A few decades ago, things were very different. In 1989, thousands gathered in Tiananmen Square and at the Berlin Wall. In 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. The same year, Samuel P. Huntington published The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, describing the global trend towards democratization. More than 60 countries in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa had experienced democratic transitions since Portugal’s “Carnation Revolution” in 1974.

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A Resilient Democracy

Many forget that Indian democracy predates this post-1974 democratic transition. Since 1947, India has been a diverse, dynamic and resilient democracy. In 1957, the southwestern state of Kerala elected to power. These communists have survived the fall of the Soviet Union and won the most recent election in Kerala. Ten years after the 1957 communist victory in Kerala, its eastern neighbor Tamil Nadu elected a regional party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (). Since 1967, Tamil Nadu has always been run by a regional party. The current chief minister of the state is the DMK leader M.K. Stalin, named after none other than the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.

India has a whole host of parties that jostle for the affection of its 1.4 billion population. In Punjab, a western state that borders Pakistan, the new Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) is in power. In West Bengal, an eastern state that borders Bangladesh, the Trinamool Congress (TMC) is in power. Both the AAP and the TMC beat the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in their respective state elections. The Indian National Congress (INC) is the oldest political party of the country. Rahul Gandhi, the party’s de facto leader, is the great grandson of India’s first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The INC remains a political force despite declining from its heyday. The party beat the BJP in the 2022 Himachal Pradesh elections and could win in the upcoming Karnataka elections. Karnataka is the state home to India’s IT capital Bengaluru, better known as Bangalore internationally. 

In brief, India stands as a shining example of a seemingly improbable and incongruous success. In 1947, India gained independence from the UK. In 1950, India inaugurated its “sovereign, democratic republic” with universal suffrage and fundamental freedoms. This audacious experiment was far ahead of its time. The French Fifth Republic would be born only in 1958. Australia would give votes to aborigines in 1962. Switzerland would give votes to women in 1971. In 1975, Portugal would conduct elections and become a democracy. The same year, General Francisco Franco would die, inaugurating Spain’s democratic transition. In South Africa, apartheid would only dissolve in 1994.

Social Mobility and Dynamism

Since 1947, India has been a dynamic democracy. The brief two-year period from 1975 to 1977 when the then prime minister Indira Gandhi assumed dictatorial powers was soundly rejected by Indian voters at the polls. The Election Commission of India which conducts national elections is independent. Transfer of power from one candidate or party to another in villages, towns, states and the center occurs seamlessly. India’s once marginalized communities are increasingly in the limelight. 

In the 2019 national , India had over 880 million eligible voters. Of these, 612 million, i.e. 69.5%, voted in the elections. These were, by far, the largest elections in history. Turnout was higher than the voter participation in the charged 2020 US elections. Typically, however, voter participation in US presidential elections hovers around . Voter participation in India is generally higher than in the US. Poorer people are much more likely to vote in India than in the US. Unlike the US, there is no of minorities and the poor, and both record high voter rates, demonstrating that Indian democracy is more inclusive than its American counterparts.

With their humble roots, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Droupadi Murmu personify the increasing inclusivity of Indian democracy. Modi began life as a tea seller by a train station. Unlike Nehru, he is not a rich Brahmin. Note that India’s first prime minister came from a family rich enough to send him to Harrow, the same boarding school that Winston Churchill attended, and then to Cambridge where he inhaled the Leftist ideologies of the times. 

If Modi’s rise is exceptional, Murmu’s story is extraordinary. She is a Santhal, one of India’s Scheduled Tribes, a forest-dwelling indigenous community that was slaughtered by the British East India Company after its historic 1855 rebellion. This preceded the 1857 rebellion that Indians now call the first war of independence. The British crushed both revolts with savage retribution, executing thousands of Indians. More than 15,000 Santhals lost their lives and the survivors were condemned to lives of abject poverty. For years, Murmu worked as a teacher in a poor small town and now this Santhal lady is the head of state of a nation of 1.4 billion people.

Modi’s and Murmu’s remarkable stories are not unusual in Indian politics. Mamata Banerjee, the TMC chief minister of West Bengal, a state with over 90 million people, is a self-made woman from a poor family. Pinarayi Vijayan, the Communist chief minister of Kerala, was once a handloom weaver. Eknath Shinde, the chief minister of Maharashtra, India’s most industrialized state, used to drive an auto rickshaw to earn a living.

