According to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the international system is undergoing “intensified fragmentation and geopolitical polarisation” as competition among China, Russia and the US reshapes the global order. In this context, the behavior of states that are neither great powers nor small, dependent states is crucial to systemic stability.

Why the middle matters

Middle powers matter because they offer more than geographic or economic weight; they constitute a relational space that sustains cooperation even when the largest actors retreat into rivalry. 

Middle powers are not solely defined by material capacity but by their strategic behavior, which explains that these states “leverage their resources through selective leadership, niche diplomacy and active engagement in specific issue areas.” Their influence arises not from overwhelming force but from credible, flexible diplomacy embedded in international networks.

Yet middle power behavior cannot be purely transactional. Unlike great powers, which can absorb reputational costs through sheer weight, middle powers depend on a consistent record of principled engagement — the moment their positions appear for sale, their value as mediators and bridge-builders evaporates. Strategic flexibility is only credible when it rests on stable principles.

Notably, some of the most effective middle power actors — Norway, Qatar, Singapore and Switzerland — formally present themselves as small states, yet their diplomatic footprint tells a different story. 

This capacity to function between poles gives middle powers a unique stake in stability — they thrive not by domination but by preserving openness and predictability in a world where rivalry threatens to narrow options for all.

The pressure to choose — and the value of autonomy

Great power rivalry today extends beyond security to trade, technology and supply chains. The pressure on other states to align is real. Yet for most, alignment is neither simple nor costless.

Kazakhstan, for example, openly maintains relations with Russia, China, the EU and the US — not out of indecision, but as deliberate diversification that enhances its strategic autonomy and flexibility. As Thomas Greminger, the author of the GCSP brief, explains, this diversification gives such states greater agency while preserving room to maneuver amid competing pressures. And, TĂĽrkiye offers an even sharper illustration: a NATO member that nonetheless purchased Russia’s S-400 missile system, demonstrating that strategic autonomy is exercised not only outside alliances, but sometimes in deliberate tension with them. 

Scholars describe this as “flexilateralism” — shifting coalitions across different issues and configurations — or simply “multialignment,” where a state maintains simultaneous partnerships across rival blocs without fully committing to any.

Autonomy in this sense is not neutrality in a moral vacuum but a careful exercise of agency — preserving space for diplomacy, cooperation and engagement across rival blocs.

When geography constrains

Geography shapes middle power behavior, but does not determine it. A strategic location between major powers can amplify diplomatic options — Kazakhstan’s position at the crossroads of Russia, China and Central Asia sharpens rather than limits its multivector diplomacy, while Qatar’s contested neighborhood has pushed it toward mediation and strategic connectivity as survival tools. But geography can also become a trap.

Countries wedged between Russia and the West — Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine — cannot exercise middle power agency in the same way; their contested position pushes them toward bandwagoning rather than bridge-building. The difference between a middle power and an “in-between country” is ultimately less about location than about the political space available to make independent choices.

Communication when giants drift apart

As great powers communicate less directly, middle powers often keep vital conversations alive.

The GCSP Policy Brief highlights that middle powers deploy a range of diplomatic strategies — including bridge-building, coalition formation and mediation — to bring parties into dialogue and cooperation. It points specifically to cases like Oman and Qatar playing roles in regional mediation, facilitating negotiations between actors that might otherwise lack direct channels.

This kind of facilitation rarely makes headlines. But preventing escalation matters. When crises do not escalate into conflict, when lines of communication hold even loosely, fragmentation is contained.

Coalitions without camps

Global institutions are under strain. Consensus is harder to achieve. Formal mechanisms stagnate.

In response, middle powers are forging issue-based coalitions that sidestep rigid bloc politics. Rather than insisting on universal agreements that exclude major disagreements, these coalitions generate functional cooperation on shared risks — climate, health, food security and technology governance.

The GCSP brief notes that by forming ad hoc alliances and working collectively, middle powers can help “repair, adapt and stabilise the international order” precisely through these narrower but productive agendas.

This cooperation does not require full alignment on all strategic questions; it is rooted in practical outcomes and shared interests in avoiding collapse into zero-sum rivalry.

Greminger’s most concrete proposal points in exactly this direction. During the Cold War, a group of neutral and nonaligned states — the so-called “N+N” — played a quiet but decisive role in facilitating dialogue between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, contributing to the stable European security order that emerged from the Helsinki Process. He asks whether a similar coalition might be needed today: Should the current Ukraine conflict move toward settlement, reconstructing a European security order will require more than deterrence — it will need committed, credible states willing to facilitate risk reduction, confidence-building and arms control. Could that coalition include middle powers like Kazakhstan, Norway and Türkiye alongside traditional neutrals like Austria, Ireland, Malta and Switzerland, with Germany and Italy as cooperative security anchors? The question is deliberately open, but the precedent is real.

Economic connectivity as a stabilizing force

In a fragmented world, economic interdependence is not just a driver of prosperity. It is a buffer against division.

Middle powers often act as connectors, integrating regional trade networks and hosting platforms for economic cooperation. Financial and logistical corridors, middle powers help build complicated efforts to draw hard bloc lines in the global economy, reducing incentives for complete decoupling.

