Given these constraints, the of approximately 55% in participating constituencies is relatively high for a country affected by widespread displacement, armed violence and political polarization. The military authorities presented the elections as a step toward restoring political order and ending open hostilities, though critics remain skeptical about their inclusiveness and intent.

The political process was also closely watched by neighboring countries, including India, as the situation in Myanmar is increasingly shaping not only border security and refugee flows, but the geoeconomic ambitions of regional players, as well.

Consolidation of power

The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), closely associated with Min Aung Hlaing¡¯²õ military regime, won the majority of the contested seats. The USDP now has a majority in both chambers of Parliament. They secured 232 of the 263 seats in the lower Pyithu Hluttaw and 109 of the 157 seats announced so far in the upper Amyotha Hluttaw. Combined with the constitutionally mandated allocation of 25% of parliamentary seats to unelected military appointees, this outcome gives the military junta effective control of the legislature and forecloses meaningful parliamentary opposition. In practical terms, the election has reinforced existing power structures, lending formal political cover to continued military authority rather than altering the balance of power.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to certify or endorse the election, stating that conditions for a credible and inclusive process were absent and confirming that no ASEAN observer mission would be deployed. Meanwhile, neighboring states that have direct security and economic interests in Myanmar took a more pragmatic position.

China publicly welcomed the completion of the election and reiterated its support for stability and continued bilateral cooperation, framing the vote as part of a domestic political process. India had previously support for Myanmar¡¯²õ plan to hold elections in a ¡°fair and inclusive¡± manner and sent monitoring teams. These actions and rhetoric reflect New Delhi¡¯²õ priority for stability and sustained engagement over diplomatic isolation. Vietnam and Cambodia also sent observers, signaling a willingness among some regional actors to maintain channels of contact with Naypyidaw despite broader international skepticism. This position reflected longstanding divisions within the bloc regarding engagement with Myanmar¡¯²õ post-coup authorities.

Myanmar¡¯²õ instability and India¡¯²õ security

For New Delhi, developments in Naypyidaw are directly related to domestic security concerns. The Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram share a 1,643-kilometer border with Myanmar. The conflict in Myanmar has intensified since 2021, creating instability in weakly controlled border regions, such as Mizoram and Manipur.

Indian law enforcement agencies have reported an increase in cross-border crimes, including weapons and drug smuggling, militia infiltration and the establishment of insurgent training camps. In Mizoram¡¯²õ Champhai, Saiha and Lawngtlai districts, operations have led to the seizure of explosives, weapons and narcotics. Between September 2025 and January 2026, the value of confiscated illegal substances $15.5 million. Further north, Manipur authorities 22 drug smuggling cases and 12 arms trafficking cases in the first quarter of 2025 alone.

The instability in Myanmar, caused by conflict between the junta and the NUG as well as deep internal divisions between local national insurgents fighting on the side of opposition forces, creates conditions for a growing number of refugees and causes civil and ethnic unrest.

In mid-2025, clashes between the Myanmar militia groups Chin National Front (CNF) and Chin Defense Force (CDF) up to 4,400 people to flee to the Indian state of Mizoram. By March 2026, the number of officially registered Myanmar nationals in Mizoram had 28,355. Of these, 27,574 had passed biometric registration. The total of Myanmar asylum seekers in India is more than 86,000. Despite the deep ethnic kinship between the majority Mizo people in Mizoram and the Chin people in Myanmar, this prompted the deployment of additional police and Assam Rifles units.

The influx of Myanmar refugees has led to growing tension amongst the locals due to the increase in competition for limited job opportunities as the state grapples with rising youth unemployment, which is to be around 12%. Furthermore, the situation is worsening due to the rising crime rate. In June 2025, Mizoram Home Minister K. Sapdanga that more than 50% of criminal cases in the state were linked to individuals who had entered the country illegally or as refugees.

The rising cost of internal strain

While Mizoram is more tolerant of refugees from Myanmar, neighboring Manipur is notorious for ethnic violence. On May 3, 2023, a dispute between the Meitei majority in Manipur and the Chin communities over Scheduled Tribe status escalated into a . Rooted in territory and identity, the situation was significantly exacerbated by the influx of approximately 10,000 refugees from Myanmar, resulting in at least 260 deaths and the displacement of over 60,000 people. Meitei groups also the growth of new settlements and a 30% increase in poppy cultivation as evidence of a ¡°narcoterrorist¡± threat from Myanmar. This the Indian government to scrap the Free Movement Regime, which allowed local tribes to travel freely without visas, and to start construction of a border fence in February 2024.

This situation poses a significant threat to India¡¯²õ domestic security and challenges its geoeconomic ambitions. Regions affected by conflict, such as Manipur in India, which borders Chin state, one of the three regions bordering India, are of particular concern as they are along the India¨CMyanmar¨CThailand . This route is a flagship connectivity project under India¡¯²õ Act East policy. New Delhi has invested over $250 million in the project directly and has extended more than $1 billion in credit lines for broader ASEAN connectivity initiatives.?

Studies on ASEAN-India cooperation that extending these corridors to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam could generate up to $70 billion in additional regional GDP and create around 20 million jobs by the middle of the decade. India is to benefit from this expansion through increased trade and development in its northeast region. However, persistent insecurity in Myanmar and its derivatives continues to construction, raise costs and cast uncertainty over the project¡¯²õ long-term viability.

Elections in the border regions

Ahead of and during the electoral process, the junta pursued local negotiations with ethnic armed organizations to secure ceasefires or tacit noninterference, thereby enabling limited polling, particularly in border areas. These efforts yielded mixed results. Chin State was almost entirely excluded from the electoral process because resistance forces linked to the NUG and local People¡¯²õ Defense Force units retained significant territorial control there. These armed groups rejected the vote outright, preventing the establishment of conditions for polling.

In Sagaing and Kachin, the situation was similarly fragmented. Armed actors repeatedly attempted to disrupt the election by targeting logistics and security deployments. In Sagaing, 11 of the 34 townships were from voting due to security concerns, and clashes were reported in seven others during the election. In Kachin State, elections could not be held in four townships and additional incidents were recorded in two more.

While areas immediately adjacent to the Indian border remained relatively calm during the initial phase, security conditions deteriorated further inland as the process continued. Myanmar Witness over 150 conflict-related incidents in townships that were officially designated as ¡°active¡± or ¡°stable¡± for voting. Insurgent groups sought to derail the process by threatening officials and voters, attacking supply routes and otherwise intimidating people.

An unsettled outcome

Although the junta held elections in most accessible areas and established institutional control, stability remains elusive because the NUG and affiliated insurgent groups have invested significant resources in preventing ceasefires and disrupting electoral activity rather than facilitating political de-escalation.

The elections showed that the war in Myanmar won¡¯t stop in the short term and that political dialogue is the only way forward. All foreign actors should assist in this dialogue, and the idea of ¡°isolation¡± should not be supported. The election was a reminder to all critics of Min Aung Hlaing¡¯²õ military regime that the USDP has its supporters, even if their number is less than the official electoral statistics indicate. It¡¯²õ impossible to ignore this part of the population and their interests. Otherwise, the situation will be mirrored, and the NUG will become another totalitarian regime.

The stance of key international actors, such as India and China, has reinforced the rationale behind taking a calibrated and pragmatic approach to Myanmar. India¡¯²õ strategy prioritizes stability, dialogue and reducing violence over ideological positioning, aiming to achieve tangible results. New Delhi continues to engage with the authorities in Naypyidaw, not to endorse military rule, but to preserve border security, sustain humanitarian access and maintain channels for political de-escalation.

This stance contrasts with that of several ASEAN members, whose refusal to engage with the junta has enabled opposition forces to reject ceasefires and disrupt the electoral process through armed conflict. Only a change in approach among ASEAN countries and mediation could bring peace closer. Without offering feasible political solutions, isolating the Naypyidaw authorities could prolong the conflict and have regional consequences, including human casualties and destroy Myanmar¡¯²õ economic potential for years. Moreover, it will affect neighboring countries with escalating refugee crises and ethnic tensions, as well as undermine projects that would promote social and economic growth in Myanmar and throughout Southeast Asia.

[ first published a version of this piece on February 6, 2026.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Myanmar¡¯²õ Elections and the Future of India¡¯²õ Act East Strategy appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Deluge of drought

The elections initially appeared to be a breath of fresh air for Bangladesh¡¯²õ politics, driven by the Gen Z revolution ¡ª also dubbed the ¡°monsoon uprising¡±. However, the momentum this revolution brought quickly faltered.

A dehydrated mandate, with heavyweight student coordinators who had held key positions, has shattered; it seems the fresh polish and the shine have both come off. The student-led National Citizen Party performed dismally in the recent elections, securing victory in only 6 of the 30 contested seats (20%). The defeat was exacerbated by the NCP¡¯²õ alliance with JIB, which proved suicidal due to the party¡¯²õ checkered past ¡ª particularly its role during Bangladesh¡¯²õ 1971 .

On top of this history, JIB has drawn a lot of for making derogatory and extremely vulgar comments against women. They have also faced grave of violence, intimidation, financial irregularities and a failure to provide safety, especially among minorities. These failures alienated many voters, shaped public perception and ultimately eroded the revolution¡¯²õ initial promise.

Alongside the general election, voters also cast their ballots in a national referendum on the , which was proposed following the ousting of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in July 2024. The charter was approved with 60.26% of the vote.

However, the modest turnout was a historic dwarf compared to the two previous referendums held in Bangladesh. In an interesting turn of events, the overwhelming majority of the freshly elected BNP Members of Parliament (MPs) boycotted the second parliamentary oath. This action followed their earlier of a note of dissent against the referendum¡¯²õ ratification, signaling deep divisions within the political elite. While the JIB and the NCP vowed to implement the reforms, they lack the clout in parliament to pass them.

A major bone of contention remains the constitution amendment, as the council that will oversee this reform will have a significant vacuum from the ruling dispensation, who may overturn it, resulting in a predicament.

Balancing the banker¡¯²õ book

The political turbulence intertwines with economic challenges. Nobel laureate Dr Muhammad Yunus, who was the epicenter of the previous 18-month interim government, faced from the sitting president, Mohammed Shahabuddin, for the grim state of affairs that prevailed during Dr Yunus¡¯²õ tenure. The president accused Yunus of being uninformed and deliberately obstructing key decisions, such as the trade tariff negotiations with the US ¡ª decisions carrying deep and significant ramifications for Bangladesh.

Bangladesh¡¯²õ ready-made garments industry, the backbone of its dollar cash crop, provides not only employment but empowerment, especially for women who play an active role in the vibrant Bengali social fabric. Any political formation aiming to alter and possibly marginalize this very significant section takes an enormous risk.

JIB also drew phenomenal criticism as they made about working women, which included comparing them to sex workers, proposing reduced working hours and hinting at the enactment of harsh Islamic laws if voted into power. JIB¡¯²õ blunder in not embracing gender equality directly antagonized students¡¯ aspirations.

With the (AL) suspended from political participation, an inclusive void prevailed, and JIP expected a monstrous verdict. However, the electorate did not play ball. Not only was the AL suspended from political participation, but the sitting Bangladeshi president also that, on the occasion of a royal invitation by the state of Qatar, his participation was blocked by design. Bangladesh had descended into a violent spiral of violence, arson, attacks targeting minorities, and an almost omnipresent law and order in the last 18 months following Sheikh Hasina¡¯²õ departure.

The role of the interim caretaker, in association with student minister designates, must be examined impartially, and the whole timeline needs a holistic, overarching inspection. If these acquisitions hold, then the ¡°banker of the poor¡± has much to disclose as to what transpired in the corridors of power in Dhaka. 

Collage of challenges

Prime Minister Tariq Rahman, returning after 17 years of self-imposed exile in London, faces a task if he wants to restore stability and usher in a new golden era for Bangladesh. He must also keep extremist elements at bay and avoid squandering the trust and faith his party has earned and paid for with blood.?

The BNP pledges to double the current decelerating economy to a trillion by 2030. Achieving this goal requires regional security, economic solidity and the restoration of peace in society. Tariq must leap onto an almost insolvent economic baton and propel it at lightning speed. International partnerships, with people-to-people contact as a core strategy, will be pivotal in this novel journey.?

Circumspection may prove a boon when expanding engagement with other neighbors and perceived friendly nations such as Pakistan and Turkey. It remains to be revealed which country Tariq will visit first after taking the oath, but for the moment, there seems to be a glimmer of optimism between the known ditch and the unknown deep blue bay.

[ edited this piece.]

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The post Bangladesh Post-Monsoon Uprising: A New Era of Political Change appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Post-election reform is the key concern for the new government following the transitional period. The BNP-led government is likely to face pressure and competition from conservative groups whose fortunes had increased during the interim period. Four challenges and key questions for the ruling party as they assume power are: the politics of memory involving imposing one memory over another, how reform mandates will be handled, negotiating the rise of Islamic right-wing identity politics, and managing geopolitics and foreign policy with pragmatism and multilateralism. Without setting up a clear ideological standpoint, however, it will be hard for the BNP to address these challenges.

New memory politics in the rebuilding process?

The politics of memory has been an important tool for identity formation, state-building and ideological reproduction amid a for legitimacy for many post-colonial states. In Bangladesh, the moralized binary between pro-liberation and anti-liberation entities served as a key factor in electoral politics for decades. This binary was not merely rhetorical but also instrumental to the constitutional self-description of the republic and the moral origin of the polity. Four fundamental principles of the constitution, viz. nationalism, secularism, democracy and socialism, were by the Liberation War of 1971.

Many argue that the moral binary of pro-liberation versus anti-liberation became a tool of political exclusion when the memory of liberation served as a credential for prolonged incumbency, thereby delegitimizing rivals. The memory of liberation was by certain key political parties to seek legitimacy for their leadership lineage. It also turned to excessive idolization and glorification centered on the memory of certain leaders to build political legitimacy. For instance, the AL cultivated a cult of personality to President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman¡¯²õ name in the collective memory of Bangladesh as the nation’s founding father.

In the recent election held in February 2026, the memory of 1971 was not a key factor, where neither the pro nor the anti-liberation narrative played a critical role, unlike previous polls. The spirit of the July revolution was incorporated into the NCP and the Jamaat¡¯²õ central moral vocabulary, shifting the narrative from 1971 as the moral origin of the state to 2024 as the ¡°true independence¡± of the country. While the NCP, represented by a segment of the youth, may not strongly with the sacrifices and memory of 1971, for Jamaat, this shift serves as an incentive, given the party¡¯²õ historical opposition to the independence movement. The BNP maintained a balanced position, upholding the July spirit without attempting to erase the memory and values of 1971.

The BNP, as a nationalist and centrist political actor that endorses nation-building with moderate Muslim ideals, has managed to establish itself as one of the two main political parties. Although Jamaat tried to itself as a ¡°moderate¡± Islamic party with democratic ideals, it also resorted to conservative politics to consolidate support. The use of religion for political gain, particularly playing the Islamic card for electoral currency, was highly visible.?

However, the electorate voted otherwise, giving a two-thirds majority to the BNP, which pledged to prioritize justice, the rule of law, human rights, women¡¯²õ safety and religious freedom. Overall, they voted for Tarique Rahman, who his vision for rebuilding the state with a curious slogan, ¡°I have a plan.¡± His vision of a ¡°new Bangladesh¡± entails a roadmap to create permanent employment for 40 million youth and several hundred thousand women.

What will be BNP¡¯²õ ideological standpoint on guiding the country after receiving a huge mandate following a period of transition? Will the party consider the July spirit as the singular guiding ideological force for the rebuilding process, or complement it with the values of 1971?

Reform: July Charter or 31-point???

The July Charter was of the post-uprising political settlement seeking comprehensive reforms and significant constitutional and political changes in the areas of elections, public administration, the police, the judiciary and government. The Charter, which was by the National Consensus Commission, provides frameworks of institutional reforms, including constraints on executive power, stronger judicial independence and a stronger parliamentary architecture.

While an inter-party consensus was finally after many rounds of discussions, certain parties opposed certain issues. For instance, the BNP was of changing the first-past-the-post system that larger parties like itself over proportional representation, which is better suited to multiparty democracy.?

As the referendum a ¡°YES¡± majority (held on the same day as the elections), the elected members of parliament will sit as members of the Constitutional Reform Council to implement the provisions of the Charter for a constitutional and institutional redesign within 180 working days. The BNP has its flagship 31-point reform agenda, which will a guiding force for governance and reform.

While the majority of the recommendations of the July charter with the party¡¯²õ reform agenda, the BNP is unlikely to grant the Charter a full constitutional status. The party a few ¡°notes of dissent¡± to the Charter before signing it, particularly on the points on the balance of power between the Prime Minister and the President, the legislative role of the upper house, setting up of an independent entity for certain appointments and the caretaker government mechanism. It remains to be seen how the BNP treats the July Charter vis-¨¤-vis its 31-point reform agenda and negotiates with the other political actors.

Identity: Can ¡°moderate Muslim¡± expression ensure inclusivity??

Post-election, BNP leaders have defined the victory as a mandate for ¡°liberal democracy¡±. The party¡¯²õ as a nationalist, and to some extent a centrist, force is likely to have brought relief that politics in Bangladesh might be governed in a more moderate manner, particularly on issues of women¡¯²õ rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties. The party to be the ¡°most progressive force¡± currently in the country amid the mainstreaming of religious-based politics and the political sidelining of the AL (although it should be noted that the BNP lacks ideological coherence where progressive, nationalist and even religious elements coexist).

The rise of Islamist parties, especially Jamaat, can be to extensive campaigning and mobilization. Jamaat¡¯²õ victories in student elections at several universities have its presence in these educational spaces and urban youth networks. In the absence of AL, Jamaat is likely to play a bigger role in the opposition arena through more confrontational politics. It will continue to project itself as different from patronage-based, nepotistic and elite-based politics associated with the BNP and the AL. Jamaat is also likely to continue stressing on its so-called moral conscience, discipline and guardianship of Islam in the country.?

While the BNP is likely to maintain its reputation as a moderate Muslim political entity, it remains to be seen how it would accommodate Jamaat and other Islamist parties in the country, and also serve the public who are ideologically, economically, socially and culturally diverse. The incoming government is expected to craft a clearer vision of a moderate Muslim majority democracy that does not undermine the Liberation War¡¯²õ plural foundation, let alone ¡°secularism.¡± At the same time, the BNP may also be required to give space to religious politics after gaining ground post-July.

Foreign policy: populism or pragmatism???

The BNP is known for its pragmatic statecraft, with experience in governing the nation and strong regional ties with neighbors. There has been a populist surge and temptation to use foreign policy as a domestic distraction by relations with New Delhi and ties with Islamabad. There are prevailing sentiments that bilateral relations between New Delhi and Dhaka were on the India-AL axis, where the AL New Delhi¡¯²õ security and strategic interests in return for patronage and legitimacy, thereby hindering the country from formulating a more balanced foreign policy.

Tarique Rahman has consistently advocated for a balanced diplomatic approach with major powers, including India, China, Pakistan and the West, through his ¡°Bangladesh First¡± policy. Many senior BNP leaders hold that a consistent foreign policy and disciplined statecraft are needed for stability in the Bay of Bengal, which depends less on slogans and more on multilateralism. However, pressure might from the opposition, such as Jamaat and the NCP, particularly on the issue of extraditing Sheikh Hasina from India.

Nonetheless, early signs of a diplomatic reset, such as consular services that were suspended under the interim government, indicate the BNP¡¯²õ willingness to restore relations with New Delhi. As the reform clock has started ticking during this pivotal period, the BNP must focus on the immediate rebuilding process without losing sight of the ideological compass. The hope is that, in his first post-election press address, the prime minister hinted at national unity and promised reconciliation through the rule of law.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Mandate for Reform, Battle for Identity: Bangladesh After the Election appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Among the reported cases is the of Dipu Chandra Das, a 29-year-old garment factory worker, who was lynched by a mob in the northern district of Mymensingh, following what police described as false blasphemy allegations. Local media reported he was tied to a tree and set on fire. In a separate incident in the same district, Bajendra Biswas, a 40-year-old paramilitary officer, was by unidentified assailants.?

Elsewhere, Khokon Chandra Das, a 50-year-old businessman in Shariatpur district in central Bangladesh, was by a group of men armed with sharp weapons. He was beaten, set on fire and died in hospital three days after the assault, according to media reports.?

In Jessore district in southern Bangladesh, Rana Pratap Bairagi, a 45-year-old businessman and a newspaper editor, was in the head, with the attackers also slitting his throat.?

Other incidents include the to death of Sarat Mani Chakraborty, a 40-year-old grocery shop owner in Narsingdi district in central Bangladesh, and the to death of Samir Das, a 28-year-old auto-rickshaw driver in Feni district in the country¡¯²õ southeast.?

All the victims identified in the incidents were members of the Hindu community, Bangladesh¡¯²õ largest religious minority, which comprises around of the population according to the 2022 national census.

Post Hasina unrest

Bangladesh experienced a wave of following the ouster of longtime Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on August 5, 2024, amid student-led protests that led to her . Amnesty International that, in the immediate aftermath, houses, places of worship and business establishments belonging to religious minorities were attacked in various parts of the country.

Local media outlets widespread vandalism, looting and arson targeting Hindu temples, houses and businesses. Reports also emerged of beatings, sexual assaults and killings involving members of the Hindu and Christian community, with the BHBCUC warning that many families were left displaced and without livelihoods. Members of the Ahmadiyya community, a minority sect within Islam, were also subjected to attacks, according to rights organizations and media reports.?

Community groups, including the BHBCUC and the Bangladesh Puja Udjapan Parishad (BPUP), at least 205 incidents targeting minority communities across 52 districts in the days following the fall of Hasina¡¯²õ government. Media reports from August 2024 documented damage to 228 Hindu homes, 240 Hindu-owned businesses and 15 temples. According to , these figures are most likely an undercount because they reflected only incidents reported to authorities or covered by the media.?

The BHBCUC said that at least incidents of communal violence were reported across the country between August 4 and 20, 2024.?

In a public statement, India deep concern for what it describes as the ¡°unremitting hostility against minorities in Bangladesh, including Hindus, Buddhists and Christians at the hands of extremists¡±.?

While the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus has described the violence as largely political, the nature of many attacks suggests a more complex picture. Numerous incidents involved the vandalism of Hindu temples, the burning of homes identified by religious symbols and lynchings following allegations of blasphemy. 

The United Nations Human Rights Office () noted that religious identity and communal tensions, in addition to political affiliation, have played a role in the violence. According to the UN report, witnesses to some of the incidents have identified the attackers as local supporters of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party () and , two major political forces in the country. In one documented case, a victim told investigators that local BNP leaders were among those involved in the attack.

Background and contested histories of the two main political parties

Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat) has a long and controversial history marked by religious extremism and political violence. Founded in 1941 in Lahore, British-ruled India (now in Pakistan), the party aimed to advance an explicitly Islamic social and political order across the subcontinent.  

In Pakistan, Jamaat played a central role in the anti-Ahmadiyya agitation called the in 1953, which resulted in widespread violence and the deaths of an estimated 2000 people, according to some historians.

Jamaat had opposed the of 1971 and aligned itself with the Pakistani Army, assisting its campaign against the independence movement. Scholars and human rights organizations have documented that Jamaat-linked militias collaborated in widespread abuses during the conflict, including the selective and targeted killing of Bengali Hindus and Bengali intellectuals, irrespective of religion. These crimes formed part of a broader campaign of mass violence that many scholars and international observers have as genocidal, in which up to three million people are estimated to have died and millions more displaced or injured.

In Pakistan, Jamaat subsequently supported General ¡¯²õ program following the military overthrow of Prime Minister in 1977.

Founded in 1979, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) identifies itself as a nationalist rather than an Islamist party. However, critics have long pointed to its with Islamist groups, most notably with , which helped mainstream religious discourse in its politics. In 1977, during the presidency of , the Party¡¯²õ founder, Bangladesh¡¯²õ constitution was to remove ¡°secularism¡± as a foundational principle of the state.

Reports and judicial probing have linked supporters and leaders of the BNP-led coalition and its Jamaat allies with targeted violence against religious minorities, including killings, rape, arson and looting in the aftermath of the 2001 elections in Bangladesh.

As Bangladesh is preparing for general elections scheduled for February 12, the future of the country¡¯²õ religious minorities remains uncertain. 

The BNP and Jamaat have emerged as two of the principal forces seeking to shape the post-election landscape. For the first time in its history, Jamaat has a candidate from the Hindu community. The BNP, meanwhile, has sought to project a secular-friendly image ahead of the elections. However, the historical record of both parties and recurring episodes of minority-targeted violence raise concerns about minority protection in Bangladesh.

Whether a future government led by either formation will demonstrate the political will to ensure minority protection and systemic justice in Bangladesh remains an open question.

[ first published this piece.]

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The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Bangladesh Heads to the Polls as Minorities Face an Uncertain Future appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Just over three years on, Anwar¡¯²õ has defied the unforgiving math of Malaysian politics that felled his reformist predecessors ¡ª notably the PH administration that collapsed after only 22 months in 2020 ¡ª by holding together an unlikely government. This very survival, however, is now shaped by the unresolved politics surrounding former Prime Minister Najib Razak¡¯²õ corruption convictions and the challenge of managing an unstable, ideologically divided government coalition.

A constructive course correction is therefore no longer optional. If Anwar¡¯²õ so-called hopes to turn mere political survival into credible reform, the next two years will be decisive, as it demands tougher handling of corruption-linked politics and firmer control over a shaky governing coalition before Malaysia enters the runway toward the next general election due in 2028.

Razak¡¯²õ corruption convictions and the political cost of reform

As the President of the ruling People¡¯²õ Justice Party (PKR), Anwar rose to power on a reform-leaning, anti-graft platform, but his government¡¯²õ moral authority has been dented whenever rule-of-law principles appear hostage to coalition politics. Nothing captures this dilemma more clearly than the ongoing saga of Najib. He remains imprisoned for , but over the years, the party he once led, UMNO, has openly advocated .

Najib¡¯²õ corruption controversy began with the creation and control of the state-owned development fund 1Malaysia Development Berhad () to attract investment and drive economic growth, which later became the center of one of the world¡¯²õ largest financial scandals, exposing of more than $4.5 billion between 2009 and 2014. The former chairman of BN was convicted in July 2020 on multiple charges linked to SRC International, a former 1MDB subsidiary. He began serving a 12-year prison sentence in August 2022 after exhausting his appeals.

In February 2024, Najib was surprisingly granted a partial by then Malaysian King Abdullah of Pahang, with the Pardons Board halving his sentence to six years and reducing his fine from 210 million ringgit ($44.5 million) to 50 million ringgit ($10.8 million), though it stopped short of granting his release. Subsequently, Najib applied for in April 2024; the High Court rejected the request in July 2024, and the matter was appealed.

The issue came to a head in December 2025, when the High Court not only Najib¡¯²õ audacious bid to serve his sentence under house arrest but, days later, him in the main 1MDB trial of four counts of abuse of power and 21 counts of money laundering, sentencing him to 15 years¡¯ imprisonment and imposing fines totalling 11.4 billion ringgit ($2.8 billion).?

Although Najib has both his conviction and sentence, the rulings affirm that Malaysia¡¯²õ courts are prepared to hold even former prime ministers to account. Regardless, the political storm surrounding it highlighted the pressure on Anwar¡¯²õ unity government ¡ª and the perception of wavering commitment to reform.?

UMNO¡¯²õ reaction to its long-time president¡¯²õ courtroom defeat was , as several senior figures denounced the decision as an affront to Malay royal authority and called for the party to withdraw from Anwar¡¯²õ governing coalition. Such rhetoric laid bare the coalition¡¯²õ fault line that is rehabilitating its patronage networks, whereas Anwar¡¯²õ PH camp is rooted in promises of clean governance.

Now, fortunately for Anwar, pressure over Najib has not coalesced into a unified offensive from the main opposition. The National Alliance () ¡ª anchored by its core parties, Malaysian United Indigenous Party (Bersatu) and Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), and supported by smaller partners such as Malaysian People¡¯²õ Movement Party (Gerakan), and Malaysian Indian People¡¯²õ Party (MIPP) ¡ª has mixed positions and thus failed to form a coherent position on Najib¡¯²õ prosecutions.

Some leaders within PN have invoked regarding the royal prerogative, while others have been about any posture that could be read as defending a figure emblematic of 1MDB-era corruption. The divide arguably exposes a deeper clash between PAS¡¯²õ Islamist orientation and Bersatu¡¯²õ Malay-primacy nationalism ¡ª a party born of UMNO defections in 2016 ¡ª by unresolved questions over PN¡¯²õ leadership and prime ministerial direction that leaves the coalition unable to sustain a unified line on Najib.

The sharpest political pressure on Anwar, consequently, has come not from the opposition benches but from inside his , where latent tensions between and PH¡¯²õ Democratic Action Party () continue to test the limits of ideological coexistence over issues of reform priorities. And this emphasizes that Najib ¡ª after a nine-year Malaysian premiership ¡ª still over Malaysian politics. Yet, he serves not as a rallying cause so much as a fault line that reveals over accountability and power.

Caught in the middle, Anwar tried to the fray ¡ª reiterating that he does not interfere in court cases and that due process must run its course. He formally kept his , but his cautious silence on UMNO¡¯²õ was widely interpreted as ambivalence and not neutrality.

Many reform-minded Malaysians who voted for change in 2022 expected Anwar to firmly reject any backroom deals for Najib or other kleptocrats. Instead, they witnessed prosecutors under Anwar¡¯²õ watch drop or defer cases involving high-profile UMNO-related figures, most notably Deputy Prime Minister and BN Chairman and , the wife of Najib Razak.

Anwar, in reclaiming the reform narrative, must reassert an unambiguous doctrine of noninterference and institutional reform. The Prime Minister should publicly affirm that coalition politics will not dictate the fate of corruption cases ¡ª no matter who is implicated. Beyond statements, his government needs to accelerate structural changes that insulate the rule of law from political bargains.

The reality, however, is less forgiving. Reformist governments are judged most harshly when their own allies, rather than their opponents, put their principles to the test. For Anwar¡¯²õ administration, these commitments must therefore be implemented in the years ahead, specifically in 2026, if the Madani government is to regain some of the reformist credibility that the compromises of coalition governance have clouded.

Balancing power in a diverse, fragile coalition

Holding together a diverse coalition has been Anwar¡¯²õ most notable achievement, but it has come at the expense of reform momentum, as 2025 showed. The year saw the prime minister navigating a series of political aftershocks, from state election setbacks to cabinet infighting, which he addressed through tactical concessions that, to critics, looked more like than transforming it.

The clearest example came from the Sabah state election in November 2025, a regional poll that delivered a sharp to Anwar¡¯²õ federal alliance. PH ¡ª comprising PKR, DAP and the National Trust Party ¡ª along with its national partners, won only one of the 20 seats it contested in the Sabah assembly.

Voters in Sabah gravitated toward local parties running on ¡°¡± platforms that reflect grievances about neglect and unmet promises of autonomy. And although an Anwar-aligned local coalition, GRS, retained control of the state, it did so strictly on . The October 2025 Kota Kinabalu High Court only hardened these attitudes by giving legal weight to Sabah¡¯²õ claims of fiscal marginalization, turning autonomy demands into a concrete constitutional grievance that sharpened voter skepticism and raised the political cost for Anwar¡¯²õ federal government of deferring reform.

Anwar¡¯²õ response, thereafter, was a long-anticipated in mid-December 2025, framed as a refresh to improve economic delivery but ultimately amounting to coalition maintenance. Several vacancies had opened up after two Anwar prot¨¦g¨¦s ¡ª Economy Minister Rafizi Ramli and Natural Resources Minister Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad ¡ª in May 2025 following defeats in PKR¡¯²õ party leadership elections, while Entrepreneur and Cooperative Development Minister Ewon Benedick in November 2025 in protest over the federal government¡¯²õ stance on Sabah¡¯²õ revenue entitlement, giving the prime minister an opportunity to rebalance portfolios among coalition allies.

The reshuffle brought in a Federal Territories Minister, , from DAP ¡ª a predominantly Malaysian Chinese, urban-based party ¡ª likely to shore up the urban non-Malay base in the federal territories of Kuala Lumpur, Labuan and Putrajaya, even as it drew from Malay nationalists.?

More notably, Anwar increased by appointing Natural Resources Minister Arthur Joseph Kurup, along with Sabah and Sarawak Affairs Minister Mustapha Sakmud, as part of following PH¡¯²õ poor performance in the recent 17th Sabah state election. Likewise, to consolidate support ahead of the 20th Sarawak state election, expected by early 2027, GPS now holds five cabinet posts and six deputy ministerial posts, in which Anwar¡¯²õ configuration is designed to project federal attentiveness to . Together with parallel adjustments involving Sabah and Sarawak, these moves strengthen Anwar¡¯²õ message that East Malaysian partners remain critical to keeping the coalition together.

Yet despite replacing more than a third of his cabinet, Anwar, as PH Chairman, was careful to keep each coalition partner¡¯²õ share of power intact. His original political home, UMNO ¡ª the Malay-centric party and strongman of Malaysian politics ¡ª retained , including several key ministerial portfolios, in return for its continued loyalty.?

Far from reset, the reshuffle amounted to little more than political , with changes largely confined to swapping positions rather than direction that prioritized coalition balance and stability, as well as projected confidence in Anwar¡¯²õ existing team, over any decisive shift in policy. This approach speaks to Anwar¡¯²õ overarching strategy since consolidating power in 2023, which prioritizes coalition survival over potentially divisive reforms. It has worked, insofar as the unity government still stands and even looks relatively stable heading into 2026.

What¡¯²õ next for Anwar Ibrahim¡¯²õ unity government?

As 2025 draws to a close, Anwar has demonstrated that the Madani government can survive the rough math of coalition politics, but it remains an open question whether it can inspire the confidence of a truly reformist government.

The next major tests of coalition cohesion ¡ª and by extension, the unity government¡¯²õ durability ¡ª loom over the next two years. The calendar opens with in January 2026, including the Sabah state seat of Lamag and the federal seat of Kinabatangan. These contests will then give way to full state polls, with the Sarawak state election due by 2027, followed by by February 2027 and by June 2027, collectively placing sustained pressure on the governing coalition as it defends its unity across multiple political fronts.

And for Anwar, the good news is that he enters this electoral cycle from a position of relative strength, as the opposition remains mired in . PN enters 2026 in disarray, following former Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin¡¯²õ (2020-2021) resignation ¡ª effective January 2026 ¡ª as the coalition¡¯²õ chairman, and the departures of several senior leaders, which together created a .?

The recent Perlis and unresolved arguments over leadership succession and ideological direction have aggravated rivalry between Bersatu and PAS. And that dysfunction sharply limits its capacity to challenge Anwar¡¯²õ government, which would tilt the political terrain in his favor ahead of the coming state elections.

Regardless of the opposition¡¯²õ weakness, Anwar¡¯²õ more immediate risk lies within his own coalition. Its internal contradictions have repeatedly slowed or blunted the reform agenda Malaysians were promised. Anwar¡¯²õ to reach the premiership has equipped him with political resilience, but staying power alone will not carry him through the next electoral cycle.?

If reforms continue to stall and state-level losses mount, partner confidence could erode, raising the political costs of inaction. With the 16th General Election due by February 2028 and political positioning accelerating by 2027, his legitimacy will hinge less on survival than on visible delivery.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Malaysia¡¯²õ Anwar Ibrahim Struggles With Reform Politics in Unstable Coalition appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Across Myanmar¡¯²õ hills and plains, life is now measured by absence. Since the 2021 coup, more than people have been killed and over 3.5 million displaced. Nearly half the population has fallen into poverty. According to the United Nations, nearly 22 million people require humanitarian assistance. Hunger and disease are no longer byproducts of war; they are its instruments.

As if human cruelty were insufficient, nature delivered its own verdict.?In March 2025, a powerful struck central Myanmar, killing thousands and leaving tens of thousands without shelter. The disaster exposed what politics had already destroyed: a hollow state incapable of protecting its people.

In the aftermath of such devastation, the ongoing violence only deepens the tragedy the nation faces. Another hospital burns. Another report is filed, marking the attack on a healthcare facility. Thirty-three dead. Twenty wounded. The numbers arrive already fatigued, stripped of urgency by repetition. The head of the World Health Organization says he is appalled. He must say this. The world nods, as it must. Indignation has become ritual ¡ª performed, recorded, forgotten. In a country long isolated, atrocity has become routine, and routine has become silence.

The illusion of order

This paralysis did not emerge by accident. It was engineered.

Civilian supremacy has been deferred since 2008, when the constitution guaranteed the military of parliamentary seats ¡ª enough to veto any reform. Elections are not a step forward; they are a mechanism to preserve that design?and block any genuine federal future.

When the generals seized power, they did not merely overturn the 2020 election; they replaced legitimacy with procedure. They appointed an election commission of former generals and prepared a vote meant not to reflect the people, but to exhaust them.

To recover the appearance of order, the generals an election on December 28. An election that the United Nations calls ¡°.¡± The big question is whether the world will pretend otherwise. It will take place under state-controlled media and laws so severe that dissent no longer risks prison alone, but erasure. Even then, thousands remain incarcerated for resistance. President Win Myint is still behind bars. Former State Counsellor of Myanmar Aung San Suu Kyi remains imprisoned, her party dissolved, her voice extinguished. Power, when it fears the people, does not persuade. It confines.

The cost of moral symbols

There is a private irony in this repression. Two leaders I once met ¡ª Imran Khan and Suu Kyi ¡ª now share the same fate: confinement imposed by regimes that claim stability. I remember my 30-minute interview with Suu Kyi in 2012. She was razor-focused, her eyes fixed on mine, listening with a meditation-like intensity. She was intelligent, already familiar with my country¡¯²õ history, noting that her Oxford classmate was the sister of Sri Lanka¡¯²õ former president Chandrika Bandaranaike, and shared reflections on Sri Lankan politics.

She asked pointed questions about our three-decade civil war. Then she asked, ¡°How old were you when your father was killed?¡± I replied, ¡°16.¡± She said, ¡°I was only 2. See, we have something in common. Both our parents were killed.¡± She paused and then asked, ¡°So, have you forgiven the killers? Isn¡¯t that reconciliation?¡± She spoke quietly of patience and moral clarity, yet warned that reconciliation in Myanmar is uniquely difficult, especially among its fractured ethnic groups.

History answered otherwise, and her later silence during the Rohingya atrocities revealed a harsher truth: even moral symbols fracture when trapped inside the machinery of the state.

A crisis without borders

Myanmar¡¯²õ democratic failure does not stop at its borders. It spills outward ¡ª into Thailand through narcotics and scam networks, into Bangladesh through the displacement of more than a Rohingya and across the region through an instability no wall can contain.

Above this suffering, the great powers calculate. Roads, pipelines and corridors thread through the Kachin and Shan States as part of the China¨CMyanmar Economic Corridor (). Geography, for Beijing, is destiny: access to the Indian Ocean and control over essential to modern technology. Much of these deposits lie in areas controlled by resistance groups such as the Kachin Independence Organization.?I trace this strategic geography in my forthcoming book, .?For China, they are a necessity. For Washington, they are supply chains. , too, explores quiet ties with the Kachin Independence Army.?Even principles bend when rare-earth minerals promise power and profit.

What peace would actually require

Yet calculation alone cannot end a civil war of this depth. A sustainable peace in Myanmar demands more than condemnation or convenience; it requires a disciplined, four-pronged effort. First, inclusive political dialogue is essential: any settlement must bring together the military, representative civilian leadership such as the National Unity Government, ethnic armed organizations and civil society. Dialogue must move beyond the Association of Southeast Asian Nations¡¯ (ASEAN) limited consensus toward a genuine federal arrangement, anchored in constitutional guarantees and a credible framework for transitional justice.

Second, international pressure and accountability must shift the junta¡¯²õ calculus. Targeted sanctions on military revenue, arms embargoes, protection for political prisoners and sustained humanitarian corridors are instruments of restraint. Accountability for war crimes is not a moral luxury; it is a condition for peace.

Third, regional mediation must be strengthened. ASEAN, supported by India, China and Japan, can facilitate ceasefires, transitional talks and confidence-building measures ¡ª if sovereignty is no longer used as a shield against human suffering.

Fourth, grassroots reconciliation and economic stabilization must anchor peace where it matters most: addressing ethnic grievances, restoring basic services, enabling the return of displaced families and rebuilding livelihoods. Federalism, tailored to local realities, remains the only architecture capable of holding this fractured country together.

The United States speaks of human rights. It sanctions, freezes funds and finances aid. Yet words without leverage resemble lamps in a storm ¡ª visible, but cold. A regime that controls only fragments of its territory and depends increasingly on Beijing is not a partner; it is a liability. Pragmatism, whether under a Trump administration or any other, may offer clarity ¡ª but only if paired with engagement.

Gregory B. Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argues that Myanmar¡¯²õ best future lies in a truly capable of toppling the military regime or forcing it to the negotiating table.?To reach that future, the United States must engage rather than isolate, countering the junta¡¯²õ drift toward Russia and China.

The people of Myanmar are not variables in a strategic equation. They are bodies broken by bombs, families uprooted by fear, survivors of earthquakes and artillery alike. Any policy that discounts their suffering is not realism; it is cruelty disguised as strategy.

In the ruined towns and shattered valleys of Myanmar, one question persists ¡ª quiet and unforgiving: will the world act as guardian or spectator? Peace cannot be declared in isolation. It must be built through restraint, solidarity and the refusal to exchange human suffering for advantage. If the great powers fail this test, Myanmar will stand as a monument ¡ª not to ambition, but to the world¡¯²õ choice to look away.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Reconciliation in a Broken State ¡ª Myanmar¡¯²õ Civil War and the Illusion of Elections appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The have drastically altered the legislative landscape, significantly strengthening Milei¡¯²õ position. LLA secured 13 of the 24 contested Senate seats and 64 of the 127 lower-house seats. This marks a substantial gain, as before the elections, his party held only six Senate seats and 30 seats in the lower house. Although it does not hold an outright majority, the LLA is now the most powerful minority bloc in Congress.

These gains are relevant because his prior , characterized by radical spending cuts and deregulation, faced various political obstacles, including opposition lawmakers who overturned his vetoes of bills to increase funding for state universities, people with disabilities and children¡¯²õ healthcare.

The enhanced representation in Congress will make it easier for Milei to push ahead with his controversial program to slash state spending and deregulate the economy. Financial markets rallied following Milei¡¯²õ victory, seeing it as a sign that his political survival has kept his economic experiment ¡ª and crucial ¡ª alive. With stronger congressional support, he is likely to implement more radical changes ahead of the 2027 presidential election.

The context of Milei¡¯²õ endorsement

Milei¡¯²õ victory in the midterms came two years into his presidency. Radical spending cuts and free-market reforms have defined his administration. He pledged to shrink state spending by taking a to it, and has since cut budgets for education, pensions, health, infrastructure and subsidies, in addition to laying off tens of thousands of public-sector workers.

The support for Milei, even amidst the painful austerity, is rooted in a deep dissatisfaction with previous governments and a desire for an end to decades of economic mismanagement.

The midterm election result shows that many Argentines remain unwilling to return to the model (which called for the state to take a leading role in the economy to ensure cooperation between businesses and labor). Milei blames this model for the country¡¯²õ long history of economic woes. Before Milei took office, inflation had hit annually, and the country was experiencing a profound economic crisis.

