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The dynamics of violent conflict in Colombia combine leftist guerillas, drug cartels and former paramilitaries.



Over a half-century, violent conflict has displaced 5.3 million Colombians from their homes, creating the world’s largest population of internal refugees.  The fighting between leftist guerillas, rightwing paramilitaries, drug cartels and government forces, combined with the systematic expulsion of small-scale peasant farmers from their lands by wealthy landowners has made the Colombian countryside one world’s most lawless and chaotic.

 

The dynamics of violence in Colombia are multifaceted.  Drug cartels traffic cocaine into Mexico, bound for the US market.  Marxist insurgencies rely on taxing drug traffickers or selling them the coca leaf directly, in order to fund their ongoing revolutions.  Many former paramilitary militias, once contracted by the government to fight the leftist guerillas, have transformed into dangerous criminal organizations themselves.

 

Drug cartels no longer wield the same power in Colombia that they did in the 1980s and 1990s.  During the era of Pablo Escobar, the Cali and Medillín cartels exerted direct control over the population and political system.   In response, the Colombian Government, backed by billions of dollars in US military assistance, killed and captured most major drug kingpins, creating fragmentation among the country’s two main cartels.

For nearly 50 years, leftist guerillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have controlled large swaths of territory throughout the countryside. Over time, FARC membership has fluctuated from 18,000 combatants during the late-1990s to around 8,000 today.  Starting in October of 2012, the Colombian government began peace talks with the FARC guerillas.  The dialogue has made significant progress, with both sides expressing optimism at the prospects of a peace agreement.

 

During the 1990s, the Colombian government consolidated hundreds of paramilitary militias into a single organization known as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).   In 2003, under pressure from the US government, Colombia demobilized these irregular forces.  However, many refused to disband, opting to continue their operations as organized criminal syndicates known as Bacrims.

 

How is Organized Crime in Colombia Relevant?




Straddling the Caribbean, Central and South America, Colombia represents an important diplomatic, economic and political player in the western Hemisphere.    For many different actors, Colombia is a keystone country in Latin America.   The US relies on Colombia as one of its strongest allies in the region and the country often serves as a liaison for conducting diplomatic relations with the rest of South America.  In April 2012, Colombia hosted the Summit of the Americas, a meeting between member countries of the Organization of American States (OAS).  

 

Many US companies are involved in the extraction of Colombia’s agricultural, mineral and energy resources.  Given Colombia’s importance, over the last twenty years the US has spent an estimated $9bn on military assistance with the objective of purging the country of criminals and insurgents powerful enough to challenge the sovereignty of the central government. 

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Another world power has come to feast on the bounty of Latin America.  China has been investing billions in the extraction of raw materials to drive its relentless pace of construction and is purchasing millions of tons of soy and grain to feed an urbanizing population.  Is China merely extending a history of resource exploitation or will Latin America capitalize on this most recent resource boom?   Though the results will vary for each country, China’s gradual pace of urbanization and Latin America’s more efficient increase in social spending may work to extend and improve this most recent bonanza.

Latin America’s economic history has followed a pattern.  Powerful countries saw the region as an opportunity to extract vast amounts of resources at a low cost.  Labor was cheap; land was abundant and fertile; natural resources were plentiful.  Moreover, the existing social structure was such that a few elites were able to control a large and mostly landless peasantry.  These conditions often contrasted with those of more developed countries, where the growing middle classes, dwindling availability of land and nearly exhausted raw materials strained their supplies of resources and increased the cost of labor.  Furthermore, the rising middle class increased demand in the economies of these foreign powers, while the production of manufactured goods shifted the focus away from agriculture as the primary engine of economic growth.

The first to arrive in the Americas were the rising powers of Europe.  Spain and Portugal came as colonizers, then later Britain, France and Germany as investors and consumers of Latin American grain, cattle, wool and metals among many other agricultural products and natural resources.  Later, the United States extended its reach, desiring many of the same goods and practicing a similar strategy of economic exchange.  In this exchange, the developed power would purchase agricultural products and then invest – either directly or through loans – in mining.  The developed country would then sell its manufactured products to the region, which fetched much higher prices compared with the primary products produced in Latin American countries.  The result left the region with high debts, towering trade deficits and little control over their extractive industries.  When global demand for a specific resource collapsed or the local supply ran out, the short-lived boom would turn into a prolonged bust, creating political and social instability in the Latin American country involved.

The Chinese Approach

In 2004, China invested $285mn in Latin America.  By 2010, that number had risen to  (FDI) in the region, and the third largest of any other country in Latin America.  However,  of natural resources.

The Chinese government and private Chinese financiers tend to take a  in competitive up-and-coming Latin American companies.  Rather than investing in the largest players, they seek out smaller partners, otherwise overlooked. 

Though Chinese companies have sought to improve their attention to local conditions, they prefer to do so on their own terms without adherence to international standards.  They tend to shy away from submission to a higher authority and instead enact their own standards, distancing themselves from conventions and cooperative agreements held by developed countries from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Urbanization: So Far, yet so Similar

Interestingly, China is going through a similar period of transition, one previously experienced in Latin America.  Urbanization and the integration of vastly different cultures within expanding mega cities are trends shared by both places.  Latin America, like China, was once among the world’s most rural societies.  Today, Latin America boasts an , one of the highest in the world.  China still lags behind Latin America with only 51% living in urban areas – a total of 700mn Chinese still live in the countryside.  Despite the difference, China’s urban population has expanded consistently by an average of 20mn residents every year.

Despite similar experiences, the process of urbanization in China is much different than in Latin America.  Urbanization in Latin American countries occurred rapidly over the course of a few decades, inspired partly by the mechanization of agriculture in the countryside and the promise of manufacturing jobs in the cities.  All at once, millions of peasants migrated to the cities, overwhelming these urban spaces, which struggled to provide basic services to new arrivals.  The result produced massive shanty towns and squatter settlements, many of which still lack running water, paved roads and electricity.  Moreover, the lack of available employment forced most rural migrants into the informal economy, where they experience unregulated working conditions and are paid below the minimum wage.  Many others turned to crime as the only source of revenue.

By contrast, the process of Chinese urbanization has been gradual and dates back to the Xia dynasty of 2000 B.C.  Internal migration in China is regulated by a system of family registry known as Hukou.  In this system, citizens are only entitled to receive government services in their region of birth, meaning that if they migrate to another area they will have to pay a premium on basic services such as healthcare and education or must go through a lengthy process to change their regional status.  While often viewed as restrictive, the Hukou system has prevented the formation of large shanty towns in major Chinese cities and has reduced the problems of establishing land ownership, which continue to trouble multiple generations of squatters in Latin American cities.

Differences aside, China’s urbanization is one of the root causes behind its need for Latin America’s resources. City dwellers are simply more connected to the global economy than subsistence farmers, which survive mostly off their own crops.  Those in the city do not produce their own food, demand modern products and are better connected with utilities and transportation services.  By breaking their reliance on local goods, China’s growing urban population puts pressure on the global supply chain to expand production.  Every new kilometer of electrical wire requires six tons of copper, yet China only produces one sixth of the copper needed to electrify new urban and suburban neighborhoods. 

If China continues to urbanize at its current rate, the pace of construction is likely to continue for another 30 years, causing the demand for raw materials to persist over the long-term.  A sudden bust in construction, as many economists fear, is less likely given the remaining potential for urbanization – extending the resource bonanza in Latin America and perhaps placing a floor on global commodity prices.  These factors would help insulate the region from a dramatic global collapse.

Standing Tall

Latin American countries have improved their ability to use economic growth from resource booms as a catalyst for poverty reduction.  Though some governments in the region follow a more socialist approach to development, even countries favoring a greater market-based approach have acknowledged the need for redistributing resource revenue to social programs.  Over the last ten years, increased revenues from commodities have been accompanied by rising wages and incentive-based cash transfers to poor families.

From 2001 to 2011, during Brazil’s China fueled commodity boom, the poorest 10% of the population , while the wealth of the richest only grew by one-sixth.  As the  in a recent study of the region’s middle class, “the proportion of Latin Americans living in poverty – defined as a daily income of less than $4 – has fallen from 41.4% in 2000 to 28% in 2010.”  Much of this rise in income and drop in poverty can be attributed to a decade of economic expansion, spurred by a rise in Chinese demand.

The greatest concern with China in Latin America is with respect to free trade.  China has pursued potential agreements with the MERCOSUR trading bloc to allow Chinese goods un-tariffed access to the South American common market.  Many fear that China’s tremendous manufacturing capabilities would further damage Latin America’s fledgling industrial sector.  While this issue may persist into the future, if wages in China continue to rise and Latin American countries maintain high trade barriers, the incentive for companies to build factories in the region may increase.  

China’s demand for raw materials from Latin America comes at the right moment.  Many Latin American governments have reconciled the extremes of state interventionism and free market austerity, learning from the pitfalls of each and finding a middle ground.  Moreover, Chinese demand helps diversify the region’s export portfolio, a basket once dominated by the economies of the developed world.  This diversified demand may protect commodity prices from dipping below the levels that caused the economic busts of the past.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51勛圖’s editorial policy.

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Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro curse the evils of US imperialism and extravagance, but still enjoy baseball as a pastime.�� While they find their economic models much more in line with that of the Chinese, they are much closer culturally to the capitalists of the United States.

Culture, Commerce and Self-Perpetuation

Before China had consolidated a national set of values, vacillating between strict Maoism and a gradual return to traditional Confucianism, the United States was busy spreading images of its way of life throughout the globe.�� The presence of US culture worldwide has benefited from nearly a century of steady exportation.

Yet, US culture has received power from its marketability.�� US cultural production largely reflects pop cultural production, meaning it possesses strong entertainment value. The US sells images of its lifestyle through music, film and the internet, making the process of culturalization self-perpetuating.�� In this way, the US has a monetary incentive to produce more cultural content, and this content serves the consumer as a pastime.

