This is what I call ¡°sachet citizenship.¡± Just as sachet products allow consumers to purchase small quantities of shampoo or coffee instead of a full bottle or package, citizens are increasingly receiving state benefits in small, transactional increments. These may include one-off cash transfers, temporary welfare programs or simplified policy messaging designed for immediate consumption. Rather than strengthening durable rights and institutions, governance is increasingly delivered through isolated interventions that offer immediate benefits but little lasting security.

As a result, citizenship risks becoming less about a sustained relationship between citizens and the state and more about a series of short-term transactions. While this approach may appear efficient and responsive, it can discourage investment in the stronger institutions and long-term public goods that underpin democratic accountability and national resilience.

The politics of microtransactions

In the political sphere, the concept of sachet citizenship is most visible in the calculated blurring of social welfare and electoral loyalty. The recent election cycles at national and subnational levels underscored a troubling where social assistance (bansos) programs became functionally indistinguishable from sophisticated . Rather than engaging the electorate in long-term ideological discourse, the state-citizen relationship has been reduced to a series of micro-transactions.

This is ¡°pay-as-you-go¡± governance. When the state provides a sachet-sized portion of rice or a direct cash transfer in the immediate lead-up to a ballot, it is not investing in a shared national vision; it is purchasing a one-off service. Once the ¡°product¡± ¡ª the vote ¡ª is extracted, the ¡°packaging¡± ¡ª the citizen ¡ª is frequently discarded. This leaves behind a pervasive ¡°political plastic¡± waste: a landscape of deep-seated cynicism and eroded institutional trust that persists long after the promotional cycle has ended.

Fulfillment through digital merit

This fragmentation extends into the burgeoning sharia economy. Indonesia has witnessed a significant surge in , where spiritual and economic obligations are increasingly fulfilled through sachet-style Islamic finance. The traditional emphasis on community-led designed to build lasting infrastructure, such as hospitals or universities, is being eclipsed by highly individualized, digital microdonations.

While the democratization of via financial technology is laudable, it frequently leads to a fleeting sense of spiritual satisfaction gained through very small digital transfers, such as a 5,000 rupiah (approximately $0.29) zakat payment. Such microinterventions lack the structural weight required to address the systemic roots of inequality. It risks reducing the profound complexities of Islamic social justice to a superficial retail experience, in which citizens purchase small units of merit without ever challenging the economic disparities that necessitate such charity in the first place.

Episodic defense

Even the most monolithic sector, such as national defense, is showing signs of sachet-style procurement and strategy, particularly within the maritime domain. For an archipelagic nation of over 17,000 islands, sovereignty requires a continuous, integrated presence. Instead, Indonesia¡¯²õ approach often resembles a series of reactive, sachet-sized interventions.

For instance, in the North Natuna Sea, the state frequently deploys a sudden of patrols in response to viral incidents of illegal fishing or territorial incursions, only to retreat when fuel budgets or political appetites wane. Rather than a unified maritime architecture ¡ª where the Navy, Coast Guard (Badan Keamanan Laut/Bakamla) and fisheries surveillance operate as a single, durable entity ¡ª there are fragmented packets of . The Indonesian government may high-end Rafale jets in small batches, but without a robust chain and sustained , the shield remains brittle and episodic.

The regressive cost of retail logic

Culturally, the medium of citizenship is being reconfigured through the lens of social media brevity. The Indonesian government increasingly bypasses formal parliamentary debates and rigorous press briefings in favor of key opinion and ¡°buzzers¡± who are organized to amplify specific narratives.

When complex legislation requires public buy-in, the state enlists to market the policy in 60-second, easily digestible sachet videos. This approach prioritizes the aesthetic of engagement over the substance of civic discourse. It is a professionalized version of propaganda that sells the feeling of progress while stripping away the nutritional value of actual policy debate.

The tragedy of this ¡°retail logic¡± is that it is mathematically regressive. Just as sachet shampoo is far more expensive per milliliter than the bottle, sachet citizenship imposes a heavy ¡°poverty tax¡± on the very people it claims to serve. It creates a culture of immediate, small-scale gratification that obscures the crumbling foundations of healthcare, education and labor rights.

Toward durable citizenship

Indonesian people have long been masters of the sachet economy. It is a testament to their ingenuity and a necessary tool for surviving precarious cash flows. But while the sachet is a brilliant strategy for individual survival, it is a disastrous blueprint for national governance. From the rice packets of bansos to the hit-and-run patrols in the Natuna Sea, the state is offering a version of governance that is easy to open but impossible to sustain.

If the common people are forced to accept their rights in these tiny, transactional increments, they cannot be surprised when the ¡°product¡± fails them during a systemic crisis. It is time to demand a model of citizenship that is not just easy to consume, but one that is built to last.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post The Rise of Sachet Citizenship in Indonesia appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

How the Japanese economy has changed

Over the last three decades, Japan¡¯²õ debt-to-GDP ratio has increased massively. In 1991, this figure sat at around 65%. By 2025¨C2026, that figure has risen to 248%. This is the biggest debt burden in the developed world. This debt spike is partly a result of the 2007¨C2008 global financial crisis and the 2020 Covid pandemic. Mostly, however, it is because Japan has run consistent government budget deficits. 

Luckily for Japan, however, 88% of the debt is owed to the Japanese people, not to foreign investors. It is denominated in yen, and interest rates are low or zero. So, unlike a country that has borrowed from outside in dollars, Japan does not face the same risk of financial crises. Still, this massive debt is a burden, and it has slowed down Japan¡¯²õ growth rate.

This is a significant shift from Japan¡¯²õ postwar economic miracle. From the 1950s to 1973, Japan sustained rapid growth, often exceeding 10% annually. Growth only after the 1973 oil crisis, becoming more sporadic during the 1980s before settling into stagnation (known as the ¡°Lost Decades¡±) after Japan¡¯²õ asset bubble burst in 1990.

Since the bubble burst, the purchasing power of the yen has declined steadily. The yen has depreciated significantly. In April 1995, $1 was worth ?83.6895, while by May 5, 2026, $1 was equivalent to ?157.74. 

Economists still puzzle over the question of what caused Japan¡¯²õ decline. The ¡°economic miracle¡± of the land of the rising sun feels a long way away in the country with the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the developed world.  Atul believes that Japan¡¯²õ economic policies of the 1980s fueled an unsustainable bubble. Tokyo focused on the marketability of assets, eased access to credit and encouraged speculation, prolonging and exacerbating the bubble.

At the peak of Japan¡¯²õ economic bubble, around 1989 or 1990, economists estimated the theoretical land value of the Tokyo Imperial Palace grounds to be greater than the value of all real estate in the entire state of California. This represented one of the largest asset bubbles in history. Tokyo real estate was priced over 350 times higher than equivalent space in Manhattan.

There were real fears in America that Japan was a real threat to the US. The 1993 movie Rising Sun captured these fears. Many argued that the US had to adapt and adopt Japanese methods. A real estate developer called Donald Trump spoke out against Japan for stealing American jobs and ruining the country¡¯²õ economy. 

Neither the central bank nor the finance ministry acted in time to contain the bubble. By August 1990, the Nikkei stock index had plummeted to half its peak by the time of the fifth monetary tightening by the Bank of Japan. By late 1991, other asset prices began to fall. Even though asset prices had visibly collapsed by early 1992, the economy¡¯²õ decline continued for well over a decade.

Japanese postwar politics moves to the right gradually

Not only has Japan changed economically, but it has also changed politically. Japan and Germany were the two great losers of World War II. Both had their militarism and even nationalism beaten out of them. The US turned both countries into loyal allies and changed their culture. Both turned away from far-right political parties to focus on economic and social advancement.

Complete defeat in World War II rejected, suppressed or placed into question all the cultural guideposts for Japanese society. America set out to remake the Japanese political system in its image explicitly and achieved dramatic success. The American occupier suppressed the Japanese nationalist right because it was responsible for a brutal war and a complete defeat.

Yet Japanese society remained conservative. In 1955, Japan¡¯²õ two conservative parties, the Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party, merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a center-right, united front against the Japan Socialist Party. The key LDP argument was that it represented Japan while the socialist report to Moscow. General Douglas MacArthur wanted to ensure Japan did not turn communist. So, it made peace with Japan¡¯²õ ruling elite, which formed and dominated the LDP. Unsurprisingly, the LDP went on to become the ruling party of Japan, retaining power uninterruptedly for decades. It presided over the economic miracle and won election after election. The LDP only lost power briefly when the Japanese asset bubble burst and damaged its sheen.

In 2001, Junichiro Koizumi, a member of the Japanese political elite, won the LDP presidency and then became prime minister. He was a reformer who revived the fortunes of the LDP. Koizumi was focused on reducing Japan¡¯²õ government debt, privatizing Japan Post in the process. He was also an advocate of a more muscular foreign policy and won international attention for sending Japan¡¯²õ Self-Defense Forces to Iraq after George W. Bush¡¯²õ invasion of the country in 2003. This was the first time Tokyo had deployed troops outside Japan since World War II. Koizumi was also a strong nationalist who visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, fueling diplomatic tensions with neighboring China and South Korea. 

Koizumi resigned as prime minister in 2006 and was succeeded by Shinzo Abe. Although Abe lost power after a year, he made a comeback later and went on to become the longest-serving Japanese prime minister. He tried to counter Japan¡¯²õ stagnation through Abenomics, a combination of monetary easing, fiscal stimulus and structural reforms, which had mixed results. More importantly, Abe steered Japan to a more nationalist and muscular foreign policy. 

In 2007, Abe initiated the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), involving the US, Australia, India and Japan, to contain the rise of China. Abe was also a member of Nippon Kaigi, a far-right organization that downplays Japanese atrocities in textbooks and denies use of Korean or Chinese comfort women for Japanese troops during World War II. In a nutshell, Abe was the key figure in the public emergence of Japanese nationalism.

Today, his disciple Sanae Takaichi has become the first female prime minister of Japan. Just as Abe was more nationalist than Koizumi, Takaichi is more nationalist than Abe. Unlike the patricians Koizumi and Abe, Takaichi is of humble middle-class origin. In keeping with the Japanese conservative tradition, Takaichi also opposes immigration. She also wants to beef up Japan¡¯²õ military.

As China has become more nationalistic and threatening in recent years, Japan has become more independent and assertive. The fetters once put on by Americans after World War II are now coming loose. In Atul¡¯²õ words, ¡°Both Germany and Japan, in some ways, are normalizing and reverting back to historical mean.¡±

Demography has changed dramatically

While politics might have changed gradually, Japan¡¯²õ demography has changed dramatically. The Japanese fertility rate dropped to 1.15 in 2024, far below the 2.1, well below replacement level. The 65+ form around 30% of the population. The working age population between 15 and 64 is about 59%. The youth, those below 14, are only 11%. The median age is 49.4 to 50.2 (second highest after Monaco), life expectancy 81 for men and 87¨C88 for women. The highest total dependency ratio is 70.2, i.e. there are 100 workers for 70 dependents, which include the old and the young. This ratio is the highest in the world.

During the postwar boom of 1950, there were over 12 workers for every retiree. This massive workforce kept the tax burden low and productivity high. Japanese demography fueled the rapid industrialization of the 1950s and 1960s. Note that Japanese workers were educated and skilled unlike their counterparts in India or Pakistan. As Japan grew richer, birth rates fell and life expectancy rose. 

By 1970, the worker-to-pensioner ratio was 9.8-to-1. By 1990, this ratio was 5.8-to-1, which declined to 2.8-to-1 by 2010. Today, this ratio is 2-to-1. There is no precedent for the dramatic aging of the Japanese population and slower growth is to some degree a result of lower birth rates. Older people do not work or consume as much as young people. 

Japan is now a ¡°super-aging¡± society. Japan¡¯²õ current population is estimated to be in 2026. Projections indicate that it will plunge to by 2050. Japan has been a socially conservative society and has been reluctant to let large numbers of foreigners immigrate to their island nation. 

China¡¯²õ rise and America going home forces Japan to act

China has become increasingly aggressive and nationalistic even as the US has become more isolationist. Trump walked out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), leaving the field open to China in the region. Beijing came up with the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which many Asian countries signed after the collapse of the TPP. In the US/Israel¨CIran War, American redeployment of troops and military kit from Japan and South Korea to the Middle East has worried both Tokyo and Seoul.

Consequently, Japan is adapting to changed circumstances. Japan has moved to replace, to the extent possible, American international economic leadership in Asia. Tokyo has replaced the TPP and countered the RCEP with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), also known as . Japan has also directed tens of billions of dollars to African development in an effort to counter China¡¯²õ Belt and Road Initiative and other African investments.

In the changed strategic environment. Japan has doubled its defense budget. Chinese aggression in the South and East China Seas and around the Senkaku Islands (known to China as the Diaoyu Islands) off the shore of Taiwan makes Japan uncomfortable. They also worry about a 2021 circumnavigation of Japan by a Chinese¨CRussian fleet. These threats have come at a time when North Korea continues to develop and test nuclear missiles.

Japan now finds itself in a position where it cannot just rely on a defensive posture but has to project force. At the end of December, 2025, the Japanese cabinet approved a $640 million defense budget, which includes the purchase of 300 US Tomahawk missiles and the development of a rapid reaction force similar to the US Marines. This force is capable of projecting power beyond simply defending the home islands. Japan has also engaged in strong bilateral discussions with Vietnam, the Philippines and Australia, and continues to engage with the US. 

What lies ahead for Japan

Despite a more robust foreign policy and increased defense capabilities, Japan lacks the size to take on either the US or China. Over the next few years, Japan will continue to slide slowly to middle-rank power status. 

Going forward, Japan will seek to fill the gaps left by America¡¯²õ isolationist policies with variable coalitions to counterbalance China, though this has significant limits. The QUAD hasn¡¯t met Japanese expectations. Thus, Japan has been deepening relationships with South Korea and Taiwan. Japan¡¯²õ grand strategy will be to contain and deter China. Fighting or boycotting China would lead to economic armageddon.

China¡¯²õ fixation with historic Japanese militarism is the result of Xi Jinping¡¯²õ obsession. Atul points out that no Japanese army can march all the way to India as it did in World War II. The Japanese simply do not have the numbers. Over time, Japan, South Korea and China will have similar challenges of aging societies and a detente makes most sense.

In the coming years, Japan¡¯²õ economy will suffer from aging pains. The nation has three possibilities to counter a declining and aging population: significantly increase immigration to keep its population numbers up, invest massively in robotics to automate work or accept economic stagnation despite technological leadership. Japan is debating the first option, but so far has chosen not to allow massive immigration. It has embraced the second wholeheartedly. The third is inevitable.

Japan will have to face an existential choice in the next 25 years: accept China¡¯²õ strategic and economic orbit; maintain a counteralliance with the US and other regional actors; or create a replacement, to the extent possible, for Pax Americana in Asia. This will involve not just an entente with other Asian states but also a detente with China based on the economic benefits of a peaceful China¨CJapan relationship. A more multipolar and uncertain Pax Asiana is likely to succeed Pax Americana in Asia.

[ and wrote this summary.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post The Dialectic: Japan ¡ª The Aging Land of the Rising Sun appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

This year¡¯²õ National Eligibility cum Entrance Test () for undergraduate medical admissions ¡ª one of the most important examinations for aspiring doctors in India ¡ª was held on May 3. Within days, however, authorities reported malpractice and decided to cancel the exam, which students had submitted after months and months of rigorous preparations. Thousands of disillusioned students took to the streets in protest, and local media that 11 students died by suicide in the lead-up to the re-test. NTA, which conducts the test, later announced June 21 as the date.

Paper leaks in entrance examinations are not new in India. Repeated leaks and systemic failures have academic life across the country. Students are now directing their anger at the NTA and the Ministry of Education, which oversee major examinations such as NEET and the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) system.

The NTA is registered as a society; it is not a statutory body, although it performs a profoundly public function that affects millions of students. Critics have raised concerns about the need for more robust legal and institutional oversight following numerous disputes. Due to the fact that NTA is autonomous in nature but is under the Ministry of Education’s jurisdiction, public discourse frequently degenerates into a blame game: Is it the agency or the ministry?

Dr. Anita Rampal, a former dean of the Faculty of Education at Delhi University, clearly noted on a Frontline Conversations that NTA is not academically qualified and lacks the vision to administer large-scale exams, including online exams. She added, ¡°NTA should not exist ¡­ we should really decentralize this.¡±

NEET: the high-stakes gateway to medical education

Every year, India produces thousands of medical graduates. Yet graduating from medical school is not the hardest step in becoming a doctor; for many students, the real hurdle is , which is mandatory for admission to medical programs in both public and private institutions. A student¡¯²õ NEET score can shape the course of their future. Families often invest huge sums in coaching classes, tutoring and online preparation in the hope of improving their children¡¯²õ chances.

NEET was introduced as a single national examination, somewhat akin to the SAT in that it sought to standardize admissions across the country. It was first conducted in 2013, but after significant backlash and legal challenges over state autonomy, the Supreme Court struck it down. Following further legal review, it was reintroduced in 2016. Unlike the SAT, however, NEET is compulsory for medical admission and is held only once a year, making it a far higher-stakes test.

Before NEET, medical admissions in India were fragmented across multiple examinations. At the national level, the All India Pre-Medical Test (AIPMT), conducted by CBSE, governed admission to 15% of seats in government medical and dental colleges. The remaining 85% of state quota seats were filled through separate state-level entrance exams, such as Maharashtra Health and Technical Common Entrance Test (MHT-CET), the Uttar Pradesh Combined Pre-Medical Test (UP-CPMT), and the Engineering Agricultural and Medical Common Entrance Test (EAMCET) in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. In addition, premier institutions such as All India Institutes of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) and the Jawaharlal Institute of Postgraduate Medical Education and Research (JIPMER) conducted their own entrance examinations. The result was a decentralized and often confusing admissions system.

Today, more than two million students sit for NEET each year in the hope of securing a seat in one of the 823 medical colleges recognized by the . This year, nearly 2.28 million students registered for 129,602 seats across 551 cities in India, 14 cities abroad and more than 5,342 examination centers, according to an . It is roughly 18 students per seat, making it a competitive make-it-or-break-it scenario.

Over the past decade, NEET has repeatedly been dogged by disruptions, including allegations of cheating, corruption and paper leaks. Despite its reputation as one of the country¡¯²õ toughest entrance exams, the system has repeatedly failed to prevent the paper from being stolen or leaked. The exam is conducted offline in pen-and-paper format and consists of 180 questions across biology, physics and chemistry, for a total of 720 marks.

In 2024, NEET was rocked by another . Eighty students reportedly received perfect scores, an unusually high number that triggered concern among educators. A subsequent police investigation found that 1,563 students had been awarded grace marks, a decision that was later reversed. Yet the highly competitive exam was neither canceled nor rescheduled, prompting widespread public outrage. These discrepancies deepened distrust among students, parents, and teachers.

CBSE faces fresh scrutiny over on-screen marking

The crisis in exam credibility has not been limited to NEET. This year, CBSE, the school board affiliated with more than 24,000 schools in India and abroad, also over the evaluation of Class 10 and 12 examinations. The board had introduced an on-screen marking (OSM) system for large-scale evaluation, replacing physical answer-book grading with digital assessment. Coempt Edu Teck, an ed-tech company based in Hyderabad, was awarded the contract. But the system soon drew criticism over technical glitches, blurry scanned images, poor resolution and improper marking, all of which cast doubt on the results.

Although Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan said he accepted responsibility and that technical defects were being addressed, it remains striking that such a large-scale shift appears to have been implemented despite serious gaps in oversight. The fate of millions of students was effectively handed to a technology company that, critics argue, failed to meet its responsibilities.

Adding to the controversy, Sarthak Sidhant, a 17-year-old student, said he found irregularities in public tender documents related to the ed-tech contract. He his findings on social media, alleging that the eligibility criteria had been modified in ways that benefited Coempt and helped it secure the contract.

The high-stakes coaching industry

Behind all this lies another uncomfortable reality: the enormous coaching industry that thrives on high-stakes examinations. India¡¯²õ test-preparation sector has expanded dramatically, profiting from the aspirations and anxieties of students and families. On average, coaching institutes charge anywhere from ?40,000 (~$424) to ?200,000 (~$2,120) per student over a two-year period.

The industry has grown rapidly over the past decade. Last year, its was estimated at roughly $7.2 billion, and it is expected to continue growing over the next several years. Urbanization, digitalization and intensifying professional competition have all fueled this expansion.

Coaching centers have dominated India¡¯²õ academic scene way before NEET or NTA came along. These centers are essential for many students, offering structured guidance and resources to navigate complex subjects. ??As a result, they play a significant role in shaping the future of aspiring medical and engineering professionals. Some critics argue that they dictate the terms in various aspects of these centralized exams.

Taken together, these failures have intensified student frustration, exposed weak government communication and underscored a growing political disconnect. In a recent with In Focus, The Hindu podcast, Dr. G. R. Ravindranath, general secretary of the Doctors¡¯ Association for Social Equality, said that discrepancies in major examinations inflict severe mental and emotional distress on students and their families. He argued that both the central government and the NTA must be held accountable and suggested that the NTA should be replaced by a new body, similar to the Union Public Service Commission, with stronger public oversight.

The crisis surrounding NEET and CBSE reveals a deepening collapse of trust that shapes the future of millions of young Indians. If these institutions continue without credibility, the damage will reverberate beyond the day of the result.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post India¡¯²õ Exam System Under Fire as NEET and CBSE Controversies Grow appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

It tastes like barbecue ribs, chicken and homemade sausage. It tastes like potato salad, broccoli rice casserole, watermelon, coconut cake, sweet potato pie and peach cobbler. It tastes like , my paternal grandmother¡¯²õ favorite soda and a Texas delicacy.?

This menu was my first introduction to Juneteenth, one of America¡¯²õ oldest African American holidays that commemorates the day enslaved Africans in Texas were told that slavery had ended on June 19, 1865. 

But long before Juneteenth became a in 2021 ¡ª a milestone made possible through decades of advocacy by figures in my hometown of Fort Worth, Texas, such as retired teacher and activist ¡ª my grandmother¡¯²õ house was my classroom, and she was my teacher.

¡°The backbone of Juneteenth festivities has always been the table¡±

Looking back, Juneteenth was my grandmother¡¯²õ time to shine, and I can still see her face light up with joy. Cooking was her superpower, and each recipe, pot, utensil and ingredient recharged it. I remember watching her carefully prepare these dishes while my dad and uncles stood at the grill in the backyard, laughing and enjoying themselves. 

As a native Black Texan, an expert in Black food history and a professor of African American Studies, I now understand that my grandmother¡¯²õ house was much more than a site of Juneteenth celebrations. It was a portal into Black Texas tradition that spans generations. 

¡°Before Black Texans had their own history, schools, churches, warriors, martyrs, and women and men of big affairs, they had Juneteenth,¡± writes Black Texan and Historian in his book :

It may not have looked like much in the eyes of an arrogant world, but it was everything Black Texans had, and they each loved and cherished that day with all their heart ¡­ and most important of all, they remembered.

In High on the Hog: A Culinary Journey from Africa to America, prominent culinary historian and -winning author Jessica B. Harris , ¡°The backbone of Juneteenth festivities has always been the table ¡­ picnics and barbecues were the hallmarks of the early celebrations.¡±

The people, like my grandmother, who carried forward the food traditions of Black Texans and sustained the holiday, are a critical piece of the Juneteenth story. As more Americans become aware of the holiday, it¡¯²õ imperative that we find ways to amplify their contributions and keep their stories alive for generations to come.

Emancipatory food power

As head cook in several restaurants, including some in the , my grandmother practiced freedom through food, exercising a personal form of what I call emancipatory food power in my book . The kitchen was her domain, and the table her sphere of influence. She transformed meals into a means of caring for her family and safeguarding their food security.?

My grandmother passed away in 2013, but she believed in the power of the table. She never sat us down to explain the facts surrounding Juneteenth¡¯²õ history. She would stand proudly in her kitchen, showing us what emancipation looked like for a southern Black woman who could cook on her own terms. 

The future in Fort Worth will stand just a few blocks from the home where my grandmother prepared many of the meals that shaped our family¡¯²õ celebrations. Including stories like hers would not only honor the women who kept these traditions alive but also broaden public understanding of how freedom was practiced, nurtured and passed down at kitchen tables, on backyard grills and at family gatherings across generations.

Juneteenth traditions are not fixed. They vary across families, communities and generations, and my grandmother¡¯²õ story is only one iteration of the holiday. Yet it is also part of a larger Juneteenth history that rarely receives public attention. Stories like my grandmother¡¯²õ ¡ª of Black women whose labor, cooking and care sustained families and communities ¡ª are as much a part of Juneteenth¡¯²õ legacy as the public celebrations that often dominate its remembrance.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post The Taste of Juneteenth: Food, Family and Freedom¡¯²õ Legacy appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Over the past three decades, Hollywood has become increasingly dependent on international markets. A quick dive into the revenue data from 2024 tells you everything you need to know about who is truly driving the film industry right now. With international markets now responsible for upward of of revenue, foreign audiences have become impossible for major American studios to ignore. Naturally, this financial lifeline comes with serious strings attached. Hollywood is in a constant process of cultural negotiation, regularly altering its narratives and softening their political edges just to ensure a film actually plays well overseas.

This is where the limits of American soft power begin to appear. For decades, Hollywood worked effectively because it did not look like state propaganda. It sold American values through entertainment: individual freedom, heroism, patriotism and the American Dream. Films such as English film director Tony Scott¡¯²õ (1987) and American actor and filmmaker Sylvester Stallone¡¯²õ (2008) projected military confidence and American superiority, while many Hollywood biopics promoted the belief that personal struggle, discipline and talent could lead to success.

There was a time when Hollywood exported these cultural ideals with remarkable confidence. That one-way flow is far less secure today. Because international markets now shape box-office revenue, studios are forced into a more delicate game of cultural negotiation. They cannot simply project American ideals without adjustment. Globalization, which once expanded the reach of US soft power, now also dilutes it by forcing Hollywood to compromise with the very world it seeks to influence.

Asia¡¯²õ rise as a cultural power

Asia has become central to this shift. The region is no longer only a destination for Hollywood films. It is also producing its own cultural narratives, industries and standards.Hollywood¡¯²õ share of the global box office has from 92% to 66% over the past two decades, alongside the rise of Asian film industries, particularly China. The success of China¡¯²õ animated film , which grossed about $2 billion worldwide, signals more than commercial growth. It reflects a changing cultural order.

The old assumption that Western culture alone dictates global taste is increasingly difficult to defend. Entertainment today is becoming more multipolar. Asian cinema, television, music, anime and literature are no longer merely responding to Hollywood. In many cases, creators across the region are setting new standards for global popular culture.

South Korea offers one of the clearest examples. Through the ¡°Korean Wave,¡± the country has transformed popular culture into a powerful diplomatic instrument. Korean pop (K-pop), Korean dramas, films, fashion, food and cosmetics now circulate globally, shaping not only consumer taste but also perceptions of South Korea itself.Le Monde has the Korean Wave as having ¡°conquered¡± the planet, a phrase that captures how far South Korean popular culture has traveled.

Japan provides another example through anime. The country has increasingly treated anime and manga as part of its cultural influence abroad, withBloomberg them as central to Japan¡¯²õ soft-power strategy. Anime does not merely entertain global audiences. It also shapes how many people imagine Japan and, more broadly, Asia.

Indonesia and local storytelling

Indonesia presents a different but equally important case in this global shift. Local filmmakers may not be able to compete with Hollywood in terms of visual effects or production budgets, but they do not need to. Rather than imitating Western blockbusters, the domestic industry has found strength in stories that foreign studios cannot genuinely reproduce: Indonesian fears, humor, family tensions, religious anxieties and everyday social realities.

Domestic films captured around of Indonesia¡¯²õ cinema market and attracted more than 80 million viewers, putting real pressure on imported films, including Hollywood releases. The numbers say something simple: Indonesian audiences are not just waiting for whatever comes from outside. They also want stories that sound familiar, feel close and speak to the way they actually live. In that sense, watching local films is not only about entertainment. It is also about recognition. Indonesian filmmakers do not need to attack Hollywood head-on to challenge its place in the market.

The decline of American cultural dominance

China has taken a more direct route. The geopolitical tensions in 2025 provide a useful example. noted in 2025 that Beijing began cutting back on Hollywood imports in response to US tariff increases. That kind of political retaliation puts real pressure on American studios in a market they are eager to keep. Combined with the growth of China¡¯²õ domestic film industry, this policy shows how cultural power is increasingly tied to economic and geopolitical competition.?

The scholar Chua Beng Huat¡¯²õ on East Asian popular culture helps explain this broader transformation. Hallyu, Japanese pop (J-pop), Asian dramas and regional cinema can all be read as signs that American media dominance no longer operates without competition. Asian audiences are not passive recipients of American culture. They choose, reject, reinterpret and produce alternative forms of popular culture.

Soft power is no longer one-way

Hollywood¡¯²õ soft power has not disappeared. It remains influential, profitable and globally visible. But it is no longer absolute. Its dependence on international markets means it must increasingly negotiate with the very audiences it once assumed it could simply influence. At the same time, Asia is no longer only a market. It has become an active cultural producer.

The future of global popular culture will not be shaped by Hollywood alone. It will be shaped through negotiation, competition and exchange between multiple cultural centers. The United States remains a major cultural force, but it no longer defines the global conversation alone. Increasingly, Asia is helping determine what stories travel, what values resonate and how the world imagines itself.

[ first published a version of this piece in Indonesian.]

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

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Today, Germany has been shaken by a series of political and economic crises ¡ª from the Covid-19 pandemic to war in Europe ¡ª fueling nostalgia for a more optimistic and ostensibly uncomplicated past. In that search, attention often turns to the early years of Angela Merkel¡¯²õ chancellorship ¡ª and to the 2006 World Cup, the subject of a recent three-part German series.

That nostalgia is easy to understand. In 2006, Germany welcomed the footballing world under the slogan ¡°A time to make friends.¡± Flags covered balconies and cars; public screenings of matches turned into festivals. German footballer Philipp Lahm opened the tournament with a curling shot into the top right corner against Costa Rica, and Germany¡¯²õ run to the semifinals helped shape the tournament into what many remember as weeks of seemingly carefree celebration. The German news magazine Der Spiegel : ¡°A happy nation ¡ª Germany, a summer fairy tale ¡ª the World Cup becomes a national Love Parade,¡± referencing the country¡¯²õ once famous techno parade to evoke mass celebration. The magazine suggested that Germany had begun to ¡°settle into its own history.¡± In a country long defined by its struggle with the Nazi past, this was a loaded idea.

For many, the tournament symbolized a newfound ease with national identity. Then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan remarked, ¡°Here you see a united and happy German people … No one sees the spirit of today¡¯²õ Berlin or of the Germans as being in any way connected to the past.¡± 

The narrative of a carefree summer ¡ª one in which Germany supposedly showed what it is really like ¡ª has become something of a national myth. Questioning it is often seen as needlessly negative. For many, it feels like a spoilsport attack on the ¡° of their lives.¡± Not even later corruption allegations surrounding Germany¡¯²õ successful bid to host the 2006 World Cup sufficed to fundamentally shake this collective memory.?

In light of growing far-right and exclusionary views ¡ª and rising support for authoritarian and anti-immigration positions ¡ª an uncomfortable question must be asked: How harmless was the ¡°summer fairy tale¡± really? What kind of impact do large-scale sporting events have? And how do they shape and intensify national sentiment?

Sporting events and national identity

Major sporting events like the FIFA World Cup have become central moments of collective communication in modern societies. They are mass media events with enormous reach and a powerful capacity to mobilize emotions and participation. These events are far from politically neutral. They function as global stages where political, social and economic interests are expressed and advanced.

show that such events can affect how strongly people identify with their nation. A key factor is the degree of emotional and practical engagement: The more people feel involved ¡ª through shared experiences, celebrations and media consumption ¡ª the stronger their sense of belonging becomes.

Through their narratives, symbols and rituals, sports and media mega-events make the host nation emotionally tangible. In Irish-American political scientist Benedict ¡¯²õ sense, the ¡°imagined community¡± of the nation becomes something people can actually feel. In Germany, football-driven patriotism has thus become a mass phenomenon deeply rooted in the social mainstream.

At the same time, research points to double-edged effects. A German found that pride in national sporting success is positively correlated with nationalism and xenophobia, raising doubts about whether sports can foster patriotic attachment without simultaneously reinforcing exclusionary attitudes.

by the University of Marburg suggest more strongly that the 2006 World Cup contributed to an increased acceptance of nationalist views: ¡°Individuals surveyed after the World Cup expressed more nationalist and less purely patriotic attitudes than those surveyed before the tournament.¡±

The myth of the ¡°summer fairy tale¡±

These studies challenge the dominant images of 2006 that continue to shape Germany¡¯²õ collective memory. German writer Max Czollek reflected in 2018:

In , people behaved as if they were shaking off a heavy burden they had carried for a long time … Germans experienced the World Cup as a collective sense of relief that it was finally acceptable to wave the national flag again, like in the past.

The sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer had already dismissed the image of a peaceful, open-minded patriotism in 2006 as ¡° nonsense.¡± His warnings about the risks of so-called ¡°¡± were often seen as overly pessimistic. In hindsight, however, they appear strikingly prescient.

As of 2026, the far-right Alternative f¨¹r Deutschland (AfD), which is monitored by Germany¡¯²õ domestic intelligence agency, has become the largest opposition party and leads national polling in some surveys. Although it has never been part of the federal government, it has shaped political discourse for over a decade. It has steadily pushed the boundaries of what is considered acceptable further to the right. Its growing strength has raised concerns about democratic stability.  Reflecting this, voices within the governing coalition led by incumbent Chancellor Friedrich Merz have described the current government¡¯²õ success or failure as a make-or-break moment for German democracy.

Exploiting patriotism politically

The 2006 World Cup can be read as a highly visible moment in the broader normalization of national pride ¡ª and as a symbolic loosening of what some had long described as an excessive or ¡°misplaced¡± sense of historical guilt. It helped make a vocabulary of national identification more socially acceptable, creating an emotional and symbolic terrain that far-right actors later found easier to appropriate. The AfD did not invent these sentiments; it sought to capitalize on them. 

If this link seems far-fetched, consider G?tz Kubitschek, a key figure in Germany¡¯²õ far-right intellectual scene, who the AfD¡¯²õ strategy as ¡°normalization patriotism¡± ¡ª a deliberately low-threshold, broadly appealing and seemingly harmless form of national identification designed to serve as a common point of reference.

In a 2025 special issue titled ¡°Football: The National Sport ¨C The Heartbeat of a German Passion,¡± the far-right magazine Compact claimed that patriotism ¡°releases feel-good hormones.¡± After Germany¡¯²õ early exit from the World Cup in Qatar, the right-wing conservative weekly struck a nostalgic tone, recalling the 2006 ¡°summer fairy tale¡± as ¡°collective loosening-up toward a more relaxed, unselfconscious patriotism.¡±

The AfD itself openly recognizes the political and identity-building power of sport. In its 2025 policy guidelines on sports, the party emphasizes that sporting success fosters ¡° identification with one¡¯²õ own nation,¡± explicitly citing the 2006 World Cup as a key example.

This strategy fits into a broader modernization of right-wing extremism. It marks a departure from the more overt neo-Nazi subcultures that were still prevalent in 2006, and that had dismissed the World Cup¡¯²õ mainstream, apolitical enthusiasm as a shallow, system-conforming display.

Patriotism as a vehicle for historical revisionism

The normalization of patriotism as part of the AfD¡¯²õ broader identity is closely linked with its ethnonationalist and revisionist approach to history ¡ª one that seeks to downplay or reframe the memory of Nazi crimes and their victims. In its 2016 party manifesto, the AfD called for an end to what it described as the ¡°¡± of German historical memory to the period of National Socialism, advocating instead for a more ¡°balanced view¡± that emphasizes supposedly positive and identity-forming aspects of German history.

Leading figures within the party have made this position explicit. Alexander Gauland, the party¡¯²õ honorary chairman, notoriously referred to the Nazi era as ¡°a of bird droppings in over a thousand years of successful German history.¡± Bj?rn H?cke, one of its most influential and controversial extremist figures, demanded a ¡° turn¡± in the country¡¯²õ politics of remembrance.

Similarly, party chairwoman Alice Weidel has rejected the widely accepted German framing of May 8, 1945 ¡ª the day of Nazi Germany¡¯²õ surrender ¡ª as a ¡° of liberation,¡± arguing that it is inappropriate to celebrate what she describes as the defeat of one¡¯²õ own country. Against this backdrop, her call for Germany to ¡° proud of itself again¡± becomes part of a broader political project ¡ª one that links national self-affirmation to a redefinition of how history is remembered and interpreted.

For actors seeking to promote a more affirmative national narrative, the 2006 ¡°summer fairy tale¡± can function as a useful point of reference within a broader national narrative: one in which the Nazi past serves primarily as a negative backdrop to a supposedly renewed, democratic present. This framing can obscure deeper continuities and mask broader social tensions.

Distraction in the euphoria of sport

Moments of national self-celebration and patriotic euphoria can create societal blind spots, masking those tensions. Even as Germany celebrated its ¡°summer fairy tale¡± in 2006, the country was already experiencing a wave of far-right violence. Between 2000 and 2007, the neo-Nazi terrorist group National Socialist Underground () ten people, most of them of Turkish descent.

Victims¡¯ families held demonstrations during the World Cup. Yet for years, investigations wrongly focused on the victims¡¯ social circles ¡ª shaped in part by racist stereotypes. The NSU¡¯²õ responsibility for the murders, as well as the extent of failures within Germany¡¯²õ security agencies, only came to light in 2011. The contrast is striking: While the country celebrated itself as open and welcoming, the most serious far-right murder series in postwar Germany remained largely unrecognized at the time.

A more nuanced patriotism

As the next World Cup approaches in the US, similar dynamics may come into view. The Trump administration is likely to use the tournament to project belief in American exceptionalism (¡°America First¡±) through highly visible, ¡°.¡± A form of patriotism long rooted in an ¡° of America-branded totems, like flags and statues¡± ¡ª a tradition amplified and radicalized by President Donald Trump¡¯²õ Make America Great Again movement.

But does patriotism inevitably have to lead to self-aggrandizement and political instrumentalization? Or are there other ways to express a sense of national belonging?

Attachment to one¡¯²õ country can also be self-critical and nuanced. The German-Iranian writer Navid Kermani articulated this in a 2014 speech in the German Bundestag marking the 65th anniversary of Germany¡¯²õ Basic Law. Rejecting the idea of a ¡°normal¡± and ¡°unstrained¡± relationship with the nation, he : ¡°There never was such a normal and unstrained relationship ¡ª not even before National Socialism.¡± Instead, German history has always contained both ¡°an excessive, aggressive nationalism¡± and ¡°a strong tradition of self-criticism, a commitment to Europe, and a turn toward cosmopolitanism.¡±

Echoing a by former Chancellor and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize Willy Brandt, Kermani concluded: ¡°A good German cannot be a nationalist.¡±

And yet, Kermani in a different Germany: ¡°Not a boastful one, not the swaggering one ¡­ a country that has matured through its own failures and no longer needs grand displays ¡­ This is the Germany I love.¡±

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Education policy is routinely shaped by what can be easily measured and quickly reported. Standardized assessments, enrollment rates and literacy benchmarks dominate reform agendas because they offer visible proof of progress. These indicators matter. They provide clarity and accountability. But when measurement begins to drive reform, the definition of learning narrows.

As the world turns its attention to the FIFA World Cup, one of the most widely watched sporting events globally, the conversation around sports cannot remain confined to stadiums and elite competition. Moments like this invite us to reflect on sport¡¯²õ broader role in society, including its untapped potential within education systems. When sports are intentionally integrated into education policy and practice, they strengthen learning, advance gender equality, build confidence, reduce isolation, and contribute to more peaceful and inclusive societies.

This is measurable. It is not aspirational language or institutional optimism. School systems that have integrated structured sports and physical activity in attendance of 15 to 20% in some contexts. In Namibia, students participating in sports-linked development programs passed Grade 10 examinations at rates exceeding national averages by more than 20 percentage points. Across multiple countries, that physical activity improves learning outcomes, strengthens engagement in school and reduces dropout rates.

Movement the brain. Increased blood flow, neural growth in the hippocampus, improved executive functioning, memory retention and attention span are all associated with regular physical activity. When students move, they are not stepping away from learning. They are reinforcing the neural architecture that enables learning.

Building leadership and trust in post-conflict environments through sports

The impact extends beyond academics. In refugee settings, structured sports programs have helped restore routine and stability for children whose lives have been disrupted by conflict. In Chad, young refugee women trained as certified sports facilitators now lead activities for their communities. Their presence on the field challenges assumptions about gender and leadership in ways that policy statements alone cannot achieve.

¡°At first, the community resisted the program,¡± one facilitator explained. ¡°Now girls and boys play together.¡±

I have stood in schools where girls who were once silent now organize teams, speak with confidence and assume visible leadership roles. The shift is not dramatic in a single afternoon. It is cumulative. It begins with participation. It grows into a voice.

When sports are embedded in education, they create structured spaces for dialogue. In post-conflict contexts, programs that combine literacy, life skills and physical activity have strengthened conflict-resolution skills and reduced aggression among youth. Shared rules, shared goals and shared effort build trust. Trust allows divided communities to rebuild relationships and function again.

Sport for Development

A approach uses sports as a platform to help children and young people realize their potential through programs that strengthen personal growth, social inclusion and community cohesion. Sports are not added for recreation alone; they are structured to advance learning, resilience and opportunity.

In practice, a Sport for Development approach is intentional and structured. It connects sports to clearly defined development objectives. Coaches are trained not only in sports skills but also in mentorship, safeguarding and facilitating discussions on topics of concern to participants. Activities are designed to reinforce life skills such as communication, cooperation, leadership and conflict resolution. Monitoring frameworks track attendance, engagement and social outcomes alongside academic indicators. The goal is not competition; It is durable human development. When implemented well, this approach integrates sports into broader education and community strategies rather than treating them as standalone initiatives.

Sports integrated into education Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in multiple areas. These include SDG 3 on health and well-being, SDG 4 on quality education, SDG 5 on gender equality, SDG 10 on reduced inequalities, and SDG 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies. Few single interventions operate across so many dimensions simultaneously.

Sports are not disposable

Yet sports are still treated as disposable. They are frequently the first element cut when education budgets are tightened, or concerns are raised about poor academic outcomes. Cutting them ignores their structural role in learning and social cohesion.

When budgets are reduced, decisions reveal priorities. Core academic subjects are protected. School construction projects move forward. Physical education and sports are often dropped from the school curriculum because they are viewed as discretionary. Yet this framing overlooks their preventative and integrative function. In contexts marked by inequality and displacement, structured physical activity can stabilize attendance, improve behavior, strengthen classroom engagement and reinforce peer relationships. Removing it often increases strain elsewhere in the system. What appears to be fiscal restraint often leads to higher long-term costs, including disengagement, classroom disruption and dropout.

Global education reform efforts today frequently emphasize foundational literacy and numeracy. These are essential. However, outcomes are strengthened when students are engaged, confident, physically well and socially connected. Sports support those conditions by fostering a sense of belonging among marginalized youth, reducing isolation, establishing predictable routines for children recovering from stress and trauma, and cultivating teamwork, discipline and respect in environments where division might otherwise take root.

Sports and physical activity reinforce learning and should not be seen as a replacement.

Empowering communities through sports in education

If we are serious about building bridges between communities and breaking down barriers to opportunity, then sports must be recognized as a core component of effective education systems. They function as social infrastructure, strengthening both human capital and the connective tissue that holds communities together.

At a moment when global attention is riveted on sport¡¯²õ capacity to transcend borders and unify diverse audiences, the imperative to embed it within education systems has never been more compelling. Sports in education is not an optional add-on; it is a strategic investment in advancing inclusion, equity and peace ¡ª shaping the everyday lived experience of children worldwide.

When we invest in both the classroom and the playing field, we build more resilient, cohesive societies from the ground up. The playing field sits at the heart of education, shaping how children develop, relate to one another and thrive.

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However, Magnifica Humanitas is not merely a religious reflection on artificial intelligence. Nor is it a simplistic rejection of technological progress. At its core,?the encyclical?is a warning against technological : the belief that technology drives every aspect of society, and therefore society must inevitably accept technological systems as they are. The document argues instead that technological progress must always be guided by human dignity, moral responsibility and the common good.

Technological progress produces two paths

The opening pages of the encyclical introduce a powerful metaphor that structures the entire document. Today, humanity must make a choice between either rebuilding the Tower of Babel or rebuilding Jerusalem. The reference is not accidental. The story of the Tower of symbolizes hubris ¡ª a civilization organized around concentrated power, excessive self-confidence and exploitation attempts to build a tower to reach God. The reference to Jerusalem, ¡°the city in which God and humanity dwell together,¡± by contrast, represents humility, openness to the divine, fraternity and collaboration.

For Pope Leo XIV, the central issue is therefore not whether humanity should say ¡°yes¡± or ¡°no¡± to technology. The deeper question is what kind of civilization technological power will produce. Will artificial intelligence serve inclusive and integral human development, or will it deepen socio-economic inequalities, human exploitation and political domination?

This distinction is crucial because the encyclical does not portray technology itself as inherently negative. On the contrary, it explicitly recognizes technology as what Pope Benedict XVI, in his Caritas in Veritate, ¡°a profoundly human reality, linked to the autonomy and freedom of man.¡± However, the Pope warns that when technology becomes ¡°the standard by which everything is judged,¡± human beings risk being reduced to ¡°mere cogs in a system driven toward ever greater efficiency.¡±

The critique is therefore directed not at innovation itself, but at what the encyclical calls the ¡°technocratic paradigm.¡± When efficiency and profits become the supreme criteria of economic and social systems, they gradually displace human dignity and the common good. The danger, as the document repeatedly emphasizes, is , or the reduction of persons to data or functional units within systems designed primarily for performance and profit. This inevitably leads to loss of dignity and of inequalities.?

In many ways, the encyclical echoes concerns already articulated by twentieth-century thinkers such as Romano Guardini. Guardini¡¯²õ observation that ¡°¡®contemporary man has not been trained to use power well¡¯¡± (as quoted in Pope Francis¡¯²õ 2015 , Laudato Si¡¯) functions almost as a diagnosis of the present technological age. Humanity has acquired unprecedented technical capabilities without equivalent moral and political guardrails.?

This concern becomes particularly acute given the changing nature of economic power in the digital age. Today¡¯²õ new technological capabilities are increasingly controlled by a few actors whose influence often surpasses that of governments themselves. The encyclical explicitly acknowledges this transformation, warning that technological power now assumes ¡°an unprecedented, predominantly ¡®private¡¯ aspect,¡± thereby making democratic oversight and accountability increasingly . The Vatican recognizes that artificial intelligence is developing within a global order characterized by concentrated digital power and weakened public oversight. The risk is not simply technological inequality, but the emergence of new forms of dependency, exclusion and manipulation.

The digital has a profound impact on human social reality

At the same time, Magnifica Humanitas expands the discussion beyond economics and governance into the broader social consequences of digital transformation. One of its most striking arguments concerns the relationship between truth and democracy. The encyclical describes truth as a ¡°common good¡± increasingly threatened by disinformation and commercialization. Digital systems, it argues, shape collective imagination, public discourse and social trust itself. 

The transformation of labor constitutes another major concern. Here, the historical parallel with Rerum Novarum becomes especially clear. Just as industrial mechanization disrupted workers¡¯ lives in the nineteenth century, artificial intelligence and automation are now reshaping the meaning of work in the twenty-first century. The encyclical warns that societies risk creating economies in which efficiency is prioritized over human dignity and labor becomes increasingly disposable.

It also addresses what it calls ¡°new forms of slavery.¡± Labor is increasingly linked to digital dependency and behavioural manipulation. The Pope also urges people to consider the consequences of technological production ¡ª harsh mining labor and profiling techniques for trafficking are just two examples. The ¡°commodification of persons¡± becomes increasingly easy with AI and digital progress.

In an era increasingly defined by the commercialization of human attention, the Pope insists on the enduring importance of relationships, care and human recognition. Human beings continue to seek attentive minds and authentic solidarity, which are realities that no machine can fully replicate. The encyclical also underscores the responsibility for the inclusive and dignified use of language in communication. 

Technology exacerbates gaps in global power structures

Perhaps the most consequential sections of Magnifica Humanitas, however, concern geopolitics. Here, the encyclical situates artificial intelligence within a rapidly deteriorating international environment characterized by great power rivalry and the normalization of war. The document argues that the digital revolution is transforming the nature of warfare itself through cyberattacks, information manipulation, automated strategic systems and hybrid forms of conflict.

These examples of new warfare point to the growing gap between technological capability and moral responsibility. Detached from ethics, technology risks rendering life-and-death decisions ¡°more rapid and impersonal¡± while presenting the use of force as an immediate and viable option. Artificial intelligence thus becomes an accelerant within an already unstable geopolitical order.

This leads the Pope to one of the encyclical¡¯²õ most controversial but intellectually significant critiques: the rejection of what he calls a ¡°false realism.¡± The document argues that modern political culture increasingly treats war and confrontation as inevitable conditions of international life. Diplomacy and peace are dismissed as na?ve aspirations, while permanent preparation for conflict is normalized as responsible statecraft. The encyclical does not deny the reality of geopolitical rivalry or power politics. Rather, it rejects the fatalistic assumption that humanity must permanently organize itself around domination and strategic competition. In this sense, Magnifica Humanitas identifies a profound tension between two competing logics of human development.

On the one hand stands the deterministic logic embedded in modern economics, technological competition and international relations. This is a logic driven by survival, accumulation, deterrence and strategic advantage. On the other hand, the moral and spiritual vision advanced by the encyclical is centered on responsibility, dignity, coexistence, peace and the possibility of solidarity even amid conflict and transformation.