Supporters, including US President Donald Trump, credit Milei with taming inflation, cutting the deficit and restoring investor confidence. The elections were significantly marked by the intervention of Trump, who, in a late-September social media post, publicly conditioned a promised US financial lifeline for Argentina on Milei maintaining political momentum and winning the elections. This threat, wielded against a precarious and heavily indebted economy, served as a powerful form of through financial pressure.

Voters¡¯ apathy helped Milei¡¯²õ political coalition. The for the election was 67.9%, the lowest in a national election in decades, suggesting widespread apathy toward politicians across the spectrum. Some voters ¡ª hardcore Milei libertarians, swing voters seeking stability and anti-Peronist urban professionals ¡ª backed Milei reluctantly, believing the country is on the right path to the desired economic stability. 

The painful price of austerity

Milei¡¯²õ favorable midterm election, however, is not a universal endorsement of his policies, which have come at a heavy cost. Critics argue that the price of his austerity has been high with social hardship, rising debt and threats of cuts in essential services. 

Retirees, people with disabilities and young people are particularly affected by the pension cuts and job losses that Milei¡¯²õ austerity has inflicted. With budget cuts, the public services, among the best in Latin America, are crumbling.

Concerns exist that essential funding laws for people with disabilities, which Milei previously vetoed, could again be ¡°in danger¡± with his strengthened position. The vetoes of bills boosting funding for state universities and children¡¯²õ healthcare have also been contentious. Despite the promise of ¡°financial freedom,¡± household debt for daily necessities is at a record high, with out of ten Argentine families taking on debt to cover basic necessities. In 2021, this scenario was milder, with out of ten experiencing financial stress.

The question going forward is whether the general population will start to feel better off, or if the ongoing pain of some of his budget cuts will test people¡¯²õ patience once more. For now, an important proportion of voters have shown they are prepared to give him more time.

Weak opposition

In the midterm election, the Peronists, the left-leaning group that dominated national politics in Argentina since the country¡¯²õ democratization in the 1980s, under the electoral coalition Fuerza Patria (FP), failed to enlarge their congressional seats in both houses. With almost of the total votes, FP maintained the same number of seats in the Senate, nine seats in total, and reduced their presence in the lower house by three seats, holding a total of 47 seats.

This electoral failure followed a resounding Peronist victory in Buenos Aires¡¯ provincial legislature election in September, where FP won roughly of the vote. This optimistic result for FP proved misleading; metropolitan Buenos Aires, the largest electoral college in the country with 17.5 million voters, does not reflect the national mood. In effect, Milei¡¯²õ rise to power comes from his large support from the countryside and such as Cordoba and Santa Fe.

FP¡¯²õ difficulty in resonating with the wide variety of voters in Argentina outside Buenos Aires has weakened the coalition¡¯²õ opposition to Milei in Congress. With their legislative power diminished, the Peronists¡¯ primary opposition to Milei will now likely shift decisively from Congress to the streets, setting the stage for a period of heightened social conflict alongside radical legislative change.

Known for its mobilizing capacity, Peronists will likely exert further pressure on Milei by protests and strikes. They have already been doing this, but until now, the main opposition was exercised by blocking or striking down Milei¡¯²õ legislative actions.

A deepening democratic erosion

Milei won because voters prefer painful liberalization to a return to failed Peronist governance, and because international financial pressure and political fragmentation helped sustain his political coalition. But this choice comes at a high price: the acceleration of democratic erosion.

According to the , Argentina has suffered a long-term erosion of democratic checks and balances, with legislative and judicial constraints on the executive weakening since the early 2000s ¡ª a decline that began under prior Peronist administrations. Under Milei, however, this trend has sharply accelerated, marked by severe declines in executive oversight and respect for constitutional norms.

His renewed electoral mandate is likely to deepen this deterioration, further strengthening the presidency at the expense of other institutions and hastening the decline of judicial independence and democratic accountability.

This congressional empowerment also arrives as Milei faces a critical test of institutional integrity: that his sister and Chief of Staff, Karina Milei, received kickbacks from a pharmaceutical company. In a climate where economic outcomes dominate political conversations, such ethical dimensions risk being overshadowed, signaling how public institutions can be captured by private interests and deepening the process of democratic decline.

In the current scenario, the 2027 election appears favorable to Milei¡¯²õ reelection. His radical discourse, disregard for institutional checks and close alignment with Donald Trump strengthen his position against any opposition candidate. If his austerity program succeeds in delivering economic stability, a significant share of Argentines seems willing to tolerate it ¡ª even at the cost of further democratic erosion.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Milei¡¯²õ Midterm Victory: Endorsing Austerity, Eroding Democracy? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

This seemingly contradicts the narrative that Bitcoin, as digital gold, will outperform spot-traded gold in the long run. After all, since the launch of spot-traded Bitcoin Exchange-Traded Fund (ETFs) in early 2024, they have outpaced gold¡¯²õ capital inflows on multiple occasions.

As of September, there is $166 billion worth of BTC in ETFs, with gold ETFs holding more than double that at around $407 billion. But the question is, does the accelerated interest in the ancient metal constitute a short-term macro phenomenon, or a failure of Bitcoin¡¯²õ long-term store-of-value thesis?

Why is gold up again?

Many analysts attribute gold¡¯²õ rise to the Federal Reserve, the world¡¯²õ de facto central bank that maintains the dollar as the world¡¯²õ reserve currency. But that is only a part of the picture. The underlying driver of gold¡¯²õ price is actually the prevailing political system across the world: democracy. Democracies have embedded social contracts in which governments provide for their citizens¡¯ welfare to win elections. In that pursuit, the feasibility of providing welfare becomes a distant concern. Instead, such a system creates an inescapable incentive structure for persistent fiscal spending on social programs, healthcare, defense and infrastructure. 

By default, political candidates who fail to ratchet such spending become less competitive than those who promise the world. The United States Government (USG) spent in fiscal 2024, of which 54% ended in welfare spending and 13% on national defense. In turn, the nation¡¯²õ economic model became debt-powered.

To put it differently, the US has found itself in a permanent state of budgetary deficits. After President Trump¡¯²õ One Big Beautiful Bill Act (Public Law 119-21), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) expects a cumulative deficit to $4.1 trillion over a ten-year period. For fiscal 2025 alone, CBO forecasts a budgetary deficit of $1.9 trillion.

By 2033, it is expected that the Social Security Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) will be insolvent. This may seem bleak, but USG is in a unique position. As a hegemonic empire that transcends mere nations, the USG is not constrained in the same way as an ordinary nation-state.

Namely, it issues the world¡¯²õ primary reserve currency, the dollar, giving it an exorbitant privilege: the ability to finance deficits by exporting dollars abroad. This ensures that demand for US debt remains robust, at least until confidence in the dollar erodes.

Accordingly, this dynamic runs as follows:

• Mass democracy institutionalizes spending irrespective of fiscal realities.
• Politicians, incentivized by elections, rely on the Federal Reserve to perpetuate a debt-driven economy.
• This process ensures the structural debasement of the dollar.
• Yet, US hegemonic power cushions the fallout, allowing the cycle to persist far longer than it otherwise could.

Even more ominously, this dynamic incentivizes politicians to import an entire new voting bloc in the hopes of rapidly expanding the population to keep servicing the ballooning debt. But now that the US labor market is weak, having been recently revised downward by a record-breaking , the Fed¡¯²õ interest rate-cutting regime is a near-certainty.

That¡¯²õ because the Fed needs to stimulate the economy by making capital cheaper. However, lower interest rates reduce the of Treasuries as dollar-denominated assets. Consequently, investors are starting to shift out of cash and bonds into assets that hold value when real yields drop, such as gold.

Investors are increasingly seeking value in gold

When the USG runs budget deficits persistently, spending more than it collects in taxes, it issues Treasury bonds as a way to borrow money. In turn, it has to enormous interest on the debt, having exceeded $1 trillion in Q4 2023.

In fact, for federal spending in fiscal 2025, net interest payments national defense expenditures, at 14% vs 13% of the total budget, respectively. This means that the nation¡¯²õ economy is drastically losing its capacity for productive growth, as the bulk of capital is drained into debt obligations. Yet, those debt obligations are critical to maintain as they form the basis for investors¡¯ confidence in the dollar and the buying of debt as Treasuries.?

Now, what happens when deficits balloon, but there aren¡¯t enough buyers at reasonable interest rates? At this time, the Federal Reserve steps in by purchasing Treasuries directly or indirectly, thus expanding its balance sheet.

Consequently, as the monetary base is expanded, people can buy less with the dollar than they could previously. Commonly, this is referred to as inflation, which is effectively another informal tax as a consequence of government spending. 

Ultimately, even with US hegemonic status, the dollar steadily erodes as a reliable measure of value. Its role as the global anchor weakens, not through sudden collapse, but through the slow grind of inflation, a hidden levy on all dollar holders. This is precisely why investors turn to gold: it stands outside the cycle of deficits, debt monetization and political expediency. Anticipating this unsustainable trajectory, other central banks keep accumulating gold. We are now at a tipping point at which foreign central banks are about to more gold than Treasuries.

Of course, given the scarcity of gold in the Earth¡¯²õ crust, at around , it stands to reason that continued central bank accumulation will keep driving its price higher. Unlike the dollar, whose supply can be conjured at will by Federal Reserve bureaucrats tapping a keyboard, the supply of gold is bound by geology, and there is no alchemy to expand it. This immutable scarcity is what underpins gold¡¯²õ value, and it is precisely this logic that Bitcoin was designed to replicate in the digital realm.

Bitcoin¡¯²õ counterweight in a debt-soaked world

Gold enjoys a legacy momentum. The precious metal has served as money for thousands of years and permeates every nook and cranny of monetary storytelling. This is in stark contrast with the novel Bitcoin, barely 16 years old, still struggling against perception and regulatory headwinds. Moreover, while retail investors do buy gold, its price is largely driven by institutional actors such as central banks, sovereign wealth funds, commercial banks, asset managers and hedge funds.

Conversely, Bitcoin started bottom up from enthusiastic cypherpunks with libertarian leanings:

• They kept mining and transacting BTC when it had little or no fiat value.?
• They kept evangelizing through forums, conferences, and writings.
• They pushed the BTC narrative as a true monetary alternative after the 2008 financial crisis.

This cypherpunk-libertarian vanguard erected an entire digital economy, as Bitcoin birthed the altcoin sector. Suffice to say, their success has proven extraordinary, as evidenced by Bitcoin¡¯²õ yearly returns.

However, as Bitcoin¡¯²õ price kept rising, especially after the $100k milestone, a psychological barrier was erected for new investors. With a market cap of $2.28 trillion, it is no longer easy to move its price, which means outsized gains are no longer likely compared to prior years. Considering that gold enjoys greater institutional engagement compared to Bitcoin, it is easy to see why gold would outperform Bitcoin this year. Or would it?

There are multiple fundamental advantages of Bitcoin over gold:

• Bitcoin is both natively digital and physical, given that its proof-of-work network is secured by real assets: energy and mining machines.
• Bitcoin¡¯²õ 21 million fixed scarcity is greater than gold¡¯²õ pseudo-scarcity, with new veins discovered almost on a monthly basis.
• Bitcoin lacks the physical bottlenecks of mining and storage.
• As natively digital, it can be used more effectively as an anchor for the digital economy and across various blockchain networks.

Case in point, publicly traded companies have accumulated over BTC as part of their treasuries. Bitcoin not only serves as an inflation hedge but also as a way to expand companies¡¯ financial flexibility, typically as collateral to raise funds.?

So far, MicroStrategy (MSTR) has been the most successful in this effort, but this is likely only the beginning of the trend. In the long run, even if retail investors begin to favor cheaper altcoins, BTC¡¯²õ yearly gains are likely to outpace gold because its market cap is only ~9.2% of gold¡¯²õ.

Moreover, the vast majority of altcoins tend to lose value as new ones enter the market, whereas institutional Bitcoin inflows ¡ª beyond spot-traded ETFs ¡ª are only starting to accelerate, signaling a structural shift in adoption. 

The bottom line

While gold¡¯²õ 2025 outperformance may grab headlines, it largely reflects short-term institutional positioning, macro-driven flight from fiat debasement and the legacy momentum of a millennia-old asset.

Bitcoin, by contrast, embodies the long-term principles that gold can only approximate: absolute scarcity, borderless digital utility and an immutable decentralized ledger immune to political cycles. Moreover, its adoption is no longer limited to cypherpunks. Corporations and sophisticated investors increasingly recognize Bitcoin as both a treasury asset and a strategic hedge against fiat debasement.

Ultimately, as the digital economy expands and the limitations of gold¡¯²õ physical supply become more apparent, Bitcoin¡¯²õ relatively small market cap is not just to match, but eventually surpass gold¡¯²õ long-term store-of-value performance as the more enduring form of money.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Why is Gold Outperforming Bitcoin in 2025? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

If the Democratic Party keeps treating the younger generation this way, young voters won¡¯t just stay home: they¡¯ll start building a political future that leaves the party behind, or even opt out of civic life entirely. And when that happens, it won¡¯t be because they decided to abandon the Democrats. It will be because the Democrats abandoned them first.

Democrats sneer at young people¡¯²õ priorities

We¡¯ve seen it repeatedly: the moment young people organize around an issue ¡ª especially one that challenges entrenched US policy ¡ª they are told they ¡°don¡¯t understand political complexities¡± or that they¡¯re letting emotions override reason. Take Gaza, for instance: for much of this generation, watching US support for Israel¡¯²õ destruction of Gaza and killing of its civilians has been a defining political moment.

In the wake of the US government¡¯²õ inaction, young people have done exactly what engaged citizens have been instructed to do. They¡¯ve organized, debated, protested and demanded that their government live up to its stated values. According to the Crowd Counting Consortium at Harvard, there have been days of pro-Palestinian protest activity. Students have made demands for policies such as divestment or institutional support for Palestinian academic freedom. The protests were overwhelmingly . 

Yet, instead of listening, older Democratic leaders and voters dismiss their outrage as na?ve, misplaced or misinformed, forgetting that civic engagement is supposed to be a democratic value, not a liability. This phenomenon is omnipresent in both news media, statements from elected leaders and even conversations. These are political conversations that happen among policymakers within the ¡°Capital Beltway,¡± the area inside Interstate 495 in Washington, DC. 

American journalist and political commentator Nicholas Kristof¡¯²õ for the New York Times is a perfect example of this subtle dismissal of young voters. While Kristof encourages activism from students, he implies that the approach taken has been performative, not meaningful. He even suggests his own purportedly more serious alternatives. Former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi even went so far as to that youth protestors are victims of Russian propaganda. And, memorably, the Democratic National Committee (DNC)  pro-Palestinian delegates¡¯ efforts to get a Palestinian American speaker on the main stage at the Democratic National Convention. 

Then, when young people abstained from voting or supported independents in 2024, they were pilloried as disloyal, unserious and reckless. The message is clear: youth organizing is only welcome when it aligns neatly with the status quo. Anything else is lazily dismissed or treated as a threat to be managed, rather than a perspective with which to engage.

The Democratic Party is rife with no-accountability culture and inaction 

But the political establishment doesn¡¯t stop at mocking young people¡¯²õ values and intelligence. The Democratic Party also models a political culture where there are no consequences to Democratic actions, no matter how damaging their policies might be. For instance, the architects of the Iraq War still collect speaking fees, teach at elite universities and opine on cable news as if their catastrophic decisions didn¡¯t the region and cost countless lives. 

Adding to this resistance to generational change is the fact that the party has not reckoned with the 2024 presidential loss or mounted a credible resistance to President Donald Trump¡¯²õ agenda. When pressed about whether the election emblematized a rejection of the Democratic Party, Pelosi it was not. After Trump unleashed a slew of executive orders, Democratic Congressman Hakeem Jeffries merely on X that, ¡°Presidents come and Presidents go. Through it all. God is still on the throne.¡± Then, when Trump went after free speech at universities, New York Senator Chuck Schumer answered with what  The Daily Show host Jon Stewart as ¡°bringing out the big guns: a strongly worded letter.¡±

Despite public outcry about the threat Trump poses to democracy, the Democrats seem to be caught flat-footed as he goes about the business of dismantling democracy. This is a huge betrayal for young people staring down the erosion of economic safeguards, civil and political rights, and democratic norms in real time. 

Further, according to , the median age of House Democrats is 57.6 years old; in the Senate, it¡¯²õ 66.0, slightly older than Republicans. We are essentially asking a generation that has grown up in the shadow of a financial crisis, endless war and climate inaction to trust the same leaders who presided over those failures ¡ª and to do so without skepticism. It is insulting to ask young people to continue to hold their noses while casting votes for Democrats, particularly given that young people have the most to gain or lose from the policy decisions of those in power.

Belittling idealism drives the stakes up for the Democrats

Youth engagement is a fleeting opportunity ¡ª a rare moment when politics can still feel like a tool for justice and progress. Young voters have the interest and capacity to dedicate energy to social causes and moral questions. Squander that capacity, and you don¡¯t just lose a voting bloc for a cycle ¡ª you lose them for a generation. You harden their cynicism, you drive them toward alternatives and you signal to anyone paying attention that the party¡¯²õ commitment to the future is purely rhetorical. The party also squanders an opportunity to organize more effectively when it dismisses young people flexing the muscles of democratic citizenship. 

Meanwhile, the right ¡ª especially the Make America Great Again movement ¡ª has been willing to speak directly to young people¡¯²õ sense of alienation. The Republicans have been offering the youth a political cause, however warped the substance may be. This has only added to the Democratic Party¡¯²õ alienation amongst the public. For example, the Harris ticket with youth in 2024. And perhaps it¡¯²õ no surprise that in 2024, more new voters chose to register as and Republican than Democrat. 

The Democratic Party must change its tune. Some say the party should take after Zohran Mamdani, the newly elected mayor of New York City. After Mandani¡¯²õ November 4 victory, Robin Smyton of Tufts University¡¯²õ TuftsNow that Mamdani¡¯²õ way of speaking about ¡°issues that young people care about and offering a compelling vision to vote for, not just a candidate to vote against, was likely key to engaging youth.¡± Perhaps Mamdani is merely offering something that better reflects the lived economic experience of the young, disillusioned electorate. 

Mamdani¡¯²õ primary and subsequent mayoral victory are indicative of a rising trend: young are stepping up against older Democratic politicians across the country. This progression should wake the Democratic Party out of its stale, dysfunctional politics. Having a young political culture that has the interest to envision alternative ways of organizing our economic, social and political lives is something to nurture, not belittle.

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The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post The Democratic Party¡¯²õ Disdain for Youth Will Have Consequences appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Assuming they cannot perform sufficient, effective and non-counterproductive vote suppression, there is a risk with extreme gerrymandering (apart from the ethical issues) that you might end up creating more seats vulnerable in a wave election against you than any that you might gain.

How gerrymandering works

Although there isn¡¯t active gerrymandering in the UK, as in the United States, the UK uses first-past-the-post electoral districts, and the last elections there are illustrative of what might happen in the US. In the UK in and , relatively small swings in the popular vote led to a remarkable number of ¡°safe seats¡± changing hands, first Labour, then Conservative.?

To break it down, the Conservatives in 2019 surged to 365 seats (of 650), a majority of 35 based on 43.6% of the popular vote, which imploded to 121 with 23.7% losing two-thirds of their seats for a less than half collapse in their vote. Meanwhile, Labour fell to 202 in 2019 with 32.1%, then more than recovered to 411 in 2024 with just 33.7%, more than doubling their seat haul for a mere 1.6% increase in their vote, i.e., a 5% increase in their total. Thus, a small increase in Labour¡¯²õ vote share propelled Labour to a substantial majority, surpassing what the Tories secured in 2019 ¡ª indeed, 46 more seats with 10% fewer votes. The central factor, of course, was the collapse of the Tories¡¯ vote, magnified by first-past-the-post; Labour didn¡¯t have to be popular, just not as unpopular as the Tories. It¡¯²õ not who voters love, it¡¯²õ who the voters are angriest with.

Back in the US, the danger in the Republicans¡¯ mathematics is part of how gerrymandering works ¡ª it tries to create districts with enough reliable voters for one party, say reliable Republican voters, to ensure that the seat is noncompetitive, that it will only ever return a Republican. 

Gerrymandering works by ¡°packing and cracking¡± ¡ª pushing many of the (presumed) consistently Democratic voting demographics into just one potential House-seat of several, and spreading (presumed) reliable Republicans out to create majorities in as many of the remaining districts as possible ¡ª the latter also with supposed to be low-propensity Democratic voting groups. The data that gerrymandering depends on is the decennial census combined with voter behavior in the most recent elections.

Dependence on voter behavior ¡ª what if the Republicans are very unpopular?

The problem is that the more extreme the gerrymandering, the thinner you have to spread the presumed-to-be-reliable Republican voters, and the more you depend on Democratic voters not turning out. This inevitably reduces many of their ¡°safe majorities.¡± But it also depends on how consistently voters will repeat their previous behavior in the next election ¡ª it assumes stability from one election to the next.

In a wave election, those assumptions can break down ¡ª gerrymandering might have turned what were believed to be safe Republican seats into marginal ones during a big wave; the ¡°sea-wall/levee is overtopped,¡± leading to electoral collapse.

Moreover, assumptions predicated on voter behavior in previous elections are ¡°carrying a lot of freight,¡± but if something happens to change that behavior ¡ª boom! It also raises the question of whether voter behavior in past elections was atypical or a durable trend ¡ª say in 2024¡­

In Texas, a lot seems to be riding on Republican assumptions about how the Hispanic population will vote; in the this month¡¯²õ general and special elections, the gains in Hispanic votes that US President Donald Trump and Republicans secured in 2024 appears to have (this too may be a long-term problem ¡ª running against the Catholicism of former Presidential Candidate Al Smith in cost Republicans Catholic voters all the way into the 1950s and 60s. How badly and permanently have Hispanics been alienated by the Make America Great Again [MAGA] Republicans¡¯ actions and rhetoric?)

In addition to 2024 voting patterns, the gerrymander is also based heavily on data from the 2010 census, which will be six years old by November 2026, in a state with large and rapid population and demographic shifts. Moreover, Texas has historically had unusually low turnout, 56.6% in 2024 versus 63.9% in the US as a whole ¡ª were something to ¡°goose¡± that turnout, such as voter anger at Trump and the Republicans¡­

Republican strategy and Trump¡¯²õ influence

Although it appears extreme, Republican gerrymandering has, until now, been cautious and carefully calculated to limit the impact of a wave election, but, spurred by Trump¡¯²õ demands, they may be going too far and have massively exposed themselves. That may leave few options except for blatant voter suppression ¡ª but this too brings its own risk of backlash, of spiking angry turnout amongst the groups targeted for suppression. 

Historically, incumbents ¡ª especially those in safe seats ¡ª have had a lot of influence over districting and gerrymandering (state parties, too, are happy to keep their safely gerrymandered majorities). They are, in fact, a key effective, if not very visible, opponent of overly increased gerrymandering because it necessarily reduces their safe majority, makes them work harder in elections and puts their seat at greater risk. But Republican incumbents are more terrified of Trump and his backing a primary candidate in their district than they are of their natural antipathy and caution about excessive gerrymandering.

Anyone remotely familiar with, say, Texas politics, or North Carolina (to cite two heavily gerrymandered states) would say that in 2001, the Republicans there already seemed to have pushed the gerrymandering math as far as they safely could get away with.

Trump, in his demand for increased gerrymandering, has nullified and silenced incumbent objections while paying little attention to the mathematics ¡ª but those Republicans are obviously more scared of a Trump-backed primary opponent than the general election. That may cost them.

Voter suppression¡¯²õ limits

Notably, a lot of voter suppression relies on making voting more logistically and bureaucratically difficult ¡ª through obstacles such as voter identification requirements, registration hurdles, voter record purges and logistical challenges like limiting or banning mail-in ballots or having polling stations that are poorly located with limited hours (which can be hard for hourly workers to find time to vote). 

The problem with these voter suppression efforts is that they could disproportionately affect MAGA constituencies, making it harder for Republican voters to cast their ballots. This is especially true because the Republican base within that group tends to include older voters, hourly workers, workers without a college education and people who will find voter suppression obstacles harder to navigate than younger, increasingly more educated voters who are breaking heavily Democrat. 

Moreover, despite Trump¡¯²õ preening, voter suppression has mostly to be instituted at the state level ¡ª and, if there is a wave election in 2026, Republican losses in statehouses might preclude effective voter suppression measures by 2028 ¡ª even more so if Republicans lose the national House and Senate. Under current law and voting arrangements, states organize and administer elections, even Federal elections, and within those states, municipalities (cities) and counties play a significant role. Even with the current Republican control of Congress and, despite the Supreme Court disgracing itself with obvious political partisanship, voter suppression would be very hard to do at the national level.

A national infrastructure usable for voter suppression simply does not exist and would take time to create (Trump has largely gutted the Federal Election Commission, by firing the Democratic Commissioner and driving two relatively moderate Republicans to resign, it no longer has a quorum, it can¡¯t do anything). Ideas Trump is militantly pressing for, like say banning postal voting at the federal level would:

¡ª Likely have to be executed at the state level and predominantly in Republican states;

¡ª Fall heavily on elderly, infirm and rural voters, constituencies Republicans rely on.

¡ª Risk a backlash amongst regular postal voters, like say the US military.

Efforts to intimidate by, say, deploying Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) to polling stations would be predicated on the myth of noncitizens voting; they¡¯d be ineffectual at suppressing these nonexistent votes, but very effective at enraging Latino, Black and other voters. The Army, the National Guard and even the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are not likely to be sufficiently partisan to be effective or willing to engage in intimidation.

Indeed, the central risk of obvious, clumsy efforts at voter suppression is that it¡¯d turn voting Democratic into an act of defiance, a middle finger extended to the Grand Old Party (GOP). Meanwhile, crude voter suppression and gross gerrymandering may antagonize independent voters ¡ª witness the huge majority the ¡°Proposition 50¡± retaliatory redrawing of California¡¯²õ districts in response to Texas unexpectedly ¡ª in August 2025, almost two-thirds of those asked in opinion polls opposed it, but it secured a vote of almost two-thirds by November. Voters are angry, but are they particularly angry at Republicans more than Democrats?

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The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Republicans Test the Limits of Gerrymandering and Voter Suppression appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Decked in a light blue checkered dress shirt and jeans, Prabowo Subianto waltzes across the stage, performing an awkward jig in front of a jubilant crowd. This was the of Indonesia¡¯²õ current President upon claiming his victory in the 2024 presidential election ¡ª a performance synonymous with his as a ¡°cuddly grandpa¡±.

Prabowo is lauded by his younger Generation Z (Gen Z) and millennial supporters as ¡°gemoy¡± and ¡°gemes¡±, meaning overcome with cuteness, as seen in circulated . This stands diametrically opposed to his formerly contentious, Machiavellian image ¡ª one smeared by a dark and bloody .

Prabowo: a ¡°political chameleon¡±

Prabowo¡¯²õ political career is marred by human rights abuse , with links to Suharto¡¯²õ military dictatorship and massacres during Indonesia¡¯²õ occupation of Timor-Leste (1975-99). from entering the US as late as 2012, Prabowo¡¯²õ political path began tumultuously. After losing several presidential cycles, he even filed a lawsuit ¡ª albeit an unsuccessful one ¡ª alleging election fraud when he lost the to Joko ¡°Jokowi¡± Widodo, the Indonesian politician and businessman who served as Indonesia¡¯²õ seventh president from 2014 to 2024.

However, Prabowo¡¯²õ longtime political resilience built him an army of supporters. The results of the 2024 presidential election showed that Prabowo of the vote, a testament to the seismic political shift and recalibrated strategy adopted by the Prabowo-Gibran campaign.

But it is not his resilience that changed the game. It is a result of a deliberately curated marketing ploy. A convergence between being a ¡°¡± and strategic incremental decisions, leveraging both to fulfill an overarching goal: to achieve slide-rule authoritarianism. The ¡°¡± movement reflects the reactionary response to the administration’s and revised .

Prabowo¡¯²õ 2019 campaign: the Islamic populist strategy

Much like the Trump administration, Prabowo is unafraid to engage with divisive and controversial . Whereas US President Donald Trump¡¯²õ appeal relies on his cult of personality ¡ª possessing presidential charisma bordering on self-caricature ¡ª which resonates with a vital fraction of the American electorate, Prabowo takes on a contrarian approach by necessity.

Unlike the demographic in the US, Indonesia¡¯²õ population consists predominantly of Javanese . Prabowo¡¯²õ strategic foregrounding and cultivation of a pious Muslim image expose the importance of having a cohesive political identity, one that aligns with the greater part of the electorate.

His 2019 presidential campaign is a testament to Prabowo¡¯²õ overt engagement with . At the end of his official national at the Jakarta Convention Centre, titled Indonesia Menang (Indonesia¡¯²õ Victory), he constructed the image of himself and his close proximity to Islam:

¡°As a proud son of the nation and of Islam, allow me to proclaim the takbir, ¡®Allahu Akbar! Allahu Akbar! Allahu Akbar! Independence! Independence!¡±

Islam became the vehicle in which he performed religious authenticity, a crucible for populist rhetoric, to stitch himself within the social fabric of the Indonesian electorate.

However, the Islamic populist strategy belies his true intentions. The U-turn in Prabowo¡¯²õ 2024 presidential campaign strategy marks a crucial inflection point in his political career. The president¡¯²õ decreased engagement with Islamic political rhetoric, in comparison to the 2019 election cycle and earlier years, is not a sign of a shift toward progressive values. It is a shift aimed at broadly appealing to ; it is a means to an end.

The power of political marketing: Prabowo¡¯²õ reformed image

This phenomenon has a direct consequence and correspondence with the increase in online pandering and deliberate curation of his new image. In other words, Prabowo¡¯²õ reformed image and accumulated years of Islamic populist strategy boil down to the very core of predatory populism: molding his identity to the prevailing sentiments of mainstream consciousness.

The key differentiator of the 2024 presidential election cycle is that Prabowo has an excellent marketing team backing him up.

The clearest example is turning around a losing debate against his political rivals. The between him and the other two political candidates, Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo, became one of the pivotal moments of the . These videos ¡ª carefully edited clips ¡ª were disseminated through his party¡¯²õ channels. In doing so, he raptured the hearts of voters as well as capitalized on its virality.

In a bid for strategic self-victimization, Prabowo, or rather his marketing team, successfully reframed what would have been a lackluster performance into craftily manipulated propaganda against his rivals.

An AI-generated image of a , portraying infantilized cartoon versions of Prabowo and Gibran, presents the perfect analogy: the idea is to soften his reputation and lodge himself within a digestible narrative. Another instance is a fake, also AI-generated video of Suharto circulated by Prabowo¡¯²õ party, endorsing his presidency, which amassed as high as 4.5 million .

Therein lies the core of his newly founded magnetism: an orchestrated reinvention that navigates between algorithmic reach and performative authenticity; the importance of image management has superseded actual engagement with public policy.

It is not Prabowo¡¯²õ charisma nor his resilience that allowed him to clinch the top spot, but a structured marketing strategy that can easily be emulated. Prabowo¡¯²õ successful campaign would not be a blip in the political arena, but the bellwether for Indonesia¡¯²õ future voting behavior.

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The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Why the Success of Prabowo¡¯²õ 2024 Presidential Campaign Strategy Matters appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

After the of the administration of Sheikh Hasina¡¯²õ Awami League, Bangladesh is at a crossroads, and the role of the has never been more critical. The actions Yunus takes in the coming months will shape the nation¡¯²õ democratic order, and public trust depends on his government¡¯²õ commitment to transparent electoral processes.

The importance of transparency in the next elections cannot be overstated. Historically, elections in Bangladesh have been marred by accusations of corruption, voter and manipulation. This cycle has created a distance between the government and its voters, leading voters to question their ability to effect change through democratic means. To encourage a more participatory and inclusive process, the provisional government must prioritize transparency at all levels, from communication strategies to voting mechanisms and ballot counting.

Who Is Bangladesh¡¯²õ Chief Advisor

Dr. is a figure of hope for many in Bangladesh. His contributions to social entrepreneurship and poverty have gained him international applause and painted him as a unifying leader for the different segments of society. As he undertakes this demanding journey, he must emphasize integrity in electoral management. Transparency will discourage malpractice and empower citizens by allowing them to feel invested in the electoral process.

The government must build an open dialogue with the people. It should organize consultations on multiple platforms to hear citizens from across the socioeconomic spectrum. Through this process, Yunus can learn the public¡¯²õ needs and aspirations and make sure the elections reflect democratic ideals. Such measures can also help reduce political disorder and violent protests that have arisen in recent years due to disenfranchisement and distrust.

Reforms aimed at improving the electoral system are also essential. The provisional government must support practices that guarantee fairness and impartiality. This could lead to the of a comprehensive electoral supervision body, with diverse representation, to monitor the entire process. By promoting transparency in electoral funding, campaign practices and voter registration, Yunus can foster a political culture that discourages negligence and encourages civic engagement.

Involving young voters is particularly crucial. In a country where of the population is between the ages of 15 and 29, their participation represents a significant share of the electorate and can drive democratic reform. The provisional government could implement educational campaigns to explain the voting process, voter rights and the role of transparency in shaping their future. By using mass communication, the government can engage young people and inspire them to champion transparency and accountability.

Why Transparency Is Key

Public trust in the electoral process depends heavily on the ability of the provisional government to address previous complaints. Recognizing past injustices and pursuing electoral reforms will be fundamental for rebuilding trust in institutions. Faced with widespread political disorder, the ethics of this election must reflect a departure from past oppressive. Instead, the government should embrace a style that values the contributions of its citizens.

The upcoming elections also present Yunus with an opportunity to leave a legacy aligned with democratic ideals. Prioritizing transparency can strengthen a sense of ownership among Bangladeshis and reinforce the idea that their voices count. The active of civil society organizations and independent monitors will support these efforts by providing a neutral eye on the process.

The path to transparent elections in Bangladesh is fraught with challenges. Historical prejudices, entrenched political interests, and social doubt all threaten the foundations of democracy. Yet under the guidance of Yunus, the provisional government has a unique chance to instill trust by upholding transparency, equity and inclusiveness. 

The stakes are high, not only for the nation¡¯²õ future but also for its democratic standing on the global stage. As Bangladesh approaches its general elections, all eyes will be on how far the provisional government is willing to commit to transparency and meaningful public engagement in what could be a decisive moment for the country.

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The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Transparency as the Foundation for Bangladesh¡¯²õ 2026 General Elections appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Rohan Khattar Singh, 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ Video Producer & Social Media Manager, talks with Leonardo Vivas, professor of political economy at Leslie University in Massachusetts, about Bolivia¡¯²õ presidential election. It had its first round of votes on August 17 and will have a run-off vote on October 19. This conversation examines why these elections matter, the collapse of the long-dominant Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, or MAS), the weakened roles of former Bolivian President Evo Morales and incumbent Bolivian President Luis Arce, and more.

Why Bolivia matters

Vivas begins by noting that Bolivia, a small landlocked country, might seem peripheral to global politics, but its elections reflect important regional dynamics. In Latin America, most conflicts in recent decades have been resolved through democratic institutions rather than violence, with the exceptions of Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and increasingly El Salvador. He argues Bolivia is likely to continue this democratic pattern: There will be a clear winner, and institutions will accept the outcome.

The second reason for global attention is the apparent ¡°demise¡± of MAS, the party founded by Morales in the 1990s and dominant for nearly 30 years. Vivas believes its decline could reshape local geopolitics, breaking one of the region¡¯²õ longest political hegemonies.

The race and the MAS collapse

The field of candidates reflects MAS¡¯²õ diminished standing. Morales¡¯²õ former prot¨¦g¨¦, Arce, opted not to run again due to poor approval ratings. Two MAS candidates competed ¡ª Senate president Andronico Rodriguez and Arce¡¯²õ former interior minister ¡ª but both polled poorly and will not continue to the second round of the vote.

The opposition appears stronger. Samuel Doria Medina, a wealthy businessman, campaigned as a moderate, aiming to unify the country. His rival, former Bolivian President Jorge ¡°Tuto¡± Quiroga, takes a harder right stance, promising IMF-backed reforms and economic stabilization. Vivas frames the contest as a struggle between a fading MAS and a reenergized right.

In the first round of the vote, Senator Rodrigo Paz Pereira, a centrist from the Christian Democratic Party, and Quiroga, a conservative, in first and second place, respectively.

Morales, Arce and the end of an era

For much of the 2000s, Morales oversaw what could be called a ¡°Bolivian miracle.¡± Gas exports funded poverty reduction and indigenous inclusion, with then-Finance Minister Arce shaping the economic boom. Yet the model collapsed as state-owned gas firms faltered, revenues plunged and exchange-rate pressures deepened.

Today, Arce faces a financial crisis marked by exchange controls and slowing growth. With his political support underwater, he chose not to seek reelection. Morales, once a towering figure, is now legally and politically sidelined. A constitutional court ruling bars him from running; his recent protest calls fell flat and he faces prosecution for statutory rape, further eroding his influence.

Morales has refused to endorse MAS¡¯²õ current candidates and has instead called for new elections, further fragmenting the movement he once embodied.

The army on the sidelines

Military involvement in Bolivian politics has long been a concern, especially after Morales¡¯²õ 2019 departure under army pressure. But Vivas stresses that today¡¯²õ army plays little role. A supposed coup attempt last year proved hollow; General Juan Jos¨¦ Z¨²?iga acted alone and was quickly rejected by both society and the president. Some even suspect the episode was staged to boost Arce¡¯²õ legitimacy.

Compared to 2019, when the military simply facilitated a constitutional transfer of power, today¡¯²õ officers remain firmly in the barracks. Vivas does not foresee the army influencing this year¡¯²õ election.

Economy and the younger vote

The central issue now is the economy. During Morales¡¯²õ rise, indigenous identity and social inclusion drove politics. After decades of reform, indigenous participation is normalized. Economic hardship ¡ª falling gas revenues, high inflation and slow growth ¡ª has replaced identity as the defining theme.

The generational shift is also decisive. Younger Bolivians, more urban and educated, care less about old ideological battles and more about future prospects. Many no longer rally behind Morales or MAS, instead leaning toward opposition candidates. Vivas highlights that MAS, as the architect of the current crisis, cannot credibly present itself as the solution.

Indigenous voting patterns reflect this shift: Morales still retains support in the highlands, but lowland communities lean right, accelerating MAS¡¯²õ decline.

Round two is inevitable

Vivas correctly assumes that the election will head to a runoff. He believes it is possible, though not guaranteed, that both right-wing candidates advance to the second round. Much depends on whether MAS¡¯²õ residual support materializes late in the race.

Based on pre-election information, Vivas sees the likely outcome as a right-wing victory. This would normalize Bolivian politics, making it resemble Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Ecuador, where power alternates between left and right. For him, that normalization marks Bolivia¡¯²õ reintegration into regional democratic trends.

External players: US, China and Brazil

Vivas also considers the international angle. The United States has lost much of its regional influence, supplanted by China¡¯²õ growing role. Washington¡¯²õ attention has shifted to global crises, leaving Latin America low on the agenda. Vivas sees US President Donald Trump¡¯²õ current administration as ¡°playing wait and see¡± while expecting right-wing gains across the region.

China¡¯²õ involvement is more cautious. Burned by its unpaid investments in Venezuela, Beijing is wary of Bolivia¡¯²õ struggling state-owned companies and is unlikely to engage deeply if MAS wins. Still, China maintains strong trade links, regardless of ideology.

Brazil, under President Luiz In¨¢cio Lula da Silva, could prove more active. As interim head of BRICS, Lula has suggested BRICS could replace the IMF as a source of financing for Bolivia. But such programs remain untested, and Vivas doubts they would materialize unless Bolivia¡¯²õ government aligns with BRICS priorities.

Cautious optimism

Despite crises, Vivas ends on a hopeful note. He believes Bolivia has a real chance, no matter who wins, to reset its politics and rebuild its economy. For him, the 2025 election could mark both the end of an era dominated by MAS and the beginning of a more balanced, democratic cycle with wider implications for Latin America.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post FO¡ã Talks: Bolivia ¡ª Fuel and Economic Crisis Lead to Widespread Support for the Right appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The LDP¡¯²õ losses, while not catastrophic, have real consequences: Ishiba¡¯²õ coalition now lacks a majority in both chambers of the National Diet. Meanwhile, traditional opposition parties such as the Constitutional Democratic Party () failed to capitalize on public discontent, making no net gains. Instead, the momentum was seized by the populist and nationalist right, with the?Democratic Party for the People ()?and? emerging as the surprise victors of the night. The DPFP gained 13 seats, becoming the third-largest party in the upper house, while ³§²¹²Ô²õ±ð¾±³Ù¨­ surged from one to 14 seats, riding a wave of anti-establishment frustration.

During the election period, the yen¡¯²õ brief rally to ?146.92 per dollar ¡ª sparked by unfounded speculation over US Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell¡¯²õ ¡ª quickly reversed as investor focus shifted back to Japan¡¯²õ escalating political risks. By July 17, the currency had weakened to ?148.48 per dollar, reflecting mounting expectations that Ishiba¡¯²õ ruling coalition would lose its majority in the upper house in the July 20 election.?

Simultaneously, bond markets flashed warning signs: the 20-year Japanese Government Bond () yield surged 4.5 basis points to 2.650%, its highest since November 1999, while the 10-year yield climbed to 1.595%, the highest since October 2008. These moves signaled rising concern that the post-election government ¡ª potentially fragmented and under populist pressure ¡ª might turn to expansionary fiscal measures financed by increased bond issuance, reigniting doubts about Japan¡¯²õ debt sustainability.

The International Monetary Fund¡¯²õ (IMF) intervention highlights just how precarious the fiscal landscape has become. In a post-election environment marked by political fragmentation and heightened investor sensitivity, the IMF¡¯²õ Director of the Communications Department, Julie Kozack¡¯²õ, serve as a warning shot. The IMF¡¯²õ message is clear: Japan can no longer defer tough fiscal choices. With public debt already exceeding 250% of GDP, rising interest payments threaten to crowd out essential spending unless a credible consolidation path is laid out. The next government, regardless of its composition, will need to reconcile competing demands ¡ª supporting vulnerable households amid anemic growth while restoring medium-term fiscal discipline. Temporary, targeted stimulus may remain justifiable in the face of economic shocks, but the era of open-ended fiscal drift is drawing to a close.

¡°The risk of a sovereign downgrade is now quite high,¡± Mark Nash of Jupiter Asset Management, pointing to the projected jump in Japan¡¯²õ interest payments as a share of revenues ¡ª from 9.9% last year to 12.2% this year. ¡°If this is paired with aggressive tax cuts and little spending reform, we¡¯re staring down the barrel of a ratings event.¡±

This election, long expected to be a routine midterm test, has instead triggered a reckoning across multiple fronts: fiscal credibility, central bank independence, voter discontent and sovereign creditworthiness. Japan¡¯²õ 2025 upper house election has major financial implications,  as forces driving political change sharpen the fiscal policy dilemmas that the country¡¯²õ fractured leadership.

