“Iraq goes to war with itself” was how The New York Times the deadly instability plaguing the country. Iraq’s national problems represent an enormous challenge to Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi’s government, which has resorted to having its security forces kill hundreds of protesters while injuring thousands of others.

“Returned to Normal”

In turn, street violence has continued unabated, with the torching of public buildings and fresh clashes, and attacks on media channels. This violent unrest remains unreported because of a near-total by the government authorities. Government forces allegedly attacked the media channels that covered the protests. Several countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have imposed travel restrictions to Iraq for their citizens. This comes amid Iraq’s in which the country’s dollar-denominated sovereign debt has fallen to a record four-month low. 

As predicted, official statements continue to insist that life has “returned to normal” after marathon cabinet meetings, days of mourning and “extraordinary” promises of reform. Meanwhile, several legislators have boycotted the emergency sessions, and the Shia leader, Muqtada al-Sadr (a coalition party head), has for the government to resign and for a snap election to be held immediately. Conversely, Faleh al-Fayyad, national security adviser and head of Iraq’s powerful Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces), has appealed for the prevention of rebellion.

The UN, the Red Cross and Amnesty International keep repeating their sermons of “restraint” and avoidance of violence. Furthermore, the key world powers — the United States and Russia — have cautioned against escalation of tensions, primarily because of the fears of further destabilizing the region given the rift between Washington and Tehran. Interestingly, the Iraqi government “malicious” actors for the current unrest and points toward “unidentified snipers” rather than its security forces as the culprits for the firing on the protesters. Likewise, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei tweeted that “enemies” were trying to drive a wedge between Tehran and Baghdad amid the unrest.

Structural Malaise

Iraq, as a middle-income country, is suffering from decades of international sanctions and ravages of war and internal strife and faces challenges that are often found in many low-income economies. These include dependence on a primary commodity, significant reconstruction and rehabilitation needs, unprecedented requirements of strengthening local and indigenous capabilities, and a legacy of poor-performing institutions.

Some recent successes in stabilizing its macroeconomic and budgetary situation have been instrumental in reversing the trends, but far more tangible and visible progress is needed in diversifying its economy and generating sustainable livelihoods for the majority of its population. Most important, this transition is expected to take place in a fragile political, security and institutional context.

Unfortunately, Iraq’s post-2003 political system has been designed to produce a consensual government, which has led to rampant corruption. In fact, the country is one of the world’s most corrupt. Iraq cannot formulate appropriate strategies to tackle such serious problems, especially in relation to the country’s economy. The Iraqi electoral system is also crafted in a way that does not reflect the real representation of the population in the parliament. It also buttresses the grips of big political parties and interests.  

The Shia-Sunni sectarian divide in Iraq’s society has been noted as an impediment to progress. But that has proved to be a red herring. The current protests defy the notion of the dominance of a Shia government — vis-à-vis Sunnis — as all the provinces that experienced an uprising have a Shia majority. Most of the protesters who have been killed are also Shia.

For a while, the unemployed youth became a recruiting ground for the Islamic State (IS) militias as a source of income and livelihood. Violence and unrest became pervasive in the circumstances of despair amongst the poor, while the uber rich and their scions found havens of money laundering in the construction sectors of Amman and the rest of the Gulf. 

The country had never developed institutions of accountability and transparency. There remains a massive gap between the top echelons of technocrats and those obeying orders in government offices. Civil and defense services lack any semblance of meritocracy in appointments and promotions. Income inequality has become more and more perverse. The worst affected are the provision and delivery of essential public services, from education to health to basic human needs of the population.

International and bilateral development institutions, on their part, have focused mainly on reconstruction of infrastructure and “sustainable” rehabilitation of the war-torn economy. Yet the focus on socio-economic policy reforms has been negligible, both at the center and the governorates. In the end, the assistance has been marred by nascent administrative and technical capacity within the various agencies entrusted with the sub-components, which reflects the legacy of the historical state-owned system of economic governance.