This extraordinary social mobility in politics in India is in stark contrast to Britain. The last five prime ministers—David Cameron, Theresa May, Boris Johnson, Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak—studied at the University of Oxford. The Social Mobility Commission’s 2019 report titled, , tells us that 57% of the current British cabinet attended Oxbridge. Today, class-divided Britain is much more inequitable and far less democratic than its so-called caste-divided former colony.

So, what explains this extraordinary deepening of democracy and its striking success in India?

Western democracies trace their roots back to ancient Athens and Rome. In contrast, democracy is deeply rooted in Indian culture itself. For millennia, many faiths and philosophies have thrived cheek by jowl in this land of Indus, the Ganges and the Kaveri. As Shailendra Mehta chronicled in his at MIT, the modern university began 2,600 years ago in India. The tradition of shastrarth, uncannily similar to the Socratic method, makes India a spiritual democracy. 

In the Indian spiritual tradition, everything is open to inquiry and discussion. This openness makes India the most multicultural society in the world. Civilizationally, India is the land of diversity and plurality. It accepts differences: social, religious, linguistic, political and cultural. As the world goes through economic slowdown, war and polarization, Indian democracy is an example for much of the world.

The success of Indian democracy is leading to a new kind of economy. India has now overtaken the UK to become the economy in the world. The Modi government has been building at breakneck speed. A huge multiplier effect will follow and build the new India that the prime minister repeatedly refers to in his many speeches. At the same time, India’s political leaders have focused on inclusive growth. Direct transfers to millions of bank accounts and free meals for millions provide a fast-improving safety net. The International Monetary Fund has called it a “.”

India’s inclusive spirit goes beyond its borders. This year, it is the leader of the G20 even as the world faces an unprecedented “food, fuel and fertilizer” . The summit sought to “generate ideas from the developing world for achieving energy security, which is affordable, accessible and sustainable.” Perhaps more importantly, India promised to utilize its G20 presidency “to give resonance to the voice of the global south.” By doing so, the world’s biggest democracy is giving expression to the democratic spirit and representing the billions who are invariably not represented at the top table in international relations. Today, India’s democracy is clearly an example for much of the world.

[Vikram Sood is the former chief of India’s foreign intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing. Kanwal Sibal is the former foreign secretary of India. Both are noted policy wonks, formidable intellectuals and prolific writers.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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India Must Modernize Its Inefficient Defense Production System

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The seeds of a new architecture have been germinating in the form of the , a grouping of India, Australia, Japan and the United States. Indian scientists have gone on a missile testing , and the political leadership in New Delhi is not softening its stand on the India-China border. India is also boosting its defense ties with Southeast Asian nations threatened by China. It has offered the supersonic cruise missile to the Philippines. BrahMos can be used against both land and sea targets. As an anti-ship missile, it has few peers. This missile effectively denies area entry to enemy surface .

In addition to BrahMos, India might soon start selling air defense missiles to its Southeast Asian friends. New Delhi is now clearly making to counter Beijing, and closer cooperation with the US seems to be part of India’s new grand strategy.

The Ghosts of 1962

In the war of 1962 over a disputed border, India lost to China, yet it did not establish closer relations with the anti-communist US for largely ideological reasons. The then-prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was a . Deeply influenced by the Soviet Union, he was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement. Poor at realpolitik, Nehru tried to the US after 1962 even as he continued to remain to the Soviet Union. The effort did not lead to much, and Beijing concluded that an Indo-US entente was improbable.

Since 1962, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has adopted an stance against the Indian Army. In contrast, India was chastened by the loss of territory and prestige. Therefore, successive Indian governments have adopted a stance vis-à-vis Beijing. In 2020, this has changed. The brutal killing of an Indian colonel by the PLA triggered a from Indian troops. A surge of patriotism followed. The Modi-led nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government drew a line in the Himalayas and has stood up to its northern neighbor.

Many in the English-speaking Indian and Anglo-Saxon media expected and predicted Indian capitulation, defeat and disgrace. The turn of events has proved them wrong. India has conducted its quickest Himalayan mobilization. It has used , nibbled some territory hitherto held by the Chinese and put all three of its armed forces — Army, Navy and Air Force — in a state of high . India has also conducted special operations inside Chinese territory and openly used for the first time in its history. 

New Entente

In October, Modi’s government has shed India’s traditional Nehruvian diffidence and embraced the US wholeheartedly. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper joined Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar for the annual US-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in New Delhi.