We must choose human dignity over unhindered digital progress

Importantly, the document does not propose centralized technocratic control as the solution to these challenges. Nor does it advocate for regulatory maximalism. Instead, the encyclical repeatedly emphasizes shared responsibility. Governments, businesses, schools, intermediary institutions, families and citizens all bear responsibility for shaping the ethical direction of technological development. The challenge posed by artificial intelligence is not merely technical or regulatory, it is profoundly educational and civilizational. The key question is whether societies can still form morally responsible individuals in environments increasingly shaped by commercial algorithms and digital fragmentation.

The encyclical¡¯²õ concluding metaphor powerfully captures this vision. Pope Leo XIV invokes the biblical figure of Nehemiah rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem ¡°brick by brick¡± after devastation. Humanity, he argues, should not become passive spectators of social and cultural fractures, nor merely commentators on civilizational decline. Instead, individuals and institutions alike are called to participate actively in rebuilding the social foundations threatened by technocratic mentality and partisan interests.

Ultimately, Magnifica Humanitas raises a question that extends far beyond the Catholic Church or even secular debates over artificial intelligence. The central issue is not whether humanity can create increasingly powerful technologies. It is whether humanity can preserve moral judgment, human dignity and social responsibility while doing so. In an age increasingly shaped by algorithmic systems and concentrated technological power, the encyclical warns that progress without ethical orientation risks producing not a new Jerusalem, but a new Babel.

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That is what makes football different in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is never just sport. It is politics without speeches. It is diplomacy without ³¦´Ç³¾³¾³Ü²Ô¾±±ç³Ü¨¦²õ. It is national identity under floodlights.

I have also stood in national stadiums in Guyana, Barbados, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Bolivia. None of those countries will be in the 2026 World Cup. Their absence is part of the story, too. Football reflects talent, of course. But it also reflects institutions, investment, migration, coaching, federation competence and the state¡¯²õ ability to organize ambition over time.

The 2026 World Cup will make that especially clear. For the first time, the tournament will bring together across Canada, Mexico and the US. FIFA describes it as the largest edition of the tournament, with 104 matches across 16 host cities. Mexico will open the tournament against South Africa at Mexico City Stadium on June 11.

That geography matters. This will be a North American World Cup. But Latin America may give it much of its emotion. Argentina arrives as the defending champion. Brazil arrives with its mystique intact, but its certainty diminished. Colombia, Uruguay and Ecuador look strong enough to punish anyone. Mexico carries the burden of hosting. Paraguay returns with its familiar mix of discipline and defiance. Panama, Haiti and Cura?ao bring stories that reach far beyond the pitch.

Latin America¡¯²õ contenders

The region¡¯²õ strongest team remains Argentina. This is not only because footballer Lionel Messi lifted the trophy in Qatar in 2022, but also because Argentina has sustained excellence after that victory. In South American qualifying, Argentina , ahead of Ecuador, Colombia, Uruguay, Brazil and Paraguay.

That matters in a World Cup. Talent wins moments; identity wins tournaments. Argentina has both. It has experience, confidence, a clear tactical personality and the aura that comes with having survived the pressure of a World Cup final. The question is not whether Argentina can win again. It is whether a team built around one of football¡¯²õ most consequential generations can manage one more act.

Brazil is different. It may still have the highest ceiling in the region. But it enters the tournament with more uncertainty than mythology usually allows. Brazil finished only in South American qualifying, behind Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia and Uruguay. That does not make Brazil weak. It makes Brazil interesting.

Brazil¡¯²õ story is now about repair. Italian football manager Carlo Ancelotti gives the team authority, calm and European managerial prestige. But the Neymar question captures the larger tension. Neymar da Silva Santos J¨²nior remains Brazil¡¯²õ all-time leading scorer, but injuries and form have made his selection a national debate. Ancelotti told that any decision on Neymar would be based on fitness and team needs, not sentiment.

That is Brazil¡¯²õ dilemma in miniature. The country has endless football memories. It also needs a modern team. The old romance says Brazil must entertain. The modern game says Brazil must press, run, track back and suffer. Ancelotti¡¯²õ challenge is not simply to select players. It is to decide what Brazil means now.

Colombia may be the best dark horse from the region. It finished in South American qualifying, ahead of Uruguay and Brazil. Colombia has enough attacking quality to frighten elite teams, but its deeper advantage may be psychological. The national team has often served as a rare point of unity in a country marked by political division, regional inequality and long memories of conflict.

A good Colombian run would not erase those tensions. Football never does. But it can briefly gather a fragmented country around a common story. That is one reason Colombia matters in this tournament. It is not just trying to advance. It is trying to show that its modern image is bigger than its old stereotypes.

Uruguay brings another kind of political lesson. It is small, but it thinks big. Few countries have done more with less in world football. Uruguay¡¯²õ football identity is built on toughness, tactical maturity and collective pride. In a 48-team tournament, where the expanded field may create more uneven group matches, Uruguay¡¯²õ value will rise as the tournament gets harder. It is built for knockout football.

Ecuador may be the most underappreciated on the South American side. Its qualifying campaign was remarkable for one reason above all: consistency. Ecuador finished in the South American Football Confederation (CONMEBOL) qualifying, behind only Argentina. That reflects organization, athleticism, discipline and a generation that no longer sees qualification as the ceiling.

Ecuador also represents a broader trend. South American football is no longer only Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The middle of the continent¡¯²õ football table has grown stronger. Colombia, Ecuador and Paraguay can now make life miserable for anyone. That says something about talent development, coaching, migration and the global football market. European clubs scout South America earlier and more aggressively than ever. Young players leave home sooner. National teams then become reunion sites for globalized talent.

Mexico faces a different burden. It is not the strongest Latin American team. But it may be the most exposed. As a host, Mexico the tournament in Mexico City against South Africa. That is manageable. It is also dangerous. Host nations are expected to advance. Mexico¡¯²õ fans will demand more than competence.

For Mexico, the World Cup is about national image. It is a chance to showcase culture, infrastructure, pride and regional leadership. But it also arrives at a moment when migration, security and relations with the US continue to shape how Mexico is discussed abroad. A strong Mexican performance would not solve those issues. But it would project confidence. A poor one would deepen frustration with a football system that has often promised more than it delivered.

Then there is Paraguay. It may not be a favorite. But it belongs in this story. Paraguay from South America¡¯²õ unforgiving competition and landed in Group D with the US, T¨¹rkiye and Australia. Its opener against the US will immediately place it in front of a host-nation audience.

Paraguay¡¯²õ football personality has long matched its national self-image: resilient, physical, proud and difficult to break. It does not usually seduce neutrals; it frustrates them. That is part of the point. Paraguay has rarely had the global soft power of Brazil, Argentina or Mexico. But on a football field, it can force larger countries to negotiate with it on equal terms.

The Defensores del Chaco is not merely a venue. Its name invokes the Chaco War, the conflict against Bolivia that helped shape modern Paraguayan nationalism. Football in Paraguay carries that memory of endurance. When Paraguay plays, it often plays as if survival itself were a style.

Paraguay also has something almost no other team in the tournament has: an indigenous language that functions as both national identity and, at times, tactical advantage. Paraguayan players have long used Guaran¨ª on the field, including in ways opponents do not easily understand. During the 2010 World Cup, The National that Paraguay¡¯²õ players used Guaran¨ª on the pitch, which could help disguise communication during play. That detail matters because Guaran¨ª is not folklore in Paraguay. It is a living national language. Paraguay¡¯²õ 1992 Constitution both Spanish and Guaran¨ª as official languages. Guaran¨ª remains central to Paraguayan identity and daily life.

In most of Latin America, indigenous languages were pushed to the margins by colonial rule, class hierarchy and urban modernization. Paraguay is different. Guaran¨ª is not a museum piece; it is spoken in homes, markets, politics, music and football. On a World Cup field, it becomes something even rarer: a national code, spoken in public, hidden in plain sight.

The most powerful stories, however, may come from the Caribbean.

The Caribbean¡¯²õ remarkable World Cup stories

Haiti¡¯²õ qualification is extraordinary. Reuters that Haiti had to play its home fixtures in Cura?ao due to instability and violence in Haiti. Haiti¡¯²õ coach, S¨¦bastien Mign¨¦, had not been able to visit the country because of safety concerns. Yet the country still topped its qualifying group and reached the World Cup.

That is state fragility in football form. Haiti will not arrive with the resources of Argentina or Brazil; it will arrive as a national team representing a country whose citizens have endured violence, hunger, displacement and institutional collapse. In that context, qualification is more than sporting success. It is a form of visibility. It tells the world that Haiti is not only a crisis; it is also a people, a flag, a song and a team.

Cura?ao offers a different but equally compelling story. In that same , Reuters reported that Cura?ao became the smallest country ever to qualify for a World Cup, surpassing Iceland¡¯²õ previous record. It also noted that Cura?ao¡¯²õ squad was composed entirely of Dutch-born players with Antillean roots.

That is the modern Caribbean in one team sheet. Cura?ao¡¯²õ success is about diaspora, colonial history, dual identity and football¡¯²õ ability to turn dispersed communities into a national project. It raises a question that runs through the entire region: What does national representation mean when so many citizens, descendants and cultural communities live elsewhere?

Panama, too, deserves attention. It qualified by El Salvador three to zero and topping its group. It now faces a difficult task in Group L with England, Croatia and Ghana. That is a brutal draw. But Panama¡¯²õ presence confirms the rise of Central American football beyond the old assumption that the region¡¯²õ World Cup hopes begin and end with Mexico, Costa Rica or the US¡¯ Confederation of North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF) rivals.

More than a tournament

The expanded World Cup has been criticized for diluting quality. There is some truth in that. More teams will mean more mismatches, but it also means more stories. For Latin America and the Caribbean, expansion has opened space for nations whose football identities were real long before they became visible to global audiences.

That visibility matters. International sport gives states a stage they do not otherwise possess. A country ignored in diplomatic forums can become unavoidable for 90 minutes; a fragile state can show resilience; a small island can become the world¡¯²õ underdog; a country known abroad for crisis can remind the world that its people are more than their suffering.

That is why the 2026 World Cup will matter for the Americas. Argentina and Brazil will chase the trophy. Colombia, Uruguay and Ecuador will look to disrupt the hierarchy. Mexico will try to meet the moment at home. Paraguay will bring defiance, and perhaps a few instructions in Guaran¨ª that its opponents will not understand. Haiti, Cura?ao and Panama will carry the pride of places too often underestimated.

The World Cup will not fix Latin America¡¯²õ problems. It will not end violence, rebuild institutions, resolve migration or cure polarization. But it will reveal something important. Across the region, football remains one of the few public languages that still binds people together.

On match night, a country can still speak in one voice. In 2026, the world will be listening.

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Recent years have seen the steady erosion of what seemed to many like a pretty good idea ¡ª the fundamental notion that free people should be able to find God where they want to, when they want to and, importantly, if they want to at all. After centuries of religious zealotry at the heart of so much human misery for those who didn¡¯t drink the Kool-Aid of the day, the people who worked hard to create a top-flight America for White Christians somehow decided that it wasn¡¯t necessary for everyone to be a White Christian, nor that the federal government be empowered to declare a state religion.

In fact, it seemed that racism took up enough of the odious societal space that the downside of religious freedom paled in comparison. For much of America¡¯²õ post-Constitution history, it seemed enough for many White Christians to vilify Black people, without having to throw in their growing distaste for those who were not Christians at all.

So what happened? It isn¡¯t very clear to me what happened, but I think this most recent American outbreak of mindless religious zealotry can find its roots in the ever-popular from the Middle Ages. Additional inspiration can be found in the Inquisition and, closer to home, the execution of witches and the like in Salem, Massachusetts. At its core, today¡¯²õ religious zealotry, like its antecedents, is religion usurped to drive a cruel and immoral agenda.

Christianity as political theater

Just a couple of weeks ago, in a show of governmental devotion to religious devotion, the Trump administration a Christian American lovefest on the very public Washington Mall. There was nothing subtle about this one. High-profile Christian ¡°celebrities¡± and high-profile administration figures and Congressional flaks couldn¡¯t get enough of that old-time religion and the palpable desire for God to bless them and their version of America. On its face, this is disgusting enough.

However, and more importantly, governmental sponsorship of and participation in this fraught White Christian nationalist performance theater does not square with the US Constitution¡¯²õ historical devotion to the separation of church and state. Further, it makes a mockery of the underlying constitutional principle that each of us should be free from our government¡¯²õ choice of religious winners and losers.

To better understand right-wing America¡¯²õ enthusiastic embrace of symbolic , it is critical to note that there does not appear to be any requirement for adherence to actual Christian orthodoxy. Far from it. So many in today¡¯²õ right-wing America identify with both Christianity and the Republican Party, including its patently cruel, racist, socially unjust and culturally exclusionary political and social reality. As a casual observer, there does not seem to be much there for to love.

Further, there is absolutely no sense of Christian irony in the added infusion of right-wing constitutional orthodoxy into the mix. While there is a thrilling rush to maximize governmental resources to trample on the separation of church and state, there seems to be an even more frenzied effort to exclude governmental resources from being used to provide a measure of freedom from the tyranny of in the nation. It is worth remembering that many of these same folks see abortion as murder of a viable human being while on the for condemned human beings, all in God¡¯²õ name.

The myth of a Christian Nationalist America

To many viewing the world¡¯²õ problems in general, and America¡¯²õ problems in particular, this latest retread of the dark side of religious zealotry may seem of little significance. Please don¡¯t be fooled; there are of pulpits in America spewing to the flocks of ¡°true¡± believers some of the most vile, racist and Christian nationalist propaganda you will find anywhere on America¡¯²õ airwaves and under America¡¯²õ spiritual rocks. Wrapping Christian orthodoxy and right-wing constitutional orthodoxy around the ¡°message¡± only makes it more persuasive and more pernicious.

In this context, President Donald Trump has shown a venal capacity to espouse so much of the mythology of the American Dream while at the same time using Christian symbolism to define the dream for his followers. This hallelujah version of the ¡°dream¡± has been handed down by generations of unscrupulous Christian politicians, preachers, educators and historians. Now, it permeates so much of America¡¯²õ public space that their version of the ¡°dream¡± can be manipulated to advance the corrupt, cruel and immoral ends of those controlling that space.

That is what is at the heart of right-wing Christian nationalist thinking. It feeds on the notion that someone is trying to take away THEIR America. Trump and his acolytes are right about this part. WE ARE trying to take away THEIR America, because theirs is an America that never existed and never will. Unfortunately, WE seem, at the moment, to be losing that fight.

THEY are fighting today for a return to a ¡°glorious¡± past that was only the stuff of legend. Their past is a past of happy native Americans sharing the bounty of the land, smiling Black slaves tilling the soil for their better future, and so many women so content to be free of the burdens of owning property and voting. And oh, the glory of God¡¯²õ bounty.

Unfortunately, the real past exposes an America always riven by social and racial injustice, income inequality, subjugated women, despised immigrants and cultural rigidity. So, as God reemerges as an avenging angel and the message becomes uglier by the day, every effort will be made by the White Christian nationalists and their crowds to conveniently use their God to keep their momentum going for a governmentally enforced return to their delusional past.

So, make no mistake. There is nothing innocent about this erasure of the line between church and state. It is today¡¯²õ crusade. It is fueled by righteousness and armed, and it has captured the apparatus of the federal government of the United States of America. 

If you think that upcoming elections will somehow save the nation from those who are in charge today, think again. I believe they have a plan, and that plan leaves little room for their failure.

[ first published this piece.]

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The severity of this discrimination varies from country to country. Women in Indonesia, the country I hail from, face the aforementioned levels of discrimination and then some. Recent of violence against in daycare centers, the continuing rise of violence against women and the line accident that disproportionately affected female workers should serve as a wake-up call. These incidents are only the tip of the iceberg of the realities that many women in Indonesia continue to face. Behind them are millions of women struggling every day within a system that has fully worked in their favor, forced to carry the burden of paid work, domestic responsibilities and safety risks all at once, often without adequate protection from the state.

Being a woman in Indonesia still means layered barriers simply to obtain decent work. The issue is no longer solely about or , but about discrimination that has become normalized in the labor market. Many job vacancies in Indonesia continue to impose requirements entirely unrelated to professional capability: maximum age limits, marital status, childlessness, attractive appearance and even minimum height requirements. Such conditions are imposed far more frequently on women than on men. As a result, women are forced to work harder simply to gain equal access to employment opportunities.

The consequences are clearly reflected in Indonesia¡¯²õ labor structure. In , more than of female workers were employed in the informal sector. Three decades later, little has changed. In 2025, more than of women will remain in informal employment, compared to of men. Meanwhile, only 36.66% of women work in the formal sector, compared to 45.87% percent of men. These figures demonstrate that for nearly 30% years, the state has failed to implement serious interventions to address gender inequality in the labor market.

Beyond the household: the urgent case for national daycare regulations

The problem does not stop here. Women workers in Indonesia also face burdens. They are expected to remain economically while simultaneously carrying the primary responsibility for childcare and domestic work.

Many women are ultimately to leave their children with relatives, hire caregivers or enroll them in daycare centers. Ironically, these caregiving costs must be from women¡¯²õ incomes, which, on average, remain lower than men¡¯²õ, despite women often working similar or even longer hours.

Furthermore, under growing economic pressure and limited state support, many women eventually give up searching for decent employment. In Indonesia, it is estimated that morethan women have left or become discouraged from participating in the labor market, including women, mothers and unmarried women alike. This is not merely an individual issue, but a significant loss for the national economy.

Unfortunately, policies concerning women workers are still rarely treated as a serious economic priority. Women¡¯²õ issues are often considered insufficiently popular politically and therefore receive limited attention from policymakers. Yet women workers also pay taxes, sustain household economies and contribute substantially to national economic growth.

Consequently, the Indonesian government must begin treating the protection of women workers as a long-term economic investment. One of the most urgent steps is establishing national daycare regulations with clear standards for safety, security, supervision and accreditation. Daycare can no longer be treated solely as a private matter; it must be recognized as part of Indonesia¡¯²õ essential economic infrastructure.?

Moreover, the state should provide daycare support for families with young children. In the context of Indonesia¡¯²õ extreme economic inequality, where the combined wealth of the individuals equals that of million Indonesians, a wealth tax could be a viable source of revenue. The potential revenue from a wealth tax on Indonesia¡¯²õ super-rich is estimated to reach around trillion Indonesian rupiah annually. This figure is substantial enough to finance strategic social protection programs, including national daycare assistance.

Additionally, revenue generated from taxing the wealth of the 50 richest individuals would enable the government to provide at least 9 million Indonesian rupiah annually in daycare support for millions of families with toddlers. Policies like these would not only help women remain in the workforce but also create a sense of security and trust that the state genuinely supports working families.

?A softer, fairer path: shifting from survival to true empowerment

If Indonesia is serious about inclusive economic growth, women workers can no longer remain marginalized. Women are not only supplementary earners within households. They are one of the driving forces of Indonesia¡¯²õ economy. Yet today, millions of women continue to work within a system that has never fully stood on their side.

On a concluding note, we need to stop women, especially mothers, who are forced to carry multiple burdens at once. Society often normalizes women juggling paid work, household responsibilities, caregiving and social expectations, while simultaneously facing stigma and inequality, as if enduring exhaustion is something admirable.?

Instead of glorifying survival under unequal systems, we should create a new path where women are given genuine space to actualize themselves, pursue their dreams, and build independent and dignified lives. Ultimately, we need to make the world a little softer, fairer and more humane for women in a society that still remains deeply unequal.

[Ainesh Dey edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

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While Lee didn¡¯t directly cause her death, the court concluded that his domineering conduct formed a link in a causal chain leading to her self-destruction. Kimberly was aged 28 when she jumped from an overpass and was hit by several vehicles in Dundee, Scotland, in 2023. Think of the implications, specifically that suicide, in at least some circumstances, can be a culmination of a potentially observable process rather than a private psychological trauma. This reimagines suicide, with key actors contributing to what culminates in self-inflicted fatality.

Coercion and suicide

The suggestion fits awkwardly in conventional understanding. It attributes coercion, mental as well as physical, with causal efficacy and places coercive relationships in the narrative of suicide itself, rather than treating them only as part of the background. It suggests that ¡°choice¡± exists but in conditions so restrictive that the scope of meaningful alternatives has narrowed to a chokepoint. (I use coercion in its broader contemporary sense. It does not require physical force. Threats, intimidation, isolation and humiliating language can all restrict behavior by progressively narrowing a person¡¯²õ freedom to act independently.)

Courts, coroners and juries increasingly inquire into suicides preceded by sustained domestic coercion. In some cases, like Milne, the chain of causation is accepted as sufficiently strong to establish criminal liability. In others, similar patterns of abuse are acknowledged but don¡¯t translate into a finding that the partner¡¯²õ behavior caused the death. And in still others, allegations of coercion see rejection entirely. Within weeks of the Milne decision, Christopher Trybus, a man who¡¯d been accused of abusing his wife prior to her suicide, saw of controlling and coercive behavior and two counts of rape.

The Milne case insinuates manipulation into the suicide complex and, in doing so, destabilizes commonsense assumptions about the solitariness of suicide. The act still involves only one person ¡ª its stipulates that one person takes their own life. (Even a suicide pact involves two people who agree to die together by taking their own lives.) If we accept a revision to our conception of suicide, the case pushes us to ask more questions than it answers. Suicide may ¡ª almost certainly does ¡ª involve others. Yet the final act is still carried out by one person alone: No one else jumps, takes the pills or draws the blade. Under what conditions, then, can another person¡¯²õ behavior become part of the causal architecture of self-inflicted death?

The verdict of the Milne case makes it exceptional. But there are other recent cases in which partners have taken their own lives following relationships affected by sustained coercion, violence and psychological control. In 2022, published the results of a study of 7,000 adults. It documented the association between what researchers called ¡°intimate partner violence¡± and suicidality, deep unhappiness likely to lead to a suicide attempt.

In some instances, courts or coroners have accepted that domestic abuse was a significant contributing factor to suicide, even if no single act was identified as directly causing death. In others, defendants accused of coercive control, assault or sexual violence have been acquitted, despite detailed allegations describing patterns of domination and intimidation. And in still other cases, abuse has been acknowledged in generic terms but detached from the legal question of responsibility for the fatal outcome.

Having reviewed the available data, criminologist Mags Lesiak : ¡°Fatal outcomes linked to domestic abuse may be being categorized as individual acts rather than perpetrator-produced harm.¡± In other words, some suicides that occur in the context of domestic abuse are being classified as purely individual acts, when they might more accurately be understood as the result of harm inflicted by an abuser.

Recognizing that suicide may have social dimensions does nothing to diminish its gravity. It draws attention to the role others may play in shaping the conditions under which the act becomes conceivable and feasible.

Insecurity is part of the social dimension, not just the human condition. In many cases of suicide, there is evidence of anxiety, depression or longer-term psychological vulnerabilities. Understandably, these conditions are assumed to be independent factors. But it¡¯²õ a superficial inference, and one that avoids the more elliptical problem of whether mental illness is a corollary or direct consequence of an abusive relationship rather than an independent cause.

Suicide, media and regulation

In 2019, a 63-year-old man was found dead a week after being accused of lying on an English daytime talk show. At the inquest, the coroner recorded a verdict of suicide, noting the combined effect of an overdose and a pre-existing heart condition. Footage of the presenter¡¯²õ combative interview was shown and the man¡¯²õ distress was evident. Yet after considering the broadcast, the coroner concluded there was no ¡°clear and reliable ¡± between the program and the death, formally exonerating presenter Jeremy Kyle and The Jeremy Kyle Show. By that time, the channel ITV had already cancelled a program that had run for 14 years and had once been described by a judge as ¡° ¡­ under the guise of entertainment.¡±

The same broadcaster faced further scrutiny after two former contestants from the television series, Love Island, died by suicide in 2018 and 2019. In neither case was the program found to have directly caused the deaths, though both individuals had experienced the intense and often disorienting effects of sudden public exposure. ITV subsequently introduced measures to support participants adjusting to life beyond the show. In each case, media exposure was implicated, but not established as decisive.

Last year, parents of a Californian teenager who took his own life sued OpenAI, claiming its ChatGPT validated his ¡°most harmful and thoughts,¡± and so encouraged his suicide. The ¡°I¡± in AI stands for intelligence, not influence, of course: Whether the provision of knowledge, information or some form of data is tantamount to encouragement depends on context and perspective. But it shouldn¡¯t surprise us to learn that non-human third parties have been identified as contributors to suicide. A report in Britain¡¯²õ last year opened with the stunning claim: ¡°More than a million users each week send messages that include ¡®explicit indicators of potential suicidal planning or intent.¡¯¡±

AI chatbots tend to affirm users¡¯ decisions and opinions. The term , conventionally meaning fawning behavior to gain an advantage, is used to define this characteristic. In an AI context, ¡°sycophancy¡± means a model¡¯²õ tendency to agree with, validate or flatter the user¡¯²õ views, even if those views are incorrect, poorly reasoned or potentially harmful. The model is implicitly optimized to be liked, accepted or rated as helpful. Validation can drift toward if not actually be endorsement, so that, for example, if a user frames suicide as a solution to a problem, the chatbot¡¯²õ response is likely to stay inside the frame rather than challenge it.

This is at once subtler and more penetrating than influence: It doesn¡¯t help form an opinion or conclusion but provides agreeable language that¡¯²õ capable of being read as affirmation. Empathy can be experienced as permission. It isn¡¯t coercion. It isn¡¯t even human. But it is social. That¡¯²õ no longer a contradiction.

It¡¯²õ misleading to treat social media analogously to AI. But it¡¯²õ understandable. Social media has been quietly installed as a prime mover in suicide, an explanation repeated so often that it now passes for fact. It offers a convenient narrative ¡ª visible, contemporary and easy to grasp ¡ª but one that risks displacing more difficult questions about coercion, vulnerability and the conditions under which despair takes hold.

My own with large samples of screen users indicates counterintuitively that those cast as malign online actors are frequently treated as objects of ridicule rather than sources of serious harm. ¡°Trolls,¡± as online users who deliberately try to upset, offend or hurt others just to elicit a response are known, are popularly depicted as fearful characters. More often, however, they¡¯re regarded as figures of fun, mocked for their pathetic and usually ineffectual attempts to provoke a reaction.

Online safety rules have had some success in limiting the visibility of suicide and self-harm content on social media In Australia, policymakers have gone further, people below the age of 16 from using social media altogether ¡ª as if restricting access could insulate them from harm. Yet the assumed causal link between exposure to online content and self-destructive behavior remains far from settled. It has been inferred, asserted and widely accepted, in part because it carries a certain commonsense appeal and offers a convenient locus of blame. But that very simplicity may be the problem: It risks mistaking a visible and contemporary factor for a cause, while more complex and less tractable influences remain in the background.

A cultural universal

Suicide is one of the most inscrutable human practices. While taking one¡¯²õ own life is usually regarded as pathological, it is present in every known human society in history and is, as such, a cultural universal, occurring across time and space. Suicide resists stable causal classification. It¡¯²õ neither purely individual nor straightforwardly attributable to a single external agent, human or otherwise; like everything else, it depends on social context.

French sociologist ?mile Durkheim this in the 19th century when he marshalled historical and statistical evidence to link suicides with changing societies. He shifted attention away from the individual and toward the patterns of social life that make certain kinds of self-destruction more or less likely. Suicide, he maintained, exists in every society, but its incidence varies with the norms, constraints and forms of association that shape how people live with and apart from one another. What appears to be a singular, private act is, on analysis, the outcome of multiple and often invisible social forces.

That insight feels closer to acceptance today. Yet the difficulty hasn¡¯t disappeared; it has merely changed form. We¡¯re still inclined to search for single causes: an abusive partner, a hostile online environment, a chatbot. The reality is more diffuse and less amenable to neat?attribution or changeless theories. Suicide may occur in solitude, but it¡¯²õ rarely produced there.

[Ellis Cashmore is the author of .]

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He hates parties. He hates small talk. He hates long dinners. He hates teaching. He , whom he has described as mostly stupid and boring. He hates his own face, which he once asked a photographer not to capture because it looked, he said, like something that belonged in a film called He has told a student who came to him with a personal problem to, in his words, . He said this and laughed. The student laughed too. The audience watching the interview laughed.

This is the strange gift of ?i?ek. He has made despair into a genre.

At 76, the Slovenian philosopher conducted a recent by video conference, at his own insistence, because he dislikes traveling and hates crowds. ¡°I hate people,¡± he told his interviewer, half-laughing, half-grimacing. This was not a slip or a provocation. It was a statement of settled conviction. 

What is remarkable is not that a man of ?i?ek¡¯²õ temperament exists. Difficult men of difficult temperament are common enough in intellectual history. What is remarkable is what has been built upon: a philosophical system, a political program, a publishing empire and a global following, all resting on a single unexamined emotional fact. The world as experienced by Slavoj ?i?ek feels fundamentally, irremediably wrong.

The question nobody has seriously asked is whether that feeling is a philosophical position or a symptom.

A pessimistic worldview 

has a characteristic cognitive style: a sense that surface pleasures conceal hidden rot, a compulsion to locate the negative within the apparently positive, a catastrophism that feels, from the inside, like clear-eyed realism. Articulate depressives are often experienced by others as unusually perceptive. They mistake their pathology for acuity. So do their admirers.

Run through that checklist against ?i?ek¡¯²õ oeuvre. You get a near-perfect match.

He has admitted, on record, that seeing stupid people happy makes him depressed. He offered this not as confession but as cultural commentary, as though happiness in the wrong hands were itself a form of social dysfunction. Behind the joke is a man for whom other people¡¯²õ contentment registers as an affront. That is a description of : the inability to experience or sanction pleasure as legitimate.

His philosophy follows the same circuitry. The central move in almost everything ?i?ek writes is the puncturing of the apparent good. In , his psychoanalytic tour through popular cinema, he asks what hidden Catholic teachings lurk in Robert Wise¡¯²õ The Sound of Music (1965), what fascist dimensions underlie Steven Spielberg¡¯²õ Jaws (1975) and what ideology James Cameron¡¯²õ Titanic (1997) perpetuates. Every beloved cultural object, examined through his lens, reveals something rotten at its core. Every chocolate box contains a turd. He does not merely analyze ideology in film. He cannot stop doing it. That compulsion, the need to peel back every surface and confirm that darkness lies beneath, is the signature of a particular kind of mind. Not a dialectical one. A depressive one.

Cinema, he once declared, is the ultimate perverted art: It doesn¡¯t give you what you desire, it tells you how to desire. This is a sophisticated observation, and also the observation of someone for whom desire is always, at some level, a trap. 

A vicious spiral of dissatisfaction

, a French psychoanalyst and psychiatrist, shared similar views through the controversial ideas he propagated. But in his later work, Lacan described the : the idea that a person can build a workable, even pleasurable relationship with their own compulsions and private sources of satisfaction, what psychoanalysis calls jouissance. ?i?ek has no interest in this Lacan. He gravitates entirely toward the Lacan of the death drive, of desire as something that can never be satisfied. It is the depressive reading of Lacan. And ?i?ek has spent his career building a philosophical architecture to confirm what he already knew in his bones.

His political philosophy operates by the same mechanism, only the stakes are higher.

?i?ek calls himself a . He has done so for decades, through the fall of the Soviet Union and the failures of actually existing socialism everywhere. When pressed on what, exactly, this communism would look like, the , which he has given in various forms, is that he does not know. He is more interested in the failure of every existing alternative than in constructing one of his own. When pushed for positive content, he retreats to ¡¯²õ famous quote from his prose work, Worstward Ho (1983): ¡°Try again. Fail again. Fail better.¡±

This has been received, in certain quarters, as radical honesty. It is worth considering whether it is something else. The inability to picture a liveable future in concrete terms is a clinically recognizable feature of depression. The depressive knows, with certainty, what is wrong. The good, in any specific form, eludes him. ?i?ek¡¯²õ communism is not a program. It is a permanent diagnosis without a prescription. And it has found a massive audience among people who feel the same way, people who have concluded that everything is broken and are not entirely sure they want it fixed.

Contempt as a philosophical method

?i?ek¡¯²õ contempt is promiscuous. He has liberal democracy, capitalism, humanitarian intervention, identity politics, the progressive left, the academic left, the populist right, Greenpeace, mindfulness culture and American linguist and activist Noam Chomsky, his one-time ally, with whom he spent most of 2013 in a very public feud. He hates ecology¡¯²õ tendency toward what he calls pseudosuperego personalization: guilt-tripping individuals over recycling instead of pushing for systemic change. The word hate appears in his interviews in the way other people use, think or feel. It is his primary register.

This, too, is a clinical feature. The depressed are not indifferent to the world. He is exquisitely sensitive to it, and that sensitivity tends to organize itself around irritability and contempt rather than sorrow. The sadness is there, beneath the surface, but it expresses itself as disdain. ?i?ek has turned this into a philosophical posture. It reads as rigorous. It is, on closer inspection, pain dressed up in Hegel.

Intimacy, fantasy and failure

His personal life, to the extent he has disclosed it, follows the pattern. He has been married three times. He has described himself as constitutionally unsuited to real intimacy, someone who prefers the fantasy of the other to the actual person. In , he writes about the fundamental disappointment that structures love: that the beloved is never, in reality, what desire is projected onto them. This is a philosophical observation with a long history. It is also what a man tells himself when closeness keeps going wrong.

He has a standard line for students who bring him their personal problems. He asks them to look at him, observe his tics and mannerisms, and ask themselves why they would seek advice from a madman. He deploys this with considerable charm. But beneath the performance is something worth taking seriously. He is telling his students, his readers and anyone who will listen that he is not well. Nobody quite believes him, because he says it with such evident enjoyment.

The universalization of personal despair

That is the paradox at the center of the ?i?ek phenomenon. He has turned his dysfunction into entertainment, into theory, into a brand. The compulsive verbal overflow, the physical tics, the shirt-tugging, the way one sentence multiplies into five, these are not stylistic affectations. 

They are the behavior of someone managing considerable internal disorder through the only mechanism that has ever reliably worked: thinking out loud, in public, without stopping. He fears being unable to work, he has said, more than death itself. That is not a philosopher¡¯²õ observation. That is a depressive¡¯²õ confession. The work is not an expression. The work is containment.

None of this would matter if it stayed personal. But ?i?ek has done something significant. He has universalized his pathology. He has taken the structure of his inner life and built a philosophical system that presents it as the correct way to see. The depressive¡¯²õ certainty that happiness is false, that beneath every good thing lies a horror, that the future cannot be pictured, that other people are mostly exhausting, that the only honest response to the world is permanent vigilance against it. All of this repackaged as insight.

And his readers have agreed. In their hundreds of thousands.

The culture that rewards bleakness

There is something to be learned here, not about ?i?ek but about the milieu that produced and sustains him. Left intellectual culture, at least since the 1980s, has developed a pronounced bias toward the bleak. Optimism is na?ve. Hope requires justification. Anyone who believes things might improve has not, we are implicitly told, read enough . ?i?ek did not create this culture, but he is its most entertaining product and its most effective salesman. He has given people permission to mistake their despair for sophistication.

The cruelest irony is this. ?i?ek has devoted his career to the critique of ideology, to showing how apparently neutral positions mask unconscious investments, how what we take to be objective analysis is always shaped by forces we have not examined. He is brilliant at this. He applies it to cinema, to politics, to popular culture, to love, to Coca-Cola.

He has never applied it to himself.

A man who finds happiness in others depressing, who cannot picture what the good would look like, who has structured an entire worldview around the inexhaustibility of what is wrong: His ideology is not communism. It is his nervous system. The revolution he is calling for is not political. It is the one he cannot quite bring himself to have.

[ edited this piece.]

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In the current Trump administration, the world is witnessing administrators¡¯ use of political weight to threaten the freedom of the press and expression. Federal Communications Commission Chair Brendan Carr recently to revoke the licenses of various broadcasters for perceived bias against the president, who also called for regulating his political enemies in the media.

This kind of government pressure to silence dissenting voices can only amplify feelings of desperation and lead to expression by more violent means. As Civil Rights leader once observed, ¡°a riot is the language of the unheard.¡±

For some, comedy represents a place where restless voices can be heard. Comedian , in a recent NPR interview with Michelle Martin, stated it is very important that ¡°every opinion has a champion.¡± He also made this point during his acceptance speech at the ceremony in 2020, calling comedy clubs one of the last forums for free speech.

Insistence on creating an environment where people can present different ideas for discussion is important. It is urgent to avoid the kind of violent scenario many rightly fear. It is also critical for maintaining any hope of achieving a genuine democratic practice. People with beliefs of all kinds must be given space to express and advocate for them.

Challenges to the university as a hub for creative thought

The university has traditionally been thought of as a laboratory for ideas. As a professor who has taught in both public and private universities for more than 15 years, I know firsthand that it hasn¡¯t always lived up to this promise. For example, in 2023, the State University System of Florida student groups connected to the national Students for Justice in Palestine organization, alleging that they supported terrorism.

Further, rising and increased political attacks put access to college education and the institution¡¯²õ viability as an institution in jeopardy. The US currently has about 4,000 colleges. According to a??from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, about 60 are closing on average each year; that number could double in any given year if the bottom falls out of enrollment.?

In short, political, economic and social pressures threaten the university¡¯²õ role as an incubator for creative thinking. Comedy may be one of the last remaining sites for free engagement.

The limits of championing ¡°every opinion¡±

Free engagement, however, is not without its challenges. Where do the limits of championing ¡°every opinion¡± lie? Not all opinions are meant to identify a common problem or offer helpful solutions, or even genuinely express an alternative vision of the world. In fact, not all expressed opinions are really opinions; some are attacks disguised as opinions. Must there really always be space for this?

For instance, in the interview, Martin expressed that some people felt Chappelle was ¡°punching down¡± with his recent jokes about transgender people. An exasperated Chappelle responded by saying he felt his jokes were being misrepresented, that media reports about his shows were a distortion of what was actually happening, and that Republicans like Lauren Boebert weaponized or politicized what he was doing. The last point is especially illuminating. 

Chappelle made a distinction between what he was doing (comedy) and what people like Boebert were doing (weaponization). The presumption is that comedy is not inviting you to form opinions or take action, but to laugh. 

However, that distinction is not so easy to maintain. In 1967, French essayist and philosopher took a scythe to the neck of ¡°the author¡± as the source of a text¡¯²õ meaning, proclaiming instead the birth of ¡°the reader.¡± According to Barthes, in his 1977 book, Image Music Text, a text, which he describes as ¡°a tissue of citations,¡± contains multiple meanings, and it is the reader who determines which meanings take precedence.

Comedians seem to assume that their intentions as the joke¡¯²õ author determine what they mean and how the audience should perceive them. However, once something leaves the writer¡¯²õ hands, they don¡¯t have complete control over what an audience will do with it. Witness, for example, the controversy sparked by .?

Anyone paying attention will recognize that this country is in a cultural moment that harbors significant anti-LGBTQ animus. , for instance, maintains an anti-LGBTQ reporting tracker that has recorded at least 3382 incidents since 2022.?

Even if Gervais¡¯ intentions were innocent, the idea ultimately championed is, to some extent, out of his hands; the audience has a say in the jokes¡¯ meaning.

Yes, the comedy club is a space for processing facts and ideas, and it may be one of the last venues for their free expression. But the club isn¡¯t an educational forum, like the university. You don¡¯t go to the club for course credit; you go to be entertained. What you get from a comedian isn¡¯t a lecture, but a performance.

The dual nature of comedy: engagement and interpretation

To be sure, comedy does have the power to help us contextualize our feelings about facts and ideas, or, as Chappelle said, function as the ¡°nation¡¯²õ kidney.¡± 

Comedy is valuable because it provides an opportunity for people to confront unvarnished feelings and attitudes, despite the discomfort we can also experience from encounters with such rawness. This kind of ¡°¡± can be useful for gaining a greater understanding of the world.?

But standup is first and foremost a performance, which can be at odds with critically engaging ideas. Not necessarily so, since educators must also use performative elements to reach students. However, the emphasis is on learning, not laughter. The comedian, then, must take care to offer as much direction as possible to avoid being misunderstood. 

Because the audience has a hand in determining what jokes mean, the comedian shares some responsibility for which meanings get activated. Not every audience member is a responsible interpreter of the performance.

Educators, comedians and the negotiation of meaning

Educators try to guide students on what the curriculum, literature, lectures and resources can mean, sometimes with varying success; comedians play a similar role. Consequently, they must be as clear and intentional as possible.

They may not have asked for it, but comedians bear some responsibility for how we sort through the avalanche of ideas and happenings of our world. Like education, comic exploration can teach us to look at old things in new ways. Making space for the expression of ideas is good. Making space for good ideas is better.

Championing every opinion isn¡¯t just about preserving free speech; it¡¯²õ about preserving the possibility of a society that listens before it silences, that debates before it demonizes and that laughs even when the truth is uncomfortable. Comedy, with its unfiltered mirror to society, and the university, with its flawed but vital role as a laboratory for ideas, both remind us that the work of democracy is never finished: It¡¯²õ a constant negotiation between what we say, how we hear and what we choose to do next.

Without spaces for honest, if messy, engagement, the alternatives are either the quiet tyranny of enforced silence or the violent catharsis of the unheard. The task, then, is to nurture those spaces, even when the opinions voiced within them challenge us, because the right to speak is only as strong as our willingness to listen. And in that fragile balance lies the health of a free society.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

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As soon as our housemistress had made the announcement to us that morning, illicit bracelets were promptly pushed under the sleeves of our tucked-in school shirts. The newly-appointed headmaster (or ¡°the Master¡± as he was referred to, bizarrely enough), clearly thought the enforcement of the lengthy dress code too lax for his standards. So, he took it upon himself to straighten us up into the prim and proper student body of a school that took its discipline very seriously indeed. 

I had been attracted by the school¡¯²õ ambitious academic environment. I had enrolled expecting a good education, but I hadn¡¯t fully considered the culture shock I was about to experience after years of enjoying an exceptionally high degree of agency as a homeschooler. 

While ironed blazers and floor-grazing uniform skirts made for excellent marketing material for strict parents, behind this veneer of decorum I observed the rebellious reality of teenagers in an atmosphere of repressive regimentation. They had become experts in the art of subversion rather than the disciplined students the school had expected.

Regimentation can lead to repression, which in turn leads to rebellion

Heavy-handed attempts to control have a tendency to backfire, as if the strictness compels people to act out. In some of my friends, particularly those with stereotypical Tiger parents who demanded obedience to their infallible parental wisdom, I noticed the same pattern: the stricter the parent, the sneakier the child. The parents do not know how their child dresses or how she spends her weekends. She pretends to be out studying, ready with photographs taken beforehand in case the parents need proof. She jumps out the window to meet the boyfriend she is not allowed to have.

Growing up with distinctly non-traditional parents myself, I was used to a dynamic of open communication, so I was often puzzled by their need for secrecy. After I experienced strict regimentation for the first time at boarding school, I began to understand why children of disciplinarians often end up leading a double life. Once autonomy has been denied to you, it¡¯²õ all you strive for.

It is not necessarily the rules that provoke rebellion, but the absence of any rationale for them. Either the adults provide no justification (after all, students answer to the school and not the other way around!) or no justification really exists, since much of the discipline enforced is a euphemism for conformity. For instance, it seems unlikely that student behaviour or performance would be impacted by wearing black socks (as many dared to) instead of the sanctioned navy. Such rules felt jarring to me after I had become used to spending hours studying in pajamas and bedroom slippers. When the rules seem more like an arbitrary list, it makes it hard to understand them. 

With teachers jumping out of alleyways to exclaim their outrage at your untucked shirt, it becomes difficult to trust that the rule-makers have your best interests and not mere optics in mind. The school administration begins to feel like an annoying adversary. And any rule-breaking that follows only furthers the administration¡¯²õ hostile attitude towards the students they deem to be irredeemably unruly. That, in turn, leads to more spite among the students, creating a vicious cycle of both sides increasingly alienating the other.

This mutual lack of trust can lead to dangerous consequences. I have seen people whose experimentation with rule-breaking has gone very wrong. A classmate told us about the intensely negative reaction to weed she had when she tried it; she teared up as she recounted the experience. She hadn¡¯t felt comfortable sharing this with either her strict parents or the equally strict housemistress at school, fearing that it would lead to more restrictions. Authority figures that seem solely controlling rather than supportive can end up isolating the ones they¡¯re supposed to be watching out for. Consequently, students may not get the opportunity to properly process harmful experiences and lack the advice needed to make better decisions. 

You cannot balance on your own if you have always ridden with training wheels

The school recently reduced some freedoms exclusive to Sixth Formers (students in their final two years of school), known as Sixth-Form ¡°privileges,¡± tightening rules to be more similar to those for younger years. The idea was that 17- and 18-year-olds, who would soon be starting university, still require rigid scaffolding to properly manage their time.

I would argue that freedom is not just a ¡°privilege.¡± It is also responsibility ¡ª a responsibility for yourself, which is a defining part of life as an adult. Does a school that dictates and keeps track of what students wear, when they wake up, when they eat, when they study, how they study, when they exercise adequately prepare them for life at university? While a regimented schedule would certainly help younger students instill a healthy routine, spoonfeeding structure to pre-university students does not seem conducive to developing the independence they will very soon require.

External discipline also does not automatically translate into long-term internal discipline. From my vantage point as a former homeschooler, I realized it may even be demotivating. Used to managing my own academic progress, I pride myself on my drive to achieve my goals. I imagined I would easily adapt to the school¡¯²õ scheduled study sessions. However, with timely knocks on my door every day to check up on me, my self-motivated decisions to honor the responsibility for my own education turned into a mandated, monitored chore.

Finding a balance

Instances of rebellion like dress-code violations or underage drinking seem inevitable in an environment like this. But if too much control tends to authoritarianism, absolute freedom leads to anarchy. The solution is obviously not a laissez-faire approach to managing a large group of teenagers. 

Instead, I am advocating for creating an incentive structure that is more sensitive to teenagers¡¯ penchant for defiance. I have attended another British boarding school that has a contrasting, more unconventional philosophy on disciplinary action. 

At this school, the rules were liberal: no uniform, freedom to spend time outside of school hours anywhere in the city (as long as they disclosed their location periodically), and 10:30 PM curfews to be in your room, but sleep whenever you see fit. This was as close to a university experience as you could get, and that was the point. Students were given a high degree of freedom. Restrictions were implemented only in cases where that freedom was abused. If you had unauthorized absences from or late arrivals to class, you risked losing the ability to go out on the weekends. The school was observant, not ambivalent, to how students used the freedom given to them. This created an obvious incentive to better manage the flexibility we had. People responsible with the liberties could continue to enjoy them.

Compare this with the Master¡¯²õ school philosophy: maintaining order with an iron hand, and deeming the slightest relaxation of restrictions a great ¡°privilege.¡± When the sanctions for rule-breaking do not feel significantly worse compared to the regimentation already in place, what is the reward for being good?

Gedogen: pragmatic, not preachy

The difference in attitude between the two schools was never as apparent as in the way they conducted assemblies. 

In the large hall, a teacher declared, ¡°Please stand,¡± as the Master walked in ¡ª dressed in robes. I remember my disbelief the first time I watched this caricature of a British boarding school experience unfold before me. The assemblies created a spectacle out of the school¡¯²õ discipline and authority hierarchies. Antiquated practices were continued without any of the lightheartedness that would have turned them into endearing traditions. Once, all students were lectured about how, as young people, we suffered from a kind of ¡°temporal illiteracy¡± and had ¡°no grasp of our own mortality.¡± One can argue about how accurate the sentiment is, but I wonder if sermonizing is the most effective way of communicating with said temporally illiterate people. 

In the other school, what assemblies lacked in ceremony, they made up for in substance. One of the deputy principals, with whom students were on a first-name basis, spoke to us about cigarette packets found littered near the school campus. After reminding students again of the risks of smoking and school rules, she acknowledged that some students would still smoke anyway. She emphasized that while these students were choosing to make a harmful personal choice by smoking, because of the littering their poor decision was also an unacceptable nuisance to others. We were spoken to as capable young people in charge of our choices and their consequences, which encouraged students to react with more maturity.

Rather than a school that dealt with older students through proscriptions and prescriptions, the second school used responsible pragmatism. By trusting them to have a high degree of freedom and stepping in when that was genuinely mishandled, rule-breaking seemed less glamorous and more like a poor decision. The school¡¯²õ philosophy reminded me of ¡°Gedogen,¡± the Dutch policy of tolerating the violation of certain laws where strict enforcement may be more disruptive. While telling us about this, my tour guide in Amsterdam had also shared the anecdote of his parents smoking weed with him before he left for university to remove any tempting sheen of forbiddenness the activity might have had. While this is a shockingly lax approach, it captures what I observed across these two boarding schools: although regimentation does provide the appearance of discipline, a liberal approach can be more effective in achieving its reality. Interestingly, that was the tour guide¡¯²õ first and only time smoking weed.

[Cheyenne Torres edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Regimentation in Education: Stricter the School, Sneakier the Child appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The first time it happened, my mustache and beard were trimmed short, and my curly hair was more prominent. A man shouted at me, ¡°Go back to Mexico, you loser!¡± By sheer coincidence, I had recently changed my barber because I moved houses. My previous barber was a talented Kurdish woman whose styling of my hair and beard actually made me feel like I looked Mexican myself.

Now that I live further away, I¡¯ve had to find a new barber, a man of Vietnamese origin. Despite giving him the exact same instructions, the result is somehow different. I feel that my Middle Eastern background now resonates differently; I no longer look Mexican to the observer, but Indian. Thus, I almost don¡¯t blame the two racists who, in separate incidents, screamed at me: ¡°Go back to India!¡±

These moments of hostility are more than personal insults; they represent a fracturing of the Canadian sanctuary I once knew, signaling a shift from a culture of mutual support to tribalism that now threatens, at various levels, the very multicultural fabric of our nation. In this delicate moment for both Canada and the world, it is time to confront the rise of these harmful ideologies and make a better country for all who live here.

The erosion of civil discourse in a multicultural Canada

Thanks to the rise of racism and other harmful ideologies, engaging in healthy, logical arguments has become increasingly difficult with a certain angry segment of the Canadian population. I can conceptually understand why those whose roots trace back to the early settlers of Canada might fall into the trap of racism (not that it is acceptable, but the objective grounds for their bias are historically visible). However, what I find truly painful and difficult to process is the growth of racism among different immigrant communities.

