Shortly before riding into the vice-presidency of Egypt on the back of military tanks, Mohammed El-Baradei told the Foreign Policy (FP) magazine, “” in a criticism of the policies (or apparent lack thereof) of the previous Morsi presidency. The comment appears to have been throwaway humor intended to impress the FP’s readership that is, to put it mildly, inclined to view anything other than opening up foreign markets for “trade” (or exploitation) as unfeasible, impractical and dangerous, coupled with their traditional deeply held negative views of Islam — a disdain seemingly shared by El-Baradei and his liberal secular allies, who appear to have little more than faux concern over the continued massacres of anti-coup protestors by the military upon the orders of General Sisi and continue to label the masses of opposition against the coup as “terrorist” elements. The FP editorial team duly responded by using the line as the title for their .

For all the rhetoric, El-Baradei would be hard pressed to identify exactly what elements of Islamic law the Morsi government was actually given the opportunity to enact in a general sense, let alone in economic policy. In fact, most criticism of the Morsi government centered on the largely continued same failed polity of the previous Mubarak regime. This implicitly would include its neoliberal economic program that earned the praise of the IMF as recently as 2010 and the widening of the wealth disparity within the country, which was one of the factors that led to the revolt in 2011. El-Baradei alludes to this in his piece, stating that the Morsi administration relied on “the same worn-out ideas” simply carried by more religious figures in power.

Committed to the Failing Policies of the Past

One of the reasons that the Muslim Brotherhood-backed government was accepted, if not warmly welcomed, by western governments was because of its openly stated commitment to the proclaimed “free market” left behind by Mubarak (along with their guarantee to maintain the strategically important Camp David agreements with Israel). As noted by , with Morsi as president, a few key Muslim Brotherhood members have espoused free markets, deregulation and attracting foreign direct investment, all of which make up the central rhetoric of neoliberal economics.

Highlighting the acceptance of several central Brotherhood figures to play within the existing neoliberal order rather than comprehensive adherence and application of Shari’a, the Morsi government pursued a loan from the IMF despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s previous condemnation of such loans due to them being interest-based. If there is a single, economically orientated Shari’a principle that is accepted and universally known, it is the general prohibition of interest. However, this position was altered by religious figures supporting the Morsi administration, who claimed that repayments were analogous to administration fees rather than interest.

One of the conditions for the loan was the imposition of a sales tax upon 25 goods, something Morsi announced and subsequently pedalled back on within 24 hours as a result of public outcry. Note, any expert of Shari’a economics will recognize the concept of a sales tax upon goods as another non-Shari’a compliant policy. Part of the campaign to oust Morsi focused upon the fact that he was pursuing such external loans that were deemed harmful to the general population, already barely surviving with below the poverty line and a further hovering just above it.

°Őłó±đĚýTamarod campaign, eventually fronted by El-Baradei and used to legitimize the military ouster of Morsi, gave new impetus to the revolutionary call for an end to the wealth inequality that was one of the hallmarks of the Mubarak-era and has not improved in the two years since his overthrow. It has since emerged that the campaign was also backed by major businessman Naguib Sawiris, the second richest Egyptian who reportedly has an estimated wealth of approximately $3 billion (eclipsed only by his father, Onsi Sawaris). The Sawiris family empire grew under the Mubarak regime, with Naguib reportedly being close to Mubarak’s son, Gamal, who further advanced a neoliberal economic agenda in the last decade prior to the uprisings in 2011. Mubarak himself was not averse to going to bat for the Sawaris business interests, for example, advocating on their behalf with the Syrian government in an attempt to resolve a dispute over an Egyptian-Syrian cell phone enterprise between Orascom Telecoms (run by Sawiris) and Syriatel.

Therefore, it is wholly unsurprising that Sawaris lamented Mubarak’s fall, stating that he was “,” believing he had “done a lot of good for the country.”

