�����������’s of the self-declared “Republic of Somaliland” is a neocolonial exploitation project of a complex, deeply divided region in northwestern Somalia. It is a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, political independence and territorial integrity, as Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud rightly declared during to a special joint session of the two Houses of Federal Parliament in Mogadishu. President Mohamud further noted how �����������’s controversial and unilateral decision was a “threat to the security and stability of the world and the region.”

Another senior Somali Cabinet official demanded that Israel “abide by international law,” as international and regional organizations, including the UN, the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the African Union — all of which Somalia is a Member State — as well as the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), strongly to �����������’s decision.

The Israeli move was also across the globe, including in China, Nigeria, Pakistan, the UK and the US, where the State Department the US recognizes one Somalia “which includes the territory of Somaliland”. �����������’s tactical decision overlooks the inconsistency of its foreign policy, particularly when juxtaposed with �����������’s own refusal to recognize an independent Palestinian state. The UN called for an to discuss Israeli recognition of “Somaliland”, in a discussion entitled “Threats to International Peace and Security”.

No political observer of Somalia missed the underlying irony of �����������’s recognition of Somaliland. After 35 years searching for international recognition, Israel became the first and only UN Member State to recognize Somaliland, a sub-national entity in Somalia that unilaterally in 1991 after claiming that the former Barre dictatorship in Somalia committed the in the 1980s. The Isaaq are the predominant Somali clan group in the central regions of Somaliland, surrounded by Darod clan groups to the east and south and Dir clan groups to the west.

In October 2025, a UN inquiry found that Israel had four acts of genocide in Gaza. A demonstrably ironic political act is that the proclaimed victims of the Isaaq genocide recognition from a state that committed genocide in Palestine.

�����������’s motivating factors

Somalia’s greatest asset has always been one of its greatest curses. The country’s geographic location, at the crossroads of global shipping lines that connect Africa, Asia and Europe, continues to attract regional and global competition for power. Even before �����������’s unilateral recognition of Somaliland, which did not come as a surprise to political observers aware of Somaliland’s long quest for Israeli validation as a sovereign state, Taiwan had recognized Somaliland and established a de facto embassy in . So, why is Israel interested in setting up a foothold in Somaliland? To unpack this, we must first understand the regional context.

In their response, international actors sought to emphasize the importance and relevance of international law, grounded in legal and political principles that aim to prevent the recognition of separatist states in Africa, which could lead to deeper instability, ongoing secessionist claims, and the undermining of order and political cohesion, thereby destabilizing the entire African continent.

In addition, Africa has never allowed an external actor, Israel or otherwise, to lead formal recognition of any new African state, including the only two nation-states to gain independence in post-colonial Africa, namely and South Sudan. In this respect, it is highly unlikely that African nations would follow �����������’s decision, which is motivated by its own strategic considerations, such as ongoing military conflicts with a number of regional actors, including Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Yemen, Iran and even the new leadership in post-Assad Syria.

In particular, Houthi maritime operations in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a strategic waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, forced shipping lines to around Africa, “driving up transit times, insurance premiums, and energy costs”. This is one of �����������’s top strategic objectives in recognizing the separatist Somali region. The strategic location of northwestern Somalia’s proximity to the Bab al Mandab Strait, across from Yemen, provides Israel a military foothold to confront and potentially neutralize Houthi forces who have targeted the Israeli economy through maritime military operations.

Second, as voiced by Somali government official Ali Omar, one of �����������’s is its pursuit of “the displacement of Palestinians from Gaza”. After two years of Israeli bombardment, targeted killings, and the destruction of critical infrastructure and the local economy of Palestinians in Gaza, leading to starvation, Israel proposed to to Somaliland as part of a wider strategy to forcefully dispossess Palestinians of their rightful homelands.

A third and equally important reason for �����������’s recognition of Somalia’s separatist region is to use Somaliland as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to join the Abrahamic Accords; recently, the Saudi leadership expressed openness to join the Accords, conditional on a “clear path” to the emergence of a . In future negotiations, it is entirely plausible for Israel to rescind its recognition of Somaliland if Saudi Arabia reverses its principled position in defense of a Palestinian state.

�����������’s decision also aims to use Somaliland as leverage against Turkish influence in Syria and East Africa. Türkiye has invested massively in Somalia since 2011, with Ankara and Mogadishu signing strategic military and commercial .

