The proposal needs to be seen in the context of the broad militarization of Turkish foreign policy. In recent years, Ankara has deployed armed forces for geopolitical leverage in Syria, Somalia, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean and Azerbaijan. The associated costs have remained very low, further emboldening Turkish policymakers. In Somalia and Syria, the Turkish military also gained experience operating in theaters where armed militants pose significant security challenges.

Joe Biden Meets Afghanistan’s Leaders as the Country Faces Collapse

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The main factor behind the airport proposal, however, is Turkish-American relations. Ankara hopes to regain favor with Washington after a string of diplomatic crises. The Turkish side knows its hand is weakened by issues such as its acquisition of the Russian S400 air defense system and Washington’s responses, including sanctions and removing Turkish manufacturers from the supply chain for the new F35 warplane. The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, known as CAATSA, is a law passed by the US Congress in 2017 that intended to penalize Russia. In December 2020, Turkey was to the sanctions list for its purchase of the S400. The proposal to help out in Afghanistan emerged as an obvious way to improve bilateral relations with the US.

A Good Reputation

As the only Muslim-majority member of NATO, Turkey played important roles in Afghanistan. Former Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin served as NATO’s first senior civilian representative in Afghanistan and Turkish officers twice commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). There are currently 500 Turkish soldiers serving with the NATO mission. Turkey never deployed a combat force, however. The Taliban, in turn, avoided targeting Turkish forces; there has only been one attack on a Turkish unit.

Additionally, Turkish state institutions and NGOs conduct a broad range of cultural and educational activities and supply extensive humanitarian aid. Reports confirm the ability of Turkish officials and volunteers to engage with Afghan society on equal terms. Shared religious and cultural elements certainly help. Although the Taliban accuses of Ankara being too pro-Uzbek, Turkey is viewed very positively across Afghan society. This, together with its ability to talk with all sides and its non-combat role in ISAF, places Turkey in a unique position.

However, protecting Kabul airport would change the nature of Turkey’s involvement. While the Afghan government welcomed the idea, the Taliban have repeatedly declared that they will not tolerate even a residual foreign force. That implies that the Taliban would target Turkish troops, risking drastic consequences for Turkey. To avoid this, Turkey’s extended stay requires prior agreement with all Afghan parties, and Ankara will use its diplomatic capacity to seek such an agreement. Moreover, rather than focusing solely on leaving a residual force, Turkey could use its diplomatic and humanitarian leverage to pursue a more comprehensive approach to the Afghan problem.

Intra-Afghan Agreement Needed

The current peace agreement involves only the United States and the Taliban. There is as yet no peace agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. As the withdrawal of NATO forces accelerates, the conflict is now between the Taliban and Afghan government forces. Despite NATO’s decades of investment, the Afghan army is no match for the Taliban. In fact, a major Taliban offensive is already underway. Kabul may not fall immediately, but time is on the side of the insurgents. But if the Taliban overplays its hand and tries to dominate the entire country, there will be a backlash, particularly from the non-Pashtun ethnic communities.

In that case, Afghanistan is likely to descend back into civil war. Under such circumstances, a Turkish military presence would be too risky and unsustainable, even with agreements with the government and the Taliban. Rather than focusing only on protecting Kabul airport, Turkey should place its diplomatic weight behind a peaceful settlement between the Taliban and the government before violence spirals out of control. The first step toward a broader agreement between the Afghan parties themselves would be for Ankara to reach an agreement with each of them. This road is arguably a stony one, but it offers much greater rewards. Turkey would certainly need the support of other countries to overcome the obstacles involved.

The first challenge is to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table with the Afghan government, which Turkey and the international community have so far failed to achieve. Here, Turkey can benefit from its exceptionally good relations with Pakistan and Qatar. Qatar is home to the Taliban’s only external office and relations are cordial. Pakistan, where many senior Taliban leaders reside, has the greatest leverage. Even though large segments of Afghan society frown on Pakistan’s involvement in their country, its influence over the Taliban would be crucial for reaching a negotiated settlement.

Europe should be more active and support Turkey’s efforts diplomatically and economically. As well as that being the morally right thing to do, Europe has a tangible interest too. A resurgence of fighting in Afghanistan would trigger a wave of migration. Afghans are already the second-largest migrant community in Turkey after the 3.6 million Syrian refugees. They also formed the second-largest group of new asylum applications in Germany in 2020. Given Iran’s open-door policy, it would be realistic to expect waves of Afghan migration to Turkey and on to Europe. The specter of a new refugee crisis looms.