Even outside the GCSP brief, analysts note that middle powers can exercise influence by mobilizing coalitions and exploiting opportunities where great powers are indifferent or immobilized, essentially shaping cooperative spaces where larger players otherwise struggle to do so.

The risks of erosion

Stabilizing the middle is no guarantee. Strategic autonomy can be squeezed by coercive tactics. Economic levers can become tools of political pressure. Domestic politics may harden into pro-alignment rhetoric.

Here, the GCSP brief highlights that middle powers’ agency depends not just on capacity but on political commitment and diplomatic skill, observing that countries like Norway, Qatar and Switzerland combine principled engagement with reputational credibility to act as effective bridge-builders.

These dual attributes — conviction and craft — are what allow middle powers to operate as stabilizers in fractured environments.

Holding the system together

The international system need not collapse, and rivalry among great powers will surely continue. Yet the degree of fragmentation the world ultimately experiences will depend not only on the behavior of the largest states, but on whether enough mid-level states sustain cooperation, connectivity and dialogue.

In this sense, middle powers do not just fill gaps left by great power abstention. They actively shape the contours of the emerging order — not by opposing or neutralizing superpowers, but by keeping diplomatic and institutional space open.

As the GCSP brief illustrates, middle powers are uniquely positioned to contribute to stability precisely because they do not seek domination but manageable, predictable cooperation in an unpredictable world.

Their success is not a function of overwhelming force, but of relational influence — a blend of credibility, commitment and strategic autonomy. Yet realizing this potential is not automatic. It requires coordinated action, long-term vision and the willingness to lead on principled yet pragmatic agendas. In this sense, the resurgence of middle powers may be the most viable path to sustaining a rules-based international order in an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world, if they choose to act collectively and in time.

[This is an op-ed, summarized version of the publication for the GCSP, where you can find all the sources.]

Roberta Campani had some follow-up questions for the author, which he answered. You can find their exchange below:

1. On Escalation and Structural Change

Roberta Campani: Your policy brief describes a fragmented but still manageable international order. Do the recent US-Israeli strikes on Iran represent a qualitative shift from fragmentation to open confrontation? Has the structural environment for middle powers fundamentally changed?

Thomas Greminger: The recent US-Israeli strikes on Iran have only further strengthened our perception of a polarized and fragmented world order where great powers choose to follow what they perceive to be their interests without any consideration of international law. This is not to say that I wouldn’t condemn the way the Iranian regime has been treating its population. So, I see a further erosion of international law with unpredictable repercussions on regional stability and the global economy, but no fundamental changes of the structural environment for middle powers.

2. On Credibility and Negotiation

Roberta Campani: When major powers signal openness to negotiations and then rapidly escalate militarily, how does that affect the credibility of diplomacy itself? Does such behavior narrow the space in which middle powers can operate as mediators?

Thomas Greminger: It undermines the credibility of diplomacy and, more specifically, conflict mediation. Just imagine that the Omani Minister of Foreign Affairs, tasked to mediate between the US and Iran, was still reporting in Washington on what he perceived to be fairly successful negotiations in Geneva, when the decision to attack militarily was taken. Compare my comments to the :

3. On Strategic Autonomy Under Pressure

Roberta Campani: You argue that middle powers rely on strategic autonomy and diversified partnerships. In moments of acute crisis, does the pressure to align intensify to a point where autonomy becomes unsustainable? How resilient is the “middle” under coercive conditions?

Thomas Greminger: Yes, this may well happen. We have, for instance, witnessed several cases where middle powers came under US tariff pressure and felt obliged to offer major concessions. I believe that resilience can be strengthened through regional alliances that offer stronger bargaining power.

4. On International Law and Norms

Roberta Campani: Many middle powers anchor their diplomacy in multilateral norms and international law. If great powers appear willing to bypass or reinterpret these frameworks, does that weaken the normative foundations on which the middle power agency rests?

Thomas Greminger: It does. At the same time, middle powers have an intrinsic interest to preserve and rebuild a predictable, rules-based international order because they don’t dispose of the might necessary to impose right. The good news is that they can still rely on a large majority of states that continue to believe in international law. There is also still a large majority of states that continue to believe in addressing global challenges through international cooperation.

5. On the Risk of Systemic Fragmentation

Roberta Campani: Is the greater danger today the rivalry itself — or the erosion of trust in diplomatic signaling and institutional commitments? In other words, what threatens the middle more: power politics or unpredictability?

Thomas Greminger: I believe it is easier for middle powers to adapt to power politics that remain stable and thereby predictable over a certain time, as we have seen in the 19th century, than having to deal with the high degree of unpredictability that marks current times.

6. On Collective Action Among Middle Powers

Roberta Campani: Your brief hints at coordination among middle powers. Do you see realistic prospects for collective middle-power initiatives in de-escalation or crisis mediation in the current environment?

Thomas Greminger: We are seeing some initial signs of such alliances. An example is regional powers aligning in response to the war in Gaza. It is true that many mini-lateral structures have popped up in recent years that address specific challenges in a pragmatic, ad-hoc way, but most of them actually serve great power interests. Clearly, middle powers would have to aim for such alliances much more systematically. This would often also imply readiness to overcome regional differences.