Fourth, Israel is also betting on capitalizing on existing infrastructure in the Port of Berbera, expanded under an investment agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2017, and on attracting American support by leveraging Berbera as a base to counter the Chinese in neighboring Djibouti. Others have proposed that can use Somaliland to also counter Chinese interests in Africa. Clearly, this is not about recognizing Somaliland as a self-governing “beacon of democracy” in an erstwhile volatile region, but rather as a pawn in a broader geopolitical war involving global and regional powers vying for strategic dominance, competing economic interests, and control over vital maritime routes and natural resources.

President Mohamud’s incoherent foreign policy has continually sent mixed signals to global capitals. While his administration maintains close relations with Türkiye and Qatar, unpredictable relations with Ethiopia, Egypt, the US, UK, EU and the UAE have been characterized by a lack of a principled and strategic foreign policy.

Somalia’s failed leadership

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud must resign in shame. A day before �����������’s unilateral recognition of “Somaliland”, President Mohamud’s administration organized the first direct , which occurred peacefully in Mogadishu for the first time in nearly 60 years, celebrating a major political milestone. Israel recognized Somaliland the next day, abruptly curtailing President Mohamud’s celebratory mood. Mohamud has served as President of Somalia for eight of the last 13 years, wielding significant influence over the country’s political trajectory, including its foreign policy. He was first elected in 2012 and re-elected in 2022 after losing to Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo in the 2017 election.��

In 2020, then-President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo was on the verge of arriving in Hargeisa to meet the Somaliland leadership as part of a led by the Ethiopian prime minister, Abiy Ahmed. The former Farmajo administration had offered a number of concessions to Somaliland, including constitutional reforms, of aviation and even the position of Prime Minister uncontested for a period of ten years.

Unfortunately, President Mohamud did not those efforts, which began in 2012 and were mediated by the UK, Djibouti and Türkiye during different rounds of political negotiations; instead, since 2022, President Mohamud chose to ignore Somaliland or use empty words about brotherhood and unity, without any substance. As such, President Mohamud will bear major responsibility for failing to lead Somalia and uphold the country’s fragile unity and territorial integrity.

Domestically, President Mohamud’s strategy of empowering Mogadishu and ignoring other domestic stakeholders, including Puntland, Galmudug and Jubaland states, further deepened the political fragmentation in Somalia that facilitated exploitation by foreign powers, at the expense of the Somali people. Instead of fostering a consultative national process and embedding federalism, President Mohamud’s Mogadishu-centric political approach alienated key domestic stakeholders and propelled clan competition. His administration mismanaged and utilized international donor support as a political tool to empower political entities that support him and weaken opposition domestic actors.

Political representation and accountability were severely eroded, as his administration co-opted the two Houses of Federal Parliament, nominated ambassadors along clan lines and used in an attempt to dismantle the Jubaland state leadership, a move that failed with catastrophic consequences.

President Mohamud also failed to capitalize on the Las Anod uprising, when the Somaliland military launched on civilian infrastructure in Las Anod in 2023, sparking an eight-month conflict that led to the defeat of the Somaliland army, including the capture of Somaliland prisoners and seizure of military equipment. Mogadishu later recognized the Northeast State in 2025, which reduced “Somaliland’s territory to about 45% of the former British Somaliland” and has considerably Somaliland’s claim to independence.

This was a moment for President Mohamud to reaffirm Somali unity, show the world that the territories Somaliland’s separatist leaders claim were not a monolithic entity, support pro-union forces in Las Anod, and condemn the military aggression and violence against civilians by the Somaliland forces. President Mohamud failed to make strategic decisions, remained indecisive, politically weak and lacked a clear vision on how to handle a national crisis, perhaps with his decision-making judgment clouded by political considerations and foreign influence. All these efforts weakened political cohesion, undermined the united front against armed extremist groups such as Al Shabaab, and deepened clan distrust and hostilities. 

Danger ahead

Israel does not understand the Somali people, nor can it be expected to. Israel reached a decision purely assessed through the prism of its own survivalist and security considerations, aiming to expand territorially through a process of violent colonialism in the name of self-defense. The Somalis are an ancient civilization that inhabits four countries in the Horn of Africa. There are conflicting historical, social, political, economic and security factors at play, both visible and invisible — not only within Somalia, but also within the boundaries Somaliland claims.

