifested the UAE’s foreign policy commitment to delivering and helping others deliver rapid crisis responses. The development of a hub for people affected by the COVID-19 pandemic continues to manifest itself in the role played by the UAE during the evacuation of Afghan refugees in August 2021.

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This support service, directly addressing people in danger, need and fleeing their country will require deep thinking and careful management. Like most sovereign states, the UAE itself, despite its fast-growing capability to balance its interests with the effects of its wealth and financial leverage, will face increasingly larger and more complex judgments about how to respond to incrementally higher demands for aid and human succor. These decisions will always come with distressing media coverage of human and environmental disaster events.

The success of the EHC is based on local capacity to deliver logistical infrastructure, a highly developed transport node and interest by an A-List of global humanitarians for a center close to several disaster-prone regions. These include the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean rim.

It will now need to deal with the deep and difficult policy problem, at least for humanitarians, of where to consolidate infrastructure and resources for rapidly accessible assistance to people suffering under complex situations. Here we will see realist foreign policy and the place and role of humanitarian assistance collide. Other wealthy states in the region will face the same problems under their current models of humanitarian support.

Humanitarian assistance, unless coupled with other incentives, rarely leads to a particular and favorable bilateral policy response. After all, the recipient state captures assistance from many quarters. Assistance by states such as the United Arab Emirates, if routine and on a policy basis more regular than opportunistic, will set a strong floor under the UAE’s global model. But it will be difficult to move from one crisis response to another without some clear “stop/go” decision points that do not appear mercenary.

Inter-Arab aid engagement has not been readily seen in humanitarian relief under the same Western and international media gaze as that of other UN member states. For the UAE, the dilemma stems from a priority to make its contributions visible and to showcase the model exemplified by the EHC. Clearly, realist soft power requires more from actions to provide international humanitarian relief. This is where real strategy concerning the concentration of aid and effective delivery will pave the way for success and emulation.

The Case of Afghanistan

The crisis continuing to expand in Afghanistan is a perfect example of emerging challenges and opportunities for new strategies. A growing need for assistance will not decline in the near future, nor will the need from time to time for states to explain their policy approaches and their prioritization of crisis responses. There is already a focus on the realpolitik of humanitarian support as a tool to advance interventionist global agendas. China’s COVID-19 vaccine aid is a clear example, especially as the breadth of Beijing’s response was undermined by the relatively poor efficacy of its vaccines.   

The model working out Abu Dhabi’s EHC allows states to advance more multilateral-driven crisis response strategies. In the case of the August reception of over 8,000 Afghan refugees, the UAE did not engage in unilateral interventionism. Instead, it responded to rapid coordination of responses to international needs for transport and hosting facilities, allowing an increasing number of Afghan nationals to be extricated during the chaos caused by the Taliban advance into Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan.

The UAE offered facilities to house Afghan refugees en route to third countries, such as the United States. It also provided relief to overstretched militaries and civilian organizations in Europe and the US that were overwhelmed by the number of refugees. Facilities such as those found at Abu Dhabi’s EHC proved a more dignified alternative to military bases and public facilities such as town halls, schools, temporary shelters and, in some cases, church-based facilities in the West.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The UAE’s Approach to Humanitarian Assistance appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Syrian Women Find a New Life in Germany

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Most opted for the convenient and electable option of telling voters what they wanted to hear. In doing so, many made use of a new in-vogue and almost bipartisan that Germany must not see a repeat of what happened in 2015, invoking fear of uncontrolled immigration and a split society that supposedly followed Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to grant entry to nearly six years ago.

But this framing oversimplifies, decontextualizes and exaggerates the events of that year. Most of all, it denies a shared responsibility for Afghanistan’s current predicament and the human stories behind the German-Afghan migration history that spans four decades.

A History of Afghan Migration

According to the UN Refugee Agency,  Afghan refugees lived in Germany in 2020, trailing only Pakistan and Iran as the largest receiving countries. At the same time, 1,592 live in the US and 9,351 in the UK. Afghan  to Germany dates back to the first half of the 20^th century, yet until the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, only 2,000 Afghans lived in Germany.

Historically, immigration to Germany varied vastly relative to the conflict phases in Afghanistan. Following the Soviet invasion in 1979, approximately 3,000 Afghans arrived in Germany each year from 1980 to 1982. The second phase of immigration followed from 1985 onward, when predominantly Afghan communists sought refuge in Germany.

The largest movement of Afghan refugees began with the end of Soviet occupation in 1989 and the start of the Afghan Civil War in 1992. Restrictions and expulsions imposed by the riparian states of Iran and Pakistan forced many Afghans to choose Germany as an alternative migration destination.

With the mujahedeen victory and the  of the Taliban, migration to Germany increased drastically until the mid-1990s before numbers declined steadily. Since 2010, with the resurgence of the Taliban, the number of Afghan refugees heading toward Germany has rebounded continuously. While 9,115 Afghans initially applied for asylum in 2014, this figure almost  to 127,012 in 2016.

Since then, the number of Afghan refugees significantly, from 16,423 in 2017 to 9,901 in 2020. The causes for this decrease can be found both on the European and national level, in policies enacted in response to the 2015 refugee crisis. In March 2016, as part of the , European Union member states provided financial support for Turkey to take back irregular migrants, mostly from Greece. In the same year, the EU concluded the Joint Way Forward with Afghanistan to ease “the return and readmission of irregular Afghan migrants from the EU to Afghanistan.”

On a national level, German information attempted to dissipate alleged rumors about lavish living conditions in Germany. Other measures, such as restrictions to family reunifications, might have also had an impact.

A New Phase of Immigration

After the fall of the government of Ashraf Ghani, a new phase of Afghan immigration is likely. Its extent will be subject to political will. Initially, Germany responded quickly to the Taliban takeover by adapting its asylum policies by halting deportations to Afghanistan. That represented a significant shift. Before, in a controversial attempt to appease the German population after support had waned for Merkel’s refugee policy, more Afghans were forced back to their home country as some areas were declared safe. 

But Germany has been timid in its response to the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. As of now, fewer than 3,000 Afghans have been to Germany. It seems that six years later, Merkel’s so-called “open door” approach still casts an overwhelming shadow over German politics and is a strong impetus for the tentative approach toward aiding Afghan refugees today.

The issue of migration has become a hot potato that German politicians were keen to avoid during the election campaign. If addressed, candidates were likely to try to outdo each other in using restrictive immigration rhetoric in an attempt not to alienate voters.

During the election campaign, the chairman of the Christian Democrats (CDU) and candidate for the chancellorship, Armin Laschet, tried to capitalize on an immigration-weary German society by that 2015 â€śmust not be repeated.” While this phrase failed to inspire a successful campaign, as the election results show, it aptly reflects the public mood: According to a  published in June, 60% of Germans reject accepting more refugees.

This collective backtracking by Germany’s political class casts an unwarranted bad light on the decisions made in 2015. Essentially, it capitulates to the far right — particularly the Alternative for Germany — in its interpretation of that period. According to journalist Anna Thewalt in Der Tagesspiegel, “with a truncated reference to the year, the events of that time are decontextualized and exposed to myth-making.”

Margarete Stokowski, a correspondent for Der Spiegel, the cynicism and the lack of empathy in the shifting political climate against refugees: “2015 was the year in which civil society accomplished much of what politics could not or did not want to. … What must not be repeated is politicians treating fleeing people like nuclear waste they don’t know what to do with.”

To the relief of many German and European politicians, a scenario similar to 2015 is unlikely to materialize. Many Afghans already face barriers and restrictions in Pakistan and Iran, stymieing a journey to Europe. According to , a sociologist at Kiel University of Applied Sciences, 2015 “will not be repeated in Europe. Afghan refugees simply don’t make it to Europe because the borders are sealed. The border regime that was established during the so-called refugee crisis is working. Afghan refugees are a minority on all main routes to Europe.”

Migration as Misfortune

In light of the human tragedy unfolding in Afghanistan, the rhetoric in German politics that dismisses migration as  is not only lacking empathy, but avoids the responsibility for the country’s 21-year military involvement in a failed Afghanistan mission. German armed forces were part of the 2001 multinational International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mandate and initially helped to secure Kabul after the defeat of the Taliban.

From 2003 onward, German soldiers were largely deployed to the northern region of Kunduz to establish a secure environment and improve infrastructure. This mission came under severe criticism due to a military exercise on September 4, 2009, when a German commander ordered the bombing of two tankers, feared to be stolen by Taliban fighters, resulting in 142 casualties, most of them civilians.

Despite increasing public scrutiny and doubts about the purpose of Germany’s involvement, its armed forces remained in Afghanistan until 2021, participating in Operation Resolute Support to advise and train local armed forces after the ISAF mandate ended in 2014.

Not only does the anti-immigration rhetoric shut its eyes to the military involvement with loss of civilian life, but it also ignores the history of Afghan migration and the human stories behind it. The of 2015 demonizes refugees “who came to Germany … started a new life here under difficult circumstances and are now part of society. What are they supposed to think now when they hear this?” asks Anna Thewalt.

Particularly Afghan women, for whom fleeing to Germany was the path to freedom and self-determination, are struggling to reenact the rising anti-migration sentiment. One of them is Adela Yamini, who had fled from Kabul to Germany in 1994 to escape the mujahedeen. She now lives in the state of Hesse, in the Rhine-Main region near Frankfurt, to a large proportion of Afghans. During her 27 years in Germany, she has thrived and excelled as a teacher in a vocational school and a local party chairwoman for the Social Democratic Party (SPD).

The recent developments in her homeland filled her with great concern and horror, as escape routes that were open to her many years ago are now closed to Afghan women. “I am overjoyed that as a woman I could flee Afghanistan and study and work in Germany. … It is terrible just to think that as a woman you have no way out and are locked up forever and ever. … When I see the pictures and hear from my relatives what they are going through, I am at a loss for words and I can’t find the language to comfort them, to reassure them,” she wrote in an email.

Yamini believes that the German government needs to face up to responsibility in light of its military involvement by supporting Afghan people “who are currently in acute danger to leave the country.” For that, “bureaucratic hurdles must be overcome and people without passports or visas should be taken out of the country.”

As of now, she sees the current German government as avoiding its duty to those who supported its mission in Afghanistan. According to Yamini, by trying not to “scare off voters,” this responsibility is foisted off to a “future government” due to the events of 2015 which were “not discussed appropriately.”

Since 2001, Germany has taken in more refugees from Afghanistan than many other countries that were capable or had a moral obligation to do so. Instead of building on that legacy, Germany is caving into false doom-and-gloom narratives around the events of 2015 that do not correspond with the realities on the ground today. According to , of the German Institute for Integration and Migration Research (DeZIM), “Germany would be much better prepared today to receive refugees — both at the level of civil society and in terms of improved accommodation capacities as well as integration measures.”

One pretext against further immigration is that Afghans find integration particularly hard. This is not reflected in reality as high employment of Afghan refugees in Germany exemplify. That is even more remarkable in light of government measures that had an inhibiting effect on the integration of Afghan refugees. According to , also of DeZIM, “German integration policy … has disadvantaged Afghan refugees for years in their access to integration-promoting measures because as a group they have not had so-called ‘good prospects of staying’ in recent years.”

As soon as the obstacles are lifted, Afghans prove their willingness to integrate into German society. When refugees were allowed to complete shortened apprenticeships in understaffed professions in , it was mostly Afghans who seized the opportunity. Already in 2016, from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees showed that Afghans in particular, who are often young and low-skilled, are seeking to complete school education and vocational training.

New Government, Same Inhibition

Following the results of the recent election, the end of the Merkel era is imminent. That era will not only be associated with the courageous decisions of 2015 but also the hasty, scowling renunciation of those policies. There won’t be another policy shift in the foreseeable future, even with the upcoming change of government.

That was indicated by Olaf Scholz, of the SPD, who is likely to take over the chancellorship by forming a coalition with the Green Party and the Liberal Democrats. During an election campaign appearance, he for Afghan refugees — as long as this takes place as far away from Germany’s front door as possible: “This time we will have to make sure that those who are also seeking protection in neighboring countries are not left alone, as was often the case in the past. Instead, we have to do everything in our power to ensure that there are prospects for integration, that they can stay there, that they can have a secure future there.”

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With this statement, Scholz conceded that an affirmative discourse on migration to Germany is a hornet’s nest. For the time being, Germany is preoccupied with its own problems. By describing the events of 2015 as catastrophic for the country, portraying migration as bad fortune and disparaging successful integration, Germany’s political class has succumbed to the narratives of the far right. As a result, this retoric has fed and reinforced the public’s negative attitudes toward migration. Meanwhile, the suffering in Afghanistan, particularly among its women, slips from public view.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Germany Lacks Political Courage to Welcome More Afghan Refugees appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Britain Must Protect Afghanistan’s Chevening Scholars

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Unconstrained by the presence of foreign forces or the binding conditions of a peace agreement, Afghan civilians will be vulnerable to attacks by the Taliban and other terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State in Khurasan Province (IS-KP). Yet if history and the current situation are indicators, the Hazaras are at the risk.

The Hazara of Afghanistan

Before the 19^th century, Shia Hazaras were the largest minority in Afghanistan, up 67% of the population. Between 1890 and 1893, Pashtun Sunni leader Amir Abdur Rahman Khan declared jihaduponHazaras, who resisted by declaring jihad against the ruling forces. Although their fighting was fierce, over half the Hazara population was killed or forced into exile, their lands confiscated and thousands via slave markets that remained active until 1920. Women were coerced into marriage with Pashtun men, a practice to destroy the cultural integrity and identity of Hazaras.

This period has been as the “most significant example of genocide in the modern history of Afghanistan.” The historic significance of Khan’s jihad not only galvanized Pashtun and other Afghan tribes against the Hazaras, but it institutionalized their relegated status within Afghan society to an inferior position. This continued until the invasion of US and NATO forces in 2001.

Today, Hazaras make up around of Afghanistan’s 38-million population. Some, such as international relations scholar Niamatullah Ibrahimi, put this figure at 25%. Yet regardless of how many remain, one thing is clear: The Hazaras are amongst the most discriminated against and persecuted people in the world. As such, they form one of the largest groups of asylum seekers and refugees.

The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 precipitated the largest exodus of Hazaras since 1890. After 10 years of war, the Soviets withdrew. A vacuum ensued that led to various factions vying for power. The Taliban seized control and ruled the country from 1996 to 2001. The Taliban soon launched another era of persecution of Hazaras. Two years after taking control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, the Taliban 2,000 Hazaras in Mazar-e-Sharif. An estimated 15,000 Hazaras their lives under the Taliban regime. The US-led invasion removed the Taliban from power and resulted in less violence against the Hazaras. Yet the community to be deemed an inferior group in Afghanistan. Historically, Hazaras were relegated to menial labor.

Despite the legacy of persecution, marginalization and exclusion from the highest levels of government, Hazaras have achieved important gains in the fields of education and culture since 2001. The Hazaras advocate and practice democratic participation, universal education and tolerance for religious and ethnic pluralism. These values are indispensable for the creation and maintenance of a healthy civil society. Yet Hazaras are anathema to the Taliban and IS-KP.

Targeting the Hazara

With the US departure imminent and the return of the Taliban inevitable, the identity, values and achievements of the Hazara people make them a primary target. The formula was repeated throughout the 20^th century: An ideologically intolerant group obtains political power and accentuates salient differences of a minority. The dominant group discriminates against minorities, marginalizes them to the lowest caste in society and then systematically eliminates them.

The pattern of violence often appears to the outside world as random. But to the Hazaras, the violence is systematic. Due to their religious and ethnic identity, passion for education and procreation, the minority community has been targeted for ethnic cleansing.

Since December 6, 2011, when thousands of Hazaras were in Kabul during the holy day of , the violence has resembled a genocidal character. The bombings, which killed 70 in Kabul and four in Mazar-e-Sharif, were claimed to be conducted by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Lei) a Pakistan-based group strongly affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In May of this year, triple bombings left nearly , 85 of whom were at Syed-Al-Shuhada high school, which is predominantly attended by teenage girls. Last year, a maternity ward of a hospital by MĂ©decins Sans Frontières was attacked. Twenty-four people , including 16 mothers and two children. In the same year, were killed at the Kawsar Danish tutoring center. 

Currently, the Taliban control more than half of Afghanistan’s territory. This includes 17 out of 19 districts in Herat’s province, which is densely populated by Hazaras. With repeated attacks against Hazaras, it is clear that ethnic cleansing is taking in Afghanistan.

The Taliban have applied this formula before and are deliberately using it again with renewed expectation for its all-out assault on Afghanistan after the US departs. Vulnerable groups in the country are already arming themselves and realigning their relationship with the Taliban. Yet not all of these groups support or embrace the Taliban. Rather, they are only doing so out of political necessity and survival. In other words, act supportively of the Taliban or die.

The litmus test of loyalty will be measured by the degree to which other ethnic groups hold the Hazaras in and advance the Taliban’s agenda against them. The phenomenon is called a “cascade,” wherein acts of violence against a marginalized group establishes one’s legitimacy in the eyes of the dominant group.

What Can Be Done?

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission has called for the UN to appoint a commission of inquiry to the murder of Hazara school children and attacks on Shia worshippers. The International Criminal Court has the chief prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, to investigate war crimes committed by all responsible parties, including the Taliban.

Yet more needs to be done. The international community should acknowledge the emerging signs that genocide is underway against the Hazaras and will only escalate. Global powers, such as the United States, must call for the protection of the most vulnerable people. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) should Hazara refugees on the high-priority list for asylum.

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In response to the Taliban’s territorial gains, several mujahedeen commanders, including Hazara leader Mohammed Mohaqiq, have organized local civilian forces whose presence has and inspired government troops. In the recent past, the government armed Hazara civilians, who successfully defended mosques and sacred celebrations from Taliban attacks. Kabul must consider this strategy again.

Yet local civilian forces, the Afghan army and international troops alone will never bring peace, security and stability to Afghanistan. If Hazaras are to remain in the country with any expectation of a recognizable civil existence, a political solution is required. But a settlement without involving Pakistan, China, Iran and the US is doomed to fail.

Pakistan continues to provide safe harbor and assistance to the Afghanistan-based Taliban. China, a key ally of Islamabad, is the only global power with credible influence over the Pakistanis. Iran now supports the Taliban. It does so in order to counter the emergence of an anti-Iranian Islamic state in Afghanistan. The long-term interest of the United States is to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a training ground for anti-Western terrorists. The presence of all these parties, particularly the Iranians and Americans, is required at the negotiating table.  

International leadership capable of identifying and appealing to these four powers, whose current relationship is shaped more by enmity than commonality, has yet to emerge. The situation on the ground requires immediate remedies specifically addressed to the threats posed to the Hazaras. It is time to take notice.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Hazaras of Afghanistan Face a Threat to Survival appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Nicaragua’s latest crisis began in 2018 with a small demonstration against President Daniel Ortega’s changes to the nation’s pension system. Since then, Ortega and pro-government groups have waged a brutal crackdown on protesters, leaving more than 300 people and over 2,000 injured.

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The situation is becoming increasingly alarming in the run-up to the presidential election on November 7. Last month, Ortega’s government carried out sweeping  of top opposition leaders and silenced dissenting voices. There is almost no likelihood of a free and fair later this year. The government’s actions have also contributed to Nicaragua’s perilous economic situation, which could impede the country’s COVID-19 recovery. Only  of the Nicaraguan population has been fully vaccinated against COVID-19 and even fewer have received only one dose.

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Political repression and economic despair have forced over 100,000 Nicaraguans to  the country. Costa Rica has generously hosted nearly 80% of those who left. Thousands more have to Mexico, Panama and the United States. In fact, apprehensions of Nicaraguans at the US southern border increased by 670% January and May of this year. A recent CID Gallup (Interdisciplinary Development Consultants, Inc.)  revealed that nearly two out of every three Nicaraguans still in the country want to migrate to the United States, Spain or Canada, due mainly to Nicaragua’s sociopolitical crisis.

Though Nicaraguan refugees and asylum seekers have been generally well-received by their neighbors, the Costa Rican system is under strain as more Nicaraguans — as well as Venezuelans, Cubans and other asylum seekers — seek protection. Nicaraguans in Costa Rica also face barriers to full economic integration and were hard-hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. Many lost jobs in the informal and more than three-quarters of Nicaraguans in Costa Rica are experiencing immense hunger. Even more alarming, nearly 60,000 Nicaraguans in Costa Rica made the harrowing decision to  home as opposed to continue living in their host country with limited support.  

Take Notice of Nicaragua

The United States should take several steps to address the ongoing displacement and suffering of Nicaraguans.  

First, the Biden administration should support Costa Rica in its efforts to receive, protect and integrate Nicaraguans. During a recent visit to Costa Rica, Secretary of State Antony Blinken  a valuable signal of US engagement. The administration should convey strong public support for Costa Rica, as a democratic leader in the region that is making serious efforts to provide safety to those in need.

The US government should also look for opportunities — directly or through international organizations like the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) — to support Costa Rica’s asylum system and continue to strongly the Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework (MIRPS), the regional initiative to address forced displacement in Central America and Mexico.

Second, as Costa Rica steps up the provision of COVID vaccines for its population, the Biden administration should explore with agencies, such as UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the provision of humanitarian aid to the Costa Rican government bodies and civil society groups supporting the needs of Nicaraguans receiving protection in Costa Rica.

The administration recently announced its plan to distribute  6 million vaccines through the COVAX initiative to Latin American countries, including Costa Rica. This is a welcomed step in supporting Costa Rica during this tenuous time. Yet Washington could go further by supporting assistance to address job losses and food insecurity that Nicaraguans in Costa Rica have faced amid the pandemic, as well as efforts to ensure that these vulnerable individuals remain protected while they await their vaccinations.