When we ¡ª Kurds, Persians, Arabs, Vietnamese, Ukrainians ¡ª adopt the same tired tropes of the ¡°classic¡± racist, something is deeply wrong. When an immigrant tells an Indian person, ¡°You¡¯re taking all our jobs, go back to India,¡± or mocks a Chinese driver for being overly cautious at a left turn, we are failing. This situation demands that we look beyond immigration laws and address the social sickness spreading within our communities, where everyone identifies as ¡°Canadian¡± only to label the next person as the ¡°alien.¡±

This reality is agonizing because when I first arrived in Canada, I felt I had reached the safest place in the world for social rights and harmony. Now, I feel that arguments are no longer arguments; they are one-dimensional screams. No one is looking for a calm, shared logic to solve our communal responsibilities. Instead, we are following egos and deceptive rhetoric that only seek an audience. This is the breeding ground for extremist ideological demagoguery.

Facing the data: A national crisis of hate

After those unsettling encounters, I didn¡¯t want to rely solely on my emotions; I sought answers in the cold, hard data provided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). What I discovered only deepened my heartache. Reading through their on hate crimes and incidents in Canada, I realized that my experiences weren¡¯t isolated moments of ¡°bad luck.¡±

The data confirms a disturbing upward trend in hate-motivated incidents across the country, crimes that target the very essence of a person¡¯²õ identity, race and origin. Seeing my personal pain reflected in official statistics transformed my individual sorrow into a broader concern for our collective future. It is one thing to feel the sting of a slur on the street; it is another to see that sting validated as a growing national crisis, proving that the sanctuary I once believed in is facing a profound moral challenge.

A lost ideal: the Canada we must reclaim

I often think back to my first years in Vancouver when my English was quite poor. One day, while waiting at the Granville SkyTrain station downtown, an older white woman with a backpack, likely a tourist, approached me. With a warm, friendly smile, she asked, ¡°Hi, do you know how often the SkyTrain comes?¡±

I felt a surge of joy. It was the first time a white Canadian had asked me for directions; for a brief moment, I felt like I truly ¡°owned¡± the city. I replied with great confidence: ¡°In shower time, every 3 minutes.¡±

I knew I had made a mistake, but before I could even process it, she gently placed her hand on mine and said, ¡°You mean in ¡®rush hour¡¯ time, every 3 minutes.¡± She corrected my English without making me feel embarrassed. In that brief moment, she didn¡¯t just give me a linguistics lesson; she gave me a lesson in ethics, culture and mutual support.

I wonder: Do we still encounter people like her today? If we do, why do they seem so few, while the angry voices of society seem so loud?

This memory serves as a reminder of the Canada we once were and the one we must strive to reclaim. We cannot simply be passive observers of our own decline. If we are to heal, we must actively reject the language of exclusion in our own social circles. The next time you witness a microaggression or hear a hateful trope, regardless of the background of the speaker, do not stay silent. Correct the narrative, defend the targeted individual and remind one another that our strength lies in our plurality, not our prejudices. We must choose to be the person who offers a hand of support rather than the one who points the finger of blame

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

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An 18-day-old baby girl, Mariam, died after from a third-floor window of a family flat. Her mother, Zahira Byjaouane, has been charged with her murder. The court heard that the child¡¯²õ father had been in the kitchen preparing formula. Emergency services arrived within minutes, but the infant died shortly afterward from a severe head injury.

There is nothing outwardly extraordinary about the setting: a central London apartment, a baby, the routines of early parenthood. Yet the allegation that a mother may have caused the death of her own newborn jars sharply with one of the most deeply held assumptions in any society.

Why do mothers kill their children? The question is unsettling. It feels almost forbidden, as if even asking it risks normalizing what should remain inconceivable. The prevailing assumption is that the bond between mother and child is not merely strong, but elemental: a natural attachment that precedes social influence and resists external pressure.

And yet cases such as this prompt a difficult question. If maternal love is as instinctive and unbreakable as commonly assumed, how can it fracture? The most familiar answer is also the most reassuring. Faced with behavior of this kind, explanation usually turns to mental disturbance: breakdown, disorder or some form of psychological impairment sufficient to account for the rupture. In some instances, such explanations are relevant. But they also serve a wider function by allowing the assumption of an enduring maternal instinct to remain largely intact, disturbed only in exceptional cases.

A mother¡¯²õ love

The question becomes more ¡ª not less ¡ª difficult when we consider how often it has had to be asked. Modern cases suggest not a single anomaly but a recurring, if rare, phenomenon. In England, women such as concealed pregnancies and killed their newborns shortly after birth. Others, like teenager , gave birth alone and in secrecy before acting in panic and isolation. In the United States, killed multiple infants over a period of years, each birth hidden, each death initially undiscovered.

And then there are cases that resist comprehension, such as that of , who, in 1994, drowned her two young sons, not in panic, but in what appeared to be a thought-out attempt to remove an obstacle to a desired relationship. In 2020, in England¡¯²õ West Bromwich, the world got a glimpse into what happens when a mother, unconstrained by conscience and unmitigated by compassion, vents her emotions on her two-month-old baby and the girl to death, fracturing her skull, ribs, legs and other body parts.

All these killings differ profoundly in motive and circumstance: Panic, concealment, calculation, prolonged abuse. Yet they share a disquieting feature ¡ª the apparent breakdown, absence or displacement of the attachment that¡¯²õ assumed to bind parent to child.

Infanticide is not new. It appears in legend as well as in modern courtrooms. In the Greek myth of , a mother kills her children in an act of revenge against their father. The story has endured not simply because of its extremity, but because it violates what is widely taken to be a basic human instinct.

One response is to treat such cases as rare breakdowns of an otherwise universal maternal bond. Mothers love their children; exceptions prove the rule. But the persistence and variety of these cases suggest a more unnerving possibility. Perhaps maternal attachment is not as fixed or automatic as we assume, but more contingent and variable. It may develop through proximity, recognition, repetition and reinforcement, as reflected in the routine practice of placing newborns immediately in their mother¡¯²õ arms to encourage early bonding. Under certain conditions, it may fail to take hold at all.

This doesn¡¯t deny that the bond between parent and child is usually deep and enduring. It suggests that its strength may derive less from biology than from the social conditions under which it is formed. If so, the question changes. It is no longer simply why some mothers kill their children.

The natural and the social

We often speak of actions or emotions as coming ¡°naturally,¡± as if they require no instruction or social context. The phrase implies ease and inevitability. But closer inspection tells a different story.

What appears natural is often the result of a long and largely invisible process of learning. Language is the obvious example. It feels instinctive, almost automatic, yet it¡¯²õ acquired through years of immersion, imitation and repetition. The same is true of manners, moral judgments, emotional responses and, crucially, attachments.

Human beings are not born knowing whom to love or how to love, or even how to respond to love. These capacities develop through socialization: an ongoing engagement with others such as parents, family members, partners, and with the physical environments in which life proceeds. Through this process, individuals absorb patterns of behavior, internalize expectations and develop bonds that come to feel natural and indispensable.

Over time, habits harden into dispositions. Emotional responses become almost reflexive, relationships deepen, strain, break and reform. A sense of self emerges not in isolation, but through constant interaction with others. Because this process is continuous, its outcomes can appear innate.

Maternal attachment is often understood in precisely these terms: as a biological instinct that emerges automatically. In many cases, something like this does seem to occur. Bonds can forge quickly and, once established, are often resilient and so capable of enduring repeated strain, as when parents persist with a substance-dependent child whose cycles of relapse test but rarely sever attachment.

Yet this resilience raises a difficult question. Is there any stronger attachment than that between a mother and her child? The question seems almost rhetorical. That is, until we consider situations in which that bond is displaced by more immediate pressures. Accounts of severe dependency, for example, describe parents whose need for a substance and priority to such an extent that obligations which would ordinarily be characteristic are neglected. These cases are , but they make a relevant point. Attachment is not simply a matter of feeling, but of what, in a given moment, takes precedence.

Social bonds

If attachments are shaped rather than simply biologically triggered, a different possibility surfaces. The maternal bond may depend, at least in part, on conditions that can be weakened, disrupted or never fully established. Proximity, recognition, stability and support are not incidental to attachment; they help constitute it.

In a different context, in 1969, the criminologist Travis Hirschi in his Social Control Theory that strong social bonds restrain harmful behavior. Individuals refrain from certain actions not only because they are irrational or pathological, but because they are tied emotionally and socially to others. When those ties weaken, the restraints they provide can loosen.

Hirschi developed this framework to explain more ordinary forms of deviance, and it can¡¯t be directly mapped onto cases of infanticide. But the underlying insight is suggestive: If attachment is contingent rather than automatic, then its failure ¡ª however rare ¡ª becomes more intelligible.

The infanticide taboo

The question returns, now in altered form: Why do so many mothers kill their children? Not simply because they lack an instinct that others possess, but because the processes through which attachment is formed and sustained have, in certain cases, broken down. Sometimes it was gradual, sometimes it was abrupt and sometimes it happened under pressures that remain largely invisible.

Across societies, the overwhelming majority of parents form enduring attachments to their children. But the strength of these ties lies not only in their apparent naturalness, but in the social processes that sustain them. From early life, individuals are embedded in networks of expectation and obligation. Families, communities and institutions reinforce the idea that children are to be protected and cared for. Over time, these expectations are internalized, becoming part of what individuals experience as their own commitments.

Powerful prohibitions also exist. The killing of a child is not simply illegal; it is one of the most deeply entrenched taboos in any culture. Its force lies not only in punishment, but in the moral revulsion it provokes. It operates as a brake on behavior that most people never countenance.

Yet adherence to norms is not absolute. As the sociologist David Matza observed, individuals can ¡°¡± in and out of alignment with moral frameworks. Under conditions of pressure, isolation or desperation, the constraints that ordinarily guide behavior may weaken. Actions that once seemed unthinkable can become, if only momentarily, possible and even probable.

Seen in this light, the rarity of infanticide does not confirm that maternal attachment is unbreakable. It suggests that the conditions under which it is formed and sustained usually hold. When they do not, through secrecy, strain, dislocation or the absence of meaningful attachment, the result, though mercifully rare, moves from the incomprehensible to the explicable.

[Ellis Cashmore is the author of .]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

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This dystopian world is not so far away. In the 21st century, governments of all kinds ¡ª democratic elected, autocracies and dictatorships ¡ª are realizing that their political ambitions can be reached faster and cheaper with the help of cultural soft power, the ability to shape the preferences of the world by art and entertainment products, resulting not only in an increase of tourism and economic growth but also in political stability and longevity in power. The only tricky thing is that citizens cannot feel that cultural soft power is being controlled by government officials; otherwise, it may not work. Discretion or denial is a key part of the strategy, and it¡¯²õ already happening.

Government influence in media and entertainment

In the US, after the by Skydance Media, led by David Ellison, Paramount has taken several steps to align with the Trump administration, including shifting the editorial direction of CBS News. This year, President Donald Trump influenced the Paramount-Warner Bros. Discovery merger by the Ellisons, who promised to reshape CNN, and by leveraging his son-in-law Jared Kushner¡¯²õ firm and the financial bonds he held in the company, which helped secure regulatory approval. With the new owners aligned with the current administration, not only journalism, but also entertainment may be shaped by their preferences (Make America Great Again [MAGA] ideologies) in the near future.

In Turkey, the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has direct influence on Turkish soap operas ¡ª known as dizis ¡ª using them as tools of cultural soft power by promoting a conservative Islamic ideology through state-run media, regulatory pressure and active encouragement of specific historical narratives, such as promoting the ¡°neo-Ottoman¡± historical dramas, such as in ?(¡°Resurrection: Ertu?rul¡±), which aligns with the Adalet ve Kalk?nma Partisi¡¯²õ (the Justice and Development Party [AKP]) narrative of national pride and Islamic identity.

The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RT?K), Turkey¡¯²õ media watchdog dominated by AKP members, issues fines, broadcast bans or sanctions against shows that violate conservative, moral or political standards. This often leads to self-censorship, where producers avoid depicting taboo topics like alcohol, smoking, sex or specific political issues.

In Hungary, the now-defeated Prime Minister Viktor Orb¨¢n and his Fidesz party have systematically the arts, media and culture sectors since 2010 to advance a nationalist narrative. Through legislative changes, centralized funding and the creation of large pro-government media conglomerates, the administration has diminished plurality in the arts, restricted independent expression and fostered an environment where self-censorship was increasingly common. The Orb¨¢n government has implemented ¡°culture laws¡± that give it greater control over institutions such as theaters and arts education.

Fidesz has created a sprawling right-wing media conglomerate (KESMA), which controls around 80% of Hungary¡¯²õ media market, including newspapers and cultural publications. This allows for the dissemination of a singular nationalist, socially conservative narrative. While the government supports a boom in Hungarian film production, funding is largely channeled through the National Film Institute (), which prioritizes content that aligns with nationalist historical perspectives.

In , the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage shapes cultural soft power by prioritizing projects that align with its conservative, patriotic and ideological agenda, sometimes resulting in the marginalization of critical or progressive artistic voices. State-controlled companies, such as oil giant Orlen, have purchased local media chains, like Polska Press, bringing local media under indirect government control. The Polish History Museum runs grant agendas, such as ¡°Patriotism of Tomorrow¡± (Patriotyzm Jutra), aimed at encouraging historical narratives that bolster national identity.

The evolution of government cultural control

How is this different from what the Soviet Union used to do with its greatest cultural soft power, ballet? Well, there¡¯²õ actually a huge difference. Back during the Cold War, the USSR explicitly used ballet as a propaganda and educational tool, fully controlling companies like the Bolshoi and the Kirov and imposing clear censorship on choreographers and dancers. But today, governments are not explicit in their direct hand on cultural production. Instead, political leaders combine wealthy allies in media conglomerates with legislative control to operate behind the scenes and reshape cultural production, always denying any censorship or state-controlled ideology. 

The ¡°narcotizing dysfunction¡± ¡ª the overwhelming flood of information that leads to apathy or inaction towards problems ¡ª became even greater with social media, where influencers and fake news flood the population, clouding the real agents and their intentions by reshaping cultural soft power. US greatest cultural soft powers ¡ª Hollywood movies, TV shows and pop music ¡ª influenced the consumer habits of the planet mostly under democratic values and freedom of speech, even with some occasional alliances with government interests ¡ª such as Disney¡¯²õ during the Second World War. But what if freedom of speech and democratic values are no longer necessary to create great manifestations of cultural soft power?

¡°Chinawood¡± and state-guided cultural soft power

In China, the local government of Dongyang, Zhejiang province, has supported Hengdian World Studios¡¯ infrastructure development, granted tax exemptions to companies and, as of 2017, planned to build government-funded studios within the complex to enhance competitiveness. While privatized, the studio operates under strict state content controls and, in 2004, was recognized by authorities as an experimental zone for the national film and television industry.

Until 2025, ¡°Chinawood¡± was far from seducing the world¡¯²õ audiences with its high-budget films. But in 2026, the $80 million budget animation Ne Zha 2 became the first animated film in history to exceed at the global box office. Okay, ¡°only¡± $50 million was made outside China. It¡¯²õ not much ¡ª international distribution is not a priority, since domestic consumption is huge. But the greatest conquest may be far from these numbers. There¡¯²õ no explicit ¡°government hands¡± over the animation, but the characters and story are perfectly aligned with Beijing. That may be the case for future Warner Bros. films and TV shows.??

From left to right, governments are proving that liberty, democracy and freedom of speech are not essential ingredients to make films, TV shows, music and art cultural soft power tools. The dystopian world where you applaud art and entertainment, with the secret blessing of your government, is already happening.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Big Brother Is Watching: How Governments Quietly Shape Cultural Soft Power appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Free at last

For me, turning 60 was strangely liberating and clarifying. 

You no longer care what others think of you. High school was so long ago. You no longer need to act cool. Friends are either those who know you well and accept you with all your flaws, or so old that they have forgotten them, or so young that they think you¡¯re retro.

You¡¯re no longer scared of the boss. You may not even have a boss ¡ª either because you¡¯ve retired, you work for yourself, you¡¯ve gotten rid of the boss or you are the boss (at least you think you¡¯re the boss). And you¡¯re no longer bound by the rules of any institution.

You no longer need to please or acquiesce to your spouse. You know each other pretty well by now, warts and all. And in spite of that, you¡¯ve decided to stay together. Or you¡¯ve long parted ways.

There¡¯²õ no need to prove yourself or pretend you¡¯re the smartest person in the room. You know you¡¯re not ¡ª and you realize that that¡¯²õ ok too. But you also realize that you have a right to your opinions and an equal right to voice them as anyone else in the room.

In many cases, the kids have grown up, moved out and moved ahead with their own lives. So, you can¡¯t embarrass them anymore. Your parents have passed on, so you can¡¯t disappoint or shock them more than you¡¯ve already done. Or they have become your friends. You¡¯re no longer ego-driven. Ambitions have either been fulfilled or marked incomplete and shelved for the next incarnation.

You realize you are vulnerable and vincible. It¡¯²õ not due to some grand design or because you deserve it, but only by sheer dumb luck that you¡¯re still alive. It has finally struck you that ¡ª surprise ¡ª you too are mortal. Time is running out, so you can either speak now or forever hold your peace.

Thankfully, you¡¯re not just older; you¡¯ve accumulated a lot of knowledge and life experience along the way. You¡¯ve earned every one of those wrinkles. And that may even have made you a bit wiser. But perhaps more importantly, you have moral clarity and compassion.

In many ways, you¡¯ve transcended yourself. You¡¯re suddenly free, and you discover your voice. You can say exactly what¡¯²õ on your mind. It¡¯²õ not that you have no filter or say random things to hurt people. But rather, you have no selfish agenda, nothing to gain or lose, no one to please or fear. As Johnny Nash¡¯²õ says, ¡°I can see clearly now the rain has gone¡±.

Pliny the Elder is attributed to have said, ¡°in vino, veritas¡±; in essence, alcohol brings out the truth. I say ¡°in aetate, veritas¡±; age brings out the truth. And I¡¯m thrilled to find I¡¯m not alone. 

Many wise voices ¡ª brave and true

I¡¯m discovering a myriad of inspiring elderly voices from various walks of life ¡ª unafraid to speak truth to power, to speak sanity to the insane, to call out unethical and inhumane actions, and to warn of impending dangers.

Some are academics who bring together history, context and knowledge to explain the current bewildering geopolitical situation ¡ª such as John (78), international relations scholar at the University of Chicago; Yakov (81), contemporary Jewish history professor at the University of Montreal; Jeffrey (71), economics professor and director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University; Richard (84), economics professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst; Rosalind (81), political science professor at the City University of New York; Vali (65), middle-east scholar at John Hopkins University); and Omer (71), Israeli-American historian at Brown University.?

Some are AI experts warning us of the impending dangers of this new, unfettered, all-consuming technology ¡ª such as Jeffrey (78), Canadian computer scientist, Nobel laureate and professor at the University of Toronto; and Yoshua (62), Canadian computer scientist and professor at the University of Montreal. Both are considered ¡°godfathers¡± of AI.

Some are retired diplomats who speak out against the demonization of other countries and for the value of diplomacy ¡ª such as K.P. (85), retired Indian diplomat, permanent representative to UN organizations, and on global affairs; Chas (83), retired US ambassador to Saudi Arabia and former Assistant Secretary of Defense; Alistair (76), retired British diplomat/MI6, former EU envoy to the Middle East and founder of the organization Conflict Forums; Mohamed (83), Egyptian lawyer, Nobel laureate and former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and Jack (96), retired US ambassador to the USSR and involved in negotiating an end to the Cold War.

Some are retired CIA and military officials sharing their experientially-derived conclusions of the futility of war ¡ª such as Douglas (79), retired US colonel, combat veteran and former advisor to US Secretary of Defense; Daniel , retired American Lieutenant Colonel, combat veteran and recipient of Ridenhour Prize for Truth-Telling; Ray (86), retired CIA officer and ex-chair of National Intelligence Estimates committee; Lawrence (80), retired US Army colonel and former Chief of Staff to the US Secretary of State; and John (70), former director of the CIA and the National Counterterrorism Center.

Some are activists highlighting the urgency of humanitarian and environmental causes ¡ª such as Medea (73), founder of the American anti-war organization Code Pink and fair-trade advocacy group Global Exchange; Vandana (73), Indian physicist and environmental activist; and Frank (75), South African cleric and anti-apartheid veteran. And notable for their brave stance in support of Palestinians are Stephen (87), Marione (88) and the North London (a group of Jewish women aged 75¨C86) ¡ª to name just a few.

Some are journalists laying bare the truth as it happens and not as it¡¯²õ reported in main-stream press ¡ª such as Chris (69), American Pulitzer prize-winning journalist and Christian minister; Peter (68), British journalist and broadcaster; Gideon (72), award-winning Israeli journalist and author; and Maria (62), Filipino-American journalist and Nobel laureate.

Some are members of the clergy preaching empathy and compassion for all ¡ª such as the late Bishop Desmond , the current Pope (70), as well as Rabbi Brant (63) and Rabbi Lynn (77).

Some are physicians explaining science and fighting for our health ¡ª such as Francis ? (75), geneticist and former head of National Institutes of Health; Anthony (85), immunologist and former director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases; and Tom (65), former director of the Center for Disease Control and the New York City Health Commissioner, and now CEO of the nonprofit health organization Resolve to Save Lives.

Aging entertainers are naturals to lend their practiced voices to causes. Robert (82), Jane (88) and Bruce (76) spoke at last month¡¯²õ No Kings rallies. Several comedians ¡ª like Jon Stewart (63) and Stephen Colbert (61) ¡ª bravely remind us almost nightly with their biting wit of the insanity of the current situation. And actor Robert , who passed away last year at the age of 89, left us an exemplary lifetime of activism.

Despite their infamous predilection to the contrary, there are even some politicians who are brave and selfless enough to fall into this category. In the US, Bernie (84) (senator from the state of Vermont) and Elizabeth (76) (senator from Massachusetts and former law professor) are famous for speaking their minds. In Malta, there is Evarist (73), former minister for European & Foreign Affairs. In Greece, there is Yanis (65), an economist and the founder of a pan-European political party. In Canada, there are Lloyd (86) (retired minister of foreign affairs and currently chair of the World Refugee & Migration Council) and Bob (77) (former premier of Ontario and later Canada¡¯²õ ambassador to the UN).

Then, there are : a committee founded in 2007 by South African President Nelson Mandela, of 12 ¡°independent global leaders working together for peace, justice, human rights and a sustainable planet¡±. Among others, the current 12 include: Gro Harlem Brundtland (86), the former Prime Minister (PM) of Norway and former director-general of the World Health Organization; Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (87), Nobel laureate and former President of Liberia; Denis Mukwege (71), Congolese humanitarian, pastor and gynecologist; Zeid bin Ra¡¯ad (62), professor, former Jordanian diplomat and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; Helen Clark (76), former PM of New Zealand and administrator of the UN Development Programme; and Juan Manuel Santos (74), Nobel laureate, former president of Columbia and current Chair of The Elders.

And these are just some of the better-known personalities who are talking their walk and walking their talk ¡ª albeit a bit more slowly.

Listen, learn, live

The elderly can be a hugely valuable resource. They are some of the smartest people on the planet. Their understanding of history, their lived experience, their selflessness and their genuine concern for the well-being of humanity are difficult to replicate in any other population group. They can provide context, a reality check and a moral compass. They can provide advice and guidance to make our world more peaceful, compassionate and livable. And they can give us a much-needed kick in the pants to act before it¡¯²õ too late.

Today, we seem to be living in a world gone mad: imagining ¡°evil¡± adversaries and creating unnecessary wars, or obsessing with minutiae ¡ª while totally ignoring diplomacy, genuine humanitarian concerns (e.g., poverty, migrations, famine, the uncontrolled advent of AI) and the relentless march of climate change. At such a time, the many sane and experienced people over 60 who are speaking their minds and, more importantly, their consciences, are not only a novelty, entertainment-wise, but also imperative to our well-being and shared humanity. We would do well to listen.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post The Coming of Age of Seniors appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The enmeshment of our lives with digital spaces poses a deeper reckoning that cuts to the heart of the world¡¯²õ basic tenets and norms we aspire to inhabit. Acclaimed author Amitav Ghosh, on the post-pandemic world, stated that ¡°The old world is gone and the new world is still revealing itself.¡± There are two significant features of our increasingly unraveled new world: widespread access to social media and the celebration of individual mobility, especially female mobility. The problem is not that our world is changing, but our ignorance of whether it is changing in a direction conducive to our Children¡¯²õ well-being.?

We are selectively critical of social media consumption when it comes to harmful content or extreme cases of addiction, as in the tragic??of three teenage sisters in India who committed suicide when their parents withdrew their phone access, preventing them from engaging on social media for a week.?However, we fail to reflect on our everyday, uneventful interactions with social media, such as weddings being planned based on what is trending on Instagram, partners jokingly commenting on each other¡¯²õ Instagram addiction and watching video reels even while driving. Such online behaviors are not innocuous. Instead of pausing to reflect on the short and long-term implications of our online behavior, we have normalized various social media interactions that do not fall on the extreme ends of addiction.?

On India¡¯²õ Republic Day this year, I visited a city park in Noida, Uttar Pradesh, that was bustling with people. While elites were few, the aspirational middle class was large. They were actively using the park not just as a space for leisure and sport, but also as an appealing backdrop for Instagram reels and YouTube shorts. On more than one occasion, my toddler mistakenly interrupted a group of young people attempting to record a video. In my friend group, two people spent almost 20 minutes on the phone during a 2-hour picnic. Today, in large metropolitan cities, when young people get together, the conversation is dominated by the videos they have watched. It is commonplace to see groups of people, young and old alike, on their phones while sitting together. 

Social norms that once discouraged phone use in the company of others have broken down, as we quietly acquiesce to living in a digital bubble, a mediated existence. Our world is subsumed by the promise of efficiency and convenience, while actively disincentivizing engagement in complicated human relationships. The overreliance on social media for content consumption elevates individual preferences, making it harder to make the sacrifices needed to build a family and foster a community.

?A proactive approach?to combating excessive social media use

As India becomes richer, the country¡¯²õ leadership must learn from the mistakes of other societies that have buckled under the passive adoption of technology. Jonathan Haidt, a leading American psychologist,? the prevalence of smartphones for the ¡°collapse in young people¡¯²õ mental health since 2010.¡± His claims are corroborated by numerous??asserting that extensive use of social media sites is associated with an increased risk of depression, anxiety and psychological distress. Such reprcutions are ?for young girls, who are more likely to use image-based platforms that perpetuate body image issues.

According to an Indian government press release, 85.5% of Indian households at least one smartphone. India is home to the second-largest number of smartphone users globally and is an important market for social media and AI companies. It is therefore important that Indian leadership learn from the missteps of the Western world, drawing on its civilizational ethos and cultural dynamism to adopt a more critical approach towards social media consumption.

The?urgent need to digital technology is rapidly becoming the global consensus position. Countries such as Australia, France, Italy, China and Indonesia have banned social media use for children under 16. In India, the Karnataka government is? a proposal to ban smartphones for students under 16. Last year, the principal of Mayo College, one of India¡¯²õ premier boarding schools,??a ban on smartphones on campus. Explaining his decision, Saurav Sinha stated that ¡°access to smartphones at a young age can mean constant distraction instead of deep focus,¡± leading to ¡°social media anxiety at the cost of genuine friendship.¡±

While restricting social media usage for children at an institutional level is a desirable first step, more action to combat the scourge of social media addiction is needed. Pulling children away from phone screens is not enough. There is an urgent need to provide them with alternative spaces that offer mental, emotional and physical stimulation.

Social media resilience in the Indian city of Rajgir?

Haidt? several norms that society must establish to regulate smartphone use. His most significant proposal concerns ¡°unsupervised play and childhood independence,¡± arguing for the need to provide children with spaces to explore and play freely with peers. These spaces, however, do not emerge spontaneously. They require a connected, secure community where people look out for each other¡¯²õ children. Away from the homogeneity and hubris of metropolitan cities, India¡¯²õ vast diversity includes communities that maintain a tenuous relationship with technology, offering a fertile, vibrant space for social and cultural development.

An example of such a space is the ancient city of Rajgir, a quaint city with a small population of 41,000. Rajgir is home to various Buddhist, Jain and Hindu temples and is replete with tourists from India and abroad. Malls and multiplexes are conspicuously absent from the city landscape. Unlike parks in other Indian cities, such as Noida, where digital technology use among visitors is prevalent, Rajgir offers a different lived reality.

In Rajgir, on a warm winter afternoon, large families throng the Pandu Pokhar Eco Adventure park. Mothers in their late thirties can be seen playing badminton while their children tug at them, demanding their attention. At the playground, children occupy the same space as a woman in her early fifties, who tells her husband she is scared to try the swing. The husband encourages her to give it a go, and her adult children join in goading her. She hesitantly sits down on the swing. When her son pushes her, ever so slightly, she begins crying in fear, much to the amusement of her family and other onlookers.

This environment is a far cry from playgrounds of Noida, where anxious parents actively surveil their children, often intervening to break up fights or respond to tantrums. In Rajgir, the parents express a sense of calm reassurance. They also navigate the park differently, as a space of leisure, where digital engagement, while occurring, is not the focal point.

Globally linked but locally rooted

What makes Rajgir fundamentally different from a city such as is that Noida is a large city and a hub for software companies and mobile manufacturing. While this makes Noida economically viable and attractive for migrants, it also dilutes its cultural ethos. The fertile land, once tended by farmers, has been replaced by factories, malls and schools. While benefiting handsomely from the acquisition of their lands, the farmers have been pushed to the fringes of the city.

Moreover, the majority of Noida inhabitants are migrants who moved from all parts of India to build their future. They are highly aspirational and willing to embrace the celebratory narrative of individual mobility that is pervasive on social media. They are also distant from their cultural ethos and less committed to building a community space that privileges the collective over the individual. Without such a space, creating social environments that draw young minds away from screens will be difficult.

In Rajgir, people are unwilling (at least for the moment) to abandon the social environment that provides them with a sense of community warmth. They are comfortable aligning their individual aspirations with what is acceptable for their family unit. This means that the negative ramifications of their digital interactions are offset by the social enrichments of their everyday lives. This allows for an organic balance and contributes to resilient social formations, which, while leaving space for digital connections, prioritize social engagement and belonging. Such a harmonious environment fosters greater tolerance for the untidiness of human interactions, encouraging children to explore and socialize with one another more freely.

Such a space provides a model for remaking the new world in ways that serve our long-term interests and well-being. While India must learn from the experiments of other nations, it should also look inwards to identify spaces of community resilience. The country must calibrate its engagement with technology to foster global connections while preserving its social ties and cultural moorings.

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The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Fostering Social Media Resilience and the Well-Being of Children in the Digital Age appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Actually, the Egyptian writing system is a fascinating combination of both pictographic and alphabetic writing systems. It is also far easier to read than most people imagine. To really appreciate Ancient Egyptian, we have to understand how the Ancient Egyptians wrote their language. To do that, let¡¯²õ look at some dirty chain texts first.

A friend of mine recently sent me an emoji-filled holiday chain letter. This is an entire genre of spam texts. In case you haven¡¯t been exposed to these wonderful messages, here are some examples:

Generally, these emoji-filled exhortations are text messages, usually wishing you a happy holiday, promising you sex if you forward it to another person and cursing you with a lack of sex if it isn¡¯t forwarded. These messages are usually littered with ham-fisted sex puns.

Emoji chain texts also happen to be the most perfect modern analogy for the writing system of Ancient Egypt that I¡¯ve ever encountered.

The Rebus Principle: a literary equation

Let¡¯²õ consider an example. From the first chain text:

Consider the function of the ¡°4¡± emoji. This is nominally a pictorial representation of the number ¡°four,¡± using the Arabic numeral system. However, in American English, the pronunciation of ¡°four¡± coincides with the pronunciation of the preposition ¡°for.¡± Hence, the pictogram ¡°4¡± can be used to mean ¡°for.¡± This is an example of the rebus principle, in which words are represented by pictograms that sound the same. Here¡¯²õ another of the rebus principle, from the Egypt Exploration Society¡¯²õ webpage:

A picture of a bee followed by a picture of a leaf would be pronounced ¡°bee-leaf,¡± a homophone of the word ¡°belief.¡± Thus, the bee and the leaf symbols, together, represent the totally unrelated concept ¡°belief.¡±

The Ancient Egyptian writing system is based on the rebus principle. Originally, the ¡°mouth¡± hieroglyph represented the concept of ¡°mouth,¡± and was pronounced something like r.

Not long after the invention of Egyptian writing, the mouth glyph was assigned the phonetic value of r. A set of these signs was standardized, creating the hieroglyphic alphabet. Here¡¯²õ the (Middle) Egyptian alphabet:

These signs are used to spell out the sounds of Egyptian in the same way that the Roman alphabet is used to spell the sounds of English. Mostly. In Egyptian, like a lot of Semitic languages (Hebrew, Arabic, etc.), vowels tend not to be explicitly written out. Only the consonants were written down, along with pseudo-vowels like i, sometimes called a ¡°weak consonant.¡± This lack of vowels in writing leads to a lot of homophones in Egyptian, words that sound (or at least are written) the same but have different meanings.

Semantic determinatives as seen through Earth emojis

Let¡¯²õ now consider a second example, from the second chain text:

Here, consider how the emojis following the word augment its meaning. It begins with ¡°Happy Earth Day,¡± followed by an emoji of a plant and three of the Earth. The compound noun ¡°Earth Day¡± is composed of two words written in the Roman alphabet. The individual characters (a, p, y, etc.) tell the reader how the words are pronounced. This is the hallmark of an alphabetic system; an individual character d represents the sound of a single consonant, and multiple characters representing distinct sounds, like d a y, are placed in sequence to form a word with lexical meaning, ¡°day.¡± The characters tell you how the word is pronounced, and collectively form a written representation of both the concept ¡°day¡± and the sound ¡°day.¡±

The sound-signs forming the word ¡°Earth Day¡± are followed by a picture of a plant and three pictures of the planet Earth, indicating that ¡°Earth Day¡± is a concept associated with living, growing things and the planet Earth. In other words, the pictograms following the alphabetic characters add shades of meaning to the phrase ¡°Earth Day,¡± clarifying the category of concept to which this word belongs.

This is precisely how Egyptian words are formed. Paraphrasing from James Middle Egyptian Grammar, Egyptian words are commonly spelled out alphabetically, but also followed by an additional sense-sign, called a determinative, that adds context and meaning to the sound-signs.

For example, the word ra is written as:

It consists of two alphabetic signs, the mouth hieroglyph, pronounced r, and the arm hieroglyph a, pronounced something like the Arabic ayin. The word ra is followed by this circular determinative, which indicates the meaning of the word ra.

Can you guess what ra means from the determinative sign? You probably can: ra means ¡°sun,¡± and the determinative is a picture of the sun. The image of the sun clarifies the meaning of the sound-glyphs r and a.

Disambiguation by means of eggplants and seated gods

Let¡¯²õ consider a third illustrative example. From the third chain text:

The emojis clarify the meaning of ¡°Hot Dog.¡± The compound noun ¡°Hot Dog¡± is followed by a peach and eggplant emoji, commonly used to mean ¡°butt¡± and ¡°penis¡± respectively. Here, the eggplant and peach emojis serve an important semantic function ¡ª they clarify the ambiguity in the sentence ¡°I Want To Eat Your Hot Dog¡± by explicitly informing the reader, using the eggplant determinative, that ¡°Hot Dog¡± is a euphemism for ¡°penis.¡± Thus, instead of the sentence indicating a desire to eat a delicious, all-beef frankfurter, it indicates a desire to perform oral sex.

Ancient Egyptian uses determinatives in exactly the same way as the chain text uses the peach and the eggplant. Returning to our example of ra, consider these two examples of Egyptian words, both spelled ra:

The first word is followed by the ¡°sun¡± determinative, and thus refers to the concept of the sun, i.e., the ball of fire in the sky. The second is followed by the seated god determinative, and instead of referring to the sun itself, it refers to the sun god Ra. The determinative serves to clarify which concept, both spelled ra, is being referred to in the text.

The determinative is extremely important to understanding written Egyptian, due to the number of homophones in the written language.

Lesson 4: Illustrative Examples

We also notice that in these emoji chain texts, the short, common words without really concrete meanings (like ¡°is¡± or ¡°to¡±) are not followed by emoji determinatives, whereas nouns like ¡°Patriotic Daddies¡± and ¡°COCKtober¡± are followed by one or two determinatives indicating their meaning or associations in the context of the sentence. 

Egyptian follows the same pattern. Short, common words, like m, meaning ¡°in¡± or ¡°with,¡± are composed of alphabetic signs alone, without determinatives.

However, nouns and verbs usually consist of a series of alphabetic signs that indicate the pronunciation of the word, followed by a semantic determinative that indicates its sense, category, or associations.

Let¡¯²õ consider the example of the Egyptian verb ¡°beget,¡± meaning ¡°to bring into existence¡±:

This word consists of five signs: three sound-signs and two determinatives. The first three signs are the coiled rope, pronounced w, followed by two loaf-of-bread signs, pronounced t. Thus, the word is transliterated as wtt and pronounced something like ¡°wetet.¡±

The next two signs are determinatives and give the sense of the word. The first determinative is a hieroglyph that¡¯²õ easily recognizable in any era.

It¡¯²õ a penis, in case you didn¡¯t notice. The penis glyph¡¯²õ function in indicating the semantic meaning of ¡°beget¡± is obvious. This sign is actually used in many Egyptian words, such as:

Yes, the penis hieroglyph can mean ¡°thick¡± in Ancient Egyptian. I guess the priests who came up with this writing system wanted everyone to know a little something about their assets.

Now, back to ¡°beget.¡± The second determinative in ¡°beget¡± is the rolled scroll.

The scroll is often used for abstract concepts. This is because abstract concepts are often not easily represented by pictograms, but can be written down on, for example, a scroll.

Putting it all together, the combination of glyphs rope, bread, bread, penis, scroll produces a verb pronounced something like ¡°wetet,¡± and meaning ¡°to beget.¡±

Convergent evolution: Hieroglyphs are still used today

Here¡¯²õ another fun fact about hieroglyphs. By pure chance, many modern emojis look nearly identical to their ancient counterparts. This has some wonderful examples of convergent glyph evolution, reproduced here for convenience.

And so, the next time one of your friends sends you a message like this:

I hope that you can appreciate it (syntactically, if nothing else) as a modern reinvention of an ancient form of writing.

[ edited this article.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post What Ancient Egyptian and Emoji Chain Texts Have in Common appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Upon seeing this message, most English speakers will wonder what the hell Sunil and I are talking about.

It has to do with a book he¡¯²õ reading, called Alex¡¯²õ Adventures in Numberland: Dispatches from the Wonderful World of Mathematics. Chapter one covers counting systems used in various societies ¡ª the Arara in the Amazon count in pairs, the Revolutionary French tried to make clocks count by tens and the Babylonians counted in base 60. But the most interesting counting system, to me, was the one used by shepherds in Lincolnshire, England, to count sheep.

1. Yan
2. Tan
3. Tethera
4. Pethera
5. Pimp
6. Sethera
7. Lethera
8. Hovera
9. Covera
10. Dik
11. Yan-a-dik
12. Tan-a-dik
13. Tethera-dik
14. Pethera-dik
15. Bumfit
16. Yan-a-bumfit
17. Tan-a-bumfit
18. Tethera-bumfit
19. Pethera-bumfit
20. Figgit

So when Sunil told me that covera pimp dik bumfit and bumfit pimp dik was 69, all he really said was that 9 + 5 + 10 + 15 + 15 + 5 + 10 = 69, which is true.

I find this counting system fascinating, and not just because counting pimp, dik, bumfit, figgit is hilarious and fun.

First of all, you¡¯ll notice that this system is a hybrid base-five, base-twenty counting system. You have unique words up to ten, then compound words (Tan-a-dik = Tan + dik = 12) up to 15 (bumfit), then some more compounds with bumfit up to figgit (20).

Secondly, this counting system felt weirdly familiar to me. Yan and one, tan and two, tethera and three, pethera and four. What about dik? Well, this is clearly similar to dec, the Latin root for ten (French is dix, Spanish is diez, Italian is dieci). Even figgit looked familiar ¡ª the Latin ±¹¨©²µ¾±²Ô³Ù¨©, meaning 20, sounds a lot like figgit. My first thought was that this system is some kind of corrupted Latin, mixed with whatever Celtic language existed in Lincolnshire before the Roman conquest.

I wasn¡¯t right about this, but I was close.

Consonant shifts and Proto-Indo-European

Why does pethera, which begins with a ¡°p,¡± sound familiar to four, anyway?

Consonant shift! Linguists have discovered regular patterns of consonant shift that occur as languages evolve. The most famous of these sound shifts are the shifts that transform into its daughter languages (Latin, English, Sanskrit, Persian, etc.).

states that the Proto-Indo-European consonants underwent predictable, regular evolution as they evolved into Proto-Germanic and Germanic daughter languages.

For example, the Proto-Indo-European word for ¡°brother,¡± ²ú?°ù¨¦³ó?³Ù¨¥°ù (something like ¡°breh-ter¡±) evolved into the Proto-Germanic ²ú°ù¨­?¨¥°ù (¡°²ú°ù´Ç-³Ù³ó±ð°ù¡±), and eventually into the Old English bro?or (¡°²ú°ù´Ç-³Ù³ó´Ç°ù¡±).

By the way, that funny letter ? is called , which is an Old English letter pronounced ¡°th.¡± If you had to read in high school English class, you might remember seeing ? all over the place.

¡°Father¡± is another good example of regular consonant shifts. Proto-Indo-European *ph?t?r (¡°peh-ter¡±) evolved into Proto-Germanic *´Ú²¹»å¨¥°ù, and eventually Old English f?der.

So ¡°p¡± and ¡°f¡± are linguistically very similar, especially in a Germanic language like English. Pethera and four could easily be derived from a common Indo-European ancestor.

The idea is similar to ±¹¨©²µ¾±²Ô³Ù¨© (Latin) and figgit (Lincolnshire shepherd¡¯²õ dialect). The ¡°f¡± and the ¡°v¡± are very similar sounds, followed by the ¡°g¡± and ¡°t¡± sounds. Try pronouncing ¡°vigint¡± ten times fast and see if it morphs a little into ¡°figgit.¡±

It was at this point, while googling consonantal shifts, that I found this video from Numberphile, with one of the least searchable titles I¡¯ve ever seen. From Numberphile, I present the gloriously titled :

In the video, Professor Roger Bowley says that the yan-tan-tethera number system is Celtic and predates the Roman conquest of Britain. So my theory of corrupted Latin is wrong ¡ª actually, both Latin and this obscure Celtic dialect have a common ancestor in Proto-Indo-European!

This explanation of the yan-tan-tethera origin fits much better than mine does. Wikipedia has a whole list of different variations on the yan-tan-tethera for various English regions.

Apparently, this weird-ass counting system is actually a very old counting system that probably predates the Roman conquest of Britain, and it¡¯²õ linguistically related to all the other Indo-European languages! Some of the words are even the same!

But wait, what about bumfit?

Consider the bumfit, and make sure it¡¯²õ hovera covered

Bumfit is a hilarious word. However, I don¡¯t think ¡°bumfit¡± sounds like ¡°fifteen¡± at all. Nor does ¡°hovera, covera¡± sound like ¡°eight, nine¡± in any way. But if all the numbers in the yan-tan-tethera counting system are derived from Proto-Indo-European, how did eight and nine (*h?e?teh? and *³ó?²Ô¨¦³Ü²Ô in Proto-Indo-European) become hovera, covera?

The explanation from the same says that bumfit and the rest are Proto-Celtic numerals that died out in modern English. The Welsh numerals do have something in common with the yan-tan-tethera system:

The Welsh pymtheg is ¡­ sorta similar to bumfit, I guess? And the Welsh pump, deg, pymtheg, ugain is at least partially recognizable as pimp, dik, bumfit, figgit.

The Ancient British word for twenty, ·É¾±°ì²¹²Ô³Ù¨©, is essentially identical to the Latin ±¹¨©²µ¾±²Ô³Ù¨© (remember, in classical Latin, ¡°v¡± is pronounced ¡°w¡±), so I guess the Wikipedia page¡¯²õ claim that multiples of five are highly conserved checks out.

But this hypothesis seems somewhat lacking to me. Where do you get hovera (8) and covera (9) from? The Welsh versions are wyth and naw, and the Ancient British versions are oxtu and nawan. That¡¯²õ not even close.

Counting Rhymes

Another friend of mine, Jill, mentioned to me that she had just finished reading The Writing of the Gods: The Race to Decode the Rosetta Stone, and the book had mentioned that the children¡¯²õ nursery ¡°Hickory Dickory Dock, the mouse ran up the clock¡± was originally a .

Short, common words, learned early in life, tend to be the most constant throughout language evolution (¡°mama,¡± ¡°father,¡± ¡°brother,¡± etc.). In the same way, counting rhymes, taught to children at a young age, are highly conserved linguistically.

This led me to the fantastic ¡°The Secret History of ¡®Eeny Meeny Miny Mo,¡¯¡± by Adrienne Raphel, on the origin and history of counting rhymes. Seriously, give this article a read; it¡¯²õ fascinating.

I would venture a guess that pretty much every English-speaking schoolchild knows some version of the rhyme:

Eeny, meeny, miny, mo
Catch a tiger by the toe
If he hollers, let him go
Eeny meeny miny mo

This rhyme has a darker history than I knew. According to Adrienne Raphel:

In the canonical Eeny Meeny, ¡°tiger¡± is standard in the second line, but this is a relatively recent revision. If it doesn¡¯t seem to make sense, even in the gibberish Eeny Meeny world, that you¡¯d grab a carnivorous cat¡¯²õ toe and expect the tiger to do the hollering, remember that in both England and America, children until recently said ¡°Catch a nigger by the toe.¡±

Didn¡¯t know that one. Yikes. But it seems that this is a fairly recent revision of a much more ubiquitous class of counting rhymes. In Denmark:

Ene, mene, ming, mang,
Kling klang,
Osse bosse bakke disse,
Eje, veje, vaek.

And in Zimbabwe:

Eena, meena, ming, mong,
Ting, tay, tong,
Ooza, vooza, voka, tooza,
Vis, vos, vay.

However, while reading this article, one particular rhyme caught my eye.

In 1830, children in Scotland chanted:

Zinti, tinti,
Tethera, methera,
Bumfa, litera,
Hover, dover,
Dicket, dicket,
As I sat on my sooty kin
I saw the king of Irel pirel
Playing upon Jerusalem pipes.

In that rhyme, found in Scotland, we see ¡°tethera, methera, bumfa, hover, dover, dicket,¡± all recognizable yan-tan-tethera numbers. Raphel goes on to connect this counting rhyme to the same yan-tan-tethera counting system we¡¯ve been discussing, which she gives as:

Yan, tan, tethera, methera, pimp,
Sethera, lethera, hothera, dovera, dick,
Yan-dick, tan-dick, tether-dick, mether-dick, bumfit,
Yan-a-bumfit, tan-a-bumfit, tethera bumfit, pethera bumfit, gigert.

Now I see what¡¯²õ going on. The yan-tan-tethera counting system is much more than simply a linguistic evolution of the ancient Proto-Indo-European numbers; it¡¯²õ a counting rhyme! Likely, it is designed to be a memory aid for a nonliterate population that needs to count things.

Some of the numbers are the same as ours ¡ª multiples of five, especially, are conserved from their Proto-Indo-European roots, but the system as a whole is meant to roll off the tongue as a rhyme, as unforgettable as ¡°eeny meeny miny mo.¡± In fact, the children¡¯²õ nursery rhyme ¡°Hickory Dickory Dock¡± probably has its in this ancient Celtic counting rhyme, via the numbers ¡°hothera dovera dick.¡±

The reason the yan-tan-tethera numbers are so fun to say out loud is the same reason that epic poetry is written in rhyming meter ¡ª repetitive, rhyming lines are very easy to memorize, which is enormously important for primarily oral cultures.

This really blew my mind.

It turns out that the yan-tan-tethera counting system really was familiar to me, and probably you too ¡ª every schoolkid in America already knows it as ¡°Hickory Dickory Dock,¡± though its origins as a Proto-Celtic counting system are long forgotten.

[Dylan Black first published this piece on .]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post A Brief History of Dik: Indo-European Linguistics and Counting Rhymes, or, Dik + Pimp = Bumfit appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

If you walk around the streets or campuses in London, you will see Chinese students everywhere. At first glance, you may see them as united, reserved and quiet. However, as time goes by, you begin to notice something strange: Most Chinese students seem to stay among themselves. 

It is even difficult to find a Chinese student speaking English with non-Chinese students. You may think this is because they prefer to remain close to their own groups in their spare time. But in class, the pattern remains the same. 

They seldom talk and often seem reluctant to participate; if they do, it is usually in the first class of a module, when they are required to give a self-introduction. Even in this case, most of them only state their name and nationality. It is rare to hear anything about their interests, future plans, why they chose the course or anything beyond that.

Language is not the problem

You might assume that they face a language barrier. However, in many European countries, new arrivals such as immigrants or refugees tend to interact with locals proactively, even when their command of the language is extremely limited. With broken sentences, gestures and improvised expressions, they gradually attempt to build everyday connections. 

By contrast, almost every Chinese student who comes to the UK is required to obtain an English language to prove that they are able to study here, which means their language proficiency is higher than that of many new arrivals. Therefore, the underlying reason Chinese students do not speak English is not that they are unable to speak, but that they choose not to speak. But why?

A degree, not an experience

For many Chinese students in the UK, especially those enrolled in one-year master¡¯²õ programs, integration is never part of the plan. Most come from wealthy and well-connected in China, and their career paths and future plans have largely been arranged by their parents before they study abroad.?

