Polexit: Is Poland on the Way Out of the EU?

READ MORE

Freedom of movement in Europe was always something I took for granted. I saw Europe as part of our heritage, despite the grumblings of euroskeptics and sly articles in the British press about the perils of straight  and the metric system. 

I traveled a lot in my youth, but travel was never really the issue. Citizens of many countries from outside the EU can stay in the Schengen zone for up to 90 days without a visa. It wasn’t until 2009 that the  of being an EU citizen became obvious to me. 

Free to Work and Study in Europe 

I signed up for a master’s degree in Brussels, Belgium. The beauty of this was, as an EU citizen, the entire degree cost me only €500 ($560). It was taught in English and full of students from all over the world.

There was no paperwork to deal with, no need to prove income, no need to apply for any student visas. Education in Belgium was as open to me as education in my country of origin. And that would have been the same for education in any country in the EU. 

I stayed in Belgium for two years. During that time, I could work freely without any authorization. I taught English at the European Parliament. I also did a number of freelance jobs on the side. But I could have worked anywhere, from behind a bar, to the top levels of the European institutions. 

As an EU citizen, I had the right to live and work in Belgium, just as I did with any other country in the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA). No sponsorship needed, no work visa, no permission of any kind. 

I often traveled back and forth between London and Brussels. The Eurostar was, and still is, the best mode of transport. It takes you directly from the center of one capital into the center of the other. With an EU passport, going through immigration was quick and simple. In contrast, passport holders from outside the EU had to wait in a separate queue, all herded together. 

I didn’t use my EU freedom of movement rights again for 10 years. But that would be for the final time, as a big change was coming. 

The Vote That Changed Everything

In 2016, a majority of British voters decided the UK should leave the European Union. Millions of British citizens would soon lose their EU rights. People with Irish or other European relatives were desperately applying for second passports.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from 51łÔąĎ. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information..

The next few years were chaotic, full of political turmoil and tribalism. The Brexit referendum had the country down the middle, and things would never be the same again.

After the vote, there was a rapidly closing window of opportunity to move to the EU. I knew that was the only option for me. So, in the early weeks of 2020, I moved to Lisbon, the capital of Portugal. Time was running out by then, with the Brexit transition period in full swing. Within months, UK citizens would be officially relegated to third-country national status. 

There was no time to waste in securing  in Portugal. As an EU citizen, it was easy. I landed in Lisbon, took my passport and showed up at the nearest municipal office. Thirty minutes and €15 later, I had a five-year temporary residency document for Portugal. 

Portugal’s timeline is five years. All being well, that document will allow me to regain my EU rights sometime in 2025, this time as a proud citizen of Portugal — the country I chose.  

The EU project is far from perfect. Like any large-scale collaboration of humans, it’s fraught with issues. Yes, there’s corruption. Yes, there’s waste and inefficiency. Despite that, the EU is an ambitious project that emerged out of the devastation of the Second World War. The resulting economic cooperation has kept Europe peaceful ever since. In that sense, it’s doing exactly what it was designed to do.

Citizen of Another Somewhere

I don’t like nationalism. It’s too easily misused. And I can’t be proud of something that I didn’t achieve: the coincidence of being born on a certain piece of land. Does that mindset make me a “citizen of nowhere”? If so, that’s good. Thanks for the , Theresa. 

As the late John le Carre once said, “If you want to make me a citizen of nowhere, I will become a citizen of another somewhere.” An Englishman all his life, le Carre an Irish citizen, so disappointed was he at the fallout from Brexit. He was fortunate to have that Irish heritage. Not everyone does. And those that don’t have become second-class citizens in Europe.

National pride is artificially constructed to hold the nation-state together. It plays on our natural inclinations toward tribalism, which is merely an evolutionary hangover. Benedict Anderson’s classic book, “Imagined Communities,” explains these ideas better than I ever could.

Perhaps the EU is an “imagined community” too. But countries working together, no matter how flawed the process, is the only route we have to improving the world. It’s a project I’m determined to be part of. And if I can’t do so as a British citizen, then I’ll happily do so as a Portuguese. 

*[Samantha North is the founder of , an EU citizenship consultancy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Value of EU Citizenship in a Post-Brexit World appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

For example, 2020 has brought an unprecedented rise in American citizens leaving the United States to seek new lives abroad. In fact, the number of Americans who gave up their US citizenship to 5,816 in the first half of 2020, compared with 2,072 in all of 2019, according to research from New York-based Bambridge Accountants. 

Fintech: Embracing the Digital Age in the Time of Social Distancing

READ MORE

This trend has been accelerated not only by America’s poor handling of the pandemic, but also the rise of Trumpism and more generalized far-right political attitudes, plus uncertainty about health care and worries about newly emboldened militia groups across the country. Those who leave may include parents looking for safer countries to bring up their children or members of marginalized groups worried about the rise in racist political ideologies.

Across the Atlantic, a similar dynamic is happening in the UK. Brexit has been a massive push factor for British digital Ă©migrĂ©s. The number of British citizens moving permanently to European Union countries by 30% since the 2016 referendum. According to research, half of this number decided to leave within three months of the original vote. By now, some will already be almost eligible for citizenship in their destination country, which in some cases takes a minimum of five years.  

Other Brits fled at the last minute, during the transition period of 2020, while their EU rights were still valid. At the time of writing, some are still planning an escape before the end of 2020. There has also been a 500% increase in British citizens who have taken up citizenship of one of the 27 EU countries. This is a predictable response to the actions of a UK government forcibly removing people’s long-held rights.

These trends in both the UK and US indicate that people are no longer prepared to tolerate the consequences of damaging political decisions. In the past, it was harder to uproot one’s life and leave for another country. For starters, international moves require having a source of income, which can be challenging to find when you don’t speak the language, don’t have connections and aren’t familiar with the local culture.

Fortunately for 21^st-century digital Ă©migrĂ©s, the rise in remote working, and particularly in across borders, has provided the necessary freedom to make rapid international relocations. What’s more, the pandemic has boosted this trend by further legitimizing online working, compelling more employers to accept it as the norm. Countries needing immigration have seen the remote working trend as a golden opportunity to attract skilled professionals to their shores. A number of countries, including Estonia and Bermuda, have introduced . Others, such as Portugal and the Czech Republic, have special pathways to residency for foreigners who generate income from outside the country.

In the case of Portugal and, more recently, , generous tax breaks are available for those who make money online. For those countries, the beauty of the setup is that the foreigners’ money can help revitalize the local economy without taking jobs on the ground away from citizens.

Indeed, the digital Ă©migrĂ© trend is gaining such momentum that governments are beginning to . If a large number of educated and skilled citizens leave their country permanently, taking their tax money with them, it could have severe implications for that country’s economy. Perhaps governments should keep this more firmly in mind when they decide to enact policies that deprive people of important rights, such as the freedom to live, work, study and retire across European Union countries. 

Governments should tread carefully in this “digital first” world, where borderless working is rapidly becoming the norm. Remote working and online business empower digital émigrés to vote with their feet. These highly educated and skilled professionals can easily relocate their entire lives to destinations that more closely match their values, goals and lifestyle choices.