Moreover, US culture perpetuates itself because it encourages consumerism.�� Cultural images of the United States showcase the material luxury of its citizens, which in themselves become an attractive economic development model at an individual level.�� Those consuming US culture are more likely to embrace the signs of material luxury present in the US, as universal images of success.�� They are therefore more likely to consume the set of complementary cultural goods that accompany the American lifestyle in order to express that form of luxury.�� The Japanese preference for high-end cognac, plastic wedding cakes, and Nike sneakers reflects this emulation of US styled prosperity.

Complementary and Contrasting World Visions

The commercialization of US culture produces images that complement and contradict its world vision.�� In one sense, they represent the spirit of universal prosperity, possible through individual ambition, intelligence and effort.�� They give hope to the individual of a brighter alternative in comparison with the circumstances of their own country.

However, US culture also boasts gluttony and highlights inequality by contrasting images of extreme prosperity with prevailing poverty.�� The US cultural representation of extreme prosperity is both inconsistent with the realities of poverty in the US and is largely unattainable to most people in developing countries.�� Simply put, economic reality makes the American Dream as seen on TV, nothing more than a fantasy for the vast majority.

The Chinese Cultural Front

Culturally, China has been active in founding Confucian Institutes, sponsoring Chinese language programs, planning cultural events and even exporting some of its soap operas.�� Since 2006, China has opened 32 Confucian institutes throughout Latin America, bringing the global total of international Confucian scholars to nearly forty million.�� Similarly, China has actively funded the study of Mandarin.�� In 2005 alone, the number of Chinese language students at the University of Buenos Aires tripled to over 1,000 students.

However, China���s cultural reach has little power on its own.�� It must be directly promoted by the central government in Beijing and is only really encountered by an educated few.�� Chinese culture does not have the same potential for private promotion as do images of US culture.�� Nor is it desired by large segments of society.

The Washington Consensus

Despite the limits of China���s popular culture and the power of US representations of economic success, China represents a cautious, but practical alternative to the US model of economic development in Latin America.

Well before the model of state-directed capitalism allowed China to take-off economically, the US model of privatization, free trade, and fiscal austerity, often referred to as the Washington Consensus, defined the development debate in the Latin America.

Since the 1970s, this model was strongly encouraged by the United States as the true path to economic stability and growth, perfect for countries where periods of expansion were often quickly followed by contraction, hyperinflation and chronic debt.�� The debt crises that swept Latin America during the mid-1980s and 1990s, cemented the attractiveness of the Washington Consensus, reforms which were often attached to rescue loans.

However, while these restructuring measures did succeed in stabilizing inflation and normalizing debt payments, they dramatically increased unemployment, the cost of living and the domination of US companies over domestic enterprise. These problems, among many others, caused a major backlash to the US led approach to economic development, as countries in Latin America sought an alternative.

The Beijing Consensus

The Chinese development model, often unofficially referred to as the ���Beijing Consensus,��� has been gaining traction throughout Latin America, following a broad rejection of the effectiveness of the Washington Consensus.�� As Richard Feinberg, a professor of the international political economy at University of California, San Diego put it, ���China and other East Asian nations have re-legitimized state interventionism in the economy.���

The Washington Consensus argued that state interventionism in the economy would lead to the inefficient allocation of resources as they trickled through the cumbersome and often highly corrupt state apparatus.�� US economists and policy makers postulated that money would do better in the hands of the private sector.�� However, successive years of high grow in China led by large state enterprises controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have lent credence to an alternative.

Though partly a backlash from the disastrous effects of US sponsored economic reforms, the resurgence of leftist leaders throughout Latin America during the mid-2000s, were bolstered in their development strategies by the example set by China���s success.�� The policies pursued by these politicians reemphasized the role of the state in the national economy and broke with the privatization/free-trade consensus that pervaded the 1990s.

Moreover, the so called ���Beijing Consensus��� has resonated most strongly in Cuba, a communist country now in the process of experimenting with economic liberalization.�� For the Cubans, China represents a model of how to liberalize an economy, while avoiding the question of the social and political reform.�� It provides a guide for the Cuban Communist Party to maintain its direct control over the economy, politics, and daily life, while simultaneously allowing for reforms to increase the efficiency of the Cuban economy.

Despite the large cultural divide that exists between China and Latin America, China���s economic model does produce significant common ground.�� In this way, the region is able to declare its independence from the US free market consensus, while still consuming US cultural goods and aspiring to some of the images from the American Dream.�� Cultural diplomacy has become limited in its power.�� Though it may help bring peoples from various nations together, it does not bridge the ideological divides of their leaders.

*[Updated: April 8, 2021.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51勛圖���s editorial policy.

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The story is all too familiar.  A conservative president launches a disastrous war against terrorism, killing tens of thousands of combatants and civilians.  After his term, his party is swiftly swept out of office, by a charismatic centre-left junior politician.  Beyond security, the new president faces problems in unemployment and economic growth, but most of all a polarized opposition struggling to recover from defeat.

This is not the saga of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, but the tale of Mexico’s President, Felipe Calderon and President-elect Enrique Peña Nieto.  Calderon was the first leader in Mexico’s history to employ the military against the country’s monolithic drug trafficking organizations.  The result has killed well over 60,000 people, a number that some expect will double over the next few years without drastic changes in security policy.  Rising insecurity combined with a stagnate economy drove voters away from the conservative Nation Action Party (PAN) and ushered in the election of Peña Nieto, the 46-year-old one-term governor of Mexico’s Federal District who promises to rethink Mexico’s policies in hopes of a brighter future.

But there’s a twist from the US version.  Mexico’s democracy is a three party system and the formidable opposition to the new president comes from the left.  Moreover, where president Obama’s moderate agenda in the face of grave national crises was met with strong conservative opposition, the agenda of Peña Nieto is likely to receive support.  If he is able to show effective leadership, his six-year term may just be one of the most productive in recent history.

Mexico’s Democracy

Peña Nieto’s party, the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) ruled Mexico for 71 years before they were defeated in 2000 by Vicente Fox of the PAN.  Though no longer in the presidency, the PRI all but blocked the agenda of the new president who failed to gain the support of the leftist Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), which lay at the opposite end of the political spectrum.

Though the next president, Felipe Calderon was more successful at reaching across the aisle to the PRI, his presidency quickly became marred by the drug war.  And while violence soared, the stagnating economy became a marginal issue and his administration failed to ignite the same progress seen throughout the rest of Latin America.

Now with the PRI back in power, perhaps the new president will have the support he needs to aggressively modernize Mexico’s economy.  As a party at the center of Mexico’s political spectrum, it is more likely that he will be able to reach across both aisles.

Oil on the Agenda

Mexico sells more oil to the US than Saudi Arabia.  And as the Middle East becomes increasingly more chaotic and US politicians advocate for energy independence, it is ever more crucial for the US to continue building upon this petro-partnership with its southern neighbor.  In Mexico, maintaining its status as a petroleum exporting country is even more important to its national income and its domestic energy supply. 

But since 2004 falling production .  If production continues to decline, there are worries that Mexico could soon become a net petroleum importer.  The main problem is a lack of credit available to expand oil exploration due to the government’s tight control over the state oil company PEMEX.  Mexico’s 1937 constitution nationalized the company as means of protecting the country’s resource sovereignty, following decades of social turmoil.  As a result, allowing foreign investment in PEMEX requires a referendum to the constitution through approval from 2/3 of the legislature.  Since the PRI – the party that originally authored the constitution – was voted out of power in 2000, there has not been enough support for opening up the company.

By contrast, Brazil opened its state enterprise, PETROBRAS to foreign investment and gave the company more than twice the amount to capital available to its Mexican counterpart.  Combined with technical assistance, these investments have allowed Brazil to begin a massive oil exploration project off its coast that may make this South American country among the world’s largest petroleum producers.

As president, Peña Nieto has promised to open up PEMEX to foreign investment.  If he can muster support from the PAN, perhaps he can succeed in reinvigorating the country’s national petroleum profile.

Workers & Corporations

Mexico’s economy suffers from two major internal problems.  Powerful unions advocating job killing labor laws and almighty private monopolies that control entire sectors of the economy, preventing innovation and competition.

During the PRI years, a few powerful unions dominated through intimidation and support from the government.  Their leaders became wealthy, while they failed to properly represent the interests of the workers that paid their dues.

Their domination prevented labor reforms that would have made it easier for businesses to hire new workers and fire ineffective ones.  On average .  Yet there are only 250,000 new jobs created annually.  The result pushes more than 2/3 of those in need of work into the informal economy, across the border or into organized crime. 

A new labor law under discussion in congress promises to cut through these archaic restrictions and create 400,000 new jobs every year.  In addition, it will allow for secret voting in major unions and the creation of independent unions.  Protests against the new bill rages on the left and among the PRI unions.  Perhaps, Pena Nieto will be able to effective stand up to the autocratic unions of his own party. If Mexico wants to become a powerful economic player it must make its unions more democratic and allow independent representation organizations. 

The new labor bill will include some of these reforms and make work more flexible by instituting hourly pay, rather than a daily rate based on an 8-hour work day.  Many Mexicans work more than 8-hours a day or hold several partime jobs.  The current system allows employers to avoid paying overtime and de-legitimizes part time work, forcing much of it into the informal economy.  The new bill will essentially put more pressure on employers to pay fair wages for these workers and place many back into the protections of the formal economy.

In addition to greater wage garuntees and more democratic worker representation, Mexico desperately needs to reform its monopolistic business climate.  When the country privatized its state enterprise following its 1982 financial crisis, state owned monopolies were mearly converted into privately owned monopolies.  The world’s richest man, Carlos Slim, is the CEO of Telmex and América Móvil, two companies that control almost all of Mexico’s telecommunication industry.  His immense wealth is testament to the country’s monopolistic private sector and the cronyism required for new businesses to enter the market.

Pena Nieto will have to pass a variety of strong anti-trust laws capable to breaking up the control of single corporations over entire sectors of the economy if he wants to foster the competitiveness of the country’s firms and protect the quality of services for consumers.