�����������’s narrow focus on the Bab al-Mandab, the Port of Berbera and regional powerplays fails to take a full view of the surrounding complexities: a legacy of dictatorship and civil war; clan boundaries; political conflicts; and extremist violence. Already, we are witnessing how global competitions, such as Ethiopia vs Egypt, China vs the US/India/Taiwan, Qatar vs the UAE and now, Türkiye vs Israel, just to name a few, are impacting and worsening internal rivalries. The loser on all sides is the Somali people, betrayed by a self-serving political class and blinded by ancient clan animosities.

This is not merely about Somaliland. This is about Africa and the principle that Somalia’s borders cannot be altered without the consent of its people and institutions. Upholding this principle is essential for long-term peace, national unity and democratic legitimacy — failure to do so risks creating new generations of radicalized youth, in Somaliland, most prominently. If not addressed correctly and urgently, we will witness worsening internal fractures and fragmentation, deeper economic decline and institutional instability unseen in the past 35 years.

The calls to defend Somalia’s dignity and boundaries are growing — being heard in every Somali-speaking household, that the enemies who seek to further divide and weaken this ancient nation are at the gates. This strategically failed approach undermines decades of US-led intervention learned and shaped through experience since the 1990s UN peacekeeping mission, founded on the policies of pragmatic engagement, tailored support and a hands-off approach to Somali internal politics, clan dynamics and balance of power.

Above all, the issue of “Somaliland” is a Somali issue before it is an African or regional issue. It is an unresolved, dormant volcano waiting to explode. Without a doubt, unless reversed, �����������’s move threatens to accelerate further instability, embolden clan violence, undermine regional security, and deepen radicalization and extremism unseen since the Ethiopian of Mogadishu in 2006. We cannot predict the future, but we are certain of one thing: Somalis will violently reject colonialist exploitation in all its forms, as they have done in the past.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The October 14 bombing that killed over 400 people, mostly civilians, near Mogadishu’s busy Zoppe Square was the single since the armed insurgency erupted in Somalia in 2006. The harrowing attack became another agonizing testament to the country’s prolonged and ruthless conflict, the unresolved security vulnerabilities and the weak institutions of the Federal Government of Somalia. It was, also, a passing moment of national unity, as Somalis from all regions and walks of life rushed to aid recovering victims. That momentum of solidarity, however, was short-lived. Within days, infighting within government institutions was underway — business as usual.

In a country where 70% of the population is under 35, entire generations of Somalis have become accustomed to a nation without a government. When the state collapsed in 1991, two decades of lawlessness and conflict followed. Violence became commonplace, social relations were torn and the economy foundered. In 2012, at the end of a 12-year political process, the federal government was formed following the .

By 2017, the country’s first-ever bicameral federal parliament was formed. Then, at parliament’s first joint session in Mogadishu in February, Somali legislators elected a former prime minister, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, also known as Farmajo, as the .

It was the culmination of a long, arduous procedure.��Observers noted that the , characterized by corruption allegations and vote buying. However, after Mohamed was declared victor, the widespread jubilation in Mogadishu and other cities surprised many. It was significantly indicative of the electoral outcome’s legitimacy and popular support and of the people’s aspirations for a better future under what many hoped to be a patriotic national leadership.

Mandate to Lead

The new government came to power with a strong mandate to lead; the nation had suffered for far too long, and it was time for change. The incoming government recognized the monumental task that lay ahead: restoring peace and national cohesion in Somalia, after decades of fragmentation. Still, the new government’s pronounced vision decidedly focused on fighting terrorism, corruption and poverty, yet it was not clear how that was to be done.

Like its predecessors, however, the government led by President Mohamed and the political newcomer, Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, is struggling to regularly pay salaries, adequately manage the federal structure or contain disputes among the political class. This has ensured that the government remains distracted from working on federalization, economic recovery or the much-needed security and justice reforms.

Even more troubling, the new administration seems to have followed the path of its predecessor, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. It wasted time and resources attempting to shape the state formation process through political manipulation and direct interference. In Jubaland, for example, such interference led to armed clashes in Kismayo in June 2013 and, in Galmudug, to the election of Abdikarim Hussein Guled, then-President Mohamud’s close associate.

The Khaire administration should learn from mistakes of its former government. The outcome could be more political tensions exacerbating fragile conditions and derailing the country’s hard-earned political transition. To maintain public support, the administration will depend on whether or not the government enacts sound policies and corrective action without which it remains a weak, self-defeating and underperforming institution, dashing public hopes after election euphoria.

Neutrality in Regional Crisis

For generations, world and regional powers have in Somalia due to the country’s strategic location connecting the Indian Ocean region, the Middle East and East Africa. With untapped natural resources, the country is a key regional security pillar and has great potential for investment and economic development.