7. On Switzerland’s Role

Roberta Campani: Given Switzerland’s diplomatic tradition and your own background, do you see particular responsibilities or opportunities for neutral or non-aligned states in preventing further fragmentation?

Thomas Greminger: Yes, absolutely! At the same time, Swiss foreign policy is very busy regulating its long-term relationship with the EU, dealing with the repercussions caused by the wars in Europe and in the Middle East, and responding to the challenges of the neomercantilist trade policies of one of its most important trade partners. There is therefore a need for a lot of political leadership and commitment for exploiting the opportunities offered to middle powers like Switzerland. It would like other middle powers also to look for creating new cross-regional alliances, perhaps similar to the Human Security Network operating successfully some 25 years ago.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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At the summit, Europe pledged to spend 3.5% of GDP on defense and 1.5% on areas like cybersecurity and infrastructure, totaling 5%. Greminger sees political resolve to invest more, but doubts all NATO members can or will reach the target. He believes it is largely a concession to please Washington.

Meeting the 5% target could undermine social stability

Singh presses on where Europe will get its funds, given its aging populations, high debt and fragile welfare systems. Greminger predicts significant “crowding out” of spending on health, education, diplomacy and other needs. Such trade-offs could fuel populism on both ends of the political spectrum. He agrees that the political backlash could be substantial if social safety nets erode in pursuit of military targets.

Europe faces a security threat mix that stretches resources thin

Greminger outlines Europe’s security environment as a mix of conventional military risks, primarily from Russia, and hybrid threats like cyberattacks and disinformation. Transnational dangers such as terrorism, violent extremism and trafficking persist, while climate change emerges as a new factor. Politicians face the challenge of stretching limited resources across defense, national resilience and social cohesion.

Globalization’s uneven rewards are weakening social cohesion

Addressing Singh’s intelligence concerns about marginalized youth — both disenfranchised Muslim communities and alienated working-class whites — Greminger says these trends have been building for over a decade. He links them to dissatisfaction with globalization, where perceptions of unequal benefit outweigh objective gains. Left unresolved, this discontent could undermine social cohesion across Europe, including in Switzerland.

Strategic autonomy is rising but Europe’s defense industry lags

Though the current trends are not a formal doctrine, Greminger sees growing determination to reduce dependence on Washington’s “moods” and unpredictability. Europeans have made efforts to unify major players, like the EU three — France, Germany and Italy — and strengthen independent capabilities. He suggests Trump may ironically be remembered as a promoter of European strategic autonomy.

Europe’s defense sector is not yet able to meet its demand, meaning militaries will continue buying US arms in the short to medium term. If the Ukraine war drags on, Europe may reindustrialize its defense base; if the conflict ends on acceptable terms, spending could decline as other priorities reassert themselves.

Trade tensions could erode the transatlantic alliance

Reconciling the US–Europe security partnership with growing trade disputes remains a challenge. Greminger warns that consistently hostile US trade policies will have political repercussions for NATO. Europeans may accept some unfriendly policies to preserve the alliance, but there are limits. Washington should act with care to avoid alienating its partners.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Thomas Greminger: Thank you very much, Atul. Great to be with you again.

Atul Singh: Brilliant. So this is a brave new world we are living in. We are recording this on Monday, 17th of March, and in 2025, how do you see this brave new world in which we find ourselves in?

Thomas Greminger: It’s clearly a world that is spellbound by the new US administration — its announcements, its early actions. A new administration that has chosen a different path than classical diplomacy in the way they manage external relations. It’s a path of disruption, of provocation. Demands are not submitted to partners by arguments, but by that provocation or by building up a threat posture, and then one waits for a reaction and then decides either to withdraw or to maintain the threatening stance or to start negotiating. So I think it’s a totally different style. And of course, one of the big challenges is to figure out to what extent is an announcement here a threat, and to what extent, you know, is this a serious policy move? And I think that is currently what most of the world is caught up with — trying to figure out how to respond to these new approaches, disruptive, transactional approaches by the US government.

Atul Singh: I see. So, disruptive approaches of the US government. But it is not just a matter of style; it’s also a matter of substance. Out goes the post-World War II order, the US is talking of taking over Canada, Greenland, not to mention Panama. The EU is deemed anti-US. Suddenly, Russia is an ally — or maybe not an ally, but a potential friend — and Ukraine is run by a dictator. So there is a lot of change in substance, too, isn’t there?

Thomas Greminger: I think we still have to see to what extent there is really also a substantive change. In some ways, yes, we do see the imposition of tariffs — and not just, you know, threatening imposing tariffs. We do see concrete policy action. But a lot, for the time being, remains on a declaratory level. And I think that’s also one of the challenges — to figure out: are they serious? Is it not more than a threatening posture?