*[This was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Role Turkey Can Play in Afghanistan appeared first on 51�Թ�.

Why Making Hagia Sophia a Mosque Again Is Good News

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The reconversion of Hagia Sophia should, therefore, be considered a significant symbolic achievement for the conservative side and a settling of scores with the early republican period. Erdogan is also seeking political gain by treating this issue as an identity battle between conservatives and secularists.

A Tactical Move?

According to a conducted in June by MetroPOLL, a majority of the Turkish population regard the Hagia Sophia controversy as an attempt by the government to divert attention from economic problems and reverse its declining support. Only 30% said they felt it was really just about a change of use from a museum to a mosque. This means that even among supporters of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its ultranationalist junior partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), significant numbers consider the move to be more tactical than ideological — even if they ultimately agree with the outcome.

Erdogan’s earlier statements also suggest that this is a tactical move. During campaigning for the local election in 2019, he responded angrily to a crowd that raised the topic of Hagia Sophia, pointing out that the adjacent Sultan Ahmad Mosque (Blue Mosque) is almost always empty during prayer times. He told his audience that he would consider reconverting the Hagia Sophia if they first filled the Sultan Ahmed Mosque. Given that this was consistent with previous remarks and little has changed since the exchange, political expediency now seems to have outweighed religious or ideological considerations. Erdogan expects reconversion to produce three political benefits.

Erdogan’s Political Expectations

The first benefit is to energize the more conservative segments of his power base by meeting one of their longstanding symbolic demands, in particular in light of the emergence of two splinter parties from the AKP, with the potential to appeal to this electorate. The prominence of the controversy suggests he has succeeded in this.

The second benefit would be to distract the public from the country’s serious socioeconomic problems. Where the youth unemployment rate — including those who have given up seeking work — has reached 24.6%, the government would like to talk about anything but the economy. Here, Erdogan has gained relief, but probably not to the extent he hoped.

The third and most important benefit would be to establish yet another identity battle between conservatives and secularists. This is the arena where Erdogan feels most secure, and the Hagia Sophia issue appeared ideally suited for the AKP’s identity wars. Its symbolism is multi-layered.

First of all, a fight over mosque versus museum slots easily into a religion/modernity binary. It can also be used to create an Islam/Christianity binary as Hagia Sophia was originally built as a church and functioned as such for nine centuries until the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul. Secondly, it awakens historical allusions and underlines the real or perceived dichotomy between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic. Reversing a decision taken by Ataturk also inflames existing debates over the early republican reforms. Finally, the move is also expected to provoke adverse international reactions, thus offering a perfect opportunity for Erdogan to breathe new life into his narrative of Turkey encircled by enemies, with Western powers subverting its sovereignty.

Domestically, Erdogan would expect the reconversion to provoke uproar among secularist circles and lead the secularist People’s Republican Party (CHP) in particular to condemn the decision and mobilize public opposition. This would create another opportunity for him to stir the “culture wars.”

In fact, however, the CHP and most of the other opposition parties avoided this ploy and either supported the reconversion or remained neutral. This approach is in line with the new strategy of CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who has been careful to avoid such traps in recent years. While he has received much criticism from his party base — especially the secularist intelligentsia — for his calculated lack of interest in cultural conflicts, Kilicdaroglu seems to have been successful in preventing Erdogan from picking his fights.

In light of the lack of domestic push-back, the Turkish president will focus on international condemnation to fan the flames of identity conflicts, presenting these reactions as interference in Turkey’s internal affairs — if not outright Islamophobia. Given that certain European countries have their own problems with accommodating Muslim places of worship, European criticisms can easily be framed as hypocritical and anti-Islamic.

In that sense, Hagia Sophia is the perfect fight for Erdogan: it is symbolic, emotionally charged, politically polarizing and consolidates political camps. And all this is achieved with scant real-life consequences. European policymakers should follow the example set by the opposition parties in Turkey and deny Erdogan the trivial rhetorical fights he clearly seeks.

*[The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy. An earlier version of this article was first on the SWP website.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post The Political Implications of the Hagia Sophia Reconversion appeared first on 51�Թ�.