Third, the Biden administration must comply with its own laws and international obligations by permitting Nicaraguans fleeing political persecution to seek asylum at the US southern border with Mexico. The US should  to ending a near-complete ban on asylum applications and stop sending people back to dangerous situations. Nicaraguan asylum seekers should have their claims assessed — with access to counsel and without being subjected to detention.  

As the situation in Nicaragua becomes increasingly dire, these measures would be a step in the right direction and would have a positive impact on displaced Nicaraguans, the government of Costa Rica and the region.   

*[Rachel Schmidtke is the advocate for Latin America and Irla Atanda is the special assistant to the president at Refugees International.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The US Must Pay Attention to Displaced Nicaraguans appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Harris walked back these statements last week, partly in response to criticism from groups like that swiftly highlighted the right to seek asylum and international protection. In an interview following her trip to Guatemala and Mexico, she , “Let me be very clear, I am committed to making sure we provide a safe haven for those seeking asylum, period.” But it remains an open question whether this commitment will be reflected in concrete policy change.

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It is time for the United States to show a stronger commitment to the protection needs of Central American migrants. The Biden administration can do so by taking five important steps.

Rights of Central American Migrants

First, the administration must commit to increasing resettlement. Politicians who want to emphasize protection sometimes speak about having migrants apply for asylum from home. This confuses asylum, which is requested at the border or from within the US, with resettlement, which is usually applied for from a third country rather than the home country, where it is too dangerous for people seeking protection to await processing.

Unfortunately, no significant US refugee resettlement program for Central Americans currently exists. Harris did not discuss plans to create one, even for the women the administration flee violence in Guatemala. The statement that Guatemalans should not come undermines not only the right to seek asylum under US law, but it also bolsters a long history of American to recognize Guatemalans as refugees or the role of US policies in causing displacement in the region.

The Biden administration has some additional refugee visa slots for Central Americans and established a Migration Resource Center in Guatemala to advise people about the availability of refugee resettlement. However, much more needs to be done by the State Department, Homeland Security (DHS) and Congress to build a substantial resettlement program for Guatemalans. The administration should work with Congress to ensure that more Central Americans are referred and are eligible for refugee resettlement.

Second, the United States must make it possible for additional at-risk youth from Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala to qualify as refugees through the Central American Minors (CAM) program. On June 15, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas announced an expansion of the renewed program, which existed under the Obama administration. It allows parents based in the United States to apply to have their children come to the country from Central America as refugees.

This is welcome news. But the devil is in the details. It remains to be seen if, unlike the Obama-era CAM program, significant numbers of Guatemalan parents will actually be eligible and helped to apply and if US officials sent to interview children will recognize them as refugees. It is also unclear if, this time around, the US government will ensure the safety of children while they are interviewed in Guatemala and provide them with needed support after they arrive in the US. The Biden administration must revise eligibility, retrain adjudicators and commit resources to make this program a true pathway to security for Guatemalan kids.

Third, the Biden administration must also restore asylum at the border. Harris’ description of the border as closed does not accurately represent precisely what is happening, only further adding to the confusion. On the one hand, newly arriving migrants cannot ask for asylum at ports of entry along the US southern border and they could be expelled under an COVID-19-related order. On the other hand, the administration has exempted unaccompanied minors from Central America from this order and is admitting rather than expelling the majority of arriving families. Yet single adult asylum seekers who enter between ports of entry are an . These migrants are either expelled without any screening for their protection needs or detained at Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities for long periods.

Further, the Biden administration that asylum-seeking families admitted at the border will have their cases adjudicated on a faster timeline in immigration court without ensuring they will have access to counsel. Refugees International encourages the administration to end the COVID-19 expulsion policy, process asylum seekers at ports of entry, release asylum seekers to pursue their claims at their destination locations, and expand access to legal counsel for asylum seekers.

Fourth, the Biden administration must listen to the voices of Central Americans. Harris’ comments will likely do little to affect migration and may take away from other issues that are of the utmost importance for Guatemalans. Smugglers are not swayed by such remarks and continue to profit off a booming business that feeds on the lack of legal pathways available to Central Americans.

Guatemalans themselves often have no control over the conditions that force them to migrate, little of which have to do with US immigration policies. Two devastating hurricanes, pervasive violence and crime, and endemic corruption are some of the main reasons why people flee. These drivers will take years to diminish. In the meantime, the United States should work to build trust with Guatemalan civil society and prioritize support to areas that Guatemalans are specifically calling for help. Most notably, the US needs to support Guatemala in reducing corruption, as several prominent organizations in the country have for.

Finally, the Biden administration must work with Mexico on a holistic approach to migration that goes beyond deterrence and the prevention of northward movement. For decades, the US has asked the Mexican government to help keep migrants from the border through increased enforcement at Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala and ramped up detention and deportation in Mexico. This limits many with international protection concerns from seeking asylum in Mexico or the US.

It remains to be seen whether policy changes like the US-Mexico “Operations Group on Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking” will offer protection to victims of human trafficking at the border, whose needs have been in the past. On his trip to Mexico last week, Secretary Mayorkas with officials from the National Institute of Immigration (INM), but not with representatives of the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR). Nor did the delegation from the United States traveling with Mayorkas include officials focused on asylum and humanitarian concerns. In bilateral discussions about migration with Mexico, the Biden administration needs to increase emphasis on access to protection.

Following Through

If President Joe Biden is serious about providing protection to Central Americans, his administration must more clearly and consistently articulate its commitment to this goal. It must follow through on the commitment via increased access to refugee resettlement and asylum and to humble and holistic cooperation with regional partners.

Harris’ approach was a political mistake and a lost opportunity. Other plans announced by the administration indicate a more productive approach that can be best fulfilled by adopting the five steps we have outlined.

*[Yael Schacher is a senior US advocate and Rachel Schmidtke is an advocate for Latin America at Refugees International.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The US Must Commit to Protecting Central Americans appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Angela Merkel: A Retrospective

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This opportunistic strategy, with the retention of power as the main objective, was devoid of a vision and an ideological foundation. The German magazine put it succinctly back in 2012: “She is pragmatic and non-ideological — like many Germans. Only what the Chancellor stands for, no one knows.”

Merkel’s reserved and pragmatic governing style hardly left room for symbolism. One of the few symbols associated with her was the famous diamond hand gesture, known as the “.”&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;During the refugee crisis, Merkel abruptly left her trodden path of asymmetric demobilization. The symbolism and emotional outbursts caused by her course of action and its consequences astounded not only the German public, but it might have surprised the chancellor herself. 

Driven by Deep Conviction

At the height of the crisis, her deliberative rhetoric yielded to impassioned pleas for a liberal, open-minded Germany. Merkel’s most famous but polarizing , “We can do this,” rallied Germans the “decision of her lifetime” to grant entry to hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants. Wearing her heart on her sleeve, Merkel to critics in September 2015, saying, “If we now have to apologize for showing a friendly face in emergency situations, then this is not my country.”&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;

Sigmar Gabriel, a former leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the federal minister for economic affairs and energy at the time of the crisis, Merkel’s conviction-driven view on the refugee influx. While debating the potential closure of German borders, Merkel replied, “But promise me one thing, Mr. Gabriel, we won’t build fences.” Looking back, Gabriel reflects, “I can still see her shaking her head … I remember thinking, this is not a superficial position, it was deep inside her.” Merkel had up during the Cold War in East Germany and had considered fleeing a dictatorial regime and repression herself.

For that rare occasion, Merkel granted a glimpse into her convictions and let emotion visibly influence her actions. Unsurprisingly, this led to a reciprocation in emotional reactions. Not only did it expose her to hate from the (far) right that blossomed due to her decision, but it also resulted in symbolic affection — the likes she had rarely received before. Refugees in Budapest, the Hungarian capital, with their sights set on their final destination, , “Germany! Germany!” Others posted love on social media after the news broke that Germany would temporarily suspend the European Union’s Dublin Regulation, which “states that asylum seekers must have their applications processed in the EU country in which they first arrive.” A selfie between Syrian refugee  and Merkel went viral.

Mother Merkel and the Asylum Row

More than five years later, Merkel’s tenure as chancellor is drawing to a close this fall as German voters head to the polls. In October 2018, most refugees in Germany met the news of her as party leader and decision not to stand in the next election with disappointment and gratitude.

Aras Bacho arrived in Germany from Syria in August 2015 and expressed his thoughts on her retirement from politics in passionate and sentimental — hence not typically German — terms. In an article on Vice, he : “I am very sad about Merkel’s decision. The woman who gave me hope and future wants to leave? This is unimaginable, and I think other candidates for the chancellorship are unqualified. I hope that I will get up tomorrow and that it was all just a dream. For me, Germany without Merkel is like bread without butter.” He added that for refugees, “she is like a mother who looks after her children. Many refugees, including myself, have found a great love in Merkel.”&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;

Bacho also touched upon concerns about a future in Germany without Merkel, who, according to him, acted “like a shield” in an increasingly polarized society. “Another chancellor would never have sacrificed herself for people who fled the war. She sacrificed her future for us, for which Merkel is hated … by a minority that is against us,” he said.

If Merkel was a shield for refugees, that shield started to crack during her time in office. Soon after her controversial decision to open Germany’s borders, public support for her migration policies dwindled. As a result, the government  deportations of migrants who had little chance of being recognized as refugees in Germany. Yet this wasn’t enough for the Christian Social Union (CSU), the sister party of Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU).

During the infamous “asylum row” in 2018, the CSU’s party leader, Horst Seehofer, demanded an even tougher stance on migration by turning back asylum seekers at the German border. A was on hand with the government and chancellor’s future on the line. A bruised Angela Merkel survived the onslaught but had to surrender large parts of her liberal approach to migration in an attempt to cling to power. As intra-party and public opinion turned against her, Merkel also refrained from her buoyant catchphrase, “We can do it!” Instead, she appeased skeptical supporters during the general election campaign in 2017 by , “A year like that cannot and should not ever happen again.”

Refugees Now Live in a Split German Society

Merkel changed the societal face of Germany by allowing an influx of refugees and migrants in 2015 alone. By setting aside her usual cautious style of the politics of consensus and power retention, she exposed herself to two opposing sentiments.

On the one hand, the adulation that refugees had for Merkel seems unrelenting. They have settled in Germany, leaving behind political turmoil in their home countries after often arduous journeys. Statistics show steady progress regarding their integration into German society. About  of refugees who fled to Germany since 2015 have found a job. Now, most live in their own . In schools, children and young people from refugee families usually integrate well. According to a study by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, conducted annually since 2016, refugees are almost as  with life as Germans themselves.

On the other hand, Merkel left behind a split society in which the once predominant “climate of welcome” has subsided. A majority of Germans now reject her refugee policies. Refugees and migrants often have to bear the wrath directed against Merkel and her policies. The crisis and its consequences have led to  radical-right violence against refugees and the radicalization of right-wing extremist groups. As a result, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) established itself as a far-right party, serving as a mouthpiece for the radical right.

The refugee crisis has thrown German society out of balance, bringing to the surface hidden feelings of injustice and loss of trust in democratic institutions. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these feelings. Reminiscent of the Capitol Hill insurrection in Washington on January 6, a group of right-wing extremists and conspiracy theorists attempted to the German parliament in August 2020. Similar to the US, German democracy has edged closer to a tipping point.

That poses a particular danger to the vulnerable group of refugees. Their fears of having to endure the same instability they had fled are rising. Angela Merkel’s unprecedented handling of the refugee crisis might be justifiably disputable, but protecting refugees by taking a firm stand against extremism should not.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Germany’s Refugees Face a Future Without Angela Merkel appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The coup will negatively affect much of the population in Myanmar, rolling back tentative democratic reforms and freedoms and leading to further mass arrests. But ethnic minority groups, which have long been a target of military abuses, have particular reason to be concerned.

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Even with the veil of a quasi-civilian government in recent years, the military has continued to commit atrocities against the Kachin, Karen, Rakhine and other states inside Myanmar. For the 600,000 Rohingya still living in Myanmar, the threat is even clearer. They survived the military’s genocidal campaign in August 2017. Indeed, the head of the military and now of the country, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, has to the Rohingya as a long-standing problem and an â€śunfinished job.”

The coup will also affect refugees outside of the country. The more than 1 million Rohingya living in Bangladesh now face even greater odds against a safe return to their homeland in Myanmar. In a way, the coup only underscores the reality that conditions for return have been far from safe and sustainable all along.

Rohingya in Bangladesh have told Refugees International that they are alarmed by the coup and worried about the fate of loved ones still in Myanmar. At least with the quasi-civilian government, there was some hope that international pressure could eventually inspire a change. But as long as the military — the entity responsible for the genocide — remains in charge, the idea of a safe return seems inconceivable.

International Pressure on Myanmar

If there is a silver lining, it is that the newly galvanized international outrage about the coup might break the inertia in addressing the military’s abuses. In a released in January 2021, Refugees International laid out critical policy advice for the Biden administration to address the Rohingya crisis. The report recommendations also provide a playbook for responding to the coup.

As a first move, the Biden administration must recognize the crimes committed by Myanmar’s military for what they are: crimes against humanity and genocide. Given the ample evidence available, it is perplexing that the United States and many other countries have not yet made this determination. A genocide declaration would not only speak truth to power about what the Myanmar military has done to the Rohingya, but it would also galvanize more urgent global action. It would signal how serious the US and other allies take the threat of the Myanmar military.

Second, the Biden administration should use the urgency of the coup and a genocide determination to engage allies and lead a global response marked by diplomatic pressure and coordinated targeted sanctions. The Biden administration has already said it is considering new sanctions and is reaching out to other countries to coordinate. Those sanctions should be placed both on Myanmar’s military leaders and military-owned enterprises, including, but not limited to, the two large conglomerates, the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL). Future lifting of sanctions should be phased and tied not only to a return to the quasi-civilian government elected in 2020, but also progress on creating conditions conducive to the return of Rohingya refugees.

Third, the US and other allies must push for a multilateral arms embargo. Ideally, this would be done through the action of the UN Security Council. But as long as China and Russia are likely to block such actions, countries like the United States and European Union members that have already ended arms sales to Myanmar should use diplomatic pressure to urge others — including India, Israel and Ukraine — to do the same.

Fourth, countries must revitalize support for international accountability efforts, including at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court. The Gambia’s genocide case against Myanmar at the ICJ has the support of the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and Canada and the Netherlands have expressed their intent to intervene in the case. The US and other allies should add their support.

Finally, the United States and other allies must push for coordinated high-level diplomatic pressure at the UN Security Council, even with Chinese and Russian reluctance to allow stronger measures. As an important first step, the Security Council did issue a  that expressed concern about the coup and called for the release of detainees; however, it fell short of outright condemnation of the coup and did not commit to any concrete action. Nonetheless, a discussion at this highest level still adds pressure on Myanmar’s military by keeping the possibility of stronger action alive. The fact that there had been no UN Security Council session on the Rohingya for the past two years is ludicrous and only fueled the Myanmar military’s impunity.

Ethnic minority groups in Myanmar know all too well that the military is capable of — and willing to execute — mass atrocities. The US and all states that stand for democracy, and against mass atrocities, must act now while the eyes of the world are on Myanmar.

*[Daniel Sullivan is the senior advocate for human rights at Refugees International.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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In Germany, we don’t do that, at least not in a formal way. We do have, however, a sense of who was a good chancellor and who wasn’t, and there probably is something of a common understanding as to why. Chancellors stand out if they accomplished extraordinary feats. Konrad Adenauer will always be remembered for accomplishing Franco-German reconciliation and anchoring the Federal Republic firmly in the West; Willy Brandt for initiating a radical turn in West German foreign policy toward the East, culminating in the reconciliation with Poland; and Helmut Kohl for seizing the historic opportunity in 1989 and bringing about the peaceful reunification of the two Germanies.

The Downward Spiral of Angela Merkel’s CDU

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What about Angela Merkel, the first woman to hold Germany’s most powerful political office? Her tenure will end in a few months’ time, at the end, one hopes, of a horrific pandemic. On September 26, Germany will elect a new parliament, and Merkel will retire. By then she will have been in office for more than 15 years, second only to Helmut Kohl, who managed to hold on to the office a few months longer. When Merkel took over in November 2005, she was largely dismissed as “Kohl’s girl” who was likely to have a hard time asserting herself in a political party, the Christian Democrats (CDU) largely dominated by men.

The Anti-Trump

In fact, shortly after the election, then-chancellor Gerhard Schröder on national television that there was no way that his Social Democratic Party would ever accept an offer from Angela Merkel to form a coalition with the CDU under her leadership. As it so happened, the Social Democrats did, and Schröder was finished. In the years that followed, it became increasingly clear that Merkel was quite capable of asserting herself in the treacherous waters of Berlin’s political scene. In fact, in 2020, Forbes magazine Merkel as the most powerful woman in the world — for the 10^th consecutive year.  

Throughout her 15 years in office, the chancellor has, on average, received . As recently as December, more than 80% of respondents in a representative survey said that Merkel was doing a good job. Appreciation for Merkel, however, has hardly been limited to Germany. In an international from September 2020 covering 13 nations, Merkel was by far seen as the most trusted major world leader. More than three-quarters of respondents rated her positively; by contrast, more than 80% saw then-US President Donald Trump in a negative light.

Poll data also suggest that during Merkel’s tenure, Germany’s stature in the world has substantially increased. In a of 10 European nations from early 2019, almost 50% of respondents agreed that Germany played a more significant role in the world than a decade ago; fewer than half said the same thing about France and the UK. Germans are, for obvious historical reasons, understandably concerned about the country’s international image and reputation. Not for nothing, Canada’s The Globe and Mail referred to her in 2018 as the “,” only to add that “We need her kind more than ever.” This in itself will secure Merkel an eminent place in post-reunification German history.

Ironically enough, the article was written at a time when Merkel’s star appeared to be rapidly waning, the result of serious electoral setbacks on the national and regional level. In the election to the German Bundestag in September 2017, the Christian Democrats lost more than 8 percentage points compared to the previous election, which meant a loss of 65 seats in parliament. At the same time, the radical right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) entered parliament, garnering more than 12% of the vote. In subsequent regional elections in Bavaria and Hesse, the Christian Democrats lost more than 10% of the vote, setting off alarm bells in Munich and Berlin.

By the end of 2018, Merkel appeared to be up against the ropes, her days numbered. Particularly the upsurge in support for the radical populist right caused alarm, particularly in Bavaria. In response, the powerful Christian Social Union (CSU), Bavaria’s independent arm of the Christian Democrats, once again to reach beyond Bavaria and create a genuinely national-conservative party, competing with both the AfD and the CDU. The CSU had always maintained that there must never be a democratically legitimated party to the right of the CSU. With the AfD, there clearly was, and Merkel’s Christian Democrats appeared not in a position to stem the tide.

Corona Winner

Yet Merkel managed to survive the various challenges to her leadership, despite continued electoral setbacks, which largely benefited the AfD. But skepticism abounded. In late 2018, a majority of Germans that Merkel would not serve out her mandate, due to expire at the 2021 parliamentary election. At about the same time, however, 70% of respondents in a said they wished she would finish her mandate. Once the pandemic hit Germany in the spring of 2020, Merkel’s stock started to soar once again. International media celebrated Germany as a most likely pandemic that had proven to the virus.

What a joke. Only this time, nobody’s laughing. At the time of writing, Germany is a coronavirus disaster zone. The country has proved, once again, to be completely unprepared in the face of the second wave of infections that threatens to overwhelm the health care system. Starting in early December, Germany posted record new infections, and this before the arrival of the UK mutation. By now, the situation in some parts of Germany is nothing short of . At the same time, the situation on the vaccination front leaves .

In mid-January, Germany more than 22,000 new infections on a single day and more than 1,100 new COVID-19-related deaths. This is at least partly the result of the German government’s indecisive, hesitant and confusing response to the pandemic, made worse by Germany’s federal system, which provides for a plethora of veto points. This means that not only has it been difficult and quite tedious to arrive at a coordinated policy but also that every Land introduced its own measures, some more stringent than others. The result has been a certain degree of public exasperation. In a , more than half of respondents said they were annoyed at the measures that were “often contradictory.”

To be sure, Merkel cannot be held personally responsible for the dramatic deterioration of the situation once the second wave hit Germany with full force. A lot of time was lost in December in attempts to get the various political officials from Germany’s 16 Länder to agree on a common strategy. And even in the face of a potential disaster in early January, Merkel had to do a lot of to get support for more restrictive measures.

Cultural Revolution

Under the circumstances, Angela Merkel’s other accomplishments as well as her failures are bound to fall by the wayside. They shouldn’t. On one hand, Merkel has dragged the Christian Democrats into the 21^st century. The CDU used to be the party of “Kinder, Kirche, Küche” (children, church, kitchen). Politics were a men’s world for, as my neighbor, a woman, used to tell me, politics is a “dirty business” — and dirty businesses should be left to men.

Merkel dared to appoint a woman to the most male of all ministerial portfolios, defense. The German armed forces did not like her, despite the fact — as even Germany’s conservative flagship publication, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, has conceded — that she managed to substantially as well as and their image. Today, that former defense minister, Ursula von der Leyen, heads the European Commission, another novum. She was replaced by another woman, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who in 2018 succeeded Merkel as the head of the CDU.

Probably nothing exemplifies the cultural revolution Merkel set in motion than the question of sexual and gender identity. Those of us who grew up in the postwar period probably recall that once in a while, our parents would hint that somebody was a “175er.” This was in reference to of the German criminal code according to which homosexuality was a punishable offense. The paragraph goes back all the way to 1871, establishing that any sexual activity between two males (there was no formal mention of lesbians) was subject to criminal persecution and punishment.