*[To find out more about, visit .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Rise of the Digital ÉmigrĂ© appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Misinformation about Muslims — including refugees, immigrants and ordinary citizens — has been used to construct harmful narratives, reinforce existing Islamophobia and, arguably, create a fertile environment for enacting profound social and political change. Although the role of Islamophobia in the media has been explored in depth, less research has been done into social media, especially the role of social media images. These images are highly susceptible to manipulation when taken out of context, or attached to wholly fake news. They can be used to promulgate certain political agendas, heighten divisions in society and cause actual harm to vulnerable groups.

In March, shortly afterĚý in London, a certain image began circulating on social media. It depicted aĚýĚýShe had a distressed expression, clutching her phone as she walked across Westminster Bridge. Behind her, one of Masood’s victims lay on the pavement, surrounded by concerned passers-by. The image went viral across Twitter, Facebook and a range of anti-Islam blogs.

The intense discussion it generated focused on the recurring narrative of the woman showing “disdain,” which degenerated into intense Islamophobic stereotyping. Some users implied that the woman had sympathies with the Westminster attacker. Others posted tweets and comments in her defense, but the damage had already been done. It seemed as if yet another layer had been added to longstanding negative public perceptions of Islam and Muslims.

Going viral: Islamophobia online

There are many studies on the portrayals of Islam and Muslims in the print and television media. However, the social media realm remains relatively understudied in this regard, in relation to its size, prevalence and increasing influence upon shaping social attitudes. that negative attitudes toward Islam and Muslims remain frequent in the social media context.

Users commonly perceived Muslims as “a homogeneous out-group embroiled in conflict, violence and extremism.” In general, Muslims and Islam are in British media in a variety of negative contexts, such as being a “threat to security,” a threat to “our way of life,” and positioned as being perpetually in conflict with mainstream “British values.”

Moreover, media coverage of Muslims seemed to have “gained its own momentum” over time, starting with 9/11 and growing ever since. It suggests the presence of innate Islamophobia, where journalists do not question the dominant narratives of Muslims but simply perpetuate them. In terms of images, the research found that the most dominant images were those of lone Muslim males, particularly in police mugshots, suggesting associations with terrorism, extremism or deviance (for example, the hook-handed cleric Abu Hamza was frequently featured).

Subjects of images were commonly located outside police stations or law courts. In addition, Muslims depicted in media images were most often found in prayer, preaching or in protest groups. This indicated a primary focus on themes either of terrorism or of cultural/religious differences among the majority of media images depicting Muslims.

In , Elizabeth Poole reinforces these findings, claiming that topics commonly associated with Muslims and Islam have included “terrorism,” politics and reactions to the war in Iraq. News coverage tends to link Muslims to global events, creating strong associations between Islam and situations of conflict and violence. Where there is domestic coverage, it tends to highlight situations that “focus on social tensions,” “raise questions over loyalty and belonging,” and consistently cast Muslims as being in opposition to “traditional British values.” Deep-rooted perceptions of Muslims as “the other,” combined with suspicion around their loyalty to “British values” and “our” way of life, could ignite feelings that spur users to believe negative fake news in relation to Muslims, and share images and stories that support their beliefs without engaging in critical analysis.

In recent years, a fresh series of newsworthy incidents related to Muslims, such as the in 2013, various Islamic State atrocities, and attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Berlin and London have encouraged members of the public to express their opinions about Islam and Muslims on social media. People have also become more likely to share images associated with Muslims without stopping to check their veracity.

Muddying the narrative: fake newsĚý

This has led to the spread a number of “fake news” stories, where images of Muslims have been linked with certain news events, taken out of context or used to create entirely fake news. In these cases, it is not merely the mainstream media to blame. Members of the public can easily create and share fake news, contributing to reinforcing negative perceptions of Muslims and perpetuating an ongoing narrative that has the potential to do harm.

Online narratives can also cause harm in the real world, as explored by Imran Awan in his linking a rise in hate crimes against Muslims to a corresponding rise in Islamophobic content being shared on Twitter and Facebook. Awan argues that a large proportion of comments posted on social media about Muslims possessed an “.” He offers a typology of Facebook Islamophobia in an attempt to explain what compels people to post and share such content.

None of the aforementioned studies, however, specifically explore the role of images on social media. Images can be powerful, even more so than words, and they dominate the contemporary media landscape. Digital technology has opened up new avenues for ordinary users to create, edit and doctor their own images. Images on social media, therefore, play an important role in constructing fake news and driving the narratives that fulfil political agendas. This is a significant area worthy of further exploration.

*[A version of this article was featured on the author’s .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:Ěý

The post How Fake News Drives Public Opinion About Muslims appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

For decades, social scientists have conducted research using some combination of surveys, census data, focus groups, interviews and observation techniques. With the exception of covert observation, which brings its own ethical issues, these methods have something in common: the dishonesty of people. These methods are all subject to human lies and, therefore, unable to paint a reliable picture of society’s true beliefs and darkest fears. In fact, the most objective forms of data are given up willingly, in private, where people are free from the worry of being judged. Short of stealing people’s diaries or tapping their phone calls, what else can researchers do to gather the most objective data possible?

In our digital era, the most obvious answer is also the correct one. But until now, few people have thought to leverage this tool and publicize their findings in such an accessible way and at such a pertinent time. What is the technology we all use to ask questions, seek validation and search for the most outrageous things?

Why of course, it’s Google. Many people would be embarrassed to publicly display their Google search history. I know mine is full of very silly things. But at the same time, these queries are deeply revealing, which is precisely why they strike a nerve. They display some of our deepest secrets. For example, a few years ago I used to get occasional panic attacks. I remember waking up at 3am in an unfamiliar country, caught in the midst of an attack, gasping for breath. To calm myself, I searched Google for reassurance that it was “just” a panic attack.

Google as Truth Serum

People search Google for all manner of things. Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, the researcher whoĚý, found many searches for terms involving “abortions,” “closet gays,”Ěý“penis size” and “breastfeeding of husbands” (the latter being apparently popular in India). He also found other more sinister patterns, ones suggesting American racism was far more widespread than previously thought.

In fact, search data shows the idea of America as a “post-racial” society, much-touted after the 2008 election of Barack Obama, to be quite absurd. Google showed American racism and Islamophobia were thoroughly alive and kicking, even in places where people didn’t publicly admit to holding racist views. They espouse very different opinions in the privacy of their own homes, face-to-face only with Google. It’s Google as “truth serum.” Almost 10Ěýyears later, with Donald Trump at the helm, perhaps America is finally showing its true face.

Obama’s address to the nation after the 2015 San Bernardino attack provides an interesting example of how search data reflects hidden social views. In the speech, he aimed to calm outraged people and restore order to the country. In particular, he wanted to counteract the backlash that Muslim-Americans would surely face. While he was speaking of Muslims as “our friends,” “neighbors” and so on, Google search data was telling a different story. After each terrorist attack (and this happens in Britain too) the volume of negative and violent searches about Muslims skyrockets. Islamophobic searches like “kill all Muslims” become alarmingly high.