By signing BECA, India has gained access to valuable geospatial data, improving situational awareness for military operations and increasing the accuracy of its missile systems. COMCASA enabled Indian and US military platforms to network with each other. LEMOA allowed Indian and US militaries access to each other’s refueling facilities and military material. GSOMIA started the sharing of sensitive military intelligence data.

These four agreements enable logistics, communication and geospatial data sharing are in place, making India a de facto US ally. India has turned decisively to the US in part because it has lost faith in Russia’s ability to contain China. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, India and the US have steadily moved closer. However, relations have been greatly influenced by the chemistry of those in power in Washington and New Delhi. Successive governments have blown hot and cold. When there has been a change of power in either democracy, their relations have suffered in the transition.

Now, the 2+2 dialogue has moved decisively toward operationalizing the Quad. Previously, the Quad had not quite taken off. Australia and Japan have all shied away from closer engagement. This year, Australian sailors are joining the navies of Japan, India and the US for the Malabar naval exercise. This is a major change in political and military alliances in the region.

The latest meeting marks a watershed in US-India relations. No longer will American policy change if a new administration enters the White House. Even as Donald Trump leaves and Joe Biden takes over, the trajectory of US-India relations is likely to remain the same. Many in New Delhi fear that Biden is likely to initiate a rapprochement with China and pressure India to kick-start talks with Pakistan. Even if that turns out to be true, ties between India and the United States have now been institutionalized, and the countries have entered an entente, if not an alliance.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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So far, a comprehensive solution to this violence has been elusive. If insurgent groups are extreme, it is difficult to apply Nelson Mandela’s reconciliatory method. The tendency to call for peace negotiations at the first sign of ephemeral success usually rebounds on the state.

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Politicians prize the urgent over important and thus feel pressured to deliver a “peace deal.” Such deals are used as breathers by insurgent organizations who mistake it for the weakness of the state. Ironically, the road to peace passes through the valley of war. Appeasement is a must avoid by a state if it wishes to succeed. There can be no lasting deal with insurgents unless they are first weakened. Insurgents have to be weakened by physical force, financial marginalization, destruction of safe havens, intelligence sharing and soft power before going the Mandela way.

A key element of the strategy to end insurgency and terrorism lies in “winning hearts and minds.” This is a complex challenge and the toughest to implement. Such an approach can only succeed on intergenerational time scales and cannot replace counterinsurgency in the short term, which many politicians and theorists often forget.

Extremism and Insurgency Are Complicated

For decades, experts and practitioners have argued about the best strategies to curb insurgencies and violent extremism. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, a scholar with field experience in South Asia, has made an important intervention in the field. D’Souza has edited a , “Understanding Insurgencies and Violent extremism in South and South East Asia,” on the subject that, in her own words, recognizes the complexity of “violent internal challenges” faced by countries in the region and engages in an “all policy-relevant work to enhance comprehension”.

D’Souza ably delineates the dilemma democracies face in countering insurgencies and terrorism. Democracies struggle with the politicization of national security issues. In addition, bureaucratic establishments get siloed due to the need to guard secrets closely and to keep important matters confidential. This contributes to interdepartmental rivalries and further complicates policymaking.

Reading between the lines, D’Souza makes an important observation. She highlights the problematic mix in most democracies. An indifferent and vacillating political leadership exists alongside an activist and biased media. This mix is the greatest impediment to a successful counterterror or counterinsurgency operation in most countries. The state also comes up short when dealing with insurgencies that use violence as by the deed and as an enabler for their ideology-driven movement.  

D’Souza’s book is divided into four sections: “Emerging Challenges,” “Cautious Optimism — or False Dawn?” “Quagmires” and “Victory?” The book is an international, multidisciplinary endeavor for the serious reader and a useful guide to an important problem.

Of all the chapters, the one authored by Marvin Weinbaum titled “Insurgency and Violent Extremism in Pakistan” struck my eye. It is an unflattering account of the terror and insurgency situation in Pakistan. Things are dire. However, Weinbaum takes the view that Pakistan is unlikely to break apart “under the weight of provincially based insurgencies or yield power to radical Islamists.”

Weinbaum may be wrong. Bit by bit, Pakistan is making concession after concession to Islamists. In the past two months, the country’s radical actions have proved controversial. Islamabad stood idly by Islamic extremists destroyed a of Buddha that was accidentally unearthed in northwest Pakistan. Authorities stopped the of the capital Islamabad’s first Hindu temple.