In their eyes, studying abroad is less about experiencing a different world than simply obtaining a shiny credential they can brag about once they return to China. Under these conditions, learning how to live and integrate into another society is totally unnecessary, given that most will return to China once their studies are finished. Considering that many of these students treat studying abroad merely as a tool and seldom integrate into local society to practice their English, their language proficiency often fails to improve when they return home. 

There is a term in China called shu¨« shu¨° (¡°Ë®Ë¶¡±) used to refer to these students who study overseas for a one-year master¡¯²õ program but whose academic and linguistic levels remain low after the year of study. In this view, such Chinese students are seen as privileged, silver-spooned kids, but not necessarily outstanding. Many people in China believe obtaining a degree in the UK is largely a matter of money rather than intelligence.

You might raise a further question at this point. Even if these Chinese students return to China after their studies, wouldn¡¯t engaging with new people, embracing different views and cultivating memorable friendships still be worthwhile? Why, then, do many Chinese students choose to spend that year in relative isolation, remaining largely within their own social bubble instead? To understand this behavior, we need to move beyond individual choice and look at the issue from a deeper ideological perspective.

Defensive nationalism

Returning to the question raised on Reddit, why don¡¯t Chinese students integrate more? This discussion has now been on RedNote, a Chinese platform similar to Instagram. Many Chinese students are clearly unhappy with the question, and their responses basically fall into two camps.

The first asks: ¡°Why should we integrate? Why don¡¯t you integrate with us instead?¡± The second assumes bad faith, believing that people outside China look down on Chinese people, making genuine friendship impossible. Although these two arguments appear different, they actually reflect the same unconscious ideology: defensive nationalism.

So what is defensive nationalism? It assumes that the outside world is fundamentally unfriendly and that dignity must therefore be protected before any perceived enemy reaches the border, turning engagement into something to be avoided. Defensive nationalism is invisible. 

It does not present itself as radical patriotism or open hostility toward others. Instead, it quietly plants fear and a sense of threat in people¡¯²õ minds, making them afraid to express themselves. Many Chinese students, often unconsciously, come to internalize this ideology after years of being taught that China has been under siege and that the outside world is hypocritical and hostile. 

Almost every person who grew up in China is familiar with the phrase ¡°imperialism will never abandon its ambition to destroy China¡± (µÛ¹úÖ÷ÒåÍöÎÒÖ®ÐIJ»ËÀ), which portrays the Western world as a permanent enemy and frames relations between China and the West as an existential zero-sum struggle. As a result, many Chinese people are deeply cautious about the world beyond China. 

When these students go abroad, many do not come to see the world from a different perspective. Instead, their existing biases are often reinforced. What they encounter is not a colorful world, but one in which even a glance, a tone of voice or a moment of silence can be misread as discrimination or hostility.

Safety in silence

Integration is no longer a neutral or positive act, but a risky one: Speaking aloud may incur judgment, engaging too much may expose weakness and adapting to another society can feel like lowering oneself. Consequently, they come to see withdrawal as the safest response, shielding themselves behind defensive nationalism.

Behind this shield, they can find a sense of security in unfamiliar environments and redefine silence as a form of self-respect. And this is precisely what we see today: A large number of Chinese students rely almost entirely on Chinese-language media and social circles, enabling them to live physically outside of China while remaining at home spiritually.

Learning to belong

As an international Chinese student myself, when I first came to London, I felt nervous and overwhelmed. I often missed the jokes of street performers, as the rest of the audience laughed. Walking into an Italian restaurant, I felt embarrassed when it came time to order, as I could not make sense of the menu, despite it being written in English. 

In both seminars and everyday interactions, I sometimes struggled to follow what my classmates were saying. At that moment, I had two options: to remain within the comfort of my own community, or to push myself forward ¡ª to listen, to speak and to try to understand. I chose the latter because I understood that these moments of discomfort were not failures, but part of the process itself. 

I came to realize that progress does not begin with confidence, but with courage ¡ª the willingness to speak imperfectly, to misunderstand and to laugh a second later than everyone else. One day, without even noticing it happened, I realized I was no longer standing at the edge of other people¡¯²õ lives, watching as an observer. I was already inside them.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Why Don¡¯t Chinese Students Integrate More? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Michael Jackson died in 2009, steeped in debt. But he certainly didn¡¯t remain dead; a reinvigorated Jackson was restored to life. His record sales spiked, a movie deal was done and, within a year, Jackson made ¡ª more money than any other musician or actor, dead or alive, over the previous 12 months. Other lucrative events included a Cirque du Soleil production and a hit Broadway show, all of which brought in over $3 billion in earnings.

But the spectral Jackson also had detractors who refused to let the allegations fade, even after Santa Barbara County Superior Court cleared him of sexual molestation charges in 2005. Suspicions of an unwholesome side to Jackson surfaced as early as 1993 when screenwriter Evan Chandler him of abusing his son, Jordan Chandler. A legal settlement the following year prevented this from damaging Jackson¡¯²õ then-flourishing career. (The limited what could be depicted about the issue artistically and, for a while, imperilled the biopic film, ¡ª trailer above.)

Head in a lion¡¯²õ mouth

Less than a year after the allegations and settlement, Jackson Lisa Marie Presley, daughter of the world-famous musician, Elvis Presley. For years before the marriage, Jackson¡¯²õ androgynous presentation, high voice, lack of tabloid-documented romantic history and unusually childlike persona had prompted speculation about his sexuality. Gossip columns periodically asked whether he might be gay or asexual. These unsubstantiated rumors circulated widely and gained impetus from the settlement, making the Presley marriage appear as a validation of his heterosexuality.

Jackson and Presley separated in 1996. That same year, only months after finalizing the divorce, Jackson nurse Debbie Rowe, with whom he had two children. A third child by an unknown mother followed in 2002.

Exactly what was on Jackson¡¯²õ mind when he agreed to appear in a documentary fronted by journalist Martin Bashir is unclear. If he was trying to improve his public image, it was a catastrophic mistake. Bashir had earlier interviewed Princess Diana and, while it wasn¡¯t clear at the time, used to persuade her. By the time he agreed to Bashir¡¯²õ request to film him, Jackson had spent over 20 years in the unforgiving glare of showbusiness. Any claim to ingenuousness about media exposure was difficult to sustain. Jackson¡¯²õ decision was rather like starving a lion for a few days and then putting his head in its mouth.

Jackson talked about regularly having sleepovers with children, including a young cancer patient named Gavin Arvizo. Bashir ended the HBO program with his on Jackson¡¯²õ home, known as Neverland Ranch: ¡°A place where his enormous wealth allowed him to do what he wanted, when he wanted, how he wanted.¡± The New York Times Jackson as ¡°creepy, but almost touching in his delusional na?vet¨¦.¡±

The program screened in February 2003. That December, Santa Barbara County District Attorney Tom Sneddon Jackson with committing lewd and lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14.

In 2005, Jackson stood ; the jury heard allegations that he had abused a 13-year-old boy and exposed him to ¡°strange sexual behavior¡± during visits to Neverland Ranch. But the jurors ultimately concluded the prosecution had not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Jackson was exonerated of all charges, walked from court an innocent man and remained legally so for the rest of his life. Innocent, that is, in a legal sense: Rumors persisted up to and beyond his in 2009.

Where there¡¯²õ smoke¡­

On October 5, 2017, The New York Times published a detailing allegations of sexual harassment against Hollywood film producer Harvey Weinstein. Among those who spoke publicly were actors Rose McGowan and Ashley Judd. The revelations triggered a cascade of accusations against Weinstein that culminated in his arrest and, in February 2020, his for felony sexual assault and a sentence of 23 years¡¯ imprisonment. Weinstein maintained his innocence.

The significance of the case extended far beyond one powerful producer. For decades, stories circulated in Hollywood about men who traded professional opportunities for sexual favors, the notorious ¡°casting couch¡± becoming shorthand for a system of exploitation long acknowledged but rarely challenged.

More than a decade earlier, in 2006, activist Tarana Burke had begun using the phrase, ¡°,¡± to support survivors of sexual abuse. After the Weinstein revelations, the phrase was repurposed as a global hashtag and rallying cry. What followed was one of the most consequential cultural shifts since the rise of the women¡¯²õ liberation movement in the 1970s.

Within a year, hundreds of prominent men across politics, entertainment and media faced allegations of sexual misconduct. Some were prosecuted, many were not. Yet formal verdicts often mattered less than public judgment. Careers ended, projects met cancellation and reputations collapsed even in the absence of criminal convictions.

A new principle seemed to have taken hold: Accusations alone could be enough to remove powerful men from positions of influence. The informal tribunal of public opinion proved faster, harsher and often more decisive than the courts. Guilty or innocent no longer seemed to matter. The adage, ¡°where there¡¯²õ smoke, there¡¯²õ fire,¡± became a serviceable rule of thumb.

Not guilty. So?

Now, reimagine the Jackson episodes I described earlier. In the post-Weinstein world, a settlement may still resolve a dispute legally, but it does not always relieve the defendant from blame even when the out-of-court agreement involves no admission of liability.

The most dramatic illustration of this occurred in 2022: then-Prince Andrew¡¯²õ settlement with trafficking survivor Virginia Giuffre, who had accused him of sexual assault. Andrew paid an undisclosed amount and donated a sum to a charity. He avoided a trial, but invited a blizzard of innuendo. Further investigations into his relationship with the disgraced financier Jeffrey Epstein pushed Andrew into an inescapable corner. King Charles III stripped him of his titles, relieved him of his royal duties and made him an unwilling symbol of privileged depravity.

In 1994, Jackson¡¯²õ global popularity was comparable with Taylor Swift¡¯²õ today. His albums Off the Wall, Thriller and Bad had established him in the same class as Elvis and the Beatles. His video, Michael Jackson¡¯²õ Thriller, remains a classic of its genre. None of the disorienting strangeness of later years had yet appeared and Jackson, like his peer, Madonna, enraptured audiences everywhere.

His prodigious popularity would have been a defense against cynics who suspected the settlement disguised indecent tendencies. Of course, Jackson never had to contend with social media, as he would in the #MeToo world; that in itself could have wrecked his reputation. But, it¡¯²õ conceivable, even likely, that his immense adoration would have been powerful enough to sustain him. The 2003 charges, however, were unexpected and uncontainable.

Remember: Jackson was eventually acquitted on all seven counts of child sexual abuse and two counts of administering an intoxicating agent. But, as we know, the legal precept ¡°innocent until proven guilty¡± lost purchase in the wake of the Weinstein case. In 2022, actor Johnny Depp won in damages from his former wife, actress Amber Heard, who had accused him of domestic abuse. But he lost his role in Disney¡¯²õ Pirates of the Caribbean franchise (at that ) and, as an on-screen actor, has only appeared in 2023¡¯²õ Jeanne du Barry since. Actor Kevin Spacey was first accused of sexual assault in 2017 and found of sexual offences at a criminal trial in 2023, and has recently a separate case. In these cases, the actors were accused wrongly, but offers for dramatic roles dried up.

The probability is that Jackson too would have been canceled, his legal innocence overridden by a verdict reached in the less formal but far more potent tribunal of culture. In 2005, when he was cleared, the shadow of the allegations were troubling but not fatal. Of more immediate concern was his extravagant lifestyle, which left him with colossal debts ¡ª at his death to be more than ¡°more than half a billion dollars.¡±

Reissues of earlier albums kept public interest alive, but Jackson himself became a recluse. So, when in 2009, he announced his first live concerts in 15 years, it seemed to confirm he needed money. A two-month residency at London¡¯²õ O2 Arena was thought to be worth . When the concerts sold out and tickets were sold online for $10,000, more dates were added. At 50, Jackson seemed to be on the verge of making an improbable but spectacular comeback. In preparation, he threw himself into an exhausting rehearsal schedule. But as we now know, the concerts never took place.?

Within three months of the announcement, Jackson was found dead at his Los Angeles home. The death was ruled a homicide and his personal physician, Conrad Murray, was of involuntary manslaughter in 2011. He had Jackson a lethal dose of propofol, a powerful anaesthetic. Jackson, the public soon found, was also a habitual user of painkillers such as OxyContin and Demerol.

In 2019, an HBO documentary, Leaving Neverland, featured graphic by two men, Wade Robson and James Safechuck, who alleged Jackson abused them as children. A less publicized claim followed when five members of the Cascio family, longtime friends of Jackson, that Jackson groomed and abused them over decades, beginning when they were children. Jackson¡¯²õ estate quietly the accusers $2.5 million.

Would a middle-aged Jackson, apparently scarred by the unproven accusation, beleaguered by debt and at least 12 years past his peak, be offered a lucrative assignment in London and sell out? It¡¯²õ not unthinkable, but fanciful just the same. Like film producers, concert promoters would tend to treat even lightly-soiled A-listers with caution. AEG Live, the prospective promoters of the London ¡°This Is It!¡± concerts, as they were called, would probably not have taken the gamble; in the event the promoters were well insured. 

Would Jackson have lived?

Paradoxically, the #MeToo environment could have saved Jackson¡¯²õ life. Were promoters disinclined to book him and record labels reluctant to offer contracts, he would have been forced to adjust his profligacy and restructure his debts. He still had income from his valuable investments in music publishing.

Perhaps he would have yearned for the buzz of live music and the entertainment industry in which he had been involved since he was six. Yet he would have had the support and comfort of his three children, growing into adolescence, around him (all three children are now in their 20s). He might still have relied on pharmaceuticals to get a night¡¯²õ sleep, but not the intravenously administered nightly cocktail that ultimately killed him.

So, would Jackson have survived in the #MeToo climate? In a professional sense, no. He would have been quietly ushered toward showbiz oblivion, living ¡ª probably to the present day, when he¡¯d be 67 ¡ª and remembered as a great but seriously flawed megastar. But he would have remained alive. The memory of the scandals would surely have receded, the music endured and the image of the prodigy turned global icon might gradually have eclipsed lingering suspicions.

Instead, his unexpected death froze the argument in place. Neither vindicated nor condemned, Jackson remains suspended between genius and tormentor, a figure whose legend is inseparable from the perhaps unanswerable questions that still surround him.

[Ellis Cashmore is the author of .]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Would Michael Jackson Have Survived in the #MeToo Era? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Today¡¯²õ situation, with the loss of Venezuelan energy support, is somewhat reminiscent of Cuba¡¯²õ experience with the devastating economic impact of the Soviet Union¡¯²õ in the 1990s, and it may be tempting to draw comparisons between the two periods. At that time, the Castro regime was forced to confront similar challenges: material shortages, isolation and civil unrest. However, today¡¯²õ reality is characterized by new factors: the physical absence of Fidel Castro and Ra¨²l Castro; the widespread use of social media; resumed flights to and from the US since 2016; and increased liberalization and warmer diplomatic relations.

No matter how valuable ending the longest-running communist government in the Americas may seem, US President Donald Trump seems to be trying out a new for foreign intervention: decapitating regimes while keeping the establishment intact. This model clearly prioritizes business opportunities over democratic values. However, it¡¯²õ not only uncertain whether it could be applied to Cuba, but also whether this is actually the plan. All of which makes it particularly difficult to imagine what could happen next.

Historically, international observers have oscillated between fascination and outrage towards Communist Cuba. In the early years of the revolution, this fascination was understandable. Cuba was a potent for activists in the 1960s and for the global civil rights movement. However, as the revolution shifted toward military autocracy rather than democratic ideals, the initial romanticism faded. This group of observers, largely comprising European baby boomers who rebelled against post-World War II imperialism, has seen its initial fervor tempered by time. Reflecting a broader evolution in leftist thought, they continue struggling to reconcile Cuba¡¯²õ social achievements with its authoritarian political regime and the continuous, increasing and deepening impact of the US trade on these revolutionary ideals since 1962.

The Cuban Revolution officially began with the 1953 of the Moncada Barracks by a group of revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro, who was relatively unknown at the time. The uprising aimed to overthrow ¡¯²õ illegitimate military dictatorship and the systemic corruption and poverty it fostered. Specifically, the movement demanded economic independence from US imperialist interests and the restoration of political liberty through an armed uprising of the working class.

After the attempted coup, Castro, a trained lawyer, was tried and imprisoned by Batista¡¯²õ regime. During this trial, he delivered an iconic defense speech that ended with the famous words, ¡°History will absolve me.¡± Indeed, he was pardoned after 22 months due to a general amnesty and went on to lead Cuba for life. However, total absolution by history is doubtful and yet to come.

After his release from prison, Castro adopted July 26 ¡ª the date of the attack on the Moncada Barracks ¡ª as the name of his revolutionary movement: the Movimiento 26 de Julio. By January 1, 1959, the rebels, including the iconic Comandante Ernesto ¡°Che¡± Guevara, had successfully overthrown the dictatorship. In response to Batista¡¯²õ pro-US regime, the revolutionaries had campaigned with slogans such as: ¡°Cuba s¨ª, yanquis no!¡± (¡°Cuba yes! Yankees no!¡±) and ¡°Yanquis, vayanse!¡± (¡°Yankees, go away!¡±).

Shortly after Castro and his group took control, the US intervened militarily in 1961, but was defeated at the Bay of Pigs. This defeat solidified the first self-proclaimed communist revolution in the region, which would become the longest-standing regime of its kind in the Western world. It is now approaching its seventh decade.

The revolution as an unfinished process

After years of rumors that he was dead and that his government was keeping him alive to prevent a political collapse, Castro died on November 25, 2016, at the age of 90. Following Castro¡¯²õ illness in 2006, his younger brother Ra¨²l assumed provisional power. By 2011, Ra¨²l had solidified his position as leader of both the presidency and the Communist Party. This appointment communicated a strong stance on hierarchy and kinship. Yet, Ra¨²l ultimately delegated governance in 2019, eight years later.

Miguel Mario D¨ªaz-Canel Berm¨²dez, Cuba¡¯²õ current president, is a direct descendant of the Castro regime, having been personally appointed by Ra¨²l Castro. Born in Villa Clara Province on April 20, 1960, D¨ªaz-Canel was born one year after the Cuban Revolution of 1959. Although D¨ªaz-Canel holds onto the revolutionary ideals of his predecessors, he is facing unprecedented times. Amid escalating instability and unrest, he called for dialogue on Monday, March 23, while not capitulating on the Revolution, stating:

We don¡¯t want war; we want dialogue. But if that space isn¡¯t provided, we are ready. I tell you this with the deep conviction that I hold, which I have shared with my family, that we would give our lives for the Revolution.

D¨ªaz-Canel said this in a conversation with Pablo Iglesias, the Spanish founder of the left-wing political party Podemos, and former vice president of Spain. Iglesias arrived in Cuba on March 24, 2026, as part of the humanitarian convoy. There, he D¨ªaz-Canel on behalf of his media organization, Canal Red. With the support of figures like Iglesias and British politician Jeremy Corbyn, the Nuestra Am¨¦rica mission delivered 20 tons of aid, including solar panels, to help alleviate the island¡¯²õ severe energy crisis.

The convoy¡¯²õ name invokes the legacy of (1853¨C1895), the ¡°Apostle of Cuban Independence¡± and a foundational figure in the development of the nation¡¯²õ identity. In his influential 1891 essay, Nuestra Am¨¦rica, or ¡°,¡± Mart¨ª contended that Latin American nations should develop governance systems grounded in their unique social realities instead of imitating foreign models. By warning against ¡°the giant of the north¡± and calling for cultural sovereignty, Mart¨ª¡¯²õ manifesto remains a powerful symbol that the modern mission seeks to reclaim. In fact, both D¨ªaz-Canel and Iglesias reiterated Mart¨ª¡¯²õ accusations that the US is responsible for Cuba¡¯²õ structural problems of the past several decades, that the 1959 Revolution eliminated ¡°all miseries and evils.¡±

The blockade of all trade and diplomatic relations with the US, coupled with the nationalization or expulsion of the private sector, did not stop the steady stream of tourists, primarily from Europe, from arriving on the island. Despite the gradual disenchantment of many, a sense of mysticism about Cuba as an oasis outside of capitalism began to emerge.

For as long as I can remember, I have heard the same tropes in stories by foreigners who visited the island in the ¡®90s and ¡®00s. One recurring theme was the idea that Cuba was ¡°suspended in time.¡± People often mentioned the old cars, which were rare in other urban landscapes. In a dimmer note, Fidel, who had once that Cuba would no longer be the ¡°brothel of the Western Hemisphere,¡± later used that same imagery in a 1999 speech, infamously , ¡°Cuba has the cleanest and most educated prostitutes in the world.¡±

In his 1965 work, , Virgilio Pi?era famously referred to ¡°the curse of being completely surrounded by water.¡± Writing from a first-person perspective while sitting in a caf¨¦ in Havana, Pi?era captured an insular reality that visitors, often distracted by the island¡¯²õ tropical allure, could never truly grasp. This metaphorical curse reveals a less paradisical side of the nation, grounding its international isolation in a bittersweet reality.

Pi?era¡¯²õ sentiment mirrors the devastating truth in Fidel¡¯²õ later remarks about the island¡¯²õ ¡°cultured¡± prostitutes. Both the poet¡¯²õ verses and the leader¡¯²õ words acknowledge a reality that, despite its high ideals, remains trapped by its circumstances. Pi?era¡¯²õ image remains profoundly expressive today, as Cuba faces renewed media attention and political turmoil, making this sense of cursed isolation feel as relevant as ever.

Following a period of diplomatic warming that began in 2015, US¨CCuba relations shifted from a hopeful path toward greater understanding to extreme hostility under the Trump administration. By 2025, Marco Rubio, a former senator from Florida and Cuban American, had become one of the loudest advocates for this shift. A Gen Xer, Rubio belongs to the first generation of diaspora children who have historically migrated to Miami. This group has traditionally been fiercely opposed to the regime they fled.

Today, many of them see the current moment as the opportunity they¡¯ve been awaiting for decades. Hispanic outlets Univision and Telemundo Miami have the various demonstrations, many of which were led by Cuban activist Ram¨®n Sa¨²l S¨¢nchez, who on the exile community at the iconic Cuban restaurant to support the protests occurring on the island. The Free Cuba Rally, which through Washington, DC, featured slogans such as ¡°Trump¡± and ¡°Cuba Next!¡± calling for US action.

Founded by Cuban exiles in Valencia, Spain, in 2014, the news outlet Cibercuba has been a relevant source that divulges information from inside the island. It has extensively covered the protests of the last few weeks against constant outages and the growing precarious situation. According to Cibercuba, there have been pot-banging , fires started in the middle of roads, and people taking to the streets regardless of the significant military and police presence.

Though their demands are diverse and sometimes conflicting, protesters in Cuba and the diaspora are united in their response to the same lack of coherence embodied by an unfinished revolution and an authoritarian regime. Unlike the diaspora, protesters on the island largely US intervention. They call for freedom and anti-authoritarianism, yet they never question their own autonomy. They correctly believe that their future is in their hands, more on immediate needs than on challenging the entire economic system. Despite its flaws, the revolution¡¯²õ accomplishments should be recognized, such as ensuring that and remain for all. 

Taking all of this into account, it¡¯²õ reasonable to conclude that Cuba is experiencing its most severe economic and social crisis in decades. Nevertheless, D¨ªaz-Canel has taken a defiant position against Washington, considering the one-party political system and the decades of cultural and structural revolution that sustain him. Even as it prepares for potential American aggression, the Cuban government refuses to negotiate its political system and its national sovereignty.

Perspectives from the Island: the case of Beto

I traveled to Cuba for the first and only time in January 2018, spending the first eight days of the year in Havana. I flew from Miami, a route that had only direct service in December 2016. I remember the other passengers, most of whom were not tourists, rushing to stand up as soon as the plane landed. Their urgency seemed to reflect the extraordinary experience of taking a direct flight after decades of needing to take indirect routes, such as via Canc¨²n, or of being unable to travel at all due to visa or the risk of state retaliation for those in exile.

Coming from a place where unlimited internet access was the norm, the intermittent service during that short trip felt unusual. Access was a luxury; you had to go to a hotel or somewhere with Wi-Fi, or buy a $5 data card that lasted 30 minutes. For the majority of Cubans, this was a significant expense, as average monthly salaries among the lowest in the world. According to a 2025 , this digital divide persists as Etecsa, the national telecommunications enterprise, continues to restrict and raise the price of monthly data top-ups.

This atmosphere of restricted access and slow change makes the current shift in US foreign policy feel like a long-awaited opportunity. However, the notion of a tipping point once again reveals its tantalizing and procrastinatory nature. To understand how this pivotal turning point was perceived beyond the official headlines, I reached out to my Cuban friends living abroad.

One of them is Beto, a chef and owner who has lived in Madrid for over 20 years. When he responded on Monday, March 16, he was visiting family in Cuba, 30 minutes outside Havana. He stayed in touch throughout his week-long trip, and I am fortunate to be able to share some of his insights here.

Beto began his testimony by recounting how difficult it was to move around the island. His brother had to buy fuel on the black market just to pick him up from the airport, paying between eight and ten dollars per liter. Beto could only afford this expense because of his life in Spain. This corroborates reports of a severe decline in fuel supply, despite Beto¡¯²õ testimony that money was circulating. 

On the drive from the airport to his hometown, which usually takes place on a busy highway toward Havana, there were no other cars. In a video he , the empty horizon could be seen in both directions, interrupted only by a car that eventually passed them. According to Beto, the airport itself also felt empty. His Iberia flight, designed to carry over 200 passengers, landed with only 60 people on board. The rental lots were empty, yet filled with cars no one was renting. ¡°Havana doesn¡¯t even have fuel for the planes,¡± Beto explained. He noted that his flight had to detour to the Dominican Republic just to refuel for the return trip to Madrid. He added that due to limited resources, tourism and travel for non-urgent matters have become extremely difficult these days.

This perception of a shortage is indicative of a broader energy crisis in which access to electricity depends on having the right technology. This takes us back to Diaz-Canel¡¯²õ recent with Pablo Iglesias. Overall, the Cuban President¡¯²õ tone was optimistic. Diaz-Canel mentioned that even amid an intensified blockade, Cuba is on the path to energy sovereignty. He highlighted the importance of solar panels, electricity generated from sugarcane fields and the increased use of electric motorcycles for various services, describing all of it as a form of ¡°creative resistance.¡±

Overall, listening to Beto confirmed both Diaz-Canel¡¯²õ description of advancements in renewable energy and the fact that it is insufficient. During the most recent national blackout, Beto said that only people near power plants or with solar panels were able to power their electronics. This was the case in his father¡¯²õ village. To cope with the heat, he said he used a battery-powered fan for up to five hours at a time in his father¡¯²õ house. A tropical storm on Monday night also helped cool the air.

Based on what he saw and experienced on this trip, the state-run food supply system, which used to equitably distribute food despite its imperfections, has nearly vanished. A new reality has emerged in which private enterprises import food and sell it at higher prices than in Madrid. Beto also shared photos of solar energy kits and kerosene stoves being sold on social media. The flyers provide contact information and state that payments must be made in cash in US dollars, and that delivery is available for an additional cost.

In addition to the photos of electronics, Beto shared a video with me depicting the unique blend of eras and economic systems found on Cuban streets. In the video, bicycle-powered taxis rattle past an old Polish Fiat, an iconic Soviet-era car, that has been modified to include a solar panel on its roof. The car was parked outside a bar called T¨®matela Fr¨ªa, where reggaeton music played from a speaker. During my short visit in 2018, I noticed that music, mostly reggaeton, was always playing on the streets. Seeing that it¡¯²õ still the norm gave me a sense of reassurance that other reports didn¡¯t.

Throughout the week, Beto and I were able to communicate with each other more than twice a day, albeit intermittently. He relied on airport Wi-Fi or Etecsa offices for internet access. There, you can pay 40 cents an hour for a connection to their Wi-Fi, which is powered by generators. When he described this situation to me, he paused and said it was all a ¡°strange, high-speed transformation caught between socialism and capitalism.¡± As citizens increasingly take to the streets, Beto¡¯²õ ambiguity sums up the reality of existing in the long-term middle ground between the two systems that polarized the second half of the 20th century.

As proof of the exceptional circumstances due to intensified protests and government dissent in the days prior, Beto sent a picture showing military helicopters circling overhead and armored vehicles moving through his father¡¯²õ neighborhood. While the townspeople attempt to maintain a facade of normalcy by selling everyday goods in private stalls, intermittent electricity and the shadow of helicopters serve as constant reminders that the country is transforming into something entirely unknown.

Against this backdrop, Beto told me that when people in Cuba talk about the importance of money from family members abroad, they often ask each other, ¡°?T¨² tienes fe?¡± While ¡°fe¡± means ¡°faith¡± in English, it actually stands for Familiar en el Extranjero, or ¡°family member abroad.¡± This refers to receiving remittances from places such as Miami or Madrid. The double meaning of faith speaks to the concept of the hybridity of the two systems that Beto mentioned earlier. The anecdote also conveys a sense of truth when considering that faith may be the only unifying factor among the different positions, regardless of the indeterminate results.

The curse of being completely surrounded by water

The curse of being completely surrounded by water condemns me to this caf¨¦ table. If I didn¡¯t think that water encircled me like a cancer, I¡¯d sleep in peace. In the time that it takes the boys to strip for swimming, twelve people have died of the bends … The eternal misery of memory. If a few things were different and the country came back to me waterless, I¡¯d gulp down that misery to spit back at the sky … The uniform of the drowned sailor still floats on the reef. It makes you want to jump out of bed and find the main vein of the sea and bleed it dry.

¡ª The Whole Island, Virgilio Pi?era

In closing, I would like to return to Virgilio Pi?era¡¯²õ poem and his words: ¡°The curse of being completely surrounded by water.¡± In the poem, he also speaks of finding ¡°the main vein of the sea and bleeding it dry,¡± building to a crescendo of intensity. Following the success of the Revolution, Pi?era was one of many intellectuals who initially supported the movement. However, the revolutionary promise soon turned into systematic censorship. Pi?era was arrested at the beginning of a period of state repression that intensified throughout the ¡®60s and ¡®70s.

In his posthumous memoir, (1993), Reinaldo Arenas, a writer of a later generation, explains how he, like Pi?era, was imprisoned because of his homosexuality and his stance as a dissident public writer. The title, Before Night Falls, refers to how he had to write by the last rays of sunlight while hiding in parks as a fugitive. It wasn¡¯t until 1980 that the Cuban state stopped homosexuals criminal figures, and the Ley de Ostentaci¨®n Homosexual was repealed.

However, prosecutions due to sexual orientation didn¡¯t stop overnight (it was not until 2019 that a new constitution was approved in Cuba that included regarding gender rights, and it wasn¡¯t until 2022 that same-sex marriage was legalized). Arenas was able to flee during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift , which began when a bus crashed into the Peruvian embassy, causing a massive refugee crisis. To be granted permission to leave through Mariel, Arenas had to ¡°¡± his homosexuality. He eventually settled in Miami and then New York, where he died by suicide while awaiting death from AIDS in 1990. In his suicide note, he explicitly blamed Fidel Castro for his death.

It¡¯²õ hard to reconcile heartbreaking stories like Arenas¡¯²õ with the continued loyalty of other prominent figures. As I have striven to convey in this piece, we find ourselves in limbo, torn between disillusionment and faith. Silvio Rodr¨ªguez, a renowned musician, exemplifies the latter. The government recently him a Kalashnikov rifle in recognition of his loyalty. Interestingly, in his popular 1993 song ¡°,¡± or ¡°the fool,¡± Rodriguez sang that deciding what the world deems foolishness may also be a stance: ¡°Could it be that foolishness was born with me?/The foolishness of what now seems foolish/The foolishness of embracing the enemy/The foolishness of living without a price.¡±

On March 16, the day I spoke with Beto, Trump escalated his rhetoric, he could ¡°take Cuba in some form¡± and do as he pleased there, adding that such a thing would be ¡°an honor.¡± Once again, when we bring together the rhetoric of Rodr¨ªguez and Trump, we feel as though we are traveling in time. As the ¡°giant of the North,¡± in Mart¨ª¡¯²õ words, confronts Cuba, the island remains caught between the remnants of communism and an emerging informal capitalism. Cubans are resisting creatively, as they always have, even when struggling in the context of an accentuated decades-long blockade. Currently, their system of governance is holding strong, albeit while being cornered in their search for a path forward.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post All Eyes Are on Cuba, and No One Knows How Its Future Could Play Out appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The answer is not straightforward, but one that entails a complex interplay of the development of labor, structural inequality, environmental necessity and unique alterations in human cognition and agency. The world population has risen steadily over the last ten years, from approximately billion in 2020 to nearly 8.3 billion today. Although a higher population ideally means a greater labor and bigger markets, it also simultaneously stresses employment systems. The AI burst adds to the problem by increasingly automating repetitive manual and even tasks. While nations grapple with accommodating increasing populations, they also have to contend with the structural displacement that comes with the speed of AI penetration.?

Work creation has lagged behind such population pressures. The International Labour Organization () originally projected the development of million new jobs by 2025, but reduced the number to million when the growth of the economy slowed down, as quoted by . Therefore, a vast majority of these new roles involve high-level technical and AI ability, leaving the conventional increasingly at risk. Consequently, this intensified disconnection adds more to the urgency of getting by on the basis of reskilling and forward-looking workforce planning. Without progressive policies, AI can further exacerbate the global between high-skill and low-skill labor markets.

Beyond the bottom line: the collateral impact of automation

On a different note, AI business deployment levels have sped up. Over of large firms had already implemented AI in their operations by 2019, as indicated by the (), given that AI is more operationally efficient, cheaper and more often makes choices. Yet this speed comes at significant human expenses. Analytics, decision-making and creative work are under threat. Overemphasizing efficiency at the expense of greater social costs can lead to incremental erosion of human in decision-making and innovation.

Furthermore, job dismissals have already been hit by trade barriers, geopolitics, sanctions and intellectual property conflicts, which are compounded by restructuring due to AI. Over employees were discharged by 221 American technology companies in 2025 alone, as estimated by . These are structural, not cyclical, , as the labor could be lost for good or require skills that the existing labor pool lacks. Subsequently, this creates destabilizing forces for traditional social safety nets and labor institutions that policymakers will find difficult to deal with.

Furthermore, the environmental of AI is typically underestimated. In addition to energy usage, AI needs custom hardware composed of scarce minerals like neodymium, dysprosium and tantalum. The extraction of the has environmental impacts and geopolitical dependencies. The data centers used to house AI systems account for vast amounts of water usage for cooling and plenty of power to process, according to the (). by fossil fuels, these operations have high levels of carbon emissions. Places with this sort of infrastructure are subject to local water deprivation and resource shortage, proof that the social benefits of AI have undetected ecological and social effects.

The cognitive erosion: reclaiming human autonomy

Aside from economic and environmental , AI insidiously menaces human thought and culture. With AI interfaces and alert systems overwhelming human , attention is splintered, diminishing creativity, civic engagement and the capacity for long-term strategic contemplation. AI excels at capturing explicit knowledge but cannot fully grasp context-dependent know-how, risking the erosion of institutional memory and local problem-solving capabilities. interpersonal decision-making and AI-mediated communication can diminish empathy, negotiation skills and emotional resilience ¡ª qualities essential for healthy workplaces and social cohesion. 

Moreover, AI¡¯²õ reliance on historical data for optimization may unintentionally constrain innovation, favoring safe and predictable trajectories over bold, unconventional ideas. The psychological reliance on AI for professional, personal and ethical decision-making also risks destabilizing autonomous human thought. Business investment in AI keeps expanding. As per a McKinsey and Company Report, of business executives are planning to increase AI spending, with over half expecting a hike from existing levels. The force of transformation that AI represents is gigantic, but not necessarily for all. Whether AI will raise human potential or speed up inequality will be determined by governance, regulation, upskilling and inclusive deployment strategies. 

As we begin this new era, caution needs to catch up to optimism. Societies may unwittingly dependent on AI networks owned and controlled by a few large firms, generating systemically produced . AI-rich environments everywhere can distract attention in the crowd, undermining imagination, long-term thinking and civic participation. Human of context-dependent and experiential knowledge can be contemplated as being pushed aside, and optimization by algorithms can pressure innovation along predetermined lines, deterring out-of-the-box solutions.

The final experiment: shaping our machine-driven destiny

On the whole, dependence on AI for making , individual and moral decisions may quietly erode independent thought. Unobtrusive external costs ¡ª such as mining of rare metals, water-cooled operation and energy-intensive usage ¡ª add to the multifaceted, interdependent nature of AI deployment footprint. A sense of these problems ensures that AI is benefiting human beings and not becoming stuck in inequality, environmental pressure or psychological reliance.

Moreover, AI is no longer a ; it¡¯²õ a force remaking the destiny of economies, societies and even the brain. The question now is no longer whether we can control AI, but whether human beings will be the masters of their own destiny and not just passive actors in a machine-dominated world. Optimism about AI needs to be paired with , ethical sensitivity and robust governance.

Therefore, in order to realize its full potential, human societies will have to develop not only technological know-how but also public wisdom, cultivating a human-AI partnership that is attuned to local conditions and capable of responding to diverse social and environmental . Not only are we developing AI, but AI is also developing us. It is a different kind of experiment, and one whose outcome is less predictable and more fateful than ever.

[Ainesh Dey edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post ?Beyond the Code: Reclaiming Human Agency in an AI-First World appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Khonoma is a village of Angami Nagas. The Angamis are a major Naga ethnic group who were the first of the Nagas to come into contact with the British. The Angamis are known for building terraced fields on hill slopes. Like most of Nagaland, most of them are now Christians, the vast majority now belonging to the American Baptist Church.

What I found remarkable, reading Charles¡¯²õ book, is the success of Khonoma¡¯²õ reconciliation process among clans and families in the village. Conflict began within the village with the British occupation of Nagaland and the subsequent handover to the Government of India in 1947. Some clans and families accepted British and Indian rule, started working with or in the state apparatus, while others resisted or rebelled. 

Nagas had obtained a promise from the British that their land would become autonomous, but that promise was lost when the Government of India took over. This caused a divide; some Nagas thought that they needed Indian support before they could create their own state and infrastructure, while others believed they should fight for independence from the start. This divide led to violence that engulfed the village. Fast forward to 2000, and over the course of ten years, the Khonoma Public Commission facilitated face-to-face meetings between perpetrators¡¯ families and victims¡¯ families. The reconciliation process addressed 22 of the killings, decades of blood feuds and deep clan divisions, leading to forgiveness, restitution and renewed unity. We asked Charles Chasie what made this possible.

Roberta Campani: Explain the conflict that happened in Khonoma and why this made the reconciliation process necessary? How did it begin? How did it unfold?

Charles Chasie: Khonoma had long been a warrior village whose clans were bound by codes of honor in which the duty of revenge passed down generations without time limit. This tradition of revenge tore apart the very fabric of the Naga national movement. When Angami Zapu Phizo and Theyiech¨¹thie Sakhrie ¡ª both from Khonoma, both believers in Naga sovereignty ¡ª fell out over means rather than ends, the village found itself at the epicenter of a conflict that was at once political and intensely personal. When Sakhrie was abducted and killed in January 1956, this became the first fratricidal killing of leaders in the Naga national movement history, triggering ancient instincts and splitting the Khonoma into armed camps along clan and khel (cluster of clans) lines.

What followed were years of mutual siege, displacement and accumulating grief. The Indian Army burned Khonoma to the ground more than once. Those who went underground starved in the forests, and those who remained behind faced blockade and harassment. When the fighting subsided, the four khels did not return together but settled in separate locations, living effectively as four villages for nearly a decade. The wounds did not heal with time. It was only when a younger generation, tired of having their elders remind them of hatreds they had not chosen, asked to be given their future back, that the village resolved to face what it had buried.

Roberta Campani: What triggered Khonoma¡¯²õ need for reconciliation after such a long and bloody conflict?

Charles Chasie: The immediate trigger for reconciliation in Khonoma was a request made by the young men of the village asking the elders to ¡°Give us our future.¡± In the wake of the Naga National Movement ¡ª as the struggle for autonomy/independence from India came to be known ¡ª and the resulting division, many intra-village killings had taken place, which continued to poison the life of the village over many decades. Every time the young people wanted to do things together as fellow villagers, they were reminded of old enmities. 

Over time, the young became fed up with this continued bitterness and wanted the elders to heal these divisions. The village elders felt they could not ignore such a request from the younger generations. This led to a three-day seminar on the theme Healing the Soul of Khonoma. This seminar enabled the participants to take a frank look at where the village stood. The areas of division were drawn up, and the young men wrote to the village authorities to help heal these divisions. The authorities set up the Khonoma Public Commission (KPC) to go into each of these divisions with the objective of achieving healing and reconciliation through forgiveness so that the future of the village could be secured.

Roberta Campani: The KPC took on 22 cases of killings, plus numerous other instances of social divisions. What surprised you most about how people responded when they finally sat face-to-face after decades of enmity? Can you describe the process and the reconciliation sessions?

Charles Chasie: We, the members of the KPC, were representing our individual clans as well. We sat down with our clansmen who had either committed or suffered wrongs to hear their stories. In each case of wrongdoing, KPC members would examine the past with the involvement of clan members themselves. In other words, KPC members who met a victim¡¯²õ family included those who were from the victim¡¯²õ clan. Likewise, those meeting a perpetrator¡¯²õ family included KPC members representing the perpetrator¡¯²õ clan.

The NPC reviewed each case thoroughly, examining the background, the details of the events and the legacy passed down. Where actual perpetrators or victims were no longer alive ¡ª in some cases, about half a century had elapsed since the events ¡ª the stories relied on the testimonies of women and elders who knew what had happened in the past. In each case, the story would be reviewed minutely with the family concerned. Only with their readiness and full consent would the case be taken to the next step.

The KPC also met and reviewed each case to see if the stories from the two opposing families found commonality. In the event of common ground, expression of genuine sorrow and readiness to forgive, the KPC would proceed to set up meetings of the concerned families for reconciliation. Usually, the KPC would facilitate meetings in the family home of the victim. We prayed together before kicking off such meetings.

When families of victims and perpetrators met, each would tell their side of the story. Often, such a retelling was not necessary, as the KPC members would have informed each party of the other side¡¯²õ story, and an expression of sorrow was enough. The perpetrator¡¯²õ family would ask for forgiveness and the victim¡¯²õ family, in turn, would pronounce forgiveness. The two families would then have a cup of tea together, which symbolized a full and proper reconciliation. In Khnoma¡¯²õ social code, partaking of food or drinks together for the two families was taboo because of the family feud. A cup of tea in this context means much more than mere tea. In fact, it is an outcome of a peace process and symbolizes the end of a simmering feud.

At such meetings, both families signed a simple written agreement that was drafted by the KPC, declaring an end to the feud and a promise not to raise the issue again. KPC members representing both families/clans would vouch for their family/clan members and bring closure to the feud. Traditionally, one¡¯²õ word was enough in Naga society. The KPC took the extra step of a written agreement to ensure the peace settlement was binding. We would end the meeting with another prayer together, asking God¡¯²õ blessings for one another.

The process usually took many meetings, both at the family/clan levels and at the KPC level. Sometimes, the process took several years, especially when the concerned perpetrators/victims were dead and the fog of time had made their stories unclear. Yet what usually stood out in our reconciliation process was that everyone demonstrated goodwill. Once people sat face-to-face, there were usually no surprises, and the final formal act of reconciliation took place smoothly. They usually shook hands. Where those reconciling were Christians, they sometimes exchanged the Bible as well.

The experience was different for each reconciliation. For me, the genuine act of contrition and the deep desire of each family to leave behind a legacy of peace stood out, especially given the fact that these families had done unspeakable things to one another in the past. It took them tremendous courage to squarely confront past facts and painstakingly examine them to ensure a better future freed from the toxic legacies of bygone feuds.

Roberta Campani: You write about how the traditions of Khonoma Village made it almost impossible to reconcile issues such as clan feuds. But you mention other traditions that were helpful and how the KPC drew on these to begin the reconciliation process. What were some of these customs and traditions?

Charles Chasie: Although killings and clan feuds were never reconciled because vengeance was considered a filial duty, the notion of reconciliation always existed in Khonoma. As a community-based society, people in Khonoma practiced forgiveness in daily life. 

In Khonoma, social ostracism instead of laws or the police is the main way norms are enforced. The of being excluded from social, economic and civic life is very real. In the past, such was the high level of trust among the Angami Nagas of Khonoma that homes had no locks on doors, the village had no jails and family granaries were often outside village precincts because there was no fear of theft.

The Angamis lived for their progeny and future generations. The family tree was key, and people did what they could to keep that tree healthy. Angamis would inherit their home and fields from their father, but these were to be held in trust for future generations. The Angamis could not sell them. Villagers could use their homes and fields to make a living and feed their families. There was an expectation from Angami villagers to improve both their homes and their fields for the benefit of their inheritors. This sense of immovable multigenerational property not only gave Khonoma Angamis a sense of belonging but also identity. This strong sense of identity and community made reconciliation possible.

Furthermore, Khonoma Angamis are devout Christians, and religion forms the warp and woof of life. Villagers say the on a daily basis, in which they ask God to forgive their trespasses and promise to ¡°forgive them that trespass against us.¡± This facilitated reconciliation as well.

In addition to their Christian faith, pre-Christian beliefs helped with reconciliation, too. Khonoma Angamis believe in life after death. Per tradition, those who live a good life are rewarded by becoming shining stars in the night sky. Living a good life has great rewards in the afterlife. So, forgiveness and reconciliation are good deeds. 

In a nutshell, a strong sense of community, the Christian faith and traditional beliefs all helped Khonoma Angamis achieve reconciliation. 

Roberta Campani: Traditional Angami culture required blood vengeance: ¡°life for life¡± with no time limit. Yet Khonoma villagers broke this cycle. Did Christianity help in breaking this cycle of vengeance, which traditionally had been held to be a sacred duty?

Charles Chasie: It is true that traditionally, vengeance was considered sacred and a filial duty that was passed down the generations from father to son. British colonials compared the Angami blood feuds to Corsican vendettas or worse. 

[Roberta Campani¡¯²õ Note: The Corsican vendetta was a deeply entrenched tradition of inter-family and inter-clan blood revenge on the island of Corsica, particularly in the 18th and 19th centuries. A killing obligated the victim¡¯²õ family to kill in return, which would then oblige the other family to do the same, and so on. These cycles could persist for generations and devastate entire communities. The Corsican tradition became so notorious across Europe that the word ¡°vendetta¡± (originally just the Italian/Corsican word for ¡°revenge¡±) became synonymous in English with this specific kind of prolonged, hereditary blood feud. By the 19th century, it was a stock reference in European writing ¡ª Prosper M¨¦rim¨¦e wrote about it and so did Alexandre Dumas ¡ª so very much part of the cultural vocabulary of British colonial officers.]

However, it is important to note that reconciliation did exist in Angami culture. It was extremely rare, though, and only occurred after the intervention of a third party, usually after both sides had exhausted themselves! 

As mentioned above, Christianity helped, but so did tradition. At the KPC, we drew on both faith and tradition to end the culture of vendetta.

Roberta Campani: You describe a crucial moment ¡ª the village-wide day of silence in August 2004, when even the animals seemed to fall quiet. What shift did that silence cause among the people of Khonoma that made reconciliation possible?

Charles Chasie: ¡°Speak Lord, for Thy Servant Heareth¡± is the prayer of Samuel in the Bible. There is a certain quality to prayerful, or even reflective, silence that only practitioners understand. Explanations cannot capture the effect of reflective silence to those who do not cultivate the practice. 

In August 2004, we observed a day of silence, and it had a profound effect. ¡°Even the animals seemed to sense something solemn was happening and had fallen quiet,¡± said one villager after another. 

There were cases of individuals being moved by the silence to put things right in their own lives, things that did not necessarily fall within the mandate of the KPC. For some, it was just a period of quiet repose and nothing more. For others, it was a time to renew their faith. People did not work in the fields, did not talk to strangers and spent time in communion with God. But what seemed clear was that this collective silence set a certain mood in the community, creating an openness where people were willing to do what was right instead of trying to find excuses or justifications for past actions. 

The apology of Sebi Dolie, the eldest son of the Dolie Clain, is a case in point. 

Roberta Campani: Tell us more about Sebi Dolie, an 88-year-old, nearly blind man taking moral responsibility for his clan¡¯²õ role in the assassination of the legendary leader Theyiechuthie Sakhrie. Sebi¡¯²õ apology on behalf of his clan was pivotal. What enabled him to do what political leaders often refuse to do?

Charles Chasie: Sebi Dolie¡¯²õ time of quiet has already been described in the book, Healing the Soul of Khonoma, in his own words. On the morning of the period of silence, Sebi later told a younger friend, when he got up and opened his door, he noticed ¡°the silence and the absence of the pigs, chicken, dogs, etc., usually scavenging for any eatables lying around. He felt goose bumps and his hair standing on end, and he thought God had surely come down to our village today.¡± With this thought, Sebi went to the nearby church to pray and reflect. He also decided to rededicate his life to God.

The relationship between Sebi¡¯²õ clan, called Dolie, and the Sakhrie clan had become estranged ever since Theyiechuthie Sakhrie, or T. Sakhrie, was assassinated in January 1956. T. Sakhrie was the general secretary of the Naga National Council (NNC) while Phizo of Dolie clan was the president. The NNC fought for Naga self-determination. Sakhrie was widely acknowledged as the ideologue of the movement, while Phizo was the charismatic figure who managed to establish direct emotional touch with the people. 

Sadly, their beliefs in the means to achieve the Naga goal differed. Sakhrie was a staunch believer in nonviolence, while Phizo was more focused on keeping up the momentum of the Naga struggle by using arms to fight. At a meeting in the village, Phizo described Sakhrie as a hurdle to the Naga goal. Sebi, who had witnessed this as a young man, had felt Phizo had gone too far. When Sakhrie was assassinated by unknown gunmen, people recalled Phizo¡¯²õ words. Phizo, even as the president of the NNC, failed to own his moral responsibility for Sakhrie¡¯²õ killing. Sakhrie¡¯²õ clan had already decided to forgive his killers, but the silence from Phizo and the rest of the Dolie clan prevented proper rapprochement between the two clans. 