During most of Obama’s speech, these searches didn’t reduce or even level off. Instead they became even more frequent. This makes sense, because challenging people’s worldviews acts as an attack on their fundamental identity. In response, most will cling tighter to whatever they believe. But later in his speech, Obama changed tack. He introduced new images: not just of Muslim-Americans as friends and neighbors who should be respected, but also of Muslim soldiers, willing to die for America, and Muslim athletes, representing the country on the world stage.

And then, something changed in the data. Islamophobic searches slowed down, to be replaced with searches for “Muslim athletes” and “Muslim soldiers.” Something had resonated with the people searching; instead of responding predictably to Obama’s perceived “attack” on their entrenched worldviews, they had become curious.

I believe this happened for two reasons, partly because the idea of Muslims as athletes and soldiers resonated with “patriotic” American audiences. But also because these images perhaps helped to de-otherize public perceptions of Muslims. By drawing on resonant all-American themes, Obama associated Muslims with a set of positive images rather than just trying to convince wider America to accept them as a group. In response, albeit temporarily, the volume of Islamophobic searches slowed and included more positive searches.

This is encouraging in some ways, because despite the fleeting nature of this positivity, its presence suggests two important things: First, that Islamophobia is largely a problem of perceptions and, second, that the tide can be turned back. Negative views of Muslims have become deeply entrenched over the last three decades. Islamophobia as a public perception is regularly reinforced by mainstream media, by certain think tanks and their “experts,” and by reactions to the terrible deeds of the Islamic State — a group that hasĚýĚý·É´Ç°ů±ô»ĺ·Éľ±»ĺ±đ.

Can Google search data offer us the chance to fix some of society’s ills? Its revealing nature shows our darkest fears in a way no survey can ever do. Having this information (anonymous of course) could be used to bring issues into the open and address their root causes. In the case of Islamophobia, analyzing Google searches could reveal where the gaps and misperceptions lie in wider society’sĚý. It could allow us to categorize the fears, misunderstandings and false perceptions. This could inform the design of social initiatives targeting specific problems, helping people understand each other better, and gain a stronger sense of reality over perception.

*[A version of this article was also featured on the author’s .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:ĚýĚý/

The post Can Google Search Data Help Solve Islamophobia? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

The digital world has been a central feature of the Islamic State’s (IS) rise to power, driving much of its recruitment as well as building and maintaining its fearsome image. But the strategy behind the mastery has remained mysterious. IS keeps its operations hidden to leverage the power of surprise and create a sense of unpredictability.

The group’s mastery of the digital world has been much-discussed in the short years of its existence. In contrast to previous jihadist groups, the Islamic State is populated by a younger generation of digitally-savvy millennials. Immersed in the online world from childhood, these individuals are naturals in social media marketing, video creation and coding—all of which are critical for developing the “digital caliphate.”

THE BOOK REVIEW

InĚý, veteran Palestinian journalist Abdel Bari Atwan explores the group’s digital strategy via a series of insider interviews. This unusual level of access offers fresh insights, not just into the particular technologies used, but also into the group’s wider strategy and narrative.

But the book is more than just an analysis of the digital aspects of IS. It also includes background information on regional history and politics, essential for placing the present-day situation into context. Having this overarching narrative helps the reader understand the complex web of events that led to the Islamic State, while also gaining more knowledge of the challenges facing the entire Middle East.

Atwan opens with a chapter on the cyber caliphate, focusing on how IS handles recruitment, dissemination, brand building and security. The level of detail about the tools and techniques used is of particular value, and will be important for those looking to discern exactly how IS conducts its operations on a practical level.

The book examines how the group’s operatives use tools such as TAILS and TOR, hashtag hijacking, encrypted messaging services like Kik, Telegram and WhatsApp, and even goes into detail about the Islamic State’s own self-produced video game. The reader is left feeling well-informed on the inner workings of the cyber caliphate, along with the (usually inferior) Western government-led efforts to counter its influence.

The roots of the Islamic StateĚý

The opening chapter is followed with a trio of “Origins” chapters that examine the key events in modern Middle East history that led to emergence of the Islamic State today. First, Iraq, where “the seed that would eventually produce Islamic State” was planted, when the US tried to engineer regime change during the First Gulf War in 1990. As political Islam grew and mutated within a shattered country, the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s defeat left a void waiting to be filled.

In 2002, the first jihadists entered Iraq from Afghanistan, among them Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founding father of what would later become the Islamic State. Zarqawi wasted no time in building up networks of jihadists within the shaky social and political fabric of Iraq. Negative sentiment among Iraqis toward the occupying power, America, helped in his mission. The rest of the Iraq chapter details the events that unfolded in post-Saddam Iraq, how these fitted in with the rest of the narrative, and how misjudgment on the part of the Americans made the situation worse.

Next, Atwan brings in three significant terrorist groups: the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. He explores how each came into being, how they connect with one another and how their various rivalries play out. The ideological standoff between Osama bin Laden and Zarqawi is discussed, and how this led to an eventual separation of IS from its predecessor, al-Qaeda, and the major differences between the two groups.

It’s interesting to note bin Laden’s concern for the al-Qaeda brand. He believed it had been “tarnished” not just by Zarqawi’s excessive violence, but also by post-9/11-Madrid-London associations with terrorism and extremism. Such dramatic “propaganda of the deed” could only serve to inextricably link the deed itself with the organization held responsible—just as the Nazis and the Holocaust were forever linked.

This chapter also delves into the generational divide that caused cracks between the two jihadist groups: one full of grizzled ex-mujahedeen, the other of tech-savvy, youthful and imaginative extremists—the “new wave” of extremism. The Arab revolutions of 2011, which unseated so many “apostate” rulers, presented a perfect chance for Islamic extremists across the Middle East.

For decades, these strongmen had imprisoned and persecuted the jihadists, but now their time had come. Crucially, this chapter explains how IS came to exist in its current form and how it took root within the smoking ruins of Syria.

Leveraging Syria’s crisis

Syria is the focus of the third “Origins” chapter. Atwan examines how IS was able to exploit a political vacuum to become powerful. He includes a useful modern history of Syria, its tribal system and its political environment—from Hafez al-Assad up to his son Bashar, the ophthalmologist-turned-dictator.

The Assads had something in common: they despised Islamists, and the Syrian security service persecuted the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. Yet they could not stamp it out altogether: New jihadi groups emerged in Syria even after the Brotherhood was outlawed.

Syria’s foreign relations are a fascinating read, especially when considered in the context of that country’s own revolution which, unlike the others, had a very different flavor. Whereas Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen all toppled their leaders within a matter of months, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad has clung on to this day.

Just months after the first peaceful protests broke out, they descended into full-scale war complete with heavy weapons. The conflict mutated and became a proxy war played out by many different parties, complete with all manner of propaganda. Syria soon spiraled into a complex mess causing death, misery and displacement of millions.

Atwan keeps this complicated story going in an organized flow, drawing together the many strands in a way that helps the reader make sense of the chaos. For seasoned Middle East analysts, there will not be much new to discover here. However, having the same details presented in a different way can bring new insights and reveal angles one might otherwise have overlooked.