Credit ratings, fiscal strain and the waning deflation buffer

Japan¡¯²õ sovereign credit ratings remain officially ¡°stable¡± across all three major agencies ¡ª Moody¡¯²õ, S&P and Fitch ¡ª but the rhetoric surrounding them has turned increasingly cautionary. For example, Fitch¡¯²õ Krisjanis Krustins has gone further. In public comments, he that ¡°if Japan adopts tax cuts that are not offset by other policy measures and that don’t lead to much higher growth, basically that leads to higher fiscal deficits and an accelerated debt trajectory. That could certainly put pressure on the rating.¡± He specifically cited opposition-led proposals to permanently reduce or abolish the 10% consumption tax as particularly risky ¡ª policies that have become central to many populist platforms during the 2025 campaign cycle.?

Although Krustins acknowledged that implementation would likely be tempered by institutional resistance within a divided Diet, he emphasized the material risks posed by any fiscal loosening without clear productivity offsets. Fitch currently assigns Japan an ¡°A¡¯¡± rating ¡ª five notches below AAA ¡ª with a stable outlook, citing the country¡¯²õ debt load, now approaching of GDP, as the highest in the advanced world.

Moody¡¯²õ Ratings said the potential impact of a consumption tax cut on Japan¡¯²õ sovereign credit rating would depend on its ¡°scope, magnitude and permanence.¡± Christian de Guzman, a senior vice president at Moody¡¯²õ, that the ruling coalition¡¯²õ weakened position may increase the likelihood of fiscal expansion. Still, it remains ¡°sufficiently strong¡± to preempt sweeping tax changes. Ishiba has also reiterated his caution, warning that cutting the consumption tax could jeopardize funding for Japan¡¯²õ rising social welfare costs. Japan¡¯²õ A1 rating with a stable outlook has held since 2014, though Moody¡¯²õ has warned that a sustained widening of fiscal deficits could lead to a downgrade.

This mounting concern reflects not merely headline fiscal aggregates but a deeper structural evolution in Japan¡¯²õ macro-financial architecture. For decades, chronic deflation and near-zero interest rates allowed the Bank of Japan (BoJ) to absorb vast amounts of government debt with minimal market reprisal. That era is now receding. Core inflation has above 3% for more than six consecutive months. While it eased slightly to 3.3% in June from a 29-month high of 3.7% in May, largely due to the stabilization of rice prices following government stockpile releases, the persistence of elevated prices underscores a regime shift.

Significantly, the so-called ¡°core-core¡± inflation rate ¡ª excluding both fresh food and energy ¡ª rose to 3.4%, its highest level since early 2023. The BoJ closely monitors this measure as a proxy for underlying demand-side inflation. Wage settlements have also reached their strongest levels in decades, and household inflation expectations have firmed ¡ª suggesting that the deflationary psychology that once dominated consumer and corporate behavior may be breaking down.

In response, BoJ¡¯²õ exit from its long-standing regime of ultra-accommodative monetary policy has unfolded with measured precision. In?March 2024, the BoJ formally its negative interest rate policy, raising the short-term policy rate to?0.0¨C0.1%, its first increase in 17 years. This move made it the final major central bank to abandon sub-zero rates. The decision marked a pivotal shift, not only in policy settings but also in the broader strategic posture of a central bank that had long been synonymous with aggressive easing.

July 2024 brought a second-rate hike, lifting the policy rate to 0.25%, the highest since 2008. This was followed by a third increase in January 2025 to 0.50%, a 17-year high. These steps reflected growing confidence among policymakers that Japan was nearing a durable exit from deflation, underpinned by accelerating wage growth, shifting corporate price-setting behavior and inflation that had persistently exceeded the BoJ¡¯²õ 2% target for over three years.

Yet despite this momentum, the BoJ has since tempered its pace. At both the?March?and?June 2025?policy meetings, the central bank opted to the rate steady at?0.50%, citing a confluence of downside risks. Chief among them: escalating US tariff measures, the uncertain trajectory of global trade negotiations and weakening external demand. These external headwinds, policymakers argue, complicate the domestic inflation picture ¡ª particularly as the BoJ continues to distinguish between headline inflation and underlying demand-driven pressures, which it still views as insufficiently robust.

This cautious recalibration has been reinforced by recent changes to the BoJ¡¯²õ governing board.?Kazuyuki Masu, newly appointed in July 2025, has advocated for restraint in the face of mounting geopolitical and macroeconomic uncertainties. At his inaugural press conference, he that while inflation expectations have risen,?¡°real interest rates remain negative,¡±?and?¡°the BoJ shouldn¡¯t be in a rush to raise rates.¡±?He underscored concerns about unresolved trade tensions with the US ¡ª particularly around auto exports ¡ª and the unpredictable implications for Japan¡¯²õ external sector.

Masu¡¯²õ entry comes at a delicate juncture. The headline?core consumer price index (CPI) has cooled to 3.3% in June,? down from a peak of 3.7% in May. This appears to have eased supply-side price pressures, such as elevated rice costs. though they remain well above historical norms. Meanwhile,?core-core inflation, excluding both food and energy, edged up to?3.4%, suggesting that underlying inflation momentum is still present. The BoJ has signaled that further tightening remains on the table. Still, Governor?Kazuo Ueda?has that any additional rate hikes will be contingent on sustained real wage growth and improved visibility around global demand conditions.

Together, these developments signal a central bank navigating a narrow path ¡ª balancing normalization against fragility, and inflation control against financial and geopolitical uncertainty. For now, the BoJ remains in wait-and-see mode, its forward guidance conditioned by a complex and evolving macroeconomic landscape.

Tariffs, the BoJ and the future of Japan¡¯²õ fiscal path

The new US¨CJapan trade agreement a significant shift in the external pressures shaping Japan¡¯²õ macroeconomic policy. By agreeing to a unified 15% tariff ceiling on automobiles, parts and selected industrial goods ¡ª down from the threatened 25% ¡ª Ishiba has temporarily averted a sharper shock to Japan¡¯²õ export competitiveness. Yet the deal comes at a steep price: a promise of $550 billion in Japanese investment into the US economy, including increased purchases of American agricultural products, aircraft and defense equipment.?

While the Trump administration hails the agreement as a historic win, Japanese policymakers now face a complex trade-off. The concessions may reduce bilateral tensions, but they also raise new questions about fiscal sustainability, particularly as defense outlays and import spending increase in yen terms.

For the Bank of Japan, the deal complicates an already delicate normalization path. The central bank has signaled a cautious exit from yield curve control, but renewed import-driven inflation and potentially weaker external demand from tariff-altered supply chains could stall further tightening. Meanwhile, the political appetite for fiscal stimulus remains strong. With the ruling coalition weakened in the upper house and under pressure to respond to voter demands for relief, calls for consumption tax cuts and increased public spending are intensifying. 

However, as Moody¡¯²õ and the IMF have recently warned, any sustained widening of deficits without credible fiscal consolidation risks a ratings downgrade. The post-election fiscal debate, now unfolding in the shadow of this US deal, will be a litmus test for Japan¡¯²õ ability to balance geopolitical accommodation with macroeconomic discipline.

Populist economics and the erosion of orthodoxy

The economic grievances of Japan¡¯²õ ¡°working poor middle¡± (ch¨±ry¨± hinmin) ¡ª a class increasingly burdened by stagnant real wages, rising costs of living and thinning social protections ¡ª have reshaped the nation¡¯²õ political discourse. Amid this pressure, populist economic appeals have gained traction across party lines, with tax cuts becoming the unifying banner. NHK reveals that ten of Japan¡¯²õ 14 major political parties proposed some form of consumption tax reduction ahead of the 2024 general election. For a political system long dominated by technocratic moderation, this marked a populist inflection point.

This new popular is captured in the voice of Noriyuki Hasegawa, a small business owner in Saitama: ¡°We raised wages three times in two years, but raw materials and packaging costs are still eating our margins. We¡¯re squeezed from all sides, and government support is just not reaching us.¡± His frustrations echo widely across Japan¡¯²õ Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), which employ over of the workforce yet remain underrepresented in policy design.

Perhaps most strikingly, this populist shift has placed Japan¡¯²õ fiscal and monetary authorities under unprecedented scrutiny. The Ministry of Finance (MOF), long the bastion of budgetary orthodoxy, has become a . Demonstrators have gathered outside MOF headquarters to denounce what they call ¡°bureaucratic austerity,¡± citing policies such as the ¡°¡± (spousal tax deduction cap) as symbols of outdated governance. Viral campaigns depict the ministry as a cloistered institution prioritizing balance sheets over livelihoods. It describes this movement as a form of ¡°material populism¡± ¡ª non-ideological but rooted in pervasive financial anxiety.?

These fiscal pressures have begun to spill into the monetary domain. In the LDP¡¯²õ September 2024 leadership race, Sanae Takaichi ¡ª a leading candidate and Minister for Economic Security ¡ª directly the BoJ¡¯²õ policy normalization. ¡°Frankly, it was too early,¡± she said at a televised debate, criticizing the BoJ¡¯²õ July rate hike to 0.25%. On her personal YouTube channel, she went further, arguing that ultra-low interest rates must be maintained to support a fragile recovery. ¡°Interest rates ought to be kept low,¡± she declared, signaling a growing willingness among politicians to challenge central bank autonomy in the name of growth and electoral responsiveness.

Ueda, by contrast, has signaled a cautious commitment to if Japan sustains 2% inflation alongside real wage growth. Yet that technocratic stance may prove politically untenable. If Takaichi ¡ª or another pro-stimulus leader ¡ª ascends to power, Japan could see monetary policy increasingly subordinated to political will. In that scenario, central bank independence, once a cornerstone of Japan¡¯²õ post-bubble policy credibility, may quietly erode under the weight of populist economic realignment.

Enter ³§²¹²Ô²õ±ð¾±³Ù¨­and the rise of the online populist right

No party embodied the populist wave more than . Founded during the pandemic with a fringe anti-vaccine message, the party won a stunning 14 seats in the upper house, up from just one. It did so with a mix of nationalist rhetoric, savvy social media mobilization and economic promises tailored to working-class voters: consumption tax cuts, child benefits and ¡°Japanese First¡± policies opposing immigration.

Its leader, ¡ª a former LDP candidate ¡ª has emerged as a charismatic (if polarizing) political force. Like many populists, Kamiya thrives on outrage. He has decried globalism, gender equality and foreign investment in Japanese land. Yet his message resonates, particularly among men aged 20 to 50.

³§²¹²Ô²õ±ð¾±³Ù¨­’s rise has already forced policy recalibrations. Days before the election, the LDP rushed to establish a new committee on immigration ¡ª a tacit acknowledgement of the party¡¯²õ vulnerability on that front. And while ³§²¹²Ô²õ±ð¾±³Ù¨­ still lacks the seats to influence budget legislation, its presence will shape the rhetorical and ideological contours of future debates.

³§²¹²Ô²õ±ð¾±³Ù¨­, a relatively new but vocal populist party, has positioned itself as a critic of both fiscal orthodoxy and elite policymaking. Its budget policy emphasizes aggressive fiscal expansion ¡ª calling for the abolition of the consumption tax, large-scale direct transfers to households and increased domestic investment without regard to debt sustainability. 

Rejecting the Ministry of Finance¡¯²õ long-standing emphasis on fiscal discipline, ³§²¹²Ô²õ±ð¾±³Ù¨­ argues that Japan¡¯²õ monetary sovereignty allows for expansive deficit financing under a ¡°national interest first¡± paradigm. Critics that such proposals risk undermining long-term fiscal stability, but the party¡¯²õ message resonates with segments of the electorate who feel excluded from Japan¡¯²õ post-COVID recovery and disillusioned with technocratic governance.

Takaichi¡¯²õ fiscal vision: Proactive stimulus in an era of constraint

Among Japan¡¯²õ leading political figures, Takaichi has consistently advocated for proactive, arguing that Japan¡¯²õ persistent output gap and demographic headwinds require bold public investment rather than premature consolidation. While critics warn of mounting debt sustainability risks, Takaichi frames fiscal expansion not as a reckless departure from orthodoxy, but as a necessary adaptation to Japan¡¯²õ unique macroeconomic conditions ¡ª namely, subdued private demand, structurally low inflation and an aging society that demands both care infrastructure and economic revitalization.

Her policy proposals include large-scale infrastructure programs, enhanced child and family support and strategic reindustrialization measures ¡ª all underpinned by the view that public spending can crowd in private investment if deployed effectively. In the post-election policy vacuum, her stance is gaining renewed attention, especially as voters demand economic relief and the US trade deal adds new spending pressures. 

Whether her fiscal philosophy will gain institutional traction remains to be seen, but it now shapes a key axis of debate within Japan¡¯²õ shifting political economy. While Takaichi¡¯²õ approach offers short-term political and economic relief, it raises profound questions about the timing, credibility and coordination of Japan¡¯²õ return to fiscal sustainability.

The global reverberations of Japan¡¯²õ macro shift

Japan¡¯²õ monetary inflection point is sending ripples far beyond its archipelago. As the single largest foreign holder of US Treasury securities ¡ª over $1.3 trillion as of mid-2025, according to US Treasury data ¡ª Japanese institutional investors wield significant influence over global capital flows. The BoJ¡¯²õ gradual retreat from yield curve control () and the normalization of its monetary stance have intensified linkages between Japanese Government Bond (JGB) yields and US Treasury rates. at Bloomberg have documented a marked rise in cross-border yield correlations, signaling a deeper integration of Japan¡¯²õ bond market into global financial dynamics.

Should the JGB market come under sustained selling pressure ¡ª as investors price in higher domestic yields and a steeper curve ¡ª Japanese insurers, banks and pension funds may face strong incentives to reduce their exposure to foreign debt and repatriate funds. This capital rotation would exert upward pressure on US long-end yields at a delicate moment for the , which is navigating disinflation, elevated deficits and tightening financial conditions. Even modest shifts in Japanese allocation preferences can affect global term premia (the additional compensation investors demand for holding longer-term bonds compared to shorter-term bonds), particularly given the scale of Japanese holdings in global fixed income markets.

The broader implication is clear: Japan¡¯²õ internal policy debate ¡ª once a technocratic affair insulated from global attention ¡ª has become a key driver of international market volatility. As populist forces like ³§²¹²Ô²õ±ð¾±³Ù¨­ call for aggressive fiscal expansion and challenge long-standing economic orthodoxy, political pressure on the BoJ is intensifying. 

Even within the ruling coalition, figures such as Sanae Takaichi have openly criticized the BoJ¡¯²õ rate hikes, signaling a growing willingness to subordinate monetary policy to political imperatives. This erosion of central bank independence raises serious concerns for investors, who are increasingly demanding a risk premium on JGBs. As the BoJ navigates its exit from ultra-accommodation, it is no longer just resetting domestic conditions ¡ª it is exporting uncertainty through bond markets, currency channels and global rate correlations.

Populism or prudence

Japan¡¯²õ 2025 upper house election has reshuffled the political deck ¡ª but not resolved the underlying tensions. Voters delivered a clear message: they want relief from economic hardship, skepticism toward the establishment and new voices in the policymaking arena. But translating that message into coherent governance will be difficult.

It might also accelerate the drift toward fiscal populism. Tax cuts, expanded social spending, and delayed reforms are politically seductive but economically perilous.

The most dangerous outcome is fiscal dominance: a regime in which public debt constraints dictate monetary policy, undermining inflation control and financial stability. Reinhart and Rogoff of this in their post-crisis research. Japan avoided it for decades. It may not be so lucky this time.

For now, the bond market is issuing a warning, not a verdict. But the window for credible policy response is narrowing. To restore confidence, Japan¡¯²õ next government must articulate a clear fiscal roadmap ¡ª one that addresses legitimate, popular concerns without sacrificing macroeconomic discipline. That is a tall order, but the alternative is far worse.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Japan¡¯²õ 2025 Upper House Election: Fiscal Reckoning, Market Jitters and the Waning Patience of the Middle Class appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Biden¡¯²õ team appeared convinced that diplomacy and the outdated Cold War of ¡°indivisible security¡± are for sissies. After all, nuclear deterrence worked throughout the Cold War, kind of, so why should it be any different today?

Nearly every informed expert ¡ª though you would not know this if you consume Western media ¡ª has concluded that Russia has won on the battlefield. What¡¯²õ left is a useless war of attrition which could go on for months or years. Unless, of course, the use by one of the parties of a tactical nuclear weapon, or some other provocation, leads to nuclear escalation. We¡¯ve been living that drama for the past three and a half years. Many Americans voted for US President Donald Trump because he had promised to end that threat within 24 hours.

He¡¯²õ still working on it. But if that wasn¡¯t enough, nuclear-armed Israel¡¯²õ permanent campaign to wage war on all its neighbors last week turned into a three-way scuffle when Trump offered to lend a hand by conducting his own massive bombing in Iran alongside Israel. Fears arose that Pakistan might intervene with its nuclear capacity in solidarity with Tehran.

If, in these perilous times, you live in the Middle East, Russia, Ukraine, practically any European capital or the US, you would be justified, every morning when you get out of bed, in thinking there may be something to worry about. Something existential.

But if you¡¯re a multi-billionaire living in the heart of Manhattan, and who also happens to be a pro-Israel Trump supporter, nuclear conflict is the last thing on your mind. There¡¯²õ much more urgent business to attend to.

American billionaire hedge fund manager Bill Ackman demonstrated that principle in a posted last week, following the upset victory of Zohran Mamdani over celebrity establishment candidate, Andrew Cuomo, in the Democratic primary of New York City¡¯²õ mayoral race. His tweet began with this thought: ¡°I awoke this morning gravely concerned about New York City.¡±

He has good reason to be concerned. Mamdani defined himself as someone ready to respond to the needs of working people and who refuses to kowtow to billionaires. Worse, he publicly empathizes with the evil Palestinians whose genocide in Gaza is being conducted by Ackman¡¯²õ favorite ¡°democracy¡± in the Middle East, with the active support of the US government ¡ª Trump¡¯²õ no less than Biden¡¯²õ. The idea that such a heretic seeking to become mayor of the Big Apple, the home of Wall Street, is far worse a prospect in Ackman¡¯²õ mind than the risk of nuclear holocaust.

Fortunately, Ackman has a plan to save New York City, which he lays out in his tweet. It contains the following pragmatic advice:

¡°Importantly, there are hundreds of million of dollars of capital available to back a competitor to Mamdani that can be put together overnight (believe me, I am in the text strings and the WhatsApp groups) so that a great alternative candidate won¡¯t spend any time raising funds.¡±

Today¡¯²õ Weekly Devil¡¯²õ Dictionary definition:

Raising funds:

The primary activity of US politicians, both before and after being elected, and the unique criterion for determining the political talent for those who will have a role in governing the nation, the states or major cities.

Contextual note

It¡¯²õ no secret for anyone paying attention to serious conducted in recent years, that the US, after innovating with the concept of democracy in the late 18th century, has more recently managed to remodel its institutions to assume the character of an effective oligarchy, with strong plutocratic tendencies. Everything we know about how Washington works, the role of lobbyists, the way campaign financing has been structured legally and financially confirms that what we¡¯re looking at is a functional oligarchy that hides itself behind the ritual of lavishly financed elections.

If missing evidence was required, Ackman¡¯²õ long tweet provides it. Ackman is as generous today with the words that describe his intentions as he will be tomorrow with the cash he promises to make available for the oligarchic cause. Like all true blue Americans, he deeply believes in this one essential truth, that ¡°time is money.¡± Ackman assures us that ¡°a great alternative candidate won¡¯t spend any time raising funds.¡± He helpfully reminds us of the mechanism that defines the entire logic of the current system: a politician¡¯²õ job has little to do with public service or the idea of devoting one¡¯²õ time to perfecting the tools of governance. It¡¯²õ about fundraising.

Fundraising is the principal skill every successful politician must acquire and work assiduously at refining. The art of communication, sometimes called spin, stands as the second skill essential to master. This consists of two basic components. The first is learning to speak in ways that sound informed and potentially authoritative (even when totally void of substance). Far more important than the cultivation of verbal style is the crafting of an ¡°image¡± or public ¡°personality¡± that projects a sense of commitment to whatever causes are seen from a marketing point of view as characterizing what Ackman calls ¡°a great alternative candidate.¡± 

The hedge fund manager¡¯²õ unlimited resources will serve to locate and groom the ¡°great candidate¡± still waiting in the wings to be pressed into service. The beauty of the method consists of relieving the chosen candidate of the task on which ordinary US politicians spend the majority of their working time. According to most, fundraising consumes around 50% of their daily schedule. With fundraising taken care of, the candidate can focus full-time on polishing his or her image for the media.

Historical note

During the first 50 years of the new American republic, the patrician elite known as the ¡°founders¡± deemed the idea of electoral campaigning unseemly behavior. The Puritan tradition had instilled the notion that community leaders should be elected on the basis of their perceived virtue. The very idea of self-promotion was anathema to the concept of US democracy. Fundraising in the modern sense was non-existent. Politicians counted on newspapers to establish their notoriety. The founding fathers on the idea of parties, which they tended to call ¡°factions.¡±

During the Jacksonian era, beginning in the 1830s, the expansion of suffrage led to the emergence of a notion of mass politics. Political parties became the major vehicle for promoting individual candidates. Limited fundraising was necessary to support local organizations. But fundraising for the sake of electing a candidate was seen as foreign to the spirit of democracy.

Things changed radically during the Gilded Age towards the end of the 19th century. Corporate interests linked to the rapid development of large scale industry made their pressure felt in politics. The rapid shift from a formerly rural economy to one dominated by massive industries changed the nature of political decision-making. It also transformed the procedures and rituals surrounding elections. Some traditional politicians sensed danger. In 1907, Congress passed the, the first federal law banning corporate donations to federal candidates. In the name of democratic ideals, the political culture of the first half of the new century retained its moral bias against campaign funding.

Post-World War I American culture rapidly turned the traditional system on its head. The emergence of the art of (PR) and the work in the political and electoral field of PR professionals such as Ivy Lee and Edward Bernays, the author of (presented as a positive, virtuous concept), transformed political culture.

From that point onward, the mindset of politicians turned from a focus on questions of governance to a far more essential one: getting elected. That meant doing everything required before and after an election to maintain one¡¯²õ position. That doesn¡¯t exclude politicians¡¯ taking an interest in serious public issues, but it certainly encourages them to stay focused on anything that brings in the cash. That includes backing issues favored by those who donate the most to their campaigns.

The trend accelerated through the age of advertising beginning in around 1950, when advertising culture began to reign supreme. It culminated with two highly visible events: the Supreme Court ruling in (2010) that gave a free rein to corporate funding, followed six years later by the election of Trump, a candidate whose political and personal psyche is nakedly governed by his belief in the power of money. Trump¡¯²õ political career signals the triumph of the new ideal of self-promotion that has eclipsed the ancient idea of the virtuous citizen.

Although Mamdani has himself developed the requisite skills of self-promotion that enabled him to defeat establishment stalwart, Cuomo, his commitment to causes defined as morally virtuous (combating wealth inequality, refusing complicity in genocide) challenges the status quo ¡ª a status quo Bill Ackman and his anonymous billionaire friends are committed to defending, in the name of democracy!

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil¡¯²õ Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The 51³Ô¹Ï Devil¡¯²õ Dictionary.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Billionaires Line Up to Save New York from Democracy appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

America stands at a perilous crossroads, caught between the calcification of its democratic institutions and the ascendance of a plutocratic elite intent on remaking society in their image. This moment encapsulates the nation¡¯²õ existential struggle: whether to renew its foundational commitment to democracy and accountability or to yield to the unchecked power of oligarchs cloaking their ambitions in the language of freedom and progress. Figures like Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, David Sacks, Marc Andreessen, Vivek Ramaswamy and the like are not merely ¡°entrepreneurs¡± or ¡°investors¡± ¡ª they are the architects of an opportunistic agenda that threatens to dismantle democracy while exacerbating inequality and societal division.

At the core of this crisis is the erosion of the democratic institutions that once served as a bulwark against authoritarianism and economic monopolization. For decades, the executive branch and its sprawling bureaucracy have become increasingly ineffective, weighed down by redundancy, opacity and political polarization. The result is a government that struggles to adapt to modern challenges, fueling public frustration and a growing sense of alienation. This institutional stagnation has created fertile ground for those who claim that the system is beyond repair ¡ª often the same actors who have most benefited from its failures.

The privatization of power

The need for reform is real. Bureaucracies must be restructured to serve the public, with a renewed focus on transparency and accountability. Yet those now leading the charge for ¡°efficiency¡± are anything but reformers. Plutocrats like Musk and Ramaswamy exploit public discontent, offering false solutions that prioritize privatization and corporate capture over genuine progress. Musk and Ramaswamy¡¯²õ Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE ¡ª a non-governmental, undemocratic, unaccountable organization) is emblematic of this strategy. Under the guise of streamlining government, it seeks to shift public functions into private hands, funneling resources to corporations while eroding the public¡¯²õ ability to hold them accountable.

This approach reflects a broader oligarchic playbook. Wealthy elites position themselves as champions of freedom and innovation, while lobbying to weaken the regulatory frameworks that safeguard democracy. Musk, whose businesses have on government subsidies and contracts, now rails against the very state that enabled his success. Thiel openly dismisses democracy as with capitalism¡¯²õ purest forms, advocating instead for a society where decision-making is concentrated in the hands of the competent few ¡ª a thinly veiled justification for oligarchic rule.

These actors weaponize societal divisions to advance their agendas. Musk¡¯²õ acquisition of the social media platform, Twitter (now X), illustrates this strategy, a platform for public dialogue into a megaphone for conspiracy theories and divisive rhetoric. By amplifying grievances and stoking distrust in institutions, they cultivate a base of disillusioned followers who view them as truth-tellers and saviors. Yet their populist rhetoric masks a darker reality: Their ultimate goal is to dismantle the structures of oversight that stand in the way of their consolidation of power.

The capture of public discourse is matched by a parallel assault on regulatory and judicial systems. The Supreme Court¡¯²õ unleashed a flood of corporate money into politics, allowing billionaires to exert disproportionate influence over policy and governance. Figures like Thiel and Andreessen leverage this dynamic to shape legislation and public policy, ensuring that the rules bend to their advantage. Their investments in political campaigns, such as Musk¡¯²õ contribution to US President-elect Donald Trump¡¯²õ 2024 campaign, are not acts of civic engagement but strategic moves to entrench their dominance.

The rhetoric of these oligarchs is steeped in the language of classical liberalism and free-market economics, but their actions betray a profound misunderstanding ¡ª or deliberate distortion ¡ª of these philosophies. Thinkers like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman championed free markets, but they also acknowledged the necessity of institutional guardrails to and . In the hands of today¡¯²õ plutocrats, these ideas have been twisted into an anarcho-capitalist fantasy, where government exists solely to protect property rights and privilege, not to serve the collective good.

This feedback loop between institutional erosion and plutocratic capture is deeply pernicious. As democratic systems falter, they become less capable of addressing legitimate grievances, fueling further disillusionment and creating openings for oligarchic exploitation. Musk¡¯²õ obsession with and Thiel¡¯²õ investments in reveal their ultimate outlook: a society where escape and survival are privileges reserved for the elite, leaving the rest of humanity to grapple with the consequences of their unchecked extraction.

The warning is clear: These figures have no interest in preserving democracy, equality or collective progress. Their vision is one of opportunistic disruption, where the mechanisms of accountability are dismantled under the pretense of efficiency and innovation. Regulatory agencies, courts and public oversight, imperfect as they may be, are the only barriers preventing the concentration of power into a few hands. Their dismantling would leave society vulnerable to exploitation on an unprecedented scale.

Reform to save democracy

And yet, while resisting this encroaching oligarchy, we cannot ignore the urgent need for institutional reform. America¡¯²õ bureaucracies must evolve to meet the demands of the 21st century. This requires not just efficiency but transparency, equity and a renewed commitment to serving the public. Reform must aim to modernize outdated processes, empower regulatory agencies to oversee complex industries and rebuild public trust in government. Crucially, it must prioritize the public good over corporate and oligarchic interests, ensuring that democracy serves all Americans, not just the privileged few.

The American experiment is at a tipping point. The promise of democracy ¡ª a government of, by, and for the people ¡ª is under siege by those who would replace it with a system where power is synonymous with wealth. The stakes are nothing less than the soul of the nation. If we fail to confront this threat, we risk surrendering our future to the ambitions of a few, abandoning the ideals of equality, freedom and shared prosperity that define the American dream.

This is not merely a battle for governance; it is a battle for the essence of who we are as a society. The time for complacency is over. To safeguard democracy, we must demand reform that serves the people and reject the hollow promises of those who seek to exploit our divisions. America¡¯²õ future depends on our ability to see through the rhetoric of freedom and efficiency and to recognize these oligarchs for what they are: opportunists intent on consolidating power at the expense of the nation. The choice is ours, and the time to act is now.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post The Faces of American Oligarchy appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Levitsky and Way observed that this shift away from constitutional democracy was occurring with surprising ease. Trump and his appointees managed to overcome various legal barriers to authoritarianism with relatively little resistance. Although the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary posed challenges, these were not insurmountable.

In a follow-up op-ed in the New York Times on May 11, 2025, Levitsky, Way and Daniel Ziblatt asserted that the United States had already become a competitive authoritarian regime. They argued that America’s nominal constitutional order had been superseded by a new 21st-century version of authoritarian rule. This form of governance does not resemble the “strongman” governments of Latin America, such as Juan Per¨®n’s Argentina or Alberto Fujimori’s Peru, nor does it mirror one-party dictatorships of interwar Europe or the theocracy of Iran.

An alternative characterization might be “kleptocracy.” Trump, his immediate family and their associates have reportedly used the presidency to enrich themselves on an unprecedented scale. While this behavior aligns with , the administration appears to pursue a broader agenda beyond mere personal enrichment.

Anne Applebaum, in her work , suggests that competitive authoritarian regimes often exhibit corrupt practices associated with kleptocracy, ranging from overt theft to more subtle forms of corruption.

Levitsky, Way and Ziblatt define “competitive authoritarianism” as a regime that maintains the outward appearances of constitutional democracy. However, the institutions, laws and norms typically associated with such a system have been hollowed out. In this model, a leader and his inner circle direct state affairs with minimal constraints on their actions.

Civil society, the free press, independent media, private enterprises, educational institutions, the judiciary and proactive local governments have all seen their capacity to resist decisions made by the ruling elite diminished. Consequently, constitutional democracy becomes a fa?ade, concealing a more authoritarian reality.

Is this newly established American competitive authoritarian regime irreversible? Trump and his appointees currently control the central levers of power. Despite attempts to overturn the 2020 presidential election through extralegal means, Trump continues to enjoy substantial popular support. His affluent donors have allocated hundreds of millions of dollars to support pro-Trump GOP candidates in the 2026 congressional elections. There are that upcoming elections may not be free from interference by Trump-aligned state officials.

Nevertheless, an anti-authoritarian backlash appears to be emerging. Almost every weekend, anti-Trump and anti-Elon Musk protesters gather not only in major coastal cities but also in smaller communities across the country, including traditionally conservative states like , and . These demonstrators carry banners and placards opposing federal budget cuts, particularly those affecting Medicaid, child welfare, wildlife and fire protection and the maintenance of national parks.

Protests extend beyond the streets. Members of Congress and senators who hold town hall meetings often face constituents voicing opposition to the Trump administration’s mass dismissal of federal employees, especially those in public health roles.

The administration has also taken steps to the free press. For instance, parent companies of major television networks like CBS and the program 60 Minutes have on unrelated grounds, seemingly aimed at discouraging critical coverage of Trump’s policies.

Despite these pressures, television news outlets such as CNN and MSNBC continue to feature commentators who are highly critical of Trump and his administration. Prominent figures like , , and have publicly condemned Trump’s rise to power.

There are precedents where seemingly entrenched competitive authoritarian regimes have been ousted and constitutional democracy restored. Poland, for example, was governed from 2015 to 2023 by the populist Law and Justice Party under Prime Minister Jaros?aw Kaczy¨½ski. During this period, the government exerted control over the judiciary, public media, cultural institutions (with religious backing) and numerous private businesses. However, in the 2023 national elections, Law and Justice was defeated by a centrist liberal party.

Brazil offers another example. Former military officer and populist leader Jair Bolsonaro won a significant election victory in December 2018. Throughout his four-year tenure, Bolsonaro frequently attacked Brazil’s democratic institutions, including its supreme federal court. Despite his substantial support base, Bolsonaro lost his bid for re-election in 2023. Subsequently, his supporters stormed key government buildings in Bras¨ªlia, demanding his reinstatement¡ªa move reminiscent of the January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol by Trump supporters. This effort failed, and Bolsonaro now faces multiple criminal charges.

Conversely, some prominent American academics specializing in European fascism, such as Jason Stanley, Marci Shore and Timothy Snyder, have accepted positions at the University of Toronto. If conditions at American universities continue to deteriorate as suggested by Levitsky, Way and Ziblatt, more scholars may choose to leave the country.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial?policy.

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Atul Singh: Yes, exactly. Let¡¯²õ talk about Mark Carney Leading Liberals to a Fourth Consecutive Victory. That is huge. So let me paint what¡¯²õ happened very quickly. Liberals won 169 out of 343 seats, they got 44% of the vote. The Conservatives won 144 seats, 41% of the vote. Pierre Poilievre, the Conservative leader, lost his own seat. Now, for our American viewers and listeners, remember that Canada has a parliamentary system modeled after Westminster in the UK. I have to explain it to a young American tomorrow ¡ª so, you don¡¯t just get to be a presidential candidate. You¡¯re the leader of a party, everyone fights their own parliamentary seat and the party that gets the most seats, or the candidate who can command majority support in Parliament, gets to be prime minister. It is somewhat important to get elected into Parliament, otherwise you can¡¯t be the leader of the Parliament if you¡¯re not even in Parliament. So, poor Pierre ¡ª a really bad day for him. What makes it worse is that this was a comeback victory. The Liberal Party has enjoyed a historic surge in polls since the start of the year. Under Mark Carney, a former Governor of the Bank of England, former governor of the Bank of Canada, Liberals have beaten the Conservative Party. So he can send a thank-you card to Donald Trump. Now, how did the fault lines break out? And remember, Mark only announced he was running on January 16, and he won all 343 electoral districts to become leader of the Liberal Party. During the leadership campaign, what did he do? He repudiated some of Justin Trudeau¡¯²õ economic policies. He blamed Trudeau¡¯²õ profligate spending for Canada¡¯²õ vulnerability to American tariffs. He pitched himself as the best-placed candidate to negotiate with Donald Trump and deal with Canada¡¯²õ perilous economic situation. The message, and obviously his impressive r¨¦sum¨¦, resonated with many voters.

Canada¡¯²õ anti-Trump vote

Atul Singh: What did Pierre do? Pierre was against immigration and inflation, and he was promising some sort of Canada First¡ª

Glenn Carle: But he was in favor of apple pie and motherhood.

Atul Singh: (Laughs) Yes, exactly. And, shall we say, he came unstuck. So more about Mark from Glenn, because both of us played ice hockey for Harvard. (Laughs)

Glenn Carle: That¡¯²õ right. His chief qualification for any position is that he was a Harvard hockey player. But he¡¯²õ a youth. He was ten years after I was there, so I¡¯ve never met him, unfortunately. Well, this may be one of the positive ¡ª perhaps the one positive ¡ª thing that Donald Trump has achieved in his public life, is that he brought Mark Carney to the premiership of Canada. I think the vote, to the extent that it has significance in a larger sense ¡ª it¡¯²õ certainly important for Canada ¡ª is that it¡¯²õ an anti-Trump vote. The Conservatives and significant parts of the center of Canada ¡ª the inland of Canada, Alberta and Manitoba, and so on ¡ª are Trumpian in their political outlooks. And this election was a repudiation of that. It was not only anger at Trump and fear of his imperialistic, bombast rhetoric, and so on, but a rejection of the resonance that that has had within elements of Canadian society and politics. So that makes it significant for Canada, but also in a larger sense. Also, Canada is¡­ well, there¡¯²õ no other superpower-sized state other than the United States or China. The EU is a conglomeration, of course, a union. So Canada has as much influence as most any. I think in the ranking of economic size, it¡¯²õ sixth or seventh or something like that, which makes it significant and plausible as a standard bearer for how to coalesce and respond to the threats to all of the norms and practices posed by Donald Trump. Now, what concretely that means remains to be seen, but he at least is, for the moment, the apparent champion of how to respond to Donald Trump.

Global response

Glenn Carle: Now, for the world, what does that imply? The issues in Canada are similar to those of France, Germany, England and other industrialized democracies. How do you address overregulation? This is the big argument always of conservatives. How do you address insufficiencies in defense spending? How do you develop a coherent foreign policy with allies that affirms these norms and yet somehow acts independently, if necessary ¡ª as it appears it will be ¡ª to the United States?

Atul Singh: And immigration.

Glenn Carle: Thank you. And the most important thing of all: All of this is a response. Carney¡¯²õ election, all the turmoil in Europe politically, the rise of the far rights in nation after nation ¡ª fundamentally, is a reaction to, if not a response to, the issue of immigration and social change. That underlays and explains, really, what¡¯²õ happened in the United States and in all of these other states. So his election shows perhaps a hope for a response, but has the similar underlying causes. Except poor Canada is stuck having this troublesome behemoth on its southern border, and so it¡¯²õ obviously a response to that. How this will evolve is unknown, but Carney has as many qualifications as anyone ¡ª with the possible exception of political skills. But he¡¯²õ done well for the last four months in that regard.

Carney¨CSheinbaum collaboration?

Atul Singh: Canada potentially offers hope for the Liberals that all is not lost. It is a huge boost to Mexico as well. Remember that the US has two major trading partners ¡ª Canada and Mexico ¡ª one to the north, one to the south. It doesn¡¯t have a Pakistan or China at its border, unlike India, so life is a lot easier. And now Claudia Sheinbaum ¡ª who¡¯²õ in some ways Marxist, but is a canny politician and a tough negotiator ¡ª will almost inevitably team up with Mark Carney, who is a technocrat, who is an economist, who¡¯²õ a savvy character who¡¯²õ acquitted himself fairly well, actually, when he was heading the Bank of Canada. That was after the global financial recession, the global financial crisis. And then he headed the Bank of England during the Brexit years, at a time when the Bank of England got greater powers to oversee banks¡¯ capital requirements. So he is a bit of a policy wonk, and it remains to be seen now how both Sheinbaum and Carney negotiate with their national¡­ I wouldn¡¯t say enemy, but national and ideological adversary. So hey ho, there we go: The die is cast.

Glenn Carle: Everyone should play hockey, and you¡¯ll have national success.

Atul Singh: Exactly. On that note, we will see you next month. Thank you very much for watching this. Subscribe to our YouTube channel if you¡¯re watching this on YouTube. And if you are reading the summary on our website, then make sure you sign up for our newsletter and follow us on social media if you¡¯re on social media. And remember that should you want advice on political and geopolitical risk and the global economy, you have Glenn Carle, the senior partner of FOI, to turn to ¡ª and we will send you good stuff should you contact us. Bye for now.

Glenn Carle: Au revoir.

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Many scholars argue that the country falls short of this ideal. They cite systemic issues that require significant reform. The system of checks and balances intended by the founders does not always function effectively. Some experts warn that aspects of governance under President Donald Trump have shown authoritarian and fascist tendencies. These include vilifying the press, undermining independent institutions and encouraging nativist sentiments.?

In 380 BC, Greek philosopher Plato warned that could devolve into tyranny. Today, nationalist appeals have led segments of the American public to support strongman politics, often without realizing its full implications.

Related Reading

No, Trump Is Not the End of US Democracy. It Never Existed.

When Trump took office as the 47th president on January 20, he solemnly to restore free speech and end political persecution. Critics argue that his administration has done the opposite. These included scrutiny of legal, journalistic and academic institutions seen as critical of his agenda. This has sent shock waves worldwide, damaging the American reputation as a society open to free speech.

War on free speech

While Vice President J.D. Vance of free speech at the Munich Security Conference in February, Trump¡¯²õ presidency alarmed allies who questioned the US commitment to open discourse. At home, incidents involving law enforcement and protestors have led to accusations of overreach. Universities such as Columbia University have prided themselves on openness and welcoming various views but are now at risk of being defunded if they do not punish protestors. While some oppression of free speech is not new to America, Trump¡¯²õ level of persecution reaching into the Ivy League universities is unprecedented.?

One example is authorities arresting Mahmoud Khalil, a Columbia University affiliate involved in protests. On March 8, when Mahmoud Khalil and his pregnant American wife, Noor Abdullah, were returning from dinner after a day of fasting in the evening to their Columbia-owned apartment complex, the authorities followed them inside the building and arrested him. After his arrest, Khalil was transferred to a Louisiana detention center. His case drew national and international attention and sparked legal challenges. Civil rights advocates raised concerns about due process and the treatment of lawful residents. On March 26, authorities also arrested Rumeysa Ozturk, a Tufts University Ph.D. student, during a . Critics questioned the use of immigration enforcement in politically sensitive contexts. These incidents contributed to concerns that dissent may receive disproportionate scrutiny.?

Republican officials, including Texas Governor , have called for punitive actions against protestors accused of antisemitism or hate speech: ¡°Students joining in hate-filled, antisemitic protests at any public college or university in Texas should be .¡± Critics argue that while public institutions must protect students from hate, blanket punitive measures risk suppressing political expression. Americans are now frightened to express their political thoughts, fearing the repercussions.

Government corruption

Concerns about democratic backsliding extend beyond law enforcement. America¡¯²õ founding fathers feared the evolution of the presidency into an imperial office. In fact, that fear was the driving force behind the of powers into three distinct branches of government: the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. This is traditionally called the ¡°¡± system. Each branch of government can challenge the actions of another branch. At first sight, the checks and balances system appears to be an effective way to maintain democracy. However, in the current state of affairs, this process has led to partisan division and logjam.

One of the more severe issues comes from the judicial branch. On July 2, 2024, the Supreme Court¡¯²õ decision in expanded presidential immunity and weakened the rule of , preventing some aspects of the system of checks and balances. This has led to perceptions that the courts are acting along partisan lines, which has eroded trust in legal institutions.

The wealthy

The influence of wealth in politics is well documented. US President once described the system as an ¡°oligarchy with unlimited political bribery.¡± This is because the US political system relies heavily on private campaign contributions. To win a Senate seat, a candidate spends an average of over $10 million. According to , the 2016 presidential candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, spent a combined sum of over $1 billion on their political campaigns. For Trump¡¯²õ , Tesla and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk contributed over $276 million, transportation heir and former Pan Am Systems chairman Timothy Mellon gave $150 million, and casino fortune widow Miriam Adelson donated $106 million to Trump¡¯²õ 2024 election effort.

This gives affluent individuals and organizations disproportionate influence. It also prevents political diversity since third-party candidates can not afford to compete. Establishment control also impacts marginalized communities through a process called , in which the boundaries of electoral districts are strategically drawn in a way that favors one political party over the other. Minorities, the poor, and the least educated are usually the victims of this unethical practice.

Wake up call

Corporate ownership and corruption continues to dominate the US, distorting political discourse and prioritizing conflict and spectacle over substance. This environment fuels widespread disillusionment among voters, who increasingly feel that neither of the major political parties represents their interests. Reforms to the system are long overdue. Otherwise, troubles lie ahead. 

To restore public confidence in democratic institutions and build a more inclusive political system, comprehensive reform is essential. Several key proposals have emerged in recent years as steps toward meaningful structural change.

