Despite his jabbing of metropolitan elitists, US President Donald Trump has cultivated praise from some over his handling of North Korea.��Ban Ki-moon, the former UN secretary-general, applauded the president’s strong words, deeming them in line with, not against, the international community’s stance toward the Hermit Kingdom.��Meanwhile, , told The Washington Post that the Trump doctrine of peace through strength “just might work.”

Some experts are now pointing out the tangible results from the administration’s more forceful approach compared with past presidents.��Speaking with��51�Թ�, Greg Scarlatoiu, executive director of the , said: “President Trump’s strategy is working. The USA can no longer be taken for granted as utterly predictable.”

After the Kim Jong-un regime reopened a hotline to Seoul on January 3, and will send its athletes to the Winter Olympics taking place in Pyeongchang, South Korea, in February.

The agreement represents a symbolic breakthrough after months of growing tensions over North Korea’s rapidly advancing nuclear program and diminishes the threat of a Kim-shaped headache during the games.��What’s more, Trump deserves kudos for nudging China, the North’s sole ally, into taking a tougher stance in the form of sanctions, thus hitting the country where it hurts. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the reopening of talks was a direct result of revived American coercion toward North Korea.��

The North may actually be taking a peace offensive in order to buy time. It knows the South Korean government wants the Winter Olympics to go off without a hitch and undoubtedly will expect returns for its goodwill gesture.��The regime is likely to present a tall order of demands for the South, according to Scarlatoiu, including the suspension of combined exercises with the United States, the end of sanctions and a demand for more aid. Failing that, the South can expect a closing Olympic ceremony fireworks show of missile launches and more nuclear tests.

Neither is there evidence to suggest that the Trump administration is any closer to its goal of stopping North Korea’s nuclear program.��Despite Trump’s threats of “fire and fury,” the North has soldiered on. In September 2017, the North conducted a nuclear test in the face of repeated , who told the global media that the US “will handle” the situation.��Following this, Kim tested a ballistic missile capable of striking the US mainland just a few months later.

While making the US more unpredictable has kept the North Korean regime on its toes, brinkmanship has not diminished the two inconvenient truths of the nuclear crisis. Firstly, the regime will never give up its quest for nuclear weapons because it sees those weapons as the only means of survival and increasingly as a��raison d’être. Secondly, there is no real military solution without the loss of millions of lives on the Korean Peninsula. Even a limited attack on the North’s nuclear facilities could be misinterpreted as an all-out attack on the country.

Defense analysts have emphasized the ��that can direct sustained artillery fire and rocket barrages up to 300,000 rounds an hour to South Korea’s capital.��Trump knows this, and it shows what his threats truly are: Twitter bluffs.

These two facts make it impossible to achieve a Korean Peninsula free of both nuclear weapons and nuclear devastation. The Trump administration, therefore, is right to encourage the two Koreas to hold talks, which is better placed to building peace in the region��— a more achievable goal. The trouble with empty threats, in contrast, is that they may be taken seriously and cause severe miscalculation. While Donald Trump’s brinkmanship rhetoric has certainly made gains, one wonders if an approach without the dangerous bluster might have produced the same results.

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Breaking with what had been a��, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warned on March 17 that the Trump administration might be forced to����“if [North Korea] elevate[s] the threat of their weapons program” to an unacceptable level.

He ruled out any more negotiations with the Hermit Kingdom to freeze its nuclear and missile programs, and declared:��“The policy of strategic patience has ended.”

It is hard to imagine the increasingly paranoid North Korea shrugging off such a statement. Indeed, these are not words to be snuffed at. Tillerson’s warning represents the toughest stance against North Korea that a US administration has taken in decades. The quiet American’s words may serve as a spark��to dramatic and devastating change upon��the Korean Peninsula.

METHOD IN THE MADNESS

Probably by calculation, Tillerson’s statement is vague. It is unclear where the Trump administration may draw the line in regard to Pyongyang’s weapons program, but that’s likely the point: to deter any further progress or to give the United States a chance to strike without warning.

Besides, drawing a line will not matter. Since coming to power in 2011, North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong-un has shown no tendency toward compromise on the issue.����have often concluded that the north maintains and expands its nuclear program for the country’s very survival.

Though not without risk, an arsenal of nuclear weapons prevents the threat of invasion. So wherever a line is drawn, Kim is sure to ignore it. For the regime, a North Korea without nuclear weapons would mean no North Korea at all.

Neither did the secretary of state clarify whether preemptive action would be limited to destabilizing the north’s nuclear facilities or committing to a full-scale assault with the aim of regime change.

Again, it may not matter. Even a limited strike would take the region down a path not seen since the Korean War.

If the regime survives a preemptive strike, the retaliation will be devastating for the peninsula. Just 35 miles from the border that separates the two Koreas, Seoul is within a path of destruction. Japan, an old imperialist foe of North Korea, may also find itself within the regime’s crosshairs. Sensing an inevitable death, it is unthinkable what vengeance the Kim regime may unleash in its dying days.