During the Nazi period, gays suffered from severe persecution, many of them ended up in concentration camps. After the war, the Federal Republic not only retained the paragraph; it also used the Nazis’ “” — in the camps, homosexuals were marked by a pink triangle on their prisoners’ shirts — to initiate some 100,000 proceedings against homosexuals. It was not until 1994 that the “gay paragraph” was finally abolished, not least because of East German insistence during the negotiations on reunification.

More than 20 years and many gay parades later, in 2017, the German Bundestag voted on legalizing same-sex marriage. On the occasion, Merkel allowed representatives to vote their conscience rather than following party discipline. Quite a few Christian Democrats came out in the support of the law, which was passed by a substantial majority, much to the chagrin of Germany’s conservatives. Some of them defected to the AfD given its vocal opposition to the law, which, as one of its leaders , threatens to undermine Germany’s traditional values and harm society. , however, that a substantial majority supported the law. In June 2017, 60% of men and more than 70% of women came out in favor of same-sex marriage across Germany.

We Can Handle This

Angela Merkel’s resolute position during the so-called refugee crisis of 2015-16 also comes out as a positive. In order to understand the enormity of the event, it might be useful to recall one of the great ł˘±đ˛ú±đ˛Ô±ôĂĽ˛µ±đ˛Ô (delusions) of the Federal Republic, the notion that Germany was “not a country of immigration.” Given the fact that by the 1980s, Germany was home to millions of guest workers and their families, many of whom had permanently settled in Germany, the notion ignored the reality on the ground. Yet it was not until 2001 that an expert commission of the German Bundestag came to the that the notion was “no longer tenable.” By 2015, a significant majority of Germans with that statement, and in 2019, more than agreed that in the future, Germany should accept as many refugees as in the past.

This is quite remarkable, given the storm Merkel provoked when in 2015 she cleared the way for welcoming a million refugees, many of them from war-torn Syria. Her main argument was that Germany is a strong country: “Wir schaffen das,” Merkel announced — “We can handle this.” The German public was not entirely convinced. Perhaps they remembered Merkel’s predecessor, Helmut Kohl, who in 1990 had promised that unification would lead to “blossoming landscapes” in the eastern part of the country. The reality, of course, was the opposite. The West German taxpayers would have to pay the bills for decades to come while in the east, resentment continued to grow only to erupt in substantial support for the AfD.

Under the circumstances, German skepticism in 2015 was quite understandable. In early 2016, around 80% of the population concern that the government had lost control over the refugee situation; among AfD supporters, it was virtually 100%. As expected, the radical right made the refugee crisis the central focus of their mobilization — a winning strategy, as the party’s success in subsequent elections demonstrated. But in the end, Merkel prevailed; early that the refugee influx would lead to major social problems were largely , and, in late 2018, a of Germany’s public agreed that the chancellor had done a good job with respect to her refugee policy.

With Merkel, the CDU moved to the left — or so her critics have . Others have that the left-wing turn of the CDU is largely a myth. The reality is somewhere in between. Empirical studies that in the aftermath of reunification, all major German parties gradually moved to the center. With reunification, Germany added millions of citizens from a socialist regime whose value system and views on major social issues, such as abortion and homosexuality, were considerably to the left of the dominant value system that prevailed in the western part of the country. As a result, the conservative ideational elements in the CDU got progressively weakened, provoking from the party’s right wing. A from 2017  (but based on interviews held before the refugee crisis of 2015) found that CDU members largely agreed. They saw their own party “distinctly to the left” of their own position and that way before Merkel’s now-famous “Wir schaffen das.”

Grey Spots

Yet against all party-internal resistance and opposition, despite calls for her to hand in her resignation, Merkel once again prevailed — a remarkable feat in these turbulent times. Future historians are likely to consider Angela Merkel’s 15-year tenure in an overall positive light. To be sure, there are grey spots, such as Germany’s handling of the fallout of the financial crisis of 2007-08 and, more recently, Berlin’s intransigence with regard to Italian pleas for “Corona bonds” during the first wave of the pandemic.

Another grey spot regards the question of gender equality. Officially, the European Union has been committed to gender mainstreaming since the mid-1990s. More often than not, the results are wide off the mark, particularly in Germany. To be sure, even here critics would that Merkel has “contributed fundamentally to the recognition of women as leaders and decision-makers in Germany.”

In other essential areas of gender politics, her record is rather dismal. Her government did little to nothing to narrow the pay gap between men and women or to do away with Germany’s “anachronistic tax system” that privileges married couples “as long as one of the two (usually the husband) has a high income and the other one (usually the wife) earns little or nothing.” And actual reforms, for instance regarding child care and parental leave, were less intended to promote gender equality than to enhance the position of the family, in line with traditional Christian Democratic doctrine.

The record was equally dismal with regard to public life. As a from late 2018 put online by the Federal Center for Political Education noted, in the course of Merkel’s tenure, the number of women in her cabinets progressively declined, from 40% in her first cabinet to 30% in her fourth. At the same time, the CDU failed to attract new women members. In 2018, women made up around 25% of party ranks.

Things were not any better with respect to the composition of Germany’s Bundestag. At the end of the red-Green coalition in 2005, the share of women MPs had been more than 40%. After the election of 2017, it had fallen to a bit more than 30%. In the Christian Democratic parliamentary group, women made up barely 20%. And although Merkel appointed a woman as defense minister, the most important ministries — interior, foreign affairs and finance — in the hands of men.

This was to a large extent also true for Germany’s civil service. In 2020, 35% of top positions in the public sector were held by women. And, as the ministry for justice and consumer protection recently “the higher up in the hierarchy, the lower the share of women.” But at least here, change is underway. By 2025, all senior positions are supposed to have closed the gender gap.

Klimakanzlerin

If Germany is a laggard with regard to gender equality, it has prided itself to be a leader when it comes to the environment. The reality, however, is somewhat different. In fact, when it comes to arguably the greatest global challenge, the fight against global warming and climate change, Angela Merkel has been a major disappointment.

As a reminder: Merkel entered office as a strong advocate of decisive action against climate change. In fact, in the years that followed, German media nicknamed her the “Klimakanzlerin” — climate chancellor. Yet over time, she gradually abandoned her convictions, caving in first to the demands of German’s powerful and then to the coal industry. Germany continues to rely heavily on for the production of energy. To a significant extent, it is the environmentally most disastrous type of coal, .

Lignite power plants are among Europe’s worst polluters. Most of them in Germany and Poland. And while a number of EU countries, such as France, Italy and the Netherlands, have decided to stop coal-fired power production by or before 2030, Germany won’t phase out its coal plants until 2038. Mining lignite is an important sector in the southeastern part of former East Germany, in Lusatia, around the city of Cottbus. Electoral considerations, particularly given the AfD’s strength in that part of the country, of course have nothing to do with the Merkel government’s reluctance when it comes to coal. Honi soit qui mal y pense.

Overall, Merkel’s climate policy has been suboptimal, to put it mildly. As a former environmental minister , for the government, political opportunism and convenience counted more than tackling an essential problem. That was before the pandemic hit. COVID-19 appears to have caused somewhat of a reconversion. By now, Merkel has once again as the Klimakanzlerin. And for good reasons. COVID-19 has largely been associated with environmental destruction, the dramatic loss of biodiversity and global warming. Polls show that Germans are quite sensitive when it comes to these issues. A found around 85% of the German population not only concerned about these issues, but also willing to make lifestyle changes to “protect the climate.” Under the circumstances, Merkel’s return to her environmentalist roots is hardly surprising. It makes a lot of sense, politically speaking.

Despite a vigorous 15-year resume as chancellor, it is now clear that COVID-19 will define how Merkel will be judged once she leaves office and by how well Germany will master this challenge over the months to come. This might be unfair. After all, Merkel is what Americans call a “lame duck.” But, as Donald Trump so eloquently put it, it is what it is. The German government’s recent frantic attempts to regain control of a situation that has largely spun out of control are an admission of unpreparedness paired with incompetence and mismanagement paired with wishful thinking. In March 2020, Merkel on national television that COVID-19 represented the “greatest challenge since the Second World War.” She was right.

As long as Merkel holds Germany’s most powerful political position, she is in charge and ultimately bears responsibility. At the moment, a large majority of Germans have full confidence that once again, she will be at the top of her game and handle the challenge. It is to be hoped that their confidence is justified.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Angela Merkel: A Retrospective appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Greenhouse gases produced as a result of anthropogenic activity such as the burning of fossil fuels and industrial processes are being at rates higher than at any point in the past 800,000 years. The resulting greenhouse effect is destabilizing the planet’s climate in hazardous ways. Extreme weather events are now more frequent and violent than ever. Heatwaves, droughts, blizzards, hail storms and floods are occurring with greater intensity, exacerbating poverty and forced migration. 2019 was the hottest year on record, with nearly 400 unprecedented instances of high temperatures in the northern hemisphere last summer alone.

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Aside from the loss of biodiversity, the disappearance of small island nations and the proliferation of new diseases, climate change is currently responsible for the of 150,000 people annually, and will expectedly 250,000 fatalities per year between 2030 and 2050. This is a wake-up call for societies, lured into complacency by technological advances, that our lifestyle and consumption patterns are not sustainable.

In this edition of The Interview, 51łÔąĎ talks to professor Ashok Swain, UNESCO chair of International Water Cooperation at Sweden’s Uppsala University, about the human rights impacts of climate change, the ensuing conflicts over resources, and the interplay between global warming and poverty.

The text has been lightly edited for clarity.

Kourosh Ziabari: According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “have an affirmative obligation to take effective measures” to mitigate the impacts of climate change on human rights. With political, economic and security concerns that are consuming resources, coupled with the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, do you think enough is being done to address climate change and its human rights implications? If states have an “obligation” to combat climate change, how is it possible to make sure they are living up to those commitments?

Ashok Swain: Both climate change and COVID-19 are global crises and [are] interconnected. Degrading ecosystems, unsustainable lifestyles and declining natural resources have led to a pandemic like COVID-19. Thus, the world should not forget the threats of climate change while confronting the pandemic. Adding to these two serious crises, human rights are increasingly under threat, and civil and political rights of people are growingly compromised in a world that is witnessing a democratic decline. Climate change has multiplied the human rights crisis in a more unequal and undemocratic world by causing threats to human health and survival, food and water shortages, and weather-related disasters resulting in death and destruction of property. A healthy and robust environment is fundamental to the enjoyment of human rights.

The world has been committed for 72 years to the observation and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and these principles have been at the heart of international agreements. Unfortunately, there is a huge gap that exists between the international commitments on human rights and climate change, and the national policies adopted by the countries. Climate change and policy responses to meet its challenges will have a significant impact on the human rights of millions of people.

The world is also witnessing the climate justice movement in a big way. Only comprehensive and collaborative actions by the states in line with protecting human rights will make it possible for the planet to meet these unprecedented challenges. Countries must commit to ambitious climate mitigation targets to keep the global average temperature increase within a manageable limit. Countries providing climate mitigation assistance and those receiving the support must commit to protecting human rights.

They must incorporate human rights norms into their domestic legal frameworks. While countries need to take important steps toward fulfilling their obligations at home, they need to work cooperatively with other countries to combat climate change and ensure the protection of the human rights of people across the world.  

Ziabari: As reported by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, more than 60% of the world’s population on agriculture for survival, and 12% of the total available lands are used for cultivating crops. In what ways does climate change impinge on the development of economies that are centered around agriculture? 

Swain: Though the impact of climate change is very comprehensive, its effects on the agriculture sector are easy to notice. Changing rainfall patterns and rising average temperatures due to climate change affect agriculture and those who are dependent on it in a very big way. Floods, droughts, new pests and weed problems add more to their woes. Climate change brings food insecurity through its impacts on all aspects of global, regional, national and local food production and distribution systems. It severely affects the people who are already poor and vulnerable, and dependent on an agriculture-based economy, but the risk and vulnerability are gradually going to shift to other economies.

However, while most tropical, arid and semi-arid regions are likely to experience further agricultural production losses due to rising temperatures, food production in the temperate developed part of the world is expected to benefit in the short term from a warmer climate and longer growing seasons.

With climate change, increasing natural disasters, recurring droughts, salinity intrusion into water systems and massive floods are invariably affecting agricultural production and resulting in food shortages in developing countries. Increasing agricultural production for a growing population while facing climate change has become a major challenge for these agricultural economies as they already face serious shortages of freshwater supply and arable land. High concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere reduces the number of nutrients such as zinc and iron in rice and wheat, and bring harmful effects on people in the countries whose diets are highly dependent on these crops.

The adverse effects of climate change on food security, health and economic wellbeing in the agriculture-dependent countries are undermining their ability to achieve their sustainable development goals in a big way. 

Ziabari: Small size, remoteness, insularity and susceptibility to natural disasters are some of the challenges faced by island nations. Last year, the Maldives’ environment minister  that for small island nations, climate change is not only a threat, but its impacts are already being felt. What is at stake for the island nations as a result of global warming and extreme weather conditions? Do you agree that for these regions, climate change poses an existential threat?

Swain: If the present trend of greenhouse gas emission continues, the UN climate science panel warns against the possibility of sea-level rise up to 1.1 meters by 2100. The rise of the seawater level to this magnitude will not only inundate large areas in the highly populated low-lying countries but also can potentially submerge many small island states in the Pacific and Indian oceans. Way back in 1987, the then-president of the Maldives, Maumoon Abdool Gayoom, made an emotional appeal at the UN General Assembly that a sea-level rise of only one meter would threaten the life and survival of all his countrymen. More than three decades have passed, and the threat of several small island countries disappearing from the global map altogether looks more real than ever before.

While they are not underwater yet, these small island countries are already facing the impact of climate change in various ways. In these countries, most human settlement and economic activity take place in coastal areas. Climate change-induced coastal erosion has already brought significant changes in their human settlement patterns and socioeconomic conditions.

Coral reefs play a big role in the wellbeing of the small island countries by supplying sediments to island shores and restraining the impact of waves. Unprecedented coral bleaching due to increased water temperature and carbon dioxide concentration are adversely affecting the reef systems, which is critical for these small countries. Changing rainfall patterns, decreasing precipitation and increasing temperatures have also presented critical challenges for the freshwater supply on these islands and to their food security.

Frequent climate change-induced natural disasters like hurricanes and floods are also bringing devastation to their economy and infrastructure. And also, these severe weather-related events affecting their key tourism sectors. Climate change will affect every country in the world, but small island nations are most vulnerable to its impacts.

Ziabari: Is it accurate to say that climate change effects are disproportionately burdening the developing and low-income countries, and that nations in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia are making up for the shortcomings of the developed, industrialized world in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions to achieve the goals set by the Paris Agreement?

Swain: Despite disagreement and debates, science is now unequivocal on the reality of climate change. Human activities contributing to greenhouse gases are recognized as its primary cause. It is a serious irony that people and countries that suffer most from climate change have done the least to cause it. The 52 poorest countries in the world less than 1% of global carbon emissions.

The poor and the powerless have very little say in the actual climate negotiation process. Several disagreements had kept the countries of the world away from a global treaty. The primary contentions had been over how much and how fast countries were going to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and, upon reaching an agreement, who would monitor it. However, to address global climate change, 194 countries of the world have finally come to an at the Paris Climate Conference on December 12, 2015. [To date, all of the world’s have signed the accords, with the US set to rejoin the agreement after the Biden administration assumes office next year. — 51łÔąĎ] In Paris, industrialized countries also promised to mobilize $100 billion to support carbon emission cuts and climate adaptation.

The Paris Agreement signals the turning point for the world on the path to a low-carbon economy — not only to cut the carbon emission but also to provide financial and technological support to poor developing countries for climate mitigation. However, the withdrawal of the USA from the Paris Agreement has been a serious setback, but, hopefully, it will return to it soon after the change of administration.

Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, in which only rich industrialized nations had climate mitigation targets, the Paris Agreement includes every country. Though the ratifying countries to the Paris Agreement enjoy the independence on how to lower their carbon emissions, it is binding on them to report their progress. It is true that developing and low-income countries are asked to do their part to mitigate climate change even if they had no role in contributing to climate change. However, the global fund [created] by rich industrialized countries is going to somewhat address this injustice by providing financial support to the most vulnerable countries and also helping them with clean environment technologies for climate change mitigation.

Ziabari: Water stress levels are high in parts of northern Africa, Iraq, Syria, Iran and the Indian subcontinent. How can the lengthy periods of drought and variability of water supply in these regions lead to conflicts and violent uprisings? Can we think of water as a determining factor in the political stability of nations in the 21^st century? 

Swain: The world is already experiencing a serious global water crisis. More than 40% of the global population is suffering from water scarcity and, by 2050, an additional 2.3 billion people from Asia, Africa and the Middle East are expected to live in serious water stress. Climate change is expected to seriously aggravate the water scarcity problem in these regions. Moreover, the increase of global surface temperature due to the greenhouse effect is expected to lead to more floods and droughts due to more intense, heavy precipitation. Not only floods and droughts are going to be frequent in the future, but even recent studies have also confirmed that climate change is already contributing to more intense precipitation extremes and the risk of floods.

As climate change brings changes to water supply and demand patterns, the existing arrangement of sharing water resources between and within countries in arid and semi-arid regions are likely to be more and more conflictual. There is no doubt that the projected impacts of global climate change on freshwater may be huge and dramatic, but they may not be at the same intensity and follow a similar periodic pattern in each region.

Climate change is also likely to cause extreme weather events, changing sea levels or melting glaciers that can generate serious threats to existing freshwater management infrastructure. It is easy to foresee that climate change will force comprehensive adjustments in the ongoing water management mechanisms as they need to have the flexibility to adjust to the uncertainties. The emerging unprecedented situation due to changes in climatic patterns requires countries and regions to cooperate and act collectively. There is no doubt that climate change poses extreme challenges to water sharing, and it has all the potential to create political instability and violent conflicts. Thus, climate change requires countries to have more flexible, hands-on politically smart management of their water resources.

Ziabari: Walk us through the interplay between climate change and poverty. Does the current pattern of the Earth getting warmer and extreme weather episodes unfurling more frequently have the potential to tip more people into hunger, unemployment and poverty? What do scientific forecasts say?

Swain: With sea-level rise, the world is also expected to witness serious storm surges in regular intervals as tropical cyclones will combine with higher sea levels. This is likely to enhance the risk of coastal high flooding, particularly in the tropics. Climate change also threatens to change the regular rainfall patterns, which can potentially lead to further intensive flooding, drought and soil erosion in tropical and arid regions of the world. Food production is going to be further affected due to extreme weather, unpredictable seasonal changes and wildfires. The Fourth National Climate Assessment Report of the US Global Change Research Program in 2018 warns that heatwaves, drought, wildfire and storms will increasingly disrupt agricultural productivity, bringing serious food insecurity and loss of farming jobs. 

Different countries and societies are responding to and will cope with climate change-induced food insecurity and economic decline differently. Existing cultural norms and social practices will play an important role in formulating their coping mechanisms. Some countries and societies are better at planning and implementing adaptation strategies to meet the hunger and unemployment challenges posed by climate change. The effectiveness and coping abilities of existing institutions of the countries also play a significant role.

No doubt that the adverse impact of climate change will be more severe on the people who are living in the poor and developing economies. Climate change will not only force more people back to poverty, but it can increase the possibility of more violent conflicts, particularly in societies and countries affected by poor governance, weak institutions and low social capital.

Ziabari: Since 2008, nearly 24 million people have been annually on account of catastrophic weather events. One of the concerns scholars raise about these climate refugees is that they lack formal recognition, definition and protection under international law. What is the most viable way to help them?

Swain: Global warming leads to sea-level rise and that is taking away the living space and source of livelihood of millions of people. There are many estimates regarding the size of the climate-induced population migration the world is going to witness in the future. For the last two, three decades, several forecasts have been made, but there are no reliable estimates of climate change forced migration as the future forecasts vary from 25 million to 1 billion by 2050. Not only there is a lack of any agreement over the numbers on climate migration, there is also no clarity on how many of them will move beyond their national borders. But there is no doubt that climate change will displace a large number of people and will force them to move to other countries in search of survival.

However, climate or environment-forced migration is not included in the definition of a refugee as established under international law, which are the most widely used instruments providing the basis for granting asylum to persons in need of protection. International refugee agencies in the past have not been able to save the lives of many environmentally displaced people in the south due to the absence of their mandate.

In this context, the recent ruling of the Supreme Court of New Zealand is quite significant. Though the court recognized the genuineness of a Kiribati man’s contention of being displaced from his homeland due to sea-level rise, it could not grant him refugee status, reasoning that he wouldn’t face prosecution if he would return home. So, there is a need for the definitional fiat of “refugee” to be expanded to address the increasing challenge of climate-forced population displacement and possible international migration.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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His main suggestion was that France “must make the island Madagascar available for the solution of the Jewish question,” that the 25,000 French citizens living there already should be resettled and compensated, and that “all Jews deported to Madagascar will from the time of deportation be denied the citizenship of the various European countries by these countries.” The idea was received enthusiastically by Adolf Eichmann’s section of the Reich Main Security Office, the umbrella organization for the German police and security forces, including the SS and its intelligence agency, the SD. His office noted in a memorandum sent to Rademacher on August 15, 1940, that “To prevent lasting contact between the Jews and other nations a solution in terms of an overseas island is superior to all others.”

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In preparation for deporting Jews to Madagascar, groups of Jews from Alsace-Lorraine and the areas of Baden and the Saarland (into which Alsace and Lorraine were incorporated following the defeat of France) were transported in sealed trains to the Gurs concentration camp in the south of France, to be held there in catastrophic conditions under which many, especially the elderly, died, prior to their journey overseas.