As a consequence, the achievements, efficiency of assistance and the results on the ground have been modest, especially at the downstream level. Additionally, there is neither a clear agenda nor adequate technical capacity nor an efficient decision-making authority for the regional and governorate-level program to promote the economic reforms. There is a scant focus on the cross-cutting themes of poverty alleviation, gender mainstreaming and security considerations for creating an overall enabling and peaceful environment in Iraq.

What Lies Ahead?

Present-day Iraq is in turbulence. Poor governance is likely to persist for the foreseeable future. No remedial actions are on the horizon. Irrespective of whether the current government survives, or the protests subside, unrest will continue.

The entire political system needs an overhaul. As Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, one of Iraq’s most influential clerics, said on his on October 4 at Karbala, “the government has not achieved anything on the ground; it must do what it can to improve public services, find work for the unemployed, end clientelism, deal with the corruption issue, and send those implicated in it to prison.” 

In sum, and overall, the rebuilding of the Iraqi state will be contingent upon three critical and parallel undertakings: consolidation of governing institutions; legitimatization of political structure and processes; and formation of a national identity incorporating the interests of a war-torn diverse population. Without reforming the political process and the electoral system, fighting corruption and promoting the rule of law, and building state institutions based on equal access to justice, no long-term solutions could be feasible in Iraq.

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Since June 5, Pakistan has faced what amounts to Hobson’s choice. Saudi Arabia has been asking its fellow Sunni Muslim ally: Are you with Qatar or with us? While Islamabad has expressed solidarity with Saudi Arabia and its people, and has always upheld the Saudi monarch’s guardianship and jurisdiction over Islam’s two most holy sites (Mecca and Medina), it has also reiterated that Pakistan has no plans to join the quartet (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) in severing ties with Doha. On the day the Qatar crisis erupted, , a spokesperson for Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry, declared: “At the moment there is nothing on [the] Qatar issue, [we] will issue a statement if some development takes place.”

Nonetheless, to placate Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has offered to leverage its influence over Qatar to defuse the situation. For this purpose, then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif promised to visit Kuwait, Qatar and Turkey. An official familiar with the development explained that Pakistan would merely complement Kuwait’s efforts to deflate the��crisis rather than playing the role of a direct mediator between Qatar and its fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members and Egypt.

Ever since the early 1970s, Pakistan has been a direct beneficiary of the economic largesse of oil-rich Saudi Arabia and other Arabian Peninsula states. This has been a result of concessionary balance-of-payments support to the economy; the subsidized provision of oil; contributions to Sunni-led charitable outfits/madrassas; the importation of a permanent contingent of military technical/training advisors; and the employment (and commensurate remittances) by semi-skilled and unskilled workers.

Since the 2015 formation of the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT), Pakistan has been constrained to play a role in the Saudi-led coalition of 41 countries. The January 2017 appointment of IMAFT’s first commander-in-chief, retired General Raheel Sharif (Pakistan’s former chief of Army Staff), creates another conundrum for the Pakistani establishment, especially now that the military alliance has been conducting joint military exercises with partners and, reportedly, having a combatant role in Yemen.

Many in Pakistan’s significant Shia population (around 15% of the country) occupy high civil and military positions. Caught up in the tensions between Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia and Shia-majority neighbor Iran, they are likely to become far more vocal should Riyadh ever attempt to impose restrictions on Qatari/Iranian devotees’ internationally recognized “right to worship” at Islam’s two holiest places.

Pakistan is ironically considered a nation already embroiled in disputes with neighboring Afghanistan and India, both of whom accuse Pakistan itself of offering support to hardline Salafist militant groups, including the Taliban and��Lashkar-e-Taiba. More importantly, Pakistan’s progressive intellectuals have always considered their nation-state as a South Asian Muslim country — even before its formal creation — thanks to its historical ties with Iran and Turkey. For this same reason, Pakistan has been unwilling to take sides with Saudi Arabia in Yemen due to the Riyadh-led military coalition having launched its campaign against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels.