If Tillerson really prefers action over strategic patience, then it is of utmost importance that the Trump administration should have a plan to limit the damage. Neither can the administration continue down its unilateral path. North Korea’s nuclear facilities must be destroyed immediately and Pyongyang brought down with limited civilian casualties. And the US must cooperate with South Korea to best protect its population. China and Japan, too, will need to prepare for a conflict that could spillover beyond the peninsula.

Even in a better turn of events, cooperation and caution is everything.��If a limited attack quickly brings down an already unstable Kim dynasty, the US, South Korea and China will have to confront an exodus of North Korean refugees pouring over the borders. And then there is the question of North Korea’s future as a nation state.

Of course, world events seldom take such an optimistic path. Great upheaval, even for the better, comes at great costs.

And����to infuriating��a , the Trump administration has tended to lurch from one foreign policy mishap to another. This is a cause of��great concern. For the sake of millions of lives, a crisis on the Korean Peninsula is a test the administration must get right.

It is now North Korea’s turn to respond to the US government’s new stance. But Tillerson needs to be several steps ahead.

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Presidential transitions are seldom flawless affairs. Yet, by all accounts, Donald J. Trump’s has been a mess. Trump has not taken to the role of president-elect well, either acting as if the campaign trail is not yet over,�� or, more confusingly, acting as if he were��already president.��His premature grasp of power has caused ripples not just in , but also beyond American shores in the Asia Pacific.

China has responded angrily to his proposal that the United States may change its policy toward Taiwan—which Beijing considers a breakaway province—resulting in the . And understanding the impact of his tweets, South Korea has already appointed a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official to . As far as messy transitions go, it is as if America has two presidents at the same time. ��

And when there is just one president, what will his grand strategy toward the Asia Pacific look like? Crucially, will the pivot to Asia—a quintessential part of President Barack Obama’s foreign policy—survive a Trump administration? ��

Scope for Success and Failure

As US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan winded down in 2011, the Obama administration sought to rebalance American interests away from the troublesome Middle East and toward the Asia Pacific. Home to almost half the world’s population and a sophisticated US military presence, the region presented America with a sphere of influence with��potential for expansion and a huge scope for success.

While trade policies played a significant part in the pivot, at the heart of the policy was a desire to strengthen military ties with old allies like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and foster new ones with smaller nations like Vietnam and Myanmar— coincidentally, all nations that found China’s new confidence threatening.

Here, the Obama administration made huge successes. In 2013, welcomed the US to play a larger military role in the region. Three years later, the American president fully lifted an arms embargo on��Vietnam. And Obama and Hillary Clinton, who served as his first secretary of state, can also , thus bringing it closer to the US.

Strategically, the pivot also meant using these newly-bolstered relationships to maintain peace and security across the region; in other words, countering China’s assertiveness by defending the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and taking preventive measures against North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. In this regard, the failings of the pivot become clearer.

China’s increasing dominance in the South China Sea since the turn of the decade has led one influential think tank to conclude that the contested region would . Beijing’s continued development of aircraft carrier groups and the creation of artificial islands for military purposes placed the Middle Kingdom at a much more powerful position than before Obama took office in 2009.

The failure of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to amount a unified opposition, coupled with continued quarrelling between South Korea and Japan, will��do little change China’s trajectory of power.

Neither has the pivot led to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. After testing atomic weapons��in 2009 and 2013, North Korea detonated a hydrogen bomb last year. The US imposed more sanctions but has been unable to persuade the Hermit Kingdom’s main ally, China, to cease propping up the regime.

But trying to measure the successes and failures of the pivot at the present time is shortsighted. President��Obama’s policies in the Asia Pacific were (characteristic of him) focused on the long term. The pivot, after all, would provide the starting point for “,”��as Secretary Clinton wrote in 2011.

Retaining Stability

President��Obama’s tenure in Asia has been about retaining stability, which he has largely succeeded at, if at the expense of American influence. Donald��Trump has never shown himself to be so long-sighted. Not one for detail, the president-elect has only made general statements about his policy for the Asia Pacific. The pivot to Asia will likely stall.

The relationships strengthened by Obama may be halted by the new president, for example. On the campaign trail, Trump recommended that US allies in East Asia like Japan and South Korea and rely less on American military power.

He has called ��a��“maniac” and seems concerned over North Korea’s nuclear program. Yet if South Korea were to mirror its northern adversary and begin its own weapons program, a nuclear arms race is inevitable. That’s uncharted territory, even for a region that spent much of the��20^th��century in violent struggle with itself.

Adding to the uncertainty, relations with China could seldom be off to a worst start. Bringing Taiwan into the limelight, Trump has threatened to put the —whatever that means. Will a Trump administration cease to protect Taiwan from Chinese aggression if the price was right? Or will the US officially recognize Taiwan again? It might not matter. Either option could set China and Taiwan down a dangerous and unpredictable path.

And prompting further Chinese outrage, :��“We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands is also not going to be allowed,” taking a more assertive tone than any previous secretary of state since the Cold War.

It is hard to predict how the spat between Beijing and a Trump administration may spiral. Indeed, the incoming team is��without a grand strategy—especially if it��chooses to do away with the pivot to Asia.