Stages of Dehumanization

The propaganda value of the Madagascar Plan was, from the Germans’ point of view, huge: They planned to trumpet their “humanity” in granting the Jews self-government — under German supervision, of course — on the island while preventing the creation of a Jewish “Vatican State of their own in Palestine,” as Rademacher put it. Furthermore, the Jews would “remain in German hands as a pledge for the future good conduct of the members of their race in America.”

The Nazis never managed to deport French or German Jews to Madagascar, as their failure to defeat Britain meant that the British Navy retained control of the Indian Ocean. But the Madagascar Plan had its value: It was an important mental stage in the process by which the Nazis moved from schemes to remove Jews from Germany, then from Europe altogether and then, during the war, to murdering Jews in situ, where they lived, and finally creating specially-designed extermination camps to which Jews were sent from across Europe, beginning with the Jews of occupied Poland.

Notions that the Jews would be left to create their own self-governing society were pure eyewash. The scheme was inherently genocidal in that there were no plans to provide for the deportees on their arrival. As the Holocaust historian Christopher Browning , the Madagascar Plan, which, “like a spectacular meteor … blazed across the sky of Nazi Jewish policy, only to burn out abruptly,” was “an important psychological step toward the road to the Final Solution.”

In the last few days, the UK press has reported that civil servants have been instructed to look at creating offshore centers for “processing” migrants and asylum seekers. The places mooted have been Moldova, Morocco, Papua New Guinea and the South Atlantic islands of Ascension and St. Helena, both British territories. None are straightforward options, for reasons of corruption and internal strife (Moldova, especially over Transnistria); lack of willingness on the part of the local authorities (Morocco), or sheer distance (PNG, to which there are no direct flights from the UK, is 8,500 miles away).

But the island solutions are the most remarkable. So remote that it is used solely as a transit point for goods on their way to the Falkland Islands, Ascension, like St. Helena, has a minute population, lies 5,000 miles from the UK, and the cost of building and staffing such a center would be astronomical. One begins to wonder whether these plans have been thrown out to the public in order to make the more likely decision to use in UK waters seem sensible.

A Threat Within and Without

There are important differences between the Nazis’ plans to deport Jews from Europe to Madagascar and the UK Home Office’s investigations into sending migrants as far as possible offshore. I am not suggesting that what the UK government is talking about is genocidal or that the idea is borne of hatred and fear of a specific group of people believed to be part of a worldwide conspiracy to destroy the British people, in the way that leading Nazis believed that Jews were a threat to the Aryan “race.” The Jews were believed to be a threat within, who had to be expelled; migrants to the UK are perceived as a threat from outside, whose entry into the country must be prevented, albeit a “threat” that resonates with those who believe that the UK is already being “Islamized,” meaning that the danger already lies within.

Nevertheless, the logic of what the Home Office is talking about does stem from the sort of fantasies and fears that have driven the persecution of minorities throughout modern history. The notion that the UK is full and cannot accept more immigrants, despite more than 40,000 deaths from COVID-19; the idea that migrants have chosen to come to Britain because they “know” they will receive better housing and welfare than long-established locals; the fear that migrants bring disease and crime, and that they will refuse to adapt to “our way of life” — all of this lies behind current and mooted policies that are as irrational as they are infantile.

The Australian policy of holding migrants in PNG or on Nauru in appalling conditions has resulted in spiraling mental and physical illnesses. The spending of huge sums of money by Frontex and by the UK Border Guard in the Mediterranean and the English Channel has not stopped migrants from traveling, and the hypocrisy of blaming people traffickers is eye-watering given that such criminal gangs only exist because of the lack of proper channels for migration.

It has been shown many times that the migrants who make the journey are among the most enterprising and energetic people in the world, desperate only to make better lives for themselves. Treating them like criminals will make them, many of whom already extremely vulnerable, ill. The cost to the taxpayer of running these centers will be far greater than the gain to the economy of allowing migrants in and letting them work.

Above all, the idea of sending migrants to far-flung places is a policy of fear and paranoia — a fear of pollution and paranoia about difference. It is a ludicrous, though deeply harmful concept, and one which will not stop migrants trying to get to the UK. Most important, it is one whose logic points only in the direction of increasingly radical measures. When we have a government that is willing to break international law in , how long will it be before the UK breaks it in another, with respect to human rights legislation or the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, even if only in a “specific and limited” way?

*[51łÔąĎ is a  partner of the .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Divisions within society, with some welcoming Germany’s worldly alignment and others fearing super-alienation, mirrored themselves within Merkel’s ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). The refugee crisis heated up a dilemma the CDU has grappled with for years: Can Muslims belong to Germany and a conservative Christian democratic party?

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Party colleagues instantly rebuked Merkel’s comments. Most prominently, Horst Seehofer, the home secretary in her cabinet who had previously insisted on speeding up deportations of rejected asylum seekers, corrected Merkel by that “Muslims who live with us obviously belong to Germany,” but this “does not mean we give up our country-specific traditions and customs out of a misplaced consideration for others.” The CDU/CSU’s struggles to find consensus in assessing the status of Muslims in Germany have been long-running. But why is it a subject of debate at all?

Valuable Voters

Whether the CDU/CSU likes it or not, between 4.4 and 4.7 million Muslims currently live in Germany, 5.4% to 5.7% of the population. Therefore, Muslims are an inevitable subject of debate for the CDU/CSU for both interest-based and ideological reasons. The of Muslims in Germany is of interest-based significance for the CDU and a chance to secure future electoral success. Some 1.5 million Muslims, or 2,4% of all voters, are , making them a sizeable electoral group.

Traditionally, Muslims harbor affiliations with center-left parties. Nevertheless, the CDU/CSU has discovered a vital interest in appealing to Muslim voters, as Andreas Wüst, a political scientist at Stuttgart University, : “Merkel brought in a different wind by emphasizing the importance of the immigration society. In the meantime, efforts are also being made in the CDU to support Muslims.” Already in 2004, Bülent Arslan, former chairman of the CDU’s German-Turkish Forum, that “around 50 to 60 percent of the Turks living in Germany are conservative. That is also a potential for the CDU.”

The second reason for intra-party discussions is the ideological orientation of the CDU/CSU. As a self-proclaimed catch-all party of the center-right, its core voters wish to preserve the ethnic makeup of society as well as the social values and religious beliefs associated with the Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions. Thus, Muslims two pillars of conservative thinking: the traditional ethnic constitution and religious imprint of German society.

With its roots in political Catholicism of the 18^th and 19^th centuries, the CDU was founded in the aftermath of the Second World War as a non-denominational party, incorporating Catholic and Protestant Christians into its structures. Preserving these roots while remaining an urbane party is a balancing act the CDU/CSU has struggled with over the last two decades. The party manifesto and policy still reveal anti-Islamic tendencies. In the latest , the terms “Islam,” “Islamism” and “Islamist” appear only nine times. Moreover, they show up exclusively in the context of dangers such as Islamic terrorism and fundamentalism.

Further evidence for the CDU/CSU’s skeptical attitude toward Islam is the long-raging debate in Germany about Muslim women wearing headscarves. Between 2004 and 2006, eight of Germany’s 16 federal states introduced a for female teachers in public schools and for public servants. The CDU/CSU governed six of them at the time. In 2019, the CDU leadership proposed that Muslim girls shouldn’t wear headscarves in nurseries and primary schools “Wearing a headscarf makes little children recognizable as outsiders. We want to prevent this from happening in any case.”

A Party Split

Another debate in 2019 revealed further divisions within the CDU regarding its attitude toward Islam. It was triggered by the party whip in the German parliament, the Bundestag, Ralph Brinkhaus. When asked the question if a Muslim chancellor from the CDU/CSU in 2030 would be conceivable, he , “Why not?” — as long as he is “a good politician” who “represents the values ​​and political views of the CDU.”

Adverse responses came in thick and fast. According to , a CDU spokesman for internal affairs, “Whoever stands for the CDU/CSU as chancellor does not have to be Christian, but must represent Christian Democratic values ​​and feel a part of Germany. Unfortunately, this does not apply to a larger proportion of Muslims who emulate religious fundamentalism and feel attached to foreign heads of state.”

Still, party colleagues, like the undersecretary for integration in North Rhine-Westphalia Serap GĂĽler, leaped to Brinkhaus’ : “Ralph Brinkhaus’s answer simply made clear that in the CDU no one is placed at a disadvantage because of his beliefs as long as he represents our values ​​and political views.”

Angela Merkel couldn’t take her party along in her progressive outlook on the status of Islam in Germany. The CDU/CSU remains torn between two attitudes: first of all, recognizing that Germany is an immigration society and, secondly, attempting to preserve its Christian roots and win back conservative voters. Many of them have switched allegiance to the Alternative for Germany (AfD) — a party that has thrived on anti-Muslim populism.

This predicament continues amid the current debate over the succession of party leader Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer. She stood for the liberal course set by Merkel but failed to stamp her authority on the party. Conservative circles within the CDU are now pinning their hopes on , the former party whip who was by Merkel in 2002 and is now pledging to win back voters from the AfD. Any outcome of the leadership race would only paper over the cracks of the debate over whether or not Muslims can truly belong to Germany and its conservative ruling party.

Perhaps the wavering attitudes and mixed messages were the results of equally ambiguous leadership. While recognizing Islam as a part of Germany, Merkel simultaneously sowed mistrust in a multicultural society in 2010 by that “The approach of multiculturalism has failed, absolutely failed!” It seems that the CDU is neither willing nor capable of providing a coherent answer to its internal dilemma concerning Islam. It welcomes Muslim immigrants while mistrusting their culture, appealing to Muslim voters while being outraged by the prospects of a Muslim head of state. The reality of Germany as an immigration society and 4.5 million Muslim citizens is clear-cut and stark. The CDU/CSU’s attitude toward this reality isn’t.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Angela Merkel’s CDU Is Still Not Sure How It Feels About Muslims appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

In fact, nine tropical storms have already formed out of the western Atlantic in 2020, something that has never happened this early in the hurricane season before, with Hurricane Isaias striking just this week. This is especially worrying as COVID-19 cases drastically increase and the pandemic continues to affect the capacity of states to respond to non-coronavirus emergencies.

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Of course, this challenge isn’t only in the Americas. Other parts of the world have already grappled with the intersection of COVID-19 and large-scale disasters with varying results. From Cyclone Harold in the Pacific to Cyclone Amphan in India to severe flooding and locust swarms in East Africa, some key trends have emerged. By studying and learning from them, policymakers in the Western Hemisphere may be able to prepare more effectively for the worst.

Straining Supply Chains, Underfunding and Marginalized Workers

The COVID-19 pandemic is putting supply chains under strain, even for basic household goods. Where supply chains are particularly stressed, the prices of essential goods have skyrocketed, making it harder for humanitarian workers to provide much-needed aid for long-standing global relief needs.

Adding large-scale natural hazard-related disasters like cyclones and hurricanes to the mix only exacerbates these already fragile systems. Strict lockdown and decontamination procedures, for instance, held up much-needed rapid delivery of emergency supplies in Vanuatu during Cyclone Harold and also relief by up to two weeks in some hard-to-reach islands. In addition, COVID-related cancellations of intra-island transport, including planes and ships, coupled with Cyclone Harold’s destruction of main roads to further delay aid delivery.

Natural hazard-related disasters, likewise, impact the delivery of COVID-related supplies. In East Africa, where record-setting floods displaced more than 1.1 million people in May, important infrastructure, including a number of key bridges and roads, were destroyed or damaged. This created a for humanitarian agencies attempting to deliver relief supplies, including those meant for COVID-19.

In the face of these challenges, aid organizations have carried on, but their budgets and impact on the ground are in jeopardy. To date, by and large, commitments for funding humanitarian emergencies, COVID-related or not, have short by at least a third as compared to this time last year. For example, funding appeals for flooding and locust relief in East Africa have a gap of $325 million, and the amounts raised represent less than 20% of the articulated need. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (UN OCHA) appeals in Ethiopia are underfunded by than 84%.

In addition, Refugees International’s own shows that this year’s Cyclone Harold, when compared to 2015’s Cyclone Pam, has received far less attention and humanitarian funding, even though it displaced more than 27% of Vanuatu’s population. According to the UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service, in 2015, Vanuatu received more than $37.2 million in humanitarian assistance for Pam; this year, only $4.8 million has been for Harold.

Yet, another layer of vulnerability for those displaced by disasters has emerged as governments around the world have moved to expel migrant workers to limit the spread of COVID-19. For example, in the Sundarbans in southern India, of thousands of migrant workers returned home from urban centers in March before Cyclone Amphan hit. Now they’ve been left stranded without job prospects as their community struggles to recover. This is especially worrying, as remittances from migrants are often a dependable lifeline during disasters.

Migrant workers who have not returned home but who may have lost jobs during shelter-in-place orders by authorities have similar challenges. In fact, the World Bank that remittances sent back home may shrink by more than 20% this year. This means that places such as Vanuatu, where seasonal workers normally send home more than $19 million , will have fewer funds from family members to rebuild and recover after the fall out of this year’s Cyclone Harold. The ability to send money back home is further hindered by the fact that migrant workers are also often not for COVID-19 social protection schemes.

What Does This Mean for Policymakers?

While the COVID-19 pandemic and large-scale disasters are being handled differently all across the world, there are undeniable trends that speak to a larger challenge that policymakers must face. First, our humanitarian supply chains are woefully underprepared for any sort of major disruption. Second, national governments and international organizations that often lead the charge to help those most in need are falling short. Third, policies to address the crisis of COVID-19 may actually exacerbate others.

Donor countries, such as the United States, must move urgently to invest in disaster relief and recovery — COVID-19-related and otherwise. The United Nations estimates the cost of protecting the most from the worst effects of the pandemic is about $90 billion. While this amount seems high, it represents less than 1% of the amount of world stimulus packages that rich countries have begun to implement. Thus, a significant from the US of $20 billion in emergency funding would not only be reasonable but also consistent with America’s expressed commitment to humanitarian leadership.

Substantial and rapid injections of aid also make long-term economic sense in fragile settings dealing with other disasters. For example, the World Bank that the locust challenge alone could cost the greater Horn of Africa region, including Yemen, as much as $8.5 billion by the end of this year. A rapid response could cut that loss by more than $6 billion.

National governments should not summarily expel migrant workers or make it impossible for them to remain, as such actions or omissions are more a result of fear and prejudice than sound public health policy judgments. Indeed, it is critical that migrant workers have access to economic opportunities — in both urban centers and abroad — to be able to adequately help their communities recover from the deadly combination of COVID-19 and disaster. In order to ensure migrant workers are best able to do so, policymakers must include them in recovery planning and economic assistance measures regardless of status.

Finally, there is the need to decentralize humanitarian operations, as some aid organizations working on the ground have already signaled they will do. Building up the capacity of local people — especially in the communities that are often affected by big storms — is essential. Doing so decreases the high costs of getting to harder-to-reach communities and maximizes humanitarian aid while reducing response times.

As we begin to witness the impacts of the Atlantic hurricane season, taking to heart these lessons will be a matter of life or death for millions.

*[Kayly Ober is the senior advocate and program manager of the Climate Displacement Program of Refugees International.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Forced displacement has hit Latin American and Caribbean countries particularly hard, highlighting existing vulnerabilities such as increased levels of violence and, more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic. Latin America is now home to one of the largest forced displacement crises in the world. As of March 2020, more than 5 million Venezuelans were reportedly living outside of their country, with 4 million of them in other Latin American countries: Colombia (1.8 million), Peru (1 million), and Ecuador and Chile (for a total of 1 million).

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Since the beginning of the Venezuelan crisis, most Latin American nations have tried to accommodate these recent arrivals, providing migrants with basic education, emergency health care services and legal status. These neighboring countries have provided a global public good by hosting millions at the risk of overwhelming their services and systems. But how will these nations be able to withstand the pressure?

Hosting countries face the new challenge of integrating larger numbers of migrants and refugees while dealing with the effects of the coronavirus outbreak. When taking into account that more of Venezuelan migration in Latin American countries is irregular and targets the most vulnerable populations, this crisis is now becoming a question of public health and safety and, ultimately, of regional security. It is time for the international community to provide a collective response that matches the magnitude of the crisis.

A first step was taken on May 26, with the virtual — livestreamed on YouTube — pledging conference for Venezuelan refugees and migrants that helped raise $2.79 billion in total commitments. This included $653 million of grant funding for the Refugee and Migrant Response Plan, which is a United Nations’ appeal to largely address the emergency needs of the migrant population.

The situation in Latin America calls for enhanced international support across the humanitarian-development nexus. In other words, the response should address pressing immediate needs —such as temporary shelter and emergency medical services — as well as the medium and long-term imperative of economic and social development through institutions, resilient local systems and service delivery. This is precisely what Colombian President Ivan Duque for when advocating the shift from “emergency response to medium and long-term development and integration.”

Five Priorities

To help countries mitigate the impact of the crisis and charter a pathway to growth and stability, there are five development priorities to focus on.  

First, new ways should be explored to provide regular status to refugees and migrants, including through targeted regularization or employment-based programs. There have been several efforts to provide regular status to recent refugees and migrants arriving from Venezuela.

Colombia, Peru and now Ecuador stand out for their ambitious regularization programs for hundreds of thousands of irregular refugees and migrants. Amid rising public anxieties over migration in some countries, it may become harder to implement such mass regularization programs or offer regular status to most who seek to enter. The approach followed by Colombia in providing regular status to those who have employment in specific sectors may provide another alternative. Similarly, Peru has been trying to regularize students in the country’s educational system — another strategy that Colombia and Ecuador seem likely to adopt in the future and one that may prove more politically viable in some countries.

Yet these approaches risk leaving out the vast majority of recent refugees and migrants who do not attend school or work in the formal economy, or the families of those who do benefit from such measures. Policymakers should, therefore, be thinking about the medium and long-term effects where providing legal status to refugees and migrants would produce optimal labor market outcomes — for themselves and the country overall. The details of implementation in each case will matter enormously, but there is room for reiterative efforts that focus on specific different groups over time. 

Second, health care barriers should be tackled through clear policies on access and financing. Almost all countries in the region, at least in theory, offer emergency health care to immigrants regardless of regular status. Still, specific policies are often unclear, and measures are not always implemented effectively at the local level, which means that migrants often have difficulties accessing health care in practice. In countries where local and regional governments pay part of health-care costs, financial burden sharing is also often unclear, leading local hospitals to cover costs that may never get reimbursed.

Creating clear policies and procedures defining both the services offered and what amount of costs will be covered and by whom are critical. In some countries, such as Colombia, Peru and Costa Rica, where residents need to enroll in the health care system to be eligible for benefits, it is vital to find agile ways of ensuring that new immigrants can register and sometimes to find ways of covering the costs of their care.

Third, access to education should be improved through flexible enrollment practices and ongoing support. One of the most critical decisions of countries has been to offer primary and secondary education to all students regardless of their status. In some countries, this was already embedded in the constitution, but others have more recently adopted these measures.

This helps avoid a generation of young people growing up without education and supports receiving countries to take advantage of the potential human capital of immigrant children who will likely grow up in their territory. In many places, however, strict registration requirements involving documents that are difficult for migrants and refugees to obtain can prevent some from enrolling their children in school.

There is also an urgent need to work with schools on policies, procedures and curricula to facilitate the integration of Venezuelan children, who may face challenges adapting to their new schools and need additional support to develop critical skills (e.g., history, culture and other country-specific knowledge). In several countries, access to college, graduate education and trade schools is also restricted for those who do not have adequate documentation, which risks wasting the human capital of immigrant youth who aspire to enter professional and technical careers, including in fields that are in demand in their new countries.

Fourth, migrants’ skills should be unlocked to boost labor market integration and local economies. The majority of Venezuelan adults suitable for paid work in countries across the region were already working before COVID-19. In fact, more than 90% of Venezuelan migrants in Peru and 8 in 10 Venezuelan migrants in Colombia were employed before the pandemic. While recognizing that the labor markets of many countries in the region are characterized by a high degree of informality, care should be taken to ensure that immigrants do have pathways to better-paid and more stable employment in the formal economy and to avoid creating conditions where employers can pay immigrants less than the prevailing wage, to the detriment of both newcomer and native-born workers.

There is no more important determinant for long-term positive labor market outcomes than ensuring regular status, which helps immigrant workers improve their wages over time and also helps avoid unfair wage competition between native-born and Venezuelan workers. Refugees and migrants tend to be relatively well-educated, which means that there is a wealth of highly skilled human capital that could benefit receiving countries.

To effectively leverage this potential, countries will need to create agile ways for immigrants to get professional and technical degrees earned in their home countries validated and recognized by employers. Argentina has done this through provincial universities, which has allowed the country to encourage professionals to leave the capital and settle in other provinces where their skills are in demand. Creating expedited credential recognition pathways for applicants willing to settle in an area of the country where their skills are most needed could also help fill labor market gaps.

Fifth, constructive narratives about immigration should be developed to highlight opportunities while not ignoring its challenges. There is no question that the sudden outflow of 5 million Venezuelans constitutes a migration crisis, and one that host countries are keenly aware of. But this migration is also an opportunity for host countries, as illustrated by increased predictions by the World Bank of regional future economic growth as Venezuelan immigration drives labor market expansion.

Immigrants, when they have access to legal status, education, health care, financial services and pathways to validate their studies, tend to become net contributors to innovation, entrepreneurship and economic growth over time. Several governments in the region have gone out of their way to maintain their focus on these long-term opportunities, even while dealing with the challenges that the sudden arrival of so many people creates for already overburdened public services. Policymakers require assistance to orient the public debate on migration by keeping an eye on the medium and long-term benefits (and designing policies to help attain them). Still, they must also acknowledge the real strains involved in dealing with sudden, large-scale inflows.