First, campaign contributions from individuals should be capped at a level accessible to the average-income American. This would help curb the outsized influence of wealth in politics and ensure that electoral participation is not contingent on financial privilege.

Second, media outlets ¡ª particularly those operating on public airwaves or benefiting from government incentives ¡ª must provide to all qualifying candidates. A truly informed electorate requires access to a diversity of viewpoints, not merely those favored by corporate media or major donors.

Lastly, the influence of large donors must be significantly curtailed through strict campaign finance rules and transparent reporting requirements. Without limits on private money in politics, the policy process risks becoming increasingly unaccountable to the public.

Only through such structural reforms can the United States create a political system that genuinely reflects the will of the people. By rebalancing the relationship between money, media, and political power, these changes would help reestablish the democratic principles on which the republic was founded.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial?policy.

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Lo and behold, that future is all too distinctly here. What happened in the first quarter of this century is already being weaponized in a startling fashion in the second era of US President Donald Trump. In fact, the deluge of eye-opening, antidemocratic policies that we¡¯ve witnessed in just the first 50 days of his presidency should be considered nothing short of a perverse escalation of the recent past. Think of it, in fact, as ¡ª if you don¡¯t mind my inventing a word for this strange moment of ours ¡ª the ¡°perversification¡± of War on Terror-era law and policy, which might once have been hard to imagine in this country.

While there are already all too many examples of that very sort of perversification, let me just focus on several that could prove crucial when it comes to the future of our imperiled democracy.

Rising racism

Among the numerous anti-democratic trends of this century, state-sponsored racism has been a constant concern. Of the many low points in the response to September 11, the unleashing of government policies of racial and ethnic discrimination stands out. Fearing a follow-up attack, law enforcement targeted Muslim Americans, surveilling mosques and casting a startlingly wide net of suspicion with a sweeping disregard for civil liberties. That approach was only strengthened by the militarization of police forces nationwide in the name of targeting Arabs and Muslims. In 2002, the government even introduced the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System , a ¡°Special Registration¡± requirement mandating that all males from a list of 24 Arab and Muslim countries, as well as North Korea, register and be fingerprinted. In the words of the American Civil Liberties Union, the program amounted to ¡°a discriminatory policy that ran counter to the fundamental American values of fairness and equal protection.¡±

A dangerous template for discrimination based on race, religion or national origin was thereby set in place. In his first term in office, Trump promptly doubled down on that Islamophobic trend, even though his predecessor, President Barack Obama, had revoked the registration requirement. By Executive Order , Trump authorized a ban on the entry into the United States of citizens from seven Muslim countries, an order that would be reined in somewhat by the courts and finally by President Joe Biden.

In Trump¡¯²õ first term, discrimination was not limited to those from Arab and Muslim countries. As the Costs of War has pointed out, the Islamophobia of the War on Terror years had set a racial-profiling precedent and example for the more broadly racist policies of the first Trump administration. ¡°The exponential surveillance since 9/11 has also intensified the criminalization of marginalized and racialized groups¡­ and has increasingly targeted protest movements such as Black Lives Matter.¡± Yes, Trump did indeed go after Black Lives Matter protesters with a vengeance during his first term, even unleashing armed without insignia to tear gas, beat and detain such protesters in Portland, Oregon.

While Obama would end the Special Registration program and Biden would revoke the Muslim ban, no preventive measures were undertaken to guard against future racist policies and, all too unfortunately, we see the results of that today.

Trump 2.0 has already escalated discriminatory policies, focusing on protecting white males at the expense of people of color and women. In fact, his very first executive orders included several measures cracking down on and closing off legal avenues to citizenship, as well as a brazen decree aimed at eradicating diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) throughout the country. Executive Order (¡°Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity¡±) was issued on January 21, 2025, the very day he took office. It ordered organizations and entities ¡ª from government offices and the US military to schools, businesses and more ¡ª to end their DEI policies ¡°within 120 days¡± or risk losing government funding.

Recently, making good on its threats, the Trump administration $400 million of federal funding in the form of grants and contracts to Columbia University as a sign of disapproval of that university¡¯²õ supposed tolerance of pro-Palestinian protests. This was, as National Public Radio reported, ¡°described as the school¡¯²õ failure to police antisemitism on campus.¡± Nine other universities are believed to be under similar scrutiny.

In other words, the discrimination enshrined by federal authorities in law and policy after September 11 opened the way for a far more widespread governmental embrace of racial and ethnic discrimination now underway.

Disappearing the record

Secrecy was likewise baked into the government¡¯²õ response to the War on Terror, often to keep what would have been obvious abuses of the law well hidden. Whether it was the use of ¡°enhanced interrogation techniques¡± ¡ª the phrase employed by the administration of President George W. Bush for acts of straightforward ¡ª or mass surveillance, the for the targeted killing of an American citizen or the implementation of other policies that deviated from accepted law and practice, all of that and more was initially kept well hidden from the American public.

Now, many have described the brazen upheavals decreed by the Trump administration as being the very of secrecy ¡ª as, in fact, ¡°saying the quiet part out loud.¡± In reality, however, in these first days of his second term in office, Trump and crew have taken secrecy to a new level, replacing it with a broad policy of erasure and invisibility. In fact, despite the administration¡¯²õ pledge of ¡°¡± in areas like spending, a hostile onslaught against the written record has prevailed.

This determination to bury the record was apparent during the first Trump administration. He repeatedly asserted his right, for instance, not to document his meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In 2017, he reportedly that were taken at a meeting with Putin. In 2019, at the G-20 in Buenos Aires, he with neither a translator nor a note-taker present. The Washington Post that ¡°U.S. officials said there is no detailed record, even in classified files, of Trump¡¯²õ face-to-face interactions with the Russian leader at five locations over the past two years.¡± In other words, on a matter of top national security concern ¡ª US¨CRussian relations ¡ª a ¡° of seclusion¡± was created, effectively leaving it to the two presidents to make decisions in secret. Meanwhile, in his first term in office, Trump allegedly certain records relevant to the classified documents case against him down the toilet.

In his onslaught against record-keeping and the public¡¯²õ right to know, the National Archives has become a prime target. Trump¡¯²õ battle with the Archives had its origins in his legal struggle over the classified documents he was alleged to have kept in his possession in violation of the law after his first administration. Supposedly, he even security camera footage taken at Mar-a-Lago that showed boxes of those documents being moved. Now, the president has US Archivist Colleen Shogan, replacing a professional academic with , despite his duties as secretary of state.

His outright refusal to keep a record of his administration¡¯²õ activities is also reflected in his that the records of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) fall under the Presidential Records . This applies to the records of the president and vice president and comes with the guarantee that they can be withheld from the public for up to 12 years after he leaves office. The Act also allows for the disposal of records, pending the approval of the national archivist.

In a further example of denying information as a form of politics, Trump¡¯²õ Office of Professional Management ordered the of gender-related content from its websites, as well as the erasure of gender-identifying pronouns from email signatures and an end to all gender-related programs and grants. This led to the removal of pages from the Census.gov website, as well as from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and military websites, and the of the acronym LGBTQ+ with LGB. Under court order, some of these webpages have been put back up, even if with this defiant :

¡°Any information on this page promoting gender ideology is extremely inaccurate and disconnected from the immutable biological reality that there are two sexes, male and female. The Trump Administration rejects gender ideology and condemns the harms it causes to children, by promoting their chemical and surgical mutilation, and to women, by depriving them of their dignity, safety, well-being, and opportunities. This page does not reflect biological reality and therefore the Administration and this Department rejects it.¡±

In other words, the Trump administration¡¯²õ claims of legitimacy for its purge of information remain strong. The legacy of state-sanctioned secrecy and a parallel burying of the record, inextricably tied to the post-September 11 era, has already found a secure footing in the second Trump presidency.

Undermining the courts and the law

Time and again in the War on Terror, the Department of Justice and the courts deferred to the federal government in the name of national security. As a 2021 Brennan Center noted, national security deference was apparent in decisions not to hear cases due to ¡°state secrets¡± claims, as well as in decisions that prioritized over civil liberties guarantees and human rights considerations what government lawyers argued were the constitutionally granted powers of the president in national security matters.

Under Trump the second time around, it¡¯²õ already clear that there¡¯²õ going to be a full-scale assault on the legitimacy of the legal system. Witness the administration¡¯²õ on judges whose decisions have gotten in the way of his agenda. When a judge ordered the restoration of public health data that had been removed from government websites, he was summarily castigated by billionaire Elon Musk as ¡°evil¡± and someone who ¡°must be fired.¡± Meanwhile, the Department of Justice has already moved to squelch independent decision-making by immigration court judges, them with nothing short of dismissal should they rule against the president¡¯²õ prerogatives.

Then there are the attacks on law firms that have opposed Trump. Recently, were removed for lawyers at the law firms of Perkins Coie, which represented presidential candidate Hillary Clinton¡¯²õ campaign in the 2016 election; and Covington Burleigh, which represented Jack Smith, who investigated Trump in the Biden years. Lawyers from those firms were also banned from federal buildings. And don¡¯t forget the all-out attempt to go after officials who and January 6 cases.

The idea of an independent Justice Department has been severely damaged, with the promise of so much more to come.

Evading accountability

More often than not, the significant transformations of law and policy that grew out of the response to September 11 were relegated to the pages of history with little or no accountability. The Senate, under Senator Dianne Feinstein¡¯²õ leadership, did produce a on the CIA¡¯²õ use of torture. It detailed despicable acts of cruelty and ultimately concluded that such techniques, decreed to be legal by the Department of Justice, were ¡°not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees.¡± And immediately upon taking office in 2009, Obama issued an officially ending the use of torture. But he was decidedly against holding any officials accountable for what had occurred, preferring, as he so memorably , to ¡°look forward instead of looking backward.¡± In addition, Obama refused to call torture a ¡°crime,¡± labeling it a mistake instead.

Today, in more mundane matters, the distaste for accountability has been institutionalized throughout the government. In his first term in office, Trump dismissed or five inspectors general, officials assigned to departments throughout the executive branch of government to monitor waste, abuse and fraud. Almost immediately upon taking office this time around, he dismissed ¡°¡± of them. For the moment, Musk¡¯²õ DOGE, which, from its creation, never included an inspector-general position, is now by the Department of Treasury¡¯²õ inspector general.

Trump¡¯²õ aversion to accountability clearly reflects a desire to protect his own efforts to totally control executive policy. It should, however, also serve as a striking reminder of the aversion to accountability that followed the legalization and uses of torture in the post-September 11 years, the allegedly decision to go to war in Iraq, the mass surveillance of Americans in that era and so much more. All of this set in place a grim template for the second Trump era: the notion that no one is ultimately accountable for abusing the law when their actions have been ordered (or simply approved) by the president.

Lessons (un)learned

Given the magnitude of the most recent antidemocratic actions by Trump and his team, blaming them on the slippery slope created during the War on Terror years may seem like a distinct overreach. Yet, given the dangerous excesses we¡¯re now witnessing, it¡¯²õ worth remembering just how vulnerable the loss of certain norms of legality and accountability in those years left this country ¡ª and how sadly little we seem to have learned from that era.

Racism, a lack of deference for the courts, the failure to hold individuals and organizations accountable for informally rewriting the nation¡¯²õ laws, the pervasive embrace of secrecy and an unwillingness to erect strict guardrails to prevent the future manipulation of both laws and norms ¡ª all those realities of the War on Terror years created a distinctly undemocratic template, however different in scale, for this Trumpian moment of ours. An unwillingness to be accountable or to circumvent secrecy during the War on Terror led the country straight into today¡¯²õ quagmire.

Today¡¯²õ horrific moment should, in fact, be considered ¡ª to return to that word of mine one last time ¡ª a true perversification of past misdeeds, made all too possible by a failure in the post-September 11 years to take measures to prevent their recurrence.

[ first published this piece.]

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The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial?policy.

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We Americans were, of course, going to shock and awe them. But from that moment on (if not from the moment, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, when, rather than simply going after Osama bin Laden and crew, President George W. Bush launched a full-scale invasion of Afghanistan), you could say that it was we who were truly shocked and awed. After all, in their own disastrous fashion, our post-9/11 wars prepared the way for¡­ yes!¡­ Trump to take the White House the first time around (shock and awe!) ¡ª and then the final disastrous retreat of the American military from Afghanistan in 2021 on the Biden administration. (¡°Kamala Harris, Joe Biden ¡ª the humiliation in Afghanistan set off the collapse of American credibility and respect all around the world.¡±) And of course, four years later, his reelection on a functional platform of Trump First, Americans Last, was distinctly a double shock and awe!

And if you¡¯ll excuse my being thoroughly repetitious, that was ¡ª or at least should have been seen as ¡ª the true definition of shock and awe. Trump! Twice! Even now, can you truly take it in? In fact, more or less every moment since his reelection victory in November 2024 has been ¡ª pardon me for the turn of phrase ¡ª a first-class S&A experience.

And ¡ª shock, if not awe ¡ª I haven¡¯t even mentioned billionaire CEO and now Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) head Elon Musk yet, have I? I mean, who can take him in either? The richest man on Planet Earth (S&A!) and, at least until Trump levied those massive tariffs on our three major trading partners (only to partially back off soon after), still making money hand over fist (wrist, pissed?) ¡ª (S&A!) just between the November 2024 election victory of Trump and the moment he actually took power again in January 2025 ¡ª at the expense of the rest of us. Meanwhile, he¡¯²õ been more or less running this country (into the ground) hand in glove with Trump, who, by the way, is already talking about a possible ! (¡°They say I can¡¯t run again; that¡¯²õ the expression¡­ Then somebody said, I don¡¯t think you can. Oh.¡±) Now, wouldn¡¯t that be an all-American S&A first (or do I mean last?)!

A mad, mad, mad world

Phew, I¡¯m already out of breath and exclamation points! No surprise there, of course, given the awesomely shocking and shockingly Trumpified (or do I mean Muskratted?) world we¡¯re now living in and dealing with.

After all, we once again have a president who himself is (or may be ¡ª since you never know with him) a and has at his side the DOGE-y man with a totally made-up position and an organization that nonetheless seems to have the power to dismantle whole parts of our government. (? Who needs them? , who cares?) He could evidently even purchase Mars (and to help colonize that planet). And imagine this: despite all the dough they and their billionaire pals possess ¡ª there are of them in his administration, worth something like $460 billion ¡ª Elon and he seem intent on shoving through Congress a plan that would make his a permanent feature of American life (whatever it may cost the rest of us).

Don¡¯t try to tell me that we¡¯re not in a mad, mad, mad world (MMMW, if you prefer). And hey, the man who only recently set a record by spending more than an hour and 40 minutes giving the State of the (Dis)Union speech or speech of any sort ever to a joint session of Congress has done a remarkable job of foisting his version of an (Foist? Last?) policy on the rest of us and this world ¡ª a world that distinctly isn¡¯t ours, but his. Think of us as now living in a Trump First World, or TFW. Of course, his version of America First includes those recent tariffs (some but not all of which have been ) that, though officially levied against Canada, China and Mexico, were actually being foisted on the rest of us. Count on one thing: in the end, we will undoubtedly pay through the nose for them. So, no question about it, we have certainly entered a distinctly S&A era.

The double D of Donald

In truth, the 45th and 47th (and ?) president of the United States is a genuinely remarkable figure. Truly historic ¡ª or do I mean hysteric? After all, who can¡¯t bring some image of him to mind at any moment? That face, that stare, that glare, that red tie, that wave in his hair. Need I say more?

In his own remarkable fashion, he should be given full credit and a double capital D ¡ª for both Donald and Decline. Or just think of him as PD (for President Decline). And it is remarkable that a single figure, one man who once oversaw the bankruptcy of he had launched, could become responsible for potentially the greatest bankruptcy of all ¡ª the ending of the American Century (as we once knew it) and even, after a fashion, humanity¡¯²õ centuries on Planet Earth.

I mean, who can even remember anymore the time in a distant century ¡ª the year was 1991, to be exact, the very moment when Trump for the Trump Taj Mahal and the year before he did the same for the Trump Plaza Hotel ¡ª when the Soviet Union went into the garbage pail, China had not yet truly risen, and this country was left alone as not just a great power but The Great Power or TGP, the only one left on Planet Earth? That, in retrospect, was a truly shock-and-awe moment. And isn¡¯t it no less shock-and-awing to think that a mere 34 years later, that same country is now led by a raging maniac on an America First platform that could, in effect, prove to be an America Last one? In a mere two terms in office, he will have taken what was once known as the planet¡¯²õ ¡°sole superpower¡± into a world of chaos and, ultimately, disaster of a sort we still can¡¯t really grasp. He will have been the ¡ª and yes, that¡¯²õ the appropriate word, not president ¡ª from hell. (In fact, the White House digital strategy team all too appropriately a portrait of Trump with a golden crown and the phrase ¡°¡±!)

And if that (and he) isn¡¯t the definition of shock and awe, what is?

Burn, baby, burn

Worse yet, tariff by tariff, tax by tax, act by act, Trump stands a reasonable chance of taking this planet down with him. Think of it as little short of remarkable that, in a world in which , (and every decade) is hotter than the previous one in a record fashion, in a world in which the weather and its devastating effects ¡ª from fires to storms to floods ¡ª is only growing more extreme and more horrific, Americans freely voted in (a second time around!) someone whose election phrase of choice was ¡°¡± but might as well have been ¡°heat, baby, heat¡± or ¡°storm, baby, storm,¡± or simply ¡°burn, baby, burn.¡±

And if his platform was America First (but truly Donald First), it distinctly should have been Planet Earth Last. (Of course ¡ª don¡¯t be shocked ¡ª he also appointed as secretary of health a man who that the way to fight measles outbreaks is with anything but a vaccine.) Yes, above all else, Trump, who has called climate change both a ¡°¡± and a ¡°¡± continues to be focused on making sure that ever more oil, natural gas and coal comes out of the ground and is indeed burned, baby, burned forever and a day.

Of course, no one should be surprised, given the way the fossil-fuel companies . He¡¯²õ already gone out of his way to anything the Biden administration did to fight climate change and the country¡¯²õ departure from the Paris climate accords (again). As the New York Times , ¡°In a few short weeks [of his second term in office], Trump has already severely damaged the government¡¯²õ ability to fight climate change, upending American environmental policy with moves that could have lasting implications for the country, and the planet.¡± What he¡¯²õ doing is now considered a ¡°¡± on climate programs of all sorts (though it might better be thought of as a ).

At one point, he was even eliminating 65% of the employees at the Environmental Protection Agency (S&A!). Lasting implications indeed.

In any other era, Trump would still undoubtedly have been considered a nightmare and a half, but not a potentially world-ending one (at least the world as humanity has known it all these endless centuries). The truth is that, once upon a time, if you had told anybody that this would be our S&A version of the future, you would have been laughed out of the room.

The second time around with no end in sight

And yet, there can be no question that, all these years later, despite bankruptcy after bankruptcy and failure after failure, he remains the man of the second, minute, hour, day, week, month and year. Give him credit. It¡¯²õ a remarkable record not just when it comes to the success of failure but of putting Himself (and yes, under the circumstances, I do think that should be capitalized!), not America First.

Oh, and while all of this has been going on, the Democratic Party has but largely been . Imagine that! And as for Congress, remind me what it is (other than an audience for You Know Who).

Consider it a remarkable historical irony that America First has remained Trump¡¯²õ slogan all these years when, in reality (or what passes for it in his universe), it should certainly have been Trump First and, when it came to anything that truly mattered to him, America (not to speak of the rest of the world) Last!

Worse yet, if all of us hadn¡¯t actually lived through the Trumpian epoch (epic? toothpick?), I don¡¯t think anyone could have made this up or, in a previous version of America, even imagined it happening. And if they could, there can be little question that they would simply have been laughed out of the room, if not institutionalized, not once but twice.

And yet here we are, the second time around with no end in sight, and a third time a history-breaking possibility, leaving us fully and thoroughly in another America on another planet. Phew! Talk about shock and awe!

I must admit, with at least three years and 10 months to go in the era of You Know Who, I find it hard to imagine our future, even if (as is certainly possible) the American and global economies go down the tubes and the Democrats are swept back into Congress ¡ª I¡¯m sorry, where? ¡ª in 2026.

Nonetheless, for the (un)foreseeable future, we¡¯re all living with Trump in a genuinely shock-and-awe world of almost unpredictable strangeness. In some fashion, all of us are now Afghans or Iraqis.

[ first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial?policy.

The post Trump’s Policies Deliver Shock and Awe While Disrupting Global Order appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

With no outright majority, coalition negotiations are underway. Merz is in talks with the SPD, aiming to form a government by Easter. Yet, AfD¡¯²õ strong performance has unsettled mainstream parties, reflecting a growing populist sentiment within Germany.

A CDU/CSU¨CGreen coalition would fail to reach a simple majority, and AfD and Die Linke are incompatible with CDU/CSU¡¯²õ values. Thus, allying with the SPD as the only viable option. Ironically, this would allow the SPD to remain in government despite a resounding defeat.

The SPD, trying to repair its image, may push for considerable concessions from CDU/CSU, complicating negotiations.

Constitutional challenges

Merz has a controversial workaround to Germany¡¯²õ constitutional debt brake (Schuldenbremse) by using off-budget special funds (Sonderverm?gen). Although a vocal defender of fiscal discipline, he suggests temporarily suspending the Schuldenbremse to finance key investments, particularly in defense and infrastructure, without violating its formal rules.

This approach mirrors the Scholz government¡¯²õ strategy to fund a €100 billion military upgrade after Russia¡¯²õ invasion of Ukraine. By shifting borrowing outside the core budget, Merz aims to balance economic pragmatism with conservative fiscal principles. Critics argue it weakens the Schuldenbremse¡¯²õ credibility and entrenches off-budget debt mechanisms.

Germany¡¯²õ constitution (Grundgesetz) limits government borrowing and ensures long-term fiscal discipline. Enshrined in Articles 109 and 115, the Schuldenbremse restricts the federal government¡¯²õ structural deficit to 0.35% of GDP per year, while the states (L?nder) are prohibited from running structural deficits. Exceptions exist for emergencies, such as economic crises or natural disasters, but any deviation requires a repayment plan.

Introduced in 2009 in response to the financial crisis, the Schuldenbremse reflects Germany¡¯²õ deep-rooted aversion to excessive debt. While praised for maintaining fiscal stability, critics argue it limits public investment and economic flexibility, especially during downturns.

The Greens and the FDP have been ¡° of [Merz¡¯²õ] proposals¡± without their party representatives present at the announcement. The current government fell apart over much smaller fiscal issues ¡ª one can only imagine how FDP, being fiscally conservative, must feel regarding these proposals.

Changing Germany¡¯²õ constitution is deliberately difficult in order to ensure stability and protect democratic principles. Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in both the Bundestag and Bundesrat, making broad political consensus essential. This rigidity prevents legal manipulations that once enabled authoritarianism. Even widely supported reforms often stall due to political fragmentation or federal-state disagreements, reinforcing the constitution¡¯²õ role as a safeguard against abrupt shifts in governance.

A race against time

In the new Bundestag, Merz will not have the majority needed to make changes. AfD will nearly double its seats in parliament, from 83 to 152, only 12 seats behind CDU¡¯²õ 164. Along with the Die Linke¡¯²õ 64 seats, two non-centrist parties will control over a third of the Bundestag, enabling them to block decisions requiring a two-thirds majority.

In a stunning move, Merz proposed amending the constitution before the new parliamentary session begins at the end of March. He aims to increase borrowing, particularly for defense spending. The proposal requires a two-thirds majority in both the Bundestag and Bundesrat. Fiscal conservatives fear it could weaken Germany¡¯²õ strict debt rules.

Some constitutional law experts the current Bundestag lacks the legitimacy to change the constitution since it no longer reflects the people¡¯²õ will. Others . Legal challenges are likely, with AfD and Die Linke action.

Even if Merz¡¯²õ proposal passes in the Bundestag, securing a two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat will be difficult. The Bundesrat represents Germany¡¯²õ 16 L?nder. Its 69 members are by state governments, not elected. States must cast all their votes as a block ¡ª either all in favor, all against or abstaining. If a state cannot agree, its votes count as abstentions, making a two-thirds majority harder to reach.

Missing votes from six states, including those where Die Linke and BSW hold influence, would leave the remaining states with just one vote above the threshold. If any of the five states with Green-led governments abstain, the proposal fails.

The Bundestag will proposed reforms on March 13, with a vote scheduled for March 18. If the Bundesrat rejects the bill, a mediation committee (Vermittlungsausschuss) will be convened to negotiate a compromise.

The Vermittlungsausschuss has 32 members, 16 from each chamber. AfD, FDP, and Die Linke hold 10 seats combined. Members are not bound by directives or party mandates, leaving room for surprises. Lengthy negotiations or delays could make compromise impossible before time runs out.

Reactions at home and abroad

Germany¡¯²õ Bundesbank has allowing a maximum fiscal deficit of 1.4% of GDP, provided the debt-to-GDP ratio stays below 60%. The proposal has little chance of adoption, as Germany¡¯²õ debt-to-GDP ratio currently sits at 62%.

Meanwhile, the EU is adjusting its fiscal rules, particularly the Maastricht deficit criteria, to accommodate increased defense spending. These rules cap government deficits at 3% of GDP and public debt at 60% of GDP.

The EU may expand what qualifies as defense investment, including military equipment, arms manufacturing, and dual-use infrastructure. Germany has for an indefinite exemption for defense spending from EU fiscal rules, a significant shift from its traditional fiscal conservatism.

The markets have had their own reaction to the developments. Expectations of increased European defense spending have driven up defense industry stocks. Companies like , and have seen share prices soar, some doubling within weeks, as governments boost military budgets in response to geopolitical tensions.

The proposed fiscal expansion will lead to increased government borrowing, higher bond issuance, and rising yields. German 30-year government bond yields saw their biggest daily since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Despite this, the European Central Bank interest rates by 0.25 percentage points on March 6, disregarding inflationary risks from large government spending programs. Higher long-term rates in Europe increase the euro¡¯²õ attractiveness, its exchange rate.

Germany¡¯²õ shift away from fiscal rigidity marks a Zeitenwende ¡ª a historic turning point. Long committed to balanced budgets and the Schuldenbremse, Germany now faces pressures from geopolitical instability, economic stagnation, and aging infrastructure. Fiscal conservatives are reconsidering their stance.

This transformation mirrors Germany¡¯²õ abrupt reversal in defense policy after Russia¡¯²õ invasion of Ukraine. As pacifism gave way to military investment, fiscal discipline now faces challenges from economic and security realities.

European governments are likely to welcome Germany¡¯²õ shift toward looser fiscal policies, as it could ease financial constraints across the eurozone. For years, Germany¡¯²õ strict austerity stance clashed with the preferences of France, Italy, and Spain, which favored more flexible spending to stimulate growth.

What will happen next?

A more expansionary German budget could boost domestic demand, benefiting European exporters and reducing economic imbalances within the European Union. Increased German investment in defense and infrastructure would also align with broader European priorities, particularly as the continent seeks greater strategic autonomy. A less rigid German fiscal approach could pave the way for EU-wide initiatives, such as joint borrowing for defense or industrial subsidies, marking a shift from Berlin¡¯²õ historical opposition to collective debt mechanisms.

Increased fiscal spending on defense and infrastructure may create jobs and stimulate economic activity, but it will not directly address the social and economic grievances fueling right-wing populism in Germany. Rising living costs, immigration concerns, and a growing disconnect between political elites and ordinary citizens have driven support for AfD. The party has capitalized on public frustration by positioning itself as the voice of the disillusioned.

Without targeted policies to address wage stagnation, housing shortages, and social cohesion, simply lifting fiscal restraints may not curb the populist surge. If higher spending triggers inflationary pressures or tax hikes, it could even deepen resentment, reinforcing the populist narrative of an out-of-touch establishment.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial?policy.

The post Winners and Losers ¨C Deciphering Germany¡¯²õ Election Results appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Rashid, popularly known as Engineer Rashid, has taken established political parties and people outside the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) by total surprise. Conducting his campaign from prison, he won a parliamentary seat in this year¡¯²õ Lok Sabha election. On July 5, he was officially sworn in.

There are indications that the J&K electorate angry at its pathetic condition and at unfulfilled promises punished established parties. 

The victory prompted political parties and the public outside the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) to wonder who Engineer Rashid is and what factors prompted his dramatic victory. 

Who is Engineer Rashid, and why is he so popular?

Engineer Rashid was a Member of the Legislative Assembly from the Langate constituency in the now-defunct state of Jammu and Kashmir. (In 2019 the Modi government decided to repeal Article 370, a special provision of the Indian constitution that autonomy and statehood to J&K. It also granted powers to the state government on all matters except defense, external affairs and communications. Once the article ceased, the state a union territory with a governor appointed by the central government.

Engineer Rashid is also the founder of the Jammu and Kashmir Awami Ittehad Party.

In 2019, the National Investigation Agency arrested him in a case. He has been in ever since. The jail sentence did not stop him, however, from contesting the election. 

Engineer Rashid¡¯²õ decision to contest the Baramulla made him hugely popular among the youth. Baramulla has been infamous for militancy and political dormancy. For much of the last 30 years, the district large-scale armed violence. Though incidents of mass violence have declined from its peak in the 1990s, until , the district faced frequent breakdowns in law and order.

Despite promises by previous governments to improve law and order and the economic situation, locals in particular the youth felt that they hadn’t seen any real change or improvement in their lives. Engineer Rashid¡¯²õ campaign tapped into this sentiment. 

His decision to from the constituency came as a rude shock to established political parties. Before the announcement, it was widely expected that the clash would be between the National Conference (JKNC) and Apni Party, both of whom had roots running deep through the constituency. While the JKNC is an ideologically party, the Apni Party itself with Prime Minister Narendra Modi¡¯²õ Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. 

The election campaign

With his father in jail, Abrar campaigned throughout the constituency. Like his father, he is also hugely popular with the party base and youngsters who accompanied him wherever he sought votes.

Abrar his overwhelming support to his ¡°father¡¯²õ good work for the people of Jammu and Kashmir,¡± adding that he was ¡°in the campaign only because [of his] father.¡± He expressed his at ¡°his father being behind bars for the past five years,¡± claiming that it was so ¡°because he talked about Kashmir and its people¡± while ¡°the rest of the parties used money and muscle power.¡± Abrar is of the opinion that ¡°people were of their own will and that the credit for the entire campaign goes to them.¡±

Many of the individuals who attended his drive-through rallies shared their support for Engineer Rashid. Among them was Inayat Adil, a young man in his 30s who was of the opinion that, ¡°For many years, or decades for that matter, people preferred to as we did not feel that any leader was worth voting for. They would visit us during the election and soon vanish, but this time we feel that we should vote for Engineer Rashid.¡±  

Mohammad Yousuf Shah, an aged man from Pattan, stated that the ¡°previous leaders made ¡®,¡¯ which is why we are supporting Engineer and participating at his rally.¡± He hoped that the Engineer could become the people¡¯²õ voice in the parliament.

People waiting in a queue to cast their votes in Baramulla. Via Sajad Ahmed Bhat. Used with permission.

In a crucial development, Home Minister Amit Shah Jammu and Kashmir on May 16, a few days before voting was to take place. Shah is something of a legend due to his feat in in 2017. Then the BJP¡¯²õ national president, he led the party to a in India¡¯²õ most populous state, Uttar Pradesh. This year, it seems, the BJP felt the need to pull the big guns into J&K.

During his visit, Shah made an appeal to the party cadre to ask party supporters to vote against the JKNC, the People¡¯²õ Democratic Party and the Indian National Congress, indicating that the Altaf Bukhari’s Apni Party and Sajad Lone’s People’s Conference were preferable options. He also expressed for not fielding BJP candidates in some seats. 

Election day

The atmosphere in and around the Baramulla constituency was different from usual. People were to vote rather than the election as was the norm in J&K. 

An Elderly man, showing ink mark on finger and holding a voting slip in his other hand, after casting his vote. Via Sajad Ahmed Bhat. Used with permission

Unemployment, lack of development and with successive governments not fulfilling their promises weighed heavily in the minds of many first-time voters. One such first-time voter was Mubasir Ahmed. He felt that the ¡°government had not fulfilled its promises¡± adding that the voters had come out of their ¡°homes in hope of a change¡± expressing faith in the vote they were ¡°going to cast this time.¡±

Other voters expressed similar sentiments. They are fed up with ¡°unemployment, long , hectic power bills,¡± expressing hope that their ¡°chosen leader will solve all their issues¡± and ¡°be their voice.¡± Yet another voter, Mohammad Ramzan, stated, ¡°Voting is everyone¡¯²õ right and that should be used, with the hope that my chosen leader will, God willing, win.¡± The voter¡¯²õ yearning for a change was visible from the turnout. 

As per the data from the Election Commission of India, the was 59.10%, the highest in eight elections. Interaction with and suggested a clear wave against the ruling BJP¡¯²õ since the repeal of Article 370 of the Indian constitution and dissatisfaction with parties not doing anything about livelihood issues. First-time young voters, educated individuals and a group of elderly voters turned out in large numbers.

Engineer Rashid won by a margin of 472,481 votes. He political heavyweights such as former Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, leader of the JKNC. Other defeated candidates were Sajad Lone from the People¡¯²õ Conference and Mir Mohammad Fayaz from the Jammu and Kashmir People¡¯²õ Democratic Party.

The results clearly indicated frustration with the status quo and a desire for change. It also showed that national heavyweights such as Shah were unable to change the result in a way that was favorable for the BJP.?Last Friday, Engineer Rashid took his oath as a Members of Parliament. Rashid was parole to take the oath. The ceremony took place amid heightened security in the parliament complex.

[?edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post An Electoral Stunner! How Engineer Rashid Suddenly Won From Prison appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The US claims to be a representative democracy, meaning the people¡¯²õ elected officials are obligated to consider their constituents¡¯ ideas, interests, concerns, and welfare in making political decisions. However, the reality is that US politicians feel indebted to the megadonors who finance their elections, and as a result, choose to serve not the people who voted them into power, but the financiers who made their election to office a reality. 

Will American Democracy Perish Like Rome¡¯²õ?

The rich have US politicians on a leash. In 2017, the then president, was accused of meeting with his 2016 campaign megadonor, Sheldon Adelson, for counsel on how to address the mass shooting in , a horrific attack that killed 59 people and injured over 500 at a country music festival. That was two days before Trump finally arrived in Las Vegas to meet with the surviving victims and the families mourning the dead. Trump has denied these allegations, claiming that the timing of his meeting with Adelson was purely coincidental, and had nothing to do with the fact that Adelson had major investments in Las Vegas.

The US electoral system is incredibly , as demonstrated by its of the House Speaker, an event that will go down in history as one of the most notorious examples of the inefficiency of American politics. The country seems to be exclusively  run by two conflicting political parties: the Democrats and the Republicans. Consequently, the nation has become extremely politically polarized, and many Americans experience daily frustration and anger over conflicting political beliefs. 

Economic disparity and discrimination are particularly oppressive to minority groups including Native Americans, blacks, Latinos, and now Muslims. The gap between the rich and the poor is deep and ever-widening. Approximately 32% of all wealth in the US is held by only 1% of the population, an alarmingly disproportionate statistic. Even more concerning is that at the same time, over 11% of Americans live below poverty.

A 2020 article by described the economic disparities in the United States quite accurately, stating that, ¡°Americans may be equal, but some are more equal than others.¡± Even when the US is in a deep deficit, the government tax policy consistently favors the rich, despite the fact that of Americans believe the nation¡¯²õ wealthiest should pay more taxes.

The Trump Dynasty is as Dysfunctional as the Windsors

The United States government (USG) is entangled with the , the ¡°¡± of America. By definition, any  government whose power, either overtly or covertly, is controlled by a small group of wealthy constituents, is called plutocracy. Former US president once alluded to the plutocracy of the US political system, describing it as, ¡°an oligarchy with unlimited political bribery.¡±

The Incentive for Corruption

Because political candidates in America require to run their campaigns, they become obliged to the rich. Towin a Senate seat, a candidate spends an average of over $10 million. According to , the 2016 presidential candidates, Hilary Clinton and Donald Trump, spent a combined sum of over one billion dollars on their political campaigns.

The wealthy also use their power to manipulate the media, flooding broadcasting platforms with polarizing advertisements and persuading the American public that the only votes that count are votes for either the Democratic or Republican parties. 

This sort of propaganda makes many Americans feel overwhelmed and confused about  which candidate they  should be voting for, and some even choose to abstain from voting at all because they don¡¯t support either candidate. Many Americans are ignorant that the elections are a scheme to make them think about having a voice in the government. However, the choice of who ultimately becomes president, congressman, or other official is usually left to the two political parties at the mercy of the rich. 

Even at the state level, wealthy Americans control political candidates and elected officials by donating to their campaigns. The rich also use their financial power to marginalize certain communities through a process called , in which the boundaries of electoral districts are strategically drawn in a way which favors one political party over the other. . Minorities, the poor, and the least educated are usually the victims of this unethical practice.

Understanding Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering

A Call For Reform

Without ethical standards in place to ensure equal opportunity and constitutional rights for all citizens, democracy can easily become what John Adams called, ¡°the of the majority.¡± Thomas Jefferson also purportedly claimed that democracy can often resemble mob rule, and this comparison has a ring of truth.

The USG must reform.The country¡¯²õ current system is riddled with corruption and will not be sustainable long term, as evidenced by the 2021 insurrection at the U.S. capitol building. At the very least, steps must be taken to make sure that campaign funding is democratic and fair first by cutting all  government funding to individual campaigns and political parties, and instead requiring the media to allocate ¡°¡± at no cost to candidates. Second, the USG must create and enforce regulations to limit campaign funding and prevent ¡°megadonors¡± from manipulating elections and government policy.

To alleviate the megadonors¡¯ influence, the USG could limit all contributions from all sources equal to what an average-income American is willing to contribute to a candidate. PACs, unions and other associations can multiply that amount by the number of their active members. However, no member can be allowed to double-dip, individual and in group.

Only when the United States takes steps to implement these changes will the nation begin its ascension to true democracy. 
[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post The Truth About US Democracy appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Lula owes his triumph to the formation of a broad political front built during the election campaign to reverse the unpopular policies of Bolsonaro¡¯²õ far-right government. The 60 million Brazilians that elected Lula hope that Brazil will be politically rejuvenated, marking the end of Bolsonaro¡¯²õ effort to erode Brazilian democracy.

Lula¡¯²õ comeback

Lula  began his long political career as a trade union leader in the early 1980s. In 2003 he was the first leftist leader to be elected president in Brazil. After two terms in power, his government ended in 2011 with the highest popularity rating of any democratic government in Brazil¡¯²õ history.

Will Brazil See Justice for the Mismanagement of the COVID-19 Pandemic?

READ MORE

Lula cannot however dissociate himself from the scandal known as Operation Car Wash, a corruption probe that uncovered a web of money laundering schemes involving the Brazilian state¡¯²õ oil company. The unraveling of the judicial procedures that followed led to the jailing of the president in 2011. However, the Brazilian Supreme Court ultimately annulled all criminal convictions against Lula on the grounds of a series of judicial procedural errors by the prosecution.

In the  extremely polarized country that Brazil has become, Many Brazilians view Lula as the  leader who led Brazil to a brief period of prosperity. Lula¡¯²õ administrations may boast of a number of achievements, in particular, a considerable reduction of poverty and hunger in Brazil, an increase of Brazilians¡¯ real income, the expansion of social programs and policies, sustainable economic growth, creation of a domestic regime for environmental preservation, and the strengthening of Brazil¡¯²õ multilateral vision in global debates.

Despite Lula¡¯²õ many accomplishments as president, the corruption crisis involving Lula and his party provided the pretext for the rise of Bolsonaro to power as a far-right leader. In effect, Lula¡¯²õ disapproval rating among the electorate still stands at approximately 46% (according to two opinion polls, Datafolha and Ipec). What saved him in the election is the fact that Bolsonaro¡¯²õ disapproval rating was even higher.

Brazil Rejects Bolsonaro¡¯²õ Anti-Politics

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For an important percentage of citizens Lula¡¯²õ return to power has sparked great optimism for the future. 44% of Brazilians believe their lives will change for the better with Lula in the presidency, compared to 21% who believe their lives will improve if Bolsonaro were to continue as president (Datafolha).

Brazil and the Latin American ¡°pink tide¡±

Lula¡¯²õ government will be confronted with strong opposition in the national congress. He will have to govern with a National Congress dominated by a majority of far-right senators and deputies, who will do everything in their power to block his political agenda.

The parties forming the pro-Lula alliance in the senate and the lower house do not have the numbers that will permit them to pass laws. Lula will have to negotiate with the pragmatic parties representing the center of the ideological political spectrum who are in the habit of trading their congressional support in exchange for political benefits (for example, political appointments in ministries).

Unlike other Latin American countries that have turned to the left in what analysts have called a “pink tide” in the region, there are doubts whether Lula has enough political strength to implement progressive policies. Lula won the elections with a narrow margin of 2 million votes, revealing a deeply divided country. In his victory speech, Lula focused on the urgent need to reconcile the country: ¡°There aren¡¯t two ¡°Brazils, he proclaimed. ¡°It’s time to lay down our arms¡±.

Brazil¡¯²õ deep social divisions

The majority of Lula¡¯²õ votes +came from women, the poor, and Catholics. The poorest voters, those who earn up to two minimum wages (45% of the Brazilian electorate),  supported Lula, who received 61% of their vote intention, compared to 33% support for Bolsonaro. Also, Lula showed a great capacity for attracting female voters (53% of the electorate). In pre-election polls, around 52% of women declared they would vote for Lula. Only 41% expressed the intention to vote for Bolsonaro.

In recent years, there has been a marked politicization of Pentecostal churches in Brazil, the country that hosts the largest Catholic population in the world. Aligned behindBolsonaro, 62% of Evangelicals (27% of the electorate) declared their intention to vote for him, while only 32% intended to support Lula. In contrast, 55% of Catholics (52% of the electorate) showed a preference for Lula, whereas 39% declared their intention to vote for Bolsonaro.

Policy changes under Lula

The fight against hunger is urgent in a country that has experienced an increase in child malnutrition. 33 million Brazilians suffer from food insecurity. Lula¡¯²õ popularity among poor Brazilians derives from his policies aimed at combating poverty and hunger, such as the creation of the cash-transfer program, Bolsa Fam¨ªlia, which lifted over 40 million Brazilians out of poverty. Many Brazilians expect that Lula will once again innovate in his social policies, in contrast with Bolsonaro¡¯²õ failure to promote policies aimed at alleviating hunger.

Lula has a strong commitment to environmental preservation. One of his campaign promises concerned the creation of a ministry to deal with the interests of indigenous peoples. Lula also guaranteed the reactivation of existing institutions and legislation to combat environmental destruction. Currently, Brazil has one of its highest deforestation rates in decades and a significant increase in land conflicts culminating in record killings of environmentalists and indigenous people.

Beyond Latin America¡¯²õ Lost Decade

READ MORE

Brazil’s foreign policy will undergo a radical change as Lula will vigorously participate in global debates. Furthermore, Lula will bring Brazil closer to its Latin American neighbors, increase the weight of Brazil in the reform of international organizations, actively participate in the BRICS¡¯ initiatives, and create cooperation mechanisms between Brazil and developing countries.