In fact, Trump has shown little inclination to preserve US interests in the region. His disagreement��with China is not over stability, but supposedly stolen American jobs. If Trump is simply seeking better economic terms with China and is willing to , the South China Sea could become a Chinese lake sooner than expected.

The pivot to Asia may have had more shortcomings than successes, but as the region heats up in preparation for a Trump administration, Obama’s subtle touch will be sorely missed.

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Despite all the anti-Chinese remarks he made, Donald Trump was a ��during the presidential campaign. The former reality TV star drew his support from Chinese netizens either privately sharing his loathing for self-serving elitists (China has plenty of them) or excited by the prospects of the oafish Trump speeding up American decline and Chinese ascendency.

These fans were in for a nasty shock when the president-elect tweeted that he had��—a figure of contempt for Chinese nationalists. The deceptively innocent exchange marked the first time in almost four decades that an American president (or soon to be president) had openly communicated with a leader of the island-state.

To make matters worse, Trump referred to Tsai on equal terms as president, thus directly contradicting the Beijing-invented narrative of Taiwan as a breakaway province from the Chinese mainland, rather than a de facto independent state with its own leader.

One China Policy

Days later, he��, making the assertion that��the United States was not necessarily bound to such an agreement. Under this policy, both Taipei and Beijing make claim to the title of China (Taiwan is officially the Republic of China), but agree that there is only “one China”—in an abstract sense if not a unified nation-state.

Beyond the relationship of the two Chinas, the policy means that no country can hold official relations with both the governments of Taipei and Beijing. For its part, the US gives diplomatic recognition to Beijing but still retains unofficial ties with Taipei.

If Trump steers US policy to treating Taiwan more like an independent state, it undermines the One China principle and by extension the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) decades-old claim to the island. Feeling its sovereign right over Taipei under threat, Beijing will retaliate.

In fact, on December 15, China captured a US Navy drone, possibly to send Trump a warning message and flex its muscles in the South China Sea. Even before stepping into office, Trump has shown his potential to damage stability in East Asia.

Which makes the threats posed after Trump enters the White House all the more serious. If he chooses to further provoke China after his inauguration in January 2017, it��could easily lead to a cycle of escalation in an already volatile region. Besides Taiwan, much of East and Southeast Asia (backed by the US) hold competing claims to territory with China.

It’s not clear whether Trump’s phone call with Tsai was an intentional plot to undermine Beijing or a result of his ignorance to the sensitivities within East Asian international politics. Given that he is��, it was likely the latter.��What kind of diplomatic crisis might he fall into next when dealing with, say,��?

Deal or no deal

Trump should take a step back before nearing the brink with China. Besides, this diplomatic faux-pas should not be interpreted as a sign of his��suddenly principled approach to world politics. Trump is right to stand up for Taiwan. But he is likely��doing so for the wrong reasons.

Unlike his predecessors, Trump has shown little concern about US-led stability or democracy in the region. Rather, the protectionist president-elect��wants to cut a deal with China over trade for the security of white-collar American jobs. In his , Trump said:��“I don’t know why we have to be bound by a ‘one China policy’ unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things, including trade.”

Foreign policy is, of course, about making deals—a skill that Trump likes to remind people he excels at. But US policy needs to be underpinned by principles and a great strategy in order to work. Simply making deals risks reducing allies like Taiwan down to bargaining chips that can be tossed away when the price is right.

It is especially concerning when considering that no deal can be struck with China in Taiwan’s favor. Beijing does not consider Taiwan’s status up for negotiation—unless the outcome is bringing Taipei under CCP rule.

That would give Trump’s Chinese fans something to cheer about.

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It was pretty humorless as diplomatic gaffes go. After touching down in China for the G20 Summit, US President Barack Obama was not provided a staircase—or the accompanying red carpet—that other world leaders were welcomed with upon arrival.

Instead, the president was forced to leave from the rear exit, or as one China expert put it, from the��“.”��American journalists also complained of China’s security forces����to prevent foreign media from watching President Obama embark.

The awkwardness soon boiled into overt hostility as Chinese officials were caught yelling, “This is our country! This is our airport!” at their US counterparts who tried to fix the situation.

Why Do Diplomatic Gaffes Matter?

Does the incident matter? Yes. While the lion’s share of diplomacy is carried out in smoky rooms behind closed doors, it is also about the calculated use of symbols, rituals and ceremonies. The welcoming of a foreign guest is one of the many occasions that require a smooth undertaking. Unlike what goes on in smoky rooms, it will be viewed by millions of people.

The cosmetic side of diplomacy matters because states like to objectify their intentions through symbols and public interactions. Most usefully, it regulates the environment for world leaders participating in diplomatic practice, usually seeking to motivate or encourage them toward a preferred direction. An adversarial is likely to become more agreeable after a generous state banquet. It also allows audiences—local and abroad—to grasp the meaning of international affairs.

Few other states understand the importance of symbolism in statecraft more than China. Consider the disastrous attempt of the Macartney Mission in 1793 to establish diplomatic ties between Britain and China. The emperor refused all of Britain’s proposals after the chief British diplomat, George Macartney, refused to kowtow to his Chinese counterparts.

