Turkey’s Ascension

As a result of the arms embargo imposed on Turkey in 1975 over Cyprus, Ankara initiated an ambitious program of import substitution, which led to the emergence of ASELSAN, a Defense Industries company. Subsequently, new large players emerged, including HAVELSAN (1982), Roketsan (1988), and TAI (2005). Facing multiple security-related threats posed by non-state actors engaging in non-linear war, Turkish armed forces required rapid modernization, including new means of intelligence gathering, recognizance and military operations — UCAVs. Turkey’s first step in this direction was pinned on reliance on imports.

However, the “decade of disappointments” — purchases of American drones in 1996 and Israeli machines in 2006 turned out to be a disaster — prompted Ankara to pursue an import-substitution strategy. In many ways, the adequacy of this move was preordained by the US decision to introduce an export ban on killer drones, which invigorated Turkey and pushed Ankara even harder toward its new strategy. Ultimately, Turkey succeeded. As by the president of ASELSAN Defense Industries, İsmail Demir, “I don’t want to be sarcastic, but I would like to thank [the U.S. government] for any of the projects that was not approved by the U.S. because it forced us to develop our own systems.”

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By 2018, Turkey had achieved visible progress in the realm of UCAVs used by the Turkish armed forces in military operations. Toward the end of 2019, the country reportedly “the world’s second-largest user of lethal drones” and “the first nation to use drones able to find, track, and kill targets without human intervention.” At this point, the Bayraktar TB2 performed its first killing mission in 2016, becoming Turkey’s indigenous armed UAV system.

Between 2016 and 2019, the UCAV was successfully in Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch, Operation Peace Spring as well as in various counterinsurgency operations against the Kurdish rebels in eastern Turkey and northeastern Iraq. However, it was in early 2020 when Turkey reached a new milestone in its use of UCAVs.

The Syrian Polygon

On February 27, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) launched an airstrike on a Turkish military convoy and observatory post near the villages of Balioun and Al‑Barah in southern Idlib, 34 Turkish soldiers. The following day, Turkey retaliated by launching Operation Spring Shield, which, to Turkey’s National Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, led to devastating losses suffered by the SAA: two jets, two drones, eight helicopters, 135 tanks, and five air-defense systems. The Turkish army claimed to have neutralized 2,557 Syrian “regime elements.”

Turkish President Recep Erdogan went on to that 10 Russian Pantsir medium-range surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems were destroyed. The Russian Defense Ministry immediately shrugged off this claim. Although the accurate figure remains a matter of intense debate, the fact that the rapid advance of the SAA was halted and the frontline was stabilized are not debatable points. This brief operation demonstrated three important points. First, Turkey has the intent to test the capabilities of its UCAVs forces in a massive and coordinated manner. Second, Ankara is ready to use killer drones against Syria’s armed forces. Third, the Anka-S UCAV had its military debut. Undoubtedly, heavy losses suffered by the SAA, even though the actual losses might be somewhat lower than claimed by the Turkish side, should be attributed to the use of UCAVs — the Bayraktar TB2 and the Anka-S. Yet various observers and military experts make diverging assessments of this success.

to the director of Security and Defence Studies Program at the EDAM think tank, Can Kasapoglu, Turkey’s use of killer drones became a “tactical game-changer.” A Turkish defense analyst Bahri Mert Demirel has that “for the first time in the world, drones were used as the primary element in air strikes … The use of drones in this manner has put forward a new military doctrine not only in Turkey but also in the world’s literature on warfare.” Another defense analyst, Arda Mevlutoglu, that “Turkey’s use of drones in this operation is unprecedented in modern military history … This provides high precision long-range strikes, enabling Turkey to bypass the Idlib airspace yet managing to inflict heavy casualties to Syrian Arab Army targets.”

Russian military experts maintained a much more critical view. Specifically, they have that Turkish “temporary success” was a tactical victory premised on the element of surprise. Arguably, once the SAA became used to this new reality, Turkish armed forces started UCAVs one after another. Other Russian experts maintained a more balanced viewpoint. Having recognized the imperfection of Turkish drones, it was argued that for the Syrians, “confronting UAVs turned out to be an exceptionally hard task.”

Furthermore, it was that this task would have been far more difficult if Syrian (de-facto Russian) anti-aircraft artillery systems such as Pantsir and/or Buk had faced a swarm attack. Indeed, as by a renowned US drone expert Samuel Bendett, the Turkish side did not carry out a swam attack, whereas the “Russians are yet to deal with sophisticated drone attacks in Syria.”

Western sources acknowledged the undisputed success of Turkish UCAVs, yet underscored some of the drawbacks, which became evident during Operation Spring Shield. The main limitations highlighted in one analysis : armament-related aspects; relatively high, albeit tolerable, level of losses in a short period of time; relatively low cruising speed, rendering Turkish UCAVs (primarily Bayraktar TB2) vulnerable to surface-to-air missiles (SAM); limited operational reach; and virtual absence (concerning both the Anka-S and the Bayraktar) of means of active/passive defense from air-to-air attack or SAMs.