European security, NATO and strategic autonomy

Thomas Greminger: I mean, when it comes to one of my favorite topics — European security, the war in Ukraine — on the one hand, you have clearly a new impulse by President Trump. He clearly wants to achieve a ceasefire as soon as possible. But at the same time, I think we are still struggling with, well, what would then be a good deal for President Trump? I think this is still not really tangible. What would be a process that would take us to a ceasefire and perhaps later on to a settlement after conflict? I mean, what we’ve been seeing is a resumption of US–Russian dialogue. That is, as such, I think, positive. It’s good that these two major powers talk to each other again. How far they’ve come in this resumption of talks is a lot less certain. But then again, coming back to Ukraine — What is a good deal? What is a process? Who sits at the table? Who deals with it? On the US side, that’s also a big question mark. You know, initially, we all thought it would be General Kellogg. Now, it seems that he is rather sidelined, and it seems to be Mr. Witkoff who does the heavy lifting in that. But again, I think when it comes to real substance, we do not have a clear sense yet. You know, also: Are we really witnessing now a fundamental shift in alliances? Is it now the US and Russia against Europe? You know, I’m not so sure yet that this is what we are really witnessing. You can hear, of course, declarations that you could interpret in this way. But when it boils down to real policy changes, I think we’ll still have to be a bit more patient and see what is really happening then on the ground, if I may say so.

Atul Singh: Alright, so you’ve talked about what’s happening on the ground, which leads me on to my next question: What is actually happening on the ground? What are the key trends you observe in this brand new world?

Thomas Greminger: Well, clearly there is — I mean, allow me to remain — the new US administration. There is clearly this short-term transactionalism that dominates over long-term alliances. We see—

Atul Singh: That’s number one.

Thomas Greminger: I think we see that when it comes to European security, when it comes to the imposition of tariffs. I think there is significant evidence for this. A second trend that I perceive, again coming out of Washington, is not only a transactional but also a hard-power-based approach to foreign and security policy. And in a way, there seems to be an abandoning of US soft power politics. So, you know — I mean, basically eliminating development cooperation, dissolving USAID, cutting contributions to multilateral organizations — all this is very fundamentally undermining soft power protection of the United States. And perhaps, you know, a third point — but this, again, takes me back to the US–Russia relation — again, I think what is notable is that there is an attempt for a reset. There has been a resumption of dialogue, but we haven’t really seen the really tough issues being addressed. There seems to be a normalization of diplomatic relations — fine — but I haven’t seen, for instance, any strategic stability issues being addressed, even though this would be quite urgent, given, you know, New START running out next year. And also, when it comes to potential Russian demands like lifting of sanctions, etc — we haven’t really gotten a sense of how far the US government is willing to go here.

Switzerland’s neutrality under pressure

Atul Singh: Right. So, let’s move on to Switzerland, where you sit. And the US has put Switzerland on a list of non-friendly countries. What does this really mean?

Thomas Greminger: Well, first, you know, we need to be precise. Switzerland is not on a channel non-friendly countries list. I’m not even sure if this category exists. But we are on a list of countries with unfair trade practices. But, I mean—

Atul Singh: I stand corrected. I stand corrected.

Thomas Greminger: But, I mean, this is serious enough, and obviously this is taken very seriously by Switzerland. Why is this so? Well, Switzerland has a bilateral trade balance with the US with a very considerable surplus, by about $25 billion. And so I think that triggered, you know, this move to put us on that list. What, however, is not being said is that, at the same time, Switzerland has a deficit in services of around $20 billion. So, all in all, you know, if you count it all together, it doesn’t look that bad. But I think the important thing is that, you know, Switzerland is taking this seriously. The Swiss State Secretary for Economic Affairs is, as we speak, in Washington, is trying to figure out why. What are US expectations behind this move? And I would suppose, you know, she would argue with, you know, an extremely open space market. She would certainly point to the fact that we have this deficit when it comes to the service balance. And she would probably also point to the fact that Swiss multinational enterprises employ around 400,000 people in the United States. So I think there isn’t really an interest, you know, to trigger any sort of trade war between the two countries. What I like is, you know, that Switzerland is taking it seriously and is trying to address it through quiet diplomacy and not, you know, through this public diplomacy, not through loudspeaker diplomacy, but diplomatically.

Atul Singh: You’ve got an excellent ambassador, Ralph Heckman, in Washington, so that should help. And, of course, you’re huge investors in research and development. So the Swiss have invested quite a bit in the US and employs, you said, quite a few people — so that should help as well. So let’s talk about moving on from Switzerland to Europe. For decades, Europe and the US have been in a transatlantic alliance, and you just mentioned that the new fashion is transactional short-term gains, not long-term alliances. So are we to infer that this fabled transatlantic alliance is now dead?

Thomas Greminger: I don’t think so. Look, these strong transatlantic relations have been built over decades, and they’re simply too strong to be fundamentally questioned by one US president, by one US administration. I mean, I wouldn’t doubt that these relations are currently undergoing a serious test, and clearly there is a particular challenge to European partners who have to step up their contribution to counter military threats on their eastern flank. But, you know, even here, I would also see an opportunity. And that is this US pressure on transatlantic relations, in a way, also represents an opportunity to advance a more autonomous European security policy. And, you know, that takes us a bit also back to Trump’s first administration. I think already back then, this was the most significant boost to European strategic autonomy thinking. But obviously this was pre-war. Now we are in a war scenario, and the war clearly has again underlined how important these transatlantic relations are. So we are, in a way, in a different situation. But what we are currently seeing over the last days and weeks is a strong mobilization on the European side in terms of more security efforts — also, I think, a will to be more autonomous. And in that sense, you know, Trump may, at some point, even become a hero of European strategic autonomy.