Conclusion

Pena Nieto has a lot on his plate in the six-year term ahead.  An ongoing drug war, the monopolization of the private sector, slow economic growth, a corrupt political system and inefficient bureaucracy stand in the way of Mexico’s future prosperity.  Reforming the oil sector, protecting the rights of workers and changing the way business is conducted will provide some crucial steps towards achieving future progress.  His party controls the most seats in the legislature and if he is able to secure the support of the PAN, perhaps he can help Mexico succeed in passing an ambitious agenda.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51勛圖’s editorial policy.

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Like a bizarro Tea Party mixed with the youthful cyber-savvy and anarchistic Occupy Movement, emerges the Yo Soy el 132 ("I am the 132"), a collection of student activists demanding an end to the corporate monopolization of the economy and the media.  Protesters partly blame the defeat of their candidate, the leftist Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador from the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD), on the mainstream media’s coverage of the election.  They argue that Televisa, a media company controlling , explicitly portrayed their candidate in a negative fashion, while reserving unabashed praise for the victor, Enrique Pena Nieto of the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI). Indeed, leaked cables from Wikileaks allege that the candidate may have .

The Root of Animosity

In the view of the new movement, Pena Nieto represents everything that is wrong with Mexico’s democracy.  They claim he is inexperienced, overly-reliant on his good looks and the champion of a party that governed Mexico with an iron fist for 71 years.  In general, Mexican students are no friends of his party, the PRI, which in 1968 notoriously gunned down students at an anti-government demonstration, killing hundreds.  The massacre of Tlatelolco as it was known, came to represent national shame and has since become a symbol of martyrdom for student movements. 

Social Movements and Social Media

The Yo Soy el 132 emerged out of a wave of social media activism, in response to the over centralization of tradtional media in the hands of the few and powerful.  Through twitter, youtube and facebook, the movement has effectively communicated its message to a wider prospective audience.  Like in the Arab Uprisings of 2011, these outlets have also proved an effective organizing tool, capable of coordinating mass demonstrations and raising awareness in civil society.

While there is no question that Mexico’s television broadcast media is controlled by a few networks favoring the PRI, the emergence of social media as a campaign tool has been decentralized and inclusive.  It allows political campaigns to engage with users on a personal level and on a mass scale.  Facebook fan groups provide voters with a space to find quick up-to-date information on a candidate and then share their views with friends, creating a multiplier effect.  Indeed, 40 mn Mexicans are connected to the internet, nearly double the amount in the last election six years ago, making the use of digital social communication an invaluable tool for campaigns across the politcal aisles.

Unlike traditional media, such as newspapers, television and radio, social media partly dismantles the division between the producers and consumers of content.  Users are able to generate, consume and then actively analyze the information presented to them, all within the same platform. 

However, the changes only go so far.  .  In fact, it is largely a means of disseminating, commentating and summarizing content created by traditional media outlets.  While the process of sharing and promotion is more participatory and inclusive than voicing one’s opinion through a syndicated article, ultimately an effective tweet or facebook post relies on links to already well-established credible sources. 

During the Mexican elections, the distribution of traditional media paralleled the distribution of social media.  Studies concluded that the PRI also dominates the social media-scape – winning the so called “battle of clicks.”  Conversely, the leftist PRD, the party of the tech-savvy Yo Soy el 132 finished last, well behind even the conservative PAN, which placed third in the national elections.

Disseminating the Cause

Rather than fundamentally changing who controls the discussion, social media often only alters how well-established figures engage with the public. This does not imply that new actors cannot emerge independent of traditional sources, or that marginal public figures cannot use social media to elevate their reach.  Entire political movements have been born on Twitter, Facebook and Youtube and unfunded individual blogs have gained notoriety as credible sources.   Yo Soy el 132 movement emerged by broadcasting their message to those with common sympathy across the country.  However, overwhelmingly, public figures with high profiles have an edge in the social media-scape. Those with more resources can afford to promote their content in these outlets and hence eclipse smaller players.

Reflecting the rise of the Yo Soy el 132, social media is most inclusive, when applied to a cause rather than a figure or campaign.  It has the ability to raise broad awareness on issues censored or ignored in traditional media-spheres.  People relate more to the credibility of a new movement voicing a particular interest or concern, than they do to an unknown figure.  From there, support for the cause gains momentum and powerful figures can then emerge.  Often the traditional media will pick up on these movements, further cementing its credibility with the public and in turn perpetuating its presence on social media.  New supporters can then engage with this previously marginal cause, which then receives a multiplier effect through sharing.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51勛圖’s editorial policy.

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Background

The party of Mexico’s 71-year civilian dictatorship is back.  On July 1, Peña Nieto of the Revolutionary Institution Party (PRI) claimed victory in presidential elections over leftist Andrés Manuel López Obrador of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and conservative Josefina Vázquez Mota of the incumbent National Action Party (PAN). Half of the votes were recounted on July 6, following a wide range of alleged irregularities, but Nieto retained his near seven-point lead.

The defeated Obrador accused the PRI of buying as many as 5mn votes. His claims are based on a survey conducted by an independent election monitor, in which 28% of respondents admitted to being asked to sell their votes or said they had been subjected to some form of coercion. Additionally, the media distorted coverage of the candidates.  Two companies, Televisa and TV Azteca, control the vast majority of all broadcast television in Mexico and consistently portrayed the PRD in a negative light, reserving favorable coverage for the PRI.

How is the PRI Victory Relevant?

The PRI ruled Mexico from 1929 until 2000.  Originally founded to quell the decade of infighting that followed the Mexican revolution, the party reigned supreme by allying the various interests groups of the state into one giant coalition.  The presidency alternated between top members of the party, each presiding for six-year terms with no reelection. 

But no dynasty is eternal.  After an election scandal in 1988 and widespread apprehension over a number of free-market reforms implemented during the ‘80s and ‘90s, the conservative PAN, led by Vicente Fox, won a historic victory in the 2000 presidential election.

For the next 11 years, PAN struggled to forge a new Mexico, facing strong opposition in the legislature from the PRI.  Though Fox failed to implement many of his reforms, his successor Felipe Calderon would leave an indelible mark on the country.  Calderon’s bellicose drug war strategy led to more than 55,000 deaths and failed to significantly diminish the influence of the cartels.

On the drug front, the PRI was once known for cutting deals with cartels and turning a blind-eye to their expansion.  Conversely, PAN is criticized for escalating the problem into a full-scale war. Nieto says he will take the middle road.  Rather than the Calderon’s hodgepodge of approaches, he plans on focusing on three central crimes: murder, kidnapping, and extortion, while still combating the issue with a frontal assault.

The return of the PRI will have serious implications for Mexico’s drug war strategy and democracy, as well as its economic and foreign policy.  President-Elect Peña Nieto wants to “reposition Mexico again as an emerging power,” and encourage private investment to help increase production at the country’s state oil monopoly. His promises are ambitious and partly reflect those of the last two presidents before him.  Whether he will be able to produce more substance than his predecessors remains to be seen.

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Upon meeting the President of the United States for the first time, Hugo Chavez handed Barack Obama a copy of Eduardo Galleano’s classic book, Open Veins of Latin America.  The gesture spoke to Chavez’s anti-imperialist rhetoric in foreign policy, but also to the root of its power.  Chavez has attempted to reclaim centuries of resource exploitation at the hands of first world economies, by redirecting oil revenue towards the disenfranchised.  While Venezuela is dependent on oil for 95% of its exports, it has used the proceeds to to over 40 countries from 2005 to 2011.  In real terms, Venezuela has redistributed the equivalent of the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe following WWII.

These expenditures give teeth to a dramatic expansion in Venezuela’s foreign policy.  For a country of its size in a fairly geopolitically stable region, Venezuela commands an inordinate share of international attention.  Since 1999, Chavez has channeled his country’s oil wealth into a self-styled anti-imperial world vision that has allowed him to leverage allies and create his own anti-empire.  But, his counterpunch to global imperialism is in itself fueled by the same market system that it seeks to destroy. The US accounts for .  In this respect, Chavez’s foreign policy, seems contradictory, for it rests on contesting the global economic philosophy and power of his nation’s largest trading partner. 

Bolivarian Internationalism

Chavez’s ultimate world vision reflects that of his hero, the Latin American independence revolutionary, Simón Bolívar.  Bolívar’s dream was to unite the countries of Latin America into a single political entity, capable of resisting the colonial powers of the day.  Chavez has combined this dream with Marxist influences to champion an alternative to the market system of international trade.

, “we do not believe in free trade. We believe in fair trade and exchange, not competition but cooperation.” 

In 2005, he founded the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), a solidarity based trade alliance with a number of other Latin American countries. The agreement was in part a reaction to a failed attempt by the US to establish a free trade zone extending from Alaska to Cape Horn.   Many countries in the region feared that without significant trade barriers, the US economy would outcompete with their local firms. 

In the ALBA alternative, goods and services are traded based on direct need, rather than the self-regulating dynamics of supply and demand.  The system works through petro-barter; Venezuela sends oil and receives doctors or some form of equivalent from the other country.  In an interview with the Progressive, . “We send oil to Uruguay for their refinery and they are paying us with cows…That’s right.  Milk for oil. The Argentineans also pay us with cows.  And they give us medical equipment to combat cancer. It’s a transfer of technology.  We also exchange oil for software technology.”

The Blank Check Bank of Chavez

Professor Javier Corrales of Amherst College the use of generous aid to attract support for its diplomatic objectives.  As Corrales explains, Chavez’s assistance packages, which comes in the form of zero interest unconditional loans, “provides governments with far more latitude in domestic spending than is the case with any form of Western aid. This domestic freedom produces close international ties.”

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) requires recipients of assistance to adopt a certain economic regime.  Government spending must be brought down to certain level and the currency stabilized.  Consequently, it is difficult to sustain policies committed to social welfare under the conditions of the IMF, without drastic cuts in many areas essential to basic governance.  Chavez helps countries approaching default to avoid resorting to an IMF rescue and retain aspects of their social spending regimes. 

Political Interventionism

Chavez’s outreach, especially in Latin America, explicitly favors leftist political affiliations.  He has spent generously on political campaigns in Peru, Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras and Argentina and only grants loans to leftist administrations.  Loans from the “Bank of Chavez” may be spent without accountability and have often been redirected towards the patronage and propaganda machines of the incumbent party. 