Turkish Drone Industry

In 2018, Erdogan set a strategic goal to be achieved by the Turkish defense industry. By 2023 — the Turkish Republic’s 100^th anniversary — Turkey must the top ten global defense industry exporters. Undoubtedly, UAVs/UCAVs should be among the factors securing this goal, and operations in Syria and Libya are to become the main marketing tool.

In effect, Turkish drones are already acquiring popularity and becoming a sought-after commodity on the global arms market. In 2017, Turkey six Bayraktar TB2s to Qatar, and Indonesia has also expressed interest in acquiring these machines. Subsequently, Ukraine a $69-million contract for another six Bayraktar TB2s. On top of that, Tunisia six Anka-S drones, three ground control stations and an unspecified level of technology transfer — a contract reportedly worth $240 million.

At this juncture, however, one element must be clarified. The effectiveness of Turkish drones may differ depending on the operational environment. For instance, in Tunisia, where drones are to be used against poorly-trained and non-tech savvy local radicals on the open terrain, the Anka-S is expected to be successful. Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the situation could be totally different. Between 2014 and 2019, Russia advanced means of electronic warfare, such as the R-330Zh Zhitel, the Tirada-2, the RB-341В “Leer-3,” the RB-301B “Borisoglebsk-2,” the R-934UM, among others, via Moscow’s proxies. Given the combat-proven effectiveness of these pieces, as well as some of the limitations of Turkish drones exposed during Spring Shield Operation, Turkish UCAVs might be less effective in Ukraine.

Beyond any doubt, the period between 2018 and early 2020 demonstrated how Turkey is becoming a drone (super)power. Further steps will lead toward (partial) elimination of some deficiencies observed in Syria, which will elevate Turkish UCAVs to a qualitatively new level. In military terms, Turkey has demonstrated its ability to successfully conduct high-tech military operations with the use of most up-to-date means of military confrontation.

On the other hand, the successful use of drones has become a symbol of national pride and Turkey’s moral and psychological victory. That said, the results of the recent operation should be critically reviewed by the Turkish side. Seemingly impressive as they are, the victory was primarily secured due to a combination of visible technological superiority, the element of surprise and very limited engagement of the Russian side with its advanced means of electronic warfare. 

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Conversely, the “eastern bloc” is led by a strong and experienced military leader (yet a relatively weak diplomat), Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who is backed by a broad spectrum of military forces, including various tribal factions and mercenaries from Chad and Sudan. Haftar has also received support from a host of Arab states — Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — along with France.

Russia is also an integral part of the Libyan conflict. Nevertheless, Moscow has not openly bet on either player, trying to preserve an equilibrium while playing an “earnest broker” role. To date, Russia’s competitive advantage in the region has fitted what the director general of the Russian International Affairs Council Andrey Kortunov as an ability to “maintain constructive ties with all actors.” In other words, pragmatism — an element that is implicitly maintained in the Foreign Policy Concept approved by Vladimir Putin in November 2016 — shapes Moscow’s Libya policy.

The Libya Policy

That said, the Kremlin’s stance on the situation in Libya now rests on a combination of the following main objectives. First, Russia aims to maintain a balance between all actors, assuming the role of an intermediary/broker. This approach, which is opposed to both Soviet foreign policy practices and the post-2011 Western actions, could secure Russia’s presence in Libya irrespective of who becomes the ultimate winner. Namely, aside from preserving ties with two main parties in the conflict, Moscow is with Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam via reported use of political technologists. Similarly, the Russian side has repeatedly voiced its readiness to use its resources to make Moscow a platform for intra-Libyan negotiations.

Second, Moscow is using the Libyan conflict as a platform for fortifying ties with Egypt and the UAE, thereby alleviating international pressure on Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Third, the Kremlin aims to secure Russia’s future role in the Libyan economy — particularly the hydrocarbon sector, as well as arms sales and large infrastructural projects — and simultaneously precluding other players, especially Italy and France, from doing so. And, finally, Russia is intent on stopping the spread of Islamic radicalism beyond the region.

Despite Moscow’s willingness to maintain an adequate distance between all parties, it appears that ��ܲ�������’s sympathies, at least in the short term, are with Haftar, which is related to both his image and background — against the weakness of his opponents. Saraj is not viewed by Moscow (especially among Russian military circles) as a decisive leader, whereas the reputation of Saif al-Islam, who also lacks sufficient military power, is tainted by international obstruction.

The pro-Haftar sentiments in Russia were profoundly boosted after the commander’s successful campaign in February this year and the seizure of the El Sharara and El Feel oil fields. But the initial excitement and Haftar’s confidence that he could quickly take control of Tripoli were cooled by ensuing difficulties. In response to Haftar’s plea for help — apparently boosted by promises of for Russian companies and businesses in Libya — Moscow reportedly increased the level of technical-material support for the filed marshal’s forces, with private military companies (PMCs) being one of the main elements.