Now, fifty years later, as the eldest in the Dolie clan, Sebi felt it was his responsibility to set things right. Note that Khonoma also has the institution of the khel, a cluster of clans, and comprises three khels. At a meeting of their khel, Sebi expressed that he would have felt exactly what the Sakhries had felt all this time. He not only apologized but also asked to be told, in friendship, of any unspoken hurts his clan may have caused. Sitting in the same meeting was the eldest person from the Sakhrie clan, who got up and said, ¡°Sebi, I have to shake your hand. We have stopped thinking your side will say anything like this that you have said today.¡± 

This magnanimous gesture of shaking hands by the two eldest persons from the embittered clans and khels rolled away years of bitterness. Later, when the eldest person from the Sakhrie clan was asked about the incident, he replied, ¡°³§¾±³Ù³Ü³ú±ð,¡± meaning that is exactly what happened.

What may need to be mentioned here is that the matter of Sakhrie¡¯²õ assassination had also led to the first division among the Naga people and in the NNC. The rapprochement in the matter of Sakhrie¡¯²õ killing, thus, was not only an inter-clan or intra-village matter but had wider ramifications. Later, Khonoma village put up a stone memorial for Sakhrie in the village, which was unveiled by the president of the Naga Hoho, a federation of Naga tribes from four Indian states, namely Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur and Nagaland, and some parts of Myanmar.   

Roberta Campani: You write that reconciliation worked in Khonoma but has failed elsewhere in Nagaland. What specific conditions or particular choices made Khonoma different?

Charles Chasie: There was nothing especially different about Khonoma except the collective determination of villagers to put the past behind them. Some other villages had also tried reconciliation in their own way, but most had failed. What made Khonoma succeed was that villagers completely rooted out the causes of hate and bitterness so that division and vendetta never reappeared again.

Today, Nagas are devout Christians, and Christianity is all about reconciliation between God and man. Sadly, Christians often have an inadequate understanding of reconciliation. One easy example is the saying, ¡°forgive and forget,¡± which is often used as a mere punchline. By removing contrition and restitution, which are vital parts of reconciliation, this saying thwarts true reconciliation. For that, there has to be genuine forgiving and a clear sense of being forgiven. If somebody is not sorry, where is the point of forgiveness? 

As Nichaloas Frayling has pointed out, such forgiveness is bad theology and does not happen in real life. People can forgive, but they do not forget. Neither are they meant to. Instead, Frayling recommends ¡°forgive and remember¡± (pardon and peace) so that the same mistake is not repeated.

Also, quite frequently, many who pray to God do little or nothing to further their own prayers. As I pointed out earlier, the Lord¡¯²õ Prayer says, ¡°forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us.¡± If you pray for peace and leave it to God alone, peace will not fall from heaven unless you do your part in putting right the wrong and upholding justice. The difference between Khonoma and other villages is the fact that people here had the courage to face the past and set things right so that future generations will not have to face the same problems again. Thus, a legacy of peace won the day.  

In Khonoma, we experimented with one more step. The people not only reflected upon the mistakes they made, or the wrongs they suffered, but they also reflected on when and how they might have provoked others to do wrongs to them. This exercise in empathy helped the people to walk in the shoes of the other person!   

Roberta Campani: Every conflict feels unique to those who are trapped in it, yet you suggest Khonoma¡¯²õ experience holds lessons beyond Nagaland. What would you say to communities elsewhere, whether in Northeast India, Myanmar or beyond, who are trapped in cycles of revenge and counter-revenge?

Charles Chasie: True, every conflict is different, as are the cultures of the people who find themselves trapped in various conflicts. This is why we should be very careful about passing quick comments or judgments. But human nature is also the same everywhere. It is only the trappings of modernity or what have you that are different. I must be able to recognize that I have the same abilities to commit the heinous crimes that others have committed. Such realizations should make us humble. For instance, the colonial British came with their canons and ability to kill in great numbers from a distance, behaving as if everything belonged to them. Seeing our spears and daos (machete), they called us ¡°barbaric¡± because they felt superior.

In the story of the British Empire, colonial forces trampled upon the rights of others and killed large numbers. Our people were killed indiscriminately with no sense of who or what was right or wrong. The of 1879 is a classic example of British oppression. Yet we Nagas have to remember that we have the same human capacity to inflict violence and oppression.

Whether it is Khonoma or Palestine or Ukraine, human suffering is the same. What worked here, I believe, will work elsewhere too. If you are willing to forgive and actually take steps to do so, you may find that your enemy, too, is only human! Sadly, the perspectives we see in the world today are topsy-turvy. People demand respect and subservience from others. The saying that there is enough in the world for everyone¡¯²õ needs but not for everyone¡¯²õ greed is almost a cliche, but, unfortunately, too real. It is this lust for revenge, power and greed that we have to avoid.

In the context of reconciliation, Maya Angelou¡¯²õ message that ¡°history despite its wrenching pain cannot be unlived¡± is true, but I would add that history faced with courage need not be lived again. This worked for us, the people of Khonoma. I am confident it will work for others, too, who are willing to try it.

I end with a poignant story about a man from Khonoma village, who had decided and even attempted to exact vengeance for his cousin¡¯²õ killing. After agonizing for many months, he said, ¡°If I can have the courage to kill a man, why can¡¯t I also have the courage to love him enough to make him a different man?¡± This man then went to his intended victim and asked forgiveness for his bitterness. The two went on to become friends. In a nutshell, attaining the courage to forgive is the challenge for every man of good conscience.

The uniqueness of a grassroots-led reconciliation in Khonoma reconciliation

The Khonoma experience resonates within a broader global tapestry of truth and reconciliation efforts. Similar efforts include South Africa¡¯²õ landmark Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) under Archbishop Desmond Tutu; Liberia¡¯²õ post-civil war healing process; Rwanda¡¯²õ community-based justice system, gacaca; and Colombia¡¯²õ transitional justice mechanisms. 

Khonoma is unique when it comes to truth and reconciliation efforts because the village relied on a bottom-up, grassroots-led process. In South Africa, the TRC was state-sponsored. Almost all truth and reconciliation have been state-sponsored, even if they have community involvement. Khonoma pioneered a community-driven and a community-led truth and reconciliation process rooted in indigenous social structures. This process relied greatly on both the villagers¡¯ devout Christian faith and intergenerational dialogue.

While national commissions often grapple with political constraints and institutional inertia, Khonoma demonstrates that meaningful reconciliation can emerge organically when ordinary people choose to confront their shared history with honesty and courage. The lessons from Khonoma complement, rather than replace, other frameworks for truth and reconciliation frameworks. In particular, Khonoma offers a model that is replicable in settings where formal institutions are absent or distrusted.

However, for this knowledge to truly serve as a blueprint for others, it must be documented, shared and critically examined alongside similar experiences. We invite other communities ¡ª whether in Northeast India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Rwanda, banlieues in France, inner cities in the US and elsewhere ¡ª to record their own reconciliation journeys. Are there other villages  ¡ª  grey zones, suburbs or any other living communities ¡ª  that feel stuck in broken cycles of vengeance or violence? What methods worked, and what failures taught hard lessons? By collecting these stories through interviews, oral histories and community archives, we can build a living repository of peacebuilding wisdom that transcends borders and cultures. 

To the readers of this interview: If your community has walked a similar path, we encourage you to share your experience. Your story may be the catalyst another village needs to find its own way out of the shadow of the past. As Charles Chasie reminds us, ¡°history faced with courage need not be lived again¡± ¡ª but this is only possible if we take the time to listen, learn and pass on what we have learned from the past.

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post FO Interview: The Khonoma Reconciliation Process appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Her earlier memoir, Free: A Child and a Country at the End of History (2021), established her as a rare writer capable of weaving rigorous political philosophy into a lived autobiography ¡ª a quality that earned it extraordinary international acclaim. In Indignity: A Life Reimagined, she goes even further. 

What makes Indignity philosophically extraordinary is not merely its scope, though that scope is vast, running from Constantinople to Salonica to Tirana to the prisons of Burrel, but its governing question: what becomes of a person¡¯²õ dignity when the state has the power to name them, surveil them, archive them and ultimately to decide, on paper, whether they lived or died? That power, Ypi argues, is never innocent, and its victims are never simply historical.

As an example, let me quote the German constitution of 1949, written specifically to remind us that dignity takes work and intention from everyone: 

Die W¨¹rde des Menschen ist unantastbar.
Sie zu achten und zu sch¨¹tzen ist Verpflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt.

Human dignity shall be inviolable/untouchable. To respect
and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.

¡ª Grundgesetz, Artikel 1 (1949)

The catalyst of the story was a photograph

Indignity is a hybrid novel-memoir, a book that moves between archival research and literary imagination, between historical fact and the admission that facts alone can never reconstitute a life. Its governing epigraphs ¡ª one from Immanuel Kant¡¯²õ Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (¡°Everything has either a price or dignity¡±) and one from Friedrich Schiller¡¯²õ On the Aesthetic Education of Human Beings ¡ª announce from the outset a work that breathes philosophical ambition, situating itself within the German Idealist tradition¡¯²õ deepest preoccupations: what it means to be a moral person, and whether that meaning survives our deaths.

The book begins with a photograph ¡ª a honeymoon of Ypi¡¯²õ grandparents, Leman and Asllan, at a luxury hotel in Cortina d¡¯Ampezzo in 1941 ¡ª discovered one day on a stranger¡¯²õ social media page, accompanied by venomous comments that sought to reduce her grandmother Leman to a caricature: collaborator, spy, fascist accomplice.?

Ypi’s response is not a refutation but a quest. She travels to the Albanian State Security archives to retrieve her family¡¯²õ secret police files, and from this bureaucratic excavation grows a three-part narrative spanning the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the interwar scramble for the Balkans, the Italian and Nazi occupations, the rise of Enver Hoxha’s hermetic communist state, and the long aftermath of exile, surveillance, and dispossession that crushed two generations of her family. 

Who decides who we are?

At the heart of Indignity is the terrifying ease with which a totalitarian regime can claim authority over a person¡¯²õ identity. Ypi¡¯²õ grandfather, Asllan, was a man of considerable standing ¡ª his father, Xhafer Bey Ypi, had served as Albania¡¯²õ tenth prime minister. Yet the communist state reduced him, in its files, to ¡°enemy of the people,¡± imprisoned him for decades on fabricated charges of collaboration with British intelligence and stripped the family of property, status and freedom of movement. Her grandmother Leman, born in Salonica to an Ottoman administrative family of cosmopolitan refinement, was reclassified as a class enemy, surveilled for years and eventually declared dead by the secret services ¡ª not because she had died, but because an informant¡¯²õ false denunciations had been discredited and the file needed to be closed. The state simply wrote her out of existence. 

In a chilling discovery, Ypi realizes that the surveillance file she has been reading belongs partly to another woman who also bore the name Leman Ypi ¡ª two lives entangled by bureaucratic error, both equally erased. The archive, Ypi writes, ¡°structures events in the same way grammar structures thought: regulating an amorphous mass of discourse, establishing patterns of transmission, prescribing who says what, when and with what implications.¡± To be named in those files was to have one¡¯²õ story colonized; to be absent from them was no freedom either, only a different kind of obliteration.

The book is equally attentive to the ways in which political violence deforms intimate life. Relationships ¡ª between spouses, between parents and children, between friends who may or may not be informants ¡ª are never merely private under a totalitarian regime. Asllan¡¯²õ friendship with Enver Hoxha, his school companion who went on to found the Albanian Communist Party and rule the country until 1985, is one of the book¡¯²õ most haunting threads: It shows how the personal and the political are not just adjacent but lethal when they collide. 

Ypi reconstructs, with great delicacy and uncertainty, how her grandparents¡¯ marriage ¡ª forged in elegance and cut short by arrest ¡ª was also shaped by contingencies of empire, displacement and political allegiance that neither could entirely control. The chapters on the population exchanges mandated by the Treaty of Lausanne, the Greek and Albanian borders redrawn around living people like chalk lines around bodies, capture with particular force the violence of state-imposed identity. It demonstrates how a family could find itself suddenly belonging to a nation that had not existed when its members were born, required to prove belonging in the land of their birth, stripped of property in Salonica that was now Greece¡¯²õ to dispose of. Regimes, Ypi demonstrates, do not simply oppress individuals; they reshape the conditions of love, loyalty and recognition within which persons form themselves.

And then there is the most piercing question the book poses: Who protects who we are when we die? Ypi is prompted to write, in part, by the brutal fragility of her grandmother¡¯²õ posthumous reputation ¡ª vulnerable to the cruelties of social media, to the reductions of strangers who found in a honeymoon photograph an occasion to convict. In death, Leman cannot speak for herself, cannot shape her own narrative, cannot refute the lies. Ypi frames this as a Kantian problem: Kant held that dignity is the property of rational beings capable of self-legislation, of giving the moral law to themselves. But the dead are no longer capable of self-legislation. Does that mean their dignity evaporates? Or does it persist as a demand ¡ª a claim on the living to remember rightly? ¡°Does dignity require someone¡¯²õ continuing existence ¡ª an active capacity to defend that dignity, protect it from assault, stand up in its name?¡± Ypi asks. 

Her answer, arrived at slowly and through pain, is that dignity is not merely a private possession but a relational achievement. It must be sustained by those who remain, which is why writing ¡ª imagining the truth of a life with the full awareness that imagination is not the same as documentation ¡ª becomes an act of moral obligation. The book is that act. In a remarkable coda, having discovered that the other Leman Ypi has no living descendants and exists only in the secret police files, Lea Ypi decides to adopt her too: To give her, as she puts it, ¡°the dignity of memory.¡±

Reading Indignity in this light, one cannot help but hear the resonance of a far older conflict ¡ª one that Western philosophical tradition has never entirely resolved.

The ghost of Antigone still haunts us

¡°Zeus does not / Justice does not / the dead do not / what they call law did not begin today or yesterday / when they say law they do not mean a statute of today or yesterday / they mean the unwritten unfailing eternal ordinances of the gods / that no human being can ever outrun¡±

Anne Carson ¡ª (New Directions, 2012)

In Sophocles¡¯ Antigone, Creon, the king of Thebes, decrees that the body of Polynices ¡ª Antigone¡¯²õ brother, slain in civil war ¡ª shall be left unburied, exposed to carrion birds and denied the rites that the dead require. The edict is and punitive: Creon has decided that this traitor shall not only die but be unmade, stripped of the rituals through which a community recognizes a life as having been fully human. Antigone refuses. She buries her brother in obedience to the gods¡¯ will. Divine law, older and deeper than any human ordinance, demands that the dead be honoured. When Creon demands to know how she dared transgress his edict, she answers with perfect clarity: The gods¡¯ unwritten laws are not subject to the override of any magistrate. For Antigone, there are three competing authorities ¡ª the city¡¯²õ laws, the divine order and the voice of individual conscience. When the city¡¯²õ laws violate the other two, conscience must prevail.

The parallel with Ypi¡¯²õ predicament is striking and philosophically productive. Creon¡¯²õ decree, like the Albanian communist state¡¯²õ archive, is a political act masquerading as a legal one. It is, at its core, an exercise of sovereign power that claims the authority to define reality. This man was a traitor; this woman is an enemy; this person is, by official decree, dead. Antigone¡¯²õ insistence that there is a law above the city¡¯²õ law ¡ª the unwritten law that obliges us to honour the dead ¡ª is Ypi’s insistence too, though she pursues it through secular and Kantian rather than divine coordinates. 

For Ypi, the ¡°unwritten law¡± that compels her is the moral imperative to treat persons as ends in themselves and never as mere instruments of history, ideology or bureaucratic convenience. Her grandmother ¡ª and the other Leman Ypi, the stranger she adopts ¡ª must be remembered rightly, not because God commands it but because to do otherwise would be to collude with the violence that reduced them in the first place. 

Creon¡¯²õ tragedy was his refusal to see that political authority has limits: that the city cannot claim sovereignty over the dead without doing violence to what makes the living human. Ypi¡¯²õ book enacts the same insight across four generations and half a century of Balkan catastrophe, demonstrating that the tension Sophocles dramatized ¡ª between the state¡¯²õ demand for obedience and the individual conscience¡¯²õ demand for justice ¡ª is not a problem ancient tragedy solved. It is the permanent condition of political life, and it is with us still.

Indignity is a book of unusual intellectual and moral seriousness, and of considerable beauty. It does not resolve the questions it raises. It is too honest for that. It insists instead with the force of lived and even embodied history (Erlebnis), that those questions matter: Who has the right to name us, to archive us, to decide the meaning of our lives? What do we owe the dead who cannot answer for themselves? And where, when the city¡¯²õ laws fail and the gods are silent, does individual conscience find its ground? These are Antigone¡¯²õ questions. They are also ours.

For those who would like to listen to a reading of Antigonick, the experimental translation by Anne Carson, you can find it .?

[A special thank you to Professor , Rome, ?formerly University of Bologna, who helped me connect with Antigone and find the quote from the German Constitution.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post The Dead Cannot Speak For Themselves appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

These achievements are politically because they concern not only Spanish as a language, but also what the language, music and the artist himself represent. In light of the of violent racism and civil rights against Hispanic, Latinx, Latin American and immigrant individuals in the US, both in and in , recognizing and representing these groups is of the utmost importance.

A cultural moment that challenged national narratives

Bad Bunny¡¯²õ popularity speaks to the resilience of the Latinx diaspora and the undeniable truth of a multilingual, multicultural and multiracial America. It¡¯²õ safe to assume that almost every person of Caribbean, Latinx or Latin American descent who watched the halftime show felt emotional and experienced a much-needed sense of pride.

However, US President Donald Trump as a ¡°slap in the face to our country¡± on his social media account. Based on this characterization of the show, I infer that the president recognizes the halftime show as a challenge to his idea of the nation.

Indeed, it was a slap in the face when considering what Bad Bunny¡¯²õ masterful performance challenged. The reason for the slap is not because it was ¡°terrible¡± nor because ¡°nobody understands this guy,¡± as Trump alleged. No, the performance was a slap in the face because it challenged the long-held beliefs of those who support colonialism and white supremacy.

For a country whose greatness is tied to the dispossession of indigenous populations and immigration, it served as a reality check and a historical reminder. Negating the significance of the performance shows an inability to recognize the large Spanish-speaking population in the US and a lack of insight into the shared history of the Americas.

This collective history includes the fact that indigenous populations in the Americas, including parts of the US, were by Spain before the US existed. Spanish was once a colonial language, but today, it is also a symbol of cultural rebellion against Anglo-imperialist ideals of homogeneity, especially given the racialization and criminalization of Spanish speakers.

In the same social media post mentioned earlier, Trump added that the performance ¡°made no sense.¡± However, the performance struck a chord precisely because it resonated with a large global audience and was deeply relevant to history.

From viral artist to symbol of the Americas

Through this spectacular production, Bad Bunny showed the world that America has multiple meanings and identities ¡ª and that more than one person can define them. Since he first went viral in 2016 with his SoundCloud hit ¡°¡±, and going from working in a supermarket in San Juan to the multimillionaire he is today, Bad Bunny¡¯²õ artistic persona reflects the multifaceted, complex and intersectional character of the Americas.

In one of the songs from his 2023 Nadie Sabe Lo Que Va A Pasar Ma?ana (No One Knows What Tomorrow Will Bring), called ¡°,¡± Bad Bunny tells the story of how he went from humble beginnings to attending the famous Monaco Formula 1 Grand Prix. As he says in , he is hanging out with actors like Leonardo DiCaprio and Brad Pitt, discussing topics that only billionaires can understand. During the performance hosted by the NFL, when ¡°Monaco¡± was playing, he delivered a message in Spanish directly to the camera that said, ¡°I never stopped believing in myself. You should also believe in yourself. You¡¯re worth more than you think. Believe me.¡± Minutes later, he took a moment to whisper, ¡°Puerto Rico, never stop believing in yourself.¡±

The above parallel between his own journey and that of Puerto Rico is just one example of the many tributes he has paid to his homeland since he began making albums. Bad Bunny¡¯²õ massive representation has always occurred alongside his public denunciation of Puerto Rico¡¯²õ involuntary dependency on the US.

For example, ¡°,¡± a 2018 hit, was the first of many protest songs and Puerto Rican anthems written by Bad Bunny. The song alludes to the messages that Puerto Ricans sent to their loved ones in the diaspora after the caused by Hurricane Maria, which exposed the island¡¯²õ structural neglect. These anthems, along with some of his public statements and at protests, are a lesser-known aspect of his fame. His unique, melodic, gravelly voice and his ability to blend depth and emptiness in his lyrics with Afro-Caribbean rhythms sometimes overshadow his activism. However, his cultural relevance has caught the attention of academics. Numerous panels, and have been developed around him.

In addition to taking a political stance on Puerto Rico, many of his greatest hits, such as ¡°¡± and ¡°,¡± focus on the freedom to express gender and sexuality, central themes to his popularity. All of these songs were featured in the halftime show. However, his latest album, Deb¨ª Tirar M¨¢s Fotos, was the key focus in the show¡¯²õ production. This is noteworthy because the album on the disputed history of Puerto Rican sovereignty. Given the resurgence of imperialism under the Trump administration, the fate of Puerto Rico becomes particularly relevant. This resurgence is evident in Trump¡¯²õ renewed territorial expansionist efforts, such as his interest in and his interventionism abroad, as seen in .?

Puerto Rico has remained the last occupied Spanish-speaking territory since Italian explorer Christopher Columbus set foot on the island in 1492, and the US the island from Spain in 1898. After invading the island, the US made Puerto Rico a free-associated state, granting some rights but taking many others away. These include the right to vote in US elections and, most importantly, the right to national sovereignty. In this regard, the ¡°Lo que le pas¨® a Haw¨¢i¡± or ¡°What Happened to Hawaii¡± is one of the most powerful in Deb¨ª Tirar M¨¢s Fotos, as it conveys the hope that Puerto Rico won¡¯t suffer the same fate as Hawaii and be forced into US statehood.

The nation¡¯²õ is a contested subject in Puerto Rico and the US Congress. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, for instance, has been one of the most advocates of the Self-Determination Bill, and Puerto Ricans have held displaying the complexities and divisiveness of existing in the ambiguity between statehood and self-determination. As I mentioned earlier, Bad Bunny has long advocated for Puerto Rican independence. For example, he has publicly that he ¡°would never want to see Puerto Rico become a state.¡±

Cultural pride and memory on the halftime stage

Another major theme of Bad Bunny¡¯²õ Super Bowl performance was his tribute to and recognition of the Puerto Rican, Latinx and Caribbean communities in the US. Through props and imagery, the production not only denounced a long history of resistance to cultural homogenization and erasure but also honored the profound influence of the diaspora on the US¡¯²õ cultural heritage and social fabric.

For example, Bad Bunny brought the iconic Highland Park Mexican in Los Angeles to the stage, while also paying homage to the importance of the Caribbean in New York City and to the development of Latinx music genres based there, such as salsa. During his halftime performance of ¡°,¡± the stage was designed to resemble a classic New York street, featuring a bodega next to a Dominican barbershop. The song opens with a remix of ¡°Si te quieres divertir, solo tienes que vivir un verano en Nueva York¡± by the El Gran Combo de Puerto Rico, which translates to ¡°If you want to have fun, you only have to spend one summer in New York.¡±

With all eyes on him during the performance of ¡°Nuevayol,¡± Bad Bunny sang about one of the city¡¯²õ attractions, ¡°Un shot de ca?ita en casa de To?ita,¡± as To?ita, the octogenarian heart and soul of the last Caribbean in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, handed him a drink. As he gradually became the global phenomenon he is today, Bad Bunny made rare appearances at this small social club, located in a Nuyorican neighborhood on the verge of , in the heart of trendy, homogenized Williamsburg.

Bringing To?ita to center stage at the halftime show in San Francisco embodies the struggle of Latinx and Caribbean diaspora communities against gentrification, developers, and other forms of attempts at erasure. Just as the Caribbean Social Club provides a physical and symbolic space for the hispanophone immigrant community, the opening scene of the original ¡°Nuevayol¡± music video features the Puerto Rican flag flying atop the Statue of Liberty ¡ª a well-known entry point for immigrants. In line with the overall sentiment of the song, this tribute to the 1977 Puerto Rican Nationalist of the statue also signals the legitimacy of the immigrant presence in the US.

Bad Bunny¡¯²õ portrayal of the Nuyorican experience is part of the broader history of the Puerto Rican diaspora¡¯²õ grassroots activism and art. The first large wave of Puerto Rican immigration to New York in the 1950s. This set the stage for a vibrant second generation of Nuyorican artists and activists who flourished in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, the Nuyorican Poets established a groundbreaking hub for slam poetry in the Lower East Side, and the Young Lords was a pivotal civil rights group. One of the Young Lords¡¯ most notable protests against the lack of public services in their neighborhoods occurred in 1968 when they took over a Methodist church in Harlem and converted it into a daycare center. Given this history, Bad Bunny¡¯²õ proud representation of Boricuas in the US cements his position within the long tradition of Latinx artists and activists who have fought against the neglect and of their communities while raising awareness through protest art.

Similarly to how Bad Bunny made his way into the most popular American sporting event despite the longstanding institutional exclusion of those he represents, Nuyorican and Latinx communities have historically forged numerous artistic and cultural paths. As previously mentioned, the confluence of rhythms and ethnicities in New York City¡¯²õ cultural landscape laid the groundwork for the creation of salsa, the most globally influential Latinx genre to date. Although salsa rhythms originated in Cuba and Puerto Rico, the genre did not become established until the founding of the Brooklyn-based , which made 1960¡¯²õ New York central to its formation.?

In Bad Bunny¡¯²õ Deb¨ª Tirar M¨¢s Fotos, salsa takes center stage as he blends orchestral salsa with Puerto Rican , as well as his upscale reggaeton and dembow production styles. Of all the songs on the album, ¡°,¡± meaning ¡°unforgettable dance,¡± stands out because it reinterprets and reestablishes the genre. During the halftime show, ¡°Baile Inolvidable¡± followed Lady Gaga¡¯²õ performance of a salsa-inspired version of her hit ¡°Die with a Smile.¡± Bad Bunny danced to ¡°Baile Inolvidable¡± with Lady Gaga, symbolizing a sense of binational and bilingual unity through rhythm and dance. In several early , before achieving (and maybe even surpassing) Gaga¡¯²õ global fame, Bad Bunny Lady Gaga as his biggest idol. Their Super Bowl collaboration sends a message of unity and serves as a testament to Bad Bunny¡¯²õ success story.

A moment of justice: Ricky Martin and the politics of language

His second guest was his fellow Puerto Rican, Ricky Martin. Martin is an iconic Latino artist from a previous generation who ¡°La Copa de la Vida¡± at the 1999 Super Bowl. The National Football League made him translate the song to ¡°The Cup of Life.¡± Because Ricky Martin wasn¡¯t allowed to sing in Spanish in the ¡®90s, his a cappella performance of ¡°Lo que le pas¨® a Hawaii¡± during Bad Bunny¡¯²õ halftime show has been called an ¡°.¡± This moment of vindication alone conveys the symbolic intensity of the entire show.

Right before Ricky Martin¡¯²õ emotional performance, we saw Bad Bunny give his Grammy to a young child and whisper, ¡°Puerto Rico, cree siempre en ti.¡± The camera stayed on the child for a moment, allowing us time to reflect. Some that the boy represented either Bad Bunny¡¯²õ past self or Puerto Rico. Others speculated that he was Liam Conejo Ramos, the five-year-old boy who was infamously detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and later . Although the child was an actor, the speculation sheds light on what was on people¡¯²õ minds as they watched the performance.

Shortly after the shot of the child holding the Grammy Award, Martin¡¯²õ voice is heard singing the chilling words: ¡°Quieren quitarme el r¨ªo y tambi¨¦n la playa, quieren el barrio m¨ªo y que abuelita se vaya. No sueltes la bandera,¡± which translates to ¡°They want to take my river and my beaches. They want my neighborhood and my grandma to leave. Don¡¯t let go of the flag.¡± Soon after, Bad Bunny is seen holding a large Puerto Rican flag in the middle of a sugarcane field. The flag is light blue instead of the official darker shade. Incidentally, this flag was from 1948 to 1957 due to laws intended to suppress Puerto Rican nationalism. This moment of him in the field holding the unofficial flag resonates, as stated, with his long-term making of protest anthems.

One such protest anthem is the hit ¡°¡± (or ¡°The Blackout¡±), in which a female voice states the same sentiment as in ¡°Lo que le pas¨® a Hawaii¡± with the words ¡°No me quiero ir de aqu¨ª, que se vayan ellos,¡± or ¡°I don’t want to leave, let them be the ones to go.¡± Furthermore, the official video of the song features a short documentary on the human impacts that foreign interests have had on the island.

The song ¡°El Apag¨®n¡± also has its own epic moment in the Super Bowl. As dancers dressed as sugarcane workers climb electric posts, Bad Bunny sings, ¡°Everyone wants to be Latino, but they lack flavor, energy and reggaet¨®n.¡± The 2022 version of the song is a testimony to the long-lasting aftermath of Hurricane Mar¨ªa in 2017 and the insufficient US aid that left the island without electricity for days. ¡°El Apag¨®n¡± immediately became an anthem and a form of historical memory for the island¡¯²õ neglect.

In addition to exposing the unequal and racialized distribution of public aid, the song unveils a centuries-long, systemic colonial worldview. Both ¡°Lo que le pas¨® a Hawai¡± and ¡°El Apag¨®n¡± epitomize what groundbreaking Black feminist scholar Bell Hooks termed ¡°imperialist nostalgia¡± in her 1992 Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance. This concept describes the paradox by which imperialism destroys and enslaves conquered territories while simultaneously idolizing and mystifying them as paradises to be exploited and visited, or as fashionable aesthetics to be imitated. Thus, the idea that ¡°everyone wants to be Latino¡± carries significant implications.

¡°Seguimos Aqu¨ª¡±: identity, sovereignty and the power of presence

Toward the end of the halftime show, a group of flag-holders takes the stage and surrounds the , a signature prop from his latest world tour. From the overhead camera view, we see all the flags being raised. First is the US flag, followed by the Puerto Rican flag and then the flags of all the other nations in the Americas. Throughout the show, we have seen flags emerge as a recurring theme in the symbols employed to vindicate national identity and self-determination. After focusing on the flags, the camera moves to Benito, who is grabbing a football.?

Holding the football, he begins, ¡°God bless America.¡± Then he continues, ¡°Be it Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and so on.¡± Bad Bunny made a point of acknowledging all the countries in the Americas. He did so with a traveling shot, walking toward the viewer while continuing to carry the football and looking into the camera the entire time. In the still photo of the larger composition, the flags surround him in the background. Further back, a neon sign reads, ¡°The only thing more powerful than hate is love.¡± These are the same words he when he received the 2026 Best Album Grammy, directly addressing ICE¡¯²õ actions toward immigrants and protesters. In addition to what the larger frame shows, listing all the nations asserts their identities and their right to be recognized as sovereign entities with horizontal relationships with one another.

Though not at the top, the US was included on the list of countries stretching from south to north, appearing just before Canada. After finishing the list, he held up the football he had been holding and displayed a message written on it. He then read the message aloud: ¡°Seguimos aqu¨ª,¡± which means ¡°We are still here.¡± By making a touchdown gesture with the ball, a symbol of victory, Bad Bunny physically expressed the same message written in ¡°Seguimos aqu¨ª,¡± which encapsulates the unwavering presence of Latinx communities in the face of ongoing supremacist, colonial and imperialist endeavors.

The triumphant touchdown momentarily resolved the debate over whether the halftime show was an affront or a source of pride. For at least one cinematic moment, Benito and those he represents claimed victory. ¡°Seguimos aqu¨ª¡± is written in the present tense, expressing the idea of always having been there and a sense of continuity. The surrounding the halftime show ultimately serves as a reminder of historical power struggles over narratives, such as those concerning the use of Spanish and the right to occupy spaces of representation. Despite the government and armed forces¡¯ attempts to undermine indigenous sovereignty and fundamental civil rights, Bad Bunny¡¯²õ halftime performance shone as a much-needed moment of beauty and vindication.

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So says , with a measure of defiance. She¡¯²õ someone who understands that endurance, not provocation, is her greatest transgression. She is now 67: For more than four decades, she¡¯²õ offended religious leaders, unsettled moral guardians and insulted polite society. Yet none of those affronts has proved as subversive as her refusal to exit quietly. In a culture organized around novelty and replacement, she¡¯²õ managed to weaponize longevity.

Madonna¡¯²õ career might be seen as a sequence of calculated shocks: The wedding dress writhing of ¡°,¡± the supposedly sacrilegious imagery of ¡°,¡± the BDSM themes of . A notable biography of her is subtitled . But her subversive moments, however incendiary at the time, were ephemeral. If anything, her most renegade accomplishments often went relatively unnoticed. Like earning $50 million (?26.7 million), a record for a female singer in 2004. Or selling more than 400 million records, including albums, singles and digital. Grossing more than $1.3 billion from her tours, another record. In 1992, she signed a then-unprecedented $60 million with Time Warner.

But what really distinguishes Madonna is not the intensity of any single provocation or her prodigious earnings but the cumulative force of her continued presence. She¡¯²õ outlived her critics, her imitators and many of her contemporaries. The real scandal is not what she did but that she survived so long.

Her endurance matters not simply because it is unusual but because it allowed her cultural experiment to take place. Over decades, Madonna tested the limits of exposure, turning private life into public performance until the distinction between the two appeared to dissolve. What started as provocation became a template for modern celebrity.

The zeitgeist

In February, she sat in the front row at Dolce & Gabbana¡¯²õ Milan Fashion Week , her arms wrapped around her knees, heavily tinted glasses shading eyes that have seen nearly every iteration of fame in the modern era. Leather gloves accessorized her black outfit, a theatrical flourish that harked back to her Erotica of 1992¨C93 (gloves, corsets and leather were part of the visual vocabulary she borrowed from fetish subcultures and, in that tour, repurposed for public consumption.) Across the mirrored runway, models twirled in lace and pinstripes, reflecting Madonna¡¯²õ many incarnations of the past.?

To call Madonna a diva is almost tautological. She is the very definition of a temperamental, world-renowned singer, famed for her volatile temperament and for being notoriously difficult to please. Formidable, demanding, exacting, she¡¯²õ a force as likely to exhaust collaborators as she is to enchant audiences.

Her epigones and successors ¡ª Taylor Swift, Lady Gaga, Beyonc¨¦, Ariana Grande, included ¡ª entertain, enchant, influence and inspire, yet all seem anodyne next to Madonna. None has matched her performative ferocity, her willingness to court scandal and alchemize controversy into precious metal. Forty years in, Madonna remains unrepentant, uncontainable, unyielding, the center of attention. She may no longer shape the zeitgeist on her terms, but she remains part of it.

In the 1980s, the world was barely aware of cellphones, the internet was inconceivable and social media was something English novelist H.G. Wells might have dreamt up. Madonna arrived in this landscape as a wannabe dancer who soon learned how to take the cultural pulse. She figured out that the press (as it then was) could either proclaim or annihilate her, that audiences rewarded artists who aroused as well as just entertained them, and who provided spectacle as well as song and dance. She decided to combine them all. In doing so, she did more than respond to a shifting world; she helped catalyze a further shift, scandalizing at every opportunity and dissolving the binary between private and public.

The experiment

Madonna Louise Ciccone moved to New York in 1978, a 20-year-old with nothing but ambition and a few borrowed instruments. She danced, drummed and sang with local bands before releasing her debut single ¡°¡± in 1982 and her first album, , in 1983. By 1984, her second album, , produced by Nile Rodgers, cemented her international status. The video for the title track and her at the MTV Video Music Awards in a wedding dress simulating masturbation was a foretaste of what was to come.

In 1985, few could imagine a woman deliberately inducing scandal and usually achieving the results she desired. Madonna¡¯²õ real innovation lay in recognizing something earlier entertainers had missed: Scandal had changed its meaning. No longer necessarily career-ending ¡ª as it had been in the cases of Roscoe Arbuckle, Ingrid Bergman and Errol Flynn ¡ª controversy had become a resource. Madonna didn¡¯t provoke randomly; she choreographed provocation, each gesture and outfit a calculated engagement with public sensibilities. Audiences, she seemed to conclude, actually enjoyed being outraged: the surge of anger, shock and indignation was oddly satisfying. This may appear obvious today. In the 1980s, it was radically contrarian.

Her 1989 album marked what might have been a Eureka! moment. Madonna appeared to sense that audiences would demand ever more from stars. This was before ¡¯²õ launched in 1992, allowing viewers to eavesdrop by watching what became known as reality TV. Madonna seems to have arrived at a broadly similar conclusion: Audiences were turning into peeping Toms.

Her ambition was not to shock for its own sake, but to maintain attention by disclosing more and more of what once passed as a private life ¡ª and without inhibition. Madonna became, in essence, her own living experiment in making her personal life open to inspection. Before her, entertainers like Elizabeth Taylor had, in the 1960s, allowed private lives to seep into public view via a more cautious media, but this was rare or sensational and delivered to surprised audiences by the then-nascent paparazzi. Madonna made it a career strategy, presenting her personal self as indistinguishable from her stage persona and inviting audiences to witness. Not just witness: Audiences were encouraged to judge her; condemning Madonna was integral to her success.

Like Semtex

The 1990s solidified Madonna¡¯²õ role as a cultural provocateur. The Madonna: Truth or Dare (1991) documented her tour with unprecedented candor, offering glimpses into backstage rivalries, rehearsals and intimate moments, all alongside the theatricality of her onstage performances. The film predated reality television by years, yet already anticipated its voracious appetite for the minutiae of celebrity.

Around the same period, her book Sex and the album pushed boundaries of sexual representation, blending performance, fetishism and artifice. She intentionally offended, proving unequivocally that scandal was like Semtex, a powerful explosive, but very pliable so that, handled carefully, it can be turned into different shapes. In the years that followed, Paris Hilton and Kim Kardashian corroborated this when they appeared on that would have ruined show business careers in earlier times.

Yet Madonna¡¯²õ influence went beyond shock and outrage. Critics like recognized her as a harbinger of postfeminist performance: She demonstrated how a woman could be sensual, assertive, ambitious and aggressive while curating her image in a way that conferred power. From this perspective, being sexy was a form of empowerment. Madonna¡¯²õ conquests were both commercial and symbolic, reframing what it meant to be a female entertainer in a male-dominated industry. Her affectations, from the pink cone bra to platinum blonde hair, were signifiers of her autonomy.

By the mid-1990s, Madonna was both a diva in the operatic sense and a pioneer in media literacy. Her aforementioned 1992 renegotiation with Time Warner secured her own record label. She remained a polarizing figure: The world alternately praised and disparaged her, keeping her relevant. She had transformed scandal into art and fame into an instrument of social influence. The celebrity landscape she helped sculpt is what we see all around us today.

Even into the 2000s and 2010s, Madonna¡¯²õ career reflected a Darwinian adaptability to changing environments. The 2003 MTV Video Music Awards with Britney Spears sparked a viral debate, raising questions about bisexuality. Tours such as and albums like demonstrated a willingness to collaborate with younger artists while retaining her signature sound. Her postfeminist sensibilities, rooted in self-expression and independence, carried through to her later albums and public appearances. At the 2023 Grammys, she to critics, accusing them of ¡°ageism and misogyny.¡±

Diva provocatrix

Today, Madonna¡¯²õ presence at Milan Fashion Week is emblematic of both her longevity and her continued authorship of the fame narrative. She¡¯²õ still a model for what it means to inhabit the public sphere on one¡¯²õ own terms. Unlike many successors, she hasn¡¯t become her own tribute act. She¡¯²õ refused to trade on nostalgia and strives to remain relevant. A figure whose demands, exacting nature and unyielding vision have shaped not only the entertainment industry but the very ways in which audiences understand and appreciate spectacle, Madonna evokes a reminder about the way we live ¡ª vicariously, voyeuristically, derivatively and by proxy.

Her legacy is inseparable from the media she mastered and, to be fair, was mastered by. Madonna didn¡¯t merely reflect social and technological changes ¡ª she anticipated them, attempted to manipulate them and tried to force the world to respond. It did: From MTV to social media, from the controversy of Like a Prayer to the candor of Truth or Dare, she engineered a dialogue with audiences that has altered our relationship to celebrities. Many will not think this is such a good thing.

Madonna belongs in the same pantheon as Maria Callas (1923¨C77), Judy Garland (1922¨C69) and Barbra Streisand (b. 1942), all imperious figures feared as much as revered for their exacting standards and refusal to accept reality when it failed to conform to their visions. Like them, Madonna has attracted detractors as well as worshippers, her difficulty inseparable from her distinction. Yet she added something new to the tradition: Madonna was not simply a diva but a diva provocatrix, a performer who treated outrage as an artistic medium. While there are many contemporary stars of immense wealth and visibility, none appears willing ¡ª or permitted ¡ª to embody the risk, volatility and sheer force that once defined the type. Perhaps Madonna truly is the last of them.

[Ellis Cashmore is the author of ]

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Palestinian films over the years

Palestinian films are no doubt difficult to make and hard to come by. As one can imagine, they don¡¯t have big budgets. Instead, their richness lies in the simple, moving, real stories of the daily challenging lives of ordinary Palestinians. Despite their quiet presentation, their impact on the world stage is growing louder.

The first one I saw was Israeli filmmaker Eran Riklis¡¯²õ The Lemon Tree. This 2008 film portrays the true story of a Palestinian widow¡¯²õ legal and emotional struggle when her lemon grove is threatened by the security concerns of her neighbor ¡ª the then Israeli defense minister. The film won in Europe and Australia.

British-Palestinian filmmaker Farah Nabulsi¡¯²õ (2020) follows a Palestinian father and daughter as they navigate West Bank checkpoints to buy an anniversary gift, showing quiet resilience under occupation. The film won many awards ¡ª including the Academy Award for Best Live Action Short Film and the British Academy of Film and Television Arts Award for Best Short Film.

Another film by Nabulsi, (2023), depicts a Palestinian schoolteacher struggling to balance his commitment to political resistance, his role as a father figure to his students and his newly forming relationship with a volunteer worker. The film won a long list of awards (best film, best actor, audience award, best music) at a variety of film festivals (including Belgrade, Brooklyn, Red Sea, Galway, Trondheim and San Francisco).

(2024), written and directed by Israeli-Palestinian Scandar Copti, follows interconnected Palestinian families whose secrets and strained relationships surface during the festive season, revealing tensions around love, duty and societal expectations. The film won awards in Hamburg, Marrakech, Thessaloniki, Tromso and Venice.

The year 2024 also delivered a brilliant documentary ¡ª No Other Land, the directorial debut of Basel Adra, Hamdan Ballal, Yuval Abraham and Rachel Szor ¡ª that shows the destruction of a Palestinian community in the West Bank, alongside the development of an alliance between a Palestinian activist and an Israeli journalist. Despite winning a long string of accolades at numerous (including Berlin, Chicago, Asia Pacific, Toronto, Vancouver, Washington, DC, Los Angeles and London) and even the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature Film, it had difficulty finding a US distributor.

Palestinian films of 2025

This past year has gifted us three amazing works. This, in spite of the ongoing Israeli killings in Gaza and violence in the West Bank ¡ª or perhaps because of.

Written, directed and produced by Palestinian-American Cherien Dabis, All That¡¯²õ Left of You () traces a Palestinian family¡¯²õ multigenerational journey, linking love, loss and memory as personal lives unfold against decades of displacement and political upheaval. Since receiving rave reviews and awards at global film festivals, actors Javier Bardem and Mark Ruffalo have thrown their weight behind the film. It was supposed to be filmed in Palestine, but the Gaza War necessitated a shift to neighboring countries, so the film is officially Jordan¡¯²õ entry for this year¡¯²õ Academy Awards in the International Feature Film category.

Palestine 36 (written and directed by Palestinian filmmaker Annemarie Jacir) dramatizes the 1936¨C39 Arab Revolt through the intertwined lives of Palestinians, showing how colonial rule, resistance and sacrifice reshape a society. It received a standing ovation at the Toronto International Film Festival. It was Palestine¡¯²õ official submission to the Academy, where it was shortlisted but not nominated ¡ª despite support from Hollywood stalwarts such as Susan Sarandon, Mira Nair and Julie Delpy. Israeli Police prohibited screening of the film in Israel, saying that it was promoting terrorism.

And one I am dreading to see: The Voice of :

January 29, 2024. Red Crescent volunteers receive an emergency call. A 6-year-old girl is trapped in a car under fire in Gaza, pleading for rescue. While trying to keep her on the line, they do everything they can to get an ambulance to her. Her name was .

Tunisian filmmaker Kaouther Ben Hania brings us this powerful true story, blending actual audio recordings and investigative reporting to examine civilian suffering, accountability and the very human and inhumane cost of war.

Since its premiere, several eminent personalities of the film world have thrown their weight behind the film ¡ª including Brad Pitt, Joaquin Phoenix, Rooney Mara, Spike Lee, Jonathan Glazer and Alfonso Cuar¨®n.

The Voice of Hind Rajab is Tunisia¡¯²õ official entry to the Academy ¡ª but in essence, it is the world¡¯²õ entry for justice and compassion. In Ben Hania¡¯²õ at the Venice Film Festival ¡ª where The Voice of Hind Rajab won practically every award given ¡ª she explains how she came to make the film. But her words regarding why are even more striking: ¡°I cannot accept a world where a child calls for help and no one comes. That pain, that failure, belongs to all of us. This story is not just about Gaza. It speaks to a universal grief.¡±

The nominees are¡­

The Voice of Hind Rajab has been nominated for this year¡¯²õ Academy Awards under the Best International Feature Film category.

The four other nominations under this category are no doubt noteworthy: Norway¡¯²õ entry, (situated in Norway, the story follows two adult sisters in their reunion with their estranged father); Spain¡¯²õ entry, Sirat (situated in the deserts of Morocco, it focuses on rave culture, regional conflicts and the sudden tragic vagaries of life); France¡¯²õ entry, It Was Just An (a group of former Iranian political prisoners struggle with whether to exact revenge on a man they believe may been their tormentor in jail); and Brazil¡¯²õ entry, The Secret Agent (situated in 1977, a former professor joins other political dissidents to resist the military dictatorship).

But for me, The Voice of Hind Rajab stands alone in its impact. Perhaps it¡¯²õ because I¡¯ve seen the plight of Palestinian children over the years; some are listed by the UN Relief and Works Agency as refugees. Perhaps it¡¯²õ because I¡¯ve read the statistics that some children are estimated to have been killed or maimed in the most recent war. Perhaps it¡¯²õ because, as a mother and a grandmother, I can imagine one of my own children when young or one of my grandchildren now as Hind Rajab: alone, terrified, hopelessly trapped in an unnecessary, cruel, tragic situation. Perhaps it¡¯²õ because the story is true and the voice we hear is indeed that of six-year-old Hind Rajab.

And the winner is¡­

Since the beginning of the most recent war in October 2023, more than Palestinians ¡ª including more than 20,000 children ¡ª have been killed in Gaza. During that same period, in the West Bank ¡ª where there is no official war ¡ª some 1,055 Palestinians have been killed, including 230 children.

And despite the apparent ceasefire, the persecution of the Palestinian people continues. Since October 2025, ¡° have been killed, and 1630 injured.¡± There is still a : 77% of the population faces food insecurity, and over 200,000 children face acute malnutrition in 2026. Israel continues to restrict of the critically ill (including children) from Gaza. Some 20,000 Palestinians want to cross the Rafah border from Gaza into Egypt to access medical treatment; Israel has only allowed some 200 to do so. The comprehensive air, land and sea that Israel imposed on Gaza in 2007 continues.

In the face of corrupt and immoral powers, it seems as if there is nothing we can do to stop the ongoing oppression, starvation, killing and, indeed, slow extermination of the Palestinian people. The least we can do is hear their voices before they die ¡ª or in this case, as they die.

Whether the Academy will hear Hind Rajab¡¯²õ voice, we¡¯ll know on March 16.

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The current American way of death is built on an avoidable lie. We¡¯re conditioned to believe that a respectful farewell requires a sealed metal casket, a concrete vault and a body injected with harsh, carcinogenic chemicals. But this ¡°toxic funeral¡± is neither ancient, globally common nor legally required. It is a largely 19th-century American invention ¡ª a post-Civil War marketing success story that has morphed into a destructive industrial standard.

The environmental and economic toll of a toxic tradition

The environmental of this approach are staggering. Annually, the traditional US burial system commits approximately 4.3 million gallons of formaldehyde-based fluid (a chemical preservative and potential carcinogen), 20 million board feet of hardwoods and 1.6 million tons of concrete to the earth. 

Our have become ecological dead zones, meticulously manicured lawns maintained with fertilizer and gasoline, turning sacred ground into resource-intensive, land-guzzling monuments to vanity.

The financial cost is equally . With the median cost of a conventional funeral easily approaching $10,000, the industry has successfully corporatized grief, turning a moment of spiritual significance into a high-pressure sales transaction. 

Crucially, the centerpiece of this system ¡ª embalming ¡ª is not legally required in the vast majority of the US. Green burial simply adheres to existing law while rejecting these costly, optional industrial standards.

Reclamation: grieving with integrity

Choosing a is, for many, an act of spiritual integrity and social defiance against the funeral-industrial complex. It allows the final disposition to reflect a life lived with environmental consciousness, bringing us back to the traditions practiced by most of the world and much of human history.

For faiths like and , some elements of green burial align well with their mandates: immediate burial, nonembalming and simple shrouds to facilitate the swift return of the body to the earth. Beyond formal religion, natural burial has profound therapeutic value. 

The process the ritual from a sterile viewing in a distant funeral home to a family-led event, offering a deeply therapeutic experience that allows for an active, meaningful ¡°continuing bond¡± with the deceased. It is a return to an affordable, dignified and democratic way to say goodbye.

The global context and rising adoption

The philosophy behind green burial is not revolutionary; it is a . Many cultures, particularly in Africa and Asia, practice natural burial out of necessity, religious obligation or deep tradition. In Western nations such as the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the natural burial movement is well established, with hundreds of certified sites. 

Germany has seen significant growth in ¡°sanctuary forests¡± or , where ashes are interred at the base of trees, providing a space-efficient and beautifully sustainable alternative. In the US, all states technically permit green burial, as embalming is generally optional. However, states are now creating specific, supportive regulatory frameworks for dedicated sites. 