This strategy of politicizing aid has been known to backfire.  Chavez’s endorsement of leftist-Peruvian candidate Ollanta Humala in 2006, riled the opposition in fear of socialist policy changes.  But, in 2010 Humala refused Chavez’s support and toned down his rhetoric, allowing for his victory as a more moderate reformer.  Similar endorsements of the leftist candidate in Mexico’s presidential elections enraged many voters.  In its most extreme form, Chavez’s support of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya partially motivated the military to oust him from office in 2009.

By politicizing assistance, Chavez is meddling in the political affairs of other nations, in a way that borders on interventionism.  Just as centuries of US favoritism for the political right has damaged the sense of trust with Latin American countries, Chavez’s sponsorship of the left produces the same negative public reactions.   By betting on one side over the other, Chavez and the US risk isolation from rival victories.  The result further polarizes politics along these lines, rather than allowing the political divisions unique to each country’s society to determine the democratic environment.  Moreover, Chavez’s interference contradicts his crusade for sovereignty, which I outline below.

An Alternative Axis

Chavez and his international allies have one thing in common: they despise or feel threatened by US power.  Despite differences in ideology, culture and geography, Chavez has rallied an axis in opposition to US global consensus.  In Latin America, Chavez’s closest cohorts share his socialist world vision.  But, throughout the world, Chavez courts allies for their resistance to US hegemony alone.

The Chavez administration has lent support to leaders condemned by the majority of the international community including those in Iran, Syria, Libya, and Belarus and has aligned itself with the global powers of Russia and China.  In Chavez’s conception of the world, sovereignty is the most essential international right.  Despite deteriorations in the quality of governance, the freedom of a state to govern without outside interference should never be impeded.  Chavez’s international agenda has sought to defend sovereignty against intrusion from western powers in the US and Europe. 

But Chavez does not want to completely eliminate the ‘so called’ imperialist ambitions of the developed world, for their consumption of oil, funds his crusade against them.  Instead, Chavez’s fiery rhetoric and controversial allocation of resources is meant to disrupt the ability of these world powers to build consensus in the international community. Unlike his Cuban counterparts of the previous generation on which Chavez partly models his style, his social programs go much further than the strategic placement of nuclear arms. 

As Corrales pointed out, “In the words of Che Guevara, Cuba’s top foreign policy goal was to create ‘two, three, many Vietnams.’ Venezuela’s adaptation of the Cuban foreign policy model could be stated as: let’s create two, three, many . . . clinics.”

In this way, ‘social power diplomacy,’ allows a second tier nation like Venezuela to challenge first tier nations without fear of significant retaliation.  Chavez can leverage a coalition of states to resist US foreign policy while avoiding the application of military force.

The Triangle of Petro-Diplomacy

The global market for oil, fuels Chavez’s robust diplomatic agenda.  Venezuela is the world’s fifth largest producer of crude oil, for the country’s state oil company in 2011.  But while oil concessions and revenues help Venezuela attract and gain advantages from allies, global markets complicate the formation of rigid diplomatic spheres.

Since 2007, China, an emerging ally of Chavez, lent Venezuela over $40bn, in exchange for oil concessions.  Indeed, over the same five year period, Venezuela’s oil exports to China have more than quadrupled.  As of August 2012, Venezuela exported to China.  However, 41% of these exports go directly towards paying back China’s Development Bank.  In reality, China has increased its consumption of Venezuela’s oil four-fold, while only paying for an increase of 1.7.

Increased oil exports to China help diversify Chavez’s export profile and drive high prices for the commodity.  They also reconcile Chavez’s contradictory policy of actively challenging his largest financial contributor, the United States.

However, as net oil consuming countries, the US and China share greater common interests than do China and Venezuela.  While Venezuela would seek to limit supply along with OPEC countries, in order to keep oil prices high, the US and China would prefer lower cost crude.  In a global dispute over the price of oil, China and the US would most likely ally themselves against Venezuela and OPEC members.

Conclusion

Chavez’s aggressive yet contradictory foreign policy is fairly representative of the current international system.  Though differences in ideology and politics continue to create conflict between major powers, economic interdependence prevents their escalation.   Chavez has effectively taken advantage of this system.  He has used his ideology, backed by billions in revenue from a surge in the global demand for oil, to establish a united front capable of balancing US power while avoiding its wrath.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51勛圖’s editorial policy.

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Though Chavez has helped many Venezuelans out of poverty, the implications of his prolonged rule bear frightening consequences.  By the end of his next term, he will have governed the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for two decades and an entire generation will have risen from birth to maturity under his watch.  Without a comparable opposition or socialist alternative, Chavismo will define the political memory for a whole segment of society.   In this way, Chavez has cultivated an era, a time in which he represents the only political figure capable of determining the country’s future.

The Making of an Era

Chavez’s Movement of the Fifth Republic, ended an era of democratic power sharing among parties dominated by the country’s business elite.  His resounding presidential victory in 1998 crippled the traditional party system that had existed since 1958.  In the following year, a popular referendum ushered in a new constitution to replace the previous one that had established the fourth republic.  Over the next thirteen years, a series of direct voting reserendums amended the constitution to remove term limits and expand the power of the executive.

Chavez’s approach was radical and produced immediate results.  Those with little, who had watched for fifty years as oil profits brought them nothing more than a toxic Lake Maracaibo, now had access to healthcare, subsidized food, literacy programs and government housing.   More than half of the Venezuelan population receives some form of assistance from the government. 

The result has reduced poverty from a near majority of the population in 1999, to below 30% today and cut extreme poverty from a quarter to just 5%.  ,this percent reduction was the highest among any other Latin American country over the same period.  

But, Chavez has cemented progress with himself.   While every other Latin American country saw changes in leadership during a decade and a half of falling poverty, Chavez deepened his influence.   Even in Brazil, where an immensely popular President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva received a lot of credit for poverty reduction, he refused to allow his party to alter the constitution to eliminate term limits and he worked hard to groom a successor who won by a narrow margin in 2010.

In no other country in Latin America has drastic poverty reduction attributed such power to the leader.  Even other left-wing populist leaders in Bolivia and Ecuador have encountered significant opposition to their agendas from within their own coalitions.  Moreover, in countries like Chile, Peru and Colombia we find a disconnect between improving economic conditions and approval for the executive.  Turnover elections brought a pivot to the left in Peru and a shift to the right in Chile, despite economic progress made by the incumbent parties.

“Inorganic Democracy” in Action

To a certain degree, Chavez embodies a modern form of the 19^th century Latin American “Caudillo,” a rural leader who raised armies from the peasantry to seize the central government from pro-free market liberals.  The Caudillo was the powerful ‘man on horseback,’ cultivating a strong sense of personal authority and ruling the country as if it were his own estate.

Though often viewed as tyrants, some scholars argue that the caudillos practiced a form of democracy that was in fact more inclusive than the liberal republics that they deposed.  Bradford E. Burns argued in his influential  thesis that caudillos represented the desires of the vast majority of the people better than any elected president.   Though they governed with an iron fist, they were simply projecting the will of the rural majority in a forceful manner.

Burns defines this phenomenon as “inorganic democracy,” a form of direct representation carried out through an authoritarian figure.  Though mostly wealthy landowners, the caudillos were the only members of the elite with any direct contact with the common people.  The caudillo never won in the ballot box, but rather in the hearts of the people whose interests he championed.  By becoming the indispensable master of the state, the caudillo personified the will of the masses.

In debating Chavez today, opponents and supporters tend to inexplicitly incorporate the idea of “inorganic democracy” into their arguments. The follow excerpts exemplify this tendency.  Jonathan Glennie for the Guardian :

"[T]he accumulation of power in the executive and the erosion of  protections have allowed the Chávez government to intimidate, censor and prosecute critics and perceived opponents in a wide range of cases involving the judiciary, the media and civil society."

But by Gregory Wilpert of Venezuela Analysis:

"Venezuela has made significant progress in the past 12 years of Chavez’s presidency towards creating a more egalitarian, inclusive, and participatory society."

If both statements are true, then how can a society be more inclusive and less democratic at the same time?   The answer is inorganic democracy: the idea that the supreme executive strengthens its control to protect the interests of the electorate. 

Chavez has fostered greater citizen participation in government through local councils and other bodies that help decentralize the decision making process.  At the same time, he has stripped the legislature of most of its power, systematically censored private broadcast media and packed the military and judiciary with loyalists. Chavez has empowered the less fortune on a local level, but dismantled any significant opposition to his agenda from the central government.

21^st Century Caudillismo

To be clear, the environment in which Chavez rose to power has changed significantly since the 19^th century following Latin American independence.  Chavez emerged in a democratic system and has sought extensions to his power through legal avenues.  Though he has used his authority to tighten his grasp on power and the media, he allows free and fair elections with the participation of significant opposition.

Chavez is a caudillo in reverse.  The 19^th century caudillo gained power through military force and then consolidated his control through civilian institutions, his personality and some form of pseudo democratic legitimacy.   Conversely, Chavez first built a legitimate democratic movement with his personal charisma and support from civilian organizations and then tightened control over the military and the executive decision making process.  The 19^th century caudillo used the sword to conquer the people, while Chavez used the people to conquer the sword.

Chavez’s messianic status among his supporters, his fight against unrestrained foreign influence and his ability to enact laws by presidential decree without approval from congress, resemble aspects of Caudillismo.  Though Chavez is not a dictator, his imagery and actions carry a patrimonial tinge.

His rise as an opponent of a democratic system dominated by a free market oriented elite, paralleled the rise of many caudillos.  The peasants who supported the caudillos, contested a liberal elite that sought to privatize their communally held property for sale to foreign companies.  Similarly, the Chavistas who voted Chavez into office were reacting to neo-liberal or free market reforms that caused a surge in joblessness, raised the cost of living and slashed government services.  Both Chavez and the caudillos were the product of public reaction to similarly oriented policies and their rule brought an end to the existing system.