One of Pakistan’s closest allies, Turkey, faces a similar complicated dilemma because of its close ties with Doha and Riyadh. On June 7, Turkey’s parliament — not only as military support but also as a humanitarian gesture to supply essential goods and services. Ankara has remained steadfast in its defense of Doha throughout the three-month Qatar crisis. Pakistan, too, has been striving to its portfolio of alliances and economic opportunities. The foremost is the establishment of the China-Pakistan economic corridor (CPEC), and more recently, Qatar’s launch (as the Gulf blockade continues) of a new direct route between the country’s Hamad Port and Pakistan’s Port of Karachi.

Fortunately, for the moment, Pakistan may not have to explicitly state its preference between Qatar and the quartet. This is because, for the foreseeable future, Saudi Arabia and Iran will remain at loggerheads over what Riyadh sees as Tehran’s efforts to tighten its grip on the sub-region, from Iraq to Lebanon and from Syria to Yemen. Furthermore, the ill-fated diplomatic and economic boycott is not sustainable. As Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declared, “The era of cutting diplomatic ties and closing borders is over.” Accordingly, diminishing returns from the diplomatic and economic boycott of Qatar — combined with growing attrition from the military venture in Yemen — may lead Saudi Arabia and the UAE (possibly the driver of the initiative) to look for some rapprochement with the Islamic Republic to mitigate the adverse effects of lingering regional conflicts.

Moreover, a flurry of diplomatic activity in the international arena (involving also the United States) indicates that the original ultimatum to Qatar by the Saudi/UAE-led bloc might be to a list of broad principles such as “commitments to combat terrorism, extremism, to end acts of provocation, and incitement.”

Finally, with the judicial ouster on July 28 of Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the country is embroiled in domestic political maneuvering by existing political parties and perhaps contending yet again with the perennial issue of civil-military relations. This turmoil could the pursuit of outward looking foreign policy considerations.

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The Saudi-led coalition to combat terrorism in the Muslim world — notwithstanding its diplomatic and economic bolstering by the Trump administration — will continue to persist as an extravagant delusion for several reasons.

It was in December 2015 that Prince Mohammad bin Salman — who is now the Saudi crown prince — with fanfare the formation of the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT). This coalition would be Saudi-led and carry the aim of collective security deterrence amid the rising insurgency of Daesh (Islamic State) and its purported financiers in the Gulf.

But only lately has this coalition gained rapid momentum, and it is now commonly dubbed as the “Muslim NATO.” From initially 34 members, seven more countries joined the group by the end of 2016. In January 2017, Pakistan’s former chief of army staff, General Raheel Shareef, was named as the coalition’s first commander-in-chief. At the same time, there was a recruitment drive in Pakistani media for retired army personnel and advisers amid plans for joint military exercises with IMAFT member states.

More importantly, in March and April, US President Donald Trump hosted Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Jordan’s King Abdullah, with the express desire to foster this armed front against “radical Islam.” Not coincidentally, these developments took place just months before the ongoing economic and diplomatic embargo against Qatar for its relations with Shia-majority Iran and — tacitly acquiescing to — its growing influence in the Middle East.

Despite solid affirmations that IMAFT would operate in keeping with the United Nations and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) provisions on fighting terrorism, all members of IMAFT are countries with Sunni-dominated governments. The official pronouncements are explicit that the alliance is part of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) efforts to take a leading role in the Middle East and Muslim world, stemming from a��.

More contentiously, the Saudi-led coalition is engaged in militarily and economically smothering any opposition and/or uprising that could be considered “unfriendly” to Riyadh and the GCC — the most recent manifestation being in Yemen, where battles continue between Saudi-led forces and Iran-backed Houthi rebels. Another instance involves the GCC itself. At the onset of the Qatar crisis in June, Pakistan was presented with a Hobson’s choice as Saudi Arabia asked its Muslim ally: “?”