Subsequent chapters delve into the life and character of Islamic State “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, along with life inside the Islamic State (as told by defectors). Other chapters focus on foreign fighters, the role of Saudi Arabian Wahhabism and the Western response to the Islamic State.

Glimpsing at life inside the “proto-caliphate” is fascinating, especially because of how well-organized it is, with various councils to handle everything from education to economics to military matters.

The Saudi Arabian strain of Islam, Wahhabism, receives its own chapter, because the fundamentalist and brutal tenets of this interpretation form the foundations of Islamic State ideology. Atwan explores how Saudi Arabia used its oil money to strategically spread “the Wahhabi seed” around the world, especially in the West, through means of mosques, madrassas and propaganda.

Saudi Arabia considered this “branding” necessary to gain and retain legitimacy throughout the Muslim world as the “home” of Islam. However, this “Wahhabization,” promoting an unyielding and intolerant core, has damaged the image of Islam and Muslims in Western minds. It also encourages a mindset among believers that risks leading them down a path into jihadi territory. Together, these factors contribute to creating an environment ripe for Islamophobia and radicalization.

Countering Islamic State: the futureĚý

Finally, the book closes with reflections on next steps for the West vis-à-vis the Islamic State, with suggestions on military and ideological counter strategies. One interesting idea is the suggestion of another “powerful Islamic figure or movement” being the only way to foil IS and radical Islam as a whole. Nevertheless, Atwan is convinced that with matters as they currently stand, groups like Islamic State and the ideologies that underpin them are here for the long term.

Islamic State: The Digital CaliphateĚýis carefully researched and offers new insights into the group’s inner workings. The use of first-hand interviews with insiders gives the book an extra edge of authority, one that’s based on facts not just speculation.

Backed up by clear explanations of the complex historical context that produced the Islamic State, the book gives a well-rounded picture not just of the digital caliphate, but of all the geopolitical machinations that created it. It’s a worthwhile read for anyone with more than a passing interest in extremism, counter-narratives, cyber terrorism, political violence and, of course, the Islamic State itself.

*[Islamic State, the Digital Caliphate is available at . This article was originally featured on Samantha North’sĚý.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:

The post Forming the Digital Caliphate appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Muslims living and working in the United States are being forced to reconsider their futures in light of Donald Trump’sĚý.

Citizens of seven Muslim-majority countries—Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Sudan, Libya and Somalia—will be denied entry for 90 days while the new Trump administration “tightens” already draconian visa laws. The move has beenĚý, with critics comparing it to the atmosphere of 1930s Germany that led to the Holocaust. In a twist of irony, Trump announced the refugee ban on Holocaust Remembrance Day.

There are many implications arising from this ban, all of them worrying. But rather than causing us too much speculation on an uncertain future, the US Muslim ban offers a pressing opportunity to explore the social and political attitudes that have created a zeitgeist where this ruling could emerge. What kind of narratives has the public absorbed to lead large swathes of it in a direction where a Holocaust-esque move could become socially acceptable? Fear is somewhere at the heart of the matter. But how did it get there, take root and flourish?

Researchers have traditionally used focus groups, polls and interviews to analyze social attitudes. Pew polls and YouGov surveys give a useful indication of generalized attitudes to certain topics. But people are less likely to offer their true opinions in a formal research situation. Instead, they may sanitize or edit their responses to appear more acceptable to the researcher. One of the more objective ways to capture true social attitudes is by analyzing what people say and do when they think no-one is watching.

Shaping the online narrative

Rhys Crilley and Raquel da Silva take this exact approach in their recently published study,Ěý“,” which examines attitudes among the British publicĚýdisplayed online in relation to British foreign fighters joining the Islamic State (IS). They argue that the views of ordinary members of the public, as well as media and elites, play a key role in shaping and generating the discursive environment, through which people filter their opinions on foreign fighters and terrorism, and form views on Muslims and Islam as a whole.

Crilley and da Silva analyze a range of online comments from social media, forums and newspaper comment sections. What they discover is problematic and disturbing, but unsurprising in light of recent developments. This study is important because it indicates how the stage has been set for the ramping up of racism, intolerance and division that has now become part of official government narrative, embodied in the figure of Trump and his administration, delivered to the masses through harsh policies that would have once been inconceivable. Although this particular research focuses on a British sample, US results of a similar study would likely reflect a related range of troubling views. The process seems to unfold something like this:

1) Filtering down of certain narratives from elites/media to the masses;

2) People reproduce and reinforce (and sometimes challenge) those narratives through means of online discussion (“echo chambers”);

3) Narratives then become part of the social “milieu”; as a result society becomes fearful, divided and more likely to back repressive policies such as Trump’s Muslim ban. This sense of victimization could also feed into the variety of factors that push certain vulnerable individuals into violent extremism.

Religion seen as key driving force

In analyzing the online comments, Crilley and da Silva focus on: a) the motivations people attribute to foreign fighters; and b) their views on suitable government responses.

The most striking feature of a) is that the most commonly-held view (51% of the sample chose it), which is foreign fighters “are pursuing their own religious beliefs,” is one that has been consistently disproved by counterterrorism experts and behavioral psychologists alike. In contrast, just 2% of respondents chose the option that foreign fighters “seek adventure or excitement,” although that is probably a more common driver than religion.

So far, the conclusion is clear: British public opinion still believes religion is a key driving factor for foreign fighters, despite expert research showing the contrary. This fixation on blaming religion (specifically Islam) carries disturbing implications about the nature of British social attitudes toward the country’s Muslim community, and toward Islam in general.

Cruel and exceptional

Things get worse in the second part of the research, which focuses on the public’s views of suitable ways to deal with foreign fighters returning to the United Kingdom. The majority of commenters (38%) want to “forbid them [foreign fighters] from returning,” while 32% of comments suggest foreign fighters should be “criminally punished.” Only 5% of comments suggest a view to “allow them to return to the UK.”

Let’s unpack the possible sentiments behind the first two responses. Forbidding foreign fighters (who are British citizens) from returning to the UK would mean rendering them stateless. For starters, this is illegal under international law. But more than that, the fact that such a large proportion of the British online public suggests stripping away the citizenship of foreign fighters points to an innate belief that British Muslims are less than “British.”

This raises questions such as: Would forbidding return still be as often suggested if the people in question were non-Muslims, specifically white Britons? Does being Muslim make them “less British” in people’s minds? The answers to these questions would be “no” and “yes” respectively.

The second most popular response was that foreign fighters should be “criminally punished.” Types of punishment discussed usually fell into the “hard” category, such as deportation (without trial), life imprisonment and even death. The latter suggestion is particularly disturbing as some see it as the “only thing that will stop British Muslims fighting in Syria” and the “only way” to silence their “vile inhuman ideologies.” This, mentioned in conjunction with the singling out of British Muslims, suggests a high level of contempt for their human rights.

In fact, many of the comments recommend cruel and exceptional punishments, implying a “state of exception” that puts British Muslims outside of the law. It dehumanizes them, reducing them to a status better suited to “savage and wild animals.” Attitudes of this kind emerge in the mainstream media and filter downward into the general population largely by means of online commenting.