The Dangers of a Chavez Era

The thing about caudillos is that they die in shame with few institutions to their name.  Their intense personalism polarizes society and prevents the continuation of their movement after death. They are irreplaceable and leave behind a power vacuum filled only by upheaval.

With few notable exceptions, after a caudillo died, his opponents took over, reversed his policies and rewrote history to show an era of tyranny.  Portraits of the great leader were ripped from the walls and a new era would begin.  Any progress made during their often decades of rule could be reversed in a matter of a few years. The most famous caudillo, Juan Manuel Rosas of Argentina, became nothing more than a hated memory in the republic that succeeded him.  The rustic gaucho class that formed his armies and received his protection, found themselves to be the scapegoat of the new government, which sought to replace the rural cow herder with European immigrants.  Rosas and his allies were so polarizing that they came to represent the dichotomy between civilization and barbarism.  Spanish, Irish, German and Italian immigrants were brought in to ‘civilize’ the nation from the perceived primitive gaucho culture.

Chavez’s irreplaceability in his movement is strikingly similar to the caudillo supremacy.  No one, not even within his Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) presents a remotely comparable alternative to his leadership.  He has not allowed enough room for his top officials to pursue their own politics and none has exhibited his passion and charisma.

Chavez, who spent the last two years battling cancer, will not live forever and when he is gone there will be nobody capable of replacing him.  If he dies in office, the Venezuelan constitution requires a presidential election be held within 30 days. Because he has failed to groom a successor, the power vacuum in his absence will most likely favor the newly energized opposition.  His polarization of Venezuelan society between those opposed and in support of his socialist revolution, may lead to a backlash against his policies and many of his social missions may be gutted for the sake of austerity and retribution.  The result may reverse decades of effort towards social progress. 

These are the dangers of a Chavez era.  The Bolivarian Revolution, as he calls his movement, can only be sustained by Chavez’s own personality.  Without Chavez it the lacks same ideological authenticity.  He has groomed a generation to associate his presidency with the state.  A post-Chavez Venezuela will have to establish a new political memory, perhaps through changes to the same extent enacted by Chavez when he ended the era of oligarchic power sharing that came before him. 

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51勛圖’s editorial policy.

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Background

Hugo Chavez is a polarizing, yet indispensible figure in Latin America.  He has empowered the less fortunate, providing free health care and access to resources for those once ignored by Venezuela’s political oligarchy. 

Meanwhile, Chavez has mismanaged Venezuela’s monetary system, created vast shortages in basic goods, and hacked away at the private sector. In the international arena, he has gained a reputation as one of world’s top demagogues.

After winning a fourth term in the October 7^th elections, Chavez is poised to continue his anti-imperialist socialist project.

Why is Hugo Chavez Relevant?

Despite his socialist rhetoric, Chavez straddles the region’s political spectrum, engaging with centre-left leaders in Brazil and Argentina – recently becoming a full member of Mercosur – and thawing relations with neighboring Colombia’s centre-right government.

On the left, Chavez is part of a group of Latin America leaders who contest the effectiveness of the free market system.  He founded the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), a solidarity-based economic arrangement that unites other left-leaning Latin American statesmen.  The agreement works through a barter and aid system, in which resources are traded for services and human capital.  Venezuela’s vast oil wealth has helped fund the majority of these reciprocal exchange programs.

Internationally, Chavez has taken controversial foreign policy positions, supporting leaders shunned by most states in the Americas.  He is involved in a number of economic , was a steadfast supporter of Libya’s Qaddafi and has repeatedly provided the Syrian dictatorship with .  Similarly, Russia’s Vladimir Putin is a close Chavez ally.

Chavez rose to the presidency in 1998.  Despite a 48-hour military coup in 2002, he has governed Venezuela for 14 years and he .  In 1999, he won a popular referendum allowing him redraft the 1961 constitution.  Many of the new document’s 350 articles allowed for the structural changes necessary to implement his socialist project. In 2009, he succeeded in changing the 1999 constitution to end presidential term limits.  After losing a supermajority in the 2010 congressional elections, Chavez’s coalition gave him the power to rule by decree before the opposition legislature could be inaugurated.

Currently, Chavez’s party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), controls 97 seats in the 165-member constituent assembly, outnumbering the 65-member opposition.

Following the attempted coup in 2002, Chavez purged the military, packing it with his supporters. Top military officials had expressed their willingness to take extraordinary measures if their leader had been defeated in fall elections. 

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Can a superpower rise from soft foundations? Throughout history, powerful states have projected their might using military force. The weapons of war have spread culture, commerce and ideas, sharing the softer side of dominance beyond the conquest. But can a world be conquered through culture, commerce and ideas alone?

Brazil has become a major diplomatic player without the show of military force, and through involvement in international initiatives on peace, development and sustainability. Moreover, Brazil’s success in drastically improving the lives of millions of its own citizens, presents an attractive model for other developing countries. This image creates a “Brazilian Ideal” – the notion that Brazil understands the correct approach – which increases the country’s credibility in diplomatic arenas. The power of Brazil’s ideas and image have now been enhanced by the country’s rise to the world’s sixth largest economy.

Hardly Soft

Joseph Nye defines soft power as the ability of a state to influence the actions of others through favor rather than force. A state’s culture, international image and economic philosophy all contribute to its ability to win over the favor of others. Hard power on the other hand, consists of military and economic clout: resources that influence other states through fear or economic cooptation. 

Soft and hard power may be quite different in appearance, yet their use directly affects one another. The use of hard power may buy allies and deter enemies, but it does not always give a favorable impression of the state that employs it – hence reducing that state's soft power. But at the same time, the use of hard economic power can help spread softer cultural images through mass media and the entertainment industry.

In most cases, a state’s hard power provides an outlet to effectively project its soft power. With access to a foreign market, a state can sell its cultural products to others. In Brazil, however, we find the opposite to be true.

Brazil has been a soft power country , maintaining a vocal role in promoting cooperative agreements on economic development and non-interventionism. But over the last decade, Brazil’s increasing hard economic power has given meaning to its soft power ideals. Beyond espousing an alternative development model, Brazil has put one into practice and seen direct benefits. The idea that these successes can be replicated in other developing countries under different circumstances gives Brazil a lot of power in negotiating with these states.

Aid and Trade

As a global power, Brazil prioritizes cooperative agreements based on development and maintaining peace to build a soft image, while engaging in robust trade diplomacy to expand the country’s hard economic power. 

Since the presidency of Lula da Silva, Brazil has become a major donor country – spearheading agreements at the UN to end hunger, eradicate HIV/AIDS, ensure sustainable development and provide disaster relief. Simultaneously, they have expanded trade with all major regions of the world – diversifying their export market and solidifying relations with traditional partners.

In 2003, Lula re-asserted Brazil’s foreign policy with a humanitarian focus, mandating Article 4 of the Brazilian constitution: “the international relations of the federative Republic of Brazil are governed…by cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind.” 

Near the beginning of his presidency, in 2005, Brazil’s . By the end, in 2010, some estimates put combined contributions from direct aid and technical assistance at – a 26-fold increase in five years. Additionally, Brazil contributed around $10bn to international aid organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and other UN programs.

As a donor country, Brazil is unique, straddling the traditional western approach and the Chinese model. Unlike, western donors and the IMF, Brazil does not attach conditional policy objectives to assistance. But Brazil also differs from China, which gives billions in unconditional loans in exchange for resource concessions. Brazil does not require conditions or Chinese style concessions. Brazilian aid focuses mostly on food security, sustainable energy and disease eradication through technical assistance programs. Chinese aid, by contrast, tends to prioritize infrastructure projects essential to resource extraction through direct loans.

Brazil is an international donor by experience, rather than capital. Though, the government grants hundreds of millions in loans to developing countries, the majority of its resources go towards technical assistance programs, which seek to improve existing local initiatives and inspire new ones. Brazil uses its own Zero Hunger Program, which  and infant mortality by 45%, as a model to promote food security in Africa. The government helps provide expertise for South Africa’s  and has given rise to similar . Brazil has also shared its experience  with developing countries, significantly increasing African production. Through technical assistance, Brazil reduces the costs of researching improvements in aid implementation, while increasing the efficient use of funds in current projects.

While China’s trade diplomacy in the developing world has focused on securing access to strategic resources, Brazil is a net exporter of many of those resources. Hence Brazil’s trade diplomacy has focused on gaining access to markets for Brazilian products and investments in expanding Brazilian companies operating in the region. By and large, Brazilian companies hire a greater percentage of their employees from Africa, whilst many Chinese ventures are staffed with majority foreign workers.

 declares that “health is a right of all and a duty of the state, guaranteed through social and economic measures.” Brazil has taken this article global, funding vaccinations, HIV prevention and other health related programs throughout the developing world. Brazil provides  to African countries and has funded the distribution of condoms and anti-retroviral drugs. In addition Brazil funds research on sickle cell in Ghana and has created an extensive  to distribute breast milk to undernourished infants.

The Afro-Brazilian Connection

As China, India and the developed world vie for influence and resources in Africa, Brazil benefits from strong cultural connections with the continent. Brazil contains the largest number of people of African descent outside of Africa – and is only surpassed by Nigeria. Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe were once Portuguese colonies and continue to use Portuguese as the official language. These connections allow Brazil to export its Telenovelas, displaying images of the Brazilian lifestyle to a wider audience, in the same way that US television and movies portray life in the US. 

In 2011,  up from $4.3bn in 2002.  food and manufactured goods such as vehicles and aircraft and imported petrochemicals and minerals from the region. 

Brazilian Business in Africa is booming as new companies move in. The growing African market, fueled by the region’s own rise, has provided a testing ground for the internationalization of Brazilian firms. Construction company Odebrecht is now one of the largest employers in Angola and Brazilian Mining Giant Vale has begun construction on a . Other developments include a fiber optic cable from Rio to West Africa and non-stop flights from São Paolo to Addis Abba in Ethiopia.

Diplomacy has expanded along with economic and cultural inroads. President Lula da Silva doubled the number of embassies in Africa to 36, touring  on 12 separate diplomatic missions. But Brazil still lags behind the US with 50 embassies and China with 42. Moreover, China, the US and EU conduct around five, four and three times more trade with Africa respectively than Brazil. 