In June 2017, when the Gulf crisis pitted a Saudi and UAE-led coalition against the state of Qatar, announced its neutral position and called for regional dialogue to resolve the diplomatic crisis. The decision provoked to contradict the federal government’s official position. State leaders argued they had a right to be consulted on major national decisions, and that the federal government violated the draft constitution by alienating regional voices. Needless to say, the regional states’ unilateral decisions bewildered the Somali public.

For the Somali government, the Gulf crisis was an opportunity to articulate its federalism strategy and foreign policy priorities. Such a strategy could help consolidate its domestic authority while augmenting its international stature. Instead, when Mogadishu unilaterally declared its position, it unwittingly instigated a domestic political row. Leading a fragmented and war-ravaged nation, the Somali government’s primary goal should be to build consensus around a national interest and recognition that such a feat requires the cooperation and input of the regional states.

Federalizing Somalia

Federal institutions and the regions have not agreed on a model to complete the federal system. The draft constitution is notorious for its vague stipulations, and both the federal government and the regions have misused the constitution to justify policies or frustrate the federalization process.

The constitutional review process has faced delays and is often associated with committees that work in secrecy. State governments have demanded a transparent constitutional process, which builds political trust and is vital to a fragile state rebuilding its democratic foundations. Particularly, roles and responsibilities between the Somali government, parliament and state governments in political negotiations remain undefined, often shrouded in controversy or locked in dispute. For example, will the prime minister and the state presidents negotiate directly, or will federal and state parliament subcommittees have an active role in federal-state negotiations?

Political friction between Mogadishu and the regions continues to be high, sabotaging the federalization process. Most recently, on October 10, five regional presidents issued a in Kismayo. Without any federal officials present, it was clear that the meeting was an effort to isolate the federal government. In late October 2017, President Mohamed invited the state presidents to Mogadishu for a week of talks. In theory, the two sides seem to have agreed on key principles. However, without a harmonized federal arrangement and an agreed model for power and resource sharing, similar deadlock cannot be prevented in the near future.

Cooperative Federalism

Article 54 of the draft constitution grants the federal government power in matters of foreign affairs, national defense, citizenship and immigration, and monetary policy. But the constitution envisions a form of cooperative federalism (as opposed to dual federalism) where power and institutional balance is harmonized between the center and the periphery. Such a system largely relies on consensus-building leaders at all levels of government.

The Somali government’s unilateral decision and lack of consultation with the states undermines that spirit of cooperation. The constitutional requirement of federal-state consultations forms the basis for preventing a return to the tyranny of centralized rule, while an incomplete federalization process, unaddressed community reconciliation and lagging security and political integration define the constitution’s realpolitik considerations.

Conversely, the regions’ contradicting the federal government’s Gulf crisis policy undermines national unity and reconciliation efforts. There are other political and institutional avenues whereby the states could express their dissenting voices, including through a federal parliament or judicial process.

Foundations of Security

Somalia’s complex security challenges cannot be addressed solely through police action and military offensives. The Somali government needs security cooperation and coordination with state governments, while ensuring tangible commitment to building the foundations of security: community reconciliation, equality under law and institutional and socioeconomic balance.

Facing the burden of geopolitics, the government’s decision to stay neutral in an international dispute was a positive move. But Somalia should benefit from its foreign policy decisions: think trade deals, investment and economic incentives. The government must balance between its foreign policy interests and local concerns. The practice of consultations and consensus building prior to making decisions affecting specific regional states’ economic interests will create trust and prevent future political crises.

Finally, there must be genuine political will — especially among the federal and state leaders — to cooperate and work together for the interest of the Somali nation. This is, perhaps, the most difficult task. It is also the only way Somalia can restore unity, confront security vulnerabilities and bolster national governance.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Somalia was supposed to have a new parliament in August, followed shortly thereafter by parliamentarians voting in a new president on September 10. This imperfect system has brought to power four new presidents since 2000.

The postponed elections put an extra burden on a fragile political, security and humanitarian situation. In addition to years of political instability and terrorism, the United Nations (UN) says that more than 5 million people are��, further exacerbating local conditions.

The initial����expected a new parliament in office by October 20 and a presidential election on October 30, but the election commission has . The commission now says that the federal parliament will be established by��November 23 and a presidential election held on November 30.