Contradictions

There is a misdiagnosed understanding of IMAFT’s sectarian foundations — in other words, the false dichotomy of Sunni versus Shia. While most non-Arab Muslim countries are unanimously in favor of preserving the sanctity of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, they are not necessarily in favor of “re-Sunnifying” the geopolitical landscape and flipping the existing power structures.�� Essentially, due to the number of Sunni-majority countries, the underlying factor is the emphasis on the special brand of Wahhabism adopted by Saudi Arabia, whereby many Islamic principles of other Sunni and Shia sects are considered as apostasy.

Equally significant is the economics of the situation. Saudi Arabia’s unsustainable financial commitment to its military mission — namely in Yemen — comes at a time when its oil-dependent economy is on a rollercoaster. Accordingly, public sector expenditures have been cut and government employment opportunities for the country’s most recent university graduates look less promising than in past years.

There is even talk of some of public sector bills There has even been discussion of for expatriates and forced repatriation of migrant labor from South Asia.

Prospects

Saudi Arabia’s desire of becoming a regional hegemon is likely to be overtaken by geopolitical events. These include the scaling back of the US military presence in Syria, the lack of Russian support, and Chinese restraint to alter the status quo — combined with the Trump administration’s reticence for the overt entangling of alliances abroad, beyond the recently-announced continuation of a military presence in Afghanistan.

The ambitions of IMAFT are unrealistic and far more grandiose than its capabilities. Non-Arab countries are quite mindful of their own pressures, internal tensions that exist within their ethno-centric communities, and the permanent interests of their non-homogenous populations with widely differing heritage and cultures.

Not surprising in this context, Turkey and Pakistan, two of the strongest and largest members of the coalition, are striving to widen their portfolio of economic opportunities — the former in Central Asian republics and the latter with Beijing by establishing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

While Saudi Arabia and Iran remain at loggerheads over what Riyadh sees as Tehran’s efforts to tighten its grip on the Middle East, there is growing frustration among the public in non-Arab countries for taking sides in any internecine conflicts of the region.

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Growing up in Lahore in the 1960s and 1970s, there were hardly any organized attacks on public institutions as we now see in present-day .��Sure, we heard about the atrocities committed by both sides in the India-Pakistan partition of 1947; we were informed of the occasional political assassinations (Liaquat Ali Khan); we learned about the military crackdown on the anti-Ahmadiyya riots of 1953; we actively participated in student demonstrations against the dictatorial regime of Ayub Khan; and we expressed collective disgust at the flip-flop shenanigans in the era of the senior Bhutto.

By and large, however, Lahore was a lively place embodying religious harmony and rule of law—though the British always denied “access to justice.”��There was a Christian chief justice of the Supreme Court.��Ahmadis held high positions in the bureaucracy.��Atheist poets and thinkers congregated at smoke-filled cafes.��Missionary schools abounded.��And the horse-driven carriages had to be registered with the municipality.

Further, the Pakistan People’s Party, founded in 1967 by former members of the long-defunct Communist Party, had presented a counter-narrative to the notion that sovereignty belongs to God when it explicitly stated in its manifesto: “Islam is our religion, socialism is our economy, and democracy our polity; all power belongs to the people.”

Come the end of the 1970s, things changed in Pakistan’s political landscape.

Monster Unleashed

I vividly recall listening to the radio address by General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq the night of the military coup on July 5, 1977, that “the salvation of Pakistan lies in Islam.”

This did not turn out to be an innocuously pious statement, but the harbinger of partisan politics, rise of intolerance, and an overnight shift in favor of fervent Sunni fundamentalism—pervasive among the to-be-sponsored jihadis fighting in Afghanistan; to recruits in public service especially the custodians of law and order, including the military; and brainwashed students coming from madrasas and spreading across the educational institutions.

Once the vociferous monster was unleashed, there was no turning back.

Money began pouring in from and the Gulf countries, which felt threatened by the overthrow of the shah monarchy in the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

As a result, Pakistan was transformed into a Saudi replica of fundamentalist-oriented decrees and ordinances (public floggings and stricter blasphemy laws); connotations and salutations (common use of Allah hafiz instead of khuda hafiz); and code of public moral behavior (hadood laws and the head-covered TV anchorwomen). Even the Pakistani passport carried an Arabic translation in its title.