Rethinking Interventionism

Brazil is a proponent of non-interventionism and has abstained repeatedly on UN resolutions to intervene in Libya and Syria. The current administration seeks to amend the UN doctrine of “Responsibility to Protect,” which declares that states have a responsibility to protect their own people from acts of genocide, abuse and torture and have a responsibility to intervene if other states fail to do so. This year, Brail’s President Dilma Rousseff, remarked that “much has been said about the responsibility to protect, but very little about the responsibility while protecting.” 

In a press conference, the Minister of Exterior Relations, Antonio Patriota, outlined some

1.       Prevention is always the best policy.

2.       The use of force must produce as little violence and instability as possible.

3.       Enhanced Council procedures are needed to monitor and assess the manner in which resolutions are interpreted and implemented to ensure responsibility while protecting.

The third principle of an “Enhanced Council” would seek to ensure that states abided by the first two principles. 

But their critique of interventionism is almost contradictory, given their ongoing bid for a spot on the UN Security Council. How can a member of the global police force claim to despise policing? Perhaps their petition will encourage better, more responsible policing.

Conclusion

Brazil’s rise as a world power of culture, diplomacy, trade and aid blends distinctions between soft and hard power and may represent a more responsible approach to global governance. Drawing on its constitution and founding principles, Brazilian foreign policy seeks to ensure order and progress by example and personal experience, rather than military might and capital alone.

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Brazil has not only taken a leading role in Latin America but continues its economic rise globally, already leaving behind well-established western economies.

Background

Just five years ago, the economy of the UK was more than three times larger than that of Brazil. But by 2011, the Brazilian economy had surpassed the UK as the world’s sixth largest. Over the next three years, Brazil is set to overtake France. By 2030, it is predicted that Brazil’s economy will eventually rise above Germany and Japan.

In the last ten years, 40mn poor Brazilian’s have joined the middle class, the minimum wage has risen by 60%, malnutrition and infant mortality are down to 73% and 45% respectively, poverty has fallen by a third, exports have grown four-fold and the overall economy is five times larger with 18mn new formal jobs.

Brazil’s economic rise has given the nation a bigger diplomatic profile, which it wields in Latin America and the world. In Latin America, Brazil is a regional power, fostering cooperation through a variety of major economic and diplomatic unions. In the world, Brazil serves as a model of successful development and has become a leader among developing countries, increasing aid and expanding its cultural presence. 

What drove Brazil’s ascent and why is it relevant?

The combination of rising demand for Brazilian grains and minerals in Asia with effective social spending by the federal government, have propelled the Brazilian economy and allowed it to consolidate its gains. 

Brazilian social policy presents an attractive middle ground between Chavez style handouts and strict free market austerity. Despite a doubling of social spending, Brazil maintains a budget surplus and low rates of inflation. Its policy approach has favored conditional programs that provide monetary incentives for good behavior. Most notably, the Bolsa Familia program transfers cash to poor families that keep their children in school, thus augmenting family income while encouraging personal investments in a more prosperous future. Other programs help ensure food security for these families by distributing food to the most needy and providing meals for children at school to reduce the burden preparing all meals from home. 

Amidst assistance from the government, cash from expanding exports gave Brazilian firms more capital to expand their operations and workforces. Disposable income among Brazilian workers increased with more jobs, higher wages and social support, causing a boom in consumer spending, which further stimulated the economy. Effective social spending and export earnings have helped connect a greater percentage of the population with the country’s economic expansion.

Brazil’s rise epitomizes the emergence of new world powers in the 21^st century. Among the BRIC countries, Brazil has the highest GDP per capita and the second largest economy. Brazil as a world power dedicated to development over control and influence and its call for accountability in humanitarian involvement represents a rethinking in global governance. Moreover Brazil leads by its own example. Brazil has consolidated one of the world’s most diverse democracies, given its size, while spreading recent economic gains in an equitable fashion. A little over half of the population identifies as afro-Brazilian, a group accounting for 70% of the 40mn new additions to the middle class. 

But much remains unfinished. Brazil still suffers from high levels of income inequality with the majority of wealth concentrated in the South in addition to poor infrastructure and deficiencies in the education system. Perhaps the next decade will show progress in these areas to the extent of the previous one.

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The presidential election of Enrique Peña Nieto from the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) is unlikely to alter Mexico’s approach to fighting the drug war. While the 45-year-old governor of the State of Mexico promises to reduce drug related violence and has offered a few new plans, his strategy is not much different from that of his predecessor, Felipe Calderón.

Key components of his plan include doubling the security budget, creating a 40,000 member paramilitary gendarmerie to replace the role of the military in policing violent hotspots, and expanding the police force by 35,000 officers and targeting smaller Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). Though he vows to ‘fine tune’ these strategies in order to reduce violence, his plan more closely resembles 75,000 man surge than a de-escalation of hostilities.

Caught between Peace and a Blind Eye

Many saw Mexico’s 2012 presidential election as a referendum on Calderón’s aggressive anti-narcotics campaign. While the third place finish of the incumbent National Action Party (PAN) candidate showed a significant desire for change, voters feared that Nieto might adopt too soft of an approach, reverting to the policy of deal making and compliance with traffickers, common during his party’s previous 71-year rule.

Caught between the conflicting demands to reduce violence and to continue an aggressive campaign against the cartels, Peña Nieto has promised to satisfy both. 

"I want to address the issue of organized crime and drug trafficking head-on. There can be neither negotiation nor a truce with criminals. I respect  to ending this scourge; I will continue the fight, but the strategy must change," he said. Despite his desire for change, his plans are vague and based off those of the current administration.

A Brief History of Changing Dynamics

Drug traffickers have operated in Mexico since the turn of the 20^th century. In the 1980s, Colombian drug lords contracted Mexican smugglers to traffic cocaine into the US. Through a connection with Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel, Miguel Ángel “El Padrino” Félix Gallardo or “the God Father” established the Gadalajara Cartel, Mexico’s first cartel. The organization was able to establish its own distribution infrastructure Though originally paid in cash, the cartel was eventually compensated in cocaine, allowing the organization to establish its own distribution infrastructure.

During this era of DTO expansion, Mexico’s PRI, which dominated the country’s politics, decided to turn a blind eye to traffickers, accepting bribes in exchange for compliance. Meanwhile, the Reagan Administration launched a campaign to dismantle the entire Caribbean corridor, used to ship cocaine from Colombia to Florida. As a haven of impunity, Mexico became an attractive alternative to the embattled sea route. Guadalajara’s trafficking routes were split to form the other cartels after the 1989 arrest of “El Padrino.”

The state’s relationship with the cartels began to destabilize when the PRI lost their stranglehold on Mexican politics in 2000, and a flood of political plurality brought representatives from outside the PRI into office. This change disrupted the network of alliances that had been forged between politicians and traffickers, requiring new deals with often less corruptible government officials. 

In 2006, Calderón launched an all-out assault on traffickers, hoping that the use of the military and purges in the police force might restore order along the drug corridors and weaken the influence of the cartels over the Mexican government. He borrowed an approach from Colombia known as the ‘kingpin’ strategy, in which security forces targeted top lieutenants with the hope of eroding the chain of command and limiting the organizations’ extensive influence.

Unfortunately, this plan backfired. By arresting or eliminating the top cartel bosses, the Mexican government destabilized the internal framework of the DTOs. The loss of leadership produced factionalism, as the loyalties of subordinates began to fragment into small organizations, led by the often more ruthless lieutenants, best able to secure their dominance with violence. Moreover, the loss of former bosses eroded the network of contacts between cartels, leading to betrayals and violent confrontations among former allies.

By 2010, seven major cartels had grown from the four that existed when Calderón took office six years previously. Today there are more than a dozen, and the number of smaller organizations continues to grow. Fragmentation has increased competition over smuggling routes, causing more violence between and within cartels. The result has killed an estimated 60,000 over the last six years.

From Peaceful Equilibrium to Violent Equilibrium

Since 1994, Mexican Drug Cartels have dominated the majority of drug trafficking into the US. However, they once existed as relatively peaceful organizations, avoiding bloody turf wars. But by 2006, everything changed.  in cartel relations from peaceful to a “self-reinforcing violent equilibrium.” In her model, government crackdowns increase cartel competition, which in turn create violent turf wars.

Rios argues that “[t]urf wars emerge when monopolistic control of territories by drug-tracking organizations is broken; when territories become competitive and trackers fight for them.”  Moreover, “[c]ompetition is inherently unstable for illegal industries because these industries lack formal mechanisms and systematic rules to deal with disputes and disagreements between organizations.” 

As negotiating mechanisms and informal rules were based on personal contacts between cartel bosses, a strategy that sought to eliminate ‘kingpins’ eroded the existing means of negotiation. To reinstate a peaceful equilibrium, outlets for inter-cartel mediation must be established.

How to Fix the Seemingly Unfixable

Rather than waging urban warfare at coveted points of entry along the US-Mexico border, cartels have been known to negotiate safe passage taxes with rivals. Under these agreements, one cartel charges an informal tax on another, to traffic their product in the other’s territory. By carefully crafting alliances, the Mexican government may be able restore the peace in many embattled Mexican cities.

Due to a history of betrayal and distrust, current territorial divisions among Mexican cartels may seem irreconcilable, but they are ripe for reconciliation. Though there are dozens of cartels, there are two main alliances dictated by the rivalry between the Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas. Sinaloa is locked in a war with Los Zetas, Juarez, and Beltran Leyva, while Los Zetas battle the Gulf Cartel, Sinaloa, and La Familia Michoacana.

Two simultaneous peace offensives could be combined to facilitate a comprehensive truce.  One would seek to ease relations between the two largest rivals: Sinaloa and Los Zetas. Another would work towards building peace between the larger contenders and their smaller rivals. Truces and even disarmaments among criminal organizations are not unheard of.  In El Salvador, a June ceasefire between MS-13 and the Barrio 18, two rival street gangs has reduced violence by 70% throughout the country.