The Punjab Assembly unanimously the Tahaffuz-e-Bunyad-e-Islam Bill 2020, which gives the all-powerful Directorate General Public Relations even more . It can now visit and inspect any printing press, publication house, bookstore and confiscate any book, before or after printing. The law has also “made it mandatory that the blessed name of Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) shall be preceded by the title Khatam-an-Nabiyyin or Khatam-un-Nabiyyin followed by ‘Sallallahu alaihi wasallam’ (darood) in the Arabic text.”

One might argue that such types of legislation may be token acts for winning over the religious vote. However, these small steps, one province at a time, indicate where Pakistan is headed. It demonstrates how Islamization is becoming increasingly entrenched and will not unravel easily. It is clear that the deradicalization of Pakistan is highly unlikely.

To be fair, Weinbaum acknowledges the direction in which Pakistan is headed. He writes: “South Punjab is the organizational home of several of the country’s leading jihadi organisations and most powerful Islamic movements, all of which aim to replace the current order with an idealised state governed by Sharia law. The province’s mosques and madrassas are among Pakistan’s largest and most influential, frequently serve up recruits for violent extremist groups, as do ostensibly non-political organisations like the Tablighi Jamaat, a proselytising movement preaching moral rearmament.”

The Pakistani military is aware of this phenomenon, but its relationship with the Afghan Taliban remains inviolable. Therefore, it cannot act effectively against jihadi organizations that serve up the cannon fodder for the Taliban.

These groups also act as appendages of the Pakistani state against India. Weinbaum points out how , an organization committed to waging jihad against India, frequently receives instructions from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s elite intelligence agency. This makes the ISI and the Pakistani state cannot act seriously against such an organization.

Given Weinbaum’s observations, it is surprising to see him conclude optimistically. He suggests that through the unglamorous but steady implementation of political, legal and social reforms, combined with economic improvements in the border areas, Pakistan could emerge from this spiral of fanatical Islamist violence. Weinbaum fails to outline how these reforms will come into being. Pakistan has fallen prey to the terrorism it has sponsored assiduously in its neighborhood for decades. Unless the country stops using terror as a tactic in its geopolitical strategy, Weinbaum’s conclusion about unglamorous reforms will remain a pious but forlorn hope.

New Challenges and Aging Institutions

Another section of D’Souza’s book that caught my eye is Dawood Azami’s chapter titled, “Countering the Islamic State in Asia.” In recent times, the Islamic State (IS) group has frequently targeted Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. The organization has sympathizers and volunteers in all three countries. One way of dealing with such a multinational insurgency is close intelligence, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency cooperation. This requires mutual trust and common strategic goals. Both of these conditions do not exist.

Unless Afghanistan, Pakistan and India can build trust and agree upon common goals, they will be unable to combat the new security challenge. An Islamic state in Khorasan — a historical term for modern-day Afghanistan and Pakistan — stretching all the way from Central Asia to Southeast Asia will keep extremists, radicals and fanatics busy. It is unlikely that IS militants in the Middle East will send volunteers to engage in this battle for Khorasan, a region often cited by Islamic fundamentalists. The group’s new model is akin to the American franchise system. The Islamic State group will rely on local franchises that will provide the manpower to fight this jihad. Azami is spot on when he asserts that the response mechanisms of the states in the region remain far from adequate.

Bibhu Prasad Routray’s chapter titled “India’s Fleeting Attachment to the Counterinsurgency Grand Strategy” is particularly relevant in the context of India’s current problems in Kashmir and the communist Naxalite insurgencies. In general, insurgencies must be tackled by local forces. In India, multiple paramilitary forces and the army operate in Kashmir, making coordination and unity of action difficult. The army has tried to win hearts and minds, but accusations of human rights violations have dogged it in the absence of a political solution.

Instead of using the army, Routray suggests that India should use a local counterinsurgency or paramilitary force in Kashmir. Using the army is counterproductive in the long run. In fact, real success in counterinsurgency is based on a political solution. The Indian states of Mizoram, Tripura and Punjab serve as good examples. The challenge with Routray’s suggestion when it comes to Kashmir is the involvement of Pakistan. India’s increasingly Islamized neighbor no longer wants a solution. Therefore, any discussion with Pakistan leads to a dead end and India perforce has to solve the Kashmir problem on its own.