Spreading the wings of victory, only three countries recognized the rule of (1996-2001): Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.��The foreign-financed domestic version of the Taliban grouped themselves into Lashkar-e-Changi (Jet), Tarik-Taliban-Pakistan (TTP) and the Sipah-Sahaba of Islam (SSI), among various shades of “freedom-fighters” planning to liberate Chechnya, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kashmir.

Challenging the writ of the state was to become the norm—from the illegal construction of the Lal Masjid in Islamabad to vicious attacks on the visiting Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore to the break-ins of police training academies.

In many ways, 9/11 and the ensuing Global War on Terror became a bonanza in Pakistan for vested interests ranging from security officials and talk-show politicos to the liberal elite engaging in doublespeak against and condemning the Western occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Consequently, hate speech, abuse of public fora and media by the clergy, and the display of official lethargy in public mourning were to culminate in the blatant murder of a former Punjab governor.��The culprit is still awaiting his death sentence while being hailed as a ghazi (war hero) by the unofficial establishment.

Let this be a test case for Pakistan’s seriousness on the War on Terror and the maintenance of order.�� Until then, Pakistan will continue with a spate of mass and innocent killings as seen at the Army Public School in 2014 and now at the Bacha Khan University in 2016.

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Aitzaz Ahsan, a prominent member of ’s opposition, once : “We [Pakistan] are, and very much remain, a South Asian Muslim country: sharing aspirations and history with India—due process, habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari. We are not a Middle Eastern Arab Muslim country.”

Such words have some bearing on the April 10 resolution— by the Pakistani parliament and endorsed by Prime Minister —to avoid taking sides in the Yemeni conflict.

For all intents and purposes, it appears highly unlikely that Pakistan’s army will enter the fray in . Pakistan’s somewhat neutral position vis-à-vis the Yemeni crisis has confounded “Pakistani watchers” in the West. Islamabad’s stance is understood as a means of Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia and neighboring Iran, while countering the risk of heightening sectarian tension, given the staunch opposition to Riyadh’s war in Yemen on the part of Pakistan’s Shiite minority and the government’s efforts to combat terrorism. In its more blatant interpretations, the Pakistani government’s position is viewed as a betrayal, given Islamabad’s on Saudi Arabia and other (GCC) members for economic and energy .

Nonetheless, many analysts and commentators who are surprised by the Pakistani parliament’s resolution ignore Pakistan’s historical ties with non-Arab Muslim countries—most notably Iran and Turkey—that transcend (or at least stand on par with) the religious affinity toward the Sunni Arab countries. A reflection on the history of Pakistan’s post-war foreign policy sheds light on Islamabad’s decision to avoid contributing ground troops to the Saudi Arabian-led military campaign in Yemen.

The Baghdad Pact to the OIC

After Pakistan championed pan-Islamic causes for a decade, by 1955, the country’s foreign policy shifted to a more openly pro-Western position in the evolving Cold War. This shift was most underscored by Pakistan’s of the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The Suez crisis of 1956, in which Pakistan was also a member of the Commonwealth, led to the estrangement of Pakistani-Egyptian ties, as well as Pakistan being denied membership within the Afro-Asian Community.

In 1964, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey signed the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), which was a multinational organization at fostering socioeconomic development in each member state. This growing economic and cultural exchange between the three nations persisted until it was weakened by certain developments—Ankara’s aspirations to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1960s, the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 and Iran’s oil boom in the 1970s.

The ascent of Pakistan’s Peoples Party (PPP) in 1971, under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a new Islamic Socialist narrative: “Islam is our Religion; Democracy is our Politics; Socialism is our Economy; Power Lies with the People.” Concerted efforts were thenceforth made to mend fences with the causes espoused by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), beginning with the Lahore Conference in 1974 and culminating in admission to the NAM at the Havana Summit in 1979.