Atul Singh: Excellent. But the alliance question: The alliance, you think, will persist? It’ll outlast Donald Trump?

Thomas Greminger: It will. It will. And, you know, I don’t think that, for instance, he would seriously consider pulling out of NATO. I think there is just too much at stake, not only from a pure security point of view. I think, you know, we need to be very clear. This has always also been an important way of assuring US interests in an absolutely fundamental market for the United States. It has been a way of projecting US power to the European continent. And I think abandoning all of that would — even if you think short-term, transactional — even in such a logic, this wouldn’t make sense.

Atul Singh: Alright. So let’s talk about what you’re saying repeatedly — transactional, transactional, transactional world we live in now. So, have we moved from a rules-based order to a transactional spheres of influence world?

Thomas Greminger: I think this is an excellent point. And indeed, if you look at the mindset of, let’s say, the presidents of the three major powers — the United States, China, the Russian Federation — I think you could make a case that they have a sphere of influence mindset, and that for them, you know, the respect for state sovereignty of neighboring countries and regions isn’t particularly strong. And I think these principles that heads of state have subscribed to over the last 50 years — that is, you know, that every state has the freedom to choose its own security arrangements, to be sovereign in its foreign policy choices — I think these are principles, values, that are not held very highly by all three of them. I mean, what is, of course, particularly surprising is that you would now also put the United States in that camp. But clearly, when you hear references to taking over Greenland, Canada, the Panama Canal, then I think this is a clear indication of a sphere of influence mindset. Scary.

Atul Singh: Yeah. I mean, so if that is the world we live in, is protectionism and hardball bargaining the new reality in this brave new world? And what does this mean for small countries like Switzerland?

Thomas Greminger: It’s clearly very challenging. If you cannot wield major power in a world that is dominated by power politics, you obviously have a major issue. And I think what it means for smaller countries like Switzerland is to be, you know, extremely attentive, smart, flexible, adaptive. Don’t put all your eggs in one single basket. You know, diversify your partnerships, diversify your supply chains. You know, try to avoid being too dependent on one of these major powers. A question that we keep discussing here in Switzerland is: Is neutrality still a tool, you know, that serves us well in this kind of world? And I would definitely argue yes. I think a smart neutrality policy — the reactive policy, you know, that shows that neutral Switzerland can be useful to the international community — is still a very appropriate way of dealing with these challenges.

Atul Singh: I see. So, some argue that this neutrality has weakened over time. After all, I mean, look at the Swiss moving towards the US in the Russia–Ukraine war. And of course, one could argue that neutrality might also be under pressure because of the financial pressure the US is exerting. Take the example of UBS. UBS got a lot of Swiss government support, but it’s threatening to move headquarters elsewhere. That might have been less likely if, perhaps, Switzerland was part of the EU.

Thomas Greminger: I mean, you are absolutely right. Being neutral these days is not, you know, an easy way of conducting your foreign and security policy. But then again, you know, what are the alternatives? The alternatives are: You join a camp, and you do what is called “bandwagoning” by political scientists. But then you’re caught in a camp; you’re bound by the decisions of such a camp. I don’t think that this is — in such a polarized world — always an advantage. And the other alternative is constant hedging. And I think that’s what you see with more major actors also in the Global South. That’s, I think, what Indians, for instance, call “multi-alignment,” right? But I think for a smaller country like Switzerland, that has less power than, let’s say, India, Brazil, South Africa — I think neutrality brings along more predictability. But it’s not a rigid concept. And, you know, this takes me back to your initial question. Things have radically changed when it comes to Swiss neutrality policy once we came out of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Switzerland had a very rigid interpretation of neutrality — it was called “integral neutrality” — which basically meant, you know, no significant foreign policy. But then, you know, once we came out of the Cold War, Switzerland had to kind of reinvent its foreign policy and neutrality policy became much more open. And when you read the still-valid neutrality report of 1993, you see that, for instance, adopting economic sanctions is fully in line with the defined neutrality policy after the end of the Cold War. That this then creates dilemmas at given points in time is absolutely true. We had, in 2014, a big discussion in Switzerland: Should Switzerland adopt fully the imposed EU sanctions? In 2014, we decided no. We just, you know, make sure that Switzerland is not being used to circumvent sanctions. But we did not fully adopt them. And one of the key arguments was: Back then, Switzerland was in a mediating role as Chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Now, when you compare that—

Atul Singh: Just for our viewers and listeners: They should know, 2014 is when Russia took over Crimea. So that’s what Thomas is referring to.