The delays come as a major disappointment, and the UN’s special envoy to Somalia, Michael Keating,����that “the new extension does not create additional space for manipulation or disruption by spoilers.” The outgoing government’s interference in the election commission’s mandate and in the selection of delegates is a cause for concern. Opposition candidates are worried that government officials are manipulating the process and exploiting clan politics.

Hope and recovery

In 2012, when the first permanent Somali government in 22 years came to power in Mogadishu, it was welcomed with optimism and high hopes. Four years on, however, Somalia remains a divided and unstable country, one that is politically fragmented, institutionally weak and vulnerable to foreign exploitation, terrorism and����by all parties to the conflict.

The federal government’s recent hosting of an Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)����in Mogadishu offered an opportunity for East African leaders to draw attention to the African Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) achievements, especially in light of the European Union’s . The summit also accorded a symbolic moment for a president besieged by his political rivals.

But the summit’s short-lived symbolic value was punctuated by the continuing wave of militant attacks, including a September 18 bombing outside the Ministry of Defense in Mogadishu, killing Somali army division commander��. On that same day, the militants were blamed for an assassination in the city of Galkayo and for����in Gedo region, near the Kenyan border.

The attacks underscored the insurgents’ capacity to perpetrate horrific violence with impunity, and exposed the government’s security weaknesses and the lack of cooperation between federal and state institutions.

Somalia: Weak institutions, indirect elections

The path to indirect elections came at the conclusion of a����and talks between federal and state leaders, grouped under the National Leadership Forum (NLF). Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, whose presidential term ended on September 10��and holds power in a caretaker role disputed by opposition leaders,����that the 2016 election will be a “step closer to universal suffrage.”

The outgoing president is overstretching. An “electoral college” of nearly��, who will elect the 275 members of parliament (MP) of the lower house, is no substitute for a general election where all eligible citizens vote in a nation of 10 million people. The anticipated process, however, encourages public participation in comparison to the limitations of the��, when 135 traditional elders handpicked parliamentarians. Somali leaders have also committed to a 30% quota for female legislators. If achieved, it will become a milestone in a traditionally male-dominated political landscape.

President Mohamud’s exaggerated justification may also be interpreted as a diversion tactic to draw attention away from his administration’s shortcomings: in the constitutional review and federalization process, social reconciliation, economic and institutional reforms, rebuilding national forces and holding timely elections.

Leadership failure

There is no question that the federal government’s institutional weakness and leadership failure have undermined Somalia’s democratic dreams. Lacking from the country’s transition to democracy is political commitment and structural reforms that prioritize state-building, social and political cohesion, and economic revitalization.

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While the UN’s Michael Keating����the 2016 election will be “much more inclusive” than past elections, the reality is that the political environment is characterized more by political violence and fragmentation, and less by inclusive politics and democratic practices.

The outgoing president’s re-election bid is challenged by a����and political newcomers, including one ex-president and two ex-prime ministers, the former president of Puntland state, ex-cabinet ministers, the former ambassador to Kenya, Mogadishu’s ex-mayor and the��.

Opposition presidential candidates, most of whom are organized under the ��in Mogadishu, have challenged Mohamud’s extended stay in office and demanded that he transfer power to the speaker of federal parliament, Mohamed Osman Jawari. Abdirahman Abdullahi Baadiyow, the 2012 presidential candidate, scholar and member of the Coalition for Change, said in an emailed response: “The incumbent regime has failed to deliver all of its Six-Pillar Policy and is adamant to come back to power using state resources, unprecedented corruption and vote-buying.”

Baadiyow also indicated that the outgoing president was “blocking all avenues of dialogue” with opposition candidates.

Allegations of power abuse,����and divisive policies have marred the outgoing president’s term. Under President Mohamud, opponents say, security conditions deteriorated, social divisions widened, the economy nearly collapsed, and political and institutional reforms lagged.

But in April, the outgoing leader told the����that “Somalia has made extraordinary progress” in peace and governance, while claiming economic reforms with an annual growth of 3.7%.

Continuing challenges in Somalia

No matter who is elected in Somalia, the next government faces continuing challenges in peace, institution-building and economic reforms. The����affirmed that “weak institutional capacity, complex clan politics, and a challenging security situation have complicated the country’s economic reconstruction.”

Political stability and economic recovery can only be assured once Somalia has peace and reconciliation. With a stable government, the country can benefit from its wealth of natural resources. Political will, enhanced institutional capacity and federal-state cooperation can build on security gains, initiate an economic transformation, and address the delicate politics of grievance and identity that sit at the heart of a prolonged conflict.