The is expanding rapidly, with states like California, Washington, Texas and New York seeing a significant in the establishment of hybrid and dedicated natural burial cemeteries. This reflects the reality that the primary hurdle is no longer the law itself, but overcoming inertia and the deep-seated resistance of the conventional funeral industry.

The power of perpetual protection (conservation burial)

The most impactful form of this is the Conservation Burial Ground (CBG). This model moves far beyond simply reducing harm; it actively protects and restores land in perpetuity.

In a , one¡¯²õ final resting place becomes a living memorial. Burial fees are directly channeled into the long-term stewardship of the land. Legal agreements, often in the form of a conservation easement held by a land trust, permanently restrict future development. 

The burial native habitat restoration, enhances biodiversity and sequesters carbon. The intentional shallow depth of burial maximizes aerobic decomposition and nutrient cycling, directly benefiting the surrounding ecosystem. It is a final act that is regenerative rather than extractive.

Addressing concerns and moving forward

As with any shift in cultural practice, have been raised, primarily focusing on public health and land use. Critics often express fears that unembalmed bodies could contaminate groundwater or be exhumed by animals. 

However, scientific studies and the experience of centuries of natural burial globally that when basic, common-sense regulations are followed ¡ª such as proper burial depth and mandated setbacks from water sources, which many states already have ¡ª  the risks are negligible. 

Furthermore, the concern over land use is easily dismissed by the Conservation Burial model, which turns the land from an ecologically inert lawn into a perpetually protected, biodiverse preserve. Momentum is building for the greening of burial practices. 

The National Funeral Directors Association (NFDA) that over 60% of consumers are interested in exploring green funeral options. However, there are still many obstacles to overcome, such as:

• Awareness and Accessibility: The primary remains a lack of public knowledge and the slow adoption by the established funeral industry. Many consumers and funeral directors remain largely unaware of green burial as a legal, accessible option, leading to a gap between consumer interest and provider availability.
  
• Regulatory Inertia and Zoning: Zoning laws and municipal ordinances were written for the conventional, lawn-park model. Adapting these regulations to accommodate the ¡°wilder,¡± natural look of a CBG political advocacy and legal innovation.
  
• The Future of Deathcare: The industry¡¯²õ response includes the rise of hybrid cemeteries that dedicate specific sections to natural burial, and the development of new alternatives, such as human composting (natural organic reduction), which are gaining in several states.

The only real concerns are navigating the lack of a uniform definition ¡ª leading to ¡°greenwashing¡± by some conventional providers ¡ª and the challenge of zoning laws, which were simply not written to the ¡°wilder,¡± natural look of a conservation site.

The green burial movement is poised to reshape the funeral industry. It proves that the final disposition of the human body can be a regenerative act. The choice is clear: We can continue to bury our loved ones in an expensive, polluting box, or we can choose to return them to the earth to enrich the living land they walked upon, leaving behind a legacy of conservation instead of consumption.

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Childhood lessons and the making of an educator

Wojcicki traces her philosophy back to her early years. Born in New York City to parents from Ukraine and Siberia, she grew up navigating multiple languages and cultures before her family relocated to Los Angeles. School quickly became a site of tension. She recalls being punished for helping classmates with their work, behavior that teachers labeled cheating. After repeated paddlings and being forced to sit under a teacher¡¯²õ desk, she remembers making a quiet promise to herself: ¡°When I grow up, I¡¯m going to change everything.¡±

That childhood vow shaped her career. After graduating from UC Berkeley and earning a journalism degree in the 1960s and 1970s, she encountered a profession largely closed to women outside the ¡°women¡¯²õ section.¡± She refused to confine herself to writing about cooking or cosmetics, and so she pivoted to education. In 1984, she launched a journalism program at Palo Alto High School, creating a classroom built on student agency rather than rigid obedience.

Wojcicki considers early childhood experiences to be formative. Personality and confidence, she argues, are shaped from the earliest years, not in adulthood.

The TRICK framework: trust over control

At the center of the conversation is Wojcicki¡¯²õ parenting TRICK model: Trust, Respect, Independence, Collaboration and Kindness. Through her app and advisory work, she encourages parents worldwide to adopt these principles.

Trust means believing children are capable of responsibility. Respect involves listening seriously to their ideas. Independence requires allowing them to attempt tasks on their own. Collaboration replaces dictation with dialogue. Kindness frames all interactions. These principles, she contends, are not ideological but developmental. Regardless of political orientation, parents want children who function well, think critically and adapt creatively.

Wojcicki insists the method works, pointing to her three daughters and generations of students as evidence. More importantly, she sees TRICK as a preventive response to what she calls a growing epidemic of anxiety and depression. Excessive control breeds fragility. When parents micromanage children¡¯²õ lives, those children struggle to manage themselves.

Depression, politics and a culture of fear

The discussion turns stark when Wojcicki cites a troubling statistic: 54% of US college freshmen are clinically depressed. To her, this reflects a deficit in coping skills. ¡°[They] aren¡¯t deficient in some kind of pill,¡± she says. ¡°[They] just don¡¯t know how to cope with life.¡± Medication may have its place, but she believes it cannot substitute for resilience built through experience and responsibility.

Campani raises structural pressures: accelerated university timelines, economic precarity and a culture obsessed with efficiency. Wojcicki widens the lens further, pointing to global political instability, rising authoritarian rhetoric and social polarization. Young people, she argues, absorb the anxiety around them. When leaders challenge democratic norms and public discourse turns hostile, the future appears uncertain. Students question whether education leads to opportunity or whether climate change and political turmoil will override their efforts.

Wojcicki believes that fear has seeped into everyday parenting. Where she once walked a mile to kindergarten alone, many parents today drive children to school and escort them into their classrooms. Campani recounts a similar experience she had in Switzerland, where she was told her child could not walk a short distance to school independently. This pattern reveals a self-perpetuating ¡°monster¡± of fear that feeds on itself.

Responsibility as resilience

Wojcicki returns to practical measures. If adults are anxious, they must resist transmitting that anxiety. Granting children meaningful responsibility, even small chores, builds competence and self-esteem. Trust communicates belief. Independence communicates capability.

She emphasizes that children who are allowed to navigate manageable risks develop confidence. Those constantly shielded may feel protected but often internalize doubt about their own abilities. The rise of food delivery services and digital convenience has further reduced opportunities for self-reliance. Teaching teenagers to cook, manage money and move through the world independently becomes a quiet act of empowerment.

TRICK is not na?ve optimism. It is a strategy for raising emotionally strong individuals in unstable times. In a world she describes as turbulent and, at times, frightening, the answer is deeper trust. By fostering critical thinking, collaboration and kindness, parents and educators can equip the next generation not only to endure uncertainty but to reshape it.

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Since the then-Prince¡¯²õ decision to grant an to BBC television in 2019 to discuss his relationship with Jeffrey Epstein, his life has been sliced open and examined forensically. The interview caused a reputational cataclysm, making Andrew appear aloof and indifferent. After that, the media have examined and interpreted his every gesture and treated every silence as evidence. The police have acted decisively and pitilessly. Where once a public would have looked away to avoid witnessing the impropriety, they have glared intently and without inhibition.

There¡¯²õ no protective shield of deference, no instinctive reluctance to look too closely. Instead, there¡¯²õ a degree of disclosure that would once have been unthinkable: Continuous, intimate and often unforgiving. The House of Windsor, once cushioned by mystique, is now consumed as spectacle ¡ª global spectacle. This transformation didn¡¯t occur suddenly, nor can it be attributed to a spontaneous change in journalistic policy, the rise of the tabloids or global satellite broadcasting, though all these contributed to the cultural shift of the 1980s.

This transformation occurred when Diana appeared. Young, photogenic and emotionally legible, she didn¡¯t merely join the royal family; she altered its relationship with the media and thus its visibility. When that changed, so did everything else. The protocol unraveled, and the monarchy has struggled to manage ever since.

Royal mystique

Before Diana, the royal family was presented like characters in a No?l Coward play: elegant, composed and emotionally self-contained. They were visible but inaccessible; ever-present yet remote; simultaneously touchable and untouchable. The media reported on ceremonies, births and funerals, but rarely intruded on private emotional affairs. Royals were not expected to reveal themselves. Their authority depended, in large part, on their opacity and mystique. They were less individuals than personifications of majesty.

Elsewhere, however, a new and more invasive form of journalism had begun to develop. In postwar Italy, freelance photographers adopted aggressive tactics to capture candid images of famous figures, most notably Elizabeth Taylor, whose life the media turned into a scandalous spectacle for audiences around the world in the 1960s. The paparazzi, as they came to be known, transformed the relationship between public figures and the media. Privacy became provisional, subject to negotiation or violation depending on commercial value. Yet Britain¡¯²õ royal family remained largely insulated from this development. Even the publication of photographs showing in intimate circumstances with Roddy Llewellyn in 1976 represented a disturbance or a crack in the royal mystique ¡ª depending on perspective. The monarchy absorbed the shock and resumed its usual stately equilibrium.

Diana¡¯²õ arrival coincided with wider cultural changes that would make such equilibrium impossible to sustain. The 1980s witnessed the rapid expansion of celebrity culture, fueled by global television, mass-circulation magazines and a growing appetite for personality-driven narratives. Fame itself was becoming democratized and commodified. Diana entered royal life not as a seasoned media strategist but as a young ¾±²Ô²µ¨¦²Ô³Ü±ð whose emotional openness aligned, perhaps unwittingly, with this newly-developing environment. The traditional reserve of royalty was alien to her: She allowed audiences glimpses of vulnerability, loneliness, uncertainty and emotional wounds, all the time offering a new kind of pleasure ¡ª guiltless eavesdropping.

Her closest counterpart was not another royal but iconic pop star Madonna, whose ascent during the same decade exemplified a new kind of fame built on continuous exposure, uninterrupted scandal and perpetual reinvention. Madonna¡¯²õ attention-acquisition seemed to have a strategy, while Diana¡¯²õ usually appeared reactive. Both women thrived by making common cause with a media that rewarded accessibility and a certain narrative tension. Both blurred the boundary between private experience and public performance. Diana didn¡¯t overwhelm the media with drama and narrative; however, by making herself visible and accessible, she normalized a new conception of the monarchy as an august institution, but one that could be seen and understood through the same interpretive lens as celebrity.

Fairytale

Diana¡¯²õ marriage to then-Prince Charles III was presented explicitly as a fairytale, not as retrospective embellishment but as contemporary cultural framing. On its wedding-day front page, the Daily Mirror described the occasion as ¡°the fairytale wedding,¡± while publishers quickly consolidated the narrative in longer form, including a 1982 biography of Diana subtitled .

When the marriage began to unravel, the media did not abandon this narrative so much as invert it. Headlines lamented that ¡°the fairytale is over,¡± preserving the story¡¯²õ mythic structure even as its emotional valence shifted. Diana remained the innocent protagonist, while Camilla Parker Bowles (now Queen Camilla) ¡ª cast as ¡°the other woman¡± ¡ª assumed the role of antagonist. The monarchy had been translated into the language of folklore.

Diana¡¯²õ own actions reinforced this construction. Her willingness to cooperate with journalists, to communicate indirectly through carefully timed disclosures and, ultimately, to submit to the now-notorious with Martin Bashir in 1995 marked a decisive break with royal precedent. No member of the royal family had ever spoken so candidly, or so publicly, about intimate emotional pain. The interview did more than reveal personal suffering: It redefined expectations of the monarchy. Audiences no longer saw them as protected.

Bashir, it was later learned, had procured the Diana interview using ethically questionable methods. He would later conduct similarly revealing with Michael Jackson, another global figure whose life became inseparable from media scrutiny. While there is no moral equivalence between the two interviews, taken together, they suggest that, by the mid-1990s, royalty and celebrity occupied the same symbolic terrain. Both were subject to the same processes of exposure, interpretation and commodification. Diana stood at the center of this convergence. She was not merely its most visible casualty but its most consequential catalyst.

Her death in 1997 marked the end of her life but not the end of her influence. If anything, her absence intensified her symbolic presence. The extraordinary public grief that followed revealed the depth of emotional investment she had inspired. Millions mourned not simply a princess but a figure they felt they knew intimately. The monarchy, by contrast, appeared uncertain, its traditional reserve suddenly out of step with public expectation. The institution that had once defined the terms of its own visibility now struggled to respond to forces beyond its control.

The logic of celebrity

In the decades since , the media environment she helped shape has expanded and intensified. The rise of digital platforms has accelerated the circulation of images and narratives, while audiences have become active participants in the construction and dissemination of scandal. The royal family now exists in a system that rewards exposure and punishes concealment. Transgression is both condemned and consumed. Public figures are elevated, scrutinized and, when they falter, subjected to ritualized humiliation.

This dynamic has affected Diana¡¯²õ sons. Prince Harry has adapted to the logic of celebrity, relocating to the United States and engaging directly with media institutions that his mother helped legitimize as sites of royal storytelling. His wife, Meghan, Duchess of Sussex, brought with her an understanding of media culture shaped outside the constraints of monarchy. Together, they have navigated a world in which royal identity is still a constitutional status, but one that amplifies narrative consequence.

While some royals have adapted and evolved in the ecosystem, others have fared less successfully. Andrew, once secure within the protective structures of , has found himself exposed to the same unforgiving scrutiny faced by disgraced celebrities in other fields. His fall from public grace illustrates the extent to which royal status no longer guarantees insulation from reputational collapse. Despite maintaining his innocence, Andrew has been treated not as a prince apart, but as a public figure subject to the full force of media scrutiny and legal process.

In February, Mountbatten-Windsor was into custody by police following a raid at his Sandringham home, the episode captured by photojournalists. He is the first senior member of the royal family to be detained by authorities in circumstances of this kind since was taken prisoner in 1647.

The death of Elizabeth II removed the last enduring link to the era before this transformation. Her reign had provided continuity and an element of stability, preserving the appearance that the monarchy existed above media attention. Her successor, Charles ¡ª Andrew¡¯²õ brother, of course ¡ª now presides over an ancient institution that must operate on a modern cultural landscape, one in which visibility is a necessity and can be a liability.

Diana¡¯²õ legacy lies in the terrain she transformed: Her influence continues to shape how monarchy and media interact. The manner in which she conducted her life and her relaxed relationship with journalists meant that the distance between the monarchy and the media would diminish during her life and keep diminishing after her death. The consequences of this change continue to unfold. 

Would a more deferential media even approach a subject that could have alienated consumers as easily as it could have excited them? Andrew was never the most popular figure in the royal family, but some could have bridled at the sensationalism afforded his apparent errancy. It¡¯²õ doubtful that a police force in earlier times would have whisked Andrew away from his home to a police station for questioning and returned him home in a manner befitting a bank robbery suspect. These are hypotheticals, but not unanswerable: No, in all cases. It¡¯²õ difficult to imagine the Mountbatten-Windsor scandal unfolding as it has before, say, 1990. 

Audiences today are fascinated by rule-breaking but equally by its baleful consequences. Our curiosity isn¡¯t natural but cultivated, and nowadays participatory, sustained by social media tech that allows constant observation and interaction. The royal family, once insulated by reverence, now exists as a permanent object of scrutiny, its struggles consumed as both cautionary parables but, more usually, plain entertainment. We¡¯re enthralled by the prospect of an English prince entangled in an international web of patriarchal exploitation and leaked documents on investment opportunities.

Diana may be gone, but the conditions she helped create remain. She altered not only the monarchy¡¯²õ relationship with the media but the public¡¯²õ relationship with the monarchy. And perhaps the monarchy itself. The House of Windsor no longer exists as a realm apart. It is part of the same unforgiving system that governs all modern fame. Andrew¡¯²õ case illustrates the final consequence of Diana¡¯²õ revolution: monarchy no longer stands apart from celebrity culture. It operates inside it ¡ª exposed to its volatility, dependent on its visibility and vulnerable to its judgments.

[Ellis Cashmore is the author of ,? published by Bloomsbury.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Diana¡¯²õ Ghost Haunts Britain¡¯²õ Royals appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

The intellectual of the 21st century finds himself between a hammer and an anvil. On the one hand, there is freedom of choice and the broad availability of media representing all political orientations and formats, from full-fledged printed newspapers to bloggers with no professional journalistic training.

On the other hand, the emergence of a phenomenon of mass entry into journalism gives rise to autonomous branches of propaganda, whose breadth is equally vast: from old state newspapers to influencers who may lack strong analytical abilities, but who nevertheless possess inherited public trust from the past and a talent for engagement.

As a result, even such powerful authoritarian systems as President Vladimir Putin¡¯²õ Russia are unable to control and turn into a single mouthpiece of propaganda not only liberal and opposition Russian media and opinion leaders, but even media loyal to the regime itself.

The resulting picture is this: numerous pro-Putin Russian bloggers, independent of federal channel institutions, are able to simultaneously convey different emotional tones to the actions of the authorities, creating meanings without crossing into the opposing camp.

Mythology from below: autonomous propaganda

One blogger, well-read in Russian history, may take Ivan the Terrible¡¯²õ Oprichnina ¡ª as a result of which the tsar acquired the full scope of a punitive apparatus for terror against the elites of that time ¡ª and link it to the case when, in the early 2000s, Putin began a the oligarchs of the ¡°¡± (a clan of businessmen united around Boris Yeltsin), in particular against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who financed .

Without delving into the details, our fictional blogger may fervently compare Putin to Ivan the Terrible. And the image he creates of Putin as a ¡°fighter against traitors,¡± or, in a more literary form, a ¡°purifier of the Russian land,¡± has every chance to become fixed and crystallize into a myth.

Especially if one takes into account the of a monument to Ivan the Terrible in Vologda on November 4, 2025, and the prevailing attitude of the Russian people toward oligarchs. According to , 43% of Russians are unequivocally opposed to the presence of oligarchs in politics.

From another, more sober perspective, Khodorkovsky was simply a rather successful businessman who was in negotiations with , an international giant, for a $6.5 billion deal and a stake in his company. Putin¡¯²õ actions, meanwhile, were more likely reactive behavior, provoked by the factors of the upcoming presidential elections, a strategy of political survival and personal prejudices against the oligarchic ¡°Family.¡±

As a result, at that time, publications began to appear in the press, both international and Russian, with headlines such as ¡°an attack on business.¡± All of this, to put it mildly, does not lead to investment or to easing the conduct of business in Russia.

Further on, from another intellectual angle but with similar convictions, a blogger may equate Putin¡¯²õ rule in the economic sphere and neoliberalism, basing such judgments on a style of governance grounded in the suppression of elite groups in order to strengthen power.

Under former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, these were trade union leaders and members of her party; under Putin, oligarchs and opposition parties. The resulting image is that of a tough, classical liberal. , one of the last reformers before the Russian Civil War, is also often invoked.

And once again, the fictional blogger leads the reader onto the pages of myth, where there is no place for truth about the relationship between the state and business without the analogies of myth-making.

Upon closer examination, the myth of Putin as an economic liberal, ready for harsh measures to rid the market of politicization, does not withstand the facts. Together with his community of security officials, the curtailment of the oligarchs¡¯ economic power precisely in order to remain . Putin facilitated this through the destruction of Khodorkovsky, who financed the opposition, and through a strategy of winning elections by exploiting toward oligarchs.

As can be seen, in reality, Putin had no plan to construct an economic philosophy of market and law in the new Russia. And while neoliberalism and Thatcherism carry ideas of the primacy of the market over the state, Putin, wishing to preserve his security officials from manipulations against oligarchs, suppresses business for electoral success.

Through his real actions, Putin delivers the final blow to the myth, leaving only the image and a political-technological design.

Mythology from above: state propaganda

If in the previous case the myth arose ¡°from below,¡± through the numerous interpretations of bloggers and commentators, thereby distancing us from the truth, there also exists a phenomenon opposite in its motivation ¡ª when a myth is constructed ¡°from above.¡±

The myth is constructed through institutions that deliberately shape symbolic meaning. In the second case, the myth ceases to be merely an emotional narrative and becomes an instrument of political design. Let¡¯²õ illustrate motivation with an example from art:

For genuine conservatives, the value of classical art lies in the traditions of painting. They will create or purchase works by those artists who strive to reproduce the techniques of the old masters and to make copies not for the sake of copying itself, but for the sake of preserving traditional techniques. Here lies a deep metaphor of symbolism that, in this case, explains the features of conservatism.

When repainting a work by an old master, we primarily strive to replicate the technical methods and the master¡¯²õ tradition. Only afterward do we think of the painting as a copy. The opposite extreme is the purchase of so-called ¡°kitsch¡± paintings. Such art often has only one aim: to oppose contemporary art while hiding behind the myth of the great art of the past, without any connection to the real traditions of that past.

Here we encounter a new function of myth, also inherent in politics: an appeal to nonexistent traditions. To myths of forgotten customs, resurrected by propaganda and appearing morally outdated for the modern world. A tradition that does not unite contemporary people is a dead tradition. In politics, such an approach, with its appeal to ancient traditions, is considered crudely nonconservative.

In the case of Russia under the authoritarian rule of Putin¡¯²õ regime, this practice shifts into the mode of propaganda. Since the time of Yeltsin, the appeal as a ¡°centuries-old tradition¡± has ignored the fact that the institutional fabric of the Russian Church was destroyed in the 20th century, and that the religious practice of the majority of Russians today does not correspond to the model presented by the authorities as a ¡°historical norm.¡±

After the Revolution of 1917 and the persecution of the Church, people, in order to survive, were forced to remain silent about their past and their family religious traditions. And despite the restoration of churches after World War II, Orthodoxy in the USSR remained largely within , with a loose and selective set of religious rules.

This made it possible to preserve Orthodoxy: according to surveys, about of Russians identify as Orthodox. However, only 10% attend religious services at least once a month. Among the youth, the connection to religion is even more ephemeral: fewer than 34% of those aged 18¨C25 consider themselves Orthodox.

This delivers a visible blow to the myth of Russia¡¯²õ religious tradition. For a tradition that does not unite contemporary people slowly dies. Today¡¯²õ reality is such that religion occupies a symbolic, but not a practical, place in the spiritual and personal enrichment of Russians.

Result: a political institution is created that, as a result of its history, has lost the ability to rely on tradition. It now stands on an imitation of tradition, which does not lead to the unification of society.

Philosophical result: the creation by the authorities of a myth of traditions is dangerous, first of all, because it substitutes the concept of ¡°tradition¡± with myth. As a result, an illusion of a strong society rooted in tradition is created. In reality, however, dead traditions hinder the formation of human associations and, subsequently, of civil society.

The absence of ¡°civil society¡± plays directly into the hands of any dictator or autocrat of the Putin type. Today, thanks to the illusion of a strong, traditional society created in Russia, propaganda can justify even the most horrifying adventures, such as the war in Ukraine, which under the pretext of ¡°protecting the Russian Church and language,¡± without taking into account the reality of traditions in Ukraine and relying solely on the myth created within Russia.

Reflections on the method of symbolism

The paradox: by recognizing myths of perception, formed at different levels of propaganda (systemic media, bloggers), as false, we risk endangering other people¡¯²õ right to the otherness of judgment.

At the same time, an unspoken law of intellectuals states that emotions derived from figurative creativity correlate only weakly with a realistic understanding of politics, since they are instruments for creating myth. Thus, a question arises from this paradox: how are we to seek truth in a world where an established myth of perception intertwines with the political tradition of symbolism and the right to dissent?

We cannot eliminate emotions and personal judgments from the linguistic practice of politics. As , politics is the highest sphere of the community. By a political community, Aristotle understood a union of people that includes all smaller unions and exists for the sake of the highest good. After all, what is good in one action for a single individual can become a potential good for the entire state.

Yet emotions and symbolic thinking, surprisingly, can also lead to good. For example, by reinterpreting what is happening through art, we can generate new, interesting perspectives and methods of inquiry. But can we also reinterpret it for the highest union itself, for the understanding of the political?

For practice, let us consider an example of a thought experiment using the method of symbolism. Through a method of topologizing the categories of history, sociology and politics, we combine them with metaphors from art, which replaces, in our consciousness, definitions of political categories with images, opening the path to pure cognition of the features of the object under analysis. Let us begin the experiment and take musical genres as metaphors:

Russian waltzes are regime propagandists. Russian marches are the right-wing opposition. Russian absurdist theater is the left-wing opposition. Historically, the theater of the absurd was in Russia and arrived there from abroad. In the same way, the Russian opposition, hiding abroad from Putin, loses trust within the country.

The result of the symbolic analysis: we obtain a new characteristic of the left-wing opposition in Russia (distrust on the part of Russians) while reflecting on musical genres. Such an analysis can also be applied to more complex phenomena. Its main goal is to help thought look at old things through new concepts, which fits perfectly into the work of the intellectual.

And in answering the question of this section, it is necessary to view the task of ¡°debunking myths¡± without the prism of myths themselves. In a world of information as fast and fluid as shifting sand, it is difficult to get to the truth simply by discarding false options.

The modern intellectual needs not so much a new method as a new strategy of work, a strategy for preserving concepts and ideas. And in order to protect oneself from crisis while doing so, the method of symbolism described above helps to develop ideas through a strategy of acquisition without destruction.

Politics: The path of creativity

The duty and principal challenge of Eastern European conservatives lies in whether they are able to reinterpret the myth of Putin in such a way as to cleanse it of falsehood, while at the same time preserving a space for symbolic thinking, without losing creativity and tolerance for ideas.

In other words, to protect conservatism from the danger of turning into a mythical cult, which threatens our desire to preserve the intellectual tradition of symbolism represented by multifaceted images ranging from Hobbes¡¯²õ Leviathan to the Ship of Theseus.

Thanks to this tradition, conservatism retains the deep inner meaning of literature and the depth of imagery. In contrast to this symbolic method stands the desire to simplify and fix the image of the political in a way that would be convenient for propagandists, for example: ¡°Putin is the savior of Europe¡± or ¡°Putin is the defender of traditional values.¡±

The duty of Russian thinkers, meanwhile, is to free Orthodoxy from the propagandistic myth of an ¡°eternal tradition¡± and to grant it the respect it deserves within the framework of a real tradition of memory and respect for the past.

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Myth or Symbol: What Shapes the Image of Russia¡¯²õ Traditions? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Debord¡¯²õ most famous was?The Society of the Spectacle (1967), in which he defined modern consumer culture as a public show of mediated images, separating human beings from genuine life. His main insight was that the world in the premodern era was characterized by direct, tangible involvement, now replaced by the passive, indirect consumption of reproduced reality. Think Andy Warhol, who turned Campbell or the photos of into an art form of images without any original production, in other words, no aura. In his day, the main culprit was advertising. In our day, we have much more to worry about: deep fakes, AI, teenage suicide caused by body shaming, internet addiction of all types, cultural conformity and its opposite, silo cultures, podcast populism and much, much more.

Debord¡¯²õ inspiration led to , the study of how our environment affects our perception. The of Nancy Guthrie, mother of TV¡¯²õ?Today?show cohost Savannah Guthrie, is a perfect illustration of this phenomenon. This true crime case, followed now by millions every day on television and the internet, began when Guthrie failed to show up at church on February 1. When friends raised the alarm, local law enforcement, the FBI, then the national media converged.

The official line was that Nancy was taken from her home against her will. Days later, investigators managed to recover doorbell camera footage that shows a masked person at her front door, gloved and apparently armed, tampering with the camera before it went dark. Engineers at Google dug into ¡°residual data¡± beyond the reach of backend systems to retrieve the images after an initial assumption that the video had been deleted due to an unpaid subscription.

The clip instantly became a national media sensation, looped on cable and sliced into bits for social platform dissemination. The disappearance of an elderly woman was turned into a serialized thriller. The mystery of what happened is quite simple. She was taken, and her family wants her back. But the story that has ballooned around the case is anything but simple. It became, in Debord¡¯²õ terminology, a spectacle involving public compassion, voyeurism, conspiracy and self-reproduction, so tangled that investigators had to spend significant time sifting not only through evidence but also through the fun-house mirror of public distortion. In Debord¡¯²õ language, authentic social life was replaced by a pseudoworld of appearances, in which news consumers became passive observers of their own projections.

Within days of Nancy¡¯²õ disappearance, began arriving, not to the family, but to media outlets. A local station in Tucson receiving a detailed email claiming to be from her kidnappers, with information about damage to a floodlight and the location of an Apple Watch in Nancy¡¯²õ house, details that appeared to match the crime scene. The celebrity gossip site TMZ said it had received a note demanding millions of dollars in Bitcoin for her safe return, to be sent to a specific, verified cryptocurrency wallet.

At least one man, Derrick Callella, was and charged with sending fake ransom texts to Nancy¡¯²õ daughter Annie and her husband, messages prosecutors said had nothing to do with the actual kidnappers but were rather an attempt to profit. The man has since been released on bail pending trial following an initial court appearance.?

Meanwhile, the Pima County Sheriff¡¯²õ Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have repeatedly urged the public to stop treating tip lines like chat rooms. After the FBI released the doorbell footage, officials asked people to call 911 or local nonemergency numbers only with actionable information and directed everyone else to online portals and dedicated tip numbers.  

In one sense, the Guthrie case is statistically extraordinary. In 2025, there were more than 49,000 kidnappings and abductions reported in the US, while only about of the victims were 50 or older, and just 145 cases involved people in Nancy¡¯²õ age group of 80 to 89. Only about 9% of all kidnappings that year were committed by strangers. But the same visibility that might help bring Nancy home attracts hoaxers, grifters, armchair detectives and people for whom other people¡¯²õ pain is just another genre of entertainment.

The FBI has now plastered her image and that of the masked figure on her porch, across the country, and has raised the reward to . The Guthrie investigation now unfolds on two fronts: the physical search for an 84-year-old woman, and the digital management of a frenzied news cycle.

Now three weeks in, the picture is at once clearer and more unsettling. After a forensic review of the Nest video, the FBI now describes the suspect as a man between 5¡¯9¡± and 5¡¯10¡± tall, of average build, carrying a black Ozark Trail Hiker Pack backpack, a Walmart house brand that investigators are trying to trace through purchase records and other surveillance footage.?DNA that does not belong to Nancy or to people known to be in close contact with her has been from her property, possibly from gloves and other items found within several miles of her home, and is now being tested. Authorities say they have received more than combined leads.

On a recent night, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) trucks and forensic vans filled a street about two miles from Guthrie¡¯²õ home as law enforcement executed a search warrant at a house linked to the investigation. Roads were blocked off for hours. One man was questioned and released; at the FBI¡¯²õ request, local authorities have said almost nothing about what, if anything, they found. In other words, the case keeps generating drama, but not resolution. We have seen this before.

Lindbergh and the birth of the kidnapping spectacle

This is not the first time an American kidnapping has become a national obsession. It may, however, be one of the clearest cases yet of what happens when crime, celebrity and the business model of modern media fully converge.

Long before doorbell cameras and true-crime television, the US experienced what many historians consider its first modern media kidnapping, the of Charles Lindbergh Jr., the 20-month-old son of aviator , in 1932.

Lindbergh was arguably the most famous man in America. The solo transatlantic flight ¡ª navigating by dead reckoning from New York to Paris in 1927 ¡ª turned ¡°Lucky Lindy¡± into an international icon. When his baby son was taken from the family estate in rural New Jersey, the crime unfolded in the full glare of publicity.

The Lindbergh case set patterns that would echo down the century, starting with an avalanche of bogus leads as thousands of tips poured in. So did ransom notes, more than a dozen letters, many from impostors trying to cash in on the family¡¯²õ desperation and the public¡¯²õ prurient interest. Each had to be checked, consuming investigators¡¯ time and attention. Newspapers reduced the case to a series of cliffhangers, mysterious messages, marked bills and dramatic handoffs in cemeteries. Complex police work, painstaking forensic analysis of a homemade, three-section wooden ladder used to reach the second-story nursery and the careful tracking of suspects had to compete with the press¡¯²õ hunger for daily drama.

The Lindberghs¡¯ grief became a national spectacle. Their home was besieged by reporters. Every move they made was scrutinized, interpreted and monetized. In the end, an immigrant German carpenter, Bruno Richard Hauptmann, was , convicted and executed for the crime. Yet the ¡°trial of the century¡± left behind enduring doubts, not only about his guilt, but about how the carnival atmosphere might have skewed the investigation.

The case catalyzed new federal kidnapping laws, but it also ushered in something much harder to legislate away, the idea that a crime involving a famous family was not just a legal matter but an ongoing mass-culture event. The Lindbergh baby was the first kidnapping to become a kind of national ¡°content,¡± updated daily. It would not be the last.

Getty and Hearst, on the miniseries model

Four decades later, another heir became headline fodder. In 1973, 16-year-old John Paul Getty III, grandson of oil billionaire J. Paul Getty, was off the streets of Rome. There were ransom notes from his abductors, but his grandfather at first refused to pay the $17 million, dismissing the abduction as a possible hoax. Then came the horrific ¡°proof of life,¡± when the kidnappers mailed the boy¡¯²õ severed ear to a newspaper, along with a threat to send him back ¡°piece by piece.¡± The elder Getty eventually agreed to pay part of the ransom, structured as a tax-deductible business expense.

What stands out, in retrospect, is not only the brutality of the crime but the way it was mediated. Early coverage was dominated by class narratives. Was this a spoiled rich kid staging his own kidnapping? Was it a scam? Those suspicions were fed by the family¡¯²õ own dysfunction, but amplified by a media eager to sell a story part true crime, part social satire.

Just as in the Lindbergh case, real ransom communications were surrounded by false ones. Opportunists phoned the Getty family, claiming to know the kidnappers; they sent fake notes and tried to insert themselves into a story that was at once a crisis and a global spectacle. Each intrusion demanded verification. Each verification drained resources. Statements by the kidnappers, the family, and Italian police all filtered through an international media system hungry for sensation. The result was a high-stakes negotiation conducted, in effect, on a public stage.

Getty III , though permanently scarred, physically and psychologically. The case became a cautionary tale about extreme wealth, family coldness and ¡°value¡± when the commodity is a human being. But it also established a template, a famous name paired with a kidnapping created a kind of dark miniseries, replete with plot twists, villains and moral lessons. If Lindbergh and Getty turned elite kidnappings into media events, the following Patty Hearst scrambled the formula by blurring the line between victim, celebrity and participant.

In 1974, Patricia Hearst, 19-year-old granddaughter of newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst, was kidnapped by the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), a small terrorist cell, active from 1973 to 1975, that claimed to be a militant vanguard of the American left. The SLA had attained notoriety for murders, bank robberies and, then, the Hearst kidnapping. The group demanded not just money, but also a massive food-distribution program for the poor, leveraging Hearst¡¯²õ family name and the media attention, which was a tactically novel gambit and perversely innovative.

Then something happened that even the kidnappers had not anticipated: Hearst twisted the drama to her own ends. On audio tapes sent to radio stations, she declared that she had joined the SLA, adopting the name ¡°Tania,¡± and later appeared on Hibernia bank surveillance footage alongside her captors, wielding an M1 Carbine rifle. The photograph and video ricocheted around the world. Was she a brainwashed victim? A radical convert? A symbol of elite guilt? The Hearst case became a national obsession not only because of her lineage but because it seemed made for television.

Every tape the SLA sent was broadcast and dissected, an early version of what CNN later pioneered as content cycles, a relentless, round-the-clock, seven-days-a-week reporting model relying on immediate, sometimes sensationalized, updates rather than waiting for scheduled, daily or weekly broadcasts. Each message had to serve both as evidence for investigators and as fodder for pundits. Competing theories about Hearst¡¯²õ agency, either as victim or perpetrator, played out in public. Law enforcement, meanwhile, had to parse the same material for leads, under the pressure and influence of public narratives.

Hearst¡¯²õ eventual 19-month was less a quiet legal proceeding than a referendum on the meaning of American criminal defense attorney F. Lee Bailey¡¯²õ ¡°coercive persuasion¡± defense and consent in the age of mass media. The jury was composed of citizens who had already ¡°known¡± Patty Hearst as part of the national drama. Although Hearst was convicted of armed robbery, the celebrity kidnapping stopped being a story about celebrities and shifted to a narrative about public media consumption.?

The media cycle spectacle?

By the late 20th century, the patterns established in the Lindbergh, Getty and Hearst cases were deeply embedded in American culture. Kidnappings involving elites, or at least people who could be framed as such, tended to become national dramas. Television accelerated that process. Cable news, with its 24-hour appetite, valorized live stakeouts, press conferences and aerial shots of search parties. The O.J. Simpson in 1994¨C95, though not about kidnapping, entrenched the idea that certain crimes could function as national soap operas, with recurring characters and daily plot updates.

The true-crime boom of the 2000s and 2010s added new layers. Podcasts, streaming docuseries and ¡°investigative¡± YouTube channels turned cold cases and active investigations into genres. In some instances, public attention has genuinely helped. The 2021 of travel vlogger Gabby Petito in Grand Teton National Park was partly solved after an online follower identified her van in another YouTuber¡¯²õ footage, narrowing the search area and speeding the discovery of her remains.

But the successes come with costs. Legal scholars warn that jurors steeped in stylized TV procedurals expect forensic breakthroughs and dramatic confessions that reality rarely delivers. Their distorted expectations can influence verdicts and perceptions of guilt. This so-called ¡°¡± describes a paradox: the more people consume fictionalized justice, the more real justice can be derailed when evidence looks ordinary instead of cinematic.

Online forums encourage ordinary people to dissect cases in real time, often with very limited information. Misidentifications, conspiracy theories and harassment of innocent ¡°persons of interest¡± have become common side effects. For influencers, commentators and some media outlets, every new case is also a new opportunity for ad revenue, subscriber growth and clout. The moral rhetoric is often one of ¡°awareness¡± or ¡°justice,¡± but the underlying currency is attention.

All of this forms the backdrop to Nancy Guthrie¡¯²õ disappearance.

The Guthrie case in the attention economy

Nancy Guthrie¡¯²õ kidnapping was not just another tragic crime, but rather a test of how our current attention economy responds when a real person vanishes, and the story is, in effect, open to individual assimilation. Her case crystallizes the paradox of spectacle crime, precisely because she is not a celebrity in her own right, but rather a retired teacher, a churchgoer, a mother and a grandmother. Her ¡°fame¡± is entirely derivative, as Savannah Guthrie¡¯²õ mom. In Debord¡¯²õ terms, the spectacle transforms active participants into passive observers of their own lives through the lens of an artificial public sphere. By identifying with media images, observers lose themselves in the melting pot of media-driven desire. 

That powerful connection was enough to make her disappearance front-page news and the lead story on national broadcasts for over three weeks now. Loneliness became nationalized, spawning live blogs, specialized , impromptu and waves of social-media commentary. Neighbors in her Tucson community tied yellow ribbons around trees and lamp posts, while a makeshift shrine of flowers and notes has grown at the entrance to her home.?Women across the nation have read themselves into the drama. The relationship is entirely arbitrary. As Allison M. Alford, the author of a forthcoming book, Good Daughtering, observed, without any irony, Ms. Guthrie¡¯²õ ¡°unfiltered expressions of love and worry for her mother resonated with women who have complicated relationships with their own mothers.¡±

The attention is not just digital. A YouTube true-crime host from Australia, who calls himself an ¡°armchair detective,¡± a kind of outdoor studio on the street in front of her house, streaming for hours every day to tens of thousands of followers. Viewers have ordered pizza and snacks for him, turning the block into a strange mix of crime scene, media camp and fan meet-up. Other true-crime enthusiasts have driven in from Phoenix simply to stand outside the house where the 84-year-old vanished, to ¡°feel the story¡± up close.

From an investigative standpoint, some of this attention is helpful. The more people see Nancy¡¯²õ face and the image of the masked person outside her home, the higher the odds that someone recognizes something, a gait, a backpack, a car. The FBI has blanketed interstates and city streets with digital billboards and has doubled the reward to $100,000 for information leading to an arrest or conviction. Authorities have multiple phone numbers as well as an online portal for tips, hoping the network effect of millions of viewers will produce at least one actionable lead. Yet the same visibility also creates complications that would be unthinkable in a lower-profile case.

The first alleged ransom note did not go to the Guthrie family directly but instead landed in the inbox of KOLD News 13, a local TV station. The message reportedly contained detailed information about the crime scene and demanded millions of dollars in Bitcoin, with tight deadlines and escalating threats. TMZ later announced that it, too, had received a Bitcoin-linked note, this time from someone who claimed not to be the kidnapper, but to know the kidnapper¡¯²õ identity, and who wanted one Bitcoin in exchange for that information.

This amounts to negotiation as a high-risk spectacle. Instead of private contact between kidnappers and family, mediated quietly by law enforcement, the ransom dynamic plays out through newsrooms and gossip sites, each with its own incentives and audiences. Officials have had to devote substantial energy to authenticating or debunking each new ¡°message,¡± often under the gaze of those same outlets.

The crypto angle adds another twist. This weird modern currency is another type of spectacle, since the point of crypto is nonfungible value, but it is entirely copyable, as the phenomenon of worthless meme coins attests. Experts have pointed out that, despite its outlaw aura, Bitcoin is far from untraceable. Blockchain records allow investigators to monitor the movement of coins tied to extortion attempts in real time. That doesn¡¯t stop criminals from demanding it; it does mean that every new wallet address mentioned in a note becomes another thread investigators must follow, whether the threat is real or a hoax.

Even beyond the arrest and release of the man accused of sending fake ransom texts, officials have acknowledged receiving multiple letters and emails claiming to know the kidnappers or to possess crucial information, for a price. Each hoax siphons time from the search for Nancy and adds emotional whiplash for her already traumatized family.

Savannah Guthrie and her siblings have responded in part by going public themselves, without TV makeup, as regular folk. In emotional Instagram videos, they have spoken directly to whoever is holding their mother: ¡°We received your message, and we understand,¡± Savannah says in one clip. ¡°This is very valuable to us, and we will pay.¡± In other posts, she has thanked strangers for their prayers, reposted the FBI¡¯²õ stills from the doorbell camera with the ¡°Someone out there recognizes this person,¡± and shared home-movie footage of her mother with the quiet vow: ¡°We will never give up on her.¡±

Behind the scenes, the FBI has given the family advice on these messages, but officials say the final wording is theirs. The result is a kind of split-screen existence. The family finds itself both in private mourning and as actors in the public square at the same time. Their pleas function simultaneously as negotiation tactics and as media content.

As images of the masked figure at Nancy¡¯²õ door spread, the Pima County Sheriff¡¯²õ Office was forced to ask people not to clog emergency lines with theories or commentary, reminding residents that 911 and nonemergency numbers are for concrete tips, not viewers¡¯ interpretations of the video. At the same time, online communities dissected clips, frame-by-frame, speculated wildly about suspects and spun elaborate scenarios, some involving cartel violence, others suggesting media conspiracies. Very little of that speculation is likely to help investigators, and some will surely muddy the information waters. This is the CSI effect in action. People who think they care, or help, or stay informed, actually participate in a spectacle that can and will impede the very justice they hope to see served.

Appearance as reality

The Guthrie case is fundamentally about a missing woman and a family in agony. But it takes place in a postmodern culture that turns tragic private lives into Netflix cliffhangers. One way to understand our culture is to look not at this specific crime, but rather at politics, and who else but at US President Donald Trump? The following is not an indictment or a political statement, but just an observation: Trump is an unusually literal embodiment of the politician as celebrity ¡ª a reality-TV star who became president and then, out of office, turned his legal troubles into an ongoing media franchise. His scandals have been covered like TV seasons, complete with teaser leaks, dramatic arraignments and press conferences designed for maximum visual impact and diversion.

Debord coined the phrase , by which he meant how charismatic leaders and totalitarian regimes maintain control through the cultivation of distraction and attention diversion. Last week¡¯²õ outrage is replaced by this week¡¯²õ new eruption. But Trump is more symptom than cause. He rose in an environment where visibility is the central currency of power. Politicians compete less on legislative skill than on memeability; governing increasingly requires showmanship. A bill signing becomes a photo op. A hearing becomes an opportunity for a two-minute campaign ad.

The same dynamics shape how we experience crime. A case like Nancy Guthrie becomes legible to the public partly because it fits familiar genres: the grainy security footage, the tearful press conferences, the countdown clocks to ransom deadlines. Savannah Guthrie is herself a skilled television performer, used to crafting narratives for a morning audience. Her visibility, and that of the Today brand, help generate the intense public focus that might save her mother¡¯²õ life, but also the intense noise that investigators must now filter.

In a politics of spectacle, every event is a potential storyline. The line between ¡°news¡± and ¡°show¡± blurs. Structurally, the Guthrie case is being treated much like a major political scandal or a high-profile trial, with live updates, expert panels, branded graphics and emotional arcs.

This is not to accuse any individual journalist or viewer of bad faith, but rather to note the structural incentives. Outlets compete for attention in a crowded market. High-profile kidnappings drive clicks and ratings. Social platforms reward commentary and speculation. Public figures, politicians, pundits and even some law enforcement officials understand that their visibility rises when they attach themselves to such stories.

The clich¨¦ today is that politicians have to be celebrities to be heard. But that also means victims of certain crimes become celebrities whether they want to or not. Their suffering becomes raw material in a culture that treats every public event as potential content.

The human cost

The Guthrie investigation is still unfolding. As of this writing, the FBI says it is pursuing persons of interest. Investigators confirmed that?DNA not belonging to Nancy?or her close contacts was found at her home. This evidence is being processed as a potential breakthrough to identify the perpetrator, but Nancy herself has not been found.?A man during a traffic stop in Rio Rico, near the Mexican border, was questioned for hours and later released without charges; he has publicly insisted he is innocent and says he wants an apology.?

Whatever the outcome, the case has already revealed the contours of a disturbing reality. Investigations must now navigate an economy of attention as surely as they navigate an economy of evidence. Families in crisis are pushed into quasi-public roles, performing their grief and their negotiations on camera. Hoaxes, scams and conspiracies are not side notes, but rather are built into the logic of visibility.

For many people far from Tucson, what is happening to Nancy Guthrie is primarily a story, a narrative to follow, discuss and eventually, perhaps, move on from. The platforms through which we encounter that story are designed to maximize engagement, not empathy. The longer the case goes unsolved, the more content it generates.

The question, then, is not just how law enforcement can adapt, but how the public will as well. It would be easy to end with a pious call for ¡°less media¡± or ¡°more restraint.¡± But the history of celebrity kidnappings suggests the problem runs deeper than any editorial choice. It lives in the basic structure of how we pay attention, how Debord¡¯²õ concept of the spectacle functions. There are ways, imperfect but real, to resist the worst distortions. For journalists and editors, one option is to treat active investigations less as serialized dramas and more as public-safety issues: minimize speculation, foreground verified facts, resist the impulse to publish every rumor that pings a newsroom inbox, especially when doing so might reward hoaxers.

For law-enforcement agencies, clarity about what kind of attention helps and what kind hurts can matter. In the Guthrie case, officials have been unusually explicit in asking the public not to flood emergency lines with analysis, but to use dedicated channels for concrete tips. Similar guidance on handling ransom communications, social-media outreach and false leads can set expectations early.

The hardest work, though, is internal. When public interest morphs from concern to compulsion, when people start refreshing for ¡°updates¡± less out of hope for a good outcome than in search of the next twist; when they scroll through clips of sobbing relatives and grainy footage, are they witnessing someone¡¯²õ pain, or consuming it? In an era when politicians must perform like celebrities to get anything done, and when crimes tied to famous names are framed as prestige dramas, it is tempting to think of attention as an unalloyed good, a form of solidarity.

The history from Lindbergh to Getty to Hearst to Guthrie tells a more complicated story. Attention can save lives. It can also distort reality, reward bad actors and turn justice into just another kind of show. In May of 1968, as students and workers staged an insurrectionist cosplay in Paris, Guy Debord quipped that ¡°boredom is counter-revolutionary.¡± In the face of spectacle saturation today, one might respond, ¡°Please yes, more boredom.¡±

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

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Florida judge Roy K. Altman has set a February 2027 trial date for US President Donald Trump¡¯²õ against the British public service broadcaster, BBC for defamation. The claim centers on an episode of the BBC current affairs program Panorama, titled ¡°Trump: A Second Chance?¡± The episode edited together two passages of Trump¡¯²õ speech on January 6, 2021, in a way that appeared to suggest he had directly urged his supporters to march on the US Capitol and ¡°fight like hell.¡±

Trump has sued American outlets before and his record is mixed. In 2024, ABC News settled a after anchor George Stephanopoulos inaccurately described the E. Jean Carroll verdict as a finding of ¡°rape¡± rather than sexual abuse under New York civil law. The settlement reportedly included a multimillion-dollar payment toward Trump¡¯²õ future presidential library and legal fees. In 2025, CBS News and its parent company, Paramount Global, also reached a financial settlement over a 60 Minutes segment Trump claimed was misleading.

But other suits have failed. In 2023, a federal judge in Florida a $475 million defamation claim against CNN over its use of the phrase, ¡°the Big Lie.¡± A separate multibillion-dollar action against The New York Times met a similar . American courts have repeatedly emphasized the high constitutional threshold for public figures alleging defamation. Two settlements, two dismissals. A 2¨C2 , if we want to keep score.?

But this is different. The BBC is not a partisan cable network in the crowded US market. It is a century-old British institution, funded primarily by a license fee, chartered to inform and educate as well as entertain. It does not allow advertising. The BBC is woven into the cultural fabric of the United Kingdom and regarded internationally as the Rolls-Royce of broadcasting.

That is what makes this case extraordinary. It¡¯²õ not simply Trump versus another newsroom. It is Trump versus a totem of British civic life. And the near-theatrical $10 billion figure signals that this is about much more than compensation. It¡¯²õ about what or who has authority, power and legitimacy on a global stage.

Error of judgment

The BBC has already conceded that the program spliced together two segments of Trump¡¯²õ speech, delivered nearly an hour apart, without making that clear to viewers. The effect was to compress his rhetoric into a single, more incendiary sequence. Critics argue that the edit omitted a crucial line in which Trump urged supporters to protest ¡°peacefully.¡±

After an internal uproar and the leak of a critical document by Michael Prescott, a former advisor on editorial standards, the BBC apologized. Its chair, Samir Shah, described the edit as an ¡° of judgment.¡± Director General TimDavie accepted responsibility before stepping down amid the wider turbulence. Deborah Turness, chief executive of BBC News, also departed.