D’Souza’s concluding remarks sum up the key problems of the region. Inadequate resources, inappropriate force mobilization, lack of united effort and weak political will have led to prolonged insurgency and an increase in extremism. Social, regional and religious fault lines add fuel to the fire. Insurgent and extremist groups have proved most adaptable. They have survived by splintering, lying low, exploiting peace deals or merging with other groups. Maoists in Nepal and Naxalites in India as well as the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been around for decades.

Since the Taliban got involved with al-Qaeda in the 1990s, a local problem has become a global one. The attacks of September 11, 2001, brought the US to the region. Since then, eye-catching headlines have made the news while local issues or threats have been ignored. The counterinsurgency strategy of relying solely on violent and overwhelming force without a political component has not succeeded. We now need new insights. The scholars in Shanthie Mariet D’Souza’s book provide some valuable ones for policymakers and security professionals, which are most relevant and will remain so in the years ahead.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The United States’s war in Iraq is over but it has ended in a fiasco. Iraq is unstable and Iran is emerging as the strongest force in the region. However, some believe that Washington has accomplished its mission in Iraq: the US and its allies have managed to regain control over the oil business in the country, which threatened to slip out of their control in 2002. Today, despite the West’s dubious success in Libya and Egypt, and the uncertainties in Syria, Iran remains a prime target for the US and its friends.

Iraq was accused of possessing (non-existent) weapons of mass destruction; in Iran’s case, the target is Tehran’s nuclear weapons programme. The US’s logic is that since Iran is rich in energy resources, it has no reason to produce nuclear energy, which they see as the first step towards achieving Tehran’s final goal of becoming a nuclear State. Iran’s attitude has been ambivalent. Tehran dared to move out of its dependency on the dollar for its energy revenue when it faced sanctions. Since the US and its allies were keen on preventing this, they unleashed a combination of war games, mind games and spy games against Iran. What is unfolding in the region now is a 21st century version of the Great Game. And the targets are oil and gas resources of Iran.

In the media, experts often discuss how Israel, surrounded by hostile nations, is determined to prevent any State from acquiring nuclear weapons and how it might strike Iran. The list of targets in Iran includes nuclear facilities at Isfahan, Natanz, and Arak. They also discuss the possible routes the attackers could take, much in the style of the Osirak attack of 1981. But many may not remember that the Mossad, the Israeli military intelligence, and the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission had opposed the Osirak attack. Even today, they are against any such attack. The decision was political then — and would have to be even so today.

However, the US is no longer leading the charge against Iran. In fact, former defense secretary Bob Gates and his successor Leon Panetta, and former senior military commanders, have opposed any Israeli strike. The US has a formidable force in the 6th Fleet patrolling the Mediterranean and the 5th Fleet operating from Bahrain. The Gulf Cooperation Council countries have bought US weapons worth $22bn in recent years and the Saudis have a deal worth $60bn pending. With so much firepower in the neighborhood and hostile Sunni-Arab neighbours, Iran has reasons to worry.

Simultaneously, there is an open discussion about Iranian reactions, which includes the possibility of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Playing its own version of mind games, the Iranian National Security Committee on December 12 announced that the country would hold a military exercise on how to close the strait. A closure of the strait could push up oil prices astronomically. About 75% of the oil for Asian markets including India, China, Japan, and South Korea passes through the strait daily.

Other possible Iranian reactions could include the use of (barely concealed) proxies. Iran could use the Hezbollah and the Hamas to target Israel. Lebanon is also dependent on the Iran-trained Hezbollah, which runs its espionage system, immigration and databases, communication, and surveillance. It is the Hezbollah that regularly nabs foreign spies and cripples the Central Intelligence Agency’s security networks.

A covert war-game between Iran and the West is an old story with reports of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists or attempted assassination of the Saudi ambassador in Washington. The use of the “incredibly precise” Stuxnet worm or the Duqu virus to cripple Iranian systems is now being talked about. The November 12 explosion at an Iranian missile base was suspected to have been the work of the Israeli intelligence. The West seems to be working on new sanctions and an oil embargo.

Meanwhile, Iran and Syria also have their supporters. The Russians have decided to move their nuclear-armed aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov to the shores of Syria along with a flotilla from the Black Sea. The Russians also have geo-strategic interests in Syria and, along with China, have watched the NATO exceed the UN mandate in Libya. Both these countries have been opposing sanctions against Syria, have even larger interests in the oil- and gas-rich Iran, and have signed strategic cooperation agreements with Tehran. Russia has been supplying high-tech military technology along with nuclear hardware and hopes to build more nuclear plants in Iran. China, with its growing energy needs, is a major investor in Iran’s energy and infrastructure sectors and has a thriving trade with the country.