Egypt’s Elite-Controlled Economy

The Sawiris clan is a prime example of the massive wealth disparity in Egypt, as it represents the tiny neoliberal elite that controls about 25% of national income. One of the most visible problems with the Egyptian economy is the fact that an elite few control it. When elites control an economy, they use their power to create monopolies and block the entry of new people and firms, which is how Egypt worked for three decades under the Mubarak regime. The government and military own vast swaths of the economy which, by some estimates, is as much as 40%. Even when they did “liberalize,” they privatized large parts of the economy right into the hands of regime insiders and friends. Big businessmen close to the regime, such as Ahmed Ezz (iron and steel), the Sawiris family (multimedia, beverages, and telecommunications), and Mohamed Nosseir (beverages and telecommunications), received not only protection from the state, but also government contracts and large bank loans. Together, this elite put a stranglehold on the economy while creating astronomical profits for regime insiders, blocking opportunities for the vast mass of Egyptians to move out of poverty. Hence, the impressive IMF pleasing macro figures coupled with poverty and desolation at the ground level.

With such financial support for the campaign to oust Morsi, it is unlikely that the military- appointed government is going to change course from the same failed policies of the past, especially given the military’s vested interests. Having already been promised a government of “technocrats,” the code-word for ostensibly politically neutral experts (whose only allegiance is to the nebulus “markets”) who will enact measures to make Egypt more “attractive” for “international investment” and financial aid, the appointment of liberal economist Hazem El-Beblawi as interim prime minister certainly bodes well for those who would like to see a continuation of the neoliberal experiment in the post-Mubarak era.

In his last before agreeing to front the future technocratic government, Beblawi talked about how the Egyptian people needed to understand that the current level of subsidies in Egypt were unsustainable, taking up 25% of the budget, and that “the cancelling of subsidies requires sacrifices from the public, and therefore necessitates their acceptance.” He also praised some of the economic performance of the Mubarak-era, stating: “Right before the revolt, growth rate was 7% for 4 consecutive years, foreign investments were on the rise and investing in the stock market became more attractive.” He failed to note (in the same manner as the IMF) that these macro indicators mean absolutely nothing about the state of the economy as far as the average Egyptian living on the bread line is concerned.

Beblawi’s call for the Egyptian public to sacrifice, echoed the words of El-Baradei two months earlier, who talked about how austerity was the price that Egypt had to pay for the sake of assistance from the IMF, which would then encourage foreign private investment. Indeed, if there is a universal constant in these times of “austerity” — it can be found in the ease with which the moneyed liberal elite inform everyone that the masses have to bear the brunt of suffering in the name of the greater good. As more time elapses after the global economic crash brought on by the financial sector, the liberal elite only appear to have grown more assured as the blame for economic woes has been shifted from greed at the top to the supposed profligacy of those at the bottom. Ideological preferences aside, the state of the Egyptian poor provide ample empirical evidence that you can’t eat neoliberalism.

An Alternative Islamic Economic Policy

Rather than relying upon trying to implement a “cleaner” version of the tried, tested and failed policies of the past, Beblawi might actually do better to consider radical options provided by Shari’a economics. Contrary to the pragmatism displayed by the ousted president, a real attempt to move to an Islamic economic system would entail a revolutionary shift and upheaval of the current economic paradigm. An economy based upon agriculture and heavy industry rather than tourism; wealth and land taxes rather than income and indirect taxation; direct rather than indirect redistributive policies; a currency backed by gold and silver rather than pegged to the dollar; no privatization of vital state resources; the abolition of the predatory stock markets; and, significantly, no interest-based loans or investments with risk-sharing enterprises in their stead.

Such a program would obviously conflict head-on with the vision of a neoliberal world economic order, in part because self-sufficiency means less debt and market opportunity to be exploited by international finance, meaning that it would take a brave person to follow them through. Whether that bravery would be shown to be born out of naivety or a visionary outlook is something that history will judge. But at the very least it is worth understanding that there are possible substantial answers to El-Baradei’s initial throwaway quip that could be explored, even if the Morsi presidency was unable to provide them.

Bravery aside, Beblawi has already proven to be a man of many contradictions. As pointed out by Joshua Stacher, he coined the phrase “” to critically describe the manner in which the Gulf states purchase loyalty for their regimes by largesse rather than through good governance. Ironically, the interim prime minister now leads a government brought in via a coup and financially rewarded by such aforementioned Gulf states. He also resigned from his position in the SCAF administration in 2011 after the Maspero demonstrations which resulted in the deaths of 28 protestors, while he accepted to join the current SCAF-appointed government after the killing of more than 50 protestors at the Republican Guard palace. Beblawi has also continued in his role as prime minister despite the killing of approximately 100 anti-coup protestors on the fringes of the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in at dawn. However, expecting a liberal economist to adopt an economic policy derived from Islamic law is probably a contradiction too far.