Fear, propaganda and the online world

Terrorism inspires such primordial fear that it has become an effective tool for manipulating public opinion. These views drive the zeitgeist and, leveraged in certain ways, can propel societies into situationsĚý. We have not learned from history, despite many illusions of progress. Those illusions have now been shattered by the election of Trump and what has followed.

The power of the online world must not be underestimated. Harnessed effectively, it is probably the best propaganda tool the world has ever seen. As we have now seen, it canĚýĚýand shift global opinion in startling directions. Critical thinking is the solution. But, as the work of Crilley and da Silva shows, much of society remains quick to jump on the bandwagon, targeting certain groups without pausing to analyze the facts.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:

The post False Perceptions of Muslims in the Age of Trump appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

It is sobering and painful to imagine bad fortune befalling those places you hold dear; to know that the streets that you once frequented and the bridges you once traversed have become bit part players in a much larger tragedy.

I first discovered Istanbul during its calmer days. I arrived in the city in autumn 2013; my first encounter with the ancient cultural heart of an altogether unfamiliar country. Istanbul captivated me at once with its energy and quirkiness, with its fascinating and shambolic mingling of cultures, and with its passion and unrelenting buzz.

TROUBLE IN THE WORKS

Admittedly, all was not entirely well in the Istanbul that I first saw. In the summer of that same year, the Gezi Park protests had brought the city’s various discontents into stark view. The heavy-handed crackdown by Turkey’s government against those protests was an ominous sign of things to come. During the Gezi events, the world saw a flow of images showing Turkish police with tear gas and water cannons turning on protesters with vicious intent. These images became a dominant motif for Turkey over the months and years that followed Gezi.

I will never forget one ordinary Saturday afternoon in late 2014. I was wandering around Istiklal Caddesi with friends on a mildly sunny day. The avenue was busy with people young and old, families and foreign tourists. Suddenly, a small crowd of people fleeing in our direction made us jump. It turned out there were police hot on their tails armed with excessive amounts of teargas.

We were about to be caught in the crossfire and knew that a gassing could be really unpleasant. So we ran for the nearest side street and took refuge in a vehicle workshop, where the owners rushed to batten down the steel door and where together we all waited until the danger had passed. Outside, the air was acrid with the lingering stench of teargas.

CLAMPING DOWN

Since those early days, there have been many more dramatic events in Istanbul and wider Turkey. Most notably, the ruling regime has stepped up its level of control, bolstered by another resounding win at the ballot box in 2015, when Turkey held its most recent general election. The leader, , is a divisive figure. At first I thought he was unpopular with most Turks, judging from the opinions of my liberal and mostly secular English-speaking Turkish friends, who never missed a chance to criticize him.

But as I got to know Turkey more deeply, it became clear that the man had widespread popular support, just not from the demographic that constituted most of my social scene. On the contrary, Erdogan supporters came from the working classes, from the more religious and less well-educated sections of society. This is a general statement but one that largely holds true.

THE ISTANBUL PARADOX

To understand Turkey better, it is important to remember that Istanbul is not really Turkey, and Turkey is not really Istanbul. In fact, most of Turkey resides in the wider Anatolian regions, beyond Istanbul, where society tends toward the poorer, more conservative and more religious. These are the heartlands from where President Erdogan draws the majority of his support base. These are the voters that have kept the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in power for almost 15 years.

Erdogan is undoubtedly a gifted politician. Although he may lack a university education—his degree is believed to be fake—he has used his time spent on the streets of Istanbul to learn exactly what makes the common Turk tick, and he has leveraged this knowledge to great effect. He is ruthless too, as shown by his cynical manipulation of Turkish society to achieve his political aims.

In summer 2015, the tide shifted in Turkey. A challenger party, the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), won enough general election votes to give it a seat in parliament. This denied the AKP the majority rule it had expected to win. The result was a hung parliament amid calls for the ruling party to form a coalition. Anyone who knows Turkish politics and the personality of Erdogan himself knows how impossible this is. There was stalemate for a number of months until a second general election was called in November of the same year.

MYSTERIOUS EVENTS

Between the first and second elections, a number of unusual events befell Turkey. In July 2015, not long after the first election result was announced, a truce between the ruling party and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is notorious for a long-standing conflict with the Turkish state, suddenly fell apart. It was unusual because this truce had been in place since 2013, with the goal to embark on a peace process. As a result, conflict duly resumed in the southeast between the PKK and Turkish security forces. Turkey was once again embroiled in a civil war.

Then, just before the November election was due, Turkey suffered the worst terrorist attack in its history. Two suicide bombers blew themselves to smithereens amid a peace rally in the capital Ankara, killing 102 people, most of them young. They had been rallying for peace in the Kurdish southeast. The finger was pointed at the . But the militant group, normally so quick to claim responsibility for its actions, has so far remained silent on this attack.

There is no telling now what the future holds for Turkey. If it continues down this path, Erdogan is likely to achieve unquestionable power.

Eyewitnesses at the Ankara event noted the surprising lack of security forces during the peace rally. It was almost as if the government wanted the rally to be attacked. Some have even gone as far as to claim the AKP deliberately orchestrated the bombing to tip the November election in its favor.

Be that the case or not, it worked. The AKP won a landslide victory and regained full control in parliament. I was out of the country when the results came through.

A CLIMATE OF FEAR

All the while tensions were ratcheting up across Turkey. The feeling was palpable in Istanbul’s overcrowded subways and heaving streets—not only tension but also fear. The country had started to feel unstable. I was fairly shielded from the effects of this fear, as I lived far from the city center at that time. The place where I lived was a low-key working-class suburb, where nothing except occasional boredom was a concern. But friends living in the center spoke of their nervousness using public transport and being in busy enclosed spaces such as shopping malls.

Istanbul was changing.

In 2016, things took a turn for the worse. There were two separate suicide bomb attacks, one in followed by a second in March in the heart of Istiklal Caddesi. Both times foreign tourists as well as Turks were killed. These two locations were absolutely the most effective choices for destroying the tourism industry in Turkey, which indeed they did.

Another suicide attack in late June, a particularly brazen one , cemented the climate of fear in Istanbul. It sent many people fleeing elsewhere if they were able to do so. Expats began talking seriously about leaving, while Turks entitled to foreign passports were trying urgently to secure them.

To their credit, the Turks had the airport up and running again within hours of the attack, which was convenient for some but rather alarming for others. Things felt normal when I flew out of that same airport just days after the attack, apart from the commemorative display in the arrivals hall where 42 people had been blown and shot to shreds.

DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS

This leads us up to the most recent news ofĚý. It is a time of high drama for Turkey. Erdogan has called on the United States to extradite his arch-rival, elderly Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen, who he has accused of orchestrating the via his many supporters who hold positions of power in Turkey. It makes little sense for Gulen to do such a thing.

What rings more true—alarmingly—is that the AKP somehow set up the coup attempt as justification for the subsequent arrest of thousands of judges and senior military figures, which happened within two days of the coup. How the wheels of so-called justice can move so fast is mystifying, unless of course the coup was expected, planned and carried out by those loyal to the AKP.