It is the control of production and distribution of oil that has helped America’s military and economic rise. The gigantic oil conglomerates bankrolled its post-World War economic boom. The West endeavors to retain control of both. Oil major BP has calculated that the world consumed 13.2bn tons of oil in 2010. In the same year, oil production was only 82mn barrels a day as against the estimated 97 million barrels a day. Future predictions about increased production are not very encouraging either. Worse, the world would need a 40% increase in fossil fuel supplies by 2030 for industrial powers and for sharply increasing demands from China, India and other nations. West Asia’s multiple insecurities affect not only Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States but also global growth which depends on uninterrupted energy supplies.

*[A version of this article originally appeared at http://soodvikram.blogspot.com/ on Dec 21, 2011]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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China’s rulers have a problem. They are not sure if they can continue to portray the image of a country interested in a peaceful rise without this coming into direct conflict with a desire to reassert newly defined core interests. All of 2010 saw more assertive Chinese foreign policy activity in its periphery, possibly reflecting a tussle of some sorts in Beijing between an assertive People’s Liberation Army (PLA) which may want a bigger role in foreign policy in the decade ahead, and a political leadership that is now going to be in transition as Mr Hu Jintao prepares to hand over power to his selected successor, Xi Jinping, by 2012. This would explain this display of assertiveness within each power centre, notably the PLA and the Party hierarchy, which have positioned themselves inside China and against the US (where there will be presidential elections in end-2012).

Recent reactions in the Chinese media to the visit of the Indian ship INS Airavat are only a reassertion of China’s aggressive stance. China had taken umbrage at US secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s July 2010 remarks in Hanoi on creating an international mechanism to resolve this issue, and this has been particularly visible in the past few weeks. Earlier, Dai Bingguo conveyed to Ms Clinton in May 2010 that China regarded its claims to the South China Sea as a core national interest.

The Chinese carried out a live ammunition PLA Navy exercise in the South China Sea on July 26, 2010 followed by another exercise on August 3 along the Yellow Sea coast — the other area of contention. The Chinese conducted exercises there in April and June this year, and were now asserting that China opposed any foreign ships entering the sea or adjacent waters; they even vehemently opposed joint US-South Korean exercises there.

The message in these demarches to the US was in keeping with protecting China’s core interests in the adjacent seas and telling the US that the western Pacific was China’s sphere of interest and influence. It suggested a division of zones of influence between the Eastern and Western Pacific. The US and China have their own geostrategic rivalries to settle, and the Chinese may have assessed that their moment has come.

China’s reaction to the visit of the Indian ship has to be seen in this context – it is part belief in its history, part knee jerk, part bullying, part worrying about energy resources, and part suspicion about the growing India-Vietnam-US triangular relationship in the South China Sea. The influential Communist Party-managed newspaper, Global Times, was somewhat hysterical when, in its editorial of September 16, it warned India that any deal with Vietnam would be ‘serious political provocation’ which could ‘push China to the limit’. It described the ONGC’s (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation) Vietnam deal as a reflection of Indian ambitions. The newspaper went on to say that while China was sincere about its peaceful rise it would not give up its right to use other means to protect its interest. China cherished its friendship with India but this did not mean that China valued this above all else. It referred to India’s intervention in the Dalai Lama issue and ended with the warning that ‘we should not leave the world with the impression that China is only focused on economic development nor should we pursue the reputation of being a peaceful power,’… Clearly, there is a debate ongoing inside the sanctum sanctorum of the Chinese Communist Party.

China’s reaction is also a reflection of its concern for energy resources. China has only 1.1% of the world’s known energy reserves but consumes 10.4 % of the world’s oil production and 20.1 % of total energy consumption in the world. The mismatch is obvious and will grow more in the years ahead. Naturally, China views the disputed South China Sea zone and its energy reserves with special interest. Some estimates state that the known reserves of the South China Sea are twice as much as China’s reserves of oil and that there is also plenty of natural gas in the sea.