This means that Beblawi and his technocratic colleagues will likely move down the line of conventional wisdom in times of “austerity,” acquiring more international debt in exchange for cutting state subsidies, adherence to IMF conditionality, the promotion of stock markets and a call for (more) public sacrifice. None of these ideas appear particularly original or are likely to satisfy an ever-more impoverished population still seeking its bread and social justice, which bear little relation to macro-economic indicators. With the price of basic foodstuffs increasing along the country’s continued dependency on others for their daily bread, the stage is set for future upheavals, irrespective of whether the current military-backed government successfully eliminates its opponents from the political scene.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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Bassem Youssef is the kind of Egyptian that people in the west can relate to. He was feted in western media as a cause celebre for freedom of speech after an arrest warrant was issued against him during March, in the wake of numerous libel suits brought against him by members of the public (initially beginning from one of his own work colleagues) and culminating in a charge that he insulted the president and Islam on his popular television program, “El Bernameg” – an Egyptian version of the Daily Show. His final show, filmed and broadcast before the huge demonstrations in Egypt which resulted in the military coup on July 3, was almost entirely a mockfest of then President Mohammed Morsi and his supporters, with little criticism of its opposition. Listed as one of the world’s top 100 influential personalities by Time magazine earlier this year, he has been credited with helping turn public opinion against the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies.

After the coup which removed Morsi, a number of media channels were immediately closed down under the justification that they were inciting violence, including the branch of Al-Jazeera Egypt, along with numerous other satellite stations with a connection to Islamic movements and personalities. Given his own recent history and liberal politics, it might be considered surprising that Youssef was supportive of the media clampdown, which included the arrests of several employees of the various stations, despite it being carried out by the military with no due process.

His public pronouncements on Twitter (where he has more than 1.7 million followers) since July 3, include the following: “The MB regime was about to close down channels and target media and politicians” (it should be noted that the vast majority of independent Egyptian satellite channels are funded by secular and liberal opposition); “Instead of writing numerous tweets[,] here's one to sum it all up[:] MB are the new form of Nazis[.] Got it? I said it on the show and saying it now;” and on July 5 that, “MB leadership sending its youths to die at army HQs to victimize themselves against the world. Blood for publicity. Cheap. #not_a_coup.” Having indulged in both apologism and victim-blaming, he made no comment other than “Kifaya” (enough), after the killing of more than 50 protestors in front of the Republican Guard headquarters, who were gunned down by the army on the morning of July 7.  

Liberal Hypocrisy

While Youssef was extremely vocal against what he considered attempts to silence him by the Morsi presidency, as well as some of the inflammatory rhetoric emanating from the pro-Morsi camp, he appears to have no public stance against either the independent media clampdown or the killing of protesters. This liberal hypocrisy summed up in the stance taken by Bassem Youssef is one of the most characteristic features of the political events in Egypt at the moment, from both within and outside.

First and foremost, among the liberal hypocrites would be Mohammad el-Baradei, the Nobel prize winning former IAEA inspector. In an interview with CNN on July 4, he claimed that the removal of the president by the military was not a coup but rather the equivalent of a recall (with the recalled candidate and close associates since being held incommunicado by the military), supported the closure of independent media as a necessary step for the immediate future, and made no comment other than “violence begets violence” after the killing of those protesting the continued imprisonment of their “recalled” candidate. Given his previous statement that he had, “emphasized to all the security authorities here that everything has to be done in due process,” and that “I would be the first one to shout loud and clearly if I see any sign of regression in terms of democracy,” his response could generously be described as underwhelming.