Challenges ahead

Since becoming president in 2018, Bolsonaro immersed Brazil in a permanent democratic crisis. In this year¡¯²õ elections, Bolsonaro used the tools of the state for political purposes to influence the electoral process. In recent months, the ministry of economy increased social benefits, granted special credit for the beneficiaries of social assistance, and decreased taxes to reduce the price of gasoline and electricity. In addition to electoral abuses, Bolsonaro attacked democratic institutions in an attempt to generate public mistrust in the election results in the case of his defeat. Bolsonaro until now has not explicitly conceded the election.

After four years of democratic setbacks, politics must now seek solutions to the real-life problems that afflict most Brazilians. Lula has committed to transforming Brazil¡¯²õ harsh social reality while at the same time seeking a way of appeasing the followers of Bolsonaro¡¯²õ ultra-right movement. This task seems particularly difficult so long as Bolsonaro¡¯²õ anti-democratic extreme right movement remains present and active in the political landscape.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Brazil’s New President and Hope for a Democratic Revival appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

This law intends to give parents greater control over their children¡¯²õ upbringing and comes at the heels of a raging debate around (CRT) and its purported instruction in schools (K-12). Debates around the bill also culminated in the passage of another bill- HB 7:The Individual Freedom bill, which quite ironically curtails speech by prohibiting classroom instruction, curricula design, and workplace training on particular kinds of discussions about race, color, sex, or national origin. Once again, the law does not define what those restricted forms of speech are. The of this law is to crack down on what DeSantis calls “wokeness”.

Advancements in Gay and Lesbian Rights over the Years: What went wrong?

While these two laws are specific to Florida residents, ongoing hysteria over sexuality, gender, and race in American classrooms has a long political and legal history. On the issues of sexuality and gender in particular, the United States has made tremendous progress over the years. Pew research show that three decades ago, nine-in-ten American adults (89%) would have been upset if their child told them they were gay. But by 2015, that number fell to just four-in-ten adults (39%). On the issue of same-sex marriage too, support has meteorically over the years. In 2005, only 36% of adults favored legalizing same-sex marriage, while a much larger 53% opposed it. By 2015, opinions flipped and 57% of adults favored same-sex marriage, while only 39% opposed it. However, this support/opposition was pretty much confined to party lines, with 65% of Democrats and 65% of Independents showing support for same-sex marriage, compared to only 34% of Republicans (as of 2015). At the time of this Pew survey, same-sex marriage was already legal in 36 states and the District of Columbia but wasn’t yet legal nationwide. Yet almost 75% of voters across party lines believed it would inevitably become the law of the land (this indeed occurred in the landmark 2015 US Supreme Court ruling,). So how did the United States go from legalizing same-sex marriage in 2015 to banning certain types of classroom and workplace discussions on gender and sexuality in 2022?

Most of the activism over the past three decades focused on securing rights for gay and lesbian Americans, which meant same-sex marriage was typically the key issue at stake. As far back as 1986, the US Supreme Court ruled in that the US Constitution did not grant homosexuals the constitutional right to engage in same-sex conduct (¡°sodomy¡±) even within the privacy of their homes. Further, the Court repudiated a lower court¡¯²õ ruling that ‘gay rights’ emanated from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Seventeen years later in 2003, this judgment was overruled in, in which the same Court held that the reasoning in Bowers was flawed because the Fourteenth Amendment did in fact protect homosexual people¡¯²õ liberty to engage in private and consensual same-sex conduct. 

By this time, debates around the (ill)legality of same-sex marriage had also taken center stage in American politics, with Congress the now-infamous Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996. DOMA defined marriage as a “legal union between one man and one woman” for federal purposes (under Section 3 of DOMA) and allowed states not to recognize same-sex marriages recognized in other states if they so wanted (under Section 2 of DOMA). Section 3 of DOMA was eventually overturned by the Supreme Court in (2013), and Section 2 fell in (2015). With Obergefell legalizing same-sex marriage nationwide, any state ban on same-sex marriage was invalidated, effectively overturning DOMA. 

It should be noted that Windsor and Obergefell were decided by narrow 5-4 margins, and both victories emanated from decades of sustained efforts by gay and lesbian lawyers and activists. Such was the opposition they faced that a detailed 45 page by the Committee on the Judiciary accompanied the DOMA legislation, which cited the need for an Act like DOMA. The report spelled out the fear that legalizing same-sex marriage, even at the state level, would ¡°divide people unnecessarily¡± and adversely affect governmental interets. These interested were not confined to ¡°defending and nurturing¡± heterosexual marriage but encompassed a fear of state sovereignty ¡°subversion¡± and the ¡°impingement¡± of scarce government resources. 

At that time, no state in the US had yet recognized same-sex marriage. However, in May 1993, the Hawaiin Supreme Court held in that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples may constitute discrimination on the basis of sex. It was this ruling in Hawaii that then-Congressman Charles Canady and others called a ¡°significant threat to traditional marriage laws,¡± leading to multiple same-sex marriage across the length and breadth of the US over the next three decades, with DOMA being just the beginning.

While gay rights activists may have ultimately won the same-sex marriage debate, new and unfamiliar issues now animate voters, specifically conservatives. These issues include the rights of transgender people and those beyond the lesbian and gay sexuality spectrum (i.e. those beyond the ¡°L¡± and¡±G¡± of LGBTQ+). Since 2017, have considered passing ¡°bathroom bills¡± that would prohibit transgender and gender non-conforming people from accessing multiuser restrooms, locker rooms, and other sex-segregated facilities of their choice. Instead, these laws would compel them to use rooms corresponding with their biological sex. As recent as April 2022, Alabama’s state legislature an expanded ¡°bathroom bill¡± that would not only limit transgender and gender-nonconforming people¡¯²õ bathroom access but also prohibit certain discussions of gender and sexuality in classrooms from kindergarten through fifth grade (very similar to Florida¡¯²õ HB 1557). 

Florida¡¯²õ law has been named the ¡°don¡¯t say gay¡± law by because of its vague language proscribing classroom discussions on gender and sexuality in any manner not conducive to state standards. Moreover, parental notification rules in the law have raised speculation by critics that teachers may be compelled to ¡°out¡± LGBTQ+ students to their parents under this law. Conservatives, however, have pushed back on these claims, arguing instead that the law ¡°protects¡± children from sexual predators and ““. By re-defining this law as an ¡°anti-grooming¡± law, conservatives effectively draw from age-old tropes about homosexuality, such as the idea of a ¡°¡±- one that popular American evangelical commentator and theologian Dr. R. Albert Mohler Jr. once as ¡°propaganda for immorality¡± and ¡°poisonous to Christian morality.¡± He was, however, referencing the increasing representation of gay and lesbian characters in Hollywood. Nonetheless, the is applied by conservatives today to address gender and sexuality in school pedagogy. 

What lies ahead?

Ever since Lia Thomas became the first transgender athlete to the NCAA swimming title, conservative media has run a series of non-stop against her, which included multiple instances of intentional misgendering that eventually ignited a new debate about ¡®women¡¯²õ rights¡¯ and the ‘protection of women¡¯²õ sports¡¯. have already passed laws banning transgender girls and women from participating in sports corresponding with their gender identity, while have banned gender-affirming care for minors with gender dysphoria. This fixation with ‘protecting’ women and children has now become a common thread in many Republican-backed laws – from, to, to the slew of. The conservatives of today may have made a begrudging truce with same-sex marriage, but they still consider other LGBTQ+ issues a form of “dangerous woke propaganda¡± that is detrimental to children.

Clearly the path ahead is rocky. While gays and lesbians may have won the hard-fought right to marry, there is still a long way to go. Americans are still uncomfortable discussing sexuality, gender identity, and gender nonconformity, and only time will tell how all of this will play out in the courts and in the upcoming midterm elections.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

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Compared to a range of other industrial countries, the SGI 2022 shows that the US remains a weak in terms of sustainable policies in general (rank 33 out of 41 nations) and it receives middling scores overall (rank 22) with regard to economic policies ¨C a topic which looms large for almost every US voter. 

Will American Democracy Perish Like Rome¡¯²õ?

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The SGI 2022 US Report explains that ¡°GDP growth bounced rapidly back, returning to robust levels in 2021,¡± which coincides with the first year of the Biden administration. Massive emergency spending, which had already started under former president Trump, ¡°included payments to individuals and firms, as well as expanded tax credits and unemployment benefits¡±. Based on the findings on economic performance, while the incumbent president¡¯²õ party could be vulnerable, slight increases in some policy indicators since the Trump years, especially economic measures, also suggest that the incumbent majority party is unlikely to face a thumping defeat.  

The party polarization indicator of SGI ¨C where the US is ranked as the most country ¨C makes it plausible that both sides of a politically divided voting public feel energized in this election year, albeit for different reasons. Democrat optimism regarding their party¡¯²õ chances to contain losses is driven by the recent Supreme Court Dobbs v. Jackson Women¡¯²õ Health Organization that ended the nationwide constitutional right to abortion that had existed since the Roe v. Wade decision of 1973. At least initially, the Dobbs decision had a significant energizing effect, especially on women, steering them towards Democratic candidates. In contrast, polls taken until the early fall of 2022 seemed to indicate that Republican-leaning conservative voters in small-town America may have felt complacent after the success of the conservative movement¡¯²õ decades-long effort to strike down Roe v. Wade. 

The Trump effect

Former president Trump remains a central, and polarizing figure. Trump continues to claim falsely that the 2020 election was stolen and he has remained in the public gaze amid Congressional investigations into the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol and his handling of classified documents. As a consequence, Democrats¡¯ campaigns focus on perceived threats to US democracy by Trump and his followers. From the perspective of SGI 2022, this strategy is obvious, but not risk-free. While the report states that there is ¡°increasing tension over the conduct of elections¡±, and ¡°voting rights have become a contested issue, with the Republican party seeking to suppress low-income and minority votes¡±, it is also true that Democrats have failed to pass a major voting-rights act through Congress despite their majority. The United States falls into the upper-middle ranks (rank 15) in terms of quality.

The Next Surge of Trumpism

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Meanwhile, the Republican electorate is reveling in President Biden¡¯²õ approval ratings of well below 50 percent, though ratings are not as low as it was a few months ago. In the polls, it is inflation, not abortion or democracy, that tops potential voters¡¯ concerns. Recent economic data¡ªwhich showed ongoing inflation¡ªwill keep it there. Nearly every US household is grappling with higher costs, energy and gasoline prices. But only Republican-leaning voters see inflation as the number one issue, blaming it squarely on Joe Biden and the Democrats. For Democrat-leaning voters, however, inflation is important but does not top the agenda, seen instead in the context of global economic disruptions following the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. For these voters, abortion rights for women after the Dobbs decision is the top issue. The number two and three issues for Republican-leaners are immigration/border control and rising crime. For the Democrat-leaning constituencies these topics matter less. For them, a close second after abortion rights is saving US democracy from the perceived attack by MAGA-Republicans, followed by health care.  

It’s the economy, stupid

But the mobilization of white suburban Republican and independent women who may be worried about the cost of living, school decisions or rising crime could neutralize or offset the impact of those who are mobilized by abortion and the threat to US democracy. As a consequence, Republicans aim to focus voters¡¯ attention on crime and immigration and away from abortion. Meanwhile, rising prices and inflation remain a factor everywhere and will ultimately decide at least the House elections. 

In sum, the midterms are more than just a referendum on President Biden. A few weeks before election day, predictions of sweeping Republican gains have been tempered by the changing political climate, thanks in large part to the Dobbs decision, although the Republicans remain favored to take control of the House. In the final weeks, amid economic jitters, elections could turn on how much sustaining energy the Dobbs decision provides for Democrats or whether it fades in the face of so-called ¡°kitchen table¡± concerns. 

What happens now in 2022 will also lay foundations for the presidential elections of 2024. If Trump-backed Republican Senate candidates like Herschel Walker in Georgia or J.D. Vance in Ohio do badly on November 8, 2022, Trump is less likely to be nominated as their 2024 presidential candidate. If Governor Ron DeSantis of Florida is re-elected as governor of the sunshine state for a second term, this will give him momentum for a likely bid for the White House. Conversely, if the Democrats manage to keep their Senate majority and win statewide races for governor and/or the Senate in crucial presidential battlegrounds like Michigan, Wisconsin or Pennsylvania, it would likely fuel confidence for a President Biden re-election campaign for 2024. On the other hand, if the Democrats fare badly in the midterms and other state elections on November 8, 2022, the current president faces rising pressure not to seek a second term. 

[We thank the Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) project of the German Bertelsmann Foundation for this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

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Like many foreign scholars before me, I debated at the Oxford Union. I met fiendishly clever debaters such as Ewan Smith, Sarah Munby (then Monroe) and Tom Hay. I also ran into knaves who are best left unnamed. In conversations with both the clever and the cads, a name came up repeatedly in discussion: Boris Johnson.

As a foreigner, I failed to see the charm of Johnson. To me, he seemed a pathological liar. Johnson was so transparently dishonest that it was surprising, if not shocking, to find clever people dance to his tune. Even then, he was truly a Pied Piper, especially for young Tories. They swore by The Spectator, used his phrases in debates and waxed lyrical about Boris¡¯²õ brilliance.

Over time, I began to understand Johnson¡¯²õ appeal. As I wrote on July 24, 2019, ¡°this Old Etonian is a lovable Falstaffian rogue.¡± He is Lord Flashheart of the comedy classic Blackadder, a modern Henry VIII and even a portly James Bond known for derring-do and top-level shagging. Johnson breezes through life as the ultimate smooth-talking amateur, cool as a cucumber under pressure. In brief, Johnson or BoJo, as he is often called, is a British cultural archetype. It is for this reason that, in the words of fellow Old Etonian Cameron, Johnson ¡° all forms of gravity.¡±

A Supremely English Cad

Ken Clarke was once known as the big beast in British politics. Today, the big beast is Boris. Persistent lies, numerous scandals and even illegitimate children have failed to sink BoJo. Like a phoenix, he has repeatedly risen from the ashes.

Yet it would be churlish to deny that BoJo has managed historic achievements. He made Brexit possible. Nigel Farage alone could not have led the Brexiteers to victory. As inflation, rising interest rates and mounting debt increase strains within the EU, Boris might emerge as the modern day Henry VIII who paved the way for the great escape from Europe.

Henry¡¯²õ reasons for creating the Church of England were not quite honorable but, arguably, the breach with Rome led to the British Empire. Brexit might not lead to Empire II but it could save the UK from a disaster-headed EU. Many equanimous Brits see the current turbulence as a passing phase. After all, German cars, French cheeses and Italian wines are still sold in the UK. In Ukraine, Brits are playing a role second only to Americans in taking on Vladimir Putin. And they can thank BoJo for it. There is life in the canny old dog yet.

Arise King Boris, Father of Brexit and Foe of Brussels

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BoJo has proved to be a winner. In 2019, the Conservatives won 365 seats out of 650 in the House of Commons.  Under Boris, the Tories smashed the ¡°red wall¡± of solid Labour seats in northern England. Not since Margaret Thatcher has anyone led the Tories to such a victory. Scandal and the loss of two key by-elections led to a palace coup. Conservative MPs ousted Johnson in much the same way as their predecessors defenestrated Thatcher. 

After a protracted leadership election, Truss won. Her government to have ¡°the shelf-life of a lettuce.¡± Unfunded tax cuts and energy-price guarantees spooked markets, put the pound in freefall and caused bond yields to rise. The Bank of England was forced to intervene . Truss resigned after 45 days, becoming the shortest-serving prime minister ever. Some would argue that, like Thatcher and Theresa May, Truss was a Roundhead. Cameron and Johnson are Cavaliers. The English Civil War of the 17^th century continues within the Conservative Party with full-on blue-on-blue conflict. Now that a doctrinaire low-tax, high-growth Roundhead is out, Big Boris might be dreaming of returning ¨¤ la the Glorious Revolution of 1688.

Dishy Rishi Stands in the Way

Even as Johnson is cutting short his holiday and flying back from the Dominican Republic, Sunak has already managed to get 93 MPs lined up behind him. Unlike Truss, Sunak is a Cavalier. He might be the son of immigrants but he went to Winchester College, a boarding school even older than Eton. Founded by William of Wykeham in 1382, the school¡¯²õ former pupils are called Wykehamists or, as a wag remarked, the special ones. So special is Sunak that he confessed to not having any working class friends, causing some during his campaign.

Sunak is not only a Wykehamist but he is also a PPEist. He worked at Goldman Sachs, did an MBA at Stanford and became a partner at The Children¡¯²õ Investment () Fund Management, a top-level hedge fund. At Stanford, Sunak met Akshata Murty, the daughter of an Indian software billionaire, and went on to marry her. Unlike Johnson, Sunak is a family man. There is not even any rumor of an affair. As a mutual friend remarked, Sunak is smart and can count. An affair would be far too expensive a proposition. He has a taste for fine things in life and his natty suits have won him the nickname Dishy Rishi.

In the leadership election debate, Sunak was on the money when he that the most pressing priority for the new government was inflation. He opposed any ¡°unfunded spree of borrowing and more debt,¡± which he predicted would make things worse. When Truss said that inflation was because of loose monetary policy, Sunak declared, ¡°borrowing your way out of inflation is a fairytale.¡± Sunak has been proved right. Many are convinced that this Goldman Sachs golden boy is the best man for the top job.

Big and beefy Boris faces slim and sexy Sunak on his return to 10 Downing Street. Some hold that BoJo will back out, let Dishy Rishi deal with the mess he has created, let Labour win the next election, screw it up and then ride back to power on a triumphal chariot as the savior of the Tories. Others argue that he will never let Sunak, the snake he picked out of obscurity, slither into 10 Downing Street. Dishy Rishi¡¯²õ resignation led to Big Boris¡¯²õ downfall. Now, BoJo is plotting revenge.

Like last time, most MPs will back Sunak. They want a safe pair of hands on the tiller. However, the 172,000 of the Conservative Party have the final say. They tend to be older and whiter in comparison to today¡¯²õ multicultural and multiracial Britain. As a friend remarked, it is hard to get grannies in Dorset or Somerset to vote for a brownie fuzzy wuzzy even if he is rich and posh. The fact that Sunak¡¯²õ wife had claimed non-domicile status, saving millions of pounds in tax, also makes many old school Tories suspicious. They have doubts about Dishy Rishi being entirely British.

Despite all his sins, the Tory rank and file adore Boris. They are likely to vote for him, not Sunak. If he can squeak through the parliamentary vote. Big Boris could well be back.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Will Boris the Big Beast be Back? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

As with previous elections, this one followed a . The story goes like this. The parliament deadlocks over disputes about who the emir has appointed as his prime minister and cabinet. Allegations of the ruling Al-Sabah family¡¯²õ corruption and unruly MPs playing to their tribal and sectarian constituencies add to a toxic brew of simmering resentment between the ruling family and the elected parliament. After months of wrangling, with important legislation left swinging in the wind, the emir dissolves the parliament and goes to the electorate hoping to end yet another impasse. Instead, the cycle of parliamentary deadlock, bitter wrangling and another election ensues. Naturally, the Kuwaitis are getting tired of this sordid saga.

Understanding the Recent Election

Earlier this year. Crown Prince Sheikh Mishaal Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah standing in for his ailing half-brother Emir Nawaf the parliament after it refused to approve his choices for the prime minister and cabinet ministers. He was hoping that voters would elect a parliament more amenable to his decisions.  The people have voted in a parliament that is bound to disappoint him. The opposition, a disparate grouping united only in their visceral dislike of the Al-Sabah family, secured significant gains. With a gain of 27 new MPs, the primary were Islamists.

The result sets up further confrontations and the promise of more deadlock at a time when the parliament needs to pass legislation enabling the government to borrow from global markets. And while the bounce in oil prices as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine has provided financial relief, it is only temporary.  Unlike Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), its fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) hydrocarbons-rich neighbors, Kuwait is in efforts to diversify the economy away from near total dependency on oil.

Jenan Mohsin Ramadan Boushehri (l) and Alia Faisal Al Khaled (r) were elected as representatives of the Kuwaiti National Assembly, the national parliament. While most commentaries have focussed on Islamist wins and the likelihood of further deadlock, passing reference has been made to the election of . Note that no women were elected in the previous parliamentary election of December 2020.

Two Women MPs, Islamists and Implications for Women

Boushehri ran as an independent in the 3^rd constituency and comfortably.  She had previously served in the 2018 cabinet as the minister of public works and the minister of state for housing affairs. Joining her is the secular writer and thinker Al-Khalid who was in the 2^nd constituency.

Kuwaiti women have long campaigned against domestic violence and honor killings. Having two women in parliament may help to turn the tide but there remains a long way to go. After a wave of honor killings had rocked Kuwait last year, the women¡¯²õ rights activist Nour al-Mukhled, writing for had this to say:

, which passed in Kuwait¡¯²õ National Assembly in August of 2020, calls for the establishment of a National Family Protection Committee that would put measures in place to tackle the spread of domestic violence in Kuwait.¡­ Despite the fact that the law was passed more than a year ago, the law remains nothing but merely ink on paper, continuously failing to protect women who end up being victims of domestic violence.

The Wave of Femicides in Kuwait

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The new law replaced the notorious which effectively enabled honour killings by treating the murder of women by their husbands or other male relatives as a misdemeanour punishable by a maximum three year jail term and/or a maximum fine of 225 Kuwaiti dinars, a little over $700.

The Family Protection Law also called for training for those assisting survivors of domestic violence and provision for shelters, rehabilitation and advisory services. A parliament consisting entirely of males, as Nour al-Mukhled noted, did nothing to put teeth into the legislation as they bickered with the ruling family.

It is high time for Kuwait¡¯²õ parliament to act on honor killings and domestic violence. With two women back in parliament, change may come. But Kristin Smith Diwan, a senior resident scholar at Washington¡¯²õ Arab Gulf States Institute, makes an regarding the victory of Islamists: ¡°If those candidates come forth with conservative social positions it will divide those who are pushing for reforms.¡± Ominously Diwan added that 17 of the newly elected MPs had signed a ¡°values pledge¡± calling for, amongst other things, gender segregation in schools.

Last October, al-Mukhled concluded:

More than one year and six lives later, we still see the offhand attitude in parliament and society toward violence against women, a convenient way of condoning this tragedy without condemning and holding accountable those responsible.

To see off that offhand attitude will take more than two women MPs, it will require an almost entirely male parliament to find its mettle and begin to bring to an end attitudes and practices that shame Kuwait.

[ first published this article and is a partner of 51³Ô¹Ï.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

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As soon as the battle is won, the reality of politics in today¡¯²õ democracies returns to its default status, that of a game. Once elected, politicians deploy their carefully refined skills that allow them to dodge anything that might tend towards implementing long-term solutions. 

Electoral battles leave the dead and wounded on the battlefield to be mourned, cared for or revenged. But like the pieces on a chessboard, in most cases they can be replaced on their initial squares. The political games that follow the battles have the effect of simply changing the order of the teams in the standings. In the game, the only thing that counts is the score when the final whistle blows as well as the corresponding W or L. The score-keeping device of democracies is called an election.

This past Sunday saw two significant elections in two very different settings. France completed its presidential-cum-legislative election cycle that, since 2002, ritually takes place every five years. The second election took place on the American continent, the country whose surreal political metaphysics were summed up by Gabriel Garc¨ªa M¨¢rquez in 1967 in his novel One Hundred Years of Solitude (Cien a?os de soledad). 

Both of those elections produced shocking results, signaling the kind of reversal of trends that Olaf Scholz recently evoked when speaking about Germany¡¯²õ foreign policy. He used the German word,, a turning point in history. Scholz applied it specifically to the consequences of Russia¡¯²õ invasion of Ukraine: the newfound military resolve of Germany. Scholz thus evoked a top-down decision that foresees other top-down decisions to follow in the future. In contrast, Zeitenwende as reflected in the French and Colombian elections is likely to be more significant and with more long-term effects. They  both represent bottom-up examples of a historical ¡°turning.¡±

The drama of France¡¯²õ Cinqui¨¨me R¨¦publique

The French legislative elections had the radical effect of breaking what until now was felt to be the fundamental logic of France¡¯²õ Fifth Republic and a sacred tradition. The result of every presidential election in the Republic¡¯²õ history was confirmed in the immediate aftermath by the same electors¡¯ voting in a solid majority for the president¡¯²õ party in the National Assembly. Within less than two months, the voters thus not only elect a supreme leader, but promptly empower the president to implement the announced battle plan. 

When, in May, 1981, Fran?ois Mitterrand with a razor thin majority defeated the incumbent, Val¨¦ry Giscard d¡¯Estaing, a month later the electorate provided him with a clear legislative majority. He immediately and boldly began implementing his announced plan to nationalize all the major French industries, including the banks. Mitterrand¡¯²õ actions conformed perfectly to the model of presidential government foreseen by the constitution of the Fifth Republic a little more than two decades earlier.

Now, four decades later, the Fifth Republic has clearly run out of steam. On Sunday, for the first time a newly re-elected president, Emmanuel Macron, found himself deprived of the majority that will allow him to preside over a program of government. Macron will now be faced with the challenge of cobbling together some kind of coalition that will be given the label of a government. Most likely both Macron and his new government will be permanently occupied with managing a chaos of conflicting interests. That situation clearly contradicts the entire logic of the Fifth Republic.

Many are predicting that the Assembly will be dissolved within a year and new elections called to permit the definition of a stable majority. At that point, two things can happen. If the spirit of the Fifth Republic is still alive, the prospect of dissolution will provide Macron with the means of breaking the apparent deadlock by soliciting the population to endow him with a majority committed to his program and his leadership. Depending on how things play out, that will appear either as a clever or desperate gamble.

If, as the turning point seems to reveal, the spirit of the Cinqui¨¨me R¨¦publique has effectively retired or died, it will mark a return to the most dramatic moment of the Fifth Republic¡¯²õ history. That was the revolt of May 1968, an event President Charles De Gaulle had the temerity to malign with the word ¡°chienlit¡± (shitting in bed). The Republic nevertheless managed to clean the sheets after May ¡®68 and survive intact. This time feels very different.

The Colombian surprise

Even more astonishingly, the Colombian election marked an inflection if not a reversal of what appeared to be the eternal fate of Colombia: to be governed by a corrupt right-wing establishment permanently closely aligned with the foreign policy goals of the United States. The newly elected left-wing president, Gustavo Petro, alas does not have access to the luxury of newly elected French presidents who historically could count on an immediate legislative election to confirm the voters¡¯ endorsement of the candidate¡¯²õ program. 

The current bicameral Congress of Colombia is dominated by right-wing, centrist, and neoliberal parties. In other words, Petro will have a major challenge on his hands trying to get anything accomplished. Add to that the fact that the state security services and the armed forces are likely to resist Petro¡¯²õ authority, and it appears likely that Colombia will be living through its own, but very different kind of chienlit.

Most observers see Colombia¡¯²õ turnabout as simply part of the new ¡°pink tide¡± in Latin America, a phenomenon in which more and more American nations are voting in leftwing leaders. It is expected to increase the chances later this year of a victory in Brazil for Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva ¨C better known as ¡°Lula¡± ¨C over the current right-wing president Jair Bolsonaro. More broadly, Petro¡¯²õ triumph confirms the increasingly visible sentiment in Latin American countries that it is time to break free from the invisible shackles of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) that have bound them to a state of subservience to the US economy for almost exactly 200 years.

The ambiguous question of NATO

When Chancellor Olaf Scholz evoked his Zeitenwende, he gave no details about its meaning. He appeared to be saying that the Ukraine crisis was a wake-up call forcing Germany to break with its policy of cultivating a long-term friendship with Russia as well as its post-World War II stance of keeping a low military profile. 

The immediate impression this gave, eagerly welcomed in Washington, is that Germany would even more securely adhere to NATO. But in the background, there may be an even more significant turning point, which could have a deeper meaning. The current move may be more like a chess gambit designed to further a goal Germany already shares with France that consists of creating an autonomous European security framework no longer dependent on US leadership imposed through NATO. 

Reinforcing NATO would hardly justify the idea of Zeitenwende. In contrast, Europe breaking free from Anglo-American domination, especially after Brexit and the increasingly obvious revolt of many poorer nations and emerging powers, would truly mark a turning point in European and German history.

Was it all foretold by William Butler Yeats in 1921?

Speaking of Zeitenwende, this may be an appropriate moment to revisit a of anguished foreboding by Irish poet William Butler Yeats published just over a century ago. Here are the first ten lines of The Second Coming.

Turning and turning in the widening gyre

The falcon cannot hear the falconer;

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;

Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,

The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere

The ceremony of innocence is drowned;

The best lack all conviction, while the worst

Are full of passionate intensity.

Surely some revelation is at hand;

Surely the Second Coming is at hand.

Yeats¡¯²õ poem has remained one of the most memorable literary pieces of the 20^th century. These lines have been quoted by political commentators at various times over the past hundred years to sum up the state of Western civilization. Yeats¡¯ message in the immediate aftermath of the First World War was dire. At its core, in the third line, was a somber double assertion: ¡°Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold.¡±

Oswald Spengler had already reflected a similar sentiment that had been growing for some time in Europe. In 1918, he published the first volume of his Decline of the West, a work he had begun composing much earlier. In 1922, T.S. Eliot¡¯²õ The Waste Land appeared after being strenuously edited and ultimately ¡°crafted¡± by Ezra Pound. It offered a panorama of the cultural and indeed civilizational confusion that had overcome Europe in the first two decades of the twentieth century.

The Waste Land took over first place and never relinquished it in the race to establish ¡°the 20^th century¡¯²õ ¡°greatest poem in the English language.¡± Nevertheless, thanks to a succession of political events that seemed to bear out Yeats¡¯²õ description of a broken system, the Second Coming has probably earned more references in the media than Eliot¡¯²õ masterpiece. As the history of the twentieth century advanced, at various critical moments, things really did seem to be falling apart.

Just as Zeitenwende itself can be interpreted in various ways, so can Yeats¡¯²õ assertion that ¡°the centre cannot hold.¡± Yeats believed that the core of Western civilization was beginning to unravel like the twine below the leather surface of a baseball that has been torn asunder. His prescience was justified by the events listed above. But the unraveling is still incomplete. Most people are now aware that it could come to absolute fruition with an impending climate crisis, already making its marks, or perhaps even more quickly thanks to a nuclear ¡°accident¡± provoked in the context of the increasingly nerve-racking standoff in Ukraine.

Defining the center

Sunday¡¯²õ elections in France and Colombia provide a hint that what people thought of as the stable ¡°center¡± of their global and local political systems is losing its grip. The center has gone off kilter, leaving the impression that it can no longer hold. As a concept, the center can be defined as a normative idea of how governments, with decent enough efficiency, carry on managing forces that are so complex and powerful they defy the ordinary citizen¡¯²õ understanding. The center can thus be defined essentially as the inertia at the core of any establishment that keeps things ticking over from day to day.

The idea people have of the center implies belief in notions such as fair competition, free markets, reasonable government regulation, rule of law, free and fair elections. These cultural ideas are trotted ouy to reassure populations that their leaders are doing a decent job. At the same time, the guardians of the center spend much of their energy warning voters to be wary of personalities who deviate from the center. If given a free hand, these deviant personalities might upset the precious applecart. That is why Barack Obama intervened two years ago to prevent Bernie Sanders from winning the Democratic presidential nomination. Joe Biden was chosen, clearly an avatar of ¡°the center,¡±. Jeremy Corbyn suffered a fate similar to Sanders’ in the UK. In France, Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc M¨¦lenchon were both labeled extremist. But these deviants have now returned to squeeze the life out of Macron¡¯²õ vaunted center.

The political center in the West¡¯²õ democratic countries has long assumed the task of defending and protecting the existing balance of economic and coercive power. It¡¯²õ a system that has evolved, in an increasingly oligarchic fashion, around the productive forces of a neoliberal system designed specifically for the needs of the consumer economies promoted in the West. Additionally, over time, the question of security and the growing needs of the military-industrial complex have tended to set the tone and influence all the major decisions of the center.

Leaders such as David Cameron in the UK, Angela Merkel in Germany, Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and Joe Biden in the US, and Emmanuel Macron in France, epitomized a center that had clearly become oligarchic and increasingly plutocratic at its core, but democratic in its formal constitution. 

And then something happened. Six years ago a series of events set in motion the feeling that the center might no longer hold or no longer deserve to hold. Various political personalities came to prominence whose style and bearing challenged the idea of ¡°centerness.¡± Boris Johnson, Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Bernie Sanders, Jean-Luc M¨¦lenchon and others, with contrasting levels of seriousness and surging popularity, dared to deviate from an ideology built around the idea of trusting the ¡°tried and true¡± to keep things on a relatively even keel. Paradoxically, that turned out to be  the key to Macron¡¯²õ success in 2017, when the former pillars of the hard center ¨C that included the traditional parties of the left and right ¨C had fallen into discredit. The young interloper, aided by a runoff with the extremist Marine Le Pen, appeared to be a safe alternative to the existing sclerotic system.

Boris Johnson and Emmanuel Macron, both ambiguously perceived by their own establishments, have adopted policies respectful of the oligarchic power base that defines the center. But in their own way, they have both undermined the credibility of the center, in part by being too close to its oligarchic interests, which people have come to suspect, and in part because they have deviated from the cultural norm associated with the center.

The long and the short of it is that, within the Western block of respectable democracies, the center is rapidly losing its grip. At the same time, the periphery around that Western core is beginning to drift away from the traditional grip of the West, a grip that began with colonial conquest half a millennia ago. 

In its reporting on the Colombian election, The New York Times a television director who lives ¡°in a wealthy part of Bogot¨¢.¡± ¡°It¡¯²õ been a long time,¡± he recounts, ¡°since we had an opportunity like this for change. If things will get better, I don¡¯t know. But if we stick with the same, we already know what we¡¯re going to get.¡±

That may be the clearest sign that, even those who have benefitted from the status quo the center was designed to protect, are beginning to understand that ¡°the center cannot hold.¡±

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post France and Colombia: The Center Keeps Trying (but Failing) to Hold appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Petro has been leading the for more than two years and was the clear winner of the of the Pacto Hist¨®rico, a group of several leftist parties. The group also placed first in the congressional , marking the first time a leftist party performed strongest in the traditionally very country.

Petro was a of the urban revolutionary guerrilla group M-19, which demobilized in the early 1990s, and later became a senator and of Bogot¨¢, Colombia’s capital. His policy are moderate left, not too from the programs of European social democrats. They promise a more redistributive tax system, increased investment into public education and an end to oil extraction. 

A Time for Change

According to the World Bank, Colombia is the second-most country in Latin America after Brazil. Almost 40% of the population lives in. So, Petro¡¯²õ proposals resonate with voters. Petro has been a presidential candidate before. He ran in 2010 and 2018, when he lost in the round to Ivan Duque of the right-wing Centro Democr¨¢tico party.

Recent congressional elections reveal that the left is more likely to win this time. Many Colombians feel it is for a political change after decades of right-leaning governments. In 2016, the government of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Juan Manuel Santos signed a deal with the FARC, a guerrilla group. FARC had been fighting a Marxist insurgency against the Colombian army and state-aligned right-wing since the 1960s.

During this internal armed conflict, internal dominated political discussions, leaving little space for socio-economic issues. For years, leftist politicians and activists were for their supposed links to guerrilla organizations. They often faced stigmatization, death threats or.

The peace deal in 2016 and the demobilization of large parts of the FARC enabled social issues to come up in political debates. Consequently, two of nationwide protests swept the country in 2019 and 2021, demanding wide-reaching social and economic as well as better state protection of social activists, who have fallen victims to killings. 

COVID-19 has boosted the left. “The pandemic hit poor people most severely, and yet the government wanted to put the burden on us,” explains V¨ªctor, a 21-old organizer of last year’s protests in Bogot¨¢. The government¡¯²õ failure to provide relief and, instead, putting the burden on the poor has caused outrage. Now, a president from the left suddenly does not seem as unlikely anymore even in historically right-leaning Colombia.

What Might Happen in the Elections?

While most observers expect Petro to win the first round of elections, recent show that he will likely fall short of the necessary votes to avoid a second round. Then, Petro’s likely opponent will be either Federico “Fico” Gutti¨¦rrez or Rodolfo Hern¨¢ndez. Fico was the of the primary elections of a coalition of several right-wing parties and, in the past, was mayor of Medell¨ªn, Colombia’s second-largest city. Hern¨¢ndez, an engineer and entrepreneur, who remained outside the primary elections, is a center-right candidate and has only risen in the polls in recent weeks. He is running an anti-corruption campaign despite a corruption of his own from the time when he was mayor of the northern city of Bucaramanga.

As can be expected, the campaign is getting heated. Recently, Fico rhetorically addressed Petro, : “What you are proposing is the same thing that Ch¨¢vez said, and look how Venezuela ended.” Fico claims he wants to prevent “,” a term the Latin American right frequently uses to link left-wing policy proposals to authoritarian regimes in Cuba and Venezuela. Fico argues that Petro’s proposed wealth redistribution would be the starting point for authoritarianism and economic decline, pointing to Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua as examples. Given the presence of almost two million Venezuelan in the country, such statements trigger alarm bells among many Colombians.

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If there were to be a second round of voting, winning the endorsement of the third-placed candidate in the first round for both of the top two candidates would be key. If Fico comes third, he will undoubtedly support Hern¨¢ndez. If Fico comes second, then the scenario is less clear. Hern¨¢ndez and other Colombian centrists might end up supporting none of the leading two candidates. In 2018, after finishing a close third in the first round, Sergio Fajardo refused to any of the two candidates in the second round and announced to spend election day watching whales on Colombia¡¯²õ Pacific Coast. Fajardo the primaries for the coalition of centrists this year. He is still in the running but his popularity has over the last few months. Regarding his 2018 decision, Fajardo now , “It took me a while to figure it out, but I admit that was a mistake.” He may support someone this year but it is unclear who Fajardo would support in this year¡¯²õ second round.

A Ruthless and Dirty Election Campaign

In the highly polarized country, the last few weeks of campaigning have been intense. Mistrust between the left and the right runs high. Right-wing elites have tried everything to prevent Petro’s rise, including frequent transgressions of campaign laws.

Petro and his vice-presidential candidate , an environmental and human rights activist, have received multiple death. This made Petro call off events in his campaign for several days. He is being rightly cautious. Presidential and political have been assassinated frequently in Colombia. Every year, more human rights activists are in this country than any other in the world. 

The fierce opposition to Petro’s victory is compounded by the underhand methods of the Fico campaign. It has exceeded the number of advertisements allowed to presidential candidates in multiple. Right-wing businessmen and entrepreneurs have openly threatened to employees who vote for Petro.

Duque, the right-wing president who cannot run again because of a constitutional one-term limit, is campaigning vigorously against Petro. In doing so, Duque is breaking a constitutional provision that prohibits officeholders from participating in campaigns. As a result, he faces a for speaking out against Petro but it is unlikely Duque will face any consequences for his actions. In contrast, the national attorney suspended Medell¨ªn’s mayor Daniel from office for much milder support of Petro’s campaign.

The left might be unfairly targeted but it has not been innocent either. Hidden were detected in Fico’s campaign headquarters, confirming statements by the Petro campaign that they had their rival¡¯²õ campaign team. Petro¡¯²õ team claimed they had done so to detect, a common practice in Colombia.. Petro¡¯²õ campaign has Colombians “to take the money and buy groceries with it but nevertheless vote for Petro.”

A Shift to the Center

This election campaign also reveals the waning influence of , a right-wing populist political movement named after Alvaro Uribe. He was president of Colombia from 2002 to 2010. During Uribe’s presidency, the regained ground against several leftist guerrilla groups forging with right-wing paramilitary groups that resulted in human rights violations. 

For decades, Uribe has been the most influential politician in Colombia. He a strong campaign against the 2016 peace agreement and was a key of Duque. Thanks to Uribe¡¯²õ influence, Duque campaigned in 2018, “to rip the peace deal to shreds” if he was elected. This year, Uribe did not run again for the senate. He is embroiled in judicial for bribing witnesses and procedural fraud. Centro Democr¨¢tico, the political party associated with his movement, fourth in the recent elections, while in the previous Congress, it was the most powerful party. Its presidential candidate ?scar Iv¨¢n Zuluaga had to call a to his campaign and now supports Fico instead.

Critics rightist candidate Fico as “Uribe’s guy,” but they are not exactly right. Undoubtedly, Fico is the most status quoist presidential candidate in this year¡¯²õ election. However, his political program reveals a relatively moderate stance on many issues, highlighting that Colombian politics has already become more centrist than before. Also, in his previous for elections to the Medell¨ªn’s city council and to be mayor, Fico ran against Centro Democr¨¢tico candidates supported by Uribe. 

Unlike Uribismo politicians, Fico the 2016 peace agreement and is open to negotiations for a peace deal with the ELN, a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group. Fico has Rodrigo Lara S¨¢nchez, a centrist close to the green party, as his running mate. Even though his supporters urged him to, Fico has also to openly support a referendum against a recent ruling by Colombia’s highest court that legalizes abortion. The sign that Fico did not do so further underlines the shift to the center in Colombian politics. 

Turbulent times ahead

This year, the Colombian elections are historic. If Petro wins, the recent of left-wing victories across Latin America will be bolstered in one of the most conservative countries in the region. Since 2018, leftist presidential candidates have elections in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru.

Petro’s proposals are bold. He has promised an end to oil , which would imply an unprecedented transformation of the Colombian economy. Petro has also promised to implement the 2016 peace deal. Yet promises are easy to make but notoriously difficult to fulfill, especially within a four-year term. Petro would have difficulties finding a legislative across both houses of congress. Even if he was elected president with a big majority, it is inevitable that Petro¡¯²õ policy proposals would be diluted.If, however, Petro loses and either Fico or Hern¨¢ndez win, a resurgence of last year’s mass-scale protests is likely. These protests led to severe police and human rights violations, which might recur. Large parts of the population are suffering. They hope that, for the first time, elections could yield a government that addresses their needs. Yet this hope is fragile. in the political process is limited and people already have doubts about the integrity of electoral results. As V¨ªctor, the 21-old activist, states: “We all hope Petro will win but rest assured that we are prepared if the right steals the elections.” In case of a close outcome, it is quite likely that Colombians could take to the streets. It seems a few turbulent months lie ahead.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Colombia Faces Historic Presidential Elections appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Petro, the former mayor of Bogot¨¢ who came second in the last presidential election in 2018, is running on a platform of addressing inequality, as well as curbing Colombia¡¯²õ oil trade. As the candidate for the Historic Pact party, Petro is appealing to a broader range of potential voters. Francia M¨¢rquez, his running mate, is an Afro-Colombian human rights and environmental activist who, if elected, would also make history as the country’s first black vice president.

Can Petro Move a Naturally Right-Wing Country Leftwards?

The vote will be a litmus test of whether Colombia, long a right-wing stronghold, is ready to swing towards the left. Given the country¡¯²õ five decades of violence between Marxist-inspired guerrillas and paramilitary and state forces, many voters remain suspicious of the left. However, patience with right-wing rule is wearing thin. Anger spiked in 2021, when people took to the streets of major cities to protest the right-wing government¡¯²õ plan to raise taxes despite a steep coronavirus-era economic downturn. These sometimes violent demonstrations were often brutally repressed by police: A said at least 44 civilians and two members of the police died.