An election alone cannot reverse decades of turmoil and economic ruin. There is hope that Somalia is on the path to progress, and renewed optimism that it can elect new leadership that brings change. For Somalia to achieve peace and democracy, state-building must be the new federal government’s cornerstone policy.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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’s political recovery will be tested in the lead-up to the 2016 national elections. It is widely agreed that the possibility of “one-man, one-vote” is both unrealistic and impractical. The war-torn, fragmented East African nation of 10 million people is not new to pseudo-democratic election processes. Since 2000, Somalia has used a strange and unfair power-sharing scheme among the country’s so-called “majority and minority clans”—an alien system known as the 4.5 formula.

The Formula

At the Arta Peace Conference, held in in 2000, Somali political leaders agreed to the 4.5 formula to distribute national parliamentarian seats. By then, over a dozen Somali “peace conferences” were held, and faction leaders sought a political solution to clan power struggles in post-war Somalia.

Three subsequent national elections—one held in Kenya in 2004, again in Djibouti in 2009 and a third in Mogadishu in 2012—used the 4.5 formula as the basis for selection of national members of parliament (MPs).��Reporting on Somalia’s 2012 elections,����wrote: “The magic number is 4.5, a formula that acknowledges the primacy of Somali clan loyalties, ensuring that the spoils of power can theoretically be divided between the four main groups — the Hawiye, Darod, Dir, and Rahaweyn — and the ‘others’, an amalgamation of smaller clans.”

The formula essentially divides the Somali people into five distinct groups and distributes national MPs based on an irrational and simplistic arithmetic to supposedly balance political power. The MPs, traditionally selected by clan elders through a system of patronage, are empowered to elect the president of Somalia and perform other parliamentary obligations.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has, both tacitly and through proxy, supported a return to the 4.5 formula. However, other political entities, including Puntland state in the country’s north, have proposed a region- or district-based election model—a community-driven initiative that was similarly used to establish state parliaments in Puntland, Jubaland, Galmudug and Southwest. State parliament seats are distributed to districts within each state and, while belonging to a “clan,” all MPs in the state parliaments represent a district seat.

This hybrid tradition-democratic system used at the level of regional states has not been replicated in national politics. For the past 15 years, and despite its own shortcomings and its origin as a transient political compromise, the 4.5 formula has helped transition Somalia from a period of lawlessness toward governance and representative national institutions. However, critics blame it for institutionalizing the clan system, further polarizing local and national politics, and reigniting local conflicts.

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud / Flickr

Today, as the country prepares for elections in August 2016, the formula has incited debate and a divergence of opinions that largely align with Somali leaders’ policy positions, threatening to further polarize a deeply divided society and fractious politics. To make matters worse, President Mohamud’s two-year term extension proposal, cleverly referred to as “,” has also provoked public frustration.

The path to the 2016 election is undoubtedly fraught with uncertainties, with regard to the election model and the question of political representation. International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think tank,����that “despite relentlessly upbeat messages and some advances in other sectors, the SFG [Somali Federal Government] and its institutions, especially Parliament, have made little real progress on key electoral preparations.”

Three��months later, in July,��the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Parliament issued����ruling out popular elections, but falling short of proposing an alternative. Instead, a����(NCF) was formed, comprising federal and state leaders. The NCF has met in Mogadishu and more recently in Kismayo to engage in deliberations about an election model, resolving inter-state boundary disputes, and building the foundation for the 2016 electoral process.

However, the Kismayo meeting concluded on January 16��without any tangible agreement on the electoral process.��According to a , the NCF leaders “made progress in negotiating an agreeable compromise,” further delaying a decision.

The new United Nations special envoy to Somalia, Michael Keating, arrived in Mogadishu in January and—accompanied by US, European Union, African Union and Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) diplomats—was engaged in private talks with President Mohamud, Prime Minister Omar Ali Sharmake and Parliament Speaker Mohamed Osman Jawari, in a bid to exert international pressure on Somali leaders to reach a compromise.

The imperativeness of political inclusion

In 2011-12, Somali political leaders achieved a number of important milestones by working together to negotiate a����(PFC), which the National Constituent Assembly ratified later that year. It is hoped that NCF leaders will deliver that same spirit of cooperation that culminated in the challenging task of ending the 12-year transitional period in Somalia.