Inclusive Development

Multilateral support will be critical in helping countries in the region meet these policy challenges. While migration from Venezuela holds the potential to enhance economic growth in the long term, it is also creating real and tangible short-term costs for already overburdened schools, hospitals and infrastructure. Multilateral support can help countries of the region overcome these challenges and reap immigration’s benefits.

This requires moving from emergency responses to long-term development and integration. While there is still a critical need for emergency services for recently-arrived migrants from Venezuela, as crises in these countries stretch on, it is also important to plan for the medium and the long term. The most important question in the future will be how to support inclusive development that can help host communities and immigrants build connections and improve their livelihoods together. Enhancing access to and quality of schools, health care facilities, housing and urban infrastructure in areas where migrants settle is vital. This is the key to successful integration and also an opportunity to turn a migration crisis into a net benefit for host societies.

While there is some need for temporary shelter and emergency medical services that international actors could help meet, the greatest needs for support have to do with building local capacity for integration and service provision both to new arrivals and long-time residents. For this, multilateral organizations like the World Bank should continue to be actively engaged in helping better manage the forced displacement crisis, in support of its mission to reduce poverty and contribute to achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

*[The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Hosting Refugees and Migrants Is a Global Public Good appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Refugees Build Bridges Across Society

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What is often misunderstood is that 72 years later, some are still there and living in camps, restricted in their civil rights and upsetting the political comity of Lebanon from time to time, which only deepens suspicion and mistrust among their hosts. Unless they can emigrate to the West or the Gulf, the Palestinians have no place else to go.

The Syrians, on the other hand, have a place to go — it’s right next door. But having fled an ongoing civil war in Syria, they face possible persecution, poverty, forced conscription, displacement, onerous laws for reclaiming their homes and businesses, and a military regime with no compunction to kill its own people if they return.

Lebanon’s Economic Crisis

So, are there any positive stories coming out of the Syrian refugee camps and informal settlements and their host communities in Lebanon? Most would reply that life has only gotten worse this past year as Lebanon is caught between a dysfunctional and depressed economy and the COVID-19 pandemic. Even international donors, facing their own economic and sociopolitical challenges, have cut back their support, and less than half of the $2.6-billion appeal for the national was funded in 2019. 

In an article for the , Salman Husain and Diam Abou-Diab write: “Overall, refugees in Lebanon are unable to benefit from international instruments of refugee protection and more than two-thirds of Syrian households lack legal residency due to institutional barriers.” With the collapse of the Lebanese economy, jobs have disappeared, wages are so low for the few available informal jobs and basic living costs have skyrocketed. And, in the last year, host communities have turned against refugees, which has led to mass evictions, restrictions on entry and egress, and unlawful deportations to Syria. Refugees have become a favorite target for some politicians who blame them for Lebanon’s deteriorating quality of life.

“In April, humanitarian agencies found that at least twenty-one Lebanese municipalities introduced additional restrictions on Syrian refugees that weren’t applied to Lebanese citizens,” Husain and Abou-Diab add, which “further restrained people’s ability to access cash or purchase basic goods.” Syrians have become an easy target for those wanting to circulate rumors about the spread of the novel coronavirus — which causes the COVID-19 disease — as the refugee camps have close quarters, little running water and poor sanitation facilities, and medicines are hard to find.

There has been a substantial rise in the price of basic food commodities like sugar and rice. This has rendered a number of once-affordable items inaccessible to the nearly 70% of Syrian households living in poverty, and the number is growing. “The International Rescue Committee, a humanitarian nongovernmental organization, reported that 90% of Syrian refugees they surveyed in April said they are â€�in critical need of food.’ This figure was only 32% in March,” reports.

Another Day Without Hope

As seen in many countries, the lockdowns caused by the coronavirus pandemic have led to a rise in domestic violence. Husain and Abou-Diab note that, in March, Lebanon saw 100% spike in the number of assault cases against refugees and Lebanese women and girls. They add that “nearly half of Syrian and Lebanese caregivers, recently, reported increased levels of violence against children since the national lockdown caused by COVID-19.” Children are out of school, with no access to remote education, forced out of their tents in refugee camps to find what little employment is available, bearing more scars from their experiences.

While there are many international and local organizations working to improve conditions, funding is in short supply and getting worse. Negotiations between the Lebanese government and the International Monetary Fund will not change the plight of the refugees. Their needs are not included in the government’s financial recovery plan, and IMF assistance is not designated for humanitarian assistance.

With no short-term anticipation of a radical change in Syria that would make a voluntary, safe and supportive return possible, World Refugee Day will turn out to be another day without hope. 

*[Jean AbiNader is an international development consultant who writes on the Middle East and North Africa from Washington, DC. This article represents his own opinions and not that of any of his clients.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post There’s No Good News for Refugees in Lebanon appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

These are the consequence of the relentless past and present exploits of the rich and powerful searching for land, treasures and people to exploit, through colonization, invasion and war. Today, this push is costing so much to those living carefully, in sensitive parts of our planet, and who have so much less, trying to maintain a delicate balance with nature — learned from centuries of experience but undermined by the greed of others far away.

Great Waves

Great waves of migration have built the complex and dynamic fabric of countries across the world. Those waves have often been generated by exploitation and cruelty: the Atlantic slave trade or the entrapment of people through bonded and indentured labor, like the Indians who came to South Africa to work in the sugar fields. Those migrants, whatever the reason behind their movement, contributed to building the infrastructure of their new societies, like the Irish diaspora who fled intense poverty and famine to build roads and canals in the UK, the US and Australia, or the Chinese migrants who built the railways across the United States.

The Irish fled poverty and unemployment created by centuries of colonial exploitation by the British. They waited on the backstreets of north London for building work, facing blatant, unashamed racism in the form of discrimination in housing — â€śNo Irish, dogs or blacks” — no real or protection from accidents. Those now leaving Ireland for work are more likely to be IT specialists from the burgeoning software industry benefiting from an education system that invests in skills.

The postwar flowering of modernist design and architecture in the UK was enriched by emigres and refugees fleeing fascism in Germany and occupied Europe. Take, for instance, the influence on ceramics by the brilliant modernist potter and teacher Dame Lucie Rie, who left Austria in 1938 to escape the Nazis and found refuge in London.

Or think of the production design of the Bond movies and the iconic Stanley Kubrick films, including the war room in “Dr. Strangelove,” and the exquisite and lyrical evocation of the British aristocratic life in “Barry Lyndon,” all designed by Jewish refugee Sir Ken Adams, who left Berlin in 1934 and became a fighter pilot for the Royal Air Force. He inspired the imagination of so many children with the creation of the star of “Chitty Chitty Bang Bang” — the car. Transport treasures were designed by Czech Jewish refugee Tom Karen, who left his home in Brno at the age of 13 and designed the beloved Raleigh Chopper children’s bicycle.

The building of Britain’s national treasure, the National Health Service (NHS) has been on the shoulders of nurses from the Caribbean, many arriving during the Windrush years following World War II, and whose children subsequently suffered under the cruel injustices of the “hostile environment,” a Tory government policy that tried to deny thousands of innocent people who had grown up in the UK their rights as British citizens. Expert doctors and health workers have also joined the United Kingdom from across Africa, India, Bangladesh and many other countries near and far. The iconic was designed by Berthold Lubekin from Georgia.

Postwar reconstruction required labor and skills in abundance. The flagship showcase in the great celebration of the new world of peace and growth, the Festival of Britain and the Royal Festival Hall, were designed by the London County Council as a project for the public good. It brought together talented young architects, including German-born Peter Moro, who arrived in London in 1936, penniless and unable to speak any English.

The 2012 London Olympics showcased the glorious undulating swimming pool, whose architect, Zaha Hadid, came to the UK from Iraq as a student and became one of the most revered architects in the world. The ArcelorMittal Orbit built to view the site games, designed by Indian-born artist Anish Kapoor, who became the first living artist to have a solo exhibition at the Royal Academy of Art in London.

It is the same story across the world. In the United States, the Smithsonian Museum and the National Mall in Washington were designed by the Ghanaian-British architect Sir David Adjaye, who also designed the Holocaust Memorial and the learning center planned for Westminster.

Global Citizens

This year, Refugee Week takes place during an unprecedented crisis that highlights our connectivity and the importance of open borders. In the UK, over 20% of health workers are from a black, Asian, minority ethnic (BAME) background. We now know that those from BAME communities are at from COVID-19. to a study by The Guardian, six in 10 of the 200 NHS staff who died from the disease by end of May came from BAME communities.

The skills and talents of global citizens have built, changed and enhanced our cities and our lives. We all gain from those who bring us skills, talents and determination along with their suitcases from around the world. And it also makes economic sense. to the Refugee Council, some 1,200 medically-qualified refugees are on the British Medical Association’s list. While it costs around £25,000 to support a refugee doctor to practice in the UK, training a new doctor costs between £200,000 and £250,000.

The Refugee Council hosts the important project, , which works with UK mentors and runs training that will help refugee doctors learn not only the language, but also the subtle nuances of the NHS that will allow them to add vital resources to the struggling system. This has never been more important than now, with the COVID-19 crisis illustrating so vividly the exceptional contribution made by refugees and migrants to our health and care services.

Without their talent, courage, dedication and expertise, Britain’s health and care systems would have collapsed, yet many of the staff working under certain have had to fight to ensure that they can access the very health system they are sustaining. A heroic struggle has been led by a Syrian refugee and filmmaker Hassan Akkad, volunteering for a vital job cleaning hospitals during the pandemic, who, along with many others, was threatened with a ruling that meant he would have to pay for access to health care in a system designed to be free at the point of need for all. His courageous and powerful testimony ensured that this inequity was scrapped for all health workers.

celebrates our global common citizenship and offers us all opportunities to learn more about what is given by those who have to sacrifice their homelands to seek peace, freedom and the chance to build bridges. It also gives us a chance to understand the profound challenges that refugees and migrants experience — so often denied rights, impoverished and humiliated, facing the risk of being under Britain’s current immigration rules.

The Gatwick Detainees Welfare Group not only visits and sustains those unjustly detained at the Gatwick detention center, but has organized inspiring walks over the last five years with those who have experienced unjust detention to highlight this injustice and to campaign to end indefinite detention. They have worked so hard to bring in new supporters, working with brilliant writers like Patrick Gale, Ali Smith, Kamila Shamsie and Gillian Slovo (a child refugee from apartheid South Africa herself), musicians like Ibrahim Aziz, and various artists. This year’s will be a virtual event with the theme of building bridges. All global citizens can participate, walking wherever they are and sharing their experience by joining the at Refugee Tales with other supporters and survivors of unjust detention.  

Without the skills of those who make such sacrifices and endure so much to leave their countries of birth, the NHS would be unable to cope, and creativity in design, music, art and architecture would be weakened. All of us as global citizens would pay the price of this evisceration in every aspect of our lives. This Refugee Week there is so much to celebrate, so many heroes to honor, but also so many more battles that must be fought if we are to keep building vibrant bridges of love, trust and respect.

*[Correction: This article previously referred to Sir David Adjaye as Ghanaian-Tanzanian. Updated on June 16, 2020, at 17:50 GMT.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Medical experts, refugee agencies and activists have been sounding the warning that this was inevitable, and that the consequences could be catastrophic. And they have called for urgent action to protect displaced people wherever they are and whatever their status. For example, Lancet Migration, a global collaboration between The Lancet medical journal and researchers, implementers and others working in the field of migration and health, issued a on COVID-19 and people on the move, arguing that all “should be explicitly included in the responses to the coronavirus 2019 pandemic.”&˛Ô˛ú˛ő±č;

COVID-19 Will Have Long-Lasting Effects on Migration

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They call for migrants and refugees to be transferred from overcrowded reception, transit and detention facilities to safer living conditions; the suspension of deportations; relocation and reunification for unaccompanied minors; clear and transparent communication including for migrant populations; and strategies to counter racism, xenophobia and discrimination.

Increasing Dehumanization

These measures are urgently required, but the extent of political hostility to unauthorized migrants — and, in many countries, the public hostility — mean that even such basic steps remain a remote possibility. The fact is that, despite their modesty, they represent a fundamental transformation of the politics of displacement. Natalia Cintra, Jean Grugel and Pia Riggirozzi point out that the concerns around the impact of COVID-19 on displaced people in terms of their health reveal their situation already is: “COVID-19 is not disrupting their otherwise �normal’ lives, so much as increasing their dehumanization still further.”

The fact is the world is locked into an international system of confinement of refugees, asylum seekers and other migrants that reinforces this dehumanization, a system in which they are identified as a problem that must be contained, even repulsed. For many of them, that system is not only oppressive but also highly dangerous and often fatal, as the Missing Migrants Project, which keeps a of migrant fatalities throughout the world, lays bare.

COVID-19 is an additional threat to the lives of refugees, but in a system which refuses to recognize their full humanity, they will continue to be exposed to that threat in ways those of us confined within our own homes, with access to food, water, soap and health care, if we need it, cannot imagine. The pandemic adds a new level of precarity to their already extremely precarious lives.

Anyone paying attention to what was happening in the camps and elsewhere knew this was coming. Louisa Brooke-Holland, a defense policy analyst at the UK House of Commons Library, warned in an April 9 briefing paper that refugee camps are especially vulnerable to serious outbreaks of COVID-19 because “they are high density settlements with poor access to water and sanitation and limited health services, and because the camps rely on host communities who themselves have limited means.” Her report focusses on the Rohingya in Cox’s Bazaar, where 850,000 refugees live in “highly congested conditions” in 34 camps, in a host community of 440,000 people and large numbers of aid workers.

Hygiene and sanitation facilities are inadequate and social distancing is not an option. According to Brooke-Holland, Cox’s Bazaar “lacks facilities to provide intensive care treatment, oxygen supplies and adequate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for health workers,” with the British Medical Journal warning in March that the nearest testing facilities are 400 kilometers away in Dhaka.

Effectively Detained

According to (HRW), around 128,000 Rohingya are “effectively detained” in government camps in Myanmar itself: “Most are trapped in dangerously overcrowded camps with severely substandard healthcare and inadequate access to clean water, sanitation, and other essential services. Many displaced people have underlying medical conditions and chronic diseases, putting them at high risk of suffering serious effects from the virus.”

In Rakhine state, around 130,000 Muslims, mostly ethnic Rohingya, have been confined in open-air detention camps since 2012, and there are 107,000 internally displaced persons in camps in Kachin and northern Shan states, displaced by fighting between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups. They lack access to health care, shelter, clean water, sanitation and food because of government restrictions on humanitarian aid.

There are similar challenges for displaced people around the world. The main concerns are for those living in encampments or being held in detention centers of some sort. Writing in The Lancet in March, Hans Henri P. Kluge, Zsuzsanna Jakab, Josef Bartovic, Veronica D’Anna and Santino Severoni that camps can present a severe health risk, with inadequate and overcrowded accommodation and lack of basic amenities like clean running water and soap, and poor access to health care, including adequate information. Basic public health measures, such as social distancing and self-isolation, are not possible or extremely difficult, and so “the concern about an outbreak of COVID-19 in the camps cannot be overstated.”

And it is not just the camps that are a concern. Migrants and refugees are also vulnerable in wider communities, “over-represented among the homeless population in most member states — a growing trend in EU-15 and border and transit countries,” according to the authors.

Victims of Deterrence

The European Union’s policies of deterring unauthorized migration are threatening to undermine responses to COVID-19. Sally Hargreaves and her co-authors in the British Medical Journal in March that these policies have led to “displaced migrants living in camps, reception centres, and private and public detention facilities within and around Europe’s borders — all victims of European policies of deterrence to stop uncontrolled migration.” They are living in “appalling conditions” and lack access to food, water and health care. The overcrowding and poor hygiene in the many migrant camps around the Mediterranean increase vulnerability not only to COVID-19, but to other infectious diseases such as varicella, measles and hepatitis A.

Reporting on the experiences of refugees in Uganda, the country which hosts 1.35 million UN-registered refugees, the largest population in the world, Lucy Hovil and Vittorio Capici the situation as highly worrying: “They live in overcrowded conditions and there is insufficient access to hygiene supplies. This makes basic measures to stem to spreads of the coronavirus such as social distancing and hand-washing, difficult.” Many of them rely on aid, but the World Food Programme a 30% reduction to the relief it distributes to refugees and asylum seekers in Uganda in April. Also, many international staff have left the field to self-isolate in their home nations, and the emergency measures put in place by UNHCR have had little impact. Not all refugees in Uganda are in camps, having decided to move to towns and cities where they have more opportunities to earn a livelihood, choosing this option over official assistance. But these urban refugees also face challenges given their uncertain legal status and increasing food prices.

Refugees attempting to flee instability in the Democratic Republic of Congo or South Sudan and claim sanctuary in Uganda are also facing difficulties as Uganda has closed its borders and suspended asylum claims. Jan Egeland, secretary general of the Norwegian Refugee Council, that border closures in Africa have left people fleeing danger unable to reach sanctuary. Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda have almost entirely closed formal crossings, effectively shutting down refugee transit centers. According to Egelund, “Refugees are being left in limbo.”

The 5.6 million Syrian refugees and the 6.6 million people internally displaced in Syria face similar challenges. The Atlantic Council’s Pinar Dost that most at risk are the more than 900,000 people who fled Idlib and Aleppo to the Turkish border in December 2019, following a Syrian government offensive. “In living conditions where often the most basic needs are unmet, it will be extremely difficult to prevent the disease from spreading among displaced Syrians unless serious measures are taken,” writes Post.

Other Dimensions

There is also a gender dimension to COVID-19’s impact. Natalia Cintra and her co-writers to the situation of displaced women and girls in Latin America. The danger here is that the pandemic “may well deprive displaced women and girls of the essential protection services they depend on and exacerbate the risks they already face to their wellbeing and lives.”

Refugees and asylum seekers face challenges in Global North states as well as in the Global South. Destitution affects many asylum seekers in the United Kingdom because of limited access to public funds and exclusion from the right to work. Lubnaa Joomun for Refugee Research Online that because of these limits, many end up living in substandard accommodation, and “those forced to live in such appalling conditions, which fail to meet even basic human needs, become susceptible to infection.”

Those confined in the UK’s immigration detention centers are at great risk as well, “unable to follow the government’s instructions to socially distance,” according to Rudy Schulkind, in Open Democracy. “Hygiene is poor and cleaning products are scarce.”

Elsewhere in Europe, the default position on refugees and asylum seekers is to keep them locked up so that, as measures are eased, they are left behind. Human Rights Watch  that while the Greek government began easing lockdown measures in May, allowing people to leave their homes without authorization, asylum seekers and migrants remain confined, sometimes in overcrowded reception centers. There has also been a failure by the Greek authorities to take basic steps to protect people held in the centers by addressing overcrowding, lack of health care, lack of access to adequate water, sanitation and hygiene products like soap. According to HRW, as of May 6, the camps on the Greek islands were six times over their capacity.

The Greek government announced on May 10 that such centers would remain under lockdown at least until May 21. The two positive cases of COVID-19 detected on Lesbos on May 12 have led some to call for the camps to be evacuated as a matter of urgency. Dimitra Kalogeropoulou, International Rescue Committee country director for Greece,  The Guardian: “Refugees living in camps have limited ways of protecting themselves from the coronavirus; if it does reach the camps, the severe overcrowding and absence of proper sanitation mean that it will spread rapidly. It is essential that the camps are decongested … [and] those most at risk are evacuated.”

The lives of displaced people are already filled with precarity, and yet in the face of this, states continue to make their world more dangerous by placing new obstacles in their way as they attempt to flee persecution, conflict, disaster and extreme poverty. If we are to join them in their struggle against this new threat from COVID-19, we must join them in their struggle against an entire global system that imposes danger across all dimensions of their lives. However remote the possibility of the transformation of that system might seem, the pandemic reinforces its urgency.

This urgency is shown by the fact that when the first version of this article was written on May 13, no cases of COVID-19 had been reported from refugee camps or other settlements for displaced people, but that has changed dramatically in a few days, and events will develop rapidly and, it seems, for the worse.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Among them are more than 900,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, who are crammed into the largest refugee settlement in the world with a population density four times that of New York City — conditions in which a disease like COVID-19 will spread like wildfire. The confirmation of the first case of COVID-19 in the camps located in Cox’s Bazar will mark a new frontline in global efforts to fight the pandemic. The time to step up efforts is now. Yet unnecessary constraints are already holding back the response.

The Risk to Rohingya Refugees

Having fled genocide at the hands of Myanmar’s military, Rohingya refugees have found refuge in neighboring Bangladesh. But they have also faced new challenges. Bangladesh has maintained on internet and mobile communications that slow efforts to educate refugees about how to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. The inability to communicate in a timely and effective fashion will also hinder efforts to track the spread of the disease and will force sick refugees to travel inside densely populated camps. A COVID-19 hotline set up in Cox’s Bazar is largely useless without reliable networks or the right to , which Bangladeshi authorities have banned.

Meanwhile, dangerous rumors are circulating through the camps. UN  suggest that many residents mistakenly believe that only “bad” Muslims are susceptible to the virus or that infected people will be killed by authorities. Bangladesh’s policies to increasingly limit Rohingya civil society and to begin building fencing around the camps have eroded trust and undermined those who are best placed to counter such false information.

The role of the Rohingya community itself will only become more important as Bangladesh understandably takes steps to prevent the spread of COVID-19, including limiting humanitarian access to only what are considered critical life-saving services. Yet Bangladeshi authorities and UN officials have not done enough to empower refugees. As a Refugees International  in February found, from absence in high-level discussions about their future to a lack of representative structures and adequate consultations on day-to-day projects, “Rohingya are still not being adequately informed or engaged on issues of vital importance to their lives and futures.”