Now is a golden opportunity for Erdogan to make his final bid for total control. His dearest wish is to change the constitution to allow executive powers for the presidency. If this occurs, it could be a death knell for any semblance of democracy in Turkey. The country will have transitioned into a dictatorship in all but name, just like its current civil war in all but name against the Kurds in the southeast.

There is no telling now what the future holds for Turkey. If it continues down this path, Erdogan is likely to achieve unquestionable power. What that means for the common people of Turkey is as yet unknown.

Now relegated to an observer instead of a more active participant, I can only hope that whatever comes next will avoid doing further damage to the city, country and people among which I spent some happy, formative and productive years. It feels like Turkey is descending into an abyss, butĚýinshallah, as the Turks say, things will not be as dark as they seem.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. YourĚýĚýis tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be aĚý.

The post How Did Turkey End Up Here? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Our story starts in 1942 with Europe in the midst of war. We find ourselves in the dusty North African outpost of Casablanca, where a motley assortment of refugees, political agitators and men with secrets gather in a place known as Rick’s Cafe. Here, they exchange news, drink whiskey and juggle illegal paperwork to get them out of the country to a better life.

Casablanca was full of anxiety and uncertainty, a limbo full of those caught between their pre-war pasts and their uncertain futures. So begins the plot of what was to become one of the most popular classic films of all time: Casablanca.

But Rick’s Café never really existed. Casablanca was not shot in Morocco. None of its actors were Moroccan. In fact, the whole thing was constructed in a Hollywood studio, making Casablanca the film as far removed from Casablanca the city as could be imagined.

Nevertheless, the city became synonymous with the film and some of the latter’s glamour rubbed off on the image of Casablanca the city.

Rick’s Cafe comes to life

Six decades after the film was released, Casablanca finally got its own Rick’s CafĂ©. Kathy Kriger, an American ex-diplomat, opened her version of Rick’s in 2004, while the world was still reeling in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the emergence of the “war on terror.” Kriger left the Foreign Service to devote herself to building Rick’s Cafe as a business and a brand name. She even found a piano player called Sam—or Issam, to be precise.

“I wanted to use it as a way to show Americans how Morocco was different,” Kriger tells me. “I knew they would put all the [Middle East] countries into one basket. So I wanted to help them make the psychological leap and not be scared.”

Now, 12 years later, Rick’s Cafe attracts a regular flow of celebrities, royalty and political bigwigs to Casablanca, along with tourists from all around the world. Many come a long way to visit Rick’s. For some, the movie is the only image that links them with Casablanca at all. While it may be a false image in some ways, the iconic film provides brand awareness for the city, which it otherwise might have lacked. Recognition is a valuable asset for any place looking to make its mark globally.

“We’re known all over the world,” says Kriger. “The Japanese minister of economy is coming here for dinner tomorrow. J-Lo’s been here. Casablanca the movie is so famous that it brings people in from everywhere. They all know of it. Some people come from Europe just to have dinner, spend the night and go back.”

The film’s influence may have spread far and wide globally, but it was never much of a big deal within Morocco until Kriger opened Rick’s. Since then, Casablanca locals have become more aware of the impact that one film had on global perceptions of their city. Some of them have spotted its potential and tried to harness it. So far, Kriger’s restaurant is the only Rick’s in town and likely to remain so now that she owns the rights to its name.

Kriger says: “When I first tried to register the name Rick’s Cafe I found out that someone else already had it. He was from Casablanca and had studied in the US. He used to get embarrassed when people there asked if he hung out at Rick’s Cafe when he went home. So he registered the name when he came back after graduation, hoping to do something with it.”

The real Casablanca

Despite the popularity of the 21st-century Rick’s Café and the large numbers of tourists it attracts, the presence of the restaurant is not enough by itself to define a city with a vibrant culture and ancient history of its own.

Today’s Casablanca mingles strains of the colonial past with a thoroughly modern present. The buzzing medina area, somewhat shabby but always fascinating, is full of market stalls, street vendors and small antique shops. Just outside the medina the streets are lined with white art-deco buildings, relics from the days of the French. A tram line cuts through the area, connecting the wealthy centre with some of the outlying slums.

Toward the coast, the Anfa hills district is full of gated compounds and leafy streets, leading down to one of the city’s main malls, Place d’Anfa. Racine, another well-to-do section, has large shops, Western chains, and luxurious apartment buildings. En route to the airport, there are new developments that can be seen in progress, including a “.” The main highway is lit using solar powered street lamps.

Overall, Casablanca retains a cosmopolitan feel, with its many foreign restaurants, cafes and bars serving hordes of Moroccans and expats alike. The variety is impressive, including sushi bars, Turkish kebab joints, Lebanese cafes, Argentinian steakhouses, Chinese noodle shops and Irish pubs, along with traditional Moroccan seafood, tagines and couscous.

The city’s main local attraction has to be the striking Hassan II Mosque, standing large and imposing with its single minaret looming over the coastline. The DNA of the city is surely rooted in cosmopolitanism, which should be a key feature of any new branding effort. This is the “real” Casablanca, where past meets present and where all travellers are welcomed.

Fortunately, local authorities in the city have already recognized the benefits of city branding and have established a series of initiatives to devise and implement a new strategy.

Rather than focusing on an image rooted in a depiction of colonial wartime Casablanca, the new strategy is determinedly modern in its outlook. IĚýspoke to Khalid Baddou, president of the Moroccan Association for Marketing and Communications, about the city’s goals to promote a refreshed image.

“The problem [with the film] is that it represents Casablanca as a very old-fashioned city,” Baddou tells me. “People get this image of colonial days, with everyone wearing red hats and so on. Although from a brand awareness point of view it’s still positive, for knowing that there’s a city in Morocco called Casablanca.”

Casablanca is known within Morocco as the economic capital. It’s the center of business, and most foreign companies are headquartered there. Casablanca is also an important center for offshoring. Global companies such as IBM are mainly located at Casablanca Nearshore Park, where they outsource a variety of IT, call center and business processes.ĚýIt also has a new business area and an extensive marina under development.

“Since independence, Casablanca has always been positioned as the economic center of the country,” says Baddou. “But that’s no longer sufficient. Today Casablanca must mean something different. We want to reposition the city and make it more attractive, by reinforcing its identity above and beyond the economic one. We will soon have competing regions in the country, with every region having its own resources. When that happens, the game will change.”

Casablanca’s city authorities aim to base its future development on the Dubai model and become known as a hub for Africa. Companies wanting to expand to Africa can use Casablanca as a jumping off point, benefiting from the connections that Morocco has already established with other African countries. According to Jorgen Eriksson, place branding specialist and CEO of Bearing Consulting, the city seems to be on the right track.

Eriksson says: “Casablanca needs to clarify its brand as a vibrant yet classic location for both oriental culture and West African business, where visitors can come as an entry point to modern West Africa. To achieve this, Casablanca needs to overhaul both its infrastructure and how it presents its unique assets to new visitors. All the components are there, but new packaging is needed.”

Casablanca’s goal to become the “new Dubai” does not chime well with the particular aspects of its image promoted in either the Humphrey Bogart film or indeed the city’s wholly authentic medina area and its colonial-era art deco streets. In fact, they are almost polar opposites where one represents modernity while the other is rooted in the past.