Fact or Fiction?

One of these private outfits, the , which is headed by Oleg Krinitsyn, is known to have since at least 2016. Yet between its first reported appearance in 2016 and new cases in 2019, there has been a big difference. Initially, the RSB Group was primarily involved in non-military missions such as sapper works and protection of infrastructure in the Benghazi area. Now it would be adequate to argue that, in terms of both composition and functions performed, Russian PMCs in Libya have made a dramatic shift toward patterns observed in Ukraine and Syria. Rumors about Russia’s use of PMCs during military missions in Libya appeared in February 2017, after Haftar’s to the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier near the shores of Syria, but were dismissed by Russian officials.

The rumors received more substance after Haftar’s visit to Moscow on November 7, 2018, when his delegation was, among other notable figures, met by — the oligarch behind the notorious Wagner group, a shadow PMC that took part in hostilities in eastern Ukraine and Syria, and is now said to be operating in sub-Saharan Africa. During this visit, the Russian side may have agreed to increase military backing for Haftar, providing necessary technical-material support for the offensive launched in April in an exchange for lucrative concessions for Russian businesses, once success is attained. At that point, however, details about Russian mercenaries fighting in Libya did not go beyond rumors. However, fresh information may help add clarity to the issue.

On September 9, mentions of “seven Russian mercenaries killed in Qaser Bin Ghashir” (in the Tripolitania region in northwestern Libya) for the first time. Later, this was picked up by Bloomberg, which reported the from the Wagner group to fight for Haftar. At this juncture, an based on data from open sources carried out by the Conflict Intelligence Team demonstrated three important aspects. First, it helped to ascertain potential location of Russian mercenaries in Libya: Ajdabiya (capital of the Al Wahat District, in northeastern Libya, controlled by Haftar forces, located 438 miles from the line of direct confrontation) and Asbia (the area of the International Airport in Tripoli, a sight of intense urban fighting).

Second, in terms of logistics and transportation, Russian mercenaries in Syria are using the same pattern as in the Central African Republic — the Ural-4320 off-road 6×6 vehicles, produced in Russia. Third, based on the profiles of the mercenaries, it is possible to ascertain that they are not current members of the Russian armed forces, yet do have vast fighting experience from previous military campaigns.

Russian Casualties

An investigation carried out by brought to light other important details. Based on information from an unnamed source close to the FSB and the Russian PMC industry, the actual number of mercenary casualties may have reached 35 militants coming from Krasnodar (where the Molkino military polygon serves as a training ground for the Wagner group), Sverdlovsk and Murmansk regions. The source claimed that Russia’s interests in Libya “are solely concerned with the oil,” whereas members of the Wagner group are involved in a broad spectrum of operations ranging from non-military (rendering physical security to logistical flaws and critical infrastructure) to para-military (surveillance and intelligence gathering) and military (actual participation in fighting) operations.

According to Meduza, the recent attack caused casualties among the Rusich group, with one of Wagner’s commanders, Alexander Kuznetsov, severely wounded; he has now been to St. Petersburg. This points to the fact that Russia employs Wagner veterans in Libya, meaning experienced fighters and its most valuable cadre.

Now, with the presence of Russian mercenaries in Libya established, it might seem that Moscow has made a shift from subtle — primarily economic and diplomatic — to direct support for Haftar in his push for the ultimate victory. This impression may, however, not be fully accurate. In effect, one could not be sure that a complete victory for Haftar is what Russia wants. While watching other parties blunder in Libya, Moscow will probably not willingly dispose of its competitive advantage by allying itself with one party and breaking up with the other players in the conflict.

First, it seems obvious that in Ankara, which considers Libya a matter of national security, the ire with ��ܲ�������’s actions in Syria and Libya is . Therefore, by taking one side, Russia might get into a confrontation with other stakeholders involved in the Libyan conflict, which would signify a departure from policies that have secured a visible share of success in ��ܲ�������’s post-2015 policies in the Middle East.

Second, it is not at all apparent — and Russia is well aware of that — that the “Syrian model” will work in Libya. In other words, Haftar’s victory is unlikely to automatically put him under Moscow’s direct control. As political scientist , both Russia and Haftar realize that they could not fully rely on each other in the long run. While maintaining an ad hoc alliance with Haftar, now fortified by Russian mercenaries from the Wagner group, the Russian side is unlikely to fully break up with other forces comprising the Libyan political landscape.

Libya’s status quo temporarily serves Russian regional objectives. On the one hand, Russia is interested in acquiring a major stake in the Libyan economy, which could be done through Haftar’s decisive success. On the other, given the number of stakeholders in the conflict, Moscow realizes that achieving unilateral control in Libya by a single player is utterly unrealistic under current circumstances.

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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