A happier anecdote came��. Upon realizing their airports lacked an air stair large enough for the American statesman’s Boeing 707—Chinese pilots were still using old Soviet aircraft—Chinese officials had a special stairway hastily built. Even secret meetings demanded protocol. Thus, the embarrassing prospect of Kissinger being unable to leave his plane was avoided. How times have changed.

China’s Image to the World

So far, there is no proof to suggest that Obama’s disorderly arrival was a bizarre stunt designed to undermine the US president. But there is undoubtedly some symbolism behind it. Jorge Guajardo, Mexico’s former ambassador to China, told����he was convinced Obama’s treatment was part of a calculated snub, as a result of “Chinese arrogance.”

“It’s part of stirring up Chinese nationalism. It’s part of saying: ‘China stands up to the superpower.’ It works very well with the local audience,” Guajardo said.

It would not be the first time China has tried to make itself look big on the international stage. When President Xi Jinping met Obama in Beijing during��the , the Chinese leader stood on the right with his open hand on show to photographers. The US president was required to approach him, as if paying tribute, from the left.

Indeed, a simple image search of “Xi Jinping handshake” finds a great majority of photos using the exact same positioning: Xi on the right, receiving the handshake of an approaching foreign leader. It is a subtle expression of power, and a symbol that allows the Chinese audience to visualize international affairs in Beijing’s favor.

Whether intentional or not, the airport episode will make the US look diminished to Chinese audiences. A Chinese official was quick to point the finger at the Americans themselves, citing that the US side “complained that the driver [of the staircase] doesn’t speak English and can’t understand security instructions” before refusing the staircase outright. State-owned media—usually unabashedly nationalist in these situations—.

The appearances were enough. The damage was already done.

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Often feeling insecure from Western-induced barbs, the Chinese Community Party (CCP) is taking its turn for viewing the other side from a pedestal. The rise of Donald Trump and Brexit have allowed the CCP a renewed sense of confidence, given that these two phenomena demonstrate the fallbacks of liberal democracy—and, by default, the success of China’s one-party state.

, a state-owned newspaper, wrote that the rise of Trump opened a “Pandora’s box,” after which the “US faces the prospect of an institutional failure.” Comparing Trump to fascists of the 1930s, the party mouthpiece reminded readers that “Mussolini and Hitler came to power through elections, a heavy lesson for Western democracy.”

And then there is Brexit: the victory of an inward-looking, Little England mindset. Though Beijing will regret the loss of its best ally in Europe, the disastrous impact of Brexit on the British economy—as well as the exposure of exaggerations and lies from the Vote Leave camp—adds to China’s argument that Western-liberal democracy is inefficient and destructive.

Beijing’s case for a one-party state is, of course, self-serving. Since China began getting rich in the 1980s, the CCP sought to legitimize its rule through its economic successes. Now the economy is faltering, the party will inevitably seek other sources of legitimacy. One of these is the failure of Western democracy to prevent self-destructive and nationalist leaders coming to power. Paradoxically, the other source of legitimacy is its own Chinese nationalism.

China’s criticism of liberal democracy is more a finger-wagging exercise against nationalist forces that inevitably arise within liberal frameworks. But China, too, is guilty of exploiting and encouraging these forces. China calls out nationalism elsewhere but actively fosters its own.

The Hague Ruling

To distract ordinary Chinese from the economic slowdown, the party has diverted their attention to the South China Sea. Based on , it uses a “nine-dash line” to mark its territory and seeks to control 90% of the South China Sea, including its encompassing strategic islets and reefs. Chinese state media has aggressively pursued a campaign to reiterate these claims to the population.

On July 12, an international tribunal in The Hague ruled in favor of claims by the Philippines over control of disputed waters in the South China Sea, which Chinese state-owned media were quick to . China’s state news agency, Xinhua, said that “as the panel has no jurisdiction, its decision is naturally null and void.”

, too, joined the nationalist chorus by hastily posting a map of China and the “nine-dash line” on Chinese social media using a viral hashtag that roughly translates to “China, not a single part can be taken out.” It is reasonable to believe some of these celebrities may have been coerced by the government, given that others have seen their .

When asking ordinary Chinese about the ruling, this author found they were likely to reiterate the party line.

“The South China Sea is China’s inseparable territory. Every fish is China’s,” said Liu Lijuan, a journalism student from Tianjin.

Some took an uglier nationalist approach. Lu Miyuan, a nurse from Hebei province, threatened: “If the Philippines claims the South China Sea, then China will claim the Philippines.”

By using nationalism, Beijing is, to use the Chinese idiom, riding a tiger and unable to get off. The use of nationalism may help prop up the CCP in the short term, but the party will find itself unable to quell the increasingly hostile sentiments of its citizenry.

Just like how Brexiters made unrealistic claims about a life outside the European Union, Beijing may disappoint the nationalist forces on which it is riding. If the Chinese government cannot secure territory and meet its citizens’ unrealistic nationalist aspirations, the CCP will lose a source of legitimacy. The people may turn against it.

And beyond the South China Sea, China is having other territorial problems, again thanks to its heavy handedness. Relations with Taiwan—which is included in China’s territorial claims but enjoys de-facto independence—are , with Taiwan showing no appetite to rejoin the mainland. , unthinkable before Xi Jinping’s premiership, are growing. The supposedly autonomous region of Xinjiang is descending into civil war, and .