According to from Strafor, a US based private intelligence service; the US actively respects the presence of dominant cartels, provided they do not cause excessive violence. A number of Mexican diplomats, cartel leaders, and US clandestine operatives were found to be implicated in the between the Sinaloa and Tijuana Cartels.

The Devilish Details of Forging Alliances

Mediating peace does not mean compliance with organized crime. That the Mexican government refuses to negotiate directly with DTOs does not imply that it should refuse to facilitate dialogue between rival cartels. To proactively reduce violence, the government should establish safe zones in which cartels are able to meet and discuss peaceful relations, without fear of ambush and betrayal. The cartels must collectively establish secure and neutral spaces not to be disturbed by rivals and negotiate safe passage agreements where they are needed. 

The thought of cartels colluding with sponsorship from the state is an unsavory one, but it is a welcome alternative to the sponsorship of violent cartel competition. As Rios observes, “[t]raffickers dislike sharing territories because it increases the costs of corruption, reduces the share of the local market that it can supply, and makes production inputs scarce.” Hence cooperative efforts that solidify territorial control among cartels will reduce violence. While more solid control over a territory may increase the power of one cartel in a certain area, their control of that area takes on a much more peaceful form. Moreover, the certainty of profits from drugs will discourage cartels from resorting to the more destructive revenue scheme of extortion and kidnapping – a strategy, which has become more common under pressure from government forces and rivals.

A Slow Noose

Peace is a goal that can be accomplished in the short-term, but the elimination of DTOs is a long-term project, as the profitability of the trade ensures the prolonged existence of its profiteers. The US and Mexico must work together to gradually reduce cartel revenue through selective legalization. The long-term nature of legalization works to prevent major shocks among cartels that might produce violent responses and massive shifts to extortion and kidnapping as methods of revenue. Gradual weakening would encourage cartels to downsize over time, rather than readjust their strategies violently in the moment. A slow, decades long plan, may also allow enough time for the public to stomach the controversial issue of legalizing narcotics.

While attempting to establish peace among rival cartels, the Mexican government should also continue to crackdown on smaller syndicates and improve police forces. As Peña Nieto prepares to take office in 2013, he will be confronted with the monster of the cartels.  If he can succeed in encouraging a more peaceful monster, then maybe he can lay the groundwork for a long-term plan to slay the beast. 

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51勛圖’s editorial policy.

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Background

The party of Mexico���s 71-year civilian dictatorship is back.�� On July 1, Pe簽a Nieto of the Revolutionary Institution Party (PRI) claimed victory in presidential elections over leftist Andr矇s Manuel L籀pez Obrador of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and conservative Josefina V獺zquez Mota of the incumbent National Action Party (PAN). Half of the votes were recounted on July 6, following a wide range of alleged irregularities, but Nieto retained his near seven-point lead.

The defeated Obrador accused the PRI of buying as many as 5mn votes. His claims are based on a survey conducted by an independent election monitor, in which 28% of respondents admitted to being asked to sell their votes or said they had been subjected to some form of coercion. Additionally, the media distorted coverage of the candidates.�� Two companies, Televisa and TV Azteca, control the vast majority of all broadcast television in Mexico and consistently portrayed the PRD in a negative light, reserving favorable coverage for the PRI.

How is the PRI Victory Relevant?

The PRI ruled Mexico from 1929 until 2000.�� Originally founded to quell the decade of infighting that followed the Mexican revolution, the party reigned supreme by allying the various interests groups of the state into one giant coalition. ��The presidency alternated between top members of the party, each presiding for six-year terms with no reelection.

But no dynasty is eternal.�� After an election scandal in 1988 and widespread apprehension over a number of free-market reforms implemented during the ���80s and ���90s, the conservative PAN, led by Vicente Fox, won a historic victory in the 2000 presidential election.

For the next 11 years, PAN struggled to forge a new Mexico, facing strong opposition in the legislature from the PRI.�� Though Fox failed to implement many of his reforms, his successor Felipe Calderon would leave an indelible mark on the country.�� Calderon���s bellicose drug war strategy led to more than 55,000 deaths and failed to significantly diminish the influence of the cartels.

On the drug front, the PRI was once known for cutting deals with cartels and turning a blind-eye to their expansion.�� Conversely, PAN is criticized for escalating the problem into a full-scale war. Nieto says he will take the middle road.�� Rather than the Calderon���s hodgepodge of approaches, he plans on focusing on three central crimes: murder, kidnapping, and extortion, while still combating the issue with a frontal assault.

The return of the PRI will have serious implications for Mexico���s drug war strategy and democracy, as well as its economic and foreign policy.�� President-Elect Pe簽a Nieto wants to ���reposition Mexico again as an emerging power,��� and encourage private investment to help increase production at the country���s state oil monopoly. His promises are ambitious and partly reflect those of the last two presidents before him.�� Whether he will be able to produce more substance than his predecessors remains to be seen.

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The power and range of large, highly profitable criminal organizations has exploded in Latin America. Cartels and street gangs dominate entire neighborhoods, cities and even provinces, destroying the tranquility of ordinary life.

Before the last few decades, political violence proved the most significant security risk in Latin America. But, as civil wars ended and insurgencies demobilized, criminal violence took its place. During the transition to democratic governance that swept the region in the 1980s, the security forces of repressive regimes were largely dismantled. Meanwhile, in North America, the cocaine craze was reaching its peak.

Coca farmers in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia produce the base product for all cocaine consumed in more than 170 countries. From a geographical perspective, Latin America straddles Europe and North America, which combined consume 86% of all cocaine. In North America, 70% is trafficked along the pacific coast of Mexico, 20% along the Atlantic coast of Mexico and Central America, and 10% through the Caribbean. To reach Europe, 51% of cocaine departs from Venezuela for Spain. The rest arrives via Brazil, by passing through West Africa.

Transnational Cartels

Cartels are criminal organizations with the power to monopolize the use of force in the territories in which they operate. They function as super gangs, controlling large swaths of territory rather than individual city blocks. To dominate trafficking activities along certain points, cartels must direct the rule of law in their favor. As such, single criminal organizations come to monopolize the corruption of government officials over large areas. In this way, cartels have become significant political entities unto themselves.

Colombian cartels once dominated the trade, but after a government campaign to destroy their leadership and crackdown on the Caribbean route into Miami, Mexican Cartels took over the majority of trafficking into the US. Today, two Mexican Cartels, Sinaloa and Los Zetas, dominate the criminal world. Sinaloa, along the pacific focuses more on cocaine and marijuana smuggling, while Los Zetas derive more of their revenue from methamphetamine, and non-drug related activities such as extortion, kidnapping and human smuggling.

Street Gangs

In the 1990s, a wave of violent neighborhood gangs emerged in Central America. The two main organizations, MS-13 and Barrio 18, were founded by young deported Salvadoran civil war refugees who brought their knowledge of US gang culture to their home country. These gangs profit from local drug dealing, human smuggling and extorting the community. More recently, Central American syndicates have been contracted by Mexican cartels to move cocaine through their territory and unto the US.

Violence and Organized Crime

Organized crime has made the Americas the second most violent world region, after Africa. With only 14% of the world population, the Western Hemisphere accounted for 31% of global homicides, in 2010. By contrast, Asia accounted for 60% of the world population, but with only 27% of world homicides. Murder is over four times as likely to occur in the Americas than in Asia; the same is true when compared with Europe.

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Pragmatic Neglect

In his first year as president, Obama succeeded in leadership in Latin America by 16 percentage points to a favorability rating of 51%, merely for not being George Bush.

But, besides his popular image, Obama has done little to court Latin America leaders.  His foreign policy has focused on a difficult pivot to Asia, complicated by troop withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan and a series of pro-democracy uprisings throughout the Middle East. 

As such, Obama’s engagement in Latin America focuses on building cooperation on global issues   outside of the Western Hemisphere.  Besides bilateral trade agreements with Panama, Chile, and Colombia, Obama furthered the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free trade agreement that aims to establish a united front against China along the Pacific Rim.  TPP includes the nations of Peru, Chile, Australia, Malaysia, Vietnam, New Zealand, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam, and may come to incorporate Mexico and Canada. It is meant to deepen US trade relations with these countries, as an alternative to Chinese trade. But, rather than focusing on a multi-state agreement with Latin American countries, Obama has prioritized an initiative that looks past the region to other horizons.

Obama waited three years into his term before touring Latin America on a diplomatic mission, intentionally bypassing countries aligned with Venezuela’s Chavez. Meanwhile, the position of US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs was vacant for nearly eight months during 2011 and 2012.

While Obama has been distracted by domestic concerns and other foreign policy issues, rivals China and Iran have made Latin America a priority and capitalized on the opportunity to engage the region’s left-leaning leaders. Twenty years ago, consensus on economic and diplomatic issues in the region reflected the ideas of US politicians and intellectuals.  Now, Latin America has created its own consensus.  From the Union of South American States (UNASUR) to the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) to the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the region has established a series of cooperative organizations which exclude the United States. 

The failure of the 2012 Summit of the Americas last April highlighted the lack of US support among leaders in the hemisphere and the diminishing leverage of the Organization of American States (OAS), which hosted the conference. By denying Cuba’s participation, despite majority support for the communist nation’s inclusion in the conference, the US showed it would continue to exert its control over the tone of debate.  The action stunted the conference and several disappointed leaders expressed that it would be the last.

So What?

Despite ignoring Latin America during his first term, Obama has not done the region a disservice.  He has allowed it to mature on its own, free from US foreign policy ambition.  Organizations like CELAC and UNASUR, which fill the vacuum of cooperative efforts normally led by the US, empower the region.  CELAC recently engaged in meetings with India and China and the trio prepares to face the world together, as the rising global powers of the 21^st century.