The DNA of the city is found in its continuous status as a port city that has seen it used as a trading centre by theĚýPhoenicians and Romans more than 2,000 years ago, and later the Portuguese (who gave it its name), Spanish and French, who colonized it in the 19th century. This is the “real” Casablanca, where pastĚýmeets present and where all travellers are welcomed.

“The film promotes one image, but we want to promote an entirely different one. The name of Casablanca is known, but what the city is all about today is not so well known,” says Baddou.

Those in charge of Brand Casablanca do not plan to cast aside the city’s heritage for the sake of modernity. There are plans already in place to shape the new brand strategy into an extension of the Casablanca that the world already knows.

“Our personal branding recommendation includes the historical heritage,” says Baddou. “We need to build on this image that people have of the city of Casa, but then add to it all the modernity that has happened in the last 60 or 70 years.”

He continues: “Cities need to build their brands based on their real DNA, whether that’s environment, business, industry, tourism or local icons. It has to be recent and fit in with reality. Casablanca the movie is good for awareness, but people also need to have the new image of the city, which is the reality now.”

Unlike the film, which was born in a Hollywood studio, Casablanca’s rebranding strategy will start from the grassroots, by discovering how the people of Casablanca actually view their own city. An important aspect of any city branding initiative, including this step can spell the difference between failure and success.

Baddou says: “We want to find out how local people view and talk about their city. For us white-collar workers, Casablanca could be very different from what the vast majority think. Everyone sees the city from a different angle. So the strategy can’t be top down. It must be built from the bottom, by first listening to the people and seeing what they say.”

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Ěý/ Ěý

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. YourĚýĚýis tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be aĚý.

The post Defining Casablanca’s Modern City Brand appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Since ancient times, places have always sought to defineĚýidentitiesĚýfor themselves. From hosting sporting events or minting coins, to producing famed thinkers or becoming notorious in battle, these achievements helped places to burnish their reputations. Powered only by word of mouth, place identity spread slowly and gradually. Developed over the long-term, identity became a deeply entrenched facet of a place’s sense of self, and shaped how others viewed it.

In today’s world, the practice of place branding has attracted controversy ever since its modern beginnings as a discipline. Clarifying exactly what place branding is, and what it isn’t, remains a key challenge for its practitioners.

When place branding first entered the public sphere in the 1990s, many PR and advertising agencies believed they could treat countries and cities as “brand-able” products. For a while, this was the accepted practice. It made large agencies plenty of money.

But soon the clients—countries and cities—began to question why their reputations hadn’t really changed, despite the large amounts of money spent on “nation branding” campaigns.

The problem lay in the approach. These campaigns usually revolved around the creation of a new logo and tagline that supposedly encapsulated the entire identity of the place. But the mistake is to equate nation branding with advertising, which doesn’t work for places. A place with a bad reputation won’t be able to fix it this way. Instead, the place must take strategic action to align its reality with its desired reputation. Once this process is in motion, the place can begin to tell the world about its achievements.ĚýBut there are no quick wins. Success requires a long-term commitment to a carefully planned strategy.

By its very nature, reputation is subjective and, therefore, difficult to measure. Nevertheless, increasing numbers of rankings exist that claim to measure countries and cities in terms of brand strength.

The Anholt-GfK Nation Brand Index is a classic example. It uses interview data from thousands of international respondents to discover what they think about the world’s countries. The Reputable Cities Index, produced by the Reputation Institute, uses an online poll of 19,000 respondents in the G8 countries, asking their opinions of 50 major cities. The major rankings often attract substantial press coverage, meaning that a high score can provide a much sought-after boost for a country or city brand.

However,ĚýĚýthat rankings should not be taken too seriously. They point out that respondents are usually citizens of certain groups of countries, such as the G8 nations, a factor that is likely to affect their viewpoints. It means that rankings don’t offer a truly objective picture of global opinion. Another problem with survey data is that people often respond, either consciously or subconsciously, by saying what they think the questioner wants to hear.

© Shutterstock

Digital Reputation

With the ubiquity of the Internet and the rise of big data, another method has emerged to evaluate global interest in countries.

Online searches have become our go-to solution for anything that sparks our curiosity. For most people, the act of searching for a country is triggered by this curiosity about something they read in the news or hear in conversation. When we search online, we are remarkably candid about what terms we type in. The terms used reveal our true opinions about countries. So it was only a matter of time before someone figured out a way to apply this to nation branding.

Bloom Consulting, a Madrid-based firm specializing in nation branding, recently released the first edition of its . This new tool categorizes online search terms to form a picture of the world’s true levels of interest in countries.

The Digital Country Index is comprehensive, using data gathered from online searches that, in theory, relate to every country and territory in the world. Although 245 are featured in the full report, some attract very few searches, so they are omitted from the final ranking. The final index consists of 180 countries, ranked according to dimensions of Tourism, Inward Investment, Talent, Exports and National Prominence. These five areas are chosen because they are judged to have the greatest influence in shaping the image, or “brand,” of a country.

Understanding what motivates people’s initial interest in a country can help governments make better strategic decisions. This data can be constantly monitored for changes over time and in response to specific triggers, such as significant policy changes, economic shifts, terrorist attacks or international accolades. This is useful because it helps countries and cities respond strategically when data shows rising or falling levels of interest in dimensions that may affect their reputation.

According to Jose Torres, CEO of Bloom Consulting, the time is ripe for governments to start monitoring their digital reputation just as they monitor it in the real world. With the rise of online influence in all walks of life, no place can afford to ignore how it is perceived digitally.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Ěý/ /Ěý

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. YourĚýĚýis tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be aĚý.

The post How Digitally Popular is Your Country? appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Across , the plight of — a border town — is on everyone’s mind. On October 7, thousands hit the streets to protest the government’s lack of action against the looming threat of the (IS). Protests raged in 22 Turkish cities, including , and at least 15 people died during vicious clashes with Turkey’s notorious riot police.

In Istanbul, the usual hotspots were affected. The busy areas of , Besiktas and Kadikoy were filled with clouds of smoke and tear gas, as armies of police fought to keep protesters under control. As always in these protests, tourists and innocent bystanders were fair game too. No one in the vicinity was spared a gassing.

Turkish media barely mentioned the protests, therefore, social media was the only way to find out what was happening. On and , Turkish and expat residents alike kept each other constantly updated on the latest developments involving armed police, gas and flames. Many cancelled or rerouted their evening plans. But overall, despite the inconvenience, everyone was full of sympathy and support for the beleaguered people of Kobane, and many were incensed by the Turkish government’s continued failure to act.

People within and outside of Turkey were especially outraged when the Turkish president, , made a public speech in which he likened IS to the separatist group, the (PKK), claiming they were both “terrorist organizations.” This attitude hints strongly at the reasoning that may drive Turkey’s reluctance to take military action, or indeed to allow Kobane’s Kurds across the border to safety.

In short, it seems the government’s tensions with the PKK run deep — so deep they may even outweigh basic humanitarian concerns. Thousands of lives are at risk, yet Turkey still hesitates because of a long-running feud over the Kurdish desire for independence.