Nonetheless, the interregnum had witnessed increased official cash flows from Saudi Arabia to Islamist parties in Pakistan. Not lost in the equation were increasing remittances from unskilled Pakistani laborers in the Persian Gulf’s Arab monarchies. The first casualty of this growing pressure from the religious parties was the Ahmadiyya community, which after a series of riots was “non-Muslim” in 1974.

Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s military takeover of Pakistan and declaration of martial law in 1977 had a clear ideological bias with support from Muslim fundamentalists. Three subsequent developments contributed to growing Saudi Arabian influence in the upper echelons of Pakistan’s government.

First, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 posed a credible threat to inspire similar Shiite uprisings against the Gulf Arab sheikdoms and their regional surrogates, including Pakistan. Second, the Soviet Union’s invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (1979-89) precipitated the nurturing of the mujahedeen (the present-day Taliban), in which Riyadh played a pivotal role as a political, moral and financial backer. Third, the transformation of rural mosques into Islamic educational institutions (madrasas) heralded an era of brainwashed street power and produced an army of “freedom fighters” who operated under the banner of Islam. Additionally, the current leadership of Prime Minister Sharif and his personal ties with the House of Saud—having been provided asylum during the ouster of the Sharif family by the military government of Gen. Pervez Musharraf from 1999 to 2008—further emboldened Riyadh’s influence in Pakistan.

Pakistan and Yemen: The Arab Sheikdoms to China and Central Asia

The resolution passed by the Pakistani parliament indeed sends a message to the Saudi Arabian leadership that Islamabad has other priorities on the international stage and must contend with unmet economic challenges. This shift in Pakistani priorities was underscored by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan, which came on the heels of the Yemen resolution’s passage in the Pakistani parliament.

The purpose of Xi’s visit was to deliver an of $46 billion in an economic corridor that will stretch from western China to the Persian Gulf. In turn, Pakistan promised China 10,000 troops commanded by a two star general—half of them coming from Pakistan’s elite force (aka the “Special Services Group”). The force, which will have its own air support, will be for protecting Chinese workers in Pakistan.

Also, on April 22, Pakistani and Iranian officials met in Tehran, where the seventh Pakistan-Iran Joint Committee meeting was held, with both countries to increase bilateral trade to $5 billion over five years. Part of the deal Islamabad arranging the construction of a gas pipeline connecting the port of Gwadar to Iran. On April 7, when Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif visited Islamabad to discuss the Yemen crisis, Prime Minister Sharif on the Islamic Republic to contribute to efforts aimed at bringing the various Yemeni factions to the negotiating table.

Today, Pakistan stands at the crossroads of defining its identity and clarifying its priorities on the international stage. Not facetiously, nearly half of the nation’s population perpetrates terrorism while the other half is victimized by it. Practically anyone who does not practice Sunni Islam, which includes one-quarter of all Pakistanis, is considered an “infidel” by the Saudi Arabian-inspired fundamentalists brainwashed in the madrasas. Many Pakistanis term their country as “al-Bakistan,” or a Saudi Arabian colony with the attendant mannerisms and connotations.

It is in this context that there are now belated calls from Pakistan’s intelligentsia, political establishment and civil society for Islamabad to re-cultivate its alliances with Asian powers that date back to the birth of the Indus civilization. From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, such a development undermines the kingdom’s regional clout. Despite Pakistan and Saudi Arabia sharing a “special relationship,” Islamabad is—at least for now—determined to avoid joining Riyadh’s pan-Sunni coalition in Yemen. Rather than sending troops into the Yemen quagmire, Pakistan is sending a message to Saudi Arabia that it is more interested in strengthening ties with other countries—China, Iran, Oman and Turkey—that either outwardly oppose Riyadh’s war in Yemen or have at least avoided backing it.

Indeed, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s endorsement of the parliament’s resolution on Yemen served to remind Islamabad’s GCC partners that Pakistan is a South Asian Muslim power, not an Arab one.

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