While the controversial scheme was used to select Federal MPs in 2012, the����stipulates that: “The 4.5 formula shall never become the basis for power sharing in any future political dispensation after the above-mentioned term [2012-16] concludes.” More importantly, the PFC makes no mention of the 4.5 formula as a basis for political power in Somalia.

In the historical election of 2012, new MPs unseated former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and elected President Mohamud to lead the FGS. The current government carries an additional burden after gaining international recognition as the country’s first permanent government in 22 years. But the public euphoria that followed Mohamud’s election—touted as a civilian, an educator and a progressive who lived in Mogadishu during the devastating civil war years—slowly disappeared after the president engaged in����and��, and����in two years.

Somalia has long been considered to be among the world’s foremost “ungoverned spaces,” and the international community prescribed a range of “First Aid” policy options…

In effect, Mohamud was continuing a vicious tradition of cutthroat politics that breeds widespread social discontent and political unrest. He soon learned that traveling to London or Washington as Somalia’s “new hero” did not amount to national legitimacy. In reality, his administration became like its predecessors, crippled by partisan politics and characterized by political infighting and failure in many of its security and state-building objectives.

But the nation’s present condition is not completely the fault of any single leader or administration. Somalia has deep problems—in reconciliation, fair politics, institution-building and economic opportunities—and the FGS was doomed to fail from the onset. A government largely reliant on foreign military muscle and foreign aid cannot be the expressed guarantor of Somalia’s national sovereignty. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is�� a year, an expensive endeavor in a world that is increasingly in need of peacekeeping operations.

In 2014, the United Nations and other international agencies received $400 million—after requesting $933 million in a����for Somalia—and implemented numerous projects in food security, water, health, education and other social sectors throughout Somalia, with the US donating 24% of total humanitarian aid. In 25 years of political unrest, the provision of basic services and the mitigating of humanitarian and environmental crises have largely depended on international assistance. Hence, without relying on its own security capacity and revenue base, the FGS cannot exercise sovereign rule and can only be a participant at a table shared with international partners.

In May 2015, US Secretary of State John Kerry��briefly visited��, in a trip designed to shore up international support for the struggling government of President Mohamud. While meeting with the president and the prime minister, Secretary Kerry said: “We all have a stake in your success. The world cannot afford to have places on the map that are essentially ungoverned.”

Somalia has long been considered to be among the world’s foremost “ungoverned spaces,” and the international community prescribed a range of “First Aid” policy options: humanitarian interventionism in the 1990s; failed nation-building programs; and, most recently, a militarist approach to “neutralize” threats of terrorism and maritime piracy. However, no external approach solved underlying roots of the Somali conflict, a responsibility that only the Somali people—through their leaders and institutions—can shoulder.

Path to Recovery

The reality is that Somalia ceased to be a monolithic entity after the state collapsed in 1991, with separatist movements, autonomous regions and armed factions emerging to replace centralized rule and fill the power vacuum. In a September 2015 report, the London-based����policy institute concluded that “for the purposes of reaching a durable settlement, the existing and developing political realities on the ground [in Somalia] will need to be accommodated.”

International concerns of threats emanating from “ungoverned spaces” are valid and, therefore, draw attention to the necessity of bolstering local capacity to address roots of conflict and disorder, including community reconciliation, conflict resolution and the promotion of representative democracy, rule of law and wealth sharing.

Additionally, and equally important, a national process of justice that addresses war crimes and human rights abuses must commence, at all levels, to end impunity and ensure that criminals and war profiteers face justice in Somalia.

This is the only viable path toward a long-term peace that restores the nation’s sovereignty and reverses the trend of political instability and violence triggered by state collapse. Only a representative, responsible and accountable Somalia can placate international concerns and ensure competing foreign policy intentions and practices do not harm the nation’s long-term stability and future prospects.

The 4.5 system had its 15-year shine, and like all things transitional, it must end to allow Somali constituencies in regions and districts to choose their MPs in the Federal Parliament. The 2016 election is definitely a major test for Somalia’s path to political recovery, but it is not an insurmountable task.

*[Article updated on February 9, 2016, at 00:12.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In 2015, entered its 25^th consecutive year of instability, fragmentation and economic decline. The world has witnessed the impact of Somalia’s instability for years—with piracy disrupting maritime trade, and insurgents staging heinous cross-border attacks, most recently at Kenya’s Garissa University College, resulting in the death of 147 . Since 1992, successive international interventions have tried to “solve” the evolving Somali crises through a range of military and political initiatives.