With USAID stretched thin, Latin America and especially Brazil have become quite active in the realm of South-South development.  Brazil has used its Zero Hunger campaign as a model to alleviate starvation in Africa.  Additionally, in 2010, Brazil took an active role in maintaining peace following the Haitian earthquake.  Brazil’s ascension as a regional leader and global power should delight – rather than frighten – US officials.  It is in US interest to have a friendly and democratic nation spreading similar values in parts of the world, such as Africa, which appears to be in the grips of Chinese influence.  This allows the US to prioritize the Pacific, rather than getting lost in proxy competition and overleveraging its resources. By giving Latin America space to grow on its own, the US also avoids the antagonism for which it has sometimes been known. 

Still, continued US disengagement from Latin America could bypass valuable opportunities. The gradual re-integration of Cuba in the global economy is one example.  Re-engaging with recent adversaries like Venezuela and Ecuador is another, and Obama has a unique opportunity with Hugo Chavez saying recently, “deep down [Obama] is a good guy, if you remove him from the context of being president of an empire.” 

We give the Obama Administration a B- for its Latin America policy in 2008-2012. On one hand, the US allowed the region room to breathe and flourish. On the other hand, America’s disengagement bordered on neglect. As Latin America’s economic and diplomatic power continue to grow, efforts to control the region will become increasingly futile. America must continue to strengthen ties and bridge the divide among opponents aligned with Chavez in order to cultivate the region’s support. 

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51勛圖’s editorial policy.

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“This people cannot yet be governed except by an iron hand lest anarchy reign.”

– Harris Gaylord Warren, Rebirth of the Paraguayan Republic

Many scholars and experts have described the recent impeachment of ex-President of Paraguay, Fernando Lugo, as a constitutional coup. However, this setback for democracy was one of the least authoritarian mishaps to befall Paraguayan history. The ouster reflects a hauntingly despotic past.

Paraguay’s historical legacy lives. A survey conducted by Latinobarómetro in 2010 says 33% of Paraguayans agreed “in certain circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one.” By comparison, between 9% and 23% of people polled in other Latin American countries in 2010, said they would endorse a non-democratic alternative under certain circumstances.

An Authoritarian History

In his study of Paraguayan history, Harris Gaylord Warren observed: “Authoritarianism was as deeply engrained among the people as the use of the Guarani language, and any effort to deviate from it entailed serious dangers.”  Indeed, when power changed hands, chaos ruled the land.

Paraguay has gone through several distinct, but equally oppressive eras of political history. The post-independence era featured two despots who, though extremely brutal, did improve the lives of the impoverished peasantry. This era was promptly interrupted by yet another dictator. His ambition provoked the wrath of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, which subsequently annihilated 90% of Paraguay’s male population in the War of Triple Alliance. In the aftermath, periods of anarchy reigned, only to be tamed by an iron fist. Despotic stability came again with the Dictator Alfredo Stroessner, whose 35-year rule finally ended in 1989.

Paraguayan democracy is less than 23 years old and its nature is a product of the same un-democratic institutions that ruled the country since the end of the War of Triple Alliance. Today, the Colorado Party and the Liberal Party control most of the legislature, maintain influence over the judiciary and dominate the nation’s political machinery through a system of patronage.  

In order to understand Paraguayan politics today we must travel back to the nation’s inception.

Dr. Francia the Supreme

Following independence in 1811, Dr. Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia rose to supremacy in 1814. The most educated man in the least educated South American republic, Dr. Francia worked as a lawyer defending Paraguay’s impoverished masses. He cultivated a large following among the majority of the population.  His popularity made him vastly more powerful than the rest of the landed elite, which reluctantly welcomed him to fill the top leadership position in the newly formed government.

While he was a member of the aristocracy, he despised the elite and set out on a systematic campaign to bar them from power.  Using a conspiracy against him as motive, he imprisoned most of the wealthy landowners for the duration of their lives, many in underground dungeons.

Part Colonel Kurtz, Kim-il Sung, and Robin Hood, he placed the estates of the incarcerated landholders under state control, using them to produce food for a new Paraguay. He all but cut off the nation from trade and entrance to foreigners. The odd botanist or explorer who happened to enter Paraguay was forced to stay up to 14 years. But, among the peasants he was a savior. The campesinos enjoyed participation as ministers in his administration and their standard of living improved through the cultivation of land leased to them by their leader. With no elite able to sway the masses against him, Francia maintained a monopoly on power. His control over Paraguay was total. He presided over nearly every aspect of its administration with zero checks to his dominance up until his death, in 1840.

The Builder and the Destroyer

While Francia left no heir, the Lopez dynasty that succeeded him built upon his foundation, continuing the legacy of absolute despotism. Carlos Antonio Lopez, the first leader following Francia became known as “the Builder” for his efforts to modernize and industrialize the nation. He built schools, made magnificent renovations to the capital, and even completed one of the first functioning railroads in South America, in 1861. Antonio Lopez reversed Francia’s policy of isolationism, and opened the nation up to foreigners. He welcomed British engineers who helped design several factories, which boosted local production of high value added products.

By contrast, the elites of other Latin American countries opened their nations to often disastrous trade agreements with European powers. European countries purchased primary products in exchange for much more expensive manufactured goods. These agreements might have enriched the coffers of the Latin American elite who controlled the ports, but they saddled their nations with gaping trade deficits.

However, Paraguay’s success was brief.  Carlos Antonio’s son, Francisco Solano Lopez would become known as the failed “Napoleon of South America.” Having been sent to train in European military academies by his father, Francisco Lopez was determined to expand landlocked Paraguay’s domain to the Atlantic. He envisioned an empire that included parts of Argentina, Brazil, and all of Uruguay.

In 1865, Lopez declared war on Brazil and then Argentina, in an effort to balance regional power with the end of satisfying his territorial ambitions. His offensives lead Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay to form an alliance against him. The war quickly devolved into a protracted struggle for Paraguayan survival, which ended in genocide by 1870. The Paraguayan people valiantly gave their lives for the ambition of a misguided leader; by the war’s end, 90% of the adult male population had been killed.

Aftermath: Anarchy and the Authoritarian Republic

After a short period of Brazilian rule, Paraguay returned to independent governance in 1878. Unfortunately, the damaged country was left with leaders who had only known despotism and had little to no political experience.

The two parties that emerged – the Colorado Party and the Liberal Party – brought little change from the previous era of authoritarianism. The Colorados, formed from the remaining supporters of Lopez and the Liberals were born from an oligarchic coalition. Each dominated different periods, with the Colorados in power from 1878 to 1904 and the Liberals in charge from 1904 to 1936. 

While a republic in name, as Warren points out, “the entire electoral process from registration of voters to recording the voice of votes was permeated with fraud.” The change in administration was only accomplished through civil war and military coups, the last of which toppled the liberal government in 1936. The mid-30s and 40s featured a series of interim governments, interspersed with more coups.

The Stroessner Dictatorship and Modern Democracy

In 1954, Alfredo Stroessner seized the presidency. He returned Paraguay to its post-independence history of personalistic one-man rule, though without a commitment to improving the lives of the peasantry. His regime favored the Colorado Party, banishing their rivals to the status of political pariahs. Only an elite cadre of his supporters and family members received access to economic and political power. 

In 1989, a coup finally ousted Stroessner from the dictatorial presidency, after 35 years of uncontested authority. Unfortunately, it was the Colorado Party that led the nation into the new era of democracy. The party retained the presidency in a series of elections, maintaining the same lines of patronage that pervaded during the dictatorship.

Paraguay’s first turnover election came in 2008, with the triumph of ex-Bishop Fernando Lugo at the head of the Alliance for Progress: a loose coalition of left-wing parties. In reality, true Paraguayan democracy had only existed for a little less than four years before the politics of an authoritarian past terminated its short life.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51勛圖’s editorial policy.

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A summary of the 2012 Rio 20+ and past environmental forums.

Background

On June 20-22, 2012, 50,000 delegates representing 190 states descended upon Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to discuss sustainability and development. This years’ summit marked the 20th anniversary of the previous Rio Earth Summit held in 1992. The participating states focused on sustainable development strategies coupled with poverty reduction. The conference also addressed the need for an institutional framework to implement global cooperation.

This year’s Rio 20+ outlined seven priority areas: decent jobs, energy, sustainable cities, food security and sustainable agriculture, water, oceans and disaster readiness. The conference aimed to produce a list of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in pursuit of a more equitable and environmentally sustainable world. These SDGs, it was hoped, might even replace the eight , set to expire in 2015.

Following the conference, however, observers declared disappointment with the lack of progress. The , “This was a conference to decide to have more conferences. Negotiators agreed on a proposal that makes virtually no progress beyond what was signed at the original 1992 summit.”

Why is Rio 20+ relevant?

We are edging dangerously close to the earth’s carrying capacity, as populations are expected to reach 9 to 10bn by 2050 while consumption steadily increases. The UN estimates that by 2030, global food demand will double and energy use will rise by more than 45%.

Despite the need to act on these fronts, the world is preoccupied with fiscal crises and economic stagnation. Just days before Rio 20+, the G20 nations convened in Los Cabos, Mexico to discuss the euro crisis and the risk of a European banking failure. Meanwhile, developing countries remain hesitant to agree to any binding targets or goals, which they fear will negatively affect economic growth.

Rio 20+ continues the tone of failure in previous environmental conferences. The UN climate change conferences in Copenhagen in 2009, Cancun in 2010 and Durbin in 2011 also did not produce significant plans for the mitigation of climate change and the pursuit of environmental sustainability.

Due to the failures of past climate conferences, economic preoccupations and other domestic concerns, the leaders of the United States, the UK and Germany did not attend Rio+20. Barack Obama was busy fundraising for the US presidential elections this November, sending Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in his stead. UK Prime Minister David Cameron cited the G20 summit in Mexico as the reason for missing the conference. And German Chancellor Angela Merkel noted her concerns over the Greek elections and the ongoing euro zone crisis. This left the initiative to powerful developing countries such as Brazil, Russia, India and China.

An Alternative – the People’s Summit

While the Rio 20+ Earth Summit unfolded, an alternative forum took place on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro, funded by the Brazilian government and NGO’s. In contrast to the Rio 20+ Earth Summit, the Rio 20+ People’s Summit was held informally in a series of intimate discussions in various tents. The proceedings were covered in detail by The Guardian UK in a  and

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