Thomas Greminger: Exactly. So we have basically two things: Illegal annexation of Crimea, and you have destabilization efforts in the Donbas. But you did not have — and that takes me to 2022 — you did not have a full-fledged aggression against a neighboring country, as in 2022. And given the severity of that breach of international law, given the fact that Switzerland had no particular role in 2022, given also, of course, the huge solidarity of the Swiss population with the aggressed state — with Ukraine — I think the Swiss government had no choice but to adopt these sanctions fully. Of course, this was criticized then by Russia. But I still think, you know, politically this made sense and is compatible with a modern interpretation of neutrality policy.

Defense, neutrality and the future of Europe

Atul Singh: Excellent. Speaking of neutrality, one would be remiss if one did not point out that Europe is rearming again. And Germany has exempted defense spending from its constitutional debt brake. Poland has talked about acquiring nuclear weapons. So, is NATO on the way out, and a new European defense alliance is about to take its place? Will it mean that some countries will take a more aggressive stance against Russia and others might just choose to be neutral?

Thomas Greminger: Well, I think the jury is still out of what form this will take. Will Europe focus on strengthening a European pillar of NATO? I think that is clearly an option. Or would it go for investing mainly in strengthening the security side of the European Union? Or, thirdly, would it be a construct that is different to NATO and EU, which would have the advantage of also integrating non-EU and non-NATO members? The European Political Community, you know, has been mentioned. But obviously, the downside is there are no established security structures, mechanisms, etc. So I think it’s still open how this part of the European security architecture will look like. I think what is clear is you will see a much more significant European effort in that — less reliance on US support. This obviously also implies that Europe will have to compensate for currently still existing important capability gaps. I think they will have to be made up. It also implies that Europe will have to cooperate in security matters to a much different way. You know, let’s be honest — I think right now, security in Europe is still very much nationally driven. Procurement is nationally driven. And I think this needs to change. You know, you cannot have twelve different tank models in the future of European security. I think you will have to focus on two or three, right? So it’s not about moving military expenditures up to 5%. I think that’s simply not necessary. What is necessary is change the cooperation mindset when it comes to defense and security in Europe. And I think there is still quite a bit to be done. But clearly, what I’ve been seeing over recent weeks and months shows me that I think Europeans have understood and they got the message, and they are now working on it.

Atul Singh: So, you say Europeans have got the message and they are now working on it. Does that mean that the Europeans are not going to buy US weapons as much anymore? Because you said you need two or three tanks — one of them, of course, is Challenger in Europe — and a key reason to buy US arms has been interoperability. But if the Europeans cannot rely on the US as much as they used to, then they’ll have to build their own weapons systems. And there is already talk of the fear of the kill switch or the US not giving you software updates as part of a trade war, even. So, it is not just increased spending — it is developing a homegrown defense technology, research and development — almost a military-industrial complex, isn’t it?

Thomas Greminger: It’s true. I think a lot will depend on how this is now being managed on both sides of the Atlantic. I think if it’s smartly managed, I would see European security being strengthened, transatlantic relations even being strengthened. If it’s poorly managed — if this threat posture remains the dominant feature of US policies — indeed, I think you’re absolutely right that one of the consequences could indeed be that Europeans buy less and less American weaponry and, you know, will basically then resort to European systems only. Which probably wouldn’t be smart from a military, from a security point of view, either. But okay — I mean, if there is bullying from Washington, Europe might not have another choice than to do that. But again, I hope this is not the scenario that we are going to see. I hope, you know, reason sets in and complementarity will remain an important principle in European security. Bear in mind that Europe will have to step up its own investment, its own effort.

Atul Singh: Thomas, most European countries have very generous social welfare systems — generous especially when compared to the US With rising defense spending, can Europe manage both guns and butter? And what is the future, then, of the European economy?

Thomas Greminger: Yeah, again, I think that’s an excellent question. This guns-and-butter dilemma I think is a real dilemma. And there is obviously a threat of crowding out social expenditures if defense expenditures will have to be kept on a very high level for a very long time. And there is also a risk of inflationary pressure, you know, if this defense spending has to be kept high for a long time. So I think it all depends on the timeframes that we are talking about. And this, of course, then takes us to developments in Europe over the next few years. Will we see an end to the war in Ukraine? Will we gradually come back to a European security order that contains cooperative elements? Or will we stick, for decades to come, in a kind of new Cold War with enormous defense expenditures on both sides? I think if the latter is the case, then indeed, you know, this guns-and-butter dilemma will become much more critical. If the former happens, we may at some point in time again see the peace dividend, you know, that will allow us to sustain social expenditures and also deal with all the challenges of an aging population, for instance, of rising health expenditures, etc.

A new Cold War?

Atul Singh: So you’ve mentioned a new Cold War, and I couldn’t help thinking: What will be the shape of this new Cold War? Let’s hope it never gets that far. Let’s hope we have a peace dividend. But in case we don’t, will this Cold War be between the US and the EU? Will it be between the EU and Russia? Will it even be between the EU and China? Because there are lots of tensions, strained tensions, and Xi Jinping has not deigned to visit Europe. So what will be the shape of this new Cold War?