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is a by-product of multilateral interventionism. The FGS was established during the 2002-04 Somali peace process in Kenya, hosted by the East Africa-based Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD members contribute the majority of ��troops to the United Nations-mandated African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The 22,000-strong peacekeeping force bolsters a weak FGS besieged in Mogadishu by political enemies, and it defends the government’s fickle claim to Somali sovereignty in the face of fragmentation, violent insurgency and economic ruin.

During the , East and West competed for power and influence over Somalia’s then-military dictatorship. Despite the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, the country retains its strategic geopolitical value today. Famine and security emergencies have led to concerted aid efforts, but many governments involved with Somalia pursue competing foreign policy priorities dictated by their own strategic objectives and economic interests.

The inescapable fact is that Somalia needs the world, and the world needs a peaceful Somalia. In January, a warned that 3 million Somalis will require humanitarian assistance in 2015, including 731,000 facing emergency levels of acute food insecurity. In December 2014, the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) requested $863 million to fund Somali humanitarian aid in 2015, but donor willingness and funding is wearing thin. Further, while the AMISOM force is currently to the tune of $50 million per month, experts that ��“international donors are beginning to tire of the burden.”

In addition to foreign aid, Somalis depend on remittances from abroad. However, the Somali money-transfer industry, hawala, has been under growing scrutiny by security agencies and financial regulators in the and other Western countries, due to alleged abuse by criminals who launder money and fund insurgents. Banks continue to abandon relations with hawala firms over regulatory pressure, and some warn of the devastating impact on the country’s . Remittances for 35% of Somalia’s gross domestic product (GDP), more than total aid spending. Although it is vital to end funding for criminal networks through robust regulatory frameworks, cutting off Somalia’s economic lifeline threatens livelihoods and may lead to further instability.

International intervention has failed because it is no substitute for a Somali-led nation-building process that prioritizes community reconciliation, encourages fair political representation and enhances socioeconomic revitalization. In Somalia, competing political narratives continue to fuel disunity, dissent and disorder. Since 2012, federal leaders have exploited sociopolitical tensions and pursued counterproductive strategies that have led to political within government institutions, renewed armed hostilities in several regions and brought about of power abuse and corruption. Somali politicians must instead return to a narrative of peace that nurtures unity, rule of law, social justice and political cohesion.

Somalia’s peaceful political narrative was lost in the violent power struggle among rival factions that erupted following the central government’s collapse in 1991. Multilateral interventions with narrow objectives have since exacerbated local tensions. In the context of pervasive violence and distrust of centralized authority, Somalia’s clans—which form the foundation of the nation’s social structure—have emerged as powerful, aggressive and self-interested political agents engaged in an aggressive competition for control of contested sovereignties.

Somalia adopted a federal system in 2004, but some analysts have wrongly associated Somali federalism with the ongoing competition among ��“political clans” fighting for power, land and resources, which emerged after 1991 when Mogadishu imploded and the central state collapsed.

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The Federal Government’s claim of sovereignty enjoys some international credibility, but local power structures based on political clans exercise de facto authority in most regions of Somalia. Mogadishu’s exclusivist politics, exacerbated by government corruption, alienates certain regions of the country and contributes to instability.

Moving Forward

To progress as a nation, Somalia must address its history of violence and end the era of impunity. In order to begin a process of national healing, a peace and justice commission composed of prominent Somalis should be established to transparently address war crimes, human rights abuses and other injustices. The commission’s work would complement the government’s mandate and local efforts to advance peace, unity and justice, providing powerful counterweights to the destructive forces of disunity and conflict.

Hope and forward-thinking must replace the present sense of despair and resignation in Somalia. With 70% of the under 30, Somalia is a young country with massive development needs. With peace, Somalia would be able to mobilize its human capital and benefit from natural resources and commercial opportunities. Encouragingly, many nations have restored their diplomatic ties, nominated new ambassadors and reopened their embassies in Mogadishu.

There are other signs of hope. Besides traditional Western donors, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and others have increased aid projects in Somalia. Peace dividends empower local authorities, provide opportunities to neglected communities and encourage alternative livelihoods.

The momentum for change is growing as Somalis tire of destructive conflict. Political leaders are under increasing pressure to make peace, build regional states and complete federalization, reform public institutions and revitalize economic initiatives. A brighter future for Somalia requires a new narrative of peace that restores healing and social trust, reinforces government institutions and fair practices, and instills hope. Only a Somalia that is good for its people can be good for the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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