It is unlikely that China will not be able to secure all these territorial claims and calm nationalist sentiment. Warning against the rise of Trump, : “The US had better watch itself for not being a source of destructive forces against world peace, more than pointing fingers at other countries for their so-called nationalism and tyranny.”

Perhaps China should take its own advice.

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The news cycle around ’s actions has become all too predictable. Its rocket launches and bomb tests tend to lead to a round of condemnation but little action from the usual voices. As of last week, the cycle repeated itself once more.

On January 6, the it had detonated a hydrogen bomb, the fourth test since 2006. Although experts are skeptical that it was in fact a hydrogen bomb, a chorus of criticism from the United States, Japan, South Korea and China sounded out. The key players in the region each have reason for choosing words over action.

US President Barack Obama cannot divert from his policy of “strategic patience” without a real act of provocation. If the Kim dynasty was to be removed by force, it would not go down without South Korea suffering devastating retaliation. Seoul, the South Korean capital, is just 50 kilometers from the demilitarized zone that separates the two Koreas. While Obama is in charge, the US will continue to play the waiting game.

South Korea, for its part, has resumed propaganda in the shape of through loudspeakers that can be heard 20 kilometers into North Korea. Yet while South Korea is committed in principle to reunification, many within the country fear the outcome of such a victory, other than the potential damage expressed above. Even if the Kim dynasty were to collapse from within, a huge refugee crisis and a bill for reunification that could cost over $500 billion would result.

, the most crucial player, has stressed its commitment to a de-nuclearized Korean Peninsula. Most of North Korea’s food and money comes from China, and its ability to trade nuclear weaponry and secrets over the border could not be possible without a green light from the Chinese. While China is believed to have the most power over the rogue state, Pyongyang’s possession of nuclear weapons demonstrates how little influence Beijing really has.

Yet this is not to say that there will no implications for the region. While the tests are damaging for stability and peace in East Asia, they are also bringing enemies together in response.

Keep Your Friends Close, But Your Enemies Closer

South Korea and Japan will “.” Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told reporters: “We agreed that the provocative act by North Korea is unacceptable … We will deal with this situation in a firm manner through the cooperation with the United Nations Security Council.”

This is a remarkable statement given that South Korea and Japan have been reluctant allies since the end of World War II. It marked a further warming of relations between the East Asian nations, coming just over a week since the over the “comfort women” issue that had previously caused a huge strain in relations between the two countries.

Pyongyang can no longer rely on resentment between the key players in the region. The tests, whether real or not, show a North Korea running out of friends and options.

Although it might not mean much for Sino-Japanese relations, the nuclear crisis at least draws attention away from tensions over disputed islands in the South China Sea, which China calls the Diaoyu and Japan the Senaku. While Tokyo fears a rising Beijing, a nuclear-armed North Korea poses a more immediate threat. As a consequence of the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan is the oldest enemy of the nationalist Kim dynasty.

There have even been calls for the US to cooperate closer with China over the North Korea issue. While it remains to be seen how China will respond, US Secretary of State John Kerry called for China to “” with the rogue state.

Further afield, while Iran and North Korea are still partners, the nuclear deal struck between the P5+1 and Tehran in 2015 no doubt left North Korea feeling further isolated. Iranian officials were present during North Korea’s three previous nuclear tests—, but not 2016. Furthermore, while Pyongyang’s desire for nuclear weapons is for survival, it also holds tests to , as it has done for years. Now that Iran has given up its nuclear ambitions, North Korea has lost a loyal customer.

Indeed, perhaps it is this isolation from its partners in Iran and China that has led to North Korea continuing its quest to become a nuclear power as a means for survival as a state.

It would be near impossible for America to repeat the success of the Iran nuclear framework. Neither North Korea nor the US can be easily brought to the negotiating table. While Iran had sometimes been diplomatic in the past—for example, offering to help the US fight terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11—North Korea’s diplomacy has never been as sophisticated.

Pyongyang can no longer rely on resentment between the key players in the region. The tests, whether real or not, show a North Korea running out of friends and options.

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The Nanjing Massacre. “Comfort women.” Did the Chinese communist forces beat imperial Japan or the nationalists? And who really owns the islands known in Japan as Senkaku and in China as Diaoyu?

Yet if there is one thing that , and can agree on, it’s that history is a powerful tool that can be used to manipulate their own respective populations.

History is a sensitive subject in East Asia. It is little wonder, then, that Seoul erupted into protest on November 14 over the decision by the government of President Park Guen-hye to make drastic revisions to how history is taught in South Korea’s schools. Tens of thousands of demonstrators marched through the streets of downtown Seoul after the announcement that South Korea’s history textbooks would be replaced with a that all high schools will use��from 2017.

It is not the first time South Korea has imposed a single state-approved textbook in schools. President Park’s father, Park Chung-hee, issued history manuals in 1974, and these remained in place until 30 years later, when private publishers were finally allowed to print their own history books, ending the state’s monopoly on the teaching of history. Currently, schools can choose from eight different state-approved textbooks.