More recently, in response to the emergence of the pandemic, Bangladeshi authorities and UN agencies have  health training and hygiene awareness campaigns and set up additional intensive care units. Hundreds of community volunteers are being trained and deployed throughout the camps to raise awareness and to look for signs of the virus. But reaching the hundreds of thousands in the camps remains a challenge. Earlier efforts by Bangladeshi authorities and UN officials to engage and empower Rohingya refugees would have better prepared the population to respond to an unforeseen challenge like COVID-19. Re-doubling efforts to do so now will be essential to ensuring the best response possible.

The Coronavirus in Bangladesh

The reality is that Bangladesh faces its own capacity challenges, lacking sufficient respirators and testing kits for its own citizens. Of a population of more than 160 million, only 55,000 people had been at the time of publishing. Just a few hundred tests have been conducted in Cox’s Bazar, the district in which the refugee camps are located.

As of April 28, more than 6,400 cases and 155 deaths have been  in Bangladesh, mostly in Dhaka. That number is probably already much higher and likely to grow quickly. In Cox’s Bazar district, 15 cases have now been confirmed. While the authorities have not officially reported any cases in the refugee camps as of yet, hundreds of Rohingya are already being isolated. Humanitarian workers on the ground say it is only a matter of time before cases of infection are confirmed.

In the face of such challenges, preparation efforts cannot be limited by unnecessary restrictions. Bangladesh should immediately lift mobile and internet restrictions and avoid moves like building fences that will only further erode trust in the community. Even as needed isolation measures restrict access for humanitarians, essential services must continue, and Bangladeshi authorities must work with UN agencies to train and equip the community members who will be the first line of defense in the response.

The world cannot afford to ignore the most  like the Rohingya. Containing the global spread of the coronavirus does not end with domestic efforts in the most advanced health systems. It must include the world’s most vulnerable to be truly effective.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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When in 2015 Saudi Arabia decided to intervene more directly in the conflict raging beyond its southern border, the Houthis had already taken control of the main urban center in the south of the country, the port of Aden. However, they were soon forced to retreat from the city.

Can the Saudi Call for Ceasefire in Yemen Work?

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Nevertheless, five years later, the Houthis still control large swaths of territory in the west of Yemen, where most of the population lives. The Houthi siege of Taiz in the southwest has , and in recent months the rebels have advanced in al-Jawf, a province northeast of Yemen’s capital Sanaa, and moved closer to control Marib province. Marib is not only oil-rich, but is also the stronghold of the internationally recognized government of exiled President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi.

Saudi Failure

After five years of conflict, the humanitarian situation in the country can only be defined as catastrophic. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, more than 112,000 people have been in the war, including 12,600 civilians. While the Houthis are responsible for a fair share of the atrocities committed in Yemen, most of the civilian deaths can be attributed to indiscriminate bombing by the Saudi-led coalition. Already in 2018, the UN warned that Yemen was on the brink of facing the “world’s worst famine in 100 years.”

Critical as the situation in Yemen had been in the tumultuous years following the downfall of long-time ruler Ali Abdullah Saleh in the wake of the Arab Spring, the Saudi-led intervention in 2015 complicated matters even further. The Saudi and Emirati engagement in the war added a new layer of complexity to a conflict in which intra-Muslim division, regional identities, competition for scarce resources, and tribal rivalry were prominent factors. Iran’s assistance to the Houthis is certainly , and describing the conflict in Yemen as a proxy war between regional rivals would be far-fetched. However, Iran’s role in the conflict has raised the stakes for Saudi Arabia.

When we confront the stated objectives of the Saudi-led coalition in launching Operation Decisive Storm with the situation on the ground five years later, it is evident that the offensive was everything but decisive, at least not in the intended sense. We may leave aside all the claims about the Yemeni population and restoring Hadi’s legitimate government. The high number of civilian casualties caused by the coalition’s airstrikes proved the hypocrisy of the first claim, while the increasing subordination of President Hadi to Riyadh’s whims eroded even further his legitimacy within Yemen.

Even though the intervention in Yemen was inadequately planned, the rationale behind Decisive Storm had clearly much to do with two major concerns. On the one hand was the fear of Iran-aligned Houthis establishing a permanent presence in the strategic entrance to the Red Sea. On the other hand lay addressing the threat represented by the rebels’ capacity to carry out strikes in southern Saudi Arabia. Five years after the operation’s inception, the Houthis control the northern section of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, and their drone attacks have grown in sophistication. The September 2019 on two major Saudi oil facilities was probably not carried out by the rebels in northern Yemen. However, the Houthis are reported to be using drone models. As the attacks have grown bolder, they have proven able to — although with little accuracy — the Saudi capital, Riyadh. 

Quagmire

Yemen has become a quagmire for Saudi Arabia. This description appears quite illustrative, since the more Riyadh has engaged in Yemen military, the further it has found itself from achieving its vaguely-defined objectives. It is easier to start a war than to find a way out of one, and the de facto Saudi ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, is learning the lesson the hard way. This is especially true because the in his hands in recent years makes it very difficult for bin Salman to spread the blame for the failing campaign in Yemen.

History could have taught the crown prince in advance that neither he nor his kingdom were unlikely to emerge in a stronger position after intense military engagement in Yemen. As thoroughly examined by the work of the scholar , the 1962-68 Yemen Civil War that put an end to the theocratic institution of the imamate in northern Yemen showed the rather limited advantages of foreign military superiority in the highlands north of Sanaa. The troops and planes sent by Egypt’s president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, had a hard time in trying to uproot tribal fighters supporting the last imam from the caves where they hid.

Airstrikes and chemical attacks were not enough to implement the revolutionary project Nasser envisioned for Yemen. In fact, the new Yemen Arab Republic, consolidated after the end of the civil war, was essentially the result of a compromise between the Yemeni pro-Nasserites and the monarchists who had been battling each other.

Whereas nowadays the Houthis control a territory that goes far beyond their mountainous stronghold in Sadah, in the event of serious military defeats in other areas — something that seems unlikely in the short run — they could always retreat to the north, where geography plays into their asymmetric warfare strategy and the population is more supportive of the rebel group. This would definitely prevent the Saudis from imposing a conclusive end to the war.

A Cynical Excuse

There are solid reasons to argue that the Saudi leadership has by now realized it cannot emerge from Yemen victorious. The of Emirati troops from southern Yemen at the end of last year, along with the infighting between southern separatists and troops loyal to President Hadi that had previously focused on fighting the Houthis, weakened Saudi Arabia’s position. A in US Congress in April 2019 to end support for the Yemen War is also a factor to be taken into account. While US President Donald Trump has stopped the resolution from having an effect so far, it might signal a more restrained future US engagement with Riyadh if Trump is not reelected later this year.

Saudi Arabia and the Houthis engaged in back-channel talks in late 2019, making a compromise in the near future a real possibility. The ceasefire announced by the Saudi-led coalition last week has been , but incentives remain for the warring parties to engage in de-escalation. Saudi Arabia has been spending at least since the beginning of the conflict in Yemen — an amount it can hardly afford considering the dramatic amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Houthis, who are on the military offensive around Marib, could soon have a stronger position to negotiate from. However, the rebel group has often needed to resort to to impose its rule in the areas it controls. Rising prices, corruption and political repression have contributed to the Houthis’ inability to win the hearts and minds of a considerable part of the Yemeni population. Arguing that the Houthis have imposed new restrictions on the international delivery of aid to the areas under their control, the US is planning to cut the majority of . The Houthis badly need this aid in order to maintain the uneasy calm in the rebel-held regions.

The situation could further deteriorate if COVID-19 spreads after the was reported days ago. The recent ceasefire announced by Riyadh has in fact been as a response to UN calls for a cessation of hostilities in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. After bombing Yemeni civilians for years, Saudi leaders may use COVID-19 as a cynical excuse to pave the way for a progressive exit from Yemen. If Yemen is ever to go back to a semblance of peace, it is necessary, but not sufficient, for Saudi Arabia to realize that it cannot emerge victorious from this quagmire.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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The new legislation allows Orban to rule by decree, converting the spread of false information — now punishable by up to five years in prison — and the failure to abide by mandatory lockdown restrictions into criminal offenses. Many fear these new measures will be used beyond the struggle against the COVID-19 crisis to silence Hungary’s opposition. Even more worrying is the absence of any reference to an end date or a requirement for renewal of the emergency legislation, which may de facto allow Orban to maintain his exceptional powers indefinitely.

Enabling Acts

For those familiar with the history of Nazi Germany, the decree evokes a nefarious parallel with Hitler’s . In 1933, Hitler exploited the to pass an emergency law that allowed him to enact legislation without consulting parliament, a step decisive to the consolidation of his rule over Germany. Indeed enabled by the act, Hitler removed the autonomy of German states and outlawed non-Nazi political parties. Hitler’s new powers were supposed to expire in 1937, however, by that time, the Führer had already taken control of German institutions and saw no obstacles to renewing his dictatorial powers.

Although the Hungarian emergency law preserves some parliamentary authority, there is little to inspire certainty that the country would not follow a path similar interwar Germany. Orban has a notorious track record as an opponent of liberal democracy, and throughout his years in office has worked to erode democratic institutions, lifting legal and political constraints to curb press freedom and the activities of civil society organizations.

In 2012, the coalition formed by Fidesz and the Christian Democrats replaced the existing constitution, introducing reformed and systems which, among other measures, limited the power of Hungarian courts, reduced the number of seats in parliament and reshaped constituency boundaries, leading to criticism from the opposition and international observers.

Later amendments, passed in 2013, also regulated to role of the press and granted public media outlets monopoly over political advertising during national and European elections. In 2018, Orban strengthened his control over the media through the consolidation of more than 400 media outlets under the (KESMA), a government-friendly entity chaired by individuals with connections to the prime minister.

In addition to the undermining of constitutional checks and balances, nativist discourse was also instrumentalized in the gradual process of erosion of democratic institutions in Hungary. As the refugee crisis intensified, Orban adopted an explicitly anti-immigration stance antagonizing other European leaders who called for a joint effort to tackle one of the greatest migration crises since World War II. Orban described migrants as a “,” stating that “every single migrant poses a security and terror risk” to Hungary. This form of nativist rhetoric was recently employed to legitimize the persecution of NGOs operating in the country.

In 2018, Orban accused these organizations of promoting and introduced a legislative package that became known as “Stop Soros” — a reference to the Hungarian-American investor and philanthropist George Soros, the founder of the Open Society Foundations and Orban’s nemesis. In addition to criminalizing NGOs that offered support to migrants, a special tax law was introduced to penalize NGOs that “promote illegal immigration.”

Little Room for Optimism

This brief overview of Hungary’s descent into authoritarianism offers some perspective on the role of the coronavirus emergency law being just another piece in a complex chain of events that have cumulatively contributed to the demise of Hungarian democracy. Although one would like to take comfort in the assurance by the Hungarian prime minister and his party that parliament retains the authority to restore democratic normalcy, Orban’s track record since being elected in 2010 leaves little room for optimism.

The passing of the emergency law comes at a moment when Hungarian democracy was finally beginning to show signs of resilience. In the held in 2019, coalitions of opposition parties defeated Orban’s ruling right-wing Fidesz party in 10 of the 23 major cities across the country, including the capital Budapest, scoring their best result in a decade. Under the new law, however, mayors have little power to challenge as any measure adopted by them can now be easily overruled.

For now, one can only hope that, once the COVID-19 crisis is over, the Hungarian opposition will react as it did in 2019, and that the European Union will uphold its values to prevent a dictatorship from taking root in one of its member states.

*[The  is a partner institution of 51łÔąĎ.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Turkey announced on March 1 that it would no longer prevent refugees from leaving its country. While Ankara claims that around 80,000 have already left, the  puts the number of refugees waiting at Turkey’s Pazarkule border crossing with Greece at around 13,000 at the start of March. Greek officials  on March 2 that a Syrian child drowned when a boat capsized off the Greek island of Lesbos.

Turkey Joins the Scramble for the Middle East

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Ankara’s determination to keep the border open despite the risk to human life is yet another example of refugees being used as bargaining chips. Having failed to persuade Russia to convince the Syrian regime to withdraw to the Sochi ceasefire line, Turkish policymakers and pro-government commentators recently called on the EU and NATO for help.

At the moment, it is difficult to predict whether the movement of refugees to the EU’s external borders will trigger a crisis comparable to 2015, when at least 1 million migrants crossed into Europe. The question demanding immediate attention lies elsewhere. It should be no surprise that Ankara uses refugees to further its foreign policy ambitions. Turkey has been increasingly doing this since 2012, especially against the EU following the March 2016 agreement on formal cooperation over migration control. Ankara’s deployment of refugees as a bargaining chip with the European Union is, in fact, a direct outcome of the EU’s externalization policies.

Turkey currently appears strikingly indifferent to the possibility of being blamed by the international community for triggering a humanitarian crisis, which is certainly on the cards given the EU’s determination to keep refugees out and the poor conditions of refugee camps on the Greek islands. In one stark example of this attitude, the Turkish public news channel TRT Arabic a map showing possible paths for refugees to reach Europe.

Distracting From Foreign Policy Failures

Ankara’s indifference should motivate policymakers in Europe to ponder over Turkey’s lack of capacity to strategize its medium- to long-term foreign policy goals. Turkish foreign policy, especially in Syria, has been a series of tactics devoid of a coherent strategy. As the case of Idlib clearly demonstrates, tactics may postpone problems but cannot solve them.

Clashes between the Turkish military and Syrian government forces backed by Russia and Iran have escalated since December 2019. This was arguably inevitable given Turkey’s misreading of the nature of its relationship with Russia and its unwillingness to relinquish its maximalist position of holding onto Idlib as leverage to keep other areas in Syria under its control, including Afrin and between Ras-al-Ayn and Tal Abyad).

The extensive coverage by pro-government media of refugees rushing to the land and sea borders should also be interpreted against this backdrop of short-sighted foreign policy. The focus on refugees leaving Turkey is intended to divert attention away from the death of Turkish soldiers. It also allows the Turkish government to mobilize public support amidst increasingly negative sentiment toward refugees across the political spectrum.

On March 1, for instance, homes and businesses of Syrian refugees in Maras, Turkey, were attacked by local residents. On February 28, Tanju Ozcan, the mayor of Bolu from the Republican People’s Party (CHP), announced that the municipality would organize free transport to Edirne, a Turkish city near the borders with Bulgaria and Greece. Similarly, some bus companies call the rides from Istanbul Esenler bus station to the border cities the “journey of hope.”

Does the EU Have Options?

In Idlib, Ankara insists on holding onto the areas that are currently under its control and possibly connecting these with a “safe zone” along the Turkey–Syria border. Such a safe zone would not only host internally displaced persons (IDP), but it might also help Turkey‘s repatriation efforts, so Ankara seems to believe. In other words, opening the borders to the European Union for refugees is a tactical move to pressure the EU to support Turkey in Idlib.

Significantly, Turkey is committed to keeping the Turkey–Syria border closed to IDPs from Idlib. Since December 1, 2019, fighting in the last remaining Syrian opposition stronghold has forced at least  from their homes, 500,000 of them children. For some, this has been the sixth or seventh displacement since the civil war in Syria began in 2011. Tens of thousands of people currently live in makeshift tents, public buildings and out in the open. Another 200,000 people are  to leave soon. Moreover, if Idlib were to fall in the hands of the Syrian regime, violent repression would be inevitable.

Preventing this unfolding humanitarian disaster is an ethical obligation. It is undeniable that Ankara, as one of the central actors, lacks commitment to democratic norms and values. Turkey cloaks its foreign and domestic policy objectives in humanitarian talk, but it does not hesitate to violate humanitarian principles.

Yet the humanitarian reality on the ground requires the support of the international community. The EU should intervene in coordination with NATO to bring mass-scale humanitarian assistance to IDPs in Idlib. This could force Turkey to pull back from its maximalist position of retaining control in Idlib and provide protection to civilians against the aggression of the Syrian regime. The European Union could make a possible coordinated intervention conditional on Turkey restoring the provisions of the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement.

*[The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy. This article was first on the SWP website.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Unfolding Humanitarian Catastrophe in Idlib appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Thanks to its strategic position, porous borders, lawlessness and an abundance of militia groups, smugglers and cartels, thousands of Africans — mostly from Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Zambia, Senegal, Gambia, Benin, Niger, Sudan and countries in the Horn of Africa — risk their lives traveling across the Sahara desert into Libya. They then follow the Mediterranean route, paying ruthless traffickers at least $1,000 to be smuggled into Europe.

Most of the migrants say they save for years to meet the expenses for this journey to a better life. Desperate to escape poverty, disease, unemployment and conflict, only a small fraction of the thousands of migrants actually manage to set foot in Europe.

Desperate Journeys

Before they get far, many die in the desert. They either fall off the back of the overcrowded pickup trucks or collapse due to immense heat. The stopovers in Tripoli, which can last months or even years, give immigrants an opportunity to work casual jobs to meet the expenses of the next phase of the journey to Europe. But vulnerable migrants are often kidnapped by rival smugglers fighting for the control of the lucrative human trafficking business only to be released after their families back home pay a ransom.

For those who manage to make it past these hurdles, the actualization of the European dream is still nowhere in sight. While thousands manage to cross the Mediterranean Sea into Europe, many drown in the sea along with their dreams of a good life, never to be found. According to the International Organization for Migration, at least 1,041 people in 2019, a decrease from 2,299 in 2018.

Thousands of African migrants in Libya who are either intercepted at sea by the Libyan coastguard or arrested in Tripoli or during their journey trying to enter or leave Libya, are being detained in across the country, some of them in conflict areas. Those held in these centers are said to number at least 5,000 and have no access to medical attention or adequate food. Overcrowding means disease, making life in Libya no different, or perhaps even worse than the epidemics they are running away from in their home countries. There are widespread allegations of malnutrition, torture and risk of auctioned off into for as little as $400.

In July 2019, 44 were killed and 133 injured, the majority of them from Sudan, Eritrea and Somalia, after an on a migrant and refugee center near a military camp in Tajoura suburb of Tripoli. The section of the center hit held some 150 of the 600 migrants and refugees. The UN-recognized government blamed Khalifa Haftar for the attacks. The UN has since for the dismantling of the detention centers saying they are not fit to house migrants.

Recruitment of Sudanese Fighters

While Sudanese were demonstrating and waging a revolution back at home in 2019 and trying to cope with and initiate a successful post-dictatorship era, some of their young men who could help rebuild the nation, which was under the rule of Omar al-Bashir for 30 years, were being recruited to fight alongside Khalifa Haftar in Libya.

In August 2019, the newly formed transitional government of Sudan seven members of the Revolutionary Awakening Council from Sudan’s Darfur ethnic group who were alleged to be headed to Libya to fight in Haftar’s Libyan National Army. In November, the and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the head of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, which has its roots in the infamous and has carried out brutal in Darfur as recently as 2015, of violating UN sanctions by deploying 1,000 troops to Libya.

Almost a decade since the beginning of the Libya crisis that grew out of the 2011 Arab Spring, the war in Libya does not seem to be nearing a resolution, with foreign interference and outside interests clashing on the ground in the oil-rich county. The ongoing conflict means that more immigrants will be detained in Libya. Some will die in the Mediterranean or, as Haftar’s offensive continues, African fighters will end up joining Libya’s warring factions.

The European Union and the United Nations continue, with more than thus far, to look for strategies to stem the refugee crisis in which Libya is a major point of passage. But it is the responsibility of African leaders, especially in West Africa, to create employment opportunities and encourage small-scale enterprise to keep their citizens away from the temptations and the hopelessness that drive them toward Libya.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Libya Is a Problem for All of Africa appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

In Britain, show that 31% of the population believes Islam poses a threat to the British way of life, with 18% holding extremely negative views of Muslims. A 2017 undertaken in 27 European nations illustrates how Islamophobia has become one of the most “commonplace expressions of racist prejudice,” with countries like Germany experiencing a threefold increase in attacks on Muslims from 2015-16, following the arrival of over 1 million migrants at the height of the refugee crisis. This year alone, there have been over , with assaults estimated to have post-9/11 levels back in 2017.  

Islamophobia has become a prevalent talking point for political leaders, used to garner public support, distract from other pressing issues and perpetuate an us-versus-them narrative for political gain. Conservative political leaders have played a major role in inciting anti-Muslim sentiment by exaggerating threats of homegrown terrorism and often painting Islam as incompatible with Western values. Even when political leaders do not appear to be deliberately targeting Muslims, they often fail to represent minorities’ interests or respond to their needs. This apathy can further entrench structural barriers that minorities, including Muslims, face, not to mention impacts on their access to equal opportunities.

In this edition of The Interview, 51łÔąĎ talks to Tahir Abbas, assistant professor at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at the University of Leiden and a visiting senior fellow at the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Abbas has written widely on Islamophobia, including most recently on how Britain’s Conservative Party from exploiting it. His , “Islamophobia and Radicalisation: A Vicious Cycle,” released on September 23, explores how Islamophobia and radicalization intersect and reinforce each other.

The text has been edited for clarity.

Dina Yazdani: Please set the stage for us: How would you define Islamophobia?

Tahir Abbas: In very simple terms, it’s the idea of the fear or dread of Islam and Muslims. It’s a broad definition that was largely put forward by the Runnymede Trust in 1996, which attempted to try and capture the meaning and the impact of Islamophobia at a time when the Bosnian crisis was going on, at a time when geopolitics was shifting away from the old East-West problematics. I think it’s that, and there are interrelated concepts within that space. We have issues of direct observable problems of structural racism and discrimination — violence toward women who wear the headscarf, mosque attacks — to issues around cultural distancing — stereotyping, orientalism — which has a much wider societal impact, not just in terms of outcomes on institutions, like when it comes to hiring practices, which suggests Islamophobia in structural terms, but we also see casual racism toward Muslims as a whole, which is much more of a cultural phenomenon.