After these protests, the morning dawned with the choking odor of tear gas still lingering in Istanbul’s streets. But there was a glimmer of hope in some news reports, which have indicated that US airstrikes have been effective in driving IS fighters away from Kobane, killing some of them. But nevertheless, if Turkey does not lift a finger to assist, Kurds will not forget in a hurry.

International support for the Kurds, especially the beleaguered people of Kobane, is at an all-time high. Solidarity protests have been springing up around the world, from Berlin to Washington DC. Unexpected audiences, such as average people from English villages, who have hardly traveled in their lives, have heard about the situation and are cheering for the Kurds against IS.

Indeed, when the next elections in 2015 arrive, this may end up as a misjudgment for the ruling party. Kurdish voters make up a large chunk of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) voter base. Kurds are fiercely loyal to their brethren, so surely they will have long memories about Kobane when election day rolls around again.

There’s a lot of anger in Turkey right now. Violent clashes continue to rear up across the country, with as many as 22 people already reported dead. is buzzing with discussion, with commentators in Istanbul saying the peace process between Turkey and the PKK could be at risk. One observer even claimed that the “entire future of Turkey could hang on the tone Erdogan takes in his next speech” — depending on whether the president chooses to be conciliatory toward the Kurds, or defiantly provocative.

People have even expressed fears that civil war could break out in Turkey, if the Kurds in Kobane do not receive some measure of support from the Turkish government. It is highly concerning to imagine the reaction in Turkey if IS militants actually get inside Kobane and carry out their infamous brutalities.

International support for the Kurds, especially the beleaguered people of Kobane, is at an all-time high. Solidarity protests have been springing up around the world, from Berlin to Washington DC. Unexpected audiences, such as average people from English villages, who have hardly traveled in their lives, have heard about the situation and are cheering for the Kurds against IS. Kobane has become famous for all the wrong reasons.

This level of reach clearly demonstrates how much Kobane has stirred people’s emotions. The bravery shown by the Kurds living there, especially by the famous female fighters, has also helped burnish the Kurdish image around the world. Sadly, none of this will matter much if Kobane falls.

All that remains now is perhaps the most difficult task of all: For Turkey to choose a wise path as it navigates this most perilous tightrope.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

/

The post Kobane: Global Solidarity, Domestic Blind Eye appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.

Syria has been making headline news for over two years as the battle rages on between President Bashar al-Assad’s army and the increasingly fragmented bands of rebel fighters.

Meanwhile, Libya, Egypt and other restive nations continue to grumble as the dust of the Arab Spring settles.

We often hear in Western media about the experiences of brave journalists reporting from the front line of these conflict zones. Some of the boldest have also been the most unfortunate, such as the veteran war correspondent Marie Colvin, who was killed by a bomb in Syria last year.

In the West, we naturally focus on issues from our own perspective. However, seeking another viewpoint is always valuable.

A Chinese War Correspondent in Damascus

Chinese news organizations have also been sending their reporters to Syria, where they have struggled to overcome their own set of challenges.

Chinese reporter Yu Zongjin always pretends to be Korean or Japanese when interviewing Syrian rebel forces in Damascus. If he gives away his true nationality, he risks kidnap or worse. Another Chinese journalist, a reporter for Xinhua News, was already kidnapped once in the Syrian capital. Fortunately he escaped alive, but the message was clear: the rebels hate the Chinese.

This hatred stems from the fact that China, together with Russia, has vetoed numerous UN Security Council resolutions, preventing UN-sanctioned foreign intervention in Syria; something many rebel and opposition factions have demanded. The rebels hate the Russians too, thanks to President Vladimir Putin’s support for Assad.

In contrast, BBC and CNN reporters can usually enter rebel-held zones with ease.

Yu arrived in Damascus in August 2012, when the conflict was in full swing. Visa restrictions kept Yu and his colleagues from China state television (CCTV) within the Damascus city limits, mainly conducting interviews with people from the Assad side. To maintain some semblance of balance in their stories, the CCTV team would try to interview rebel forces using Skype.

It was the only safe method, because the rebels could not be trusted. They may have planned to kidnap the team or harm them in some way.

The CCTV team struggled to find good, reliable rebel sources. Sometimes they would report on the rebels by interviewing proxies, such as Turkish or Jordanian "fixers." The team also used information gleaned from other media reports, often those produced by Western journalists.

Constant Risk of Kidnap

In Damascus, the constant risk of kidnap hung over the heads of the Chinese journalists. They had to stay vigilant at all times, not just for potential kidnappers. According to Yu: “Most of the time we were afraid of snipers. Usually they stay hidden, but at the same time they can see you. That makes you extremely vulnerable.”

At that time, Damascus was littered with unexploded bombs. It was impossible to guess when or where the next one might explode. Suicide bombers were prevalent and caused massive destruction that no armor could protect against. Mortars added yet another layer of danger.

Yu said: “One night I was in my room at the Four Seasons Hotel when I heard a mortar go off on the roof nearby. It was too close for comfort and reminded me that the hotel could easily become a rebel target.

“Explosions usually come twice. One side bombs and the other side responds. One day we were out reporting in the street when this happened. Everyone was running away. I ran into a small shop to hide.

“I saw a lady, sitting quietly at her desk surrounded by destruction, just watching the scene. In Arabic, I told her I was sorry. She started to cry.”

Yu explained that the attackers bomb in pairs because people tend to gather at the site of an explosion. A second explosion causes maximum damage, wiping out many of the onlookers.

September 2013 was the tensest month so far for Yu and his team, as the US had just announced its intention to attack Syria. The UN had already left town and the Chinese team were expecting an attack to follow any day soon. They were preparing to leave and had already sent much of their equipment back to Beirut.

Yu said: “The idea of the Americans bombing Damascus scared us mainly because of the rebels.

“If Assad’s forces fell in the capital, the rebels would storm the city and perhaps take over the Four Seasons and the Chinese Embassy. We’d have nowhere left to hide.

“But if we’d left before the bombing started, that would be a different story. I believe that weakening Assad would have helped the situation, by achieving a power balance between his side and the rebel side.

“That could pave the way for talks to begin.”

Assad Has to Step Down

Yu can see only one clear solution to the never-ending Syrian conflict. “Assad has to step down. It may not bring peace but at least it will help end the major battles. The West intervened too late and even now they are not doing enough. They need to reach [an] agreement with Russia and convince Assad to leave. This is essential.” 

When asked for his views on the future of war reporting, Yu said that he is convinced new media will never be able to replace actual war reporters in the field.

He said: “If you just let the people already in the war zone report events by social media, then for sure the story won’t be balanced.

“We still need professional trained reporters out there. To make it safer, they should receive better training, more insurance and more support."

“But there will always be reporters willing to take the risks of war, to see things no-one else will ever see.”

With the complex politics that entwine Syria, it seems the risk could now be greater for some reporters than for others.

*[Note: Yu Zongjin is a reporter for the Beijing-based CCTV news channel. He speaks fluent Arabic and has covered conflicts in Yemen, Libya and, most recently, Syria.]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

The post The Snipers of Damascus: Chinese Perspectives on Reporting the Syrian War appeared first on 51łÔąĎ.