Crucially, though, the corporation stopped short of admitting . It offered no damages. And it strenuously denied malicious intent. So, when Trump¡¯²õ lawyers escalated the matter into a multibillion-dollar suit filed in Florida, the BBC challenged the court¡¯²õ jurisdiction, arguing that the program was neither produced nor broadcast in Florida and was not available there via its streamer BritBox as alleged. Judge Altman rejected attempts to delay discovery; the case will now proceed.

Could the broadcast genuinely have damaged Trump¡¯²õ checkered reputation? That is the legal nub of the matter. Defamation law in the United States, especially for public figures, sets a prohibitively high bar. A claimant must show not only falsity but ¡°:¡± knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Trump¡¯²õ legal team the edit was ¡°intentionally and maliciously¡± misleading. Note: Intentionally. The BBC says it was a mistake, now acknowledged.

There are precedents for media organizations paying dearly for editorial lapses. But there are few, if any, precedents for a British public broadcaster facing a $10 billion claim in an American court over a documentary edit. And, in this instance, timing matters because the BBC doesn¡¯t enter the fray in good financial health.

Under pressure

Even without Trump, the BBC is under pressure. The broadcaster is pursuing savings of up to (over $860 million) over three years. License fee revenues are falling as households move toward streaming platforms and social media. Around fewer British households paid their license fee in the last reported year. Departments are bracing for cuts. Outsourcing is inevitable.

Public service broadcasters were never designed to absorb shocks of this magnitude. Unlike commercial rivals, the BBC doesn¡¯t rely on advertising or subscription revenue. It¡¯²õ funded by a compulsory license fee whose legitimacy is periodically contested in Parliament and in public debate. It is right now.

In that context, a $10 billion liability ¡ª even a fraction of it ¡ª would not be an ordinary line item. It would be an existential catastrophe. (While the BBC isn¡¯t in literal ¡°debt¡± like a business with a balance-sheet liability that must be paid off, it is running deficits and facing revenue shortfalls and operating pressures that are forcing cost cuts and license fee increases.)

Which brings us to the first conjecture.

What if Trump wins?

Bookmakers, were they to set odds, would likely price a full $10 billion victory as 25/1, maybe 33/1 at most. The legal hurdles are formidable. Yet imagine, for argument¡¯²õ sake, that Trump prevails and secures a judgment on that scale.

The immediate consequence would be seismic. The BBC¡¯²õ annual budget is roughly ?5 billion ($6.8 billion) sterling. A damages award of $10 billion (about ?7.5 billion) would eclipse its annual income. Even a significantly reduced award could destabilize the corporation¡¯²õ finances, potentially forcing emergency government intervention or radical restructuring.

The reputational damage would be devastating, too. For a broadcaster that trades on credibility, reliability and impartiality, a court finding of malicious defamation would undermine its moral authority at home and abroad. Critics who already question its impartiality, neutrality and objectivity ¡ª and there are plenty in the UK and elsewhere ¡ª would feel vindicated. Politicians skeptical of the license fee would gain leverage. Calls to privatize, allow advertising or dismantle the corporation completely would intensify.

For Trump, by contrast, victory would be nectar. He has long depicted mainstream media as hostile and dishonest. A courtroom triumph over, of all broadcasters, the BBC would validate his narrative to a global audience. It would bolster his standing among supporters who see him as a victim of elite institutions. It would inflate his already considerable self-belief.

And there is a longer-term implication: A Trump win would signal to media organizations worldwide that editorial misjudgments, even acknowledged and corrected, can carry calamitous financial risk. The effect could be sobering. Investigative journalism, already expensive and fraught, might grow more cautious. Legal departments would gain power. Editors would hesitate. The media would be domesticated.

That might please those who see the media as already too powerful and untouchable. It would trouble those who value the media¡¯²õ autonomy and ability to criticize without fear.

What if the BBC wins?

The alternative is less obvious but still significant. Suppose the court finds no defamation ¡ª perhaps that the edit, while erred, did not meet the criterion of actual malice. The BBC would emerge legally vindicated. Bookies might price this as evens, perhaps 5/6 (meaning you stake $6 to win $5 if the case is thrown out).

A ¡°victory¡± for the Beeb would not, however, bring a reward of $10 billion from Trump. Nor would it remove the BBC¡¯²õ structural financial problems. License fee decline would continue. Savings targets would still loom. Pride and honor might be restored, but balance sheets would not be any healthier.

For Trump, defeat would sting. By February 2027, he will be 80 years old and approaching the end of a second term in office. Attention will be shifting to the next presidential contest, which is scheduled for November 7, 2028. The Republican Party will be thinking about succession and electability.

In July 2024, gunman Thomas Matthew Crooks attempted to Trump, grazing his ear with a bullet ¡ª an event that underscored how deeply the now-president divides American society. A courtroom loss would not change his polarizing potential nor end his overall influence. His capacity to command loyalty and shape narratives as well as antagonize detractors and engender hatred would remain formidable. But failure would pierce the aura of inevitability that has often surrounded him. For a leader who reduces complex events, especially , to deals or no-deals, a public defeat against a foreign broadcaster would be an unequivocal disaster. Not just defeat, but humiliation.

Would it be transformative? No. The BBC would continue to struggle financially. Trump would continue to dominate attention for at least the remainder of his tenure. Yet the symbolism would matter. It would reaffirm the resilience of established media institutions against political assault. It would remind would-be litigants that courts are not just campaign platforms.

Beyond damages

Strip away the legal briefs and this case is about something larger: the collision between a populist politician who thrives on confrontation and a public broadcaster that embodies an older model of civic rectitude.

Trump has built a career on challenging institutions, including courts, universities, newsrooms and intelligence agencies. The BBC represents a particularly attractive target: foreign, publicly funded, proud of its editorial standards, perhaps even haughty about the global prestige it still enjoys after over a hundred years of broadcasting.

The corporation, for its part, is navigating a media environment transformed by YouTube, Netflix, TikTok and myriad streaming services. It¡¯²õ pruning costs while trying to maintain global reach. It can ill afford complacency at the moment. The Panorama edit was, by its own admission, a lapse. In an era of forensic scrutiny, lapses can be expensive.

What happens in that Florida courtroom in 2027 will reverberate far beyond the litigants. A Trump victory could reshape the risk calculus for journalism worldwide. A BBC victory would help stabilize an institution under strain and reinforce the legal protections that enable robust reporting.

Either way, this is emphatically not routine litigation. It¡¯²õ a clash of reputations: one personal and political, the other institutional and national. When the gavel falls, the consequences will extend well beyond damages.

[Ellis Cashmore is the author of , now in its third edition.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

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However, there is a yawning gap between the approaches taken by the makers of The Hunt and Dhurandhar that couldn¡¯t have been starker. It is worth examining Dhurandhar and The Hunt for their logical consistencies, their comparisons to Hollywood franchises and what the creation of such media indicates about the future of the prevailing pseudo-nationalist narrative in India.

Two stories, two perspectives

The Hunt follows the events after the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the subsequent investigation. Rajiv Gandhi was on May 21, 1991, by a suicide bomber belonging to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (). The LTTE was an insurgent group that sought to establish an independent Tamil state.

While The Hunt doesn¡¯t hit the high-water mark of Adolescence, another procedural smash hit of 2025, it faithfully depicts the inter-agency friction that happens when multiple personalities with overlapping jurisdictions and constitutionally or statutorily limited powers collaborate in national interest. There are occasional mentions of political dithering, but the final product ends up highlighting the true nationalism of dedicated investigators during the politically tumultuous India of the 1990s.

Dhurandhar, on the other hand, makes a mockery of India¡¯²õ institutions. It does this by linking the movie¡¯²õ fictional, sensationalized events to real-life tragedies such as the of IC-814 by militants linked to Pakistan-based Islamist group Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, as well as the Mumbai attacks orchestrated by terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba. In particular, the fictional portrayal of , India¡¯²õ current National Security Advisor, is another insult to viewers¡¯ intelligence and basic understanding of history and civics.

The hypocrisy of the on-screen Ajit Doval bashing the previous Congress-led administration would have been tragic if it were not comically illogical. This is the same administration that seemingly kept funding his undercover operation, started during the Vajpayee-led government¡¯²õ tenure before that, in order to demonstrate institutional maturity in national security matters.

In the film, the character of Ajay Sanyal is inspired by Doval. He is portrayed as the only bureaucrat in the sprawling military establishment who cares about the country and, at the same time, as an arbiter of others¡¯ nationalism. He is the one who sends the film¡¯²õ main character, Hamza Ali Mazari, into Pakistan as an undercover spy.

In one of the scenes, Mazari is seen riding a motorcycle while drunk. Behavior such as this would be a red flag for any spy handler, but not for the juvenile caricature of Doval. Given the embarrassing details that have emerged from the botched plot against Sikh separatist leader Gurpatwat Singh Pannun on American soil by hired gun Nikhil Gupta, perhaps a drunk, bike-riding spy in Pakistan is a fitting tribute to the incompetence demonstrated by the Indian government. Logic, it seems, is the first casualty of pseudo-nationalism.

Despite such glaring holes, several commentators have on the Dhurandhar bandwagon by comparing it to Western military propaganda spread by franchises such as Top Gun and the Bourne trilogy. Dhurandhar¡¯²õ financial success might have tapped into the cultural demand for India¡¯²õ own James Bond. However, there is a difference: most of the other global franchises it is being compared to are outward-looking. They might occasionally criticize their own national security establishments or utilize rogue spy characters to highlight a country¡¯²õ political values, but Western global franchises rarely elevate one politician at the expense of all other previous leaders of the home country.

Similarly, making the fictionalized Doval claim that Pakistan¡¯²õ Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is directly or indirectly responsible for all the terrorist attacks in the world has no comparison in any of the above-mentioned global hits. While monolithic in their portrayal of Western democracies as the good guys, the films don¡¯t assume that their audiences are stupid or na?ve regarding history. 

The Hunt is more similar to Western military films than Dhurandhar is. Not because of its content, but because of its approach in portraying government responses and procedures. In addressing the complexities of LTTE terrorism, The Hunt aspires to drag typical Indian black-and-white, no shades of grey storytelling towards more nuanced Western military propaganda films such as Black Hawk Down. In comparison, by making the Doval-inspired character deliver childish lines, Dhurandhar does a disservice to decades of rich Indian history of espionage, showing it in a poor light. It truly is a bastion of pseudo-nationalism.

Connecting the dots shouldn¡¯t be difficult

As an advocate of freedom of expression, I defend the right of the creators of The Hunt and Dhurandhar to make any kind of content. In return, instead of the success of Dhurandhar to the supposed demise of outdated, elitist gatekeepers of entertainment in the New India, it would help if the supporters of Dhurandhar could address a few issues. 

First, they should address why the government of this mythical New India, particularly the Central Board of Film Certification (), has not changed its decades-old habit of content censorship since assuming power in 2014. India the BBC¡¯²õ documentary on Narendra Modi in 2023, even going so far as to block people from circulating clips on social media. Similarly, the CBFC continues to order inordinate amounts of ¡ª often inane ¡ª cuts to films such as , All India Rank and countless others since 2014. When it comes to censorship in India, the way George Orwell ended his classic Animal Farm is instructive: ¡°The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from man to pig, and from pig to man again; but already it was impossible to say which was which.¡±

However, after a decade or so of similar propaganda efforts in the media, Dhurandhar should not come as a surprise. The sequel has been predictably teed up to be released on the eve of the upcoming West Bengal state . Given the mechanics of film production, it makes one wonder whether ¡ª India¡¯²õ military response to the latest terrorist in Indian-administered Kashmir ¡ª happened in the middle of the making of the two-part saga. This would have most likely forced the filmmakers to stretch the first film to almost three-and-a-half hours to ensure the latest operation would be accommodated in the sequel.

Since the caricature of Doval in Dhurandhar has been bizarrely lamenting the lack of nationalism in any previous leaders and waiting for the messiah to arrive, it is safe to assume that Modi will make a grand entry in the second edition. He will most likely magically justify the botched 2016 while simultaneously ushering in a mythical New India that eliminates the scourge of Pakistani terrorism with cross-border strikes. Just don¡¯t ask questions about the ever-changing justification of demonetization by Modi in its immediate aftermath, or the fact that Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil resigned after taking moral responsibility for the 26/11 attack, while neither the Home Minister nor the National Security Advisor has resigned after multiple terrorist attacks since 2014. 

There is one thing audiences can be sure of: In the nuance-free world of Dhurandhar, India¡¯²õ geopolitical and political reality will be nowhere on the radar. One can only hope that other filmmakers follow the lead of The Hunt and pick more historic events in the recent past to make realistic, respectable content.

Until then, viewers will have to contend with the reality not shown in Dhurandhar. Mukesh , owner of the group that runs Dhurandhar¡¯²õ production house Jio Studio, was worth $62 billion in 2014 and is now worth over $98 billion in 2025. Ambani exists in a time when 800 million (80 crore) Indian citizens are below the poverty line, making them eligible for Modi¡¯²õ free monthly food . As net foreign investments in India are , even Indian companies are in expanding domestically. For the gainfully employed, inflation has far outpaced wage growth in the past decade. And with hundreds of unemployed young Indians showing up for every government job opening, sometimes even graduate degree holders have to accept clerical jobs.

When you cannot provide your fellow citizens the dignity of a decent job and two square meals, you have to keep feeding them pseudo-nationalism. In this case, it comes in the form of Dhurandhar.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post The Hunt for Nationalism in the Age of Dhurandhar appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Football¡¯²õ unifying spectacle?

For a sports event established and still trading on the rhetoric of world peace and unity, such a controversial intervention from a past FIFA leader is unprecedented and extraordinary. FIFA, football¡¯²õ global governing organization, has long insisted that politics should be divorced from sports. Its statutes historically prohibited expressions of political opinion on the pitch, and its public posture has been to allow host nations¡¯ flag-waving patriotism while disavowing partisan disputes and domestic politics. But the context of what has been happening in the US has now made that firewall look flimsy.

The US is co-host for the 2026 World Cup alongside Canada and Mexico. Eleven US cities, from Atlanta, Georgia to Seattle, Washington, will stage 78 of the 104 matches, including the showpiece grand final in July at the MetLife Stadium in East Rutherford, New Jersey. The US considers what Americans call soccer a rising sport and a marquee opportunity to showcase itself globally. (The word soccer was originally derived from ¡°socia¡± from the middle of association football.)

Yet, as many know, the country hosting these games is currently deeply fractured. Operation , US President Donald Trump¡¯²õ aggressive extrajudicial immigration enforcement operation centered in Minnesota, has witnessed more than 3,000 arrests and multiple deaths. The killing of Alex Pretti, an intensive care nurse, by a federal agent while filming immigration enforcement sparked massive protests and led Minnesota Governor Tim Walz to the National Guard.

On January 21, the Eighth US Circuit Court of Appeals an injunction that had restricted immigration agents from arresting peaceful demonstrators. Civil liberties groups denounced this move as a violation of First Amendment in a tournament host state. And in what Minnesota activists called the first general strike in eight decades, hundreds of local businesses shut down and thousands in protest at the ICE raids and detentions.

In this volatile geopolitical context, Blatter¡¯²õ announcement sounds like a lot more than rhetorical noise. It seems quite rational and reflects international concern that the US¡¯²õ civil rights crisis, a colossal breakdown in trust between citizens and federal authority, could disfigure what is meant to be football¡¯²õ greatest unifying spectacle.

FIFA¡¯²õ stance on politics, then and now

For decades, FIFA¡¯²õ was that football and politics don¡¯t mix; players couldn¡¯t display political messages and host countries were told that their internal affairs did not concern world football. In the same way, the International Olympic Committee for decades that sports and politics should remain strictly separate. Politicians were tolerated on pitch sidelines, but political protest was not and players were strenuously discouraged from publicizing their beliefs. That principle stretched credulity at times, especially in and , when the World Cup was staged in Russia and Qatar ¡ª countries that had both been condemned for their poor human-rights records. Yet FIFA¡¯²õ public neutrality remained the default position.

With the infamous of George Floyd in the US in May 2020 and the ensuing global movement for racial justice, FIFA and its affiliates were obliged to shift. The organization embraced inclusiveness and equality as new principles, endorsing campaigns, advancing and signaling support for and LGBTQ+ rights. These themes have become central to FIFA¡¯²õ brand: Women¡¯²õ tournaments are positioned explicitly as platforms for empowerment and social inclusion and equality initiatives are now integral to FIFA¡¯²õ corporate identity.

While it would have been inconceivable as recently as ten years ago, FIFA, in 2021, approved of players taking the before games. The move , but players, especially in England¡¯²õ Premier League, appeared to welcome the gesture of defiance against racism and perhaps other forms of bigotry. The gesture no longer takes place, at least not on a regular basis.

This evolution was initially tactical: It was a sensible and timely response to the changing zeitgeist of global social movements. Other sports similarly abandoned their bans on politics and social affairs. But in football, the change has morphed into something more doctrinal. FIFA¡¯²õ embrace of diversity, equality and inclusivity is no longer just an add-on feature of the game; it¡¯²õ part of its credo. That¡¯²õ why critics argue FIFA can no longer convincingly separate sport from politics when a host nation¡¯²õ domestic policies contravene the very values FIFA now claims to uphold. Consistency disappears.

And now the contradiction is visible. The question that¡¯²õ being asked is: How can FIFA champion equality, anti-racism and inclusiveness on one hand, while blithely staging its flagship event in a country where civil unrest stems from bitterly contested enforcement of immigration policy, and where critics claim human rights are being ignored?

FIFA President Gianni Infantino has close personal ties with Trump, a fact that has not helped the organization¡¯²õ credibility on this matter. Under Infantino¡¯²õ leadership, FIFA offered Trump a widely-ridiculed ¡°¡± at the World Cup draw. It was a supinely sycophantic act that introduced geopolitics into an otherwise sporting occasion.

Analysts inside and outside football circles worry that FIFA¡¯²õ seeming acquiescence could reduce the sport to a mere appendage of realpolitik, meaning that football¡¯²õ moral capital can and will be exploited by host governments for their own agendas in this and future World Cups.

Protest at the World Cup??

The real question isn¡¯t whether fans can watch 48 teams compete in 104 matches: They will. The tournament infrastructure is already being built, tickets are selling and stadiums are being prepared. But what moral character will the World Cup have?

Trump wants the World Cup in the US. It has more symbolic importance than even the Olympics. It attracts far more attention and lasts longer than a G7 summit. Heads of state will congregate as will all manner of high profile politicians, dignitaries and other kinds of celebrities. The world¡¯²õ media will attend. Live crowds from everywhere will number in the millions. The hosts will entertain the visitors with pomp and spectacle. But, for all his braggadocio, Trump must surely realize there are risks.

A global sporting event set against a backdrop of civil strife could become a stage for protest rather than celebration. Already, American sports arenas have seen anti-immigration and anti-ICE demonstrations spread into professional games. If similar activism manifests during the World Cup (for example, protests at venues, international delegations refusing to sing anthems, public backlash over entry bans or travel restrictions, etc.), politics could overshadow the spectacle.

Imagine Senegalese fans barred from entering certain US cities. Or headline-making protests in Los Angeles and New York City on match nights. Or even teams and fans using the platform to draw attention to human rights concerns. None of these scenarios are likely but none of them is wildly far-fetched, either, given the current social context and the US¡¯²õ political direction of travel. FIFA¡¯²õ administrative muscle in demanding guarantees from host governments has limits. US immigration policy is set by a president emboldened by his base and seemingly deaf to international opinion.

Blatter¡¯²õ critics also suggest that a stronger FIFA leadership, i.e. one not beholden to Trump, might have already relocated World Cup matches entirely. It¡¯²õ logistically challenging and financially ruinous, but not impossible. Seasons were shifted for Qatar 2022; matches have been relocated for other tournaments. Yet FIFA¡¯²õ economic interests and commercial contracts make such a major move barely conceivable, especially considering the US media¡¯²õ influence in FIFA¡¯²õ World Cup finances.

So, the Cup will go ahead. But should it?

Pros vs. cons: should or shouldn¡¯t we cancel?

Why we should not hold the World Cup in the US:

1. Moral inconsistency. FIFA¡¯²õ exalted values of inclusivity and equality ring hollow if the host nation¡¯²õ core policies violate those principles.
   
2. Civil unrest risk. The US is currently facing large-scale protests and crackdowns that could spill into tournament dates and locations, perhaps necessitating heavy security presences at all games.
   
3. Safety concerns. Recent federal shootings and lifted protest protections raise international safety questions.
   
4. Political exploitation. The World Cup might inadvertently become a tool for partisan agendas, diminishing football¡¯²õ unifying power.

Why the World Cup should go ahead in the US:

1. Unmatched infrastructure. No other co-host ¡ª Canada or Mexico ¡ª alone can shoulder the logistical and financial burden on such short notice.
   
2. Football¡¯²õ universality. Football transcends politics; millions will watch and enjoy without engaging with the host nation¡¯²õ controversies.
   
3. Economic and cultural opportunity. The tournament could still grow the game in the US and foster youth engagement, long-term.
   
4. Risk of precedent. Canceling sets a precedent where sports events hinge on transient political climates, forcing every future host to meet subjective moral thresholds.

FIFA¡¯²õ dilemma

The 2026 FIFA World Cup presents a dilemma: a global festival of sport scheduled in a nation currently racked with deep political fissures that show no signs of repair and could worsen over the next few months. Blatter¡¯²õ call for a boycott echoes wider anxieties about the US¡¯²õ social cohesion, and the ethical contradictions between FIFA¡¯²õ stated values and its hosting choices are more conspicuous than ever.

Association football has long been more than a sport. It¡¯²õ a global cultural force that can and often does mirror global tensions. The World Cup this year will test whether the sport can stay above geopolitics, or whether politics and justice will impose themselves on football¡¯²õ grandest stage. The strong likelihood is that the tournament will go ahead. But for 39 days in June and July, the world of football and perhaps the rest of the world will hold its breath.

[Ellis Cashmore is the author of , now in its third edition.]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Should FIFA Pull the World Cup Out of the US? appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

In Spain, a continuum existed between the reconquest of its own territory from the Moors and the conquest of its new American lands. Indeed, the year 1492 represented the end of the former and the beginning of the latter. Meaning, the defeat of the last Moor enclave in Spain and the ¡°discovery¡± of a new continent by a Spanish expedition headed by Columbus.

In just half a century

As a result, the spirit of mission that had animated the Spanish life during eight centuries (that of expelling the Moors) simply moved to the other side of the Atlantic. No other European country, without the sense of warfare mobilization and religious combativeness that prevailed in Spain, could have had the energy and the daring to take hold of such an enormous and inordinate geographical space in just a few decades. In just about , indeed, Spain subdued the indigenous populations, Christianized them, urbanized and populated the new territories, founded universities, put in motion a process of economic expansion and created its ruling institutions.

During that brief period, the Spanish conquerors defeated war-oriented indigenous populations throughout the continent. This included the mighty Aztec and Inca empires in current Mexico and Peru. Meanwhile, their missionaries thoroughly evangelized the native populations. For that purpose, they had not only to master the different indigenous languages but also their meanings and symbols, as this was the only way to make their teachings understandable. After attaining their religious purposes, though, the missionaries simply discarded such knowledge as an expression of paganism.

Urbanization had been an essential part of the Spanish Reconquest of its territory from the Moors. Indeed, every advance upon them had to be consolidated by building cities and towns within a concept of expanding frontiers. Not surprisingly, urban-minded Spaniards brought the same approach to the Americas. Towns and villages would become the tools for consolidating conquered spaces and for integrating the hinterlands to the coasts.

Populating the newly founded towns implied bringing women from Spain. Much has been written about the solitary nature of the Spanish conquerors as the leading cause for miscegenation, with indigenous women being the only females available to them. Undoubtedly, this is true, yet only to a certain extent.

Of the registered Spaniards who came to America in the 16th century, 10,118 were women. In other words, there could have been around 20,000 married couples and around 25,000 single men. Moreover, during the first quarter of that century, a of all the arrivals were women. This entails that half of the men had access to a Spanish wife. These Spanish couples would become the origin of the colonial gentry through endogamous marriages.

As early as 1538, the Spaniards the University of Santo Tomas de Aquino in the Dominican Republic of today. It was not only the first in the hemisphere but also among the first 15 within the Spanish world. This institution was followed in 1551 by the founding of the University of Mexico and that of San Marcos in Lima. When these universities came to life, a wide network of schools already existed throughout the region.

In 1545, the 20-year span in which the major in Mexico and Peru took place began. They were to become large-scale operations that put in motion numerous interconnected economic activities. Workers needed housing and stores, while mines required masonry, winches, ladders and huge amounts of leather. Mules and horses were required to move the bullion to mints and to the exporting coastal areas. Plantations and ranches had to be established to supply mining operations and the emerging adjacent towns. And so on, amid a flurry of action.

To administer these territories, the Spaniards created a centralized political structure. From Spain, the was responsible for the whole, while in America, two main viceroyalties were created: New Spain (current Mexico) and Peru. These viceroyalties controlled smaller administrative units called audiences, which in turn had jurisdiction over governorships.  From the beginning, a complex bureaucratic system was put in place.

Meanwhile

Nothing remotely similar happened in Brazil during the same period. This territory was granted to Portugal by a that divided the lands of the New World between the Spaniards and the Portuguese. The fact that Portugal had completed its war of reconquest 243 years before Spain was directly related to this. Indeed, there was no connection between the reconquest of their own territory from the Moors and the conquest and colonization of their American possessions. Moreover, while in the case of Spain an old sense of purpose easily switched from its own land into its newly acquired transatlantic territories, Portugal had ample time to define different priorities. Naval exploration and international trade represented these priorities.

Beginning in 1418, with the incorporation of the Azores and Madeira islands off the coast of Africa, the Portuguese continued south along the coasts of West Africa. Along this descendant route, they established a of slave and ivory trading posts, without inland colonization. In the late 15th century, they had discovered a sea route to the East around the Cape of Good Hope. In 1510, they the colony of Goa on the western coast of India. A few years later, the Malacca peninsula (current Malaysia) became the strategic base for Portugal¡¯²õ trade expansion towards South East Asia, China and Japan. Subsequently, it built fortified settlements in present-day Indonesia to control the spice trade. The Portuguese Empire of the East, with its capital in Goa, included possessions in all of the Asian sub-continents. 

The Portuguese thus had a global reach unknown to the Spaniards (whose sole Asian possession was the Philippines, which became a simple extension of its American Empire through its galleon trade with Mexico, inaugurated in 1565). But whereas the Spaniards had their American possessions under a firm grip, the Portuguese were highly vulnerable in their overexpanded territories. Through a several-decade between the Dutch and the Portuguese, in the 17th century, the former seized most of Portugal¡¯²õ possessions in Asia.

A minor concern

While Portugal¡¯²õ attention was elsewhere, was of minor concern to them. There, they replicated their experience on the western coasts of Africa: establishing isolated trading posts along the coast, without aiming to penetrate inland. These first five decades, in which Spaniards were making deep inroads into their own American territories, were a period of absolute neglect for Brazil. As a result, impoverished Portuguese male settlers were left to their own devices.

Through an old indigenous practice of incorporating strangers into their tribes through marriage, these settlers were assimilated into indigenous populations. Taking as many ¡°wives¡± as possible implied, by extension, widening their network of relations with different local tribes. The result of this process was a polygamist society in which the multiple offspring of the settlers ended up being much closer to their native mothers¡¯ way of life than to their European fathers¡¯ way of life.

Speaking in the indigenous Tupi language and living under primitive conditions, the descendants of the first Portuguese settlers became a troop of rough adventurers, much closer to plunder than to production. Armed with rudimentary military tools, this amalgam of Europeans and natives transformed itself into a human-hunting society. Their aim, indeed, was to capture and enslave the natives with the purpose of selling them. This happened, basically, in the current state of S?o Paulo.

After depleting the coasts of their human prey, the Portuguese and their offspring began making inland raids that were to become more and more ambitious and predatory. Preceded by banners, they gathered into huge groups that, for extended periods of time, raided the inland territories. The enslaved indigenous peoples, for whom good prices were fetched, became their main commodity of trade. 

The main buyers of this human merchandise were the planters of north-eastern Brazil. Indeed, another pole of Portuguese settlement took shape farther north along Brazil¡¯²õ coast, where sugar plantations began to emerge. It was undoubtedly a more civilized society, where production and not plundering was the goal. 

When France its right to take possession of any nonoccupied part of Brazil, the Portuguese Crown was forced to react. In 1549, Portugal appointed its first Governor General in Brazil, with a base in Salvador de Bahia. With sugar exports later followed by precious metals generating increasing revenues, and Crown authorities exerting a larger role, Portuguese America became a much more structured society. 

Eventually, it would end up catching Hispanic America in this regard. Moreover, at the end of the colonial period, Brazil surpassed its Spanish American cousins in terms of institutional strength and territorial cohesion. The introduced in Brazil at the end of the 18th century, and the fact that the Portuguese Crown was forced to move there for more than a decade as a result of the of Portugal, were responsible for it. Hence, while at the beginning of the colonial period, Spaniards greatly surpassed the Portuguese in providing structure to their American territories, by the end of that period, the Portuguese outshone them.

Utter lack of curiosity

What both Spanish and Portuguese had in common, though, was their utter lack of curiosity in relation to the indigenous populations that they found in America. The Portuguese were undoubtedly much harsher towards them than the Spaniards, whose protected indigenous people. However, the Spaniards¡¯ behavior was more blameworthy. This is simply because they met with advanced civilizations far from Brazil, which was inhabited by primitive tribes. Civilizations, whose scientific advances (particularly in mathematics, astronomy and engineering) and many of their organizational and cultural traits merited to be preserved. However, all the knowledge that they represented was completely and systematically discarded and erased by the Spaniards.

Not surprisingly, nowadays, resentment against Spain is substantially bigger in Hispanic American countries than it is in Brazil towards Portugal. Brazilians, indeed, don¡¯t have a quarrel with their colonial past, whereas much of Hispanic America does. This explains why, in the last few decades, the statues of Italian explorer Christopher Columbus have been taken down from their pedestals in many cities of Hispanic America. For several Latin American countries, this still remains an unresolved contention.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

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A handful of racist gestures posted by Miss Finland and members of the Finns Party ¡ª East Asian facial features through a slanted-eyes trope ¡ª triggered an international backlash of remarkable speed and scale. Within days, Finnish embassies in China, Japan and South Korea formal apologies. Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo publicly the state from the conduct of its own parliamentarians, stating unequivocally that racism had no place in Finnish society. The response was swift, but the damage was already measurable.

Finnish airline Finnair of consumer backlash in Asian markets. Finland¡¯²õ Minister for Economic Affairs acknowledged reputational harm to tourism and trade. Chinese and Japanese media the episode not as a fringe scandal but as a test of Finland¡¯²õ values. In Brussels, Finnish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) cautioned that diplomatic capital built on trust can evaporate far faster than it accumulates. Soft power, once dented, does not rebound easily.

This was not merely a domestic political embarrassment. It was a foreign policy event.

When domestic failures become diplomatic liabilities

In an era of instant amplification, internal social failures migrate rapidly into the international arena. For countries such as Finland ¡ª newly inducted into NATO, deeply reliant on rules-based multilateralism and economically intertwined with Asia ¡ª moral credibility is not ornamental. It is strategic. When a state¡¯²õ brand is on inclusion, any contradiction resonates louder abroad than at home.

The deeper discomfort lies in the fact that this did not emerge in isolation. Amnesty International has repeatedly that Finland struggles with structural racism, describing it as among the most racist countries in Europe in terms of lived experience. Surveys cited by Yle show that nearly of Finns now recognize racism as a serious societal problem, a sharp increase over five years. Black residents report some of the levels of harassment on the continent. These realities sit uneasily beside Finland¡¯²õ global reputation for fairness.

The contradiction exposes a familiar illusion in advanced democracies: that high development immunizes societies against prejudice. It does not. Racism adapts. It becomes quieter, coded, sometimes joking, sometimes dismissed as childish. Yet when projected through the megaphone of social media, even casual prejudice acquires geopolitical weight.

Racial innocence and the limits of Nordic exceptionalism

History matters here. Finland, like much of Europe, has often imagined itself outside colonial entanglements. Yet historians increasingly note Finland¡¯²õ participation in movements and its absorption of racial hierarchies in European modernity. The idea of racial innocence has functioned less as truth than as comfort. The scandal cracked that veneer.

Comparisons across the Nordic region reinforce the point. Sweden¡¯²õ with far-right normalization, Denmark¡¯²õ cases and Norway¡¯²õ debates over Indigenous all reveal similar tensions beneath progressive surfaces. Globally, France and the UK continue to grapple with colonial legacies that complicate their human-rights advocacy. Finland¡¯²õ experience fits into this wider pattern: development without deep reckoning leaves unfinished business.

What distinguishes this episode is its international reverberation. Asian reactions were not symbolic. Commentators in Beijing and Seoul the scandal as indicative of a broader European blind spot toward anti-Asian racism. For Asian publics, gestures that echo a century of humiliation resonate deeply. Trade figures and diplomatic alignments do not insulate against cultural insult. On the contrary, economic interdependence amplifies sensitivity.

This is where the foreign policy lesson sharpens. Values are not merely proclaimed; they are performed. For small and middle powers, particularly those that rely on coalition-building and normative leadership, domestic conduct becomes external messaging. Every parliamentarian, every public official, becomes an informal diplomat.

From apology to accountability

Finland¡¯²õ response has been earnest. Ministers have undergone anti-racism training. Parliamentary leaders issued strong condemnations. The Finns Party signaled internal disciplinary measures. Finland remains by the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the EU¡¯²õ anti-racism action plans. These frameworks matter, but credibility depends on implementation, not signatures.

Study increasingly links social inclusion with sustainable development. Studies published in argue that racism economic resilience, institutions and corrodes trust ¡ª the very foundations of sustainability. The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization¡¯²õ (UNESCO) Global Alliance Against Racism discrimination as a systemic risk, not a moral footnote. In that sense, addressing racism is not ancillary to development; it is central to it.

There is an opportunity here, albeit born of embarrassment. Finland possesses the institutional capacity, educational depth and international goodwill to turn this episode into a demonstration of democratic self-correction. Genuine curriculum reform, empowered equality watchdogs and enforceable political codes of conduct would signal seriousness. More importantly, sustained engagement with Asian partners ¡ª through cultural exchange, academic collaboration and honest dialogue ¡ª could transform apology into partnership.

Across the Asia¨CPacific, the lesson lands with particular force. This is a region stitched together by migration, memory and mobility, where history travels alongside trade and identity moves faster than policy. Societies from Northeast Asia to the Pacific Islands have learned, often painfully, that cultural slights are never contained within borders. They echo through shipping lanes, student exchanges, defense dialogues and boardrooms. 

Diplomacy in Asia-Pacific is sustained not only by strategy papers but also by acknowledgement, dignity and a quiet assurance of mutual respect. As a result, it is vital to establish an effective accountability unit to investigate officials¡¯ misconduct, as well as to implement mandatory anti-bias training throughout the government. In addition, consider a focused cultural diplomacy and investment package based on a recovery in partner trust, trade and tourism.

Dignity as strategy in a post-insulated world

When racism surfaces ¡ª whether in Europe, North America or within the region itself ¡ª it unsettles far more than domestic politics. It shakes confidence in partnerships painstakingly built over decades. In a region where trust is cumulative and memory is long, moments of disrespect are not quickly forgotten. Strategic alignment may open doors, but cultural empathy keeps them open. Without it, even the strongest alliances begin to feel brittle, exposed to the slow erosion of credibility and goodwill that no amount of economic interdependence can fully repair.

The age of domestic insulation has ended. A gesture in Helsinki can unsettle boardrooms in Shanghai and ministries in Tokyo. Foreign policy now begins at home, in the mundane ethics of everyday conduct. States that fail to grasp this reality will find their influence shrinking in ways that statistics cannot immediately capture.

Finland¡¯²õ moment of reckoning is therefore not uniquely Finnish. It is a mirror held up to all societies that pride themselves on progress while underestimating the persistence of prejudice. The question is no longer whether racism damages international standing. The evidence is conclusive. The question is whether moments of exposure become catalysts for renewal ¡ª or merely footnotes in a longer pattern of denial.

In a world bound tightly by perception as much as power, dignity has become a strategic asset. Once lost, it demands more than an apology to recover. It demands transformation.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post How Domestic Racism Is Undermining Finland¡¯²õ Global Credibility appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

According to his brother, the assault began with racial slurs that framed the two as outsiders. The situation escalated quickly. His brother was struck with a metal object, while Chakma was stabbed in the head and back. The violence was sudden, brutal and devastating. For many Northeastern Indians, however, it was also painfully familiar.

Chakma¡¯²õ death was not an isolated act of violence. It was the culmination of everyday racial hostility that Northeastern Indians face across the country, especially in mainland cities where their appearance, accents and cultures are marked as ¡°foreign.¡± What happened in Dehradun reflects a broader pattern of racialization that India continues to deny.

A pattern, not an outlier

For many from the Northeast, a region with distinct ethnicities, cultures, languages and physical features that often differ sharply from those of Mainland Indians, daily experiences of name-calling, mocking of physical features and assumptions of being ¡°foreign¡± or ¡°outsiders¡± create a sense that Mainland Indian spaces aren¡¯t fully welcoming to them. 

These acts are often dismissed as ignorance or prejudice, but their persistence reveals something deeper. Racism in India is not accidental; it is structural.

Chakma¡¯²õ death is one among several high-profile tragedies. In , Nido Tania, a 19-year-old student from Arunachal Pradesh, was beaten to death in Delhi in 2014 following an altercation in which he was targeted with racist abuse. His death sparked protests and national outrage. Activists demanded legal reforms and recognition of racism as a serious crime.

Yet more than ten years later, little has changed. Chakma¡¯²õ killing shows that the promises made after Tania¡¯²õ death were never fulfilled. The same demands for accountability, legal recognition and dignity are being raised again, underscoring how slow and superficial India¡¯²õ response has been.

Law, identity and the limits of ¡°unity in diversity¡±

India¡¯²õ Constitution equality before the law and celebrates the country¡¯²õ diversity. In practice, however, there is no national law that explicitly recognizes racial discrimination or racially motivated violence as distinct offenses, unlike caste or gender. Hate speech provisions exist, but they are vague and rarely applied in ways that reflect the lived experiences of racialized communities.

After Chakma¡¯²õ murder, student groups and civil liberties organizations have a public interest litigation seeking hate-crime guidelines and urging the courts to recognize racially motivated violence as a discrete constitutional wrong. Even the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes has , pushing police to treat the incident with urgency.?

The debate has revealed two disturbing tendencies: first, official reluctance to acknowledge racism as a motive, even when victims and their communities say it plainly; second, a cultural denial that racism, structurally embedded and socially normalized, exists within Indian society¡¯²õ own borders. 

in the Chakma case have publicly stated that no racial motive has been established so far, claiming that there is a lack of clear evidence in the first incident report (FIR) rather than the lived testimony of the victim¡¯²õ brother.?

Not an isolated experience: racism beyond the northeast

While Chakma¡¯²õ death has once again brought to light the violence that people from India¡¯²õ Northeast face because of their ethnic and racial background, it¡¯²õ important to remember that this pattern is not limited to one community.

African students, too, have faced similar challenges; in particular, they have that they faced racial profiling and harassment in Indian cities.

The similarities are striking. In both cases, visible difference becomes a marker of exclusion. Skin color, facial features and cultural unfamiliarity are used to justify dehumanization. These experiences reveal that racism in India operates through a hierarchy of belonging, where citizenship alone does not guarantee safety or dignity.

Addressing racism against Northeastern Indians, therefore, cannot happen in isolation. It requires confronting how race, identity and power function more broadly within Indian society.

Why an antiracism law matters

The absence of a clear legal framework for racial discrimination has serious consequences. When racial motives are downplayed, victims and their families are made to feel that their experiences are insignificant. Prosecutors are left with blunt legal tools that fail to capture the specific harm caused by racial violence. Society, meanwhile, receives the message that racism is not serious enough to warrant dedicated protections.

A specific antiracism law would not be symbolic. It would acknowledge patterns of harm and provide law enforcement and courts with clearer standards for investigation and accountability. Just as India has developed legal frameworks to address caste-based and gender-based discrimination, it must do the same for race and ethnicity.

Beyond law: toward cultural inclusion

Legal reform alone will not end racism. Chakma¡¯²õ death also exposes a cultural failure to recognize Northeastern Indians as equal participants in the national community. While the region is formally part of India, its people are often treated as peripheral, exotic or foreign.

This exclusion is reinforced through media representation, political rhetoric and everyday social interactions. Jokes that reduce people to stereotypes create an environment in which violence becomes easier to justify. Over time, this normalizes the idea that some lives matter less than others.

Education, responsible media coverage and political leadership are essential to reshaping these narratives. Equality must extend beyond constitutional language into social reality.

Chakma¡¯²õ killing is a test of India¡¯²õ commitment to its own ideals. If unity in diversity is to mean anything, it must include legal recognition of racism and a willingness to confront uncomfortable truths about who is considered fully Indian.

Justice in this case is not only about punishing those responsible. It is about acknowledging systemic blind spots and ensuring that no one is made to feel like an outsider in their own country. Without that reckoning, tragedies like Chakma¡¯²õ will continue to repeat themselves.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Anjel Chakma¡¯²õ Killing Exposes India¡¯²õ Denial of Racism appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

These are the words of a woman who was, for more than 30 years, coerced into having sex with multiple men, while the man who controlled her photographed and filmed the encounters. She was threatened if she refused, though precisely how was never fully spelled out in court. The abuse followed a grim routine: cars, hotels, secluded woodland. Several times a week. Year after year. Decade after decade.

This is not a Victorian melodrama or a cautionary tale from a distant culture. It¡¯²õ a contemporary , recently tried, exhaustively evidenced and adjudicated. The man responsible has now been imprisoned for life. The woman, finally free, says she no longer knows who she is.

It¡¯²õ difficult to read this without a sense of disbelief. Not because such abuse exists; that is depressingly and appallingly beyond dispute. But because of its duration and apparent invisibility. How does one person compel another adult to engage in acts they find abhorrent, repeatedly, for over 30 years, without chains, drugs or physical confinement? How is this possible?

A perverse Stockholm Syndrome

My initial temptation was to reach for explanations that preserve assumptions about human autonomy. Perhaps the woman was dependent on drugs, and her tormentor controlled her supply. Or maybe she suffered from untreated mental illness or severe cognitive impairment. In both scenarios, she was, in some sense, incapable of understanding what was happening to her and thus not inclined to do anything to change it.

These explanations are not frivolous. They reflect an intuitive need to anchor such cases in obvious forms of vulnerability. But, in this instance, they don¡¯t work: No evidence of drug dependency was introduced at trial; no diagnosis of learning disability was advanced. The court proceeded on the basis that this was a woman who, in formal terms, was a sentient adult capable of consent and yet whose consent was somehow rendered meaningless or, at best, ineffectual.

The real force of the case is its apparent ordinariness: Nothing about it depends on extraordinary pathology. The abuse didn¡¯t happen in a basement or a makeshift dungeon. It took place in spaces that were mundane, transient and socially transparent: cars, hotel rooms, countryside lay-bys. The perpetrator didn¡¯t need constant violence or even the threat of violence. He needed time, routine patterns and control over consequences.

This is why this case is so unsettling. It doesn¡¯t even let us reassure ourselves that freedom, once established, is lasting or self-perpetuating. It forces us to confront the possibility that freedom can be taken away, gradually, invisibly and without spectacle. And right under our noses ¡ª so we don¡¯t notice it vanishing. 

We hear much of , in which people who are held captive, over time, become comfortable with their captivity and even identify positively with those who hold them. It¡¯²õ a perverse development, perhaps, but in the process, the captives surrender what once passed as their power to speak, act or even think as they want; they give up their volition.

Agency

This brings us to the concept of agency, a term that does a great deal of heavy lifting in contemporary discussions of women¡¯²õ lives. We are frequently reminded that women have agency. They choose. They decide. They act. The insistence on agency has been politically necessary, a corrective to fallacies that portrayed women as passive, dependent or merely responsive to men.

But there¡¯²õ danger here. When agency is treated as a universal possession rather than a socially conferred capacity, it loses its analytical edge. Worse, it becomes accusatory: If women have agency, then failure to act can begin to look like failure of will, judgment or even courage.

Agency, properly understood, is not an inner resource that individuals carry with them regardless of circumstance. It is a condition created and sometimes withdrawn by cultural, institutional and relational environments. Those environments distribute possibilities unevenly. They make some actions thinkable and others unthinkable; some exits imaginable and others pipedreams.

In the case I¡¯ve outlined, the woman did not simply ¡°fail¡± to leave. She occupied an insular social world in which resistance carried consequences she believed she could not survive, while compliance became the least damaging option available. Over time, that world was normalized. Her abuse was ¡°normal.¡± The idea of escape was unthinkable.

If the concept of agency is to remain socially and politically useful, it must be capable of accounting for this. Otherwise, it risks becoming a slogan rather than an analytic tool.

Abuse disguised as intimacy

It would be comforting to treat this case as a grotesque anomaly. But it is not without precedent. Its most fabled case is George du Maurier¡¯²õ 1894 novel , in which the controlling and mesmeric manipulator Svengali wields a sinister power over a young Parisian orphan girl. There are more recent, real-life cases.

drugged his wife repeatedly and arranged for strangers to have sex with her, recording and photographing the assaults. Around 70 men were eventually implicated. The case shocked France not just for the abuse, but for how long it was orchestrated without detection (2011¨C20).

In a man reportedly drugged and filmed his wife over 15 years, using secrecy and routine to sustain his long-term control. South Korea¡¯²õ notorious Case involved victims who were coerced into recording sexual acts, often under threats or blackmail. One of the most harrowing cases took place among a in Bolivia: In 2009, a group of men were rounded up and convicted of the rape and sexual assault of 151 women and girls, including small children.  

Some of the cases involved drugs and physical assaults; other cases involved women being ¡°shared¡± in ostensibly intimate relationships, their compliance sustained through intimidation, humiliation and the threat of exposure rather than brute force. What they shared was not violence alone or even its threat, but length of time. The violations were habitually repeated over and over again, so that they became routinized and eventually regular features of the social landscape. The victims probably appeared to outsiders as complicit in their own exploitation, and this is precisely why intervention failed to materialize.

I¡¯m making a deeply uncomfortable observation, and it must be handled carefully. To say that a victim becomes implicated in their captivity is not to say they desire, less still endorse it. It is to recognize that survival in unusually constrained circumstances often requires forms of cooperation that, from the perspective of outsiders, resemble consent.

Indeed, a common rhetorical question directed at victims of domestic violence is the blunt and accusatory: ¡°Why didn¡¯t she leave?¡± Rape victims are often subjected to a similar, implied blame. Their actions are anatomized after the fact: if she froze, if she didn’t scream or if she refused to fight back, she¡¯²õ assumed to have somehow induced the assault. Women already face deep-rooted scepticism when reporting sexual violence. Often, that scepticism is loaded with assumptions about consent and by narrow expectations of how a ¡°real¡± victim ought to behave.

This dynamic is not confined to heterosexual relationships. Comparable patterns can be observed in same-sex relationships, in cults, in abusive workplaces and in situations where women exercise power over men. Even consensual BDSM relationships, when viewed without context, can appear indistinguishable from exploitation to outsiders. The difference lies not in surface behavior, but in the presence or absence of exits.

Some readers may have seen the recent Harry Lighton film (2025) about a queer relationship in which one man becomes ¡°happy¡± (his word) to operate not just submissively but servilely, while outsiders, like his mother, recoil at the apparent abuse he¡¯²õ prepared to take. Abuse does not always announce itself as ¡°abuse.¡± Sometimes it looks like accommodation or habit. Or even more unfathomably, intimacy.

Captivity and freedom

The final, and perhaps most troubling, implication of the main case is that many similar situations may ¡ª no, I should be clearer, will ¡ª never come to light at all. The idea that victims eventually realize what¡¯²õ happening to them and leave is a consoling piece of fiction. After decades of routine coercion, there is usually no epiphany waiting to happen. Just a continuation.

The woman at the center of this case didn¡¯t wake up one morning after 30 years and have a lightbulb moment when it dawned on her that what was happening to her was just plain wrong. The conditions that had shaped her life for so long didn¡¯t disappear. What actually changed was not her clarity of vision, but the collapse of the structure that had contained her.

Sociologists use the term ¡°¡± to describe the process by which moralities, norms and identities acquired in childhood and adulthood are displaced, often following a momentous or disorienting experience.

Such replacements are inherently fragile. The conception of reality they sustain can be destabilized by even fleeting encounters with alternative ways of understanding the world. It’s likely that those subjected to long-term exploitation have their casual social contacts quietly restricted. A conversation in a shop, a bar or a workplace may be enough to unsettle a relationship whose assumptions are otherwise rarely questioned. In this case, the woman¡¯²õ bond with her tormentor was eventually broken, perhaps through just such unguarded encounters that allowed her, for the first time in decades, to see her situation anew.

That¡¯²õ why these cases should stop us in our tracks. Not because they are shocking or hideous, but because they expose the fragility of assumptions we prefer not to question. Agency is real, but remember: it is also uneven. Freedom exists, but it always has limits. And some forms of captivity are so thoroughly normalized that they persist for a lifetime without ever being known.

The woman now says she is free. Perhaps. It¡¯²õ a beginning. But the more pressing task is collective: to develop ways of thinking about power, coercion, consent and, most critically, agency that are capable of recognizing such situations before they harden into decades.

[Ellis Cashmore is the author of ]

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Sexual Exploitation ¡ª Why Leaving Is Not So Simple appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

Today, 58 years later, that dream is being strangled. Auroville¡¯²õ recent crisis is not merely the decline of a township; it is a blow to humanity¡¯²õ capacity to imagine a world beyond greed and fear. It is being methodically destroyed by the people who were supposed to protect it. 