The Indian reaction to this charge by Beijing has been firm in pointing out that India’s cooperation with Vietnam or with any other country ‘is always as per international laws, norms and conventions…’ India has also pointed out China’s role in the disputed part of POK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) where China may be on the verge of using the territory for developing communication links with Afghanistan. Obviously, China is planning for a post-US phase in Afghanistan, access to its mineral resources, and an ultimately linking to Iran and the Gulf. It would not want the region to be solely India’s sphere of influence. India has also to keep its own vulnerabilities in Arunachal Pradesh in mind; even though outright war is unlikely it should expect both economic cooperation and periodic tensions with China. China-India relations will not be determined by strict bilateral terms. As both countries rise, there will be competition in other spheres – for markets, resources and influence.

Yet China remains concerned with its intricate trade and financial links with the US, and also with the security of its trade and supply routes that transit the Malacca Straits. It has endeavoured to develop extensive land routes through Central Asia, but these are inadequate. It is a matter of time before China will make its presence more visible in the Indian Ocean. It has port facilities in Kyaukpyu, Hambantota and Gwadar, and a presence in the Arabian Sea, where it battles Somali pirates. China has expanded its contacts with Iran and has developed strong ties with Burma.

It is of course entirely feasible that China would have reacted in this manner even if there was not the question of energy reserves present in the South China Sea. It would have had more to do with its own perception as zhongguo – the “Middle Kingdom” or the “Central Country”, where neighbouring countries were considered to be vassal states and which accepted the Emperor in Beijing as the supreme power in the region.

Thus while New Delhi agonises over challenges across land frontiers, ignoring the new challenge in the Indian Ocean would hurt Indian interests. There is need to plan counter measures in China's periphery from now. Perpetual whining about China's grand designs will not help.

This article was first published by  on September 21, 2011.

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Admiral Mike Mullen recently warned that 2011 would be bloodier than 2010 and at the current rate of loss another 1,500 young men and women will die by 2014.  The US treasury will have spent another $ 600 billion by then. Other parameters do not look healthy either. The primary aim of the US in the Afghan theatre is to make America safe from terrorist attacks emanating from Afghanistan. European and American public opinion is swinging away from this war and the Europeans are anxious to leave. There is little possibility that by 2014 either the Afghan National Army or the Afghan National Police will be ready to take over the responsibility of ensuring Afghanistan's security and law and order across the country. The United States is looking at a strategic stalemate.

Following recent upheavals in the Middle East, US policy makers are anxiously watching the entire region, from the Maghreb to the Saudi Peninsula and even Iran and Pakistan. The replacement of regimes in the Middle East may not all result in US-friendly governments given the undertones of both the anti-American sentiment and Islamic fervour in these regions. In the early days of the 21^st century, where power equations are changing and there is intense discussion of the implications of the rise of China and its interests in the Middle East, this must be a matter of additional concern in Washington.

The region is energyrich and also home to some of the most radical Islamist movements that arise from the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) region as well from the Middle East. US interests in Afghanistan have come under increasing stress in recent weeks over the Raymond Davis affair. America’s most important ally in the region, Pakistan, is witnessing another round of increasingly vocal anti-American sentiment amidst growing sectarianism, violence and instability. US patience with Pakistan is running low and the cancellation of the US-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral is a direct result of this impasse on the Davis issue.

Today, the entire region from the Oxus to the Indus has become extremely unstable with an unending wave of Pushtun-led violence in Northern Pakistan and in the Punjab province. This does little to help the execution of a complicated and a difficult war against an elusive enemy in an environment sullied by acute mistrust between the US and Pakistan.

The war against terrorism was well begun in Afghanistan in 2001, but it quickly ran aground because of changed priorities. Consequently, it became a wrong war in the wrong place impeded by an unreliable ally. With inadequate boots on the ground no amount of aerial attacks was going to provide the ability to clear and hold territory so essential in a counter insurgency campaign. Inexplicably, US policies have been more of the same; a paucity of ideas that believes in funneling more funds to Pakistan either as a reward for services believed rendered or in the hope that they will rendered. In the process, Pakistan has acquired a veto power over US policies in AfPak. Since the US considered Pakistan to be part of the solution rather than the problem, Pakistan became an indispensible ally even as it pursued a course directly contradictory to US and NATO – even global – goals in the region. If there has to be any attribution to reasons of failure, this American inability or unwillingness to understand Pakistan’s strategic ambitions and attitudes would be the most crucial factor responsible for the present US position in AfPak. 