Of these eight textbooks, conservatives in the government only endorse one as appropriate for teaching purposes. Yet it was criticized for overlooking many episodes of state-sponsored violence in South Korea’s recent history, and for championing the controversial 1961 coup that brought President Park Chung-hee to power. Published in 2013, this book was rejected by schools. Unsatisfied by this shunning, conservatives have decided to ditch the eight-book system and impose a single state-sanctioned textbook.

The aim of this new policy is to correct a “pro-North Korea bias,” with proponents such as Education Minister Hwang Woo-Yea claiming,��“.”��Critics of the decision are calling it a��, as it will continue to overlook the atrocities of authoritarian governments of pre-democratic South Korea. In the 2013 book, there is no mention of, for example, the Geochang Massacre of 1951 in which 719 unarmed civilians perished. Photos of the first North-South Korea summit have also been removed, which speaks volumes about the current government’s attitude toward reconciliation with North Korea.

The Park government is also attempting to stifle debate on the legacy of the president’s father, who while modernizing South Korea also presided over serious human rights abuses. Awkwardly, while Korean nationalism is based on opposition to Japan, the elder Park was a Korean collaborator with imperial Japan, serving as an officer in the Japanese colonial government of Manchukuo (now present-day Northeast China).

Japanese soldiers in Nanking, China, 1937

By reverting back to issuing a single textbook, it makes South Korea the latest East Asian country to meddle with its own history for political purposes.

The History That Bends…

Japan has long been guilty of ensuring a national amnesia of its history. It is a common complaint outside Japan that the Japanese education system simply does not cover enough of World War II and Japan’s attempts at establishing its dominance in Asia during that time. Mariko Oi, a BBC journalist,��recalls how the —an atrocity in which between 40,000 to 300,000 Chinese civilians and soldiers were systematically raped, tortured and murdered—was reduced to a footnote in her school history book.

Outside the classroom, an atmosphere of intimidation in Japan is mostly to blame for the muting of open discussion over the country’s dark past. To criticize the Sino-Japanese War could prove to be career-threatening and even life-threatening in Japan. In 1990, a gunman almost fatally shot Motoshima Hitoshi, mayor of Nagasaki, for saying that Emperor Hirohito bore some responsibility for World War II.

Perhaps most damaging is the manipulation of history at the top of Japanese society. In August, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s����was more sympathetic to the soldiers of imperial Japan, casting them as only following orders from their emperor. “Comfort women” were not mentioned in name, but only referenced in a single sentence as “women … whose honor and dignity were severely injured.” There was no mention of the Nanjing Massacre. Little wonder, then, that both China and South Korea regarded this apology as��“” and “not living up to expectations.”

At its worse, in his statement, Abe appeared to attempt mitigating or even seeking legitimacy for Japan’s past acts of aggression and war crimes. Claiming that “the peace we enjoy today exists only upon such precious sacrifices,” he suggested that the atrocities imposed on East and Southeast Asia by imperial Japan somehow led to peace in the region. It fits in with the Japanese far-right’s version of history in flowery rhetoric: Japan as the liberator rather than colonizer, as the victim and not the aggressor.

The issue of Japan’s past has always been fresh in the minds of Chinese and Korean leaders since Abe’s visit to the controversial Yusukuni Shrine in 2013. Abe visited the site to pay respects despite a chorus of Korean, Chinese and Taiwanese protests that the shrine honors Japanese war criminals as well as Chinese and Korean nationals who were conscripted into the imperial Japanese army against their will.

For Japan and South Korea, preferring to overlook or downplay difficult episodes of their respective histories is a result of their vibrant democracies. South Korean and Japanese leaders often have to pander to far-right views to stay in government and bolster their own authority. In contrast, authoritarian China is effective in stifling debate over its history.

History with Chinese Characteristics

Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also exploits history for its own legitimacy. Like Korea, the Chinese brand of nationalism is based on opposition to Japanese intentions. While there is no right-wing party in Chinese politics, the CCP uses the struggle against Japan to bolster its own party’s legitimacy and exploit the nationalism of the Chinese population. “In school, we were taught that the nationalists did not prioritize defending our country,” says Fang Jinqing a student of China’s prestigious Fudan University.

The outcome of the bending of history is increasingly strained relations between the three biggest powers in East Asia. Today, the biggest point of tension has been over island disputes, despite shabby historical claims.

This historical revisionism was on show during the Victory Day parade held in Beijing last September. China is wholly justified in reminding the world of the forgotten sacrifices it made during World War II. However, the Victory Day celebrations exaggerated the role of the CCP in the war against Japanese aggression and ignored the role of the nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek.��As Rana Mitter of Oxford University points out, it was the of the Japanese invasion. Historian Jung Chang goes further, saying that during the war, the Communist Party did not completely cease hostilities toward the nationalists and often sabotaged Chiang’s efforts against the invading Japanese armies.