While Turkey’s desire to prevent Kurdish political autonomy is plausibly reconcilable with the Syrian/Russian wish to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity, this cannot be said for the refugee issue. The regime’s northward advance inevitably creates a flow of Syrian refugees toward Turkey, which is amplified by the brutality and vengefulness of the regime forces against the opposition.

The Unabated Bombardment of Idlib in Syria

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Turkey’s use of jihadi factions as proxies throughout the Syrian civil war has further complicated the picture. As the United States and Pakistan experienced in the past, employing jihadi groups as military proxies is like taking the genie out of the bottle and can have long-term disruptive effects.

In Syria, these jihadi groups have become concentrated in Idlib province as they successively lost control of other parts of the country. Although the opposition have proved unable to topple the regime, Turkey both chooses not to give up its patronage of them and cannot do so. It chooses not to abandon these groups because they have been useful in other conflicts, specifically against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and more recently in Libya. But more significantly, Turkey cannot easily renounce its patronage for fear that they might turn against their former benefactor if they feel betrayed.

Caught between a rock and a hard place, Turkey tries to diffuse and postpone the crisis as much as possible. Idlib has been a ticking time bomb for several months already. Numerous Turkish attempts to solve the mounting crisis — such as the Sochi agreement signed by Turkey and Russia in September 2018, as well as the brokered last month — only postponed the inevitable. Now that the Syrian regime has retaken control of most of the country, Idlib is the only opposition-held enclave left and it is no longer possible to postpone the conflict.

While there is no easy long-term solution to the current situation, it is still possible to contain the crisis. At this stage, both sides appear to be applying increasing military pressure. Syrian forces made recent advances and encircled Turkish military outposts in and around Idlib. Turkey responded by deploying additional forces. These escalations can be understood as each side strengthening its hand to gain a better long-term deal.

In one possible compromise, Turkey would accept the regime’s advances but try to preserve a diminished buffer zone further to the north, both to contain the flow of refugees and to again postpone its problem with its proxies. This solution would also receive support from European countries which, like Turkey, consider preventing new refugee movements their top priority.

Once again, any solution would be temporary and Turkey will continue to face the consequences of its Syrian policy in the near future. Whatever compromise is reached, tensions must be eased as the situation can easily run out of control. This could happen simply through human error among the military forces or, more likely, as a result of the jihadi groups’ desire to drag Turkey further into the conflict.

Limitations of Russian-Turkish Cooperation

In a broader perspective, the recent escalation in Idlib highlights the limitations of Turkish-Russian cooperation. In fact, Ankara’s turn to Moscow was dictated more by domestic considerations than geopolitical realities. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, seeking to tighten his grip on power, found anti-Western sentiment to be a useful tool to mobilize support for his ambitious political projects.

Despite being on opposite sides in Syria and later Libya, as well as in other regions such as the Balkans and the Black Sea, both Turkey and Russia — and, more significantly, their two leaders — manage to sustain their cooperation. Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system expanded the cooperation to the military realm. The two countries also deepened their ties in the energy sector: Russia is Turkey’s primary energy supplier, while the TurkStream pipeline enables Russia to bypass Ukraine when supplying European markets. However, as has become clear, despite appearances of increased cooperation, strategic rivalries continue to run deep.

This does not mean that the relationship is on the brink of collapse. President Erdogan and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, have both committed too much to it and have already signaled a wish for reconciliation after brokering a ceasefire on March 5. However, the revelation of deep strategic conflicts will have a long-term impact. Particularly for Western countries, the recent escalation should remind them once again that Turkey has little to benefit from its drift toward Russia. Contrary to the gloomy picture presented in most Western capitals, the possibilities of a long-term Turkish-Russian alliance are still quite limited. So, although under duress, Turkey might be now more open to influence from the West.

Recent statements of support from Washington can be considered a sign that the United States is already aware of this possibility. German financial support for Turkish housing projects in “safe zones” in northern Syria is another case. However, the expectations need to remain realistic. Turkey’s pro-Russian foreign policy will not be reversed overnight, as the two leaders will find some kind of compromise amidst mounting pressures. But the general realization that the Turkish-Russian rapprochement will remain limited will increase the room of maneuver for Western countries and for pro-Western factions within Turkey.

*[The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy. An earlier version of this article was first on the SWP website in February 2020.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

The post What the Idlib Crisis Means for Turkey and Russia appeared first on 51�Թ�.