The predicament is that the US cannot permanently maintain the present force level, the casualty rate or the cost of the war. It also does not thus have the luxury of time to put together a viable local alternative. Departure from an unsettled region will only lead to further instability and a conceivable  civil war reopening old animosities between the largely Pushtun south and east against the other minorities – the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. A prolonged conflict in the region seems the more likely course. Intervention by outside interests in Afghanistan will inevitably follow.

It is sometimes forgotten that in the ultimate analysis, the Taliban are Pushtun who live on both sides of the Durand Line which was a demarcation made due to British imperial interests of the time. These interests divided the Pushtun between Afghanistan and the North West Frontier Province under British control.  In recent years there has been an upsurge in anti-Pushtun violence in the Balochistan province of Pakistan, in Karachi, the country’s largest city and in FATA, which has seen repeated US attacks. It may not be long before there is an upsurge of a demand for Greater Pushtunistan once the foreigner and therefore common enemy has departed and the Pushtuns internalise their several problems swept under the carpet by preceding regimes. Pushtun assertiveness will almost certainly lead to retaliation from Afghanistan’s other ethnic groups. Religious obscurantism combined with ultra-nationalism can be a very explosive mix. Of course, given Afghanistan’s complex tribal structure it is not easy to predict the future.  Most certainly, however, any change in the configuration of the Pushtun belt will have its repercussions on Pakistan.

Faced with limited options, it might be considered a satisfactory, if not a good solution, for Washington DC to be able to come to an agreement with the ‘good’ Taliban assuming that: they exist, they are less fundamentalist and they are therefore more benign than other parts of the Taliban. The war in Afghanistan was not just against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda but against the medieval obscurantism that they represent. Today, one discerns dialogue in the west that seems to suggest that the Taliban are not such bad fellows after all; they have a regional (i.e. Afghan nationalist) approach and are merely fighting against foreign occupation. The implication is that once this cause disappears then the Taliban angst will disappear and Afghanistan can be left to them. This is a dangerous rationalisation and does not take into account Pakistani ambitions, the Taliban/Al Qaeda combine or the criminal narcotics-warlord nexus. Accepting this deal is accepting the mindset and the short route to rapid Islamisation of the region and beyond.

A solution can be possible only if four aspects are seriously considered. Pakistan must be reined in and made to understand that it is less indispensible to US interests than it makes out. The US must accept that it can no longer determine the fate of other countries on its own and has to reach out to other neighbouring countries like Iran and others who have important stakes in the stability and independence of Afghanistan (i.e. Russia and India).  Additionally, the US has to use more of the stick and less of the carrot when dealing with Pakistan. The narcotics criminal warlord nexus must be severed. This cannot be done without adequate agricultural relief work and pacification of Kandahar, where the challenge is greatest. To deal with Afghanistan effectively, there has to be closer US and NATO engagement with Russia and separately with Iran, however unpalatable it might appear today. We must evaluate if there can be any agreement amongst all nations about non-interference in Afghanistan and whether will Pakistan continue to remain a considerable part of the problem.

Whatever happens in the next few years, it must be accepted that the nature of the region will change, perhaps forever. A stable Pakistan may have been able to exercise reasonable influence on a much weaker Afghanistan. However, Pakistan is itself in a mess of various kinds, where one hears increasingly intolerant and violent religiosity with ethno-political fissures. It is doubtful whether Pakistan would be able to either control or bring stability to the region.  Pakistan’s quest for strategic depth is more likely to end up as a strategic quagmire. What we are looking at is a very unstable and turbulent region.

Given that more troops cannot be committed, funds may be in short supply and that the discourse in the US and the West has changed, what are US options? How does one define ‘Mission Accomplished’ when all of the options are poor or even impossible?

Perhaps Vice President Joe Biden’s plan is effective:  withdrawal of ground forces substantially and then hunting Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan using special forces, Predator missile attacks and other surgical tactics. Ambassador Robert Blackwill’s Plan B for Afghanistan is really an extension of this. He suggests a withdrawal of American forces substantially from the Pushtun south and east and a concentration of US forces in the north and northwest as bases for striking against targets. Blackwill’s plan leaves some sizeable forces in the region protecting American interests though it also means an admission that the war as presently configured is unwinnable. Within this plan is dialogue with the Taliban, reduction of US dependency on Pakistan and an informal coming into being of a Pushtun homeland. Both Biden and Blackwill realise that the essential problem is in Pakistan.

Any amount of readjustment or reevaluation of US policies and priorities in Afghanistan will not succeed unless there is a similar reevaluation of its policies and priorities in Pakistan.

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