Yazdani: Where has its front stage been?

Abbas: Well, a lot of it is coming out of the “global north” experience, predominantly, starting out in Western Europe with the experience of postwar migration acting as a backdrop to that reality. And then, more recently, across the pond from North Africa, where we see Muslim groups who were relatively integrated and assimilated into American society pre-9/11 finding themselves facing similar issues around discrimination and victimization — disproportionately in terms of the criminal justice system, vilification of the press, demonization in the press by groups presenting a them-versus-us dichotomy.

Yazdani: In a 2018 for the Middle East Eye, you described there was “mounting evidence” of “organized Islamophobia” in both Europe and the US, and that “the lived realities of brown and black people in some of the poorest parts of the country is ongoing evidence of policies that have not only excluded minorities but also demonised them.” What policies are fueling this anti-Muslim sentiment and reinforcing these divisions across the Western world?

Abbas: These policies are an implication rather than a direct result, in the sense that when we think about housing policies, we think about it as social policies allocation. So, for example, migrant groups coming into the UK in the 1990s to the 2000s from Iraq, Afghanistan and more recently from Somalia, Syria, etc., are located into areas that are experiencing downward pressures, areas that face decline and that have an existing majority population that is feeling left behind and alienated. So when they see these Muslim groups moving into their areas, seemingly protected by the state, they feel resentful and sometimes mobilized around this.

When we see some of these activities across Britain and Europe, we see that it’s often these poor parts with Muslim groups where there are more profound patterns of resistance around that. So at one level it’s a question of social housing allocation, and on another level it has to do with housing and markets, and the inability of Muslim groups to find themselves in the position to move out of poorer areas due to various gatekeeping issues within the private housing sector.

There is also exclusionary behavior at the level of the state, and even the [market] — this notion of “white flight,” which is crude. But it tells us something about when certain areas have minorities, Muslims moving into them has a knock-on effect of reducing average household prices and increasing the rate of concentration of those new groups. Often, people who come to those areas wanting to share a particular lived experience has resulted in existing issues of isolation and alienation, such as Muslim groups who grew up in poorer areas, whose children qualify for universities and get professional qualifications, who don’t immediately move into purely affluent, white neighborhoods even if they could because they want to retain certain links with their communities of origin — including, places of worship, etc. So there is often a tradeoff. It’s also a result of fear and a result of discrimination, because upwardly mobilizing Muslims going into affluent white areas faces hostility and racism of a different kind.

Yazdani: Building on that knock-on effect, what effect have policies promoting multiculturalism or, on the other hand, integration, had on Islamophobia?

Abbas: Integration is the idea of the state providing certain opportunities, spaces for minorities because they have signed a contract of sorts that acknowledges their citizenship and status in society legally, but also culturally, socially, politically. It’s the idea of a social contract. In exchange, the minorities provide a sense of engagement, participation — they pay taxes, they turn up to vote. In return, the state says it recognizes that they may want places of worship, mosques, Islamic centers — and that we are tolerant and open-minded enough to provide that, because it’s only right, and also because we afforded the same kind of privileges to other minority groups over the years.

Although, for example, when it comes to Muslim education, Muslim education [in Britain] didn’t kick into place until 1997, although there have been Jewish schools with state school funding since 1944, although it’s a much smaller community. Integration requires a sense of acceptance — and a sense of acceptance on the part of minority communities that they have a role and a sense of responsibility as citizens. There has been increasing pressures on the idea of differences, which might be seen as acceptable in a diverse society; the idea that diversity itself has been placed under pressure because there’s been a real resistance to multiculturalism, particularly in light of events like 9/11 and 7/7 [London bombings], where it was felt that some of these differences are spaces in which extremism flourishes and where there is a menace for national security to think about.

It’s a misunderstanding. It’s extremism, and also a lack of enthusiasm about the idea of diversity among particular institutions and individuals in elite society.

Yazdani: What are the most egregious examples of organized Islamophobia over the past few years? Where has it been manifested?

Abbas: A lot of it has been online, and it has quite a degree of mobilization online, in terms of pushing out Islamophobia sentiments — including notions of fake news, exaggerated news, distorted news — which perpetuate the almost daily view that Muslims are a problem or a threat, a fifth column. The tropes of Islamophobia are that [Muslims] are disproportionately feeding off the welfare state, and all of these concerns around extremism and terrorism which never really go away and keep bubbling up. So the online space is a major space in which the sentiments of Islamophobia are generated, repackaged, reformulated and recommunicated.

Some of that is orchestrated, well-organized and well-funded, as has been reported by many in terms of the far right. The role of various groups, which exist to fund anti-Muslim sentiment online, is to push Islamophobic sentiment for their own political means, some of which leans into far-right thinking.

Yazdani: Following that far-right thinking, what role have policymakers, lawmakers and politicians played in fueling this anti-Muslim sentiment?

Abbas: We have this area of populism, authoritarianism and elitism that sort of characterizes a lot of the “global north.” We’ve got the global economic crash of 2008 as a recent backdrop here, huge wealth, inequalities as a result of the disproportionate impact of austerity on poorer groups — we’ve seen all of these effects on Britain, [] in the UN special rapporteur report, etc. This has been an ideological program, not one derived from sound economic thinking even.

Economic inequalities, in these times, have resulted in political polarization. The center is hollowed out, and it’s the peripheral voices of the far right and far left, Islamists and all the other extremist groups that have an amplified voice in this political space, while the center ground — in this extreme sort of attempt to capture the center — has been diffused to such an extent that there’s nothing that holds it together anymore. That’s why we’ve got these extreme voices coming into the center, via these figures that provoke these populist sentiment, like [Donald] Trump, [Viktor] Orbán, [Narednra] Modi, [Recep Tayyip] Erdoǧan — and to an extent also Brexit — that are symptoms of this hollowing out of this political center.

Yazdani: In 2005, France experienced widespread riots by French Muslims, mostly living in the banlieus, on the outskirts of major cities. This was an eruption of injustice perceived by these French Muslims who felt, despite identifying as French and being French citizens, disenfranchised and marginalized in France. Looking back at this example, and similar moments of backlash by the Muslim communities witnessed in more recent history but perhaps on a smaller scale, how do second generation Muslims experience Islamophobia and experience their ethnic and cultural identity differently when compared to more recent immigrants?

Islamophobia has a way of destabilizing all sorts of social relations. We have to try and stick our necks out a little bit, knowing that even in doing so, we’re going to face potential blocks along the way.

Abbas: The second generation have got a foot in both camps. They were born in a new country, often to parents born in another country. Being born in a new country, they learn the language of the new country, and go through the education in the new country. They are expected to go through these hoops in a way that everybody else is under the same conditions and under the same expectations. For example, in a meritocratic liberal society, if you work hard and achieve quality education, you will be rewarded with returns to your human capital investments.

However, patterns of discrimination do not abate when we think of the impact of change from the first to the second generation. The first generation were heavily discriminated against, from the jobs they got from the outset, in terms of their mobility or lack thereof, that led to them being trapped in those poor areas. The second generation are born in a new country, and they have the expectations of the people in their peer groups more generally, but they are not getting the chances. They’re feeling the same kind of frustrations [as the first generation], and often it’s a lot worse. So those pressures are doubly felt — they feel that they carry the discrimination and racism of their parents before them.

These huge patterns of discrimination felt from the second generation meant that men and women go through the educational system, but do not experience the kind of relative performance you would expect them to. There are some studies done on this [suggesting] that maybe you can put this down to the lag of experience from the first generation. So there are going to be language gaps, there are going to be certain social capital gaps, like who you know rather than what you know that helps in certain professions, like law and media. This lack of capital explains a great deal of the lag. These are non-discriminatory factors. But that’s a real ruse, because we have to understand that there are various stages of discrimination that are accumulative.

What starts as not being able to get the job you want having done the degree you achieved, having gone through the local school systems, means that there are patterns of discrimination that stay with you from the very beginning. We know from recent studies and observations around who has power, status in society, that it’s the self-selected, privately educated and, in the case of England, folks from a narrow set of schools and universities — two in the case of the UK. And while minorities do feed into that process, there are disproportionate effects that need to be taken into consideration.

Yes, there are people who move up the social ladder and achieve a certain level of success beyond expectations to be had at the start, but there is a great deal of people who lag behind and have all the talent, all the skills and all the capacities which aren’t realized because of system patterns and institutional dynamics around discrimination and racism that affect all groups of color. In today’s world, there’s a layer of Muslims within all groups who are also a feature in that.

Yazdani: Earlier you mentioned radicalization. On that topic, many believe that what drives Islamophibia is the fear that Islam promotes violence and makes Muslims more prone to being radicalized than adherents of other religions. They point to the rise of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and their offshoots, and attacks by Muslim terrorists around the world. What are the driving factors behind radicalization among Muslims, especially Muslim youth, and how do anti-Muslim sentiments feed into that?

Abbas: There are lots of schools of thought on what drives radicalization. We have essentially a spectrum of push and pull factors. The push factors are structural problems: unemployment, disadvantages, poverty, alienation, marginalization, inequality — and the pull factor is ideology. It takes an angry young man to reach out to online forums or literature to find arguments that somehow support their grievances, sense of injustice, perceptions on racism and the reality of racism in their society, whether it’s to their friends, parents, or to themselves or local communities.

In wanting to redress all of that, they find it a totalizing, unique, all-capturing closed set in violence and extremism, combined with a sense of adventure, thrill and masculinity, a sense of belongingness. This “groupdom” that comes with those movements, especially in the Middle East and with the rise, and now fall, of the Islamic State, which acts as a pull.

Depending on whom you listen to and what their arguments are, many would say that it’s all about ideology, because there are poor, marginalized, alienated, unemployed Muslim men who don’t become terrorists. In fact, the mass majority don’t, and there are middle class, upward mobile and privately educated Muslim men who commit terrorism. This isn’t the norm. Far more research is pointing out to a combination of structural conditions and ideological factors.

From my research into this field over the last 10 to 15 years, of talking to people who have been radicalized and have gone off to carry out missions abroad, locked away for crimes — or locked away in Guantanamo on crimes that were unfounded — there is a sense of grievance, a sense of anger. A sense of “You’re not recognizing my potential as a human being, as a man and as a woman. I’m angry, and bereaved, and have no real way of really addressing this unless I do something about it myself. I cannot look to even my own existence or my local faith community setup. The imams don’t understand where I’m coming from, and their narrow interpretations do not support my worldview or aspirations.”

So they take an even narrower perspective on Islam and the lure of adventure, thrill and totalizing solutions become the routes through which they enter into violence extremism. So this is the broad playing field around the radicalization process — and it can be a process. People can move from one end to the other, can move back, in an out of different stages throughout all of this.

There’s not a linearity in the process as a whole. A linearity in this field can lead to all sorts of accusations that it takes a moment for a Muslim to become an extremist, because of the potential that is always within. There’s a lot of discourse within the counterterrorism field that conservative Muslims are steps away from becoming violent extremists. And so deradicalization and preventing violent extremism has inadvertently, or deliberately, traversed into the wider field of what it is to be a Muslim in the “global north” and in the “global south,” where in fact Muslims are killing other Muslims in far greater numbers than we would imagine elsewhere.

So, there are these push factors and pull factors, depending on how you see it — because, again, ideology feeds into the research process. The think tank and policy world, everyone has an agenda here. Academics are supposed to cut through all of this, but the work that we do in academia on this is quite diverse. But it’s difficult to talk to former terrorists, talk to family members, difficult to access police records, court cases and files, so we have to do a sentimental, sectional analysis after the event — surveys, things like that.

Yazdani: You’ve argued that, contrary to public perception, Islamism is not just a term to describe fundamentalism, but that it can also be a progressive idea. Can you explain what you mean by that?

Abbas: Yes. So when you’ve got Islamism branded about as somehow a given concept in relation to the idea that it’s naturally tending toward violence, then you’ve got an ideological problem that contaminates the study of Muslims and extremism. Islamism in broad and simple terms means the idea of using Islam, engaging with Islam through a political lens.

Now, if you’re a citizen in Europe and you see Islam as a force for justice, charity, community development, sharing with others in local area settings — but also in terms of building ideas and working together toward [resolving] the issues; and if you see that role as one of being a good Muslim, then your ideals are not shaped by violence or extremism, but by the idea of being a good Muslim through the lens of thinking about focusing on humanity and the needs of humans who are different, are unequal, have existing problems; when your religious principles teach you that it’s an aspiration to want to better a lot of humanity by working together and knowing each other through this process.

These kinds of spiritual, political, cultural outlooks can also be defined under the rubric Islamism might use, but they’re wholesale neglected. In a recent book of ours, we talk about how Muslims are actively engaging with their societies and citizens in their new countries, using a Muslim framing and Islamic intellectual awareness they have often determined themselves through their own individual interpretations and are acting as good citizens in every sense of the word, and as good Muslims in every sense of the word. That, for me, is progressive Islamism.

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Yazdani: As Muslims, whether we wear the hijab or not, pray or not, whether we’re black or white, or anything in between, I think it’d be hard to find one of us who had not experienced some level of Islamophobia. Taking your professorial hat off, what advice would you give to Muslims experiencing Islamophobia?

Abbas: I would say that it is a tough time in the world today. We have to recognize that for what it is. It’s not some kind of simplistic light vs. dark, good vs. evil end of times, Venetian view on the world — there are a lot of complexities and subtleties, and we have to understand it as well as we can. We have to understand that things are going to be tough, and we have to fix things. But we also have to realize that there’s a great deal of mobilization around resistance, not just among Muslims, but among the left-leaning individuals, institutions, all over the world. And I think it’s important to build those alliances, bridge those alliances and forge movements that traverse immediate differences, because we’re all in this together in many ways.

Islamophobia has a way of destabilizing all sorts of social relations. We have to try and stick our necks out a little bit, knowing that even in doing so, we’re going to face potential blocks along the way.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Talking Islamophobia With Tahir Abbas appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

On August 17, escalation in the offensive on Idlib left dead, including six children, as an air raid hit their home in a village in the south of the governorate. The casualties were recorded a day after 13 other people were killed in a displacement camp in the village of al-Haas and following the displacement of hundreds and thousands of civilians as Syrian forces have advanced on the last opposition stronghold in the country.

The UN has said at least 400,000 people have been uprooted, some for the fourth or fifth time, as a military campaign — reportedly assisted by Russian forces — has continued “unabated” since late April, as one spokesperson for the multilateral body put it. Turkish media say the number of internally displaced persons (IDP) could if operations expand.

The current humanitarian decline in the province has occurred despite a ceasefire being declared at the recent Astana peace talks as well as past efforts for Idlib to become a de-escalation zone. The regime blamed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an that controls Idlib, for not fully complying with the ceasefire and for carrying out attacks on civilian objects. Human rights groups say the Syrian regime and its allies have been responsible for killing a least 781 civilians, including 208 children, in raids between April 26 and July 27. By August 5, the ceasefire was declared officially over.

Stark warnings have been ushered by the United Nations, with the situation “total panic.” Mark Lowcock, the under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator, has that it could create the “worst humanitarian disaster” of the century.

Consider that Idlib has, over the last few years, acted as a reception area for civilians fleeing government advances elsewhere, and without other opposition-held territories to flee to, most displacement has been contained within the province, with a proportion fleeing northward to Aleppo.

While horror unfolds under the rain of mortar and fire, already densely-populated areas of Idlib province suffer , impacting the humanitarian situation and precarity among displaced communities. Strained resources also mean more support is needed from aid agencies, although the sector concedes that aid alone is not a sustainable solution. At the same time, child labor among displaced communities is now becoming more prevalent, lending concern that children are being exposed to abuse and exploitation.

On August 22, the Syrian government announced it was opening a “humanitarian corridor” to allow civilians to leave Idlib province and the neighboring Hama. Yet without the current offensive relenting, the humanitarian situation is only expected to worsen, while overall in Syria some remain in acute need. Furthermore, those who have returned from cross-border displacement have been subject to abuse and persecution by the regime, according to the (SNHR). The organization has also documented that at least 426 IDPs returning to regime-controlled areas have been detained, including 13 children — 284 of whom were forcibly disappeared.

With Idlib in crisis, the international response has been wanting. In July, UN Human Rights Chief Michelle Bachelet aired frustration at the lack of acknowledgment from the international community, : “Airstrikes kill and maim significant numbers of civilians several times a week, and the response seems to be a collective shrug.” Othman Mokbel, chief executive of Syria Relief, recently for The Independent that the country no longer forms part of the national conversation anymore and much of the British public are not even aware there is still a conflict there.

A Safe Zone in Syria

Meanwhile, the US and Turkey agreed on August 7 to put in place a 32-kilometer-deep safe zone in northern Syria, something that has been in Turkish sights for a while now. This is in addition to a “peace corridor” running between the Euphrates River to the Iraqi border in order to help the safe passage of Syrian refugees in Turkey back into Syria as well as facilitating securitization needs.

However, with the US using the People’s Protection Units (YPG) — which Turkey sees as a terrorist group — as a proxy to fight Islamic State militants in the region, there in the deal. In particular, Ankara wants to clear the area of forces from the YPG and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and remove administrative autonomy in any of the Kurdish-run towns. With reference to a previously stalled deal over the northern city of Manbij, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu has Turkey was not prepared to wait this time.

There is also the fact that, several years ago, there were serious over the establishment of a safe zone and how secure it might be for civilians.  

Syria is now enduring its ninth year of war, marred throughout by some of the most egregious harms — barrel bombs, disappearances, chemical weapons and conscription — while proxies, non-state actors and parties to the conflict compete for their own interests, convoluting the theater of war. Now, the worst could be yet to come while the world fails to register the devastation.   

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Unabated Bombardment of Idlib in Syria appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

In 2010, Rwanda was by the World Bank as the top reformer for business, and Mauritius ranked as the most prosperous African country in the 2018 , ahead of economic giants like Nigeria and South Africa. Botswana, an emerging economy that has gained a reputation for transparency, holds Africa’s top spot in the Transparency International .

However, parts of the continent are still issues like child labor, poverty, lack of education, food insecurity, low rates of economic growth, corruption and violence, particularly against women. Currently, 19 out of the 20 countries in the world with the worst food and nutrition security are in . More than two out of five African adults cannot read or write.

Africa faces numerous security challenges that require a coordinated global effort to resolve. A swathe of militant groups are in the Maghreb, the Sahel and Nigeria, where the Boko Haram insurgency has more than 50,000 people and 2.3 million from their homes in neighboring Chad and Cameroon since 2009. Somalia, plagued by decades of conflict, is still fighting al-Shabab militants, but the African Union (AU) to end its peacekeeping missions in the country and hand over security to Somali forces by 2021.

In recent years, violence and unrest across Africa have caused an exodus to Europe and the United States. As reported by the European Commission, more than 134,000 African refugees and migrants in Europe via the Mediterranean Sea in 2018. At the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015, the number stood at just over a million.

The European Union invests heavily in various sectors across Africa to promote democracy and human rights initiatives and economic integration models; create more jobs; provide educational opportunities; and tackle violence, corruption and undemocratic practices. It was last year that the EU, in its next budget period, would invest $46.5 billion in Africa. The for the EU is to secure $54 billion in sustainable investment by 2020.

In this edition of The Interview, 51łÔąĎ talks to Ranieri Sabatucci, the EU ambassador to the African Union, about the extensive cooperation between Europe and Africa, democratization and sustainable development across the continent.

The text has been edited for clarity and length.

Kourosh Ziabari: What are the major areas of investment by the European Union in Africa? In what ways do these investments contribute to sustainable development and  job creation on the continent?

Ranieri Sabatucci: On September 12, 2018, the European Commission a “Communication on a new Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs: Taking our partnership for investment and jobs to the next level.” This alliance reflects our efforts to deliver on the commitments made at the 5th African Union-European Union summit in Abidjan, held at the end of 2017, where leaders called for investments in job creation.

The alliance is about unlocking private investment and exploring the huge opportunities that can produce benefits for African and European economies alike. It is an economic partnership that puts the respective strengths of Europe and Africa to work. To do so, the EU will focus its investments in those areas with potential for job creation and value addition in Africa where the EU has a significant added value, namely transport connectivity, digital, energy and agro-industry.

In parallel, the EU will invest in education and skills to ensure that job offers match market demand; contribute to improving the business environment and investment climate across the continent; and strengthen economic integration and trade within Africa and between Africa and Europe, building on the political momentum of the African Continental Free Trade Area. The long-term perspective might well be to create a comprehensive continent-to-continent free trade agreement between the EU and Africa, from Scandinavia to the Cape. The EU is using its weight to promote a global level playing field in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations where this has become ever more important. EU trade deals create economic opportunities, and that means jobs.

The European Union is also implementing an ambitious three-pillar European External Investment Plan [EIP] to encourage investment in our partner countries in Africa and the EU neighborhood region, to strengthen our partnerships and contribute to achieving the SDGs [Sustainable Development Goals]. The EIP aims to bridge the gap between sustainable development needs and the availability of viable business opportunities for public and private investors. It is our largest ever investment program for Africa and the neighborhood.