Beijing loves to cast Japan as an aggressive villain of East Asia. China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Liu Xiaoming, recently��.��While it is true that Japan has not apologized for its war crimes as fully as Germany has done, Japan today is not the aggressive power that is painted in the CCP’s narrative. Unlike China, Japan has not fired a shot, let alone engaged in any conflict since 1945. By being dishonest about Japan, China uses this narrative to claim more clout in the region today. Comments over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands) are often laced with references to Japan’s imperial past.

The CCP’s worst offence is the forced national amnesia of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, in which hundreds or thousands died (the death toll is unknown). Meanwhile, just across the border in Hong Kong, an enormous candlelight vigil is held every year—the subject remains completely taboo in public, in the media and online 26 years on. On each anniversary,�� and remove any online posts that reference the massacre. The result is that those born after 1989 or who were too young at the time to remember have no reference to the protests. “Many young people have no idea about the June 6^th incident,” says Zhang Bowei, a father of two who works in Beijing.

This is not to say that all history is often used to ill use. China rightly teaches in great detail about the Nanjing Massacre and other Japanese war crimes, which are often forgotten in the West. On any given day of the year, dozens of different schools across China visit the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall. Before Iris Chang’s��The Rape of Nanking��was published in 1997, very little was known about the massacre outside of China. Neither Mao Zedong’s People’s Republic of China, nor Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China sought wartime reparations from Japan after the war as both leaders were competing for Japanese trade and political recognition. Against the threat of communism, the United States, too, sought close relations with Japan and did not press the issue.

Great Leaders Make History, Bad Leaders Write It

The outcome of the bending of history is increasingly strained relations between the three biggest powers in East Asia. Today, the biggest point of tension has been over island disputes, despite shabby historical claims. Both China and Japan lay claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Yet China never����China’s claim to Taiwan is also difficult to defend, given that the island was never part of the People’s Republic of China. Indeed, the mainland has not administered Taiwan since 1895. Meanwhile, relations are strained between South Korea and Japan over the Liancourt Rocks, though no conclusive evidence has surfaced as yet on ownership.

The war in East Asia has long been over. But dishonesty over it is threatening peace in the region.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.��

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Celebrating its 50^th year of independence last August, Singapore is Southeast Asia’s second youngest nation. It is ironic, then, that its people are the oldest in the region. According to a recent��, the average age of the population has jumped to 40.7 years from 38.6 in 2010 and 36.6 in 2005.

The effects of this will be mostly economical, as pressure mounts on health care services to provide for a growing retired population. In national security, Singapore will also face a shrinking army.

Compared with the Southeast Asian median age of just 29.2 years, Singapore is aging at a worryingly fast pace. The government will need an even faster response.

By 2026,��the United Nations estimates��that Singapore will be a “” with one in five persons aged 65 or over. It pegs the old-age dependency ratio as 30 dependents to every 100 working age adults. When Singapore gained independence in 1965, less than 3% of the population was 65 or above, and the dependency ratio was just five.

With fewer people in the labor force, Singapore will be worse off economically as families will be hard-pressed to find the extra cash to support graying relatives. The state will be strained too, as it will face a widening gap in tax revenue and a shrinking pool from which it can conscript troops.

The Lion City needs to effectively address the consequences of its own success. As one of the Four Asian Tigers, Singapore attained high levels of income and living standards through a combination of sophisticated manufacturing and service industries in its 50 years of existence. Singapore’s economic policies, along with a relatively peaceful international environment, have fostered a well-educated citizenry and prolonged life expectancy—all without the introduction of a welfare state.

Welfare is a dirty word among political circles in Singapore. To them, the welfare state is a lofty Western ideal that encourages idleness and undermines the competitive and thrifty nature that has been integral to Singapore’s economic growth. As an alternative to the welfare state, the nation’s approach to the provision of health care, retirement income and housing involves people being��required to put aside a ��into savings plans, which they can later use to buy a home, pay tuition fees and purchase a variety of insurance policies.

This system allows the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) to be more thrifty on social spending. Singapore’s elite assumed that the bulk of social responsibilities—childcare, for example—would be managed by tightly knit families rather than through handouts from the state. As an unintended consequence, the lack of state-provided childcare, coupled with more women in employment and education, incentivized families to have fewer children.

Singapore’s fertility rate rose slightly to 1.25 in 2014 from 1.19 the previous year, but it is still far below the desired replacement rate of 2.1. To link the welfare state with fertility rates, consider that France is exceptional in aging Europe with a high fertility rate of 2.01, due to its generous active family support policies including childcare facilities, tax allowances and benefits. As the fertility rate in Singapore falls, the society naturally ages as a result.

As Singapore’s population shrinks, the economic consequences will become serious. The core labor force, consisting of those aged between 25 and 49, will peak in 2020. Singapore will have great difficulty preserving its impressive growth rate with a shrinking labor force.

As the government’s authority relies considerably on providing high growth rates and improving the material lives of citizens, an economic slowdown could seriously damage the PAP’s hold on power and reputation.

As for defense, an economic slowdown will mean that Singapore may not be able to continue to spend between 3% to 5% percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on national security annually. Furthermore, with a shortage of young people, it will need to think of viable alternatives to a shrinking army.

A More Generous Nanny State?