Growing discontent with President Iv¨¢n Duque M¨¢rquez, a conservative like others before him, has more than halved his approval ratings. In any case, Colombian presidents cannot run for a second term. Polls released in showed that Petro¡¯²õ support at 43.6%, while the center-right candidate Federico ¡°Fico¡± Gutierrez, a former mayor of Medell¨ªn, the country’s second-largest city, commanded 26.7% support.

However, Petro will need to take more than 50% of votes in the May 29 ballot to win outright. If no single candidate garners more than half of the votes, the two frontrunners will take part in another round in June.

Rural Killings Are on the Rise

Colombia is facing deep political fissures. Violence is climbing in rural areas, raising doubts about the chances for the to hold. This agreement was signed by the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) more than five years ago.

In the context of the nation¡¯²õ long and bloody civil war, the of Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) has described the new wave of killings of activists, human rights campaigners, and former FARC fighters as ¡°a new phase in the country¡¯²õ trajectory of violent conflict.¡± The , which assesses the quality of political leadership steering transformation processes, showed how Colombia¡¯²õ performance score ticked lower between 2020 and 2022. It has, fallen from 6.42 to 5.88 out of a possible 10 points. For the last 10 years, it forms an inverted U-curve, rising under previous president Juan Manuel Santos Calder¨®n from 5.98 to 6.93 points in the BTI 2018, only to fall to the lowest score in a decade under Duque.

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The 2016 peace process was lauded internationally, earning Santos a Nobel prize. The peace process has been gradually weakened by Duque¡¯²õ government. The new president will likely make or break the success of the peace deal. The process could be protected if the new leader commits to holding up the Colombian government¡¯²õ side of the deal by offering aid to affected municipalities and protection for community leaders in areas where violence is rising. Alternatively, the new president may extend Duque¡¯²õ established pattern of intentionally . Of those in the running, Petro, who in his youth was a member of the and is a long-term advocate for social equality, is the only candidate pledging to work to restore the floundering peace deal.

Meanwhile, the incoming leader will have to deal with the fallout of neighboring Venezuela¡¯²õ humanitarian disaster. Food scarcity and violence have made abouttwo million to seek refuge in Colombia.

Does this Volatile Oil-Based Economy Mark a New Trend?

The coronavirus pandemic sent the Colombian economy diving into its sharpest recession in more than a century. Now, theGDP is projected to again by 5.5% in 2022 and 3.1% in 2023. However, the search for ¡°a decent and better life¡± remains a priority for many voters, explained Mariano Aguirre, an associate fellow of Chatham House and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Bogot¨¢. Around 19.6 million people out of a population of 50 million were in poverty by the end of 2021. Of these, millions were living in extreme poverty.

¡°Many but not all of these votes will go for Gustavo Petro,¡± Aguirre said in an interview. ¡°But many will vote against him for fear of a too leftist government. These votes will be both from sectors of the middle class and the powerful elite that sees its privileges threatened. On the other hand, there will be voters from regions outside of Bogot¨¢ seeking to move away from the traditional ¡®vote buying machine¡¯ and deeply rooted local corruption. They are seeking new democratic ways of doing politics ¡ª many will turn to Petro in the hope he will change the status quo.¡±

The rival candidates for the 2022 election take starkly different stances on how they would steer Latin America¡¯²õ fourth biggest economy. Colombia¡¯²õ economy is tied to commodities. In particular, oil makes up around half of the total exports. This situation leaves Colombia exposed to price shocks which, combined with the deep cleft between the rich and the poor, means that the potential for social unrest remains . Petro has a track record of challenging Duque¡¯²õ emphasis on energy exploration along Colombia¡¯²õ coasts. Instead, he seeks to turn the country into an energy transition frontrunner by halting oil exploration and replacing fossil fuel income with income from renewables and other sectors.

Analysts meanwhile view the Colombian ballot in a broader context. Some see it as a test of a fledgling second Latin American ¡°pink tide¡±, referring to the term for a wave of left-wing electoral victories in the continent in the 2000s. Recent left-wing victories have included GabrielBoric’s in Chile and Xiomara Castro¡¯²õ rise to power in Honduras. Looking ahead, eyes will be fixed not just on Colombia¡¯²õ historic vote but on the general elections in Brazil in November to see how the next chapter unfolds.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Will Colombia Vote for its First Ever Left-Wing President? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

As the ballots are counted and results are declared across the country, a clear picture emerges: these local elections are the most consequential local elections in decades.

If the results of the local elections were to be replicated in a general election, we will find ourselves in territory where several scenarios could emerge, primarily based on and dictated by the number of seats secured in the House of Commons by the Labour and Liberal Democrats.

Bumbling Boris

Boris Johnson’s leadership of the Conservative Party has been a controversial one. The Conservatives and the country have not experienced a leader like Johnson before. His career as a journalist and politician is littered with transgressions and . 

Boris Johnson is the ultimate Teflon politician. In the words of his lifelong friend and rival David Cameron, “always been able to get away with things that mere mortals can’t”. Cameron certainly did not get away with the Brexit referendum that led to his downfall as prime minister. In contrast, Johnson has sailed through one scandal after another and won a thumping majority in the 2019 elections.

Before those elections, Johnson¡¯²õ unconventional leadership of the Tories in its first few months involved unlawfully and removing the whip from 21 of his who voted to block a disastrous no-deal Brexit that the prime minister was pursuing at the time. Those MPs included party grandees and bigwigs such as former chancellors of the exchequer Ken Clarke and Phillip Hammond, and former ministers Dominic Grieve, Oliver Letwin, Rory Stewart, Ed Vaizey, and even Nicholas Soames, the grandson of the revered wartime Conservative Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

Johnson’s leadership of the Conservatives involves an implicit pact between himself and his party. His history of transgressions and misdemeanors, and economic relationship with the truth and facts as well as his antiques are tolerated as long as he wins elections. In the 2019 elections, Johnson upheld his side of the bargain and delivered an 80-seat majority for the Conservatives.

In the wake of the 2019 election results, Tory strategists and spin doctors claimed that Boris’ antics and his scandalous personal life were always ‘priced in’ by large parts of the electorate. Last week¡¯²õ local election results dispute this Tory claim. It turns out that voters repeatedly raised the scandal when campaigners and journalists turned up at their doorsteps.

The Conservative Party is extraordinary at winning . They are good at stealing the clothes of other parties and doing what is necessary to win. That involves ruthlessly knifing their leaders when they stop winning. No Tory leader has been exempt from this rule, including Winston Churchill and Margaret Thatcher. Yet Tory knifing is a clinical cold-blooded affair. MPs knife their leader when credible successors lie in wait to mount the saddle.

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So far, Johnson has ensured that there is no successor lying in wait. Despite partygate and the , Johnson¡¯²õ position is secure because he has ruthlessly eliminated all potential rivals. Rishi Sunak, the current chancellor of the exchequer, was once touted as a potential prime minister but, like Icarus, he has come down to earth. Johnson is a Balliol classicist who wanted to be ¡°world king¡± when he was young. Cloak and dagger palace intrigues come naturally to him. Sunak and his wife have been thrown to the wolves by the so-called Bumbling Boris whose team have leaked juicy tales of the couple¡¯²õ domicile, tax and financial affairs, causing outrage among voters. Sunak can now kiss goodbye to ambitions. A career managing his father-in-law¡¯²õ billions from sunny California seems more probable.

The local elections have been nothing short of disastrous for the Tories. Nearly were in play. They were voted out in a quarter of the seats they were defending. Losing so many seats should put pressure on Johnson. His fast and loose reputation with the truth has finally come to haunt the Conservative Party. However, the Tories do not have any potential successors in sight and Johnson is secure for now.

Johnson is not like Cameron who resigned after losing the Brexit referendum. He has thick skin and no sense of shame. Johnson is not going to resign because he is found guilty of wrongdoing, misconduct or misjudgment. As one cabinet ally puts it, ¡°He¡¯²õ not going anywhere, his fingernails have been dug into the Downing Street window frames and he would be taken away kicking and .¡±

Johnson is certainly in the mood to fight back against any attempt by Conservative MPs to remove him from power. For now, he still has the support of the press. Tory-sympathizing journalists have gone into overdrive to spin the disastrous local elections as largely inconsequential and irrelevant for the Conservative Party. They take the view that these local elections were not a referendum on Johnson.

There is another key factor to note. The prime minister has a track record of resorting to unconstitutional methods, unlawful actions and top-level deceit to save his skin. At the moment, the only way Johnson will leave 10 Downing Street is through an election defeat.

Starmer Stakes All

Elections are complicated affairs. They are not as simple as one party or candidate beating the other. In general, power changes hands only when the ruling party loses energy, direction or cohesion or any combination of the three and the opposition party gets its act together to emerge as a ruling party in waiting. In the British system, any change in power takes two to tango. When John Major lost in 1997, the Tories were divided, discredited, exhausted and bereft of new ideas after 18 years in power. In contrast, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown offered fresh energy and projected competence. Like the 1997 elections, other changes in power were also such dual acts involving both ruling and opposition parties.

Currently, Keir Starmer is the leader of the Labour Party. He is a distinguished barrister who headed the Crown Prosecution Service. He took over in April 2020 after two failed leaders. Jeremy Corbyn presided over five turbulent and disastrous years. Before him, the uninspiring Ed Miliband squandered another five years. Starmer seemed like a sane and surefooted choice for the Labour Party. Here was a safe pair of hands who would  return competence and order to the office of the of Her Majesty’s Most Loyal Opposition.

Unlike most of his predecessors, Starmer is not a political animal. His approach to politics is measured and forensic. His early performances during the weekly Prime Minister¡¯²õ Questions (PMQs) caught Johnson off guard. Starmer¡¯²õ lawyerly approach and mannerisms were in direct contrast to that of Johnson¡¯²õ populist, colorful, and theatrical political style. This rattled some Tory nerves in the early days and cheered Labour backbenchers.

Starmer¡¯²õ star has waned since. His back-handed political operations and communication blunders have not helped. Starmer is comfortable with big decisions but has a blind spot for the minutiae that drive modern politics. Some of these big decisions have long been necessary. Starmer has removed the from Corbyn and purged Corbynistas from key offices. Starmer has also worked hard to make Labour electable again.

On Monday, May 9 ¡ª three days after the local elections ¡ª Starmer rolled the dice to take the biggest of his political life. The Labour leader announced that he will step down if found guilty of breaking the stringent lockdown rules when he visited Durham, a historic city in Northeast England, in 2021 during the election campaign.

Starmer¡¯²õ announcement is a very bold move. If he is cleared by the Durham Police, Starmer will stand tall next to a prime minister alleged to have parliament over partygate, a resigning matter under ¡®normal¡¯ circumstances. If Starmer¡¯²õ move comes off, it will be the political equivalent of checkmating Boris Johnson. If Starmer is found guilty and resigns, his leadership will come to a premature end and it is unclear if the next Labour leader would benefit from such a move. The fate of British politics lies in balance on the Durham Police investigation.

Old Wine in New Bottle

Regardless of what transpires in Durham, the recent local elections provide a roadmap to toppling Tories from power. Starmer and Liberal Democrat leader Ed Davey are carefully treading a once charted by their charismatic predecessors in the 1990s. Then Blair and Paddy Ashdown forged a Labour-Liberal non-aggression pact to unseat the Tores from power. Starmer and Davey hope this may be a winning model for the next parliamentary elections.

While Starmer only became an MP in 2015, Davey first entered parliament in the historic elections of 1997. He benefits from the advice of Baroness Olly Grender, a veteran of the Ashdown years known for her political nous. Starmer lacks Davey¡¯²õ long history and subconscious memory but the Labour leader is proving to be ruthless and flexible in his pursuit for power.

Starmer and Davey might find it hard to replicate the Blair and Ashdown deal. However, the current leaders are well aware of the dividends such an arrangement could bring. If both their parties can avoid bloodletting, they could mount a challenge to Tories discredited by Johnson¡¯²õ repeated shenanigans.

If the results of the recent local elections were replicated in the next parliamentary elections, the UK would have a hung parliament with no party having a clear majority. If Labour and Liberal Democrats can build on what they have done, they could oust the Tories. Both opposition parties have a strong incentive to cooperate and their leaders seem to be sensible enough to do so.

Brexit Dividend

Even though Brexit is now fait accompli, it continues to haunt British politics. The Brexit business model championed by hardline Brexiteers is flawed, irrational, contorted and thus bound to malfunction. The so-called Brexit Dividend of their dreams has so far failed to materialize. In fact, the Boris-led Brexit is turning out to be an expensive deal for the country. The independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) has estimated “the in trade volumes to bring about 4% reduction in the size of Britain¡¯²õ economy over the long run, in line with its pre-Brexit forecast”. Elsewhere, experts have calculated that Brexit is currently costing the economy to the tune of a week ¡ª and counting.

So far, the Tories have managed to hide the economic self-harm caused by Brexit. They argue that the economic downturn is due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the squeeze on household budgets and the cost-of-living crisis is chipping away at this Tory narrative. Voters might not yet be in the mood to punish the Conservative Party for Brexit, but they will certainly punish Tories for the pain they are suffering thanks to economic mismanagement.

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For the foreseeable future, the Conservative brand will be intimately associated with Brexit and its economic consequences. The recent elections demonstrate that the national backdrop provides the mood music even for local voter choices. Westminster and Wandsworth Councils, two historically and symbolically significant Tory councils, were won by the Labour Party in the early hours of the morning of May 6. Safe Tory seats in affluent parts of Southwest England such as Richmond and St Albans fell to the Liberal Democrats. In the words of George W. Bush, the Conservatives have taken a ¡°.¡±

The Disunited Kingdom

Bush never quite recovered from that 2006 midterm thumping. He left the US divided over Iraq and in the throes of a global financial crisis. Under Bumbling Boris, the Tories have embraced a disastrous Brexit business model and a toxic English ethnonationalism that threatens the integrity of The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland itself.

On May 5, Sinn F¨¦in achieved a historic victory in the Northern Ireland Assembly elections. This has sent shockwaves through the Unionist Movement that seeks to keep Northern Ireland in the UK. Sinn F¨¦in¡¯²õ victory has caused further embarrassments, anxiety, and alarm for the Conservative and Unionist Party ¡ª the full name of the Tory Party ¡ª in London.

The Irish Question dominated British politics a century ago. After World War I, Ireland won its long-cherished independence from the UK and disintegrated into civil war. Northern Ireland remained in the UK but the broke out in the late 1960s. A violent sectarian conflict between Protestant unionists and Catholic nationalists caused much tragedy in this picturesque land till the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. This period of peace might be coming to an end.

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Never before have Catholic nationalists who aim for the reunification of Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic wielded power in Belfast. The unionists are unlikely to accept the dominance of the republicans in Northern Ireland.

The election results in Northern Ireland have put into stark relief the Northern Ireland Protocol negotiated by Johnson with the EU. It was backed by his unionist allies, especially the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). In these elections, the unionists were divided and Sinn F¨¦in trumped DUP to emerge as the top dog in Northern Irish politics. Together, the unionists have a greater vote share but the specter of a reunion with Ireland looms large.

Even as Northern Ireland threatens to slip out of the UK, so does Scotland. The Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) has campaigned for independence from London before. The SNP is now the natural ruling party of Scotland and is chipping away at the foundations of the union. In the long run, the SNP wants a second referendum and to turn Scotland into an independent nation. In the Brexit referendum, Scots voted to stay in the EU. Leaving the UK and entering the EU is the SNP ambition. Bumbling Boris and political gravity are helping their cause.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post The Tories Get a Thumping in Local UK Elections appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

One of the consequences that is already being felt concerns the status of democracy in many regions of the world. By status I mean not just the attribution of power to different categories of political force, but the idea people hold of what democracy is, whose interests it represents and how it should play out in terms of actual governance. France may be the latest and most interesting example of the challenge to that status.

The American model for democracy

In the West, and more particularly in the US, a nation that has been labeled the birthplace of modern democracy, most youngsters are taught in school that constitutional democracy, unlike other more arbitrary forms of government, aims at being both fair and reasoned. They assume that for the most part it achieves its fair and reasonable goals thanks to a carefully constructed system of checks and balances.

In theory, democratic institutions are designed to reflect a logical pattern by which the population of any political entity, from a township to a nation, elects leaders committed to securing the resources and defining policies that respond flexibly and appropriately to the physical, social and economic environment its citizens live in. Democratic decision-making follows from what people believe to be an open dialogue about actions required for the security and well-being of its citizens.

Democracy produces governments in which all citizens are involved to the extent that they choose leaders who reflect their needs, values and interests. Decision-making becomes complex at the level of a nation state, particularly in a world that has become increasingly diverse and mobile. Presumably the leaders elected in modern states nevertheless understand the complexity of the balancing act that representing a diverse population requires. Nobody ever believed that would be an easy task.

In a stable world, most capable leaders ¡ª and even quite a few incapable ones ¡ª manage to juggle with competing forces. On one hand, they respond to powerful private interests that sit often invisibly at the core of the economy. On the other hand, they try to remain sensitive to public pressure that expresses itself in a variety of forms, transmitted notably by the media and omnipresent polls in the periods between elections. This pressure from the undefined masses incites leaders to find ways of keeping most of their citizens reasonably happy, or at least minimally unhappy. In times of relative stability, this to-and-fro occurs within social and economic systems that evolve very slowly, usually by tiny incremental steps. 

Most leaders see their job as consisting of managing a slow evolution within a stable historical framework. They have no means of predicting the earthquakes that occasionally shake history itself, suddenly throwing it off kilter. In the typical two-party systems of modern democracies, politicians have learned to master the dynamics of alternating access to power. Essentially, they provide the same product, but with a different label and a different tagline. They are comfortable knowing there are periods when, having lost an election, they may forfeit the reins of power and literally relax as members of the opposition, whose actions will not be criticized. They spend their time in the opposition critiquing their opponents and investing their creativity in plotting their return to power.

Problems, however, arise when history itself becomes unstable, when the equilibrium of a certain habitual balance of power begins to falter. It was the case in Europe, for example, towards the end of the 18^th century (1789) and again in the early 20^th century (1914-17). At such times, instability takes the form of highly irrational and uncontrollably complicated wars and revolutions. Leaders accustomed to managing the routine of occasional domestic tension and generally anodyne international rivalries, begin to lose their foothold. They will typically seek to keep their populations in check and avoid revolution. But they lack the means to deal with the chthonic forces of history. We appear to be entering into such a period in 2022.

The psychology of leadership

Leaders see themselves as actors in the scripted play of history. But to act in politics, as opposed to theater or cinema, means not just to follow a script but to observe history and craft appropriate reactions to the unexpected. In democracies, as opposed to autocracies, leaders should think of themselves as ¡°fair observers¡± and act accordingly. (A fair observer seeks to integrate the widest range not just of information but of sensitivity to the dynamic forces of history that defy the logic of pure information).

Faced with the challenge of a moment in history in which even the values assumed to be shared by people convinced that they represent an evolved form of civilization are called into question, we may legitimately wonder whether it is even possible for any leader to be simultaneously both an actor and an observer of history. In such moments, leaders typically fail to observe, but proceed to act. As soon as they act, they become observed by others. At the same time, the very awareness of being observed may distort their own ability to observe, precipitating actions based on faulty and disastrously incomplete observation. This is one way of accounting for Russian President Vladimir Putin¡¯²õ actions that have now spawned a global crisis that extends far beyond the Russian-Ukrainian border.

But the same pattern of failure to observe accompanied by a compulsion to act holds true for other leaders, especially when the degree of instability makes the consequences of any action especially risky. US President Joe Biden appears to be as clueless about where the forces of history are moving as Putin himself. Both have responded to specific pressure points on the system of power they have been charged with maintaining. Both have misjudged some of the forces of history at play in the background.

Putin reacted to three decades of shifting policies in the West, which appeared to him aggressive with regard to his own power and the stability of his system. This ever-increasing pressure was accompanied by an observable decline of the effective power and prestige of the American hegemon following its catastrophic military initiatives in Afghanistan and the Middle East since 2001.

Biden reacted to the growing challenge felt across the globe to the supremacy the US established three quarters of a century ago following the Second World War. Not only has US prestige declined as a consequence of George Bush¡¯²õ Middle Eastern wars and the financial collapse of 2008, but the perception that the official supremacy of the US dollar can now for the first time be effectively challenged has created a growing resolve in the rest of the world to overthrow what is perceived as the tyranny of the dollar over the global economy. That vague but increasingly well-defined perception of fragility is becoming as symbolically real as the French population¡¯²õ perception of the significance of the Bastille prison in 1789.

Will France overthrow the 5^th Republic?

Though any fair observer of history should be aware of the providential power of symbols, it is perhaps only a coincidence that France is poised to use its democratic institutions not just to call into question the system Charles de Gaulle put in place more than six decades ago, the Fifth Republic, but also to send shock waves capable of producing significant cracks in the fa?ade of Western complacency.

For the third time a candidate representing the right or the center-right defeated a far-right candidate with the surname, Le Pen. The first time Jacques Chirac, a direct descendent of the original Gaullist party, defeated Jean-Marie Le Pen, the founder of the xenophobic Front National. Emmanuel Macron has now defeated Jean-Marie¡¯²õ daughter, Marine, twice. It has become a sport of establishment politicians in France to maneuver the electoral processes so as to find themselves opposed to a far-right candidate in the runoff election for president. Victory is practically certain. Legitimacy is claimed at a very low cost.

Macron played the game perfectly to ensure his re-election. The problem he perhaps hadn¡¯t anticipated is that, not having the talent or even the inclination to create a well-defined party to back his presidential status, a resurgence of unity on the right or the left could imperil his chances to reign over a fragmented political landscape. He assumed that the egoistical rivalries and the thin skin of representatives of the traditional parties would guarantee the gap in the center that he managed to consolidate into a fragile simulacrum of a political party after his victory in 2017.

Alas, to Macron¡¯²õ consternation, a strong showing in third place during the presidential election in April by the former socialist and resolutely progressive leftist Jean-Luc M¨¦lenchon created the conditions that would convince the previously warring parties on the left, including the Green party and the communists, to imagine a program of government they would all adhere to in their quest for a parliamentary majority coming out of June¡¯²õ legislative election. This is bad news for Macron, who can only count on traditional political opportunists from the center-right and center-left to join forces with him in a movement he has rechristened the Renaissance (formerly, la R¨¦publique en Marche). Very few French voters feel inspired by Macron¡¯²õ example. His hope is that just as they preferred electing him to a candidate on the extreme right, they  will react similarly to a threat from the left, which they will try to represent as extreme.

There may be a slight problem with the symbolism of the new moniker of his party. By claiming to represent a Renaissance, he may be implicitly suggesting his former term as president was the equivalent of the Dark Ages. And in some sense, it was, marked by the revolt of the Yellow Vests and the black plague of Covid. But the French remember the Renaissance as a period of history dominated by kings that was eventually overturned by the 1789 revolution.

Could the unified left seize effective power over the government? Legally, Macron is in place for five years. But the left has adopted a theme M¨¦lenchon has insisted on for the past five years: replacing the Fifth Republic by a Sixth Republic, which would be less focused on presidential powers. If Macron is forced to nominate a left-wing prime minister ¡ª the most likely candidate being M¨¦lenchon himself  ¡ª  pressure could mount towards establishing a new constitution. Though the kind of constitutional regime change a Sixth Republic would represent appears unlikely so long as Macron remains president, the worm is already in the apple. At some point there is likely to be a constitutional crisis with an uncertain outcome, capable of upsetting the supposed stability of what may be called “the European compromise,” a philosophy of governance built on the twin pillars of Anglo-Saxon liberalism and dependency on US leadership in European defense via NATO.

Among the planks of its platform, the left calls specifically for a radical revision of the strategy concerning Europe. While reaffirming France¡¯²õ adhesion to the European Union, the left-wing government coalition has vowed to put pressure on Europe to move away from its traditional neoliberal ideology. This frame of reference has, in the eyes of many Europeans, not just in France, become more and more fragile as the source of shared values. This could eventually lead to fracturing what has become an increasingly fragile consensus between Europe and the United States. With the end of the Fifth Republic one of the main goals of Charles de Gaulle could then be paradoxically fulfilled: releasing France, and possibly Europe itself, from the iron grip of Washington.

What is happening in France is not an isolated event. Brazil will have a new presidential election later this year. Polling shows a profound dissatisfaction with its right-wing president Jair Bolsanaro, who won election five years ago thanks to highly suspect legal maneuvering. The likely winner of the new election is left-wing former president Lula da Silva. One of the da Silva has made this time around is to “create a currency in Latin America, because we can¡¯t keep depending on the dollar.¡± Voices in the Beltway are likely to announce, ¡°Them¡¯²õ fightin¡¯ words.¡±This was, after all, the ambition of the late Muammar Gaddafi for the entire African continent. That is, in a brief moment of history before US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton intervened to make sure that she would subsequently have the opportunity to , ¡°we came, we saw, he died.¡±

The American sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine have led to an acceleration of initiatives emanating from various quarters to free the global economy from the enforced dominance of the dollar. For five decades or more it has been a tool not so much of payment for international trade as of political control, allowing the US, either through its own efforts or those of the International Monetary Fund, to have its cake and eat it. The establishment of the dollar as the world¡¯²õ reserve currency in 1944, followed by President Richard Nixon¡¯²õ decoupling of this currency from the gold standard in 1971, forced other countries to hold their credit in dollars (US Treasury securities), meaning that the wealth thus created abroad was transferred implicitly back to the US economy. Every fluctuation in value ¡ª devaluation and revaluation ¨C could be used by Washington to its own political and economic advantage. As economist  Michael Hudson, ¡°This monetary privilege¨Cdollar seigniorage¨Chas enabled U.S. diplomacy to impose neoliberal policies on the rest of the world.¡±

In other words, there are indications that a fracturing of the neoliberal economic and political world order initially established at Bretton Woods nearly 80 years ago and then transformed by Nixon in 1971, creating the first theoretical compromise in its integrity, is now taking place. The last three decades have seen two major evolutions. The first is the failure of Europe to achieve its collective hope of acquiring the kind of influence that might redress the balance of power in relation to the United States. The second is the rise of China to a level of economic and political clout that has forced a massive rethinking of global hegemony.

Speculation about the destabilizing impact of the rise of what has been called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) on geopolitical power has been rife the past two decades. China finally emerged as an economic powerhouse unto itself, capable of directly challenging US hegemony. Russia, with a weaker economy, has continued to play an increasingly abrasive political role, culminating with the current war in Ukraine. As the tectonic movement in various latitudes begins to increase, India, Brazil and South Africa will see emerging opportunities to exert their influence on events in a world that is clearly starting to have a very different look from the one people have been accustomed to in recent decades.

Though not quite in the same league, France itself may have a role to play, and as so often in the past, that role will be cultural and intellectual rather than a manifestation of its limited political and economic clout. If the move towards a Sixth Republic actually commences, its symbolic importance for the rest of the world should not be underestimated. Europe will be the first to take notice if an unanticipated French government under Macron begins rowing against the established European current. 

Mark it on your speculative calendars. The 21^st century¡¯²õ Bastille Day may well be June 19, the date of the second round of next month¡¯²õ legislative elections. Even if the left is successful, its moral victory will not be followed by ¡°impure blood¡± in the furrows, nor a Reign of Terror, nor the rise of a new Napoleon. But its disruptive message will resonate throughout Europe and beyond mainly because the old order, which Macron still represents, is losing its footing across the globe.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

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The post Is France Ready to Storm a New Bastille? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Apart from Macron¡¯²õ supporters, the commentators across the political chessboard saw the blowout more like a stalemate than a checkmate. The left had been divided during the first round. It now appears ready to at least consider uniting its disparate forces for June¡¯²õ two rounds of legislative elections, which everyone on the left is now calling the ¡°third round¡± of the presidential election. 

The defeated Marine Le Pen put forth a similar message, hinting that her relative ¡°success,¡± which marked a significant improvement on 2017 (over 41%, up from 34%) opened the possibility of leading a populist movement that she hopes will attract voters from the left as well. ?ric Zemmour, the other far-right candidate, a dyed-in-the-wool xenophobe, who at one point appeared to challenge Le Pen¡¯²õ hold on the rightwing fringe, evoked his ambition for a purely nationalist and basically racist coalition that would avoid the indignity of reaching out to the left.

The buzzword of the evening was nevertheless the idea of a ¡°third round,¡± in which an adversary might deliver Macron a knockout punch. The Macronists immediately mocked such talk as a denial of democracy, in the minutes following the president¡¯²õ resounding majority. But as the various interested parties on all sides invited by the television channel France 2 developed their analysis, a consensus emerged that all was not well in the realm of Macronia.

The demise of France¡¯²õ traditional parties

On the positive side for Macron¡¯²õ faithful or at least for his political marketers, the traditional parties on the left and right had been humiliated once again. It was even more brutal this time around than in 2017, when Macron first swept through the miraculous gap in the political Red Sea to reach the promised land without even having to dawdle in the desert. The ¸é¨¦±è³Ü²ú±ô¾±³¦²¹¾±²Ôs and Socialists, once the valiant wielders of the scepter of power, are clearly left with little to hope for other than possibly being invited, as individuals, into the new government Macron will be appointing this week to demonstrate his willingness to construct a new alliance. But looming beyond the now concluded five-year compromise Macron engineered and rather ineptly managed during his first term, is the vision of a France now divided into largely incoherent blocs defined less by political vision than by exasperation with all the traditional solutions, left, right and center.

A Fifth Act for the Fifth Republic

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Le Pen and Zemmour have demonstrated that there exists a substantial pool of voters not averse to xenophobic reasoning. But those same voters tend to hail from the working class or the rural lower middle classes. They voted for Le Pen less out of the conviction that she would be a good leader than to protest against the political and financial elite that Macron represents in their eyes. Half a century ago, most of Le Pen¡¯²õ voters were faithful to the Communist Party.

If the former communist bloc of voters gradually drifted away from a Mitterand-led governing Socialist coalition to align behind the far-right Front National, embodied by Marine Le Pen¡¯²õ father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the Socialists settled on their own rightward drift. They leaned increasingly towards the center, much as the Clinton Democrats had done in the US. That left a gaping hole on the left, which no political personality had the force or the name recognition to fill. Jean-Luc M¨¦lenchon, a former minister, finally stepped into the role, seeking to counter the trend towards the technocratic center, a political position that appeared to suit the culture and mood of the post-Mitterand generation of Socialists.

Ever since declaring independence from the party in 2009, M¨¦lenchon has been vilified by his Socialist brethren for the crime of contesting its visibly centrist and increasingly corporate elitist drift. This was the same party, led by then president Fran?ois Hollande, that named the youthful former banker Macron minister of the economy. 

M¨¦lenchon¡¯²õ persistence during Hollande¡¯²õ presidency as a provocative progressive, contesting his former party¡¯²õ orthodoxy, already positioned him in 2017 as the most distinctive, if not necessarily most attractive personality on the left.  Thanks to his more than respectable third-place showing in the first round two weeks ago, he has emerged as the eventual ¡°spiritual¡± leader of a newly unified left that could bring together the now marginal Communist Party (with just 2.5% of the vote), the Ecologists and even the Socialists, though they remain reticent to acknowledge M¨¦lenchon¡¯²õ ascent.

Can the left overcome its divisions?

Unlike the famous that formally allied the Socialists, Communists and the center-left Radicaux de Gauche and brought Fran?ois Mitterand to power in the 1981 presidential election, M¨¦lenchon has nothing concrete to build on other than exasperation of all the other parties with Macron. Preceding the second round, the head of La France Insoumise (¡°France unbowed¡±) cleverly honed his rhetoric to aim at being ¡°elected¡± prime minister in June, even though he knows full well that the prime minister is appointed by the president, not elected by the people. It is his way of both highlighting the incoherence of the Fifth Republic¡¯²õ electoral system, while at the same time offering Macron the opportunity to run an experiment in government that would mirror the history of the past five years. During Macron¡¯²õ first term, an officially centrist president consistently appointed prime ministers from the traditional right, betraying the hopes of some on the left for more balance. M¨¦lenchon is proposing a similar solution, but this time pointing left.

The timing of this strategy couldn¡¯t be better. According to an IPSOS of French voters, ¡°57% want to see the main left-wing parties form an alliance and present common candidates in the constituencies.¡± Importantly, 56% of those polled have stated they do not wish to see Macron obtain a majority, which means they hope to see another ¡°cohabitation¡± in which the president shares power with an opposition party in parliament. Only 35% of French voters, 6% fewer than voted for Le Pen, would support a coalition of the two extreme rightwing parties, Le Pen¡¯²õ Rassemblement National and Zemmour¡¯²õ ¸é±ð³¦´Ç²Ô±ç³Ü¨º³Ù±ð. Voters who support the traditional right are split between seeking an alliance with the extreme right (22%) or with Macron¡¯²õ R¨¦publique En Marche (25%). An overwhelming 53% of ¸é¨¦±è³Ü²ú±ô¾±³¦²¹¾±²Ô voters eschew the idea of an alliance with either.

What this means is that the next few weeks will be very interesting to watch. Can the man accused of being ¡°the president of the rich¡± lead a government focused on the policies of the left? Or does he have the wherewithal and the political talent to confront what may become a populist uprising that draws energy from both the left and the right?

Macron, the revolutionary?

Two years ago when the COVID-19 outbreak forced the French government to take action, I noted in these columns that ¡°French President Emmanuel Macron, of all people, seems to detect the beginning of a calling into question of the entire consumerist free market system, without giving much of a sense of what might replace it.¡± Perhaps he is ready to take seriously his own two-year old epiphany by appealing to the insights of a coalition on the left led by a prime minister named M¨¦lenchon. After all, this time around, Macron has nothing to lose, since he cannot seek a third term. He might see this as his last chance to recover from the massive unpopularity that threatened his reelection and was saved only by his deft maneuvering aimed at ensuring that Marine Le Pen would be his hapless rival in the second round.

The World This Week: Another French Revolution

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More likely, Macron will try in the coming weeks to assemble a range of individuals from different sides, with variable symbolic value. He presumably hopes that this will persuade people of his capacity to assemble his own coherent majority. Macron¡¯²õ attempt is highly unlikely to succeed and is likely to suffer a worse fate than his previous right-leaning, improvised coalitions.

Macron¡¯²õ real achievement is to have violated, not once but twice, the entire logic of the Fifth Republic that since its Gaullist beginnings always supposed the president would be the leader of a powerful governing party. In his first five-year stint he profited from the mental confusion in French electors¡¯ heads, trying to understand the vacuum that had suddenly appeared, as he cobbled together what could only be seen as a temporary and to a large degree illusory solution. The confusion quickly provoked the Yellow Vest movement that called the entire montage into question. The unexpected arrival of a pandemic and a lockdown took the protesters off the street and put Macron back in the driver¡¯²õ seat. A temporary situation was thus prolonged but its fragility has become even more evident than before.

So now the French nation confronts a moment of truth, when the nature of its institutions must be given a makeover. Not because it would improve their look, but because they are on the verge of a permanent crisis. It seems unlikely that some simple solution will appear or that Macron can convince the people to continue to trust him to make, Jupiter-like, all the right decisions that might guide the nation through the troubles that lie ahead. 

In his victory speech, Macron said absolutely nothing of substance. He congratulated and thanked his supporters for the victory and announced all the good things he is in favor of, promising, as expected, to respond to the needs and desires of ¡°all¡± the people. On the same evening, violent broke out in Paris, Nantes, Lyon and Marseille, with spontaneous crowds contesting the election. The protesters from the right, upset by Le Pen¡¯²õ failed bid, were joined by others from the left, who shouted slogans such as: ¡°Macron, Le Pen, one solution: revolution.¡± Others shouted: ¡°No fascists in our neighborhoods¡± and ¡°Macron resign.¡±

Unlike the ¡°Stop the steal¡± protests in the US following Donald Trump¡¯²õ loss to Joe Biden, the French do not complain that the election was rigged, nor do they wish to see its results overturned. They are unhappy with a system that fails to represent their interests or needs. Having already effectively rejected the traditional parties and practically erased them from the electoral map, they are now focused on calling into question the curious political anomaly that Emmanuel Macron embodies in their eyes.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Macron Won But the Election Isn¡¯t Over appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

We have ¡°changed, changed utterly¡±

Something has changed since the days of 2002 and 2017. This time around, many choose not to choose. Thousands are breaking ranks with past beliefs and practices. They are not outraged by Le Pen making it to the final round of the presidential election. They are neither demonstrating nor showing any intention to vote. Alarmingly, even progressive thinkers are shilly-shallying in the face of adversity.

From afar, I am taken by surprise, still dumbfounded by how many people ¡ª including family and friends ¡ª are willing to compromise on what we have held to be non-negotiable principles. Instead, many French seem to be inclined to dive into the unfathomable. I wonder why? What has happened in my absence for this ni-ni concept (neither Macron nor Le Pen) to replace revulsion for a fundamentally abhorrent populist position? Is it out of spite, frustration or anger vis-¨¤-vis the current president? 

Emmanuel Macron might have failed on many fronts. Like many politicians over the ages, he might be guilty of false promises and dashing expectations. Yet Macron does not assail the values of our French Republic. He adheres to the constitution, the precedents and even the values of our Republic. Have the French lost all judgment and adopted a new nihilistic moral relativism?

The World This Week: Another French Revolution

READ MORE

Marine Le Pen appeals to the people. In recent years, she has cultivated a softer image, the image of a figure who cares about the common people. And we know that modern politics is less about ideas or positions and more about connection and caring for the voter. This is especially so during election campaigns. Over the last few weeks, it seems that Le Pen has done a better job at showing empathy for the poor, the voiceless, the marginalized and the desperate than Macron. The bottom half of the country who struggle to make ends meet seem to identify more with Le Pen than her rival. 

Le Pen¡¯²õ strategy to tone down her racist rhetoric, promote a strong social agenda and focus on the most vulnerable seems to be paying off. At the same time, Macron is still regarded as ¡°le Pr¨¦sident des .¡±  More than ever, voters identify him with the well-off, the influential, the tech-savvy entrepreneurs and elites of all sorts. The disconnect between Macron and the ordinary voter is terrifying. Worryingly, even the middle class is splitting and stalling. If we do not remain vigilant, the thrill of the unknown conjured by many of the sorceress¡¯ apprentices will inevitably turn into the chill of disenchantment on Monday morning.

What is the real choice this Sunday?

Simply put, this bloody Sunday is about choosing the rule of law over the law of the mob. It is about choosing impartiality over discrimination, multilateralism over nationalism, cooperation over strife, cohesion over division, inclusion over exclusion, and democracy over demagoguery. This election is about saving our Republic.

We French must remember that politics is a dangerous game. Yes, incarnation is a part of politics but some things cannot be reborn or recast. There are inalienable values for any civilization, any nation and any democracy. We must stand up for them. For all her tinkering and softening, Le Pen stands for extreme nationalism, irresponsible populism and dangerous xenophobia. To use an Americanism, she does not offer a decent value proposition for us French voters.

Democracy is at risk around the world. France is no exception. Today, many in France believe that they have nothing to lose and everything to risk. This belief characterizes fragile societies and failed states. I should know. I have been working on them.

In fact, the French have everything to lose and nothing to risk. The current system is already tottering. This election confirms the collapse (and perhaps even end) of traditional parties, the rise of identity politics from Jean-Luc Melenchon on the left to Eric Zemmour on the right, and the mainstreaming of ecology and its fragmentation across the political spectrum (voiding the Green Party of its substance and meaning). This election has also been marked by the absence of debate, which has been compounded by the mediocrity of the media and the consequent numbing of the voters. Having lived in Trump¡¯²õ America, I have a sense of d¨¦j¨¤ vu.

The French presidential campaign is marked by the absence of a collective vision and action. There is an argument to be made that the fifth republic no longer works well and needs reform. Some may and do argue for a sixth republic. The French can make many such choices without voting for Le Pen. Even if they despise Macron, his failings are not a reason to abandon core French values. 

As citizens, we have work to do if we do not want to wake up to a daunting new reality on Monday, April 25. I strongly believe that France can reinvent itself. Our nation still has a role to play in Europe and on the world stage. And so do we. But first let¡¯²õ vote.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post The French Must Vote to Rescue Democracy appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Economic Collapse, Not Foreign Conspiracy Led to Fall

Khan claimed there was a foreign conspiracy to oust him. He tried to subvert both the parliament and the judiciary to cling on to power. Yet his claims of a foreign hand in his ouster appear overly exaggerated. In three years and eight months as prime minister, Khan was known more for headlines than for results. He was vocal on the incendiary issue where he sought US intervention. Khan was in the limelight for visiting for the Winter Olympics and for visiting even as Russian troops invaded Ukraine. For all his flirtation with China and Russia, Khan did little to hurt US interests in the region. In fact, Khan was a between the US and the Taliban that led to the . He facilitated the peaceful takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, allowing US troops to withdraw from the region.

The real reason Khan was voted out of the prime minister¡¯²õ office is his lack of competence in economic matters. has run persistently high and stood at 12.7% in March. Not all of it is Khan¡¯²õ fault. Commodity and energy prices have been surging. However, Khan¡¯²õ government presided over the greatest increase in in Pakistan¡¯²õ history. The nation¡¯²õ debt went up by over $99 billion (18 trillion Pakistani rupees). This unleashed inflationary pressures in the economy and caused the economy to enter free fall.

Pakistan¡¯²õ foreign currency dropped dramatically. On March 25, these reserves were $12,047.3 million. By April 1, they had fallen to $11.32 billion, a loss of $728 million in a mere six days. The Pakistani rupee also fell to a record of 191 to the dollar.

What Next for Pakistan?

After the ouster of Khan, PML-N leader has taken over. He is known as a competent administrator. Political analysts believe that Sharif would pivot Pakistan toward a traditional foreign policy vis-¨¤-vis the US and Europe. His government has already resumed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It will try its best to avail the remaining $3 billion under the IMF¡¯²õ $6 billion loan more speedily to stabilize its foreign exchange reserves and strengthen the rupee.

Political uncertainty was roiling markets. They might settle now that a new government is in charge. Pakistan faces a tricky situation, both politically and economically. Khan still has ardent supporters and the country is divided. The economy is perhaps at its lowest ebb at a time when the risk of a global recession is running high. To navigate such a critical period, a coalition government formed by an alliance of seasoned politicians might be a blessing for Pakistan.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Why Did the Pakistani Parliament Pass a Vote of No-Confidence against Imran Khan? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Therefore, we spoke to eminent French journalist Florence Biedermann about the first round of the presidential elections. They have thrown up the same two candidates for the final round as last time around. One candidate is Emmanuel Macron, whom many call ¡°le Pr¨¦sident des .¡± The other candidate is Marine Le Pen, the far-right leader who risen in popularity in France. This is the first time in French political history that a far-right leader is so close to the winner of the first round.

Watch or read Biedermann make sense of it all.

Florence Biedermann on Marine Le Pen, Emmanuel Macron and the French Elections

In this episode, we have the former chief editor of Agence France-Presse explain what is going on in France. You can read what she has to say below.

Why is Marine Le Pen so popular? 

Florence Biedermann: She really focused on a program for social matters, on social questions, on the cost of living and this is the main worry of the French people right now.

After the war in Ukraine, the price of energy has risen considerably. There is a stronger inflation and it is now one of the main topics for the French people. So she managed to put aside all the more extreme side of her program on immigration, of changing the institutions, and her resistance to the EU, and she really focused on the daily life of the people with small incomes, on their difficulties and has insisted that Emmanuel Macron was a kind of an elitist who was far away from those daily worries of the French people. 