With EU contributions of €4.1 billion [$4.6 billion], the External Investment Plan is on its path to leverage up to €44 billion of investment by 2020, including for the most fragile countries. Our priorities are focused on sectors such as access to finance for micro, small and medium enterprises [SMEs], energy and connectivity, smart cities, digital, environment and agriculture. We aim to generate environmentally and socially sustainable projects, create decent jobs, functioning markets and balanced growth, and open up opportunities for women and youth. In the scope of the EIP, we have a specific Africa Investment Platform, the main purpose of which is to support sustainable growth in Africa.

Jobs and Growth Compacts are also currently under discussion with many African countries in order to steer the joint efforts around value chains with the highest potential for job creation, seizing the opportunities for manufacturing and processing, unlocking the huge potential of green economy, supporting transition to low-carbon and climate-resilient economies, exploiting the potential of the data economy, and tackling the areas requiring reform in order to improve the business enabling environment.

Ziabari: How are the EU and the African Union collaborating to tackle climate change and global warming? How did they contribute to the 2015 Paris Agreement, and how are they going to work toward a low-carbon, climate-resilient future?

Sabatucci: We are jointly providing assistance to African Union member states in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This implies support to ratification of National Determined Contributions [NDC] by member state countries’ parliaments and their alignment to national sectoral plans and strategies. The key activities to be implemented are clustered around coordination, monitoring and evaluation communication and advocacy and mobilization of political will. The key actors are the African Union Commission and the Regional Economic Communities [RECs].

In particular, the EU supports the AU Commission and the RECs in the coordination, implementation, monitoring and reporting process related to national and regional climate strategies. This is done through technical capacity building and through a joint working group and program steering committee meetings.

We also provide support to the development of a continental reporting framework for the implementation of the climate change strategies and NDCs in Africa. In this context, field missions to RECs and AU member states enable us to assess the program implementation and ensure the reporting.

What happens in Africa matters in Europe and vice versa. In a more complex, more contested and more connected world as we see it today, this is more valid than ever.

Furthermore, we are engaged together with the AU in advocacy and communication activities, mainly through promotion and communication materials, campaigns and events in order to showcase Africa’s achievements, opportunities and challenges in the implementation of the Paris Agreement. One example is the co-organization of Africa Day.

Finally, we provide technical and scientific support and backup to the African Group of Negotiators on current and emerging issues during climate negotiations. We help convening high-level fora and policy dialogues, conferences such as the Climate Change and Development in Africa Conference and other events in Africa to enhance dialogue, share experience and exchange knowledge. We also support and facilitate the representation of African institutions and experts in global and regional climate and development related fora.

Ziabari: Let’s move on to a different topic. A large number of migrants to the European Union come from the African countries. Does the EU consider the African migrants a threat or an opportunity?

Sabatucci: Properly managed regular migration brings benefits to migrants and both the countries of origin and destination. In specific areas of its economy, Europe is believed to benefit from regular migration, and so do countries of origin through remittances, including non-monetary remittances. Migration routes have become increasingly dangerous, creating vulnerability to smugglers and traffickers and leading to loss of lives and human rights abuses. Preventing human suffering stands high on our joint AU and EU agenda and our work in the context of the EU-AU-UN Libya Task Force is starting to deliver results.

Beyond bilateral agreements, there is a need for a holistic approach to addressing the root causes of irregular migration and creating more pathways for regular migration. Migration is an essential consideration in economic and political governance in Africa as well as in Europe. Thus, plans to strengthen economic ties between the continents, to boost investment and to create employment opportunities in Africa would contribute to alleviating migratory pressure.

In the same vein, progress in terms of respect for the rule of law and political participation would improve the prospects for many potential migrants of staying in their home countries. While to a lower extent than for economic purposes, people do also move because of conflicts and lack of security in Africa, and a stronger partnership with African countries on conflict prevention and stabilization — silencing the guns — is a prerequisite for creating the stability that would enable economic development.

The European Union has a comprehensive migration agenda and is working closely and effectively with different African bodies carrying out several initiatives with the aim of making migration a choice rather than a necessity.

A few examples of our joint work include the European External Investment Plan launched in Abidjan in November 2017 to promote inclusive growth, job creation and sustainable development with the aim of tackling some of the root causes of migration; a greater role for diasporas as contributors to development; increased opportunities for Africans to study in the European Union; the praiseworthy work of the African Institute of Remittances on lowering remittance costs supported by the EU; the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has funded over 100 programs for a total of close to 2 billion to date.

These projects range from improving capacity for better managing migrant and refugee flows to more long-term support addressing resilience, stability and job creation, with particular attention to young people.

Migration is a phenomenon that can only be addressed jointly, between Europe and Africa, recognizing our joint interest in doing so. The spirit is one of a partnership of equals. The recent Africa-Europe Alliance Meeting held in Vienna emphasized the ambition to offer 750,000 apprenticeships and 105,000 Erasmus+ spots for students until 2027, and to create 10 million new jobs in the next five years.

Ziabari: As I understand, EU efforts to make migration sustainable revolve around two main themes: integration of migrants in the EU and facilitation of the return of those who won’t be seeking asylum. Can you tell us more about these efforts and how international partners, including the UN and the UN Migration Agency (IOM), are contributing?

Sabatucci: It is not just a matter of integration of the migrants and facilitation of the return. With both continents recognizing the need to address the drivers of displacement, prevent hazardous journeys and reduce deaths in transit, as well as to find solutions to the more long-term and structural challenges, we need to comprehensively address the drivers of irregular migration while seizing the benefits of well-managed mobility. Development has a central role to play in the sense that development should work for migration, and migration should work for development.

The EU is certainly strongly committed to continuing its engagement on migration, with the final objective of ensuring that all migration is undertaken in a regular and safe manner, and that it becomes a choice, not a last resort out of desperation. We need to support partner countries and create opportunities for regular and orderly migration.

That said, we have currently, in particular in Libya, increased numbers of irregular migrants willing to return to their countries of origin. The EU, with the AU and the UN, established in the fall of 2017 the Libya Joint Task Force, which has, since the end of 2017, helped more than 39,000 voluntary returns and is supporting reintegration of 55,000 migrants through the EU-IOM joint initiative supporting return, protection and reintegration of migrants in sub-Saharan Africa.

The complex, multidimensional process of reintegration requires a holistic and a need-based approach. The AU, EU and UN through the IOM and UNHCR are actively collaborating toward this aim. Enabling migrants, who may find themselves in vulnerable situations in their countries of origin and in need of reintegration support, to return in a safe, dignified and voluntary way and to restart their lives in their countries of origin are key objectives.

Since every returnee faces a particular reintegration situation due to their personal profile [such as] age, sex and gender, experiences, etc., individualized reintegration support is crucial in addressing otherwise overlooked individual challenges.

Also, there is the need to consider the role that communities play in migrant reintegration. When return is seen as a failure, leading to a more hostile environment, reintegration efforts will be negatively impacted. Resentment among communities may also be generated, if the reintegration assistance received by individual returnees is perceived as an undue reward to returnees as compared to local populations. On the other hand, when communities perceive returnees’ reintegration positively, they can provide a conducive environment for reintegration in terms of safety nets, support of strong social networks, as well as financial resources.

Ziabari: In which African countries is the human rights situation considered a challenge by the EU? What initiatives are being implemented to change the status quo and ensure the full protection of human rights in these countries?

Sabatucci: The protection of human rights presents a range of challenges not only in Africa, but also in Europe and many other countries around the world. There are African countries that have come a long way in safeguarding human rights for their citizens, as there are others where advancement remains to be achieved.

The crisis and civil war in Somalia has been a longstanding issue of concern for the EU and its member states. The EU has been a reliable partner of Somalia during these difficult times, trying to help it overcome its difficulties.

The EU works to support the furthering of human rights on the African continent both at country level and at the pan-African level. We do this through a two-pronged approach: political dialogue and development cooperation. My delegation’s mandate is relations with the African Union, whereas our bilateral delegations support the promotion and protection of human rights in the countries where they are accredited.

It is important to recall that the mandates that the AU and its member states have given to the organs of the African Human Rights System are based on the concept of the universality of human rights and thus on principles which are fully shared by the EU.

We currently have a €10-million project supporting the pan-African Human Rights System that is supporting the various AU human rights organs: the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, based in Banjul, Gambia; the African Court on Human and People’s Rights, located in Arusha, Tanzania; and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, currently in Addis Ababa but set to relocate to Lesotho and the Pan African Parliament in Midrand, South Africa. We also support the human rights-related activities of the African Union Commission based in Addis Ababa.

Our main objective is to contribute to the ratification, implementation and domestication of the AU relevant instruments on human rights through the efforts of the organs mentioned above. The program also includes capacity-building activities for those AU organs. We believe that by supporting the African Human Rights System, we are contributing to a better protection and promotion of human rights in Africa.

Ziabari: What are the most intractable challenges faced by women in Africa? How is the European Union helping them resist and overcome these challenges?

Sabatucci: Violence against women and girls (VAWG) is a global pandemic, a crime and an immense obstacle to development. The UN reports that more than 1 in 3 women has experienced physical or sexual violence, and violence manifests itself in several forms. Each year, 12 million girls are married before the age of 18, often with severe implications on their well-being. Meanwhile, an estimated 200 million have been subjected to female genital mutilation, which results in big numbers of lifelong complications.

The European Union has become a world leader on VAWG through its €500-million commitment in the form of the global Spotlight Initiative to Eliminate Violence Against Women and Girls — a partnership with the United Nations. Half of this funding is going to Africa, with a focus on tackling harmful practices. In order to be as impactful as possible, the funds will be channeled into projects in eight countries: Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Some work will also take place at regional, i.e. continental, level.

Ziabari: In 2018, a Congolese gynecologist, Dr. Denis Mukwege, became the only African to be awarded a Nobel Prize. What do you think of his work and his important endeavors to cure women who have been the victims of sexual violence?

Sabatucci: In the words of our High Representative Federica Mogherini, “as the European Union we admire the immense courage and tireless work” of Dr. Mukwege. Following the award, the EU decided to allocate €4 million to support his work at Panzi Hospital in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The hospital has treated 50,000 women victims of sexual violence, and has also supported their socioeconomic reintegration. The EU has a long friendship with the Panzi Foundation that reaches well beyond the Nobel Prize.

In total, we have provided close to €19 million so far to this noble cause, and Dr. Mukwege was awarded the prestigious EU Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought in 2014. We want to continue projecting him as the role model that he is, for Africa and for the world.

Ziabari: African Peace Facility (APF) and the Pan-African Program (PanAf) are the two main sources of EU funding for the African Union. Are you satisfied with the progress made in the implementation of projects funded through these schemes?

Sabatucci: Let me begin with the African Peace Facility, which provides financial support to African-led Peace Support Operations, to the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture and to mediation and conflict prevention initiatives. It constitutes the main source of funding to support African efforts in the area of peace and security. A 2017 external evaluation of the APF confirmed that it is a highly relevant instrument in support of peace and security in Africa, which allows the EU to play the role of an enabler, not just a donor.

The evaluation also found evidence showing the long-term impact of programs funded under the instrument, including the increase of African ownership in the domain of peace and security. Going forward, we aim to further strengthen our common vision with the AUC and to ensure complementarity with the actions of non-EU partners.

With a budget of €845 million for the period 2014-20, the objective of the Pan-African Program is to support the strategic partnership between Africa and the EU. Under the first phase of the program (2014-17), actions undertaken contributed primarily to a 42% growth and human development (29%), as well as to global issues (13%), governance (12%), and peace and security (4%). In its second phase, the PanAf is guided by the following priorities agreed at the 5th AU-EU summit, which took place in November 2017 in Abidjan: investing in people — education, science, technology and skills development; strengthening resilience, peace, security and governance; migration and mobility; and mobilizing investments for African structural sustainable transformation.

Overall, the PanAf has allowed us to meaningfully “export” several European success stories, such as the Erasmus exchange program in the form of the Intra-Africa Mobility Scheme, which supports higher education cooperation between countries in Africa, and the use of EU satellite technology — Global Monitoring for Environment and Security for earth observation and the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service — for satellite navigation.

What happens in Africa matters in Europe and vice versa. In a more complex, more contested and more connected world as we see it today, this is more valid than ever.

Ziabari: One of the main priorities of the European Union has always been to promote and advocate for democracy worldwide. Do you think the democratic movements in Egypt and Tunisia that framed the basis of the 2011 Arab Spring have been able to accomplish their mission and bring freedom and democracy to these nations?

Sabatucci: The events of early 2011 in the Arab world were very tumultuous and involved a range of forces and grievances for the people, who took to the streets to protest and bring about change in their countries. There may have been some differences in the ambitions of those who were pushing for change: For some, it was a desire for more freedom and more democratic government, while for others it may have been a more basic desire for better prospects for themselves and their children.

In any event, many have been disappointed with developments since. Eight years later, we are still advocating many of the same issues in the region as we did before the so-called Arab Spring.

Eight years after the revolution, Tunisia continues to take important steps toward the consolidation of democratic values ​​and human rights, and remains an example for the entire region. Starting from its irreversible commitment to democracy, Tunisia is determined to progress in its transition despite a number of major socio-economic and security challenges. Last year alone, important steps forward have included the organization of the first free municipal elections; the creation by the president of a commission on reforms related to individual freedoms and equality and the adoption of significant legislation relating to the elimination of violence against women; the fight against racial discrimination and the setting up of independent bodies on good governance; the fight against corruption; and the protection of human rights.

At the same time, challenges related to the effective implementation of the landmark 2014 constitution remain, including the establishment of a constitutional court and the revision of legislation to fully align with the principles of the constitution.

In the immediate aftermath of the 2011 revolution, the EU pledged to support the Tunisian people’s transition toward greater democracy, freedom and social justice. The EU-Tunisia Privileged Partnership was concluded in 2012. Tunisian civil society, which plays a key role in the transition, will continue to be closely involved in the process, primarily through regular tripartite consultations on the main areas of EU-Tunisia cooperation.

Since 2011, the EU has more than doubled its financial contribution to Tunisia. The combination of grants, macro financial assistance and loans brought total support to Tunisia from 2011 to 2016 to approximately €3.5 billion. The joint communication, “Strengthening EU support for Tunisia,” adopted in September 2016, is the concrete response to Tunisia’s request for more support from the EU to its transition. In 2018, for the second year in a row, the European Commission honored the commitment made in the communication to allocate additional €300 million in grants.

EU assistance in the field of democracy and human rights covers a wide range of areas, including the reform of the justice sector, support to the Tunisian parliament and to independent institutions, freedom of expression and media, the promotion of gender equality, and support to civil society. The country is the main recipient of the so-called “umbrella” funds granted in recognition of progress made in the field of democracy and human rights.

The EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities 2017-2020 set out the strategic political framework for political engagement and enhanced cooperation between the EU and Egypt. One of their pillars is a shared commitment to democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. Since the Arab Spring, important challenges remain as the country continues to face important security, social and economic challenges. Action has been undertaken in the fields of the fight against corruption, addressing the rights of women, children and persons with disabilities.

[Egypt’s] 2014 constitution represents a very important and forward-looking text, which includes progressive articles and guarantees the protection and the respect for fundamental human rights. At the latest EU-Egypt Association Council in December 2018, the EU reiterated its concerns regarding the human rights situation in the country and encouraged Egypt to step up its efforts to improve the situation in line with the Constitutional guarantees and its international commitments and obligations.

In line with the August 2013 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, support to civil society remains a priority in EU bilateral assistance to Egypt. EU assistance focuses on the promotion and protection of human rights, support for civil society and democratic governance. Assistance is provided via ongoing bilateral programs under the European Neighbourhood Instrument with the government, as well as under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and thematic programs under the Development Cooperation Instrument.

For example, the financing agreement for the Citizens’ Rights” project — €10 million for 2016-19 — provided support to the National Council for Human Rights (€2.5 million from July 2017). This project also aims to increase women’s participation in public life and gender mainstreaming of selected public services.

Ziabari: The Fragile States Index ranks Somalia as the second most volatile country in the world, with an ongoing civil war and a strong presence of both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. What has the European Union done to tackle the crisis?

Sabatucci: The crisis and civil war in Somalia has been a longstanding issue of concern for the EU and its member states. The EU has been a reliable partner of Somalia during these difficult times, trying to help it overcome its difficulties. It has been one of the only donors to consistently support Somalia through a comprehensive range of instruments consisting of active diplomacy and support to the political process, stabilization and security support, development assistance and humanitarian aid focused on re-establishing peace and stability.

It’s impossible to enumerate all the support the EU has given. But it is estimated that the EU and its member states have allocated an overall amount of €3.4 billion for the period 2015 to 2020, making it the largest donor to Somalia. Additionally, we are one of the few partners that have a delegation in Mogadishu, showcasing our support and solidarity to the people of Somalia.

Specifically on the security front, I would like to highlight the significant investments the EU has made for the benefit of the Somali people. On the one hand, we have the AU mission, AMISOM, which the EU has supported heavily since its inception. More than €1.7 billion of support has been given to AMISOM in order to help the Somali people live in a more secure environment.

However, we should not forget the heavy price paid by the troops of the AMISOM contingents. Additionally, the EU has also contributed directly through three security and defense missions: the Military Training Mission, which supports Somali security forces; the EU Naval Force, which fights piracy, and EUCAP, which aims to improve regional maritime security.

To end, I would like to challenge the premise of your question a little. I would dispute that Somalia is the second most fragile country in the world. Many other obvious examples come to mind. Instead, since the previous elections and the reforms undertaken since then by the government, I have an optimistic view of the trajectory Somalia is on. Yes, there are still hurdles to be overcome, but all in all, the Somalia of today is no longer the negative story it may have been in the past. It is time for everyone to rally behind Somalia, and support the government in building a safer and prosperous future for all its people.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post What Happens in Africa Matters in Europe appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

And even worse, unfit to respond with empathy to the reality of a young father dying on America’s southern border riverbank with his toddler daughter dying by his side, clinging to each other in their desperate search for a better tomorrow. Their alone is a damning portrait of today’s America and the moral depravity at its helm.

This is what happens when ignorance, incompetence and cruelty coalesce. Their image is the face of the nation that should come to mind every day as long as Trump’s moral vacuum is allowed to define America for a significant portion of the nation and the world. Shame on each of us who does nothing in response.

But, as horrific as the image is and as depraved as I believe Trump and his supporters to be, I want to give credit where credit is due. Trump’s ignorance, incompetence and cruelty have coalesced to bring two critical American realities out of the shadows, one nationally and the other internationally.

America’s False Narrative

Let’s start at home. For some decades now, there seems to have been a white, middle-class notion that racism was slowly drifting away as a defining social and economic factor on the American stage. But not anymore. Trump’s overt racism and the covert racism he has empowered have unleashed a public regurgitation of white nationalism in the US.

A whole lot of black Americans knew it was there because they saw it every day, at job interviews, in the quality of inner-city schools, in routine interactions with the police. Likely in every corner of their lives. But those of us who are white and are not racists seemed to take Barack Obama’s election in 2008 as a symbolic passage to a racially neutral world in which we somehow could believe that things were “better.”

Then Trump rode down that elevator on his way to the presidency, crafted a message of “us” versus “them,” and minions of suppressed haters crawled out of their caves for all to see. Now, it is a whole lot easier to believe those stories about the social media ranting of racist law enforcement officers and the more subtle resurgence of suppression of the black vote and of de facto housing and school segregation.

On the international front, despite disastrous results and unending death and destruction unleashed by the United States in the lands of others, our “allies” have steadfastly walked by our side, hand in hand. No lie was too big, no death toll too daunting, no ravaged peoples too ravaged for our international lap dogs to fall into line. Yet, believe it or not, Trump has finally managed to free some countries in the world from the “tyranny” of America’s false narrative.

Most of the post-World War II American leadership fought long and hard to convince once skeptical allies that America was a torchbearer of democracy and human rights and could be relied upon to put global interests (collective allied interests) ahead of national interest in determining the world’s winners and losers. There was a kind of acceptance of the notion of “American exceptionalism,” as long as we were leading the way and paving the way with our material and human resources.

Leaders of the “free” world flocked together in lockstep no matter how inconsistent our actions were with our stated objectives. None seemed to learn anything from the devastation of the Vietnam War. That illustrious flag of freedom always seemed worth flying until it wasn’t. One international disaster has followed another, with seemingly no lessons learned along the way.

It Was Always “America First”

Then Trump shows up in his little red hat to assert openly what should have been obvious to our international “partners” for decades: “America First.” America first was not a revelation to the Vietnamese, the Afghans, the Iraqis, the Syrians, the Palestinians and countless others who have suffered so that America could manufacture its battles to be fought on someone else’s land for American public consumption and American gain.

Further, a significant part of Trump’s “America First” mantra is that America is open for business to anyone and everyone who can put their money on the table. Not so bad if we’re selling Coca Cola to Saudi Arabia, but real bad if we’re selling armaments. So step up Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Turkey, South America and Africa to buy America. Come one, come all. No background check needed. And no questions asked about who is going to die for the glory of Trump’s of America and for the profit of its merchants of death.

At long last, maybe some US “allies” are awakening to the sickening truth. These nations — Britain, Germany, France, Japan, Australia and Canada, to name a few — are complicit. Now with eyes opened wide, there should be no repeat of the old-world order in which America was the default good guy. America is not now nor has it ever been a good guy. It has sometimes done good things, even for the right reasons. But “America First” is nothing new. It is just a louder version of America first.

It is now well past time to thank Trump for his blatant disregard of the American narrative and to get him out of the way. America has to confront again old truths that should have been self-evident long ago. Racism is alive and thriving in today’s America, and that nifty notion of America as a beacon of democracy and human rights never was a reality.

And when a father and his daughter died seeking freedom on our shores on June 23, American myths that have been nurtured for generations should have died with them.

*[A version of this article was cross-posted on the author’s , Hard Left Turn.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post Image of Dead Immigrant Child Torches America appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.