Thomas Greminger: Yeah, again, I think the jury is still out. Well, until a few months ago, one would have said, well, it’s probably the West against the rest, or against China and Russia. Now, with this attempt to reset US–Russia relations and this declared strategy of President Trump to kind of, you know, pull Russia out of China’s embrace, we may see different developments. And then, of course, a lot will also depend on how, for instance, Europe will position itself. Will Europe try to kind of remain and keep an independent stance, or will it side exclusively with the US? You know, when you look at the relevance of economic relations between China and Europe, I don’t think that this would be a very favorable strategy for both China and Europe. And I get clearly a sense that China is trying very hard to reach out to Europe. This may not be reflected in heads-of-state visits lately, but diplomatically, what I perceive is a strong outreach by the Chinese. And I think they would want to deal with a Europe that is as independent as possible.

Atul Singh: Excellent. Thomas Greminger, thank you so, so much for your time. It’s always a pleasure to have you with us. We hope you’ll come back soon. There’s lots to discuss in this brand new world, in this fast-changing world. And we wish you all the best with all your endeavors.

Thomas Greminger: Thank you very much, Atul. Thank you for inviting me.

[ edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Trump, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War: A Swiss View on the New World in 2025 appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The war’s impact on Europe has been significant. Heightened energy prices have affected countries heavily reliant on Russian gas, such as Germany. European nations have also diverted resources and attention toward Ukraine and away from other crucial areas like social spending and healthcare. Most fundamentally, the war has shattered the last remnants of trust between the East and West, leading many European nations to up their defense budgets in anticipation of a potential direct conflict with Russia.

Switzerland in the middle of an increasingly anxious Europe

Reflecting this defensive attitude, EU High Representative Josep Borrell that Europe is a garden and the rest of the world is a jungle. Germany has closed its borders, apparently to avoid the jungle taking over the garden. Switzerland takes a more moderate approach. While acknowledging migration and integration challenges, the country emphasizes the need for proactive and inclusive migration policies.

Right-wing leaders are in charge in many parts of Europe, like Robert Fico in Slovakia and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. In Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party is on the rise, and in France, the National Rally party made a decent dent in the latest parliamentary elections. Switzerland finds the rise of right-wing, anti-immigrant populist movements across Europe to be a cause for concern. Unlike other European countries, though, Switzerland is a decentralized confederation. This offers a degree of resilience against nationalist trends that would seek to dominate politics at the countrywide level. Yet Switzerland remains uneasy about the deeper political and social crises of which the rise of the far right is a manifestation.

Switzerland the investor

In lighter news, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway a free trade agreement with India in March. Swiss diplomat Ralf Heckner has received the credit for achieving what the EU, the UK and the US failed to do. The secret of Swiss success is the country’s independent position. As a non-member of major trade blocs, Switzerland has greater flexibility in forging agreements with emerging markets. Additionally, India’s status as a rapidly growing economy and Switzerland’s political commitment to strengthening economic ties played crucial roles in the successful negotiations.

Switzerland is looking east for economic growth, with China and India among its top export markets. However, the country has adopted a cautious approach toward China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy, economic slowdown and challenges faced by private actors. 

Switzerland the peacemaker

As a famously neutral territory for peace talks, Switzerland hosted a summit to resolve Sudan’s ongoing civil war. Yet Sudanese General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces, to sit the talks out. Despite his absence from recent negotiations, Switzerland remains committed to facilitating dialogue and humanitarian access.

Switzerland has faced more than one setback in Africa in recent times. The cocoa crop in CĂ´te d’Ivoire and Ghana is facing its third tough year in a row. Chocolate-loving and chocolate-producing Switzerland may need to diversify its cocoa supply chain and include more suppliers from Latin America, with which it maintains cordial relations.

Finally, remaining in the Western Hemisphere, Switzerland views the current state of American democracy with concern, particularly regarding the deep political polarization and potential challenges to the peaceful transfer of power. The US is the preeminent global superpower, and uncertainty about its future direction adds to instability everywhere.

To manage these risks, Switzerland has adopted a flexible and open-minded approach, maintaining communication channels with both major political parties in the US. This proactive strategy ensures continued cooperation and stability in its relationship with the global superpower, regardless of the election outcome.

[Peter Choi edited this podcast and wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post A Swiss Perspective on World Affairs Today appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Switzerland has been neutral for so long that neutrality has become part of its identity. It is what makes the country unique, giving Switzerland a unique vantage point in world affairs. To find out more, we asked Swiss diplomat and author Thomas Greminger the question: “How does Switzerland see the world?”

Of course, in many ways, the world doesn’t look so different from the high Swiss Alps as elsewhere. International norms seem to be crumbling. Russia has brought back hard-power politics and invaded its neighbor, Ukraine, with no legal justification. China is eyeing Taiwan and staking out the South China Sea as its private lake — much to the chagrin of its neighbors who share this sea. War has broken out again in the Middle East, with Israel invading Gaza and missiles flying everywhere from Yemen to Pakistan. The world is chaotic indeed. There is much wisdom in the Swiss policy of staying out of conflict.