An obvious response to this would be to increase the forced savings rate. However, with the rising cost of living and stagnant wages spurring Singaporeans to put away even more money for retirement, this increment will be a hard sell. Citizens must already provide for their parents, and refusing to do so may end in a long drawn out court battle.

Singapore’s government will need to think of new ways to prepare for an aging population, and it will need to rethink its attitudes toward the welfare state.

Fortunately, as one of the world’s richest nations, Singapore is in a good position to invest a higher percentage of GDP into social care. This may be in the form of paying for house servants to ease the burden of families looking after their old, or through technology. The city-state is already investing in robotics. ��are starting to be used to help the elderly stay in shape. To address the shrinking labor force, Singapore will need to make significant gains in labor productivity, perhaps also through robotics.

All, however, is not lost. Singapore’s rapidly aging population presents significant opportunities. Merrill Lynch, a US consultancy firm, has estimated that that the global Silver Economy will be worth $15 trillion by 2020—think fashion brands aimed at grandparents.

If Singapore is able to take the initiative in dealing with an aging population, it could pioneer measures that may be applicable within other countries as well. With Europe, China and Japan rapidly aging, Singapore is hardly alone in this predicament.

Singapore’s success over the past 50 years was against the odds. Upon independence, it had no natural resources and a population of just 1.3 million. Today, it stands as a shining example of nation-building in the 20^th century. There is little reason to think that its own aging population will conquer the Lion City. Should Singapore be able to overcome this crisis, it will have more reason to celebrate.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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On September 3, China’s Victory Day celebrations unveiled a turning point in northeast Asian relations: South Korean President Park Geun-hye was present, while her North Korean counterpart Kim Jong-un was not. Kim’s absence signaled a dramatic shift in the triangular relationship between China and both Koreas, which has been based on Beijing’s desire to preserve stability on the Korean Peninsula.

Though the two Korean states have been seeking reunification on their own terms over��the last decade, the relationship had taken a step back following beginning with a landmine maiming two South Korean soldiers in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), leading to artillery rounds fired from both sides. While high-level talks were held to ease tensions, North Korea’s destabilizing behavior became an opportunity for Beijing and Seoul to reassess their relationship.

Park’s attendance shortly after a summer of tension shows how Beijing has hoped to use its friendly relations with Seoul as leverage against Pyongyang. China, after all, has been providing the financial and political support that has kept the Kim regime in power since the end of the Korean War in 1953.

Wary of Beijing’s support of its neighbor, South Korea has simultaneously engaged with and balanced against a rising China in recent years. Seoul has cooperated��with China in the form of trade over North Korea, but has balanced against China by emphasizing the importance of the strategic alliance with the United States. Stronger cooperation between the two Confucian nations would be mutually advantageous, as the triangular relationship has not fostered lasting stability on the Korean Peninsula. President Park should use political leverage to persuade China to gradually end relations with North Korea and side with South Korea.

Of course, a closer relationship with China would come at the expense of relations with the US. Yet Park’s attendance at the Victory Day celebrations, , shows that such a relationship is already taking shape.

President Park should persuade China to turn a blind eye to —where North Korean traders have been bringing smartphones and radios into the Hermit Kingdom, which in turn educates North Koreans about the world around them. More importantly, President Park could strike a deal with Beijing to allow North Korean defects to escape safely into South Korea. If China is tired of Western governments criticizing its human rights record, Park could reason with the government, which��would at least help North Korean refugees.

China’s Traditionalists and Progressives

Two main factors have led to Beijing reassessing its relationship with the two Koreas.

First, China’s current policy is contradictory and is clearly not working. It finances the Kim dynasty by paying for its fuel, food and guns, while simultaneously encouraging the north to follow the same economic trajectory that transformed China—.

Second, Sino-North Korean relations have been at their coolest for years. Since President Xi Jinping took the helm in China in 2012, official has shrunk to a “trickle,”��and factions have emerged within the Chinese government over North Korea; between traditionalists those who still see the DPRK as a strategic asset and progressives who view it as a liability.

The traditionalists assert the need to maintain the status quo. They insist that Beijing must continue to back Pyongyang as a buffer against the US and its allies, especially South Korea. Though they concede that the north is an unreliable ally, it is still an ally among hostile neighbors in the region (China has territorial disputes with ��save for Pakistan). Even worse, the conventional wisdom is that if North Korea collapses, a joint South Korean and American-sponsored government would take its place, setting US��soldiers at China’s borders.

These arguments have been outdated since the end of the Cold War, retort the progressives. This faction emphasizes the importance of maintaining a solid relationship with the US and understanding the limitations of the Pyongyang regime. Indeed, while traditionalists have emphasized preserving stability on the Korean Peninsula, the progressives point out that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is destabilizing and harms China’s national interests.

Until the progressives can sway Beijing’s policy over the Koreas, the peninsula will be unstable. Worse, if Pyongyang is to acquire nuclear weapons, China will be forced to act with unpredictable consequences.

The Victory Day celebrations were an exercise in muscle flexing, but its official aim was to “convey to the world that it is devoted to safeguarding international order, rather than challenging it,” as a .

If China wants to show it is a responsible world power, it should pull the plug on funding a��rogue state. The stability of the region may depend on it.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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