Has Marine Le Pen detoxified the Le Pen name? 

Florence Biedermann: And that’s how she managed to somehow detoxify her brand, because for years she has been associated, of course, with extreme views and immigration. A few years ago, she was still against the EU, she wanted to withdraw from the EU. 

She is still very much a euroskeptic, but she gave up this project. She also gave up the fact that she wants to get out of the euro and she styled herself as a kind of innocuous housewife, a cat lover who raised her children on her own. She has presented herself as someone running an ordinary life and being close to ordinary people. And it really worked pretty well when you see the voting results now. 

After Trump and Brexit, could France be in for a surprise result? 

Florence Biedermann: So of course the big question now is whether she can win or not. I mean, all the polls still give Macron as the winner, but we know that polls failed before in predicting the victory of Trump, and the victory of Brexit. So everybody is pretty careful and obviously there is nervousness in the camp of Macron because he’s now campaigning really hard, which he didn’t do before the first round because he was busy with the war in Ukraine. 

So obviously there is a chance that she can win, especially because one of the measures proposed by Macron is very unpopular as it is to postpone the retirement age from 62 to 65 and if this election ends up finally being a kind of referendum on this question, then he may lose. 

What would a victory for Le Pen mean for France and Europe as a whole? 

Florence Biedermann: So for France on the international scene, a victory for Marine Le Pen would really be a disaster. France is one of the main countries trying to make the EU more dynamic, more efficient, which does not interest her. She wants to present France as a sovereign country where French laws would be more important than European laws. Let’s say you can really compare her to Viktor °¿°ù²ú¨¢²Ô. She’s the same kind of leader.

And then of course in the EU with one of the main leaders being eurosceptic that would be a disaster. Also, she’s kind of very reluctant towards NATO. And let’s not forget she was an admirer of Vladimir Putin for years. She even needed to borrow from a Russian bank to finance her campaign. So definitely the image of France internationally would be completely downgraded. 

This transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Making Sense of the 2022 French Elections appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The second surprise was the strong showing of Jean-Luc M¨¦lenchon, a non-establishment leftist, who, it now transpires, would have overtaken Le Pen had any of the other candidates dropped out to line up behind him. It¡¯²õ a moral victory of sorts for voters on the left, who have now been excluded from the final round of the two most recent presidential elections. The compensation is that, with legislative elections looming in the immediate aftermath of the April 24^th presidential face-off, it will inevitably lead to some kind of intriguing regrouping or redefinition.

In its reporting on the election, The New York Times focused on the one issue that is of most interest to its American readers: the impact on what it calls the ¡°Western unity¡± US President Joe Biden has so solidly engineered in his response to Russia¡¯²õ invasion of Ukraine. The Times foreign editor, Roger Cohen the fear that, ¡°in the event of an ultimate Le Pen victory¡± France will become ¡°anti-NATO and more pro-Russia.¡± He adds that this ¡°would cause deep concern in allied capitals, and could fracture the united trans-Atlantic response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.¡± In other words, make no mistake about it, The New York Times is rooting for Macron.

Today¡¯²õ Weekly Devil¡¯²õ Dictionary definition:

Anti-NATO:

Opposed to the ideal the United States government imagines for Europe, defining it as a continent composed of free, enlightened democracies irremediably dependent ¡ª both economically and militarily ¡ª on the benevolent leadership of a powerful American Deep State and the sincere brotherly love offered by the American military-industrial complex.

Contextual note

The Times may have reason to worry. While the odds still favor Macron, Le Pen could possibly duplicate Donald Trump¡¯²õ incredible overcoming of the odds in 2016 when he won the US presidency, and largely for the same reasons. Macron has been a contested leader, branded by opponents on the left and right as the ¡°president of the rich.¡± Hillary Clinton similarly suffered from her image of being a tool of her Wall Street donors. There comes a point in every nation¡¯²õ life when the people seem ready to take a chance with what appears to reasonable people as a bad bet.

Perhaps that time has come for France. Its electors exercised what they call ¡°republican discipline¡± against far-right politicians when Jacques Chirac defeated Le Pen¡¯²õ father, Jean-Marie, in 2002. He harvested 82% of the vote to Le Pen¡¯²õ 18%. In 2017, though Macron was still an unknown entity with no serious support from either of the major political groupings, the young man easily defeated the far-right candidate with 64% of the vote to Le Pen¡¯²õ 36%.

Prognosticating statisticians might simply follow the curve and assume that the downward slope will lead this time to a 50-50 election. They may be right. But the reason lies less in an arithmetical trend than in the growth of a largely non-partisan populist revolt directed against what is perceived to be an occult power establishment comprised of powerful industrialists, bankers, unrepresentative parties, corrupt politicians and a political class marked by an attitude of subservience to the American empire. Macron, the former Rothschild banker, has himself tried to burnish his image as a neutral, pan-European visionary who seeks to break free from the chokehold held by the power brokers of Washington DC, Arlington, Virginia and Wall Street. His attempts to negotiate with Vladimir Putin before and after the Russian invasion were undoubtedly designed to bolster that image.

The explanation everyone likes to give for Marine Le Pen¡¯²õ success in distancing her rivals ¨C including fellow xenophobe, Eric Zemmour ¨C is her focus on inflation. James Carville may be applauding from afar. It is, after all ¡°the , stupid.¡± The issue has been there throughout Macron¡¯²õ term. It was the COVID lockdown and not Macron¡¯²õ policies that cut short the dramatic ¡°yellow vest¡± movement that was still smoldering when the pandemic struck. The French have not forgotten their own need for economic survival while living in a society in which the rich keep getting richer. Voters remember Macron¡¯²õ joyous elimination of the wealth tax and the alacrity with which he announced higher gas taxes would fill the gap.

A musician I work with regularly told me recently: ¡°I¡¯m not voting in the first round, but I¡¯ll vote against Macron in the second round.¡± In other words, of the possible rivals in the second round ¨C Le Pen (far right), M¨¦lenchon (progressive left), some even predicted Val¨¦rie P¨¦cresse (right) ¨C he would have voted for any one of them, just to eliminate Macron. I don¡¯t believe he¡¯²õ a racist, but he is now ready to be voting for a woman who has put xenophobia at the core of her political program.

Historical note

If we tally up the scores of the candidates who are clearly anti-NATO ¡ª without including Macron who keeps his distance but adheres to the US alliance in the current campaign against Russia ¡ª the total climbs towards 60%. Historically, France is the only European country to have declared independence from NATO, when De Gaulle withdrew from NATO¡¯²õ military structure and banished all NATO installations from the nation¡¯²õ territory in 1966.

Roger Cohen¡¯²õ and The Times¡¯ concern may be justified, even if Macron wins the election. Even more so if the results are close. Very few commentators, even here in France, have begun trying to tease out what¡¯²õ likely to emerge from June¡¯²õ legislative elections. With the two traditional establishment parties on the ropes and utterly leaderless, is there any chance that a reassuringly ¡°coherent order¡± dear to establishment politicians might reappear? Even if Macron wins, he never really managed to assemble a stable majority in his first term. The real questions now are these: among the defeated, who will talk to whom? And who will even grudgingly accept to defer to whose leadership? If Le Pen wins, it is unlikely she will be able to muster anything resembling a loyal majority. It is often said that ¡°the French voters¡¯ heart is on the left, but their vote is on the right.¡± With a president so far to the right, the voters won¡¯t deliver a presidential majority in parliament, as they have so often done in the past.

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Like the US and the UK, France¡¯²õ democratic institutions have become profoundly dysfunctional. In no way does the political class even attempt to implement the ¡°will of the people.¡± The globalized economy, with its arcane networks of power, had already diminished the meaning of democracy. The US is now consciously splitting in two that same globalized economy through its campaign of sanctions against Russia, possibly as a broader strategic move designed to create a degree of chaos that will ultimately embarrass its real enemy, China.

That radical split points in one direction: militarizing even further an economy already dominated by military technology. And as we have seen, a militarized economy means an increasingly militarized society, in which surveillance, propaganda, control and enforced conformity in the name of security cancel any appeal not just to the will, but even to the needs of the people.

It is a real pity that Jean-Luc M¨¦lenchon didn¡¯t make it to the second round, if only to enrich a largely impoverished debate. Independently of any of his political orientations concerning the economy or foreign policy, the leader of his party, La France Insoumise (France Unbowed), was already insisting in the previous election five years ago that the nation needed to replace with a 6^th Republic an out-of-date 5^th Republic created in 1958 by Charles de Gaulle. M¨¦lenchon¡¯²õ idea of a 6^th Republic contained less presidential power and weaker parties, meaning better access for the people.

A lot of water has flowed under the Pont Neuf since 1958, and neither of the candidates appears interested in reducing presidential powers. But the result of this election demonstrates clearly that both presidential power and the ability of parties to give direction to the politics of the nation have become non-existent as tools of democratic government. The results show that they have reached a point of no return. No one should be surprised to see ¡ª  at some point in time after the legislative elections ¡ª  France being rocked by a constitutional crisis on the scale of the one Pakistan lived through this past week. At which point, a 6^th Republic may emerge from the ashes, Phoenix-like, but with more than a few burnt feathers.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil¡¯²õ Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The 51³Ô¹Ï Devil¡¯²õ Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Democracy and France¡¯²õ Theater of the Absurd appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

We invite readers to join us by submitting their suggestions of words and expressions that deserve exploring, with or without original commentary. To submit a citation from the news and/or provide your own short commentary, send us an email.

March 4: Tragic

Even though he hesitated until the last minute to make it official on Thursday, everyone in France knew that their president, Emmanuel Macron, would be up for reelection in a contest whose first round will take place on April 10, followed by the second-round runoff on April 24.

The strategic delay in his decision-making has been officially explained by the combination of the ongoing COVID-19 crisis and the much more recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, a dossier for which Macron has been very active in recent months. The race is very difficult to call given the range of opponents, but Macron is favored to win the first round. Though it¡¯²õ anyone¡¯²õ guess how the second round may play out or even who the opposing candidate is likely to be.

How Coherent Is NATO Today and in the Future?

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With the Ukraine crisis dominating the headlines, Macron stepped up this week, almost at the same time as US President Joe Biden¡¯²õ State of the Union address, to give a rousing speech with a similar theme, insisting on solidarity with the Ukrainians and the defense of democracy. But unlike his American counterpart, whose speech read like a celebration of his administration¡¯²õ and his nation¡¯²õ moral commitment to the Ukrainian cause, Macron went a bit further, invoking the ¡°tragic¡± dimension of the current situation with these : ¡°To this brutal return of tragedy in history, we owe it to ourselves to respond with historic decisions.¡± He added the idea that ¡°Europe has entered a new era¡± and hinted that it would be an era defined in terms of ¡°energy independence¡± and ¡°European defense.¡±  

Macron¡¯²õ vision of a different future may be interpreted more as a campaign promise than a realistic forecast of how European identity will evolve in the future. But it is a theme that Macron has heavily invested in, an idea he has been promoting for a long time. Despite past failure to move the needle, he may be onto something this time concerning the future of Europe¡¯²õ security policies, which are as much under attack as Kyiv itself.

The crisis in Ukraine reveals not only the threat Russia potentially represents for some European nations, but also the risk associated with Europe¡¯²õ dependence on Russia¡¯²õ natural gas. Even more significantly ¡ª though discussion of this topic must wait for some sort of resolution to the Ukrainian drama ¡ª the crisis has revealed the troubling degree to which European countries have become the hostages of the monster known as NATO.

The calling into question of NATO may sound paradoxical at the very moment when every country in the prosperous West has expressed its heartfelt solidarity with Ukraine and its bitter condemnation of Russia¡¯²õ invasion. Many commentators have waxed lyrical about the ¡°unification¡± of Europe in opposition to Russia and see this as a prelude to the reinforcement of NATO. That is possible, but at this early stage in the conflict, it sounds like a hasty conclusion.

Macron is hinting at a world beyond NATO. He is certainly right to assume that he isn¡¯t the only European leader who, without complaining too loudly, is privately assessing Washington¡¯²õ responsibility in the conflict. After all, the US is the nation that, despite France and Germany¡¯²õ resistance, drew the red line defending the iron-clad principle of Ukraine¡¯²õ inalienable right to join NATO.  

Macron¡¯²õ position should help his chances in the coming election. He cannot be accused of electoral opportunism as he has proved himself consistent and sincere in his mission to redefine Europe¡¯²õ security in European rather than North Atlantic terms. It hasn¡¯t worked yet despite his and, to some extent, Germany¡¯²õ previous efforts, but that predictable disappointment occurred before the tragedy that is now engulfing Europe. When the dust settles on the Russia-Ukraine crisis, all Europeans (and maybe even the UK¡¯²õ Boris Johnson) will begin parsing the complex lessons produced by a terribly mismanaged fiasco that is still ongoing and shows some signs of possibly leading to a nuclear conflagration.

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For the moment, the Americans have presented the Russian assault as a combat between good and evil. Europe and its media have, in their very real but to some extent staged outrage, followed suit. But at some point in the near future, Europeans will sit down and attempt to assess not just the winners and losers as the US tends to do, but the volume of evil that is attributable to both sides. European cultures tend to be far less binary and Manichean than US culture, which has demonstrated in this crisis its inimitable capacity to discard the kind of nuance that can, at least on some occasions, actually prevent or at least forestall tragedy.

The idea of tragedy, understood to be a noble art form, is taken seriously in France, a nation that produced two famous authors of tragedy, Corneille and Racine. Apart from a brief episode in the 18^th century (partly due to jealousy), France has always admired Shakespeare and Schiller. The French know that authentic tragedy is never about the battle between good and evil. The literary genre that exploits that kind of binary logic is called melodrama. Tragedy always contains something corresponding to Aristotle¡¯²õ intuition of its being built around the notion of a tragic flaw.

In his analysis of Oedipus Rex, Aristotle attributed the flaw to the tragic hero, seen as admirable and good, but affected by something that undermines his good fortune. But the flaw may also exist in the system and its rules, in the government or the culture of the play, in the environment in which tragic heroes and heroines are permitted to act. As one famous tragic hero noted, there may be ¡°something rotten in the state of Denmark,¡± something that to which the tragedy itself is drawing the audience¡¯²õ attention.

When he characterizes the Ukraine conflict as a tragedy, Emmanuel Macron, like other Europeans familiar with the history of the past century, is thinking not so much of the literary tradition as the devastating wars that have taken place on the continent¡¯²õ soil. This is a privilege not equally available to Americans, whose only lasting memory of war on their own soil is that of a civil war that happened over 150 years ago.

The idea of history Americans learn at school and through the media, even in the case of their own civil war, is always about a struggle between good and evil. Slavery defined the South as evil, despite the fact that Southerners were true Americans. Because all conflicts are framed as a combat between good and evil, Americans are encouraged to think of their nation as a ¡°force for good.¡± America is exceptional and has been called the ¡°indispensable nation.¡± Many attribute to the French leader Charles de Gaulle the reflection that ¡°the graveyard is full of indispensable people.¡± History too is full of indispensable nations and even empires.

Today, everyone in Europe perceives the Ukraine situation as a worrying tragedy that is still building toward its most destructive climax. But for Macron, whose reelection is far from assured within the chaotic political environment that currently reigns in France, it may turn out to be a serendipitous tragedy. It may turn out to be the moment of enlightenment in which his dream of a Europe no longer tethered to the United States may define and implement its own security system. As he begins to hone his official reelection campaign, Macron can pursue that goal and, at the same time, hope that it will convince his electors that he¡¯²õ the one who can carry it out. 

Why Monitoring Language Is Important

Language allows people to express thoughts, theories, ideas, experiences and opinions. But even while doing so, it also serves to obscure what is essential for understanding the complex nature of reality. When people use language to hide essential meaning, it is not only because they cynically seek to prevaricate or spread misinformation. It is because they strive to tell the part or the angle of the story that correlates with their needs and interests.

In the age of social media, many of our institutions and pundits proclaim their intent to root out ¡°misinformation.¡± But often, in so doing, they are literally seeking to miss information.

Is there a solution? It will never be perfect, but critical thinking begins by being attentive to two things: the full context of any issue we are trying to understand and the operation of language itself. In our schools, we are taught to read and write, but, unless we bring rhetoric back into the standard curriculum, we are never taught how the power of language to both convey and distort the truth functions. There is a largely unconscious but observable historical reason for that negligence. Teaching establishments and cultural authorities fear the power of linguistic critique may be used against their authority.

Remember, 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ Language and the News seeks to sensitize our readers to the importance of digging deeper when assimilating the wisdom of our authorities, pundits and the media that transmit their knowledge and wisdom.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Emmanuel Macron¡¯²õ Chance to Appear Transformative appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Will the Pandemic Revitalize Ideas of the Global Common Good?

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In the same period, Great Britain moved to the right under Prime Minister Boris Johnson while autocratic regimes in Poland, Hungary, Turkey, the Philippines and Brazil tightened their grip on governance structures.

What does the future hold for liberal democracies around the world in the next decade? Are current trends an aberration, or is Marc Plattner prophetic in in ¡°Democracy in Decline?¡± that authoritarianism seems to have the ¡°wind at its back even if it has not yet spread to many more countries¡±?

Inevitable Decline Scenario

Current trends produce compelling evidence that seems to suggest that the decline of democracies is an inevitability. In the United States, daily columns appear pronouncing that democracy is in peril and under siege, and asking whether another civil war is possible. The January 6 assault on the Capitol continues to be a flashpoint in what was already a very volatile political environment. Voting restrictions targeted at likely Democratic voters have been instituted in many pro-Republican states. Given the prominence of America as a symbol of liberal democracy, countries around the world are now thinking the unthinkable about the future of democratic governance.

Last year’s Freedom House , ¡°Freedom in the World for 2021,¡± carries the subheading ¡°Democracy under Siege.¡± It suggests that the aggregate decline in freedom has exceeded gains for the past 15 years. While much of the deterioration in 2020 was associated with regimes in Africa and the Middle East, European nations ¡ª Poland, Hungary and Turkey ¡ª recorded reductions in freedom. Moreover, the United States has seen a 10-year decline in freedom equivalent to that experienced in 25 other nations.

Meanwhile, as the left-wing populist party headed by Nicolas Maduro has captured the headlines because of his dismantling of democratic institutions in Venezuela, right-wing populist movements are increasing across Latin America ¡ª Brazil, Bolivia and Peru are examples. More recently, following Jair Bolsonaro¡¯²õ playbook in Brazil, the leader of the right-wing populist Christian Social Front in Chile, Jos¨¦ Antonio Kast, forced a run-off in a recent election after voicing a desire to return to the autocratic regime of Augusto Pinochet.  

Kast eventually lost in a landslide, which bodes well for the stability of democracy in Chile for the near future, but still raises the disconcerting issue of the popularity of authoritarianism among a sizeable minority of Chile¡¯²õ polity. 

Predisposition to Authoritarianism

All of these recent events would seem to posit an argument that many citizens are susceptible to an authoritarian appeal. However, forecasting trends from recent events is always hazardous. Yet there is a more ominous source for predicting inevitability than the recent accounts and actions of political leaders and pundits. The writings of a number of social psychologists, historians and political scientists are extremely relevant to the question at hand.

Karen Skinner argues in her book ¡°The Authoritarian Dynamic¡± that autocratic tendencies are baked into the psychic of citizens of liberal democracies. Fear of change and diversity is easily transformed into a call by a politician for a return to the status quo of the past, like ¡°Make American Great Again.¡± Long before the ascent of Trump, Skinner estimated that as many as one-third of the population in liberal democracies have a predisposition to authoritarianism.

Given that democracies encourage diversity, alternative interpretations of history and open dialogue on difficult issues, these strengths may exceed people¡¯²õ capacity to tolerate difficult issues. A growing lack of tolerance toward immigrants, people of color or bureaucrats provides a platform for opportunistic leaders to activate that ¡°authoritarian »å²â²Ô²¹³¾¾±³¦.¡±

Roger Griffin a similar argument when he attributes modernity as a force for fascism. With the unfolding of modernity, populist interpretations of an idealized national past arise in response to the anxiety that citizens feel about a future where the only certainty is that it will be different than the past. Leaders with autocratic ambitions use ¡°restorative nostalgia¡± ¡ª Svetlana Boym¡¯²õ concept in her book ¡°The Future of Nostalgia¡± to describe a hereafter that replicates the past ¡ª to rally citizens to a populist political movement, a revolt against democratic institutions and their advocates, ¡°the bureaucratic elites.¡±

The arguments offered by Skinner, Griffin and others provide an important understanding of how the internal vulnerabilities of liberal democracies can nurture their own demise. However, despite the presence of an authoritarian dynamic within liberal democracies, a political leadership factor is part of the calculus for predicting the future of democracies. The past decade has witnessed the emergence of Plutarchian leaders who have learned to navigate the pathway that enables populist sentiments to be integrated with autocratic predispositions.

While their hold on the masses is important, what is required to secure power is their ability to bewitch a small key group of capable and principled people in leadership roles and convince them to submit to the autocratic impulses of a prophetic leader as a means of achieving limited policy goals.  

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A cadre of ¡ª those who have no autocratic predisposition but are willing to align with anti-democratic politics as a means of achieving specific policy goals or to ensure their own power base in the governance structure ¡ª is required. The important and notorious role that Franz von Papen had in enabling the rise of fascism in Germany in the 1930s must not be duplicated if democracy is to be resilient in countries experiencing populist movements. The dangerous combination of a charismatic populist leader and a sizable component of politicians willing to compromise their political ideals for transitory political goals would make the downward spiral of democracy inevitable.

Yet in the United States, a contingent of politicians did defy the urges of the Trump administration to decertify the election results and preserve democratic rule. In Chile, citizens and political leaders rejected the call to return to the autocratic governance model of Pinochet¡¯²õ dictatorship. In Europe, despite the political uncertainties created by the pandemic, right-wing populist movements have not established themselves as viable alternatives to current regimes. 

Democracy will be resilient and survive the current wave of right-wing authoritarianism if leaders and institutions demonstrate their ability to solve critical social and economic problems, reverse the erosion of trust between themselves and the public, and put the safeguarding of democracy at the forefront of their political agenda.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Is the Decline of Democracy Inevitable? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Whatever Happened to Elon Musk?

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During the presidential campaign of 2000, Bush famously said, in a moment of humorous truth-telling at a gala dinner in New York: “This is an impressive crowd. The haves and the have-mores. Some people call you the elite. I call you my base.” Bush spoke as a Republican, a party known to cater to the wealthy business class. But he was speaking for everyone in the crowd, his Democratic opponent, Al Gore, included.

Bush¡¯²õ election inaugurated a period of political and cultural chaos that began a prolonged process whose effect was to undermine Americans¡¯ understanding of the nation¡¯²õ proclaimed democratic values. Bush¡¯²õ Middle East wars ¡ª so pleasing to Carlyle ¡ª were followed by a financial meltdown, leading to President Barack Obama¡¯²õ bailout of the ¡°have-mores¡± and his sacrifice of the middle class. It reached a point of culmination in 2016 when Donald Trump, like Bush himself, was elected with a minority of the popular vote and a sense of a quasi-religious mission.

The elections of 2000 and 2016 left the Democrats in a strategic quandary from which they still haven¡¯t recovered. Promoting issues that appeal to voters and a demography evolving in their favor, Democrats should easily dominate national politics. But they simply do not know how to win elections. Worse, every time they lose ¡ª as they did in an important gubernatorial race in Virginia last week ¡ª they become more deeply confused. It has become an extraordinary spectacle featuring political ineptitude aggravated by the legacy media beholden not so much to the Democratic Party as its donors. The New York Times heads that list.

An opinion penned by The Times¡¯ editorial board on the dilemma facing the party after the disappointment in Virginia predictably claims that ¡°what is badly needed, is an honest conversation in the Democratic Party about how to return to the moderate policies and values that fueled the blue-wave victories in 2018 and won Joe Biden the presidency in 2020.¡±

Today¡¯²õ Daily Devil¡¯²õ Dictionary definition:

Moderate policies and values:

Any approach to politics and government that will find both straightforward and devious ways when necessary to protect the vested interests of people with enough wealth to pay for the outlandishly expensive electoral campaigns of Democratic candidates who are nobly focused on the only goal that matters: getting elected or reelected

Contextual Note

Despite The Times¡¯ insistence, 2018 and 2020 saw no ¡°blue waves.¡± In both cases, Democrats progressed slightly thanks to a powerfully orchestrated negative reaction to the havoc created by Trump faithfully amplified by the media. The logic of the narrow victory achieved in the 2018 midterm elections and the capacity to rise above Trump¡¯²õ nevertheless impressive numbers in the 2020 presidential election lay entirely in the capacity of the media to convince enough people that Trump was an aberration from hell. For many ¡°moderate¡± voters, unconvinced by either party, there was no positive reason to vote for Democrats. There was, however, a compelling reason to free themselves from a news cycle dominated by a narcissistic troublemaker. What The Times called a blue wave was nothing more than a Trump-colored ebb as the residue of 2016 temporarily receded.

It is always instructive to learn how off-kilter The New York Times¡¯ collective thinking can be. In the wake of the Virginia gubernatorial race, the editorial board notes that ¡°Democrats lost there ¡ª even with a longtime moderate as their candidate for governor.¡± Could that realization persuade them to wonder whether being a moderate committed to doing things the way they have always been done isn¡¯t the problem? No, not The New York Times. Instead of blaming the moderate candidate, it excoriates an imaginary entity ¡ª ¡°the party¡± ¡ª that has failed to consolidate around ¡°moderate, unifying solutions.¡± The Times specifically complains about the Democratic Party¡¯²õ insistence on ¡°looking left on so many priorities and so much messaging.¡±

The editorial cites ¡°left-center squabbling¡± that has prevented ¡°passing both the bipartisan infrastructure bill and a robust version of the Build Back Better plan.¡± The rhetorical trick here is the word ¡°robust.¡± Robustness is exactly what not just the progressives but even establishment stalwarts such as Chuck Schumer appear to be pushing for. It is ¡°moderate¡± Democrats ¡ª namely, Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema ¡ª who have ostentatiously battled to deprive the legislation of its robustness.

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The Times fears a ¡°sharp leftward push¡± in the party and claims that ¡°more centrist Americans¡± are opposed to spending. That is a convenient but traditional fabrication. A clear majority of Americans polled want the specific programs being eliminated in the name of reduced spending. But that fact doesn¡¯t interest The Times. Those who have led the opposition to robustness are ¡°centrist¡± Democrats, like the multi-millionaire Manchin and the obstreperous narcissist Sinema.

On the same day as the editorial, Times reporter Shane Goldmacher revealingly what he sees as the real problem President Joe Biden is faced with. He recounts that last year, Biden promised his ¡°top fund-raisers,¡± whose cash got him elected, to ¡°never, ever let you down.¡± Ten months later, Goldmacher reports that the donors ¡°are feeling neglected if not outright cast aside.¡± He quotes one major fund-raiser who complains: ¡°It¡¯²õ very discouraging. We don¡¯t exist.¡± The Times finds that worrying. It finds less worrying the fact that a majority of Americans, with no expectations of a hotline to the White House purchased with hefty contributions, have long felt the same way. This is so absurd it could lead to the speculation that Biden has become a left-wing activist intent on shafting the donor class.

The Times describes the Democrats as ¡°the only party right now that shows an interest in governing and preserving democratic norms.¡± This is meant to sound reasoned and reasonable. But it says nothing positive. It focuses on ¡°preserving,¡± defending the status quo. Every election since 2008 has been an expression of the voters¡¯ admittedly confused desire for change that never happens.

Historical Note

The New York Times may have forgotten that the historical basis of any two-party system in a modern democracy relies on the distinction between concepts traditionally termed left and right. The left has traditionally represented two characteristics of the population: people who depend on a propertied class for employment, and the oppressed. The right has traditionally represented the authority of the business class and those segments of the stable middle class that were comfortable with their superiors¡¯ ability to collectively manage the economy. Whether in the US, Britain, France or Germany ¡ª to cite only those countries ¡ª there is a documented trend of a loss of confidence in the ability of any of the traditional parties to manage things efficiently.

Radical changes have been taking place in this simple dichotomy across the developed world. As Thomas Piketty has insisted, parties traditionally of the left ¡ª supposedly representing the working class and the oppressed ¡ª have become dominated by the educated class with a technocratic managerial mindset.

As a consequence, broad swaths of the population have begun to feel alienated by a system controlled by technocrats working alongside business leaders focused on accumulating wealth. In total disorder, they turn to various forms of populism that can range from forms of anarchism to fascism. Donald Trump brilliantly exploited that trend and, despite serious personal discredit, is continuing to do so even today. In other words, the dummy Trump understands what the shining intellects of The New York Times refuse to see.

According to The Times¡¯ editorial board, the Democrats, wedded to moderation and technocracy, are in deep water because they have drifted too far to the left. According to Shane Goldmacher, they are suffering because they haven¡¯t properly honored their wealthy donors. Put the two lessons together and it¡¯²õ easy to understand that The Times has a clear preference for oligarchy over democracy.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil¡¯²õ Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil¡¯²õ Dictionary on 51³Ô¹Ï.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post The Democratic Party vs. Its Voters appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Germany and France Head Into Two Very Different Elections

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As it turns out, they can. Last week, a came out that had Eric Zemmour surpassing Marine Le Pen in next year¡¯²õ presidential election. As things stand now, Zemmour, not Le Pen, would advance to the second and decisive round of the election, facing the incumbent, Emmanuel Macron.

Machine ¨¤ Pol¨¦miques

The results sent shockwaves across the French political landscape and put Zemmour onto the front pages of the country¡¯²õ major news outlets. Zemmour ante portas, quelle horreur! The whole thing is quite remarkable. After all, as of yet, Zemmour has not declared his candidacy for the election. But it appears to be a foregone conclusion. The media certainly act as if it were, and Zemmour would be a fool to contradict them. Fool he is not ¡ª quite the contrary.

The whole thing is even more remarkable, and not devoid of irony, given the fact that Eric Zemmour happens to be Jewish (and practicing, at least until his father passed away in 2013) and originates from a French-Algerian family that left Algeria during the country¡¯²õ struggle for independence. Zemmour himself defines his ethnic background as Berber. A curious case, indeed. A Jew, a ¡°³¾¨¦³Ù¨¨±ç³Ü±ð¡± (a pejorative term for alien residents) ¡ª the nightmare of every traditional extreme-right French nationalist, as the left-leaning magazine Marianne recently .

Eric Zemmour is France¡¯²õ response to Donald Trump, if not his French avatar. Like Trump, he has no filters, but unlike Trump, he is highly intelligent, erudite, refined, articulate and sharp-witted. A prolific author of editorials, commentary and bestselling books, a prominent TV personality and celebrity, Zemmour figures among France¡¯²õ most notorious provocateurs, a ¡°machine ¨¤ pol¨¦miques,¡± as Politico recently , who riles, aggravates, irritates and polarizes.

For years now, Zemmour has been content to play the role of the public intellectual on the right, a modern-day male Cassandra, indefatigably lamenting the seemingly inexorable decline of France and fustigating the whole of the French political establishment for failing to halt and reverse it. The title of his bestseller from 2014, ¡°Le suicide fran?ais,¡± said it all. It was an analysis of how France¡¯²õ elites ¡ª political, economic, administrative and particularly intellectual, the ¡°heirs of May ¡¯68¡± ¡ª have systematically ¡°undone France.”

The result is a line of argumentation reminiscent of the Kulturpessimismus that pervaded late 19^th and early 20^th-century Germany, most notably Oswald Spengler¡¯²õ ¡°Decline of the West.¡± In the past, Zemmour noted, France had ¡°imposed¡± its ideas, its vision of the world, ¡°even its caprices¡± on ¡°a universe carried away by all these wonders.¡± Today, by contrast, France was ¡°forced to swallow values and mores that are the total opposite to what it had built up for centuries.¡±

At the same time, he charged, the French political and economic elite had to a large extent renounced and abandoned the country¡¯²õ sovereignty and national independence in the name of the European project and of globalization, all under the approving eyes of the media that enthusiastically praised ¡°this great renouncement.¡±

At first sight, it might appear that this is nothing more than the typical Euroskepticism so dear to the contemporary radical right. In reality, Zemmour¡¯²õ diagnosis of the spiritual situation of the current age goes a bit deeper. It is informed by a strong sense ¡ª Kulturpessimismus oblige ¡ª that not just the French, but Western civilization in general has run its course, fallen victim to fatigue and exhaustion.

Dechristianization and widespread suspicion with respect to the notion of progress have hollowed out the foundations on which it has rested. In the process, it has lost its spiritual shield and made itself vulnerable to the influx of alien ideas and values.

Great Obsession

Like so many other right-wing populists in Europe these days, Zemmour is obsessed with Islam, and for more than a single reason. For one, there is the that Muslims have retained what the West has largely abandoned ¡ª a sense of spirituality and anti-materialism, an ethical and moral compass and, above all, a sense of honor.

At the same time, Zemmour regurgitates ad nauseam all the familiar anti-Islamic tropes that have made the political fortunes of radical right-wing entrepreneurs in recent memory, from the late Pim Fortuyn to Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, from Pia Kj?rsgard in Denmark to Paulin Hanson in Australia. These tropes posit that Islam is not only a religion, but also a political ideology, and as such totalitarian; that the basic principles of Western culture and civilization, such as democracy, freedom of religion and opinion, the equality of men and women, or the separation of church and state, are fundamentally at odds with Islam; and that Islam is all about submission and therefore incompatible with liberal democracy.

Zemmour¡¯²õ other great obsession is closely tied in with his anti-Islamic position ¡ª the specter of the ¡°grand replacement.¡± This is a conspiracy theory that has been around for quite some time. It gained new traction with Renaud Camus¡¯ eponymous book from 2011 (now in its third edition). But it has been Zemmour who has popularized it in France, with great success.

In 2018, one out of four respondents in a representative survey to the ¡°theory¡± of the great replacement. The idea here is, in a that the combination of mass immigration and high birth rates of non-Europeans is going to overwhelm the ¡°original¡± European population and replace it as well as its culture, values and traditions, and all this with the full knowledge, complicity and support of Europe¡¯²õ cosmopolitan elites who have nothing but contempt for national identity and their own culture.

Reluctant Savior

A few weeks ago, Zemmour¡¯²õ new book came out. The title is meant as a warning, ¡°La France n¡¯a pas dit son dernier mot¡± ¡ª “France Hasn¡¯t Yet Said Its Last Word.¡± As expected, it is a ¡ª in first and second place on amazon.fr at the time of writing ¡ª and, as expected, it is largely seen as a manifesto designed to launch his campaign. The message is clear. It is not yet too late to act. But act we must, and fast. For we are faced with a situation of life and death: either remain France or disappear.

To win, Zemmour insists, ¡°we have to fight on all fronts.¡± To keep ¡°the invaders¡± away from us and ¡°to save our identity and regain our sovereignty.¡± That¡¯²õ the only way to put a stop to the ¡°migration waves¡± that ¡°for decades overwhelm our territory and our people.¡± Otherwise, France is lost, fallen prey to reverse colonization and the great replacement. For, as Zemmour asserts, ¡°demography is destiny.¡±

This is where Zemmour comes in, a reluctant savior, who steps in because, as he charges, there is no one, no political party ¡ª and that includes Marine Le Pen¡¯²õ National Rally ¡ª capable of ¡°expressing the just wrath and anxiety of the French people.¡± Zemmour sees himself as the heir to a long tradition of national-populism, and particularly to one of its most prominent exponents, Maurice Barres, famous for his definition of identity and belonging as “la terre et les morts” ¡ª the soil and the dead. At one point in the book, Zemmour characterizes himself as a ¡°Fran?ais de la terre et des morts¡± who passed from Emile Zola to Barres.

On a certain level, this makes sense. After all, Barres was, at the end of the 19^th century, to obsess about France being inundated and submerged by migrant workers ¡ª first inklings of the great replacement. Ironically enough, Barres also happened to be a , who played a prominent role during the Dreyfus affair, a defining moment in modern French history that left a permanent mark on the republic.

Another prominent notorious heir to this tradition is, of course, Jean-Marie Le Pen. Recently, Le Pen ±è¨¨°ù±ð was asked his opinion on Eric Zemmour. Le Pen¡¯²õ was as revealing as it was disconcerting: ¡°The only difference between him and me is that he is Jewish.¡± Honi soit qui mal y pense ¡ª evil to him who evil thinks, as the saying goes. One thing is sure, the next months are going to be turbulent in France, and perhaps amusing ¡ª as long as you happen not to be French.

*[51³Ô¹Ï is a  partner of the .]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Eric Zemmour¡¯²õ Plan to Save France from Extinction appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Democrats face challenges of their own trying to figure out how to weave together moderate Biden Democrats with a new generation of democratic socialists. One way to become ¡°the party of the future¡± is to articulate a clear plan for solving the problems of the future. Here is one clear opportunity.

The Weak European Reflex in German Cybersecurity

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Both the Trump and the Biden administrations approved multibillion-dollar pandemic stimulus programs. Despite the gravity of the COVID-19 economic crisis, half of the did not get to the working Americans who desperately needed help. Much was stolen by fraudsters and criminal rings who exploited online claims. Made worse, 70% of the stolen funds went abroad to Russia, China and Nigeria.

California State Auditor Elaine Howle as much last August and announced in a January report that the Employment Development Department (EDD) had sent 555,000 claims to 26,000 suspect addresses ¡ª an of 21 per address ¡ª despite the evidence of fraudulent activity. One address had more than 80 claims, and yet EDD¡¯²õ missed 12 as late as in December 2020. Howle also noted that a disturbing number of claims went to people currently incarcerated in California prisons.

This begs the question: How long will taxpayers support government programs only to learn that the money ended up in the hands of criminals? This is how we stop it.

Every FBI or Drug Enforcement Administration office has a special agent in charge (SAC) to coordinate efforts in combatting criminal threats. We need state-based SACs for cybersecurity to assist state and local governments, prevent fraud and direct funding for state task forces as we already do for counterterrorism.

Under the authority of the secretary of homeland security, chief security officers in each state would provide a full conduit of information to all levels of government to intercept criminals. Besides preventing fraud, they could play a valuable role in helping local governments encrypt both and as well as portect against .

Governments in general also need more cyber experts. Cyber gangs have upped the ante, going so far as to examine companies¡¯ before activating ransomware as experts believe was done in the most recent Kaseya hack. We need to raise the bar to intercept these bad actors before they reach private citizens or entities. A Marshall Plan for cyber hiring across all government would put us on stronger footing to combat increasingly aggressive behavior by state-supported crime syndicates.

Lastly, we need to measure how we are doing. We need to require that states publicly account for the share of unemployment benefits that get into the right hands. Obviously, not every malicious individual can be caught. By spotlighting our efficacy, we can highlight the problem, heighten demand and recruit more people with the tech backgrounds we need to tackle fraud.

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As a lifelong Democrat, I believe in the power of a strong government that provides a social safety net to protect its citizens. The answer is not less government or pretending there will not be more tech-based attacks on our citizens and businesses. The answer is for government to demonstrate it can proactively provide solutions to stop the problem and provide accountability.

We need a government that is technologically capable enough to protect our people and smart enough to get the money to those who need it most. Whichever party shows it understands the future by solving new problems like cybersecurity will be in the pole position to win in 2022 and beyond.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post A 21st-Century Marshall Plan for Cyber Defense appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Algeria to France: No Thanks for the Memories 

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Yet within the current situation, an important question arises: How much change can happen with newly elected parliament members when interrelated issues such as governmental corruption, Iranian influence in Iraqi affairs and the presence of armed militias seem less likely to change?

Religion and Politics

To understand what is taking place in Iraq, it is necessary to look back at recent developments. After the dramatic upheaval with the war in 2003, Iraqis witnessed the rise of religious authorities engaging in political activities, which is when the so-called  agenda began to develop. In political theories, scholar Leo Strauss introduced the ¡°theologico-political problem¡± as an issue of authority ¡ª that is, political authority founded on religious revelations. This theory can explain age-old problems and help analyze the dynamics and parameters of political  in the context of Iraq.

One significant issue that exists in Iraqi politics is the dominance of the Shia religious agenda in shaping the country¡¯²õ affairs. Figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr, Ammar al-Hakim, Qais Alkhazaali and others are in charge. In fact, it is difficult to imagine or predict a change where Sunni or other secular political leaders arise, even within a climate of supervised fair elections.

This ¡°theocratic¡± model has caused multiple predicaments that have worsened and complicated the existing conditions. It has simply proved dangerous. Such theologico-politicians who claim religious authority can be morally corrupt and disguised in a righteous mask. Yet such figures need to show they follow custom-interpreted religious doctrine. Their goal is to gain popular votes by convincing like-minded Iraqis of the importance of religion.

The consequences have intensified over the years. Theologico-political figures have established their own political parties and armed militias. The presence of militias in Iraq has become one of the most difficult issues to solve, particularly as militants operate autonomously with impunity. They have infiltrated government institutions where they have influence. They also maintain power and funding. Both of these issues make it difficult to dissolve such organized groups.

There has recently been an increase in assassinations, threats and targeting of ¡°new¡± potential candidates, activists and proponents of change. In 2019, it was that a 700-name list was issued by the Iran-backed Shia militia Asa¡¯ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) to target Iraqi journalists and activists, including those living overseas, who support the ongoing protests.

Iraqis Are Tired

The core problem of this theologico-politics is that its rhetoric is always divisive. In a religiously diverse country like Iraq, people of different faiths and sects should coexist and be considered in the decision-making process. This one-sect politics can never function when its agenda inherently dismisses, discriminates against and persecutes the ¡°other¡± group.

But Iraqis are tired of this. The majority of Shia-led  oppose the government¡¯²õ agenda and Iran¡¯²õ interference in Iraq. The people do not want sectarian ruling anymore. The status quo favors Iran over Iraq¡¯²õ interests to ensure long-term existence. Protesters have demanded basic infrastructure services and reform of issues exacerbated by Iranian meddling and accompanying governmental failures in all spheres. This includes a failing economy, widespread corruption, deteriorating health care and education systems and, most significantly, rising civil unrest.

In contrast to this new form of dictatorship ¡ª theologico-politics ¡ª what Iraq needs are conditions that support true liberal democracy, secularity and the separation of religion and state. However, this may seem implausible, especially when speculation over the election results seems more inclined toward the domination of Islamist politics.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post How Theological Politics Affects Iraq appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Macron¡¯²õ Campaign to Reveal France¡¯²õ Historical Sins

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Out of frustration with Algeria¡¯²õ lack of cooperation in repatriating its citizens illegally residing in France, Macron¡¯²õ government decided to reduce the number of authorized visas for Algeria and Morocco by 50% and Tunisia by 30%. To justify this move, Macron accused the Algerian government of mental games. As by Le Monde, ¡°Macron considers that since its independence in 1962, Algeria has based its development on a ‘memorial rent’ fostered by its politico-military system.¡±

Today¡¯²õ Daily Devil¡¯²õ Dictionary definition:

Memorial rent:

The only possible English equivalent of an untranslatable term invented by the French historian Benjamin Stora and hijacked by Emmanuel Macron, who believes that his 2017 election as president of the republic made him the nation¡¯²õ and the world¡¯²õ historian-in-chief

Contextual Note

In July 2020, seeking to resolve the conundrum of tense French-Algerian relations, Emmanuel Macron commissioned historian Benjamin Stora to prepare a report on ¡°the memories of colonization and the Algerian war.¡±

In January, Stora delivered his copy. Eschewing the interpretation of specific events and facts, which will always remain controversial and painful to consider, the historian chose to focus on the cultural and psychological effects left by the memory of those events on both sides of the Mediterranean. Those whose lives were affected by the long war of independence, according to Stora, have remained constrained within a permanent state of mutual misunderstanding. 