The vision that called them home

To understand what is being lost, one must first understand what was being built. Auroville was not founded on the principle that more buildings would save humanity. It was founded on the belief that a different way of living could transform human consciousness itself.

The Mother¡¯²õ unambiguously: ¡°Auroville belongs to nobody in particular. Auroville belongs to humanity as a whole.¡± This was not poetic language. It was a legal and spiritual commitment. It meant that no one could own land in Auroville as private property. It meant that decisions would be made collectively. It meant that people who had given up everything ¡ª careers, family homes, the comfort of belonging to one nation ¡ª whether a retired forester from Germany, a French architect, a youth from Brazil or a farmer¡¯²õ daughter from Tamil Nadu, would sit together, as equals, to decide how to live as one community. From a handful in the 1960s, their numbers grew to about 400 by the late 1970s and to 3,300 from about 60 nations in the 2020s.

This was an attempt to give deliberate choice to the people who had rejected the world¡¯²õ values and decided to live differently, not because the world had failed them, but because they had glimpsed something truer.

The institution that lost its way

Dr. Jayanti Ravi (Indian Administrative Service officer, Gujarat cadre, 1991), nominated Secretary of the Auroville Foundation in July 2021, did not arrive at her position to dismantle a dream. She arrived at a moment of institutional vulnerability, when growth, development and the complications of managing a multinational community had created some tensions. At that moment, she had a choice: to facilitate the Mother¡¯²õ vision or to consolidate power. She chose consolidation. 

Under her watch and with the acquiescence of a , whose term expired last October, the Auroville Foundation did something that should trouble every institutional steward in India. It took powers explicitly reserved to the , the democratic voice of 3,300 residents, and seized them for itself. The relevant provision is unambiguous. of the Auroville Foundation Ac states: ¡°The Residents¡¯ Assembly may allow the admission or cause the termination of persons in the register of residents.¡±

Not the Secretary. Not the Governing Board. The Residents¡¯ Assembly.

Yet Dr. Ravi¡¯²õ office issued to 35 residents ¡ª people who built homes with their own hands and often from their own resources, raised children here, watched grandchildren born on this land ¡ª suddenly received emails from committees with no legal authority to send them. ¡°Show-cause notice¡±: the language of employers disciplining servants. Except that Aurovilians are not employees. They are citizens bound only by commitment to the Mother¡¯²õ Charter and India¡¯²õ laws. The accusations came without evidence. The tone was a threat, not dialogue: justify your existence, or face expulsion from the Register of Residents. Erased.

This is not a policy disagreement. This is the seizure of democratic authority.

The quiet expulsion

When 90% of residents voted to call for transparent planning decisions, the Board ignored them. When 520 residents signed an open letter objecting to the show-cause notices, it was filed away. When the , composed of recognized experts in Auroville¡¯²õ philosophy, issued urgent communications asking the Board to reconsider its course, they were dismissed. Not debated. Dismissed.

The response to dissent has been methodical and brutal.

More than have left Auroville in the past three years. Some were forced out, their visas denied. Others were driven away by something more insidious: the knowledge that speaking truth would end in retaliation. A 35-year resident, founder of the Auroville Earth Institute and internationally recognized pioneer in earthen architecture had his visa revoked in June 2023 without explanation. Over 200 residents have had visa renewals weaponized against them: approvals for just three months at a time, or one year instead of the earlier five, each renewal a barely veiled exit order. A former Aurovilian-born community representative was issued a ¡°Leave India Notice¡± in 2023 for speaking about administrative irregularities.

A very modest monthly allowance that keeps Auroville¡¯²õ poorest residents alive was arbitrarily cut for over people. Some were suddenly billed for ¡°city services,¡± including those who had been granted poverty waivers. Others faced backdated bills spanning three years, demanding over one lakh rupees from families already struggling to eat. Youth hostel residents were evicted. Educational initiatives focused on self-directed learning were stripped of funding and shut down. A was forcibly closed for ¡°non-compliance with Mother¡¯²õ ideals,¡± a phrase so divorced from reality that it reads like parody.

This is not administration. This is the slow strangulation of a community by those entrusted to protect and nurture it.

The environmental betrayal

What makes Dr. Ravi¡¯²õ tenure even more troubling is what has happened to Auroville¡¯²õ environment. Between 2021 and 2025, the forest, the green sanctuary that made Auroville an ecological beacon, recognized internationally as a model of human-nature harmony, has been systematically bulldozed, with many thousands of trees felled. In , workers were caught cutting protected trees along the state highway with no evidence of proper environmental clearance. Not once. Repeatedly.

Protected species have disappeared. Water catchment areas have been obliterated. The environmental destruction is not a policy disagreement. It is the erasure of one of the Mother¡¯²õ core commitments: that a more evolved humanity would live in harmony with nature, not dominate it.

And yet, Dr. Ravi¡¯²õ administration has reframed this destruction as ¡°development¡± and ¡°progress.¡± The said development consisted of large roads with enormous concrete slabs laid by the Central Public Works Department (CPWD), with no proper urban development plan behind them. When residents questioned this type of development, they were met with expulsion notices or visa revocations.

This destruction extends beyond forests. For over four decades, residents transformed barren wasteland into one of India¡¯²õ finest organic farms ¡ª , supplying over 30% of Auroville¡¯²õ food needs. Without consulting residents, the Governing Board handed of its 135 acres to IIT Madras for a truck test track.

people signed petitions against it. The Residents¡¯ Assembly objected to it and was ignored. The lease was registered on December 23, 2025.

This is what happens when ¡°development¡± destroys sustainability. When a ¡°sustainability campus¡± is being built on the ruins of actual sustainability. This is not an administrative failure. This is the annihilation of principle dressed as progress.

This is the aberration that everyone can see, yet few are willing to name directly. The Secretary, backed by the Governing Board, presided over environmental destruction while expelling those who dared to question it.

The question we must answer

This is what must be understood: when an institution designed to serve a spiritual and philosophical vision becomes merely an instrument of administrative control, it dies. The buildings remain. The infrastructure persists. But the soul is gone.

The Governing Board¡¯²õ mandate was clear: to facilitate Auroville¡¯²õ collective life and growth. Instead, it became an instrument of control. It did not respond to resident concerns. It did not acknowledge the International Advisory Council¡¯²õ repeated guidance. It refused to consult the Residents¡¯ Assembly (as it is mandated to do) before making decisions that affected thousands of lives and Auroville¡¯²õ future. It simply acted, and when questioned, it punished.

The Governing Board¡¯²õ term has expired. It should not be renewed in any form.

The question before India¡¯²õ , which oversees Auroville, is this: Do you believe such a unique project as Auroville should be managed in collaboration with the residents who have lived and worked there, as the Auroville Foundation Act requires? Or do you believe appointed administrators should hold unilateral control?

The answer matters. Not just for Auroville, but for India¡¯²õ credibility worldwide as a steward of visionary institutions.

India has a responsibility here

The Government of India cannot ignore what has happened at Auroville. A Parliamentary Committee, comprising 30 members with 16 from the ruling party, was asked to investigate several autonomous bodies under the Ministry of Education, including Auroville. It adopted a in December 2025 identifying ¡°deep flaws¡± in the Governing Board¡¯²õ functioning. The report stopped short of frontal attacks on government policy, but the message was unmistakable: something is profoundly wrong with how the Governing Board has operated.

This is not a marginal issue. This is about India¡¯²õ international standing. The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization () recognized Auroville as a symbol of human unity. The blessed it. International scholars have studied it as a unique human and institutional experiment. When India allows an appointed Secretary to dismantle the democratic structures protecting that experiment, it sends a message about India¡¯²õ commitment to its own ideals.

The scale of this crisis has not gone unnoticed. A?petition signed by nearly ?demanding government intervention has reached the highest levels of Indian governance. Concerned Residents and Supporters have soft and hard copies to the Prime Minister¡¯²õ Office, the President of India and concerned ministers. The message is unmistakable: Auroville¡¯²õ future is not a local administrative matter. It is a test of India¡¯²õ commitment to democracy, to the ideals enshrined in the Auroville Foundation Act and to the vision of human unity it once championed.

And India still has time to correct course.

What must happen now

The new Governing Board, which should be appointed immediately, must be fundamentally different from the last one. But that is not enough. Dr. Ravi, whose term has just been extended for another year, must be removed as Secretary. The government must appoint a Secretary who understands what Auroville truly represents. Someone versed not just in administrative procedure, but in the philosophical vision animating Auroville. Someone who has studied and believes in Aurobindo¡¯²õ and vision of human unity. Someone who recognizes that Auroville is not a real estate project but an in human evolution. Someone who sees themselves as a steward, not a master who rules by division and intimidation.?

They must work with the common consciousness of Aurovilians. They must empower the Residents¡¯ Assembly and its working groups, not circumvent them. They must believe that residents, not administrators, are the true guardians of the Mother¡¯²õ vision.

With this understanding, the new Governing Board¡¯²õ mandate must be unambiguous:

First, immediately withdraw all show-cause notices and put an end to the . These actions were illegitimate and violated natural justice.

Second, restore the Residents¡¯ Assembly¡¯²õ powers of admission and termination as mandated by law. This is not a symbolic gesture. It is the restoration of democratic governance.

Third, ensure transparent consultation with the Residents¡¯ Assembly and the International Advisory Council on land decisions, environmental actions and major administrative changes. The Master Plan cannot be bulldozed through in closed rooms.

Fourth, compensate residents whose livelihoods were destroyed through arbitrary allowance cuts and visa manipulations. Those whose homes were threatened or taken over must be restored to their previous status.

And fifth, critically, the new Governing Board must include residents. Not just advisors. Residents. The Mother¡¯²õ vision of collective governance should be reflected in how Auroville is governed. Only then can genuine growth and development take place.

This is about legitimacy, not just law

Some will argue that the Governing Board¡¯²õ legal authority is not in question. They may be technically correct, although a number of legal actions are still being played out in India¡¯²õ courts. The Auroville Foundation Act does vest significant power in the Governing Board and its Secretary. But legitimacy is a different matter. When an institution uses legal authority to violate the spirit of a founding vision, it loses legitimacy.

Dr. Ravi and the Governing Board exercised legal power while violating the fundamental principles they were supposed to protect. They instead of serving them. They silenced dissent instead of addressing it. They destroyed the environment instead of protecting it. They weaponized bureaucracy against the vulnerable.

This is what authoritarianism looks like at small scale. It does not announce itself with fanfare. It comes wearing the robes of administration, speaking the language of development, order and compliance, and when you resist, it accuses you of violating the very values you are trying to protect.

The choice before India

For 58 years, Auroville has proved that humans can live beyond the boundaries that divide us. The Mother¡¯²õ vision was not naive idealism. It was a deliberate experiment in consciousness, community and collective living. It worked. It produced something genuinely transformative: a place where equality mattered more than power, where truth was valued over compliance, where the poor were not discarded, and where innovation and experimentation were valued and encouraged.

Now, that experiment is under threat. Not from external enemies. From the institution designed to protect it.

India can allow this to continue. The government can appoint another Governing Board that consolidates power, continues the environmental destruction and slowly completes the dismantling of the Mother¡¯²õ vision. Auroville will become another empty township, its forests gone, its residents scattered, its dream abandoned.

Or India can intervene.

The Government of India can appoint a new Secretary and Governing Board that are genuinely committed to the Mother¡¯²õ vision and ready to work with residents rather than control them. A Governing Board that protects the environment while working with Auroville¡¯²õ experts to develop a forward-looking model of sustainable development. A Board that facilitates collective governance instead of strangling it.

This second path requires courage. It requires the government to acknowledge that the previous Governing Board failed, that Secretary Ravi¡¯²õ administration went astray, and that course correction is necessary. It requires appointing new leadership. It requires listening to the International Advisory Council¡¯²õ guidance. It requires empowering the Residents¡¯ Assembly.

But it is possible. And it is urgent.

The death we cannot accept

India has always positioned itself as a civilization rooted in philosophical depth. A nation remembering ancient insights about human unity, consciousness and collective flourishing.

Auroville was India¡¯²õ proof that these were not merely historical echoes but living possibilities. The tragedy is not that Auroville tried and failed. The tragedy is that Auroville succeeded in creating something genuinely transformative, a place where people from across the world lived as equals, where truth and collective wisdom mattered more than individual power, and now that success is being systematically dismantled.

This does not mean that all was perfect: inevitably, in an experiment of this type. Auroville¡¯²õ journey has not been without limitations and occasional failures, but it has pioneered in fields from alternative architecture to organic farming, eco-restoration, rural development, skill development or integral education, advances acclaimed in India and the world over and of great relevance to the challenges of the 21st century, beginning with the art of collective living.

What is being killed in Auroville is not just a township. It is an idea. The idea that humanity can live differently. The idea that greed and hierarchy are not inevitable. The idea that consciousness can evolve beyond the narrow confines of ego and nation.

The children born in Auroville are watching what the adults do now. They are watching to see if the dream their parents gave everything for is worth defending. They are watching to see whether conscience can guide policy or if power always wins. So are the thousands of trainees and volunteers whose lives were impacted by a stay in Auroville, the thousands of villagers who acquired skills and a better environment, and Auroville¡¯²õ well-wishers in India and abroad.

The answer will echo far beyond Auroville. It will say something about India¡¯²õ commitment to her own ideals: that Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (the world is one family) is not an empty slogan, that democratic institutions matter, that collective harmony is possible, that nature is sacred and that truth is valued over control.

The Mother once , ¡°Auroville belongs to nobody in particular. Auroville belongs to humanity as a whole.¡± India¡¯²õ government could respect that, and it must.

Because some things, once lost, can never be recovered. And Auroville was meant to prove that another world was possible.

The time for India to act is now. Not next month. Not after another report. Now. Because Auroville is not just a township. It is India¡¯²õ conscience made visible. What India does about Auroville will define what India believes about herself.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Saving Auroville: A Call for Immediate Intervention appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

A unfurled when an Afghan asylee was arrested for the November 26 shooting of National Guard members in Washington, DC. The Trump administration extrapolated the actions of one suspect to an entire group of people, while ignoring the easy availability of guns.

But for white men, who, relative to their population, commit mass shootings in the United States, there is neither extrapolation to their entire demographic (nor, of course, policy prescriptions to reduce the availability of guns) ¡ª only ¡°thoughts and prayers.¡±

So untouchable is gun control in the United States that some even double down, saying restricting firearms would lead to because victims wouldn¡¯t be able to defend themselves against perpetrators, never mind that in the case of the Bondi Beach massacre, an tackled the gunman with his bare hands, ensuring more lives would not be endangered. If guns truly made people safer, the US, which has than people, would have among the lowest rates of gun violence in the world.

But the is true. In 2023, the latest year for which statistics are available, more than in the US lost their lives as a result of gun violence, which is also the of death for children and teenagers. Every day, an average of are killed in the US because of the easy availability of guns, their blood and bodies swept under the rug, hidden from view.

But perhaps we need to see the bodies in order to end our love affair with guns.

The stark reality of gun violence: Australia vs the US

Gun violence is so appallingly prevalent in the US that it is akin to a nation ¡°experiencing .¡± There were mass shootings in 2025 alone, one of the most recent taking place on the campus of on December 13, where two people who escaped death survived . Gun regulations barely featured in media coverage of the Brown University shooting. Instead, focused on the perpetrator being on the loose for days before being found. Such perverted attentions are symbolic of the pro-gun adage that ¡°guns don¡¯t kill people, people do.¡±

As horrific as the Bondi Beach massacre was, in Australia, a nation with strict gun laws, it was an outlier. It took a single mass shooting in 1996 for Australia to pass strict gun controls. Known as the , a shooter killed 35 people, after which the nation¡¯²õ politicians united to pass wide-ranging bans on assault rifles, shotguns and other types of firearms. Authorities bought guns back en masse from the public and melted down as many as 1 million guns.

The results were stark, especially compared to the United States, where right-wing factions seem to consider guns more sacred than human life. Australia¡¯²õ per capita rate of was 12 times lower than that of the United States, according to 2023 figures. For more than 20 years, there were no mass shootings in Australia. That record was broken in 2018 with a horrific murder-suicide, and then in December 2025 with the Bondi Beach shooting.

Closing the loopholes

If Australia¡¯²õ laws were already so strict, how could the Bondi Beach massacre in Sydney have happened? It turns out they weren¡¯t strict enough. in the nation¡¯²õ regulations allow individuals to stockpile guns, and gun club members in particular are allowed to purchase firearms using licenses for recreational use. One of the suspected shooters was a of such a gun club and had a recreational license for the gun believed to be used in the shooting.

Moreover, the gun used in the shooting required , because semiautomatic assault rifles, which automatically reload, are in Australia. They are in the US and have been used in horrific mass shootings, such as the in Uvalde, Texas, allowing shooters to spray bullets without pausing. That means the Bondi Beach massacre could have been far deadlier if Australia had the same lax laws as the US.

Australian lawmakers and advocates of gun laws are taking the logical next step to ensure that the lives of the Bondi Beach victims were not lost in vain and are actually working to the loophole that appears to have led to their killings. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese refreshingly announced ¡ª alongside protections for the Jewish community ¡ª greater .

Why the US can¡¯t quit guns

Gun laws work, and Australia isn¡¯t the only example. Within the US, those states with fewer gun restrictions have higher rates of gun-related deaths. A June 2025 in the Journal of American Medical Association (JAMA) Pediatrics found that ¡°states with the most permissive firearm laws after 2010 experienced more than 6,029 firearm deaths in children and adolescents aged 0 to 17 years between 2011 and 2023 and 1,424 excess firearm deaths in a group of states with permissive laws.¡± In contrast, ¡°four states had statistical decreases in pediatric firearm mortality during the study period, all of which were in states with strict firearm policies.¡±

A majority of Americans it is too easy to obtain guns in the US, and while most Democrats agree on basic regulations such as banning assault rifles, there is a majority bipartisan support for raising the minimum age for purchasing guns to 21.

So, why is it nearly impossible to pass stricter gun laws in the US? A large part of the problem is the stranglehold the has over the political system.

Additionally, the US is a nation tilting headfirst toward authoritarian rule, and gun owners, who are right-wing and white, are seen by the political establishment as far too important to alienate. Republicans are fanatically pro-gun, while Democrats are on gun control.

We also have a national cultural attachment to guns that borders on religious. For that, we can thank the around gun-toting pioneers who believed they were destined to colonize the nation. Our obsession with individual rights over collective well-being is not limited to a reticence against or . Individualism is at the heart of gun ownership, no matter the strong correlation between lax gun laws and gun violence.

Facing the true cost of gun violence

We are awash in stories that glorify guns, especially from the liberal purveyors of obsessively feeding us movies about ¡°good guys with guns.¡±

But the pain of gun violence survivors is rarely explored in nuanced ways on our television screens, newspapers or social media. If the Bondi Beach massacre had happened on US soil, there would be little focus on guns beyond the usual advocates calling in vain for stricter controls and gun activists shouting them into silence.

What if, instead of pixelating the images of gun victims ¡ª which quite literally renders them invisible ¡ª we were forced to face the ugliness of gun deaths?

In 1955, insisted on an open casket for Emmett Till to showcase what white supremacist lynch-mob violence did to her son and to force the nation not to look away. Perhaps the news media ought to start showing us what bullets do to a body.

In the 1970s, of the Vietnam War on nightly television news shows helped Americans see the impacts of massacres funded by their tax dollars and turned the tide of popular support against the war. Perhaps today¡¯²õ censors ought to stop shielding us from how a person¡¯²õ brains and guts spatter a campus sidewalk when an armed shooter has emptied the assault rifle.

In 2025, former President Barack Obama¡¯²õ speechwriter credited social media with ¡°smashing our young people¡¯²õ brains all day long with video of carnage in Gaza,¡± as a reason for why public opinion has moved against Israel over its genocide. Perhaps social media platforms ought to show us what victims of mass shootings really look like before they are buried or cremated.

Such imagery can carry the requisite trigger warnings to save those already traumatized by witnessing gun violence from being subjected to it again. But those who vehemently support deadly weapon ownership over the right to live free from fear ought to face the results of their dogma.

We should be haunted by the images of the dead. They should invade our dreams. Better to be traumatized by such savage visuals than to end up dead, or worse, lose a beloved to gun violence.

[This article was produced by , a project of the Independent Media Institute.]

[ edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author¡¯²õ own and do not necessarily reflect 51³Ô¹Ï¡¯²õ editorial policy.

The post Americans Aren¡¯t Traumatized Enough by Gun Violence appeared first on 51³Ô¹Ï.

About a year later, three young PayPal employees, Chad Hurley, Steve Chen and Jawed Karim, were still talking about it, lamenting that there wasn¡¯t an easy way to replay the moment. It was 2005. Social media barely existed. They decided they could build a platform where people could upload, store and share video clips easily. Within months, the world was talking about .

Janet¡¯²õ ¡°malfunction¡± may have brought personal embarrassment and corporate panic; it also hurt her career, but it helped catalyze a revolution, though one I confess I never saw coming. Discussing the new, oddly named YouTube on Britain¡¯²õ SkyNews, I pointed out that it was becoming a repository for quirky videos, like a kitten grappling with a ball of wool, and would continue to grow, but how many quirky vids did we need? YouTube was only just beginning, though. From a collection of amateur uploads, it became the world¡¯²õ dominant media treasury.

Today, YouTube has eclipsed Netflix as the service that audiences spend the most time watching, accounting for 13.1% of all TV viewing, compared to Netflix in second place with an 8.7% share, according to . That means more people watch YouTube than Disney, Amazon Prime or any legacy broadcaster. It is the biggest podcast platform. It shapes music consumption. It is encroaching on live sport. And by the time YouTube takes over the in 2029, it won¡¯t merely be streaming Hollywood: it will be part of it.

Zeitgeist in a bottle

Every so often, a company comes along that seems to have captured the zeitgeist in a bottle, like Nike. It found a niche in the sports apparel market in the 1970s, then recreated that market so that sneakers, tracksuits and baseball caps were no longer just for sports. I remember teaching a class at a US university where I worked in the 1990s and challenging anyone not wearing or carrying one piece of Nike apparel. Everyone was.

Likewise, Apple¡¯²õ success was not just about elegant hardware but experience architecture: intuitive interfaces, seamless ecosystems and signature aesthetics that made its products desirable. Like Nike, Apple didn¡¯t just capture market share: it set expectations for what technology should be and, in the process, built a new Apple market. Every new product it launches is an event in itself. In both cases, these companies expanded far beyond commerce. They formed new habits. Traditional market preferences ceased to be individual choices and became more like cultural defaults.

YouTube did not design and make products, nor did it create anything in particular. Its power lay in how it framed and presented what people watch and now expect from the media. Uploading a video of a toddler his older brother¡¯²õ finger or an animated, pixelated with a Pop-Tart body leaving a rainbow trail, set to a repetitive, catchy tune, might not register many views without the imprimatur of YouTube. With it, both became internet sensations.

Gangnam Style 

YouTube¡¯²õ early aspirations were modest: it simply provided an online warehouse for people to share their videos. But 18 months after its inception, Google saw its wider potential and acquired YouTube in what then seemed a prodigiously high $1.65 billion (?884 million) all-share deal. It effectively made YouTube one of the fastest internet ever. That was 2006; a reorganization in brought YouTube under the ownership of Alphabet, a parent company.

In 2007, Google established the fundamentals of an unusual but effective internet business model. Instead of hosting and sharing videos created by amateur enthusiasts, it allowed producers to monetize their videos with advertising revenue. If the video failed to attract significant views, the producer paid nothing. If they made an impact, YouTube charged them and charged a commission. YouTube called it a .

By 2010, three things happened: YouTube matured into a stable, reliable streaming, global platform; smartphones arrived, making video portable; video became frictionless to share. And, as a result, billion-view counts became possible. YouTube¡¯²õ first one was ¡°¡± by Psy in 2012. The global rise of K-pop followed later in the decade. In the 1990s and early 2000s, broadband penetration was still limited, mobile video didn¡¯t exist and neither did social media amplification.

Later in the year, YouTube invested in original channels with a $100 million initiative to bring professionally produced content to the platform. This was an early step toward widening content beyond user uploads and an indication that YouTube had designs on the established television market: It rolled out 60 new channels, none of them owned by YouTube, but all producing original content. YouTube claimed 20 of the new channels generated more than a million views . But YouTube remained a distribution outlet rather than a production company.

This meant comparing YouTube with the likes of the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), Disney or Amazon was like comparing apples and oranges. NBC and practically every other major media company in history commission, finance, curate and sometimes produce original programs themselves. These can be expensive.

In 2008 (until 2013) AMC¡¯²õ Breaking Bad was considered mid-to-high end at about $3-5 million per episode, but values have risen markedly in recent years. When HBO¡¯²õ Game of Thrones began in 2011, each episode would have cost $3-6 million. By the time of its conclusion in 2019, this had risen to . Netflix¡¯²õ Stranger Things (2016¨Cpresent) is comparable. YouTube stayed resolutely out of production and focused only on hosting. 

Killing time and spending time

This encouraged critics not exactly to dismiss YouTube, but to contemplate its limitations. Ted Sarandos, Netflix co-chief executive, issued a put-down when he made the distinction: ¡°There¡¯²õ a difference between killing time and .¡± Sarandos pointed out, ¡°We¡¯re in the how-you-spend-time business.¡± He said that he thought much of YouTube¡¯²õ creator-made videos to be ¡°snackable¡± content, compared with the professionally made shows and films available on his service.

Thing is: what if some of those ¡°snacks¡± are like caviar-topped blinis or wagyu-and-white-truffle sliders ¡ª tiny, yes, but impossibly rich, intensely pleasurable and probably more desirable than the heavy multicourse banquets Netflix serves up. In other words, brevity doesn¡¯t mean inferiority. Sometimes the smallest bites stay with us the longest.

The trouble for Netflix and indeed for all other major media corporations is that media appetites have evolved. A growing share of viewers actually want lots of small, intensely flavored portions instead of a sit-down multi-course feast. They don¡¯t lack attention capabilities; they just don¡¯t want to surrender their concentration for hours at a time. YouTube doesn¡¯t fight that reality; If anything, it feeds on it.

Consider: audiences have been entertained since the rise of cinema in the 1920s by narratives that demand attentiveness for up to two hours, often longer. Film itself was modeled on plays, which in the 18th and 19th centuries were typically 2-3 hours long. Ancient Greek plays were often shorter, unless they were performed at festivals, in which case they could last for days. So, television has absorbed a cultural form that¡¯²õ at least 2,500 years old. Few other aspects of culture are so enduring.

It surprises practically anyone over the age of 20, but long-form storytelling with a multiepisode arc, character development and conclusion may no longer have appeal. No, let me be blunter: may now be boring. The short-form, hook-driven snippets provided by YouTube may be the preferred format. YouTube vids can be full of highlights from sports, concerts and potentially anything; they can be prescriptive, demonstrating how to fix things, they can be reactions to practically any event, good or bad. And, perhaps surprisingly, YouTube mostly escapes the censorial criticism usually directed at Meta, X and TikTok. However, it has attracted concern over algorithms, misinformation and child safety, plus conspiracy rabbit holes, extremist content and ostensibly children¡¯²õ cartoons that turn out to be .

The media, or ¡°mass media¡± as it was in the early 20th century, dictated rather than cultivated social tastes, dispositions and appetites. Television introduced substantial changes, particularly in discovering and satisfying our passion for quiz and talk shows, and, at intervals, live sports, music videos and reality TV. Streamers have broken the linear stronghold, allowing viewers to choose when they watch, and devices let them choose where. will soon invite viewers to participate in creating their own characters and plots and deploy AI to turn them into drama. The signs are that Gen Z has grown weary of traditions and wants an altogether different experience. Sarandos and other media execs are betting that this is temporary and maturity will restore more familiar preferences. Cultural taste is rarely so ineluctable. 

[Ellis Cashmore¡¯²õ is published by Routledge]

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And I found that a serpent was coming towards me. It was thirty cubits in length, and its beard was more than two cubits in length, and its body was covered with gold scales, and its eyebrows were of pure lapis lazuli¡­

And it opened its mouth to me, as I was lying flat on my stomach before it, and it said unto me, ¡°Who hath brought thee hither? Who hath brought thee hither, O miserable one?¡±

That is from the Tale of the Shipwrecked Sailor, the oldest complete story that has come down to us from antiquity. It was written in Hieratic during the Middle Kingdom of Ancient Egypt, and I read it in the original Egyptian from the comfort of my bed, four thousand years after it was written.

Reading an ancient story is an experience unlike any other. It is a glimpse into the mind of an alien ¡ª utterly foreign, yet oddly familiar. A yawning gap of time, culture and language divides me from the author, but I read his tale nevertheless, and I marveled when the sailor encountered the serpent god with eyebrows of lapis lazuli.

I¡¯ve often felt the pressure to better myself, and I occasionally crack a technical manual or a literary classic in my spare time in deference to that pressure. I¡¯ve known colleagues whose hobbies are essentially identical to their work ¡ª Nothing would depress me more, though I¡¯d probably be better at my job.

Instead, my hobbies are almost militantly useless. I write a blog in which I the hot-dog-ness of various sandwiches, and spin density waves if they were made of guinea pigs. The only foreign languages I speak are Latin and Ancient Egyptian, into which The House of the Rising Sun (so useful). The history books I love best are the furthest removed from my own time. In general, my delight in a hobby is inversely proportional to its utility.

But despite, or perhaps because of, the unavoidable pressure to be productive that pervades modern life, I feel that my useless hobbies are not only personally valuable, but essential to a life well-lived, and I think the ancient philosophers tend to agree with me.

Crawling in the mud: Zhuangzi and °Â¨²·É¨¦¾±

°Â¨²·É¨¦¾±, nonaction in accord with the natural flow of the universe, was praiseworthy to the Daoist sage Zhuangzi, born 2300 years ago in ancient China. Zhuangzi was renowned across China for his wisdom, and his counsel was greatly desired by the political elites of the time. When the duke of Qi, one of many desiring wise counsellors, invited Zhuangzi to become his chief minister, his messengers found the old sage fishing among the river reeds. Upon receiving this job offer, Zhuangzi did not look up from his rod and :

¡°I have heard that there is a sacred turtle in Chu that died three thousand years ago. The duke keeps it in a casket wrapped in cloth and has placed it in a temple. May I inquire whether the sacred turtle wanted to be dead and to have its bones venerated by man? Or was its intention to stay alive and crawl around in the mud, dragging its tail?¡±

¡°Naturally,¡± replied the messengers, ¡°it hoped to crawl around in the mud, dragging its tail.¡±

¡°Go home,¡± said Zhuangzi, ¡°I also want to crawl around in the mud, dragging my tail.¡±

The serenity of Epicurus

, too, understood the value of nonproductive pursuits. He was a Hellenistic philosopher who suffered from chronic pain all his life, and perhaps fittingly, developed a philosophy focused on pleasure and pain. To Epicurus, what is true pleasure? True pleasure is not the fleeting pleasures of wealth, rich food and debauchery, but a restrained, mental satisfaction that lingers, like heat from the embers of a hearth. True pleasure is the absence of pain and freedom from unnecessary desires.

This pleasure comes with freedom from the desire for wealth, freedom from the fear of death and of the gods, the bond of the tight-knit community and from pure intellectual exploration ¡ª this pleasure is serenity, ataraxia in Greek. The fear of death was simply one more pain to overcome in the life of Epicurus, and so his followers wrote thusly on their tombstones: Non fui, fui, non sum, non curo ¡ª I was not, then I was, I am no more, I do not mind. 

Epicurus reminds us that the pursuit of wealth does only so much to decrease the pain of life. For indeed, what shall it profit a man, to gain the world but lose his soul?

Aret? and the joy of useless excellence

But for me, there is still more to life than ·É¨²·É¨¦¾± and ataraxia, for there is pleasure too in purpose. Former US President John F. Kennedy, another great philosopher, spoke to this purpose when he of the Apollo moon mission that we choose to go to the moon not because it is easy, but because it is hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone and one we intend to win.

Indeed, to strive for one¡¯²õ excellence, for one¡¯²õ aret?, in any field of human endeavor, for no practical benefit whatsoever ¡ª this is the highest pursuit of man, his virtue par excellence, and his greatest good. To strive for mastery in a field, regardless of practical benefit and indeed in spite of it, is a noble and fulfilling pursuit.

So why do I waste my time? To exist in non-action, to be free of the burden of utility, to find ataraxia, to strive for something difficult, yet not lose myself in pursuit of material gain, and because ultimately, it is my time to waste.

In the words of Seneca, omnia aliena sunt, tempus tantum nostrum est ¡ª All else is foreign to us, only time is ours. And I intend to spend mine generously, spiced with those useless hobbies that bring me joy.

[Dylan Black first published this piece on .]

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Bangladesh¡¯²õ , which ended with the toppling of Sheikh Hasina¡¯²õ 15-year increasingly authoritarian premiership, was the first of this Gen Z Protests wave. What started as dissent against quota-based recruitment to government jobs quickly grew into a massive pro-democracy and anti-corruption movement, in which were killed, and the incumbent fled across the border to India and has since been sentenced to death.

In the last 18 months, similar Gen Z protests have emerged in more than 20 countries worldwide, from Mozambique to Mongolia, Paraguay to the Philippines. There are ongoing protests in 11 countries.

From local sparks to a global Gen Z uprising

The triggers for resistance are often incidental and varied in different contexts. In Serbia, the of a rooftop in the Novi Sad railway station, where 16 people were killed, led to a spontaneous eruption of protests among the student community against government corruption and negligence. In Madagascar, a peaceful September protest against the persistent failures of state-owned companies¡¯ provision of power and water in the capital into widespread unrest spearheaded by a Gen Z online movement, and a military coup has since replaced the President.??

But there are between these disparate protest movements: the erosion of democratic rights, rising authoritarianism, corruption and economic stagnation. Each protest has learned the lesson of the last, taking from online culture and other protests to create independent movements, each with a recognizable Gen Z signature.

Gone are the ¡°There is no Planet B¡± placards of 2020¡¯²õ Fridays for the Future , which blossomed globally but were most prominent in the capital cities of Europe, Australia and North America. Now, protestors are taking inspiration from online meme culture. ¡°Ok boomer, time¡¯²õ up¡± became a rallying cry for the successful protests in Nepal this past September. A skull-and-crossbones flag from the Manga One Piece has become a of protest across countries, and Pikachu is no longer a beloved Pok¨¦mon but a firebrand provocateur.?

The protests themselves are an expression of a generation that has grown up in a global social media age, who pride themselves on absurd humor and nihilism, and ironically, are willing to die for it. 

And while their methods and motivations might be unconventional, with Nepal¡¯²õ election via the app Discord providing the best case in point, Gen Z protestors have been remarkably successful. Governments have been overthrown in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and Madagascar. Major policy changes have been achieved in Timor-Leste and Kenya.?

Not since the of 2011 and 2012, when pro-democracy protests deposed rulers in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen, has a protest movement caused so much political upheaval in such a short time.

Climate change and global protests

There were many contributing factors to the political instability that rocked the Arab Region over a decade ago. But the of climate change, especially when combined with bread and butter issues like affordability, corruption and authoritarian overreach, are an explosive cocktail. Indeed, widespread droughts wiped out around of livestock across eastern Syria in 2011, while severe weather-induced in 2010 saw price spikes on key foods cascade across the region.??

With protests ongoing around the world, it would be difficult to attribute all current Gen Z protests to a single climate event. In fact, climate change has been noticeably absent as a rallying call for the movements altogether.

At a cursory glance, that might be surprising. It was only six years ago that more than protesters took to the streets around the world for the Global Climate Strike. The phrase ¡°Gen Z Protest¡± has its origins in a by the French Market Research firm Ipsos, which looked at climate action and intergenerational conflict. Since then, climate activism hasn¡¯t gone away, but it has undergone a reckoning. The last major global climate strike took place in ahead of the 26th UN Climate Conference (COP26) in Glasgow.

For a while, the COP process provided a lightning rod for protest. But the hosting of three subsequent COPs in Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Azerbaijan significantly curtailed the space for such campaigns. 

One noticeable outcome of COP30 being hosted in democratic Brazil has been a welcome return of newsworthy peaceful protests. This was best exemplified when 90 protestors from indigenous communities the negotiators¡¯ entrance to object to resource extractivism in the Amazon.

Why climate change is missing ¡ª and why that matters

A decade on from the landmark Paris Agreement, there has been little progress in annual greenhouse gas emissions. However, there have also been wins along the way. China continues to hurtle forward in its staggering rollout of . Recently, the European Union announced that it was on track for its 2030 emissions .

However, anthropogenic greenhouse gas are still higher than they have ever been. Even the Secretary-General of the United Nations has warned that exceeding the warming target, even temporarily, is inevitable.

During that period, activism and protest movements have had to adapt to a more turbulent and impoverished world, rocked by the economic and social shocks of the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions, major military conflicts and the advent of artificial intelligence. The World Bank estimates that global growth in this decade will be the slowest since the .

Key figures in the climate movement, while not abandoning their roots, have since chosen to devote their energy to pressing humanitarian disasters. In September, Greta Thunberg and 170 other pro-Palestinian protestors were by Israeli forces as they sailed an aid flotilla to Gaza.

The flare-ups of protest led by Gen Z are a response to a fragmented and dangerous world order. It is not surprising, then, that the center of gravity of this new wave of protests lies in developing economies and fragile democracies, and that its chief protagonists are local activists focused on bread-and-butter issues.

Climate change will exacerbate the conditions for political instability. The World Economic Forum estimates that for every degree of warming, of global GDP is lost. The world is currently on course for 2.7 ¡ãC warming by .

The nature of that instability could derail climate action and see a slide towards authoritarianism. This is already happening in the United States, where a in climate migrants crossing the US-Mexican border has been used to justify the Trump administration¡¯²õ homeland security policies. The Gen Z protests might demonstrate an antidote to this in the long run, ironically, precisely because they do not tackle climate change head-on.?

Accountability and the rule of law are prerequisites for international climate action. Corruption and inequality are blockers to addressing both rapid mitigation and adaptation, the latter being a significant challenge in the developing world. 

In this day and age, some of the most effective climate change activism might not be about environmental collapse, but rather about reinvigorating the democratic contract between governments and their people.

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At the height of her global adoration, Bardot was revered in France. President Charles de Gaulle famously remarked that her contribution to French exports rivaled that of French automobile manufacturer Renault. From 1969 to 1972, she as the model for Marianne, the symbol of French liberty and the Republic. And in 1985, she was France¡¯²õ highest honor, the L¨¦gion d¡¯Honneur. As her looks faded and film roles dried up, however, she morphed into a very different kind of figure ¡ª one some continued to adore, but others found deeply repugnant.

And God Created Woman

Parisian grew up in a Roman Catholic family. Her father was an industrialist; her mother, a dance enthusiast, enrolled Brigitte in classes. She performed well enough to gain admission to the National Superior Conservatory for Music and Dance in 1947. As a teenager, she began modeling for fashion magazines. She married film director Roger Vadim in 1952 and made her screen debut in Jean Boyer¡¯²õ Le Trou Normand that same year. Among her early appearances was a small role in the British comedy Doctor at Sea (1955).

The following year came (Et Dieu… cr¨¦a la femme), Bardot¡¯²õ breakthrough. A decade before Raquel Welch in One Million Years B.C., Bardot played an uninhibited 18-year-old, widely labelled a ¡°nymphet¡± at the time. She soon acquired the epithet ¡°.¡± This was the mid-1950s, when the term ¡°objectification¡± was used almost entirely in literary criticism rather than feminist discourse. (As in ¡°the author objectifies the character¡¯²õ emotions perfectly.¡±)

Nothing succeeds like scandal, and the 1950s were no exception. Religious and censorship groups, especially in the United States, were outraged by Bardot¡¯²õ on-screen sexuality ¡ª outrage amplified when it emerged she was having an with her married costar Jean-Louis Trintignant. Parallels with her contemporary , whose affair with Richard Burton made her tabloid prey, are obvious. Both women were vilified.

Bardot herself acknowledged that her fame rested more on image than craft: ¡°I started out as a lousy actress and have remained one,¡± she once . Perhaps this is why she turned briefly to singing. In 1967, she recorded Je t¡¯aime¡­ moi non plus with her then lover Serge Gainsbourg ¡ª a provocative song that seemed to eavesdrop on lovers in flagrante. Bardot asked for the track to be withdrawn; the version released ¡ª and made notorious ¡ª was recorded later by Gainsbourg and Jane Birkin in 1969.

Bigotry

In the 1970s, Bardot to animal welfare. A committed vegetarian, she fulminated against what she regarded as needless cruelty in practices ranging from seal-culling to the horsemeat trade. Halal slaughter, which does not require stunning, became one of her particular targets.

She campaigned vigorously, the Brigitte Bardot Foundation for the Welfare and Protection of Animals in 1986 and raising substantial funds, including half a million dollars from auctioning her jewelry. She wrote protest letters to world leaders, including China¡¯²õ Jiang Zemin and Denmark¡¯²õ Queen Margrethe II. Today, celebrities regularly wander into ethical and political terrain; at the time, Bardot¡¯²õ activism felt more startling. And she didn¡¯t stop there. In 1992, she Bernard d¡¯Ormale, a former adviser to Jean-Marie Le Pen of the far-right Front National, and began publishing her views.

Bardot repeatedly France¡¯²õ immigration policy, with particular hostility toward Muslims. She was convicted five times of inciting racial and religious hatred. Like Taylor, Bardot was an independent, self-willed woman who cared little whether she was loved or hated. Unlike Taylor, Bardot veered into far-right politics and unapologetic Islamophobia. As the only French celebrity openly to defend the far right, she must have realized how much this damaged her reputation. Perhaps this motivated her decision to live her final years reclusively in St Tropez, where she died.

Arts and artists

So how do we parse La Bardot? In the 1960s, she had few, if any, rivals as a symbol of female sexual liberation, and at the time, this felt revolutionary. Simone de Beauvoir her ¡°the locomotive of women¡¯²õ history.¡± Today, many would say she also played too willingly into male fantasy. Her animal-welfare campaigning achieved real legislative impact; her bigotry caused real harm. Both statements are true.

Can anyone who lived through the 1960s remember Bardot simply as the cinematic siren without wondering whether the bigotry was always there, merely lacking expression? And even if it was, would it have provoked the same response then as now? Simply ¡°backtracking,¡± as has done, is an easy option. The harder question is whether we can meaningfully separate art (in the broadest sense) from the artist. Bardot emerged at a time before women were widely encouraged to free themselves from domestic subservience. appeared only in 1963, yet the values she later embraced leave her firmly on the wrong side of history.

Perhaps the more unsettling truth is that Bardot forces us to confront our own complicity. We didn¡¯t merely consume her image; we helped manufacture it. The erotic fantasy she embodied was fed by studios, journalists, politicians and audiences who thrilled in her transgression while quietly accepting the cultural status quo that made such fantasies necessary. Bardot didn¡¯t invent misogyny any more than she did spectacle, but she allowed herself to be a convenient vessel. In reassessing her, we are not only re-evaluating an individual¡¯²õ life; we are examining the culture that first exalted her, then recoiled in horror when she revealed that the conservatism and cruelty embedded in that culture were hers as well. We arrive at similar conclusions when listening to Michael Jackson, R. Kelly or Sean ¡°Diddy¡± Combs.

[Ellis Cashmore is the author of the book .]

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The Church¡¯²õ Latin liturgy and humanist devotion to classical antiquity hardened this self-portrait, leaving little room for Islamic or Jewish voices. By aligning itself with antiquity rather than the multilingual, multifaith worlds of al-Andalus and the Levant, Europe chose a story of continuity over complexity.

Yet this narrative concealed a deep contradiction ¡ª how could a civilization claim universality while denying the traditions that sustained it? This tension, between selective inheritance and suppressed hybridity, set the stage for German Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche¡¯²õ radical critique of what he called life-denying civilization.

Christianity¡¯²õ famine of life

For Nietzsche, the moral revolution of Christianity marked the moment when Europe began to starve its instincts. In (1888), he accused the Church of destroying ¡°the whole harvest of ancient civilization.¡± What began as a transformation of Jewish ethics into Roman law soon became, in Nietzsche¡¯²õ eyes, a moral economy built on guilt and repression. Power became sin; pleasure became shame; suffering became virtue.?

In his , Nietzsche diagnosed this as the psychology of ressentiment ¡ª a world where the weak define ¡°good¡± by condemning the strong. ¡°Man would rather will nothingness than not will at all,¡± he wrote, describing how the will to life was replaced by a will to denial. Ascetic ideals turned vitality inward, away from creation and toward salvation.?

While Moorish Spain celebrated philosophy, architecture and sensual beauty, Christian Europe retreated into metaphysics. Nietzsche¡¯²õ critique, though aimed at his own century, looked backward in search of worlds that had once embraced existence. This hunger for vitality, this famine of the spirit, would drive him southward, to the civilization he saw as the embodiment of life-affirmation.

Moorish Spain and the lost East

To show what Europe lost, Nietzsche invoked the memory of Moorish Spain, calling it ¡°a wonderful culture ¡­ nearer to us and appealing more to our senses and tastes than that of Rome and Greece.¡± For him, al-Andalus was the model of a life-affirming civilization ¡ª one that ¡°said yes to life, even to the rare and refined luxuriousness of Moorish life.¡± 

Its achievements were not metaphors but monuments. By the 10th century, C¨®rdoba housed over 400,000 manuscripts, far surpassing any European city. Scholars like Averroes (Ibn Rushd) and Avicenna (Ibn S¨©n¨¡) preserved and expanded Aristotle, pioneering rationalism centuries before Ren¨¦ Descartes. 

As historian notes, translators in Toledo transmitted Arabic philosophy, optics and medicine into Latin, laying the intellectual foundations of the European university. This pluralism extended beyond knowledge. The architecture of the Alhambra, by Mar¨ªa Rosa Menocal, fused geometry, calligraphy and poetry into a sensual celebration of beauty.?

To Nietzsche, such refinement born of strength exemplified what he called ¡°noble and manly instincts¡± ¡ª not patriarchal domination but the courage to live without guilt, to turn instinct into art. In contrasting this Moorish feast with Europe¡¯²õ Christian famine, Nietzsche was not idealizing Islam; he was diagnosing Europe¡¯²õ amnesia. Al-Andalus, he believed, was a mirror of what Europe could have been: confident, worldly and joyous in its creation.

Orientalism and Nietzsche¡¯²õ mirror

Nietzsche¡¯²õ admiration, however, came filtered through Orientalist romanticism. Scholar Ian Almond it as ¡°rhetorical Islamophilia¡± ¡ª a fascination less with Islam itself than with what it symbolized: vitality, sensuality and affirmation. Nietzsche¡¯²õ Islam was drawn not from theology or travel but from the same 19th-century sources that nourished German writer and polymath Johann Wolfgang von Goethe¡¯²õ West¨CEastern Divan and French philosopher Ernest Renan¡¯²õ racialized Orientalism.

Like many Romantics, Nietzsche saw ¡°the East¡± as everything Europe was not: instinctive where Europe was cerebral, passionate where it was ascetic. The difference was that Nietzsche inverted moral polarity. For him, the ¡°sensuous East¡± was not decadent but noble ¡ª the antithesis of Christian weakness. In that inversion, he both challenged and reproduced Orientalism: the East remained Europe¡¯²õ reflection, not its equal.

Yet this mirror cracked the old binary. When Nietzsche could say the Moorish world was ¡°nearer to us,¡± he implicitly questioned the idea of a pure, bounded Europe. His rhetoric of life-affirmation became, unintentionally, a bridge toward what post-colonial thinkers would later call entanglement. Nietzsche¡¯²õ mirror may have been distorted, but it reflected a Europe uneasy with its own reflection ¡ª a civilization that could admire the vitality of the Other only after destroying it.

The irony Nietzsche intuited has since unfolded with eerie precision. The very civilization he saw as ¡°life-affirming¡± came to be branded as ¡°fanatical¡±, while the Europe he described as spiritually impoverished reinvented itself as the bastion of liberal reason. 

In the 19th century, Romantic writers such as and turned the Muslim world from a landscape of sensual freedom into one of moral excess and irrationality. After the colonial encounters of the 20th century and the geopolitics of the 21st, this image hardened into the stereotype of ¡°Islamic fanaticism.¡±?

Meanwhile, Europe¡¯²õ Christian famine ¡ª its moral rigidity and guilt ¡ª was secularized into a liberal order that prized tolerance yet struggled to embrace the vitality it once condemned. AsTalal Asad argues in , secularism did not erase the Christian inheritance; it refined its moral discipline under new banners. The result is an inversion Nietzsche would have recognized: the ¡°lively, free¡± Muslim world recast as repressed, and a ¡°life-denying¡± Christendom reborn as the world¡¯²õ moral guide.

From inheritance to entanglement

Post-Orientalist scholars have since redrawn the map Nietzsche glimpsed only dimly. Said showed that ¡°the Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture.¡± Historians like and philosophers such as trace how Nietzsche¡¯²õ writings later circulated through Arab intellectual networks, influencing debates about modernity and secularism.

These exchanges reveal that knowledge never moved in one direction; it was reciprocal, sustained by translation and critique. The city of Toledo ¡ª where Muslims, Jews and Christians once translated each other¡¯²õ books ¡ª embodies this truth. 

Civilization advanced not through isolation but through contact zones: Baghdad¡¯²õ Bayt al-Hikma, Sicily under Frederick II and C¨®rdoba¡¯²õ academies. Each was a site where languages met, and worldviews merged. The myth of a self-contained Europe collapses when viewed from these crossroads. Nietzsche¡¯²õ ¡°life-affirming¡± Moorish Spain thus prefigures the post-Orientalist insight that vitality arises from mixture. His ¡°life-denying¡± Europe warns what happens when cultures mistake purity for power. 

Today, as Europe grapples with pluralism, migration and memory, the philosopher¡¯²õ metaphor acquires new urgency: civilizations survive only by affirming the fullness of their entanglements. When they forget, the feast turns once again to famine.

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