His political party, the National Salvation Front, issued a statement which condemned “all acts of violence,” including assaults on military barracks and army officers – a nod to the acceptance of the military’s narrative that the killings were, in fact, the result of “a terrorist group” trying to storm the building (an assertion not backed by any witness statements, but accepted without question at the eerily Mubarak-era style press conference held after the event). This, at least, was somewhat better than the response of the leftist former presidential candidate, Hamdeen Sabahi, who stated that the only beneficiaries of the event were those who wanted to drive the country into civil war, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Dishonest Campaign

While this hypocrisy has become ever more apparent as the events in Egypt unfold, a step back finds that the movement against the former president appears to be predicated on the same type of dishonesty. The Tamarrod campaign built popular support based upon a petition that complained about worsening security and economic conditions, along with prominent complaints that the country was “begging” the IMF for loans and continuing to “follow in the footsteps” of America.

Though there is room for debate as to how much responsibility the Morsi government had, given the lack of real control over state institutions and the hangover of more than 60 years of dictatorship, these are all valid grievances that are justification for widespread discontent and demonstrations. The same points were continuously raised by the spokesperson for the campaign, a young Nasiri activist called Mahmoud Badry, who consistently complained how the country was a “prisoner” to the IMF, an organisation that only wanted ill for the country. He demanded an independent Egypt – the Egypt of Gamal Abdul Nasser (an apt allusion given that he was the first Egyptian dictator to move decisively and harshly against the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1950s).

And yet, Tamarrod’s candidate for prime minister was none other than el-Baradei, a supporter of private enterprise and a believer in the austerity that Egypt would have to implement to pay for the IMF loan, a position he has consistently maintained. He is also hardly a figure who would take Egypt away from its position as a close US ally, spending time on the phone with Secretary of State John Kerry the day before the coup took place, apparently in order to convince him of its necessity. A man with little street support in Egypt, he polled in single figures at the time of the presidential elections, and is widely seen as a favourite of the western media. Whether el-Baradei is manipulating Tamarrod, or Tamarrod is manipulating el-Baradei, or they are both manipulating the public, is up for discussion. But what is clear, is that the grievances and demands that gathered the people in Tahrir Square appear to have little to do with the machinations taking place.

This hypocrisy is not limited to liberal Egypt, with the statements from the EU, Britain and the United States in the wake of the coup effectively accepting the events without much reserve. The Obama administration’s refusal to use the word “coup”, due to the financial aid implications involved, is further testimony to lack of principle on all sides. Details have since emerged in the American media of the extent of the government’s knowledge and support of the moves by the Egyptian army in the week leading to the formal removal of Morsi. And while both pro- and anti-Morsi supporters are united in their desire to see Egypt take an independent path, the political leaderships ostensibly representing the two sides clearly rely upon the patronage of the United States, evidence of its continuing hegemony over the politics of the country, and the fact that no one is willing or able to meet public demand.

Slipping Back into the Mubarak Era

It appears in the immediate aftermath of events that the side that has benefited the most is the military and other remnants of the previous regime. Adly Mansour, the current president installed by the military, was previously the head of the constitutional court, and headed the constitutional hearings in 2012 that scrapped the “political isolation” law, which prohibited members of the old regime from contesting elections. The re-installed attorney general, Abdel Meguid Mahmoud, was previously removed by Morsi as a result of the acquittal of those accused of the “camel battle” episode, when Tahrir Square was stormed during the revolution of January 25. Since being re-installed, he has offered his resignation stating that he wanted “all of the public prosecution decisions to be free of any doubt or suspicion,” but not before he had issued more than 200 arrest warrants and travel bans for Muslim Brotherhood members. Along with these stalwarts of the previous regime, the hated police force has also taken the opportunity to rebuild its image as a “protector of the people”, a novel re-invention for one of the institutions whose widespread torture and abuse was one of the major grievances leading to the uprising against the Mubarak regime, back in 2011.

As Egypt slips back into the era of Mubarak, who was formerly a close ally of the west and seen as a strong bulwark against Islamic movements, the liberal elements cheer on from the sidelines. Unable to win any open election — presidential, parliamentary or otherwise — they are now riding into government on the back of tanks called out by popular demonstrations that were gathered upon a platform which they themselves do not agree wholeheartedly with, but were happy to co-opt. Variously applauding and assenting to the clampdown upon their opposition, as Bassem Youssef admitted in his own opinion piece written earlier this June — Egyptian liberals and secularists “”. While he contended that this occurred as a result of the Morsi presidency, the events of the last few days suggest that the problem lies deeper.

*[This article was originally published by .]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51łÔąĎ’s editorial policy.

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