Stora proposed the metaphor of ¡°memorial rent¡± to characterize how the different groups have mobilized a set of recriminations concerning the injustice done to them in the past. They cite this as the psychological ¡°rent¡± due to them by their adversaries. 

On the French side, there are those who can be either nostalgic or ashamed of their colonial adventure and France¡¯²õ self-proclaimed . This includes officials and soldiers, but also the Harkis ¡ª Algerian Muslims who fought alongside the French army ¡ª and the pieds-noirs or the Europeans settled in Algeria but repatriated after the war.

On the Algerian side, there are those who identified with the struggle for independence as a political cause and a less politically motivated majority, who appreciated independence without actively embracing the cause. Many Algerians were alienated by the political and ideological infighting that the revolution fatally produced.

After long decades of official hostility between France and Algeria, people in both countries welcomed Macron¡¯²õ declared intention to resolve the inherited problems and define a new relationship. The task could never be easy since France, even when excluded in the most absolute terms from Algeria¡¯²õ internal politics, has always been lurking in the background. Numerous economic, linguistic and cultural links have maintained a necessary but distant relationship between the nations and their peoples.

Anyone who lives and works in the business world in France realizes that generations of North Africans have found their permanent place within French culture, even if their presence in the social structure is subjected to a curiously ambiguous dynamic. North Africans have simultaneously been encouraged (and accepted) and discouraged (and rejected) from being fully integrated into the French social fabric.

Stora insisted on the notion of memorial rent as a way of accounting for the mentalities that still inhabit the two populations and their governments. The Algerians cannot forget the reality of colonization. Having definitively renounced its colonial mission, France seeks to live up to its ideals of ¡°libert¨¦, ¨¦galit¨¦, fraternit¨¦,¡± in the name of modern Western liberalism.

Macron, the maverick, wished to distinguish himself from his predecessors by finding some common ground and opening a new horizon of cooperation. He hoped that by honestly acknowledging what was reprehensible in France¡¯²õ past in Algeria, the two nations could begin a fraternal dialogue that had been shattered by the revolution.

Macron now feels his act of good faith has not been reciprocated. He nevertheless insists that he maintains excellent relations with the current Algerian president, Abdelmadjid Tebboune. Perhaps he sees a kinship to Donald Trump¡¯²õ account of his relationship with Kim Jung-un. It contains the idea that a sentiment of personal friendship ¡ª even if totally imaginary in Trump¡¯²õ case ¡ª accompanied by a willingness to dialogue on a person-to-person basis, could lead to long-term understanding.

Macron is not alone in noting that Algeria¡¯²õ system of government appears seriously sclerotic. A majority of Algerians appear to share his analysis. Massive protests last year by the pro-democratic popular movement known as Hirak permitted the destitution of the doddering, despotic and now deceased President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Last week, Macron dared to express his sentiment that Tebboune, for all his good intentions, was the prisoner of a system that he described as ¡°very hard.¡± Though diplomatically delicate, it was a point worth making.

But after insisting that resolving the question of historical memory as described by Stora was the key to progress, Macron made a major mistake. Playing the amateur historian, he questioned whether Algeria had ever existed ¡°as a nation¡± before French colonization, a period in which the region of Algeria was a precinct of the Ottoman Empire.

In other words, Macron implicitly called into question the historical legitimacy of Algeria as a nation-state. For Algerians, and other observers as well, that stands as a clear example of European political hubris.

To be fair, Macron cited a valid historical fact. But it implied a message not dissimilar to President Nicolas Sarkozy¡¯²õ contention in a 2007 in Dakar that ¡°the African has not fully entered into history.¡± In Sarkozy¡¯²õ passably racist mind, Europe alone defined the drift and logic of history. At the time, Senegalese writer Boris Diop, remarked: ¡°Maybe he does not realise to what extent we felt insulted.¡±

Many ordinary Algerians today feel the same way about Macron¡¯²õ reflection on the status of Algeria. It clearly signifies that Macron thinks of Algeria as a second-class nation at best, lacking the dignity of European nation-states.

Historical Note

Le Monde¡¯²õ editorial board that ¡°Emmanuel Macron was right to make reconciliation between the painful experiences on both sides the axis of his ¡®memorial policy.¡¯¡± An outside observer might note that the idea a ¡°memorial policy¡± would be unimaginable in most other cultures and historical contexts. The only significant precedents concerning national policies intended to produce an official account of the collective memory may be Israel¡¯²õ remembrance of the Holocaust and South Africa¡¯²õ truth and reconciliation commission.

But these three cases ¡ª Israel, South Africa and France ¡ª are all very different. In the Israeli case, there was no nation to reconcile with, Germany having been totally transformed after the war, followed by the subsequent creation of Israel. In South Africa, the formerly oppressed and their oppressors had to find a way of changing places by allowing a black majority to exercise its prerogatives.

Macron¡¯²õ historicist approach, seeking to identify an entire people¡¯²õ memorial content, may be seen, like so much else in French culture, as typically Cartesian. It transforms Descartes¡¯ celebrated axiom, ¡°I think, therefore I am¡± into ¡°I remember, therefore I was.¡± This is as dangerous as it is potentially helpful because, while it seeks to reconcile, it creates false equations. Macron¡¯²õ own discourse, when he invokes history to delegitimize Algeria as a nation, reveals the risk.

The president went even further when he of failing to recognize its own past as a colonial power. The mention of Turkey, whose president last year not only criticized Macron but called into question his ¡°,¡± would seem to indicate that for all his supposed Cartesian rationality, Macron can at times become unhinged, especially in the months before a presidential election.

Apparently aware of his mistake, Macron now is seeking to lower the tensions. But as political scientist Hasni Abidi observes, in the , Macron¡¯²õ ¡°mea culpa would be denounced by the parties of the right.¡± At the same time, Abidi believes the French may see Macron as a serial troublemaker adept at ¡°creating multiple conflicts with Turkey, Mali, Australia or the US.¡± The election takes place in April. 

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil¡¯²õ Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil¡¯²õ Dictionary on 51³Ô¹Ï.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Algeria to France: No Thanks for the Memories? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Third Rome: Will Russia Save Europe From Itself?

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Critics, however, claim the changes were aimed at facilitating a win for the ruling United Russia party. During this election cycle, the Kremlin has moved to further tighten its grip on the opposition. Despite the crackdown, United Russia¡¯²õ decreasing popularity represents a valuable opportunity for the opposition to strengthen its position as a political alternative to the status quo.  

Important Test

This election have been an important test for United Russia, whose goal was to keep its supermajority in the Duma. The party has progressively lost popularity since the controversial pension reforms of 2016, coupled with chronic problems such as widespread corruption and socioeconomic issues. Statistics published by the Levada Center in March showed that of those interviewed would vote for United Russia in the upcoming election, the lowest rating since the party’s consolidation in the early 2000s.

The 450 seats in the Duma are allocated via a ¡ª half through a party-list proportional vote with a 5% threshold and half via a majority in single-mandate constituencies. The electoral system was in 2014 when the first-past-the-post component was introduced, granting United Russia a comfortable in the 2016 elections.

It is crucial to notice that the electoral system is not the only element pointing at deficiencies in Russia’s democratic procedures. Opposition candidates are not admitted to run for elections. Those parties allowed to participate are labeled as because, even if formally independent, they remain subordinated to United Russia.

This year, has been low ¡ª around 52% according to official figures or just 38% as per ¡ª because of the general climate of distrust and dissatisfaction. Despite its increasing unpopularity, United Russia managed to obtain an absolute majority, 49.82% of the votes and securing 324 seats in the Duma. Yet United Russia lost public consensus compared to 2016, when it won 56% of the vote. Until this year, the party has steadily increased its control over parliament since 2003, when it only obtained a with 37%.

The fact that the party predictably won 88% of the single-seat constituencies allowed it to hold on to its supermajority, vital to furthering the government’s agenda. Among its challengers, the Communist Party (KPRF) obtained a satisfying result, getting almost 19% of the votes. Another element worth noticing is the access of a to the Duma for the first time in the country’s history.

Dirty Tactics

Unsurprisingly, candidates even loosely connected with Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), which has been designated an in June, were from running. However, the group has invented an interesting method to challenge United Russia: so-called , already tested during the Moscow elections in 2019. At the time, the tactic was , with 23 of the 40 candidates it backed elected. According to Navalny, Smart Voting helped United Russia‘s majority in three cities in last year’s regional elections.

Before this year’s legislative elections, a dedicated website and app were developed by Navalny supporters to help voters pick the best option to maximize the chance of beating pro-Kremlin candidates, thus avoiding dispersing the votes toward several oppositional candidates.

Under pressure from the Kremlin, however, both Google and Apple from their respective stores after their Russian employees were with jail terms. When organizers turned to YouTube to explain Smart Voting, the video was removed. This is not the first time the Russian government has attempted to subordinate tech companies. The messenger Telegram was completely banned in Russia for two years because it refused to share with the security services.

The 2021 elections have been marred by a number of controversies and alleged fraud. During the campaign, smear tactics and other dirty tricks were employed against candidates not running with United Russia. For example, a of the notorious rapist Viktor Mokhov wearing a T-shirt and cap showing the KPRF logo and praising its leader, Gennady Zyuganov, was shown across several media outlets a few weeks before the election. In May, a group of women depicting themselves as part of the Ukrainian collective Femen a protest supporting the KPRF candidate Nina Ostanina.

In the months before the vote, articles describing scandals and petty crimes committed by KPRF candidates started to appear in tabloids and newspapers. A ¡°¡± in support of the right-wing LDPR party on a boat on the river Neva in St. Petersburg was staged to divert potential voters; the party’s electoral base is staunchly conservative.

Another dirty tactic was the emergence of so-called spoiler candidates to break up the vote. A few days before the election, Boris Vishnevski, a candidate for the liberal-democratic Yabloko party, lamented that candidates with the same name and appearance were registered in an apparent attempt to disperse votes. According to an by the Russian newspaper Kommersant, spoiler candidates have also been deployed against KPRF.

Numerous surveillance videos from several polling stations around the country showed ballots being tampered with. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe was not able to because of the pandemic. The fact that United Russia reached almost 50% of the vote compared to the 40% anticipated by opinion polls is likewise suspicious, especially in Moscow, where the party’s support is among the lowest in the country.

Moreover, after a significant in reporting results, online votes suspiciously reversed predictions and past voting patterns, granting victory to United Russia candidates in 15 electoral districts across the capital. In the of Sergey Shpilkin, an independent election analyst, ¡°Electronic voting is an absolute evil ¡ª a black box that no one controls.¡± 

Least Free

The 2021 legislative elections represented only a partial victory for United Russia. Even though the party succeeded in securing control of parliament, controversies around the vote have further weakened its legitimacy. Conversely, the Communist Party has strengthened its presence in the Duma, possibly also thanks to Navalny’s Smart Voting.

KPFR is also possibly evolving from a systemic opposition party to a more of the Kremlin, especially after several of its politicians have denounced the many irregularities that occurred before and during the elections. Moreover, the party successfully led a demonstration against the alleged fraud last Saturday, that mass arrests have been performed just before the event.

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Several commentators have emphasized how these elections have been the in Russia¡¯²õ modern history. Indeed, the country seems to be further strengthening its authoritarian grip in face of its weakening electoral appeal. After the elections, two more independent organizations, the online magazine Mediazona and the police monitoring project OVD-Info, have been added to the rapidly growing list of , while have been pressed against Navalny, who is currently serving a two-and-a-half-year prison sentence for parole violation.

It remains to be seen if the opposition could find ways to elude the pervasive control of the Russian state and coordinate united action, especially since disunity was the main cause of failure in 2011-12. Moreover, KPFR will have to decide whether it wants to remain “systemic” or join the opposition. Such a prospective alliance looks very fragile because of the neo-Stalinist leaning of a significant part of the KPRF leadership as opposed to the liberal slant of Alexei Navalny and his movement.

*[51³Ô¹Ï is a  partner of the .]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post On the Heels of a Controversial Election, Russia Grows Increasingly Unfree appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Because the 2019 election occurred before the pandemic upended government plans, Trudeau claimed he needed a new mandate for an economic recovery agenda. But amid rising infections and back-to-school preparations, opposition parties and many media were skeptical. A controversial likened Trudeau to a spoiled child focused only on winning back the absolute parliamentary majority he lost during the 2019 election.

Jagmeet Singh, leader of the center-left New Democratic Party, wrote to Trudeau just days before, asking him not to call a new election but instead to recall Parliament and pass the progressive legislation both parties campaigned on. ¡°If the Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, wants to work on something that¡¯²õ going to help people, we¡¯re ready to pass that legislation,¡± Singh told .

The World¡¯²õ Love Affair With Justin Trudeau Is Over

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With polls at the time showing an absolute parliamentary majority in reach, Trudeau opted not to negotiate further and dissolved Parliament to call an election instead. He thus left much of his stated progressive agenda to be implemented later, potentially without the consensus and the compromise minority parliaments require. Progressive bills, such as a proposed ban on gay ¡°conversion therapy,¡± unceremoniously at committee level as the House of Commons dissolved.

Kabul fell the same day. While French troops went through the Afghan capital to get their people out, Afghans who worked with Canadian organizations received texts telling them to go to the airport on their own, carrying the same papers Taliban soldiers could use to identify them and shout ¡°Canada.¡±

The Liberals started tumbling in opinion polls almost right away. The party struggled to shake opposition claims that Trudeau called a ¡°¡± election in the midst of both a fourth COVID-19 wave and a mishandled Afghanistan evacuation, just two years on from the last election. The Conservatives briefly surged before polls tightened into an unexpected tie, leaving the winner to be decided by how vote distribution will translate into seats under the distortions of Canada¡¯²õ first-past-the-post electoral system.

Power Grab

During Trudeau¡¯²õ two terms in office, increasing amounts of his time and political capital became devoted to managing scandal fallouts and avoiding accountability. His pandemic leadership in particular demonstrated Trudeau¡¯²õ tendency to prioritize political considerations and his government¡¯²õ survival above both his legislative agenda and established norms of Canadian parliamentary democracy.

Although the Trudeau government was to scandal before the pandemic, March 25, 2020, marked a pivotal moment for Canadian parliamentary democracy that, perhaps alarmingly, has barely been discussed since.

At a time when much of the world was first locking down, the Canadian House of Commons was pulling an to pass an economic relief package following a debate riddled with suspicion and acrimony. It was a bill that could have sailed through Parliament in a rare show of political unity, camaraderie and consensus. But at the last minute, Trudeau and his cabinet resorted to a power play. Tied up in the multibillion-dollar bill were provisions that, if passed, would have given the finance minister the authority to raise and lower taxes, as well as spend funds without parliamentary approval until the end of 2021.

A Conservative referred to the amendment as a ¡°power grab.¡± NDP leader Singh the Liberals to drop the provisions so MPs could pass economic relief measures and quickly get money flowing to people and businesses that needed it. ¡°I remember scrambling, going through this and we were just like, ¡®What is this?¡¯ It was caught, but it was technical language,¡± says Conservative Shadow Health Minister Michelle Rempel.  

Trudeau¡¯²õ 11^th-hour attempt at taking powers from Parliament through a technical amendment risked delaying support for Canadians and plunging the country into a political crisis during a raging global pandemic. It served as the first major glimpse of his apparent instinct for using a crisis as an opportunity to further his political position or avoid accountability.

It didn¡¯t have to be this way. Trudeau¡¯²õ willingness to run roughshod over the Canadian Parliament during COVID-19 is almost unique among his fellow western leaders. New Zealand¡¯²õ Jacinda Ardern and Germany¡¯²õ Angela Merkel, both often credited with handling the pandemic relatively well, didn¡¯t resort to similar tactics. Their crisis response was arguably better for it. Indeed, at precisely the same time as Canadian opposition MPs lobbied to sink Trudeau¡¯²õ amendment, very different scenes were taking shape half a world away.

Crisis Leadership

As MPs haggled in Ottawa, New Zealand¡¯²õ Civil Defence system sent an to mobile phones across the country with loud alarms and vibrations: The entire nation would go into its highest level of lockdown at midnight. ¡°This message is for all of New Zealand. We are depending on you,¡± it read. That same evening, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern smiled as she asked a live audience to excuse her casual sweater while taking questions via ; she had just put her toddler to bed and wanted to ¡°check in¡± with everyone.

As Ardern spoke, members of the German Bundestag were up early and nearly unanimously with Chancellor Angela Merkel¡¯²õ government to suspend the country¡¯²õ constitutionally-enshrined debt brake. Doing so would give the necessary fiscal space for an emergency package of health spending and economic support measures. ¡°We have never before taken measures involving so much money so quickly to provide security and stability,¡± Merkel said of the response in her .

In both cases, Merkel and Ardern¡¯²õ crisis leadership yielded early successes without the need for power-grabbing tactics. Both leaders come from different political traditions ¡ª Ardern a progressive and Merkel a center-right conservative. Yet their leadership styles both focus on achieving consensus, something Trudeau arguably finds difficult at best.

Merkel¡¯²õ instinct was to bring institutional interests together to make deals. Ardern¡¯²õ was to use her empathy and communication skills to get New Zealanders to buy into a ¡°” strategy requiring a strict lockdown and border controls. ¡°She has very high emotional intelligence,¡± says Auckland-based center-right commentator Ben Thomas. ¡°She didn¡¯t use the opportunity as a power grab.¡±

¡°Everyone did feel like a ¡®team of five million,¡¯¡± says Madeleine Chapman, of ¡°Jacinda Ardern: A New Kind of Leader,¡± referring to one of the prime minister¡¯²õ key phrases during lockdown. ¡°She built up that sense of responsibility in everyone through her communication.¡±

Opposition MPs with New Zealand¡¯²õ National Party contend that Ardern¡¯²õ crisis leadership record isn¡¯t spotless, saying that she was tone-deaf toward certain groups, particularly small businesses. Yet her crisis leadership saw no break in parliamentary scrutiny. An opposition-chaired Epidemic Response Committee began digitally three times a week as soon as in-person sittings stopped.

¡°I think that her administration as a whole was dismissive of other voices,¡± says National Party MP Chris Penk. ¡°I don¡¯t think she articulated, at any point, a view that I would have been really uncomfortable with around the fact that the opposition has no role.¡±

Ardern went on to a landslide reelection in October 2020. As other countries battled their second and third waves, of thousands of New Zealanders safely enjoying music festivals and nightclubs flooded social media. For much of the pandemic, life in Ardern¡¯²õ New Zealand has been fairly normal ¡ª a result achieved without much political scandal.

Stark Contrast

The contrast with Canada is stark, not least because communication and messaging are particularly noteworthy strengths for both Trudeau and Ardern. At times, they¡¯ve both been held up as international examples of charismatic, progressive politicians.

¡°To go out there and to convey some spirit of togetherness, some sense of how tough it was for people, how frustrating it was for people, maybe even how scary it was for people and to reach people on that level. I think he is just sort of, naturally suited to hit those notes,¡± says Aaron Wherry, of ¡°Promise and Peril: Justin Trudeau in Power.¡±

Trudeau¡¯²õ daily press conferences in the pandemic¡¯²õ early months ¡ª including those he gave after his own wife tested positive for COVID-19 ¡ª undoubtedly played a role in boosting his early on. He would with his own finance minister over the Canadian Emergency Response Benefit, a policy some observers ¡°an unintended experiment in basic income.¡± Yet the policy proved with Canadians.

Even after his original power play, the prime minister had an opportunity to follow his fellow progressive Ardern and unify the country by creating a ¡°team of 37 million.¡± Instead, in Wherry¡¯²õ words, ¡°This government, even going back before this pandemic, has struggled at times to figure out how to approach Parliament.¡±

But is that assessment too generous, particularly for a leader who originally came to power on a platform of reinvigorating Canadian democracy after 10 years under the Conservatives? ¡°We are committed to ensuring that 2015 will be the last federal election conducted under the first-past-the-post voting system,¡± read the from that campaign. ¡°Stephen Harper has used prorogation to avoid difficult political circumstances. We will not.¡± Trudeau would go on to break both pledges.

In August 2020, five months after his attempted power grab, he prorogued Parliament. This effectively shut down parliamentarian committees why the WE charity was selected to administer a $900-million pandemic support program for Canadian students. No other organizations had been invited to submit a proposal, as would normally be the case for projects that spend taxpayer money. Opposition MPs accused Trudeau of cronyism, given that the charity had paid his mother, Margaret Trudeau, around $250,000 in speaking fees to date.

Trudeau ostensibly to provide his government with more time to work on a throne speech to be delivered about a month later. In Canada, throne speeches are used to outline a government¡¯²õ priorities for Parliament¡¯²õ next sitting. Despite the extra time prorogation provided, the Trudeau government¡¯²õ eventual throne speech in September 2020 was short on details as to how it planned to achieve its promises. His finance minister, Chrystia Freeland, would take until April 2021 to deliver a that would put a price tag on the pledges Trudeau suspended Parliament to work on.

If Parliament¡¯²õ month-long break wasn¡¯t instrumental in preparing the next phase of Canada¡¯²õ pandemic response, why did Trudeau feel the need to prorogue at all other than to stop the investigation into WE?

Democracies Soldier On

Angela Merkel provides a noteworthy comparison to Trudeau precisely because she demonstrates how leaders don¡¯t have to give up on democratic principles when managing crises. Unlike New Zealand, where the national government has comparatively centralized power, Germany¡¯²õ federal chancellor shares authority with 16 state leaders. Just like Canada¡¯²õ provincial premiers, they are largely responsible for decisions on when to lock down or reopen. Merkel¡¯²õ pandemic-time responsibilities are thus broadly similar to Trudeau¡¯²õ ¡ª communication from the top, economic stimulus packages, border controls and procurement of vaccines.

Both Canada and Germany, which pooled its vaccine purchasing with its European partners, were slow to roll out the jab before a few months in. Yet Merkel¡¯²õ economic stewardship has arguably gone much smoother while working with a parliament that kept its regular sittings throughout the pandemic.

¡°It wasn¡¯t ¡®business as usual,¡¯¡± says Oliver Wittke, an outgoing member of the Bundestag with Merkel¡¯²õ Christian Democratic Union, emphasizing that parliamentarians of all political stripes knew they had to act quickly. ¡°Normally Bundestag consultations are more extensive. But there was always participation of the German Bundestag.¡±

After shutting down in March 2020, over a month would pass before Canada¡¯²õ House of Commons would even set up a digital COVID-19 committee to scrutinize the Trudeau government. Meanwhile, there¡¯²õ little to suggest the Bundestag¡¯²õ uninterrupted involvement slowed down German response. In March 2020, the Merkel government shepherded a worth over €1 trillion ($1.2 trillion) through parliament. Germany would also contribute the largest single share of money to an EU recovery plan.

¡°A pandemic must never be used to undermine democratic principles,¡± Merkel before the European Parliament in July 2020. Although intended as a veiled criticism of Hungary¡¯²õ , it¡¯²õ a statement Canadians should consider when assessing Trudeau¡¯²õ record.

German politicos say that national history ¡ª as well as Merkel¡¯²õ personal convictions ¡ª plays a big role in creating political balance. ¡°Germany¡¯²õ constitutional setup is designed to be anti-autocratic,¡± says Christian Wenning, whose career in political consulting includes a year-long stint as Merkel¡¯²õ parliamentary assistant just before she became chancellor. ¡°But it¡¯²õ also in her genes ¡­ having been a citizen in a totalitarian state.¡±

Stefan Kornelius, author of ¡°Angela Merkel: The Chancellor and Her World,¡± of a young woman who surreptitiously listened to Bundestag debates on the radio. ¡°The first trip she did [after the Berlin Wall fell] was to London and the first thing she did was stand in front of Parliament because she was such a huge admirer of the Westminster system,¡± he says.

The Westminster system that inspired Germany¡¯²õ first chancellor from former East Germany is the same one Canada inherited from the UK. Yet Trudeau¡¯²õ antagonism toward the country’s Parliament during the pandemic serves to spotlight the system¡¯²õ many gaps for holding its executive branch to account. COVID-19 has now seen Trudeau¡¯²õ Liberals join in a prorogation controversy. Longer term, this risks normalizing politically expedient prorogation and further neutering the country¡¯²õ elected institutions.

Trudeau¡¯²õ attempt to grab power from Parliament last March would also ¡°normally¡± have been possible. Opposition MPs were able to prevent it because the Liberals don¡¯t have an absolute majority and must work with other parties to pass laws. So-called minority Parliament isn¡¯t common in Canada; overall, have governed the country for only 20 years since 1867. Usually, one party gets more than half the seats, even when it wins less than half the votes. By comparison, proportional voting that leads to coalition governments ¡ª and thus cross-party collaboration ¡ª are normal in both Germany and New Zealand.

From Reformer to Corrupt Politician

Ironically, Trudeau himself spotted this problem and promised to change the Canadian voting system to a proportional one like Germany¡¯²õ or New Zealand¡¯²õ in the 2015 Liberal manifesto. In 2017, however, he broke that pledge, to the newspaper Le Devoir that his government¡¯²õ success in one election was somehow akin to a fundamental reform of Canadian voting that would last long after he left office: ¡°With the current system, [Canadians] now have a government with which they¡¯re happier. And the need to change the electoral system is less compelling.¡±

For Michelle Rempel, COVID-19 hasn¡¯t given Canada a different Justin Trudeau but instead revealed instincts that were already there. ¡°Trudeau has always seen Parliament as a nuisance, and that goes back to when he was first elected,¡± she says. ¡°Our democratic institutions ¡ª the principles of them ¡ª should be immutable. And when somebody seeks to erode them, there should be a cross-partisan outcry from every Canadian.¡±

Yet the problem is bigger than either Justin Trudeau or his crisis leadership. Despite the attempted relief bill power grab, the WE controversy and prorogation, there has been no major protest from within Liberal ranks that their leader repeatedly overstepped democratic norms. Furthermore, whether it was Stephen Harper¡¯²õ 2008 prorogation to avoid losing power or the that helped bring down the Liberal Party under Jean Chr¨¦tien and Paul Martin, Justin Trudeau is hardly the first prime minister to test Canadian democracy through an ethics scandal.

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Trudeau¡¯²õ tenure since 2015 has helped make the executive branch¡¯²õ nonchalance toward Canadian parliamentary democracy more ¡°normal.¡± Restoring Canadian democratic norms was a major part of both the 2006 and 2015 election campaigns that brought Harper and Trudeau to power, respectively. By contrast, the 2021 campaign saw far less discussion on the state of Canadian democracy ¡ª from either the party leaders or the national media.

Unfortunately, as we¡¯ve seen in other Western democracies since 2016, both voters and the media can become gradually desensitized to democratic erosion. Canada under Trudeau, however, demonstrates how democratic backsliding isn¡¯t exclusive to conservative politicians. Secondly, even a country that enjoys a relatively good reputation for democratic governance is still always vulnerable.

Two of Justin Trudeau¡¯²õ fellow Western leaders have demonstrated that decisive crisis leadership is concomitant with upholding democratic principles. Canadians should be able to expect their leaders to set and follow that example. But getting there means asking some tough questions about the current health of Canadian democracy. That starts with demanding better accountability at the very top.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Justin Trudeau¡¯²õ Dubious Legacy for Canadian Democracy appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The outcome, in turn, is completely open. The composition of the post-Merkel government depends on how many votes each of the major parties will manage to capture. Several coalitions are possible, center-right, but also center-left. Much hinges on the results of the Greens and the liberals. And there is the additional factor of the radical populist right, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which commands around 10% of the vote.

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Shunned by all other parties, the AfD remains a nuisance factor, particularly in its strongholds in the eastern part of the country where it has established itself as the voice of all those who feel disregarded and disrespected, who consider themselves second-class citizens in unified Germany.

No Alternative

Next year, French voters are called upon to elect a new president of the republic. As it looks now, nothing will change. Macron is likely to get reelected, largely by default. As Margaret Thatcher once famously put it, albeit in an entirely different context, ¡°There is no alternative.¡±

In French presidential elections, there is, of course, always an alternative. The alternative is Marine Le Pen, leader of the Rassemblement National (National Rally), the rejuvenated, remodeled successor to her father¡¯²õ National Front.

Marine Le Pen has gone a long way to refurbish and embellish the face of France¡¯²õ ¡°extreme¡± right, to the point where many on the hard right no longer wish to be associated with the party. Their charge: Marine Le Pen is far too much to the left.

The results of the recent regional elections have shown that Le Pen¡¯²õ strategy to moderate her party¡¯²õ image did not work. It had hoped to win at least one or two regions but came out of the election with empty hands. Surveys paint a similar picture. Although the party records some gains among a few groups like the youth, overall, its base of support has been stagnant. Nothing suggests that this is likely to change in the foreseeable future.

This in itself is quite remarkable. It is generally thought that the far right does particularly well in times of crisis. This was the case, most recently, in the of the 2008 global financial crisis that boosted the fortunes of a number of radical right-wing populist parties in Europe. Today, at least in France, the situation is even more propitious for the radical right, yet Marine Le Pen has largely failed to capitalize on it.

If in Germany the general mood is somber these days, in France it is outright morose ¡ª and alarmist, and panicky. The word is »å¨¦³¦±ô¾±²Ô. To be sure, the French have always had a certain for conjuring up the specter of decline, more often than not informed by the fear that the country was falling behind its neighbor to the east.

In 1953, as France was about to embark on what would come to be known as the Trente Glorieuses ¡ª the postwar ¡°golden age,¡± a point of reference for contemporary French nostalgia ¡ª prominent politicians in all seriousness proclaimed that the time of decline had come. Some 30 years later, different times, same refrain. In the 1980s, leading publications were publishing national surveys exploring the decline of France.  

Today, history repeats itself once again, perhaps more dramatically and desperately. How else to make sense of a statement by J¨¦r?me Fourquet, in charge of public opinion at Ifop, a premier French polling and market research firm, who the situation in France today to the defeat of its army in 1940: One thought France was strong, only to be swept away by Germany.

Wrong Direction

Today again, there is an acute sense that things are going in the wrong direction ¡ª that France is falling behind, that it is being relegated to the minor leagues, as Jacques Juillard has in the pages of Le Figaro. The phrase reflecting these sentiments is ¡°le grand d¨¦classement,¡± which made its way into the public debate in the spring of last year.

It was provoked by the experience of the beginning of the pandemic, particularly the lockdowns, which confined the French to their homes ¡°like in the Middle Ages,¡± as an in Le Figaro put it in late April. And this because the country lacked the industrial capacities to produce the equipment necessary to protect the population or at least furnish protective masks. And of course, once again France was compared to Germany ¡ª the country ¡°that managed the pandemic the best.¡±

In the meantime, that narrative of le grand d¨¦classment has been significantly expanded. The most recent example is an expose on France¡¯²õ decline in the field of research and development in the latest issue of , a decline seriously jeopardizing France¡¯²õ competitive position in the world. Here, as in many other areas, France has been overtaken by Germany, as another editorial in Le Figaro recently. No wonder the country has fallen into a state of ¡°,¡± with no end in sight.

The results of the most recent extensive inquiry into the state of French public opinion, Ipsos’ , largely confirm that much of the country has fallen into a deep psychological black hole. Some key findings: A large majority of the population (78%) shares the view that France is in decline; 60% think globalization poses a threat to the country; and almost two-thirds that France should protect itself more against today¡¯²õ world.

In the meantime, little appears to have changed. In a from August 2020, 55% of respondents said they were pessimistic with regard to their future and that of their children.

If ever there was one, this is the perfect ¡°.¡± Populist moments go to waste, however, if there is no populist entrepreneur to exploit them. Enter Eric Zemmour, the ubiquitous media personality, journalist, editorialist, polemicist, provocateur and the great new white hope for all those on the right who have written off Marine Le Pen¡¯²õ National Rally.

Like so many on the far right, Zemmour is obsessed with ¡°le grand remplacement,¡± the notion that one day in the not-so-far future, immigrants are going to ¡°replace¡± the native population. As he recently on French TV, by ¡°2050, France will be half Islamic; by 2100 we will be in an Islamic republic.¡±

Zemmour might not (yet) have announced his candidacy, but he certainly has said all the right things to rally the troops, on immigration, Islam, the decline of the nation. His : Today France is divided between those who fear le grand rechauffement (global warming) and those who fear le grand d¨¦classement (downward social mobility).   

This was the conflict that not so long ago provoked the eruption of associated with the yellow vests. The movement came to a screeching halt with the beginning of the pandemic, only to morph into a new one, this time against the government¡¯²õ anti-COVID-19 measures, against vaccinations and the threat of a ¡°health passport.¡± It reflects a growing polarization between the great metropolitan areas and the rest of the country, between cosmopolitanism and parochialism, between an open and a closed society.

These conflicts have been around for some time. With Zemmour, they might have found a new champion ¡ª provided he chooses to run for the presidency. With his due to appear in a few days, it might, of course, be no more than a clever ploy to boost sales. In any case, Zemmour promises to remain a nuisance factor on the right that, should he run, is likely to significantly diminish the chances of any center-right candidate progressing to the decisive second round of next year¡¯²õ presidential election.

Island of Calm

Compared to France, preelection Germany looks like an island of calm. Yet appearances are deceptive, even in Germany. As has been the case elsewhere in Europe, Germany has been hit hard by the pandemic and, like elsewhere, was not prepared to face a crisis of these dimensions. For a country known for its efficiency, it took quite a long time to get organized.

At the same time, the pandemic laid open the shortfalls of the famed ¡°German model,¡± particularly in the field of communication technology. As a commentary in Germany¡¯²õ premier news magazine Der Spiegel put it in March of this year, with respect to the country¡¯²õ handling of the pandemic, Germany received ¡°¡± ¡ª zero points.

The pandemic has drastically shown that Germany needs a new beginning. And this was before the catastrophic floods that left entire towns and villages this summer devastated as if hit by a . The floods caused billions worth of damage. At the same time, the extent of the destruction served as a drastic reminder not only that climate change and global warming were real, but also that a continuation of Panglossian politics of neglect would likely end in disaster ¡ª and this much sooner than expected.  

The message appears to have arrived. A from late September found more than 70% of respondents agreeing with the statement that the catastrophe was a direct result of climate change. Some 80% agreed that the government had to do more for the environment. Only a majority of AfD supporters disagreed with both statements.

The combination of a pandemic and a climate catastrophe has seriously damaged Chancellor Angela Merkel¡¯²õ image and, with it, the fortunes of her Christian Democratic Union. For weeks now, the party has been in a free fall in the polls. The has it hovering around 20%, some five points behind the Social Democrats, the culmination of a dramatic turnaround that opens the possibility that the next chancellor will come from the center left.

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Angela Merkel has recently that the upcoming election represents a Richtungswahl ¡ª an election that will determine which direction the country is going to take. In reality, however, there can only be one direction, toward accelerated decarbonization, toward more social justice, toward a rapid modernization of the country¡¯²õ physical and digital infrastructure.

With the British exit from the European Union and France¡¯²õ self-absorption, Germany is left alone as the uncontested leader in Western Europe. If in the past this was a nightmare scenario, today it is no longer, or at least less so. The new German government better be prepared to assume its responsibilities.

*[51³Ô¹Ï is a  partner of the .]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Germany and France Head Into Two Very Different Elections appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Germany¡¯²õ Greens Are Within Earshot of Power

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In May, showed that 43% of the German population perceived Baerbock as a suitable successor for Merkel, leading over her two main contenders; at the end of August, this figure was down to 22%. Targeted online campaigns have been busy exploiting Baerbock’s missteps and stoking fears of political change among voters. These attacks have laid bare how modern political campaigns in the age of social media flush sexist attitudes that persist in both politics and the wider society to the surface. 

Belittled and Patronized

Before Merkel rose to become one of the world’s most powerful female politicians, she was underestimated and belittled throughout the 1990s as a woman from East Germany by a male-dominated West German political class. Despite prevailing in intra-party struggles by often adapting to male behavior, she still had to face gender-based headwinds during her first general election campaign in 2005 as the front runner of her party.

The Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) began the campaign polling at 48%, only to plummet to a sobering 35.2% on election day, securing a knife-edge victory over the incumbent, Chancellor Gerhard Schr?der. Even back then, when social media was still a negligible factor, Merkel had to face partly overt, partly subliminal gender-discriminatory reporting. German media dissected Merkel’s outward appearance, starting with the corners of her mouth and her hairstyle and ending with her now-famous pantsuits.

According to , president of the German Bundestag from 1988 to 1998, at times, ¡°there was more discussion about hairstyle, outer appearance, facial expression, hands, etc. than there was debate about the content. And how often did the question come up: Can the girl do it?”

Her competence was called into doubt, as stereotypical headlines from the time show: “Angela Merkel ¡ª an angel of understanding kindness,” “A power woman … corpses pave her way.” In 2004, the Austrian newspaper Die Presse came to the following conclusion to the question of why Merkel had to face such inappropriate media scrutiny: “Because she is a woman and comes from the East. And that is not the stuff of political fantasies that make West German men’s clubs ecstatic.”

Even Merkel’s nickname, ¡°Mutti¡± (mommy), used affectionately by most Germans now, was originally a  epithet. The slow reinterpretation of this nickname is emblematic of how difficult it is for women in politics to break away from antiquated role models.

Since then, Merkel has emerged victorious in four consecutive elections, at the moment the country¡¯²õ after Helmut Kohl. She is one of the countless global role models who have proven women to be apt leaders. In light of this overwhelming evidence of women’s political prowess, the levels of sexism and disinformation launched against Baerbock are astonishing. 

Targeted From Day One

When the Green Party chose Baerbock as its front runner in April, it did so with confidence that after 16 years of Angela Merkel, voters had shed their misgivings about aspiring female politicians. If anything, the Greens expected a young, energetic woman to embody political change and provide an appealing contrast to the stodgy, veteran, male candidates like Armin Laschet of the CDU and Olaf Scholz of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). But soon after the announcement of her candidacy, voices emerged online questioning whether a  would be suitable for the chancellorship. However, it¡¯²õ not just her status as a mother that made Baerbock an ideal target, especially for conservatives and far-right populists on the internet: Unlike Merkel, she is young, politically more inexperienced, .

Adding to that, Baerbock exposed herself to criticism by making unforced mistakes. False statements in her CV, delayed declarations of supplementary income and alleged plagiarism in her published in June provided further ammunition to her adversaries. Her book’s title, “Now. How We Renew Our Country,” and the criticism she faces mirror the Greens’ current dilemma. Before Baerbock could even communicate a new, innovative policy approach with climate protection at its center to the voters, public attention had already diverted to her shortcomings.

While part of the blame rests with Baerbock herself, a lack of proportionality of criticisms toward her as opposed to other contestants in this election is apparent. For more than a year now, accusations loom around her contender for the post of chancellor, Olaf Scholz. As finance minister and chairman of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, he is accused of failing to prevent the  in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany surrounding Wirecard AG, a payment processor and financial services provider. Luckily for Scholz, still-unanswered questions concerning the scandal receive scarce media attention, partly due to the complexity of the issue at hand making it harder to distill into bite-size news. 

Armin Laschet, the CDU‘s candidate for chancellorship and minister president of the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, had to navigate rough waters during the COVID-19 crisis. The state government used opaque procedures to award a contract for protective gowns worth €38.5 million ($45.6 million) to the luxury fashion manufacturer , a company linked to Laschet’s son. Laschet also received criticism for a good-humored appearance during a visit to areas affected by floods that killed at least 189 in July. In addition, he too was accused of plagiarism due to suspicious passages in a book published in 2009.

Even though Scholz’s, and especially Laschet’s missteps have not gone unnoticed by the media, the public and political opponents, Lothar Probst, a researcher at the University of Bremen, recognizes a systematic character in the criticism faced by Baerbock. In an with the German Press Agency, he surmised: “Her credibility, respectability, and authority are undermined, she is portrayed as sloppy. … A young, urban smart woman [is] once again tackled harder than her competitors.”

Even before Baerbock’s gaffes were in the spotlight, she found herself in the firing line. Conspiracy theories surfaced, suggesting that Baerbock was a puppet of  and an advocate of the ¡°great reset¡± conspiracy. Disinformation about Baerbock was also gender-based. Collages of quickly circulated, including deepfake photographs disseminated via the messenger Telegram.

Such disinformation originated significantly from far-right circles. In 2019, according to the , 77% of registered hate posts were attributable to the center-right and far-right political spectrum. According to political scientist , from Trier University, female politicians from green parties are primary targets for right-wing attacks and disinformation because topics such as climate protection and emancipation inflame passions and mobilize the political right.

Worldwide Concern

Baerbock’s political opponents and critics deny disproportionate criticism, insisting that she should have known what she had signed up for; after all, election campaigns are not for the faint-hearted, especially when entering the race as the front-runner. Yet statistics prove that in Germany, hatred toward female politicians is an everyday occurrence. A survey by  showed that 87% of the female politicians interviewed encountered hate and threats on an almost daily basis; 57% of these were sexist attacks.

These results are in line with international studies. In a 2019 “#ShePersisted. Women, Politics & Power in the New Media World,” conducted by Lucina di Meco and Kristina Wilfore, 88 global female leaders were interviewed, were “concerned about the pervasiveness of gender-based abuse.” The study that “A new wave of authoritarian leaders and illiberal actors around the world use gendered disinformation and online abuse to push back against the progress made on women¡¯²õ and minority rights.”

A recent from January, “Malign Creativity: How Gender, Sex, and Lies are Weaponized Against Women Online,” by the Woodrow Wilson International Center, also shows that 12 of the 13 surveyed female politicians suffered gendered abuse online. Nine of them were at the receiving end of gendered disinformation, containing racist, transphobic and sexual narratives, with the latter being the most common.

Sixteen years have passed between Angela Merkel‘s and Annalena Baerbock’s first campaigns for the chancellorship. Today, women striving for power still have to deal with mistrust and gender-discriminatory prejudice. Merkel had to hold her own in a male-dominated environment where she was underestimated and often treated disparagingly. But compared to Merkel, the campaign against Baerbock has reached a new,  dimension. Merkel, who is childless, outwardly inconspicuous and politically more conservative, offered less of a target to conservative, male adversaries than the young, modern and progressive Baerbock.

Besides, Baerbock’s opponents in 2021 have more effective tools for spreading gendered disinformation on social media. While disinformation targets both male and female politicians, women are more affected. It aims to  women’s credibility and their chances of electoral success and discourage future generations of women from pursuing political careers. Germany’s female politicians must keep in mind that such disinformation is spread by distorted, unrepresentative groups that don¡¯t reflect the social progress made over the years.

At this particular moment, it appears unlikely that Baerbock will move into the chancellor’s office as Merkel did in 2005 by the narrowest of margins. Yet the race is far from over, with nearly a month until election day. Baerbock’s recent performance in the first of three TV debates proves that she is not ready to abandon the field to (online) campaigners spreading gender-based prejudice and disinformation. Despite polls declaring Scholz as the debate’s winner, narrowly ahead of Baerbock, she presented herself as a modern and socioecological alternative to both her contenders and reverted attention to policy away from her persona and gender.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

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