The US has played its part, and so have others

Many Swiss observers lay the blame for this chaos at the feet of the US. The global hegemon has not done a good job of managing affairs as of late. Donald Trump, the former president and the Republican frontrunner for the presidential ticket, introduced much instability into the international system. His unpredictable and erratic foreign policy left both allies and foes guessing. Today, countries from the Middle East to East Asia are increasingly worried that they will have to rely on their own devices instead of the US. They are preparing for conflict rather than trusting in a tranquil, American-backed world order. This preparation has made nations more suspicious and more reactive, making the world more volatile.

As nations pull up the drawbridges, they are economically disengaging from each other. Nearshoring, friendshoring and reshoring are the watchwords of the day. Trade between China and the West is under strain as Washington and Beijing impose tit-for-tat tariffs in an ongoing trade war. Financial interconnectivity between the developed world and the developing world is under pressure. 

Even as trade declines, China’s economic growth is flagging. Like Germany, Switzerland is feeling the pinch as China enters a deflationary period and Chinese demand for foreign goods consequently drops. Fortunately, Switzerland is more diversified than Germany and not as reliant on exports to China as its northern neighbor. Therefore, the Swiss economy is not suffering as much as the German one.

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FO° Exclusive: China’s Worsening Deflation Now Spells Big Trouble

Not only the Chinese economy but also the Latin American economies are in the doldrums. Much of Africa is suffering and military coups are overthrowing democratic governments in many countries. Some of these coups have popular support. Even Asian economies, with the exception of India, Vietnam and a handful of others, are no longer growing that fast. Switzerland, with a highly developed financial industry, has been deeply invested in developing economies across the world. For now, the only thing this small country can do is batten down the hatches, continue to diversify and hope for more favorable conditions in the future.

Swiss observers are worried, too, about the state of their own continent. Democratic norms are weakening in Europe. In the Netherlands, the nationalist, anti-Muslim politician Geert Wilders took the lion’s share of votes in the November 2023 elections. In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany is on the rise. And Georgia Meloni, the far-right prime minister of Italy, hails from a party with post-fascist roots. The chatter in Austria, Switzerland’s neighbor to the east, is that the populist Freedom Party is looking strong. Austrians go to the polls in June. In Slovakia, Robert Fico has begun his assault on democratic institutions, attempting to bring the mechanisms of the state under his party’s control. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán has already accomplished this feat, turning Hungary into an illiberal democracy.

Related Reading

Robert Fico Returns: Will Slovakia Become the New Hungary?

The world may not quite be coming apart at the seams, but Switzerland must proceed cautiously if it does not want to become isolated in its own neighborhood.

How Switzerland is getting on in a dangerous world

The Swiss, of course, don’t have to worry about being invaded like the Ukrainians or the Taiwanese. Switzerland is armed to its teeth, and this mountainous country is a natural fortress — dotted with bunkers for good measure. But even the Swiss cannot live in the world alone. The country has deepened its relations with the EU and even with NATO. In the past, Switzerland failed to find a solution to engaging with the EU that balanced integration with Swiss independence. But recent global unrest has driven Bern and Brussels closer together.

Switzerland has participated in European sanctions against Russia because Swiss neutrality does not necessarily exclude participating in international sanctions. Switzerland’s neutrality policy took current legal shape in 1993 after the end of the Cold War and allows for sanctions. The real novelty in Switzerland’s foreign policy is that it has begun to cooperate with like-minded nations in security. In 2023, Swiss defense minister Viola Amherd achieved a historic first by participating in a meeting of NATO’s decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council. Switzerland may not be abandoning neutrality, but it is certainly moving much closer to Europe and the US than ever before.

Still, Switzerland is not turning its back on Russia or other non-Western-aligned powers. Switzerland prides itself on being a place where officials and experts from deeply opposed nations can meet and work together. The country is, for example, one of the last places in the world where US and Russian policymakers can still discuss nuclear weapons. Arctic powers, including the US, Canada and Russia, meet and speak here. In an increasingly divided and suspicious world, neutral Switzerland’s importance is increasing.

Switzerland is not immune to the unrest

Many look upon neutral and prosperous Switzerland as an island of stability. In many ways, it is so indeed. Swiss democracy has been resilient and moderate. It is a federal, semi-direct democracy that gives its voters a real voice in how their local, regional and national governments are run. The application of this principle of subsidiarity is a rarity and makes Switzerland unique.

Yet many Swiss citizens feel that the system is not being run in their interest. They see Switzerland’s many advantages being used to enrich a small elite, rather than the common people. Prices are running high and few own houses or can buy them. Many are resentful and are turning to populism. The Swiss People’s Party has grown stronger and poses a threat to Switzerland’s liberal democratic status quo.

Switzerland must navigate the territory carefully. As it copes with the modern world, this idyllic mountain country must avoid compromising its traditions of neutrality and Swiss citizens’ personal freedoms. The relatively new Swiss law, Measures for Protection against Terrorism, has many worried that the government may begin compromising the rights to privacy or free expression. Yet, for now, Switzerland seems to have crafted a legal solution that adequately balances security with these values.

In an uncertain world, Switzerland must strive to draw on the best of its political heritage, trudge forward and stay the course in hope of better days ahead.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Making Sense of the World Through a Swiss Lens appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.