In 2018, the government launched Ayushman Bharat, a health insurance scheme for the bottom 40% of India’s population. Access remains patchy. Furthermore, health-care infrastructure remains pitiable, acute poverty persists and so does lack of education or awareness. This leaves millions vulnerable to exploitation or neglect, or both. A 2018 by The Lancet found that 2.4 million Indians die of treatable conditions every year. Of the 136 nations examined in this study, India was in the worst situation.

In this guest edition of The Interview, Nilanjana Sen talks to Dr. I.P. Singh, a senior consultant in plastic and reconstructive surgery at the Indraprastha Apollo Hospitals, New Delhi, about the state of the health-care system in India, the role of the private sector and the challenges faced by professionals in the field. 

This interview was conducted prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Nilanjana Sen: Is corruption a big issue in India’s health-care system?

I.P. Singh: Corruption has been all pervasive in every sector and every walk of life right from the early 1960s. Unfortunately, it has spread to the health-care sector as well. In health care, corruption takes myriad forms such as unnecessary procedures, overcharging for necessary procedures and not providing treatment or services that have already been paid for. The mentality that pervades the environment outside the medical profession has finally seeped into health care too, and it is not possible to insulate the profession from the outside environment.

Quacks and abound and comprise between 57% to 58% of India’s so-called doctors. I remember a case from some time ago when some quack claimed that he had removed a dead serpent from the abdomen of a lady. He probably removed a necrose intestine and claimed to have found a snake. In another famous case, a doctor in Assam claimed to have transplanted a into a male patient. This doctor wanted to be recognized for his achievement even though the patient died.

Doctors and quacks also prescribe fake or substandard drugs in remote areas. We have to realize that 70% of our population lives in far-flung rural areas, and it is very difficult to monitor what happens there. Most people are barely literate, so a lot of unethical practices go unnoticed and unchecked. Corruption is now endemic in India’s health-care system.

Sen: In such an unequal country, what is the real state of health-care coverage? Can the new government-backed insurance system be a success?

Singh: There are two main reasons for poor health-care coverage. First, we don’t have enough trained medical personnel. The World Health Organization a ratio of 1:1,000, i.e., we should have one doctor for every thousand persons. For India, the doctor-population ratio statistic is unclear and murky. We do not know whether we have one doctor for 1,700, 1,500 or 1,000 persons. We lack clarity because we do not know how many doctors are registered medical practitioners, how many practitioners are still active, how many are out of practice and how many are quacks. The government admits that more than 75% of the primary health-care system is managed by people who are . This is one of the major reasons for poor health care in India.

Second, most of the trained medical personnel are not willing to serve in rural areas, which lack basic facilities and infrastructure such as electricity and roads. Even though basic amenities have improved in recent years, working at rural medical centers is often demoralizing. There is rampant pilfering of drugs, malfunctioning equipment and terrible waste management. Further, there is a lack of professional development opportunities, poor management and a lack of transparency at all levels.

The new insurance backed system of Ayushman Bharat is a very good idea to start with, but I hope that the people who have planned it have done their math correctly. It is an extremely difficult and arduous task to plan health care for roughly people. If you look at health care across the world, uniform and fairly good health coverage is limited to Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and some other countries in Europe.

Health care is fairly decent for most people in the US, but the American health-care system has its share of major flaws. Approximately 33% of the American population does not have and is left at the mercy of God. Many more Indians find themselves in a similar situation. India’s large population means that the government has to provide health care at scale and, therefore, must get its mathematics right for the program to be successful.

Ayushman Bharat must not only sort out finance but also build a team of dedicated staff. Only then can they plug gaps and leakages in the system. Last year, I was reading the newspaper and was shocked to learn that were practicing fraud. Of these, the government barred 97 hospitals from its insurance scheme. This year, it barred another . Such fraud will derail Ayushman Bharat.

Sen: The present government seeks to involve the private sector in the health-care system. Will this help improve accountability and reduce malpractices?

Singh: The intention behind this idea is good, but one man or one agency with good intentions cannot set everything right. There has to be a tectonic cultural shift. Many unscrupulous people will claim benefits at the cost of voiceless people who will lose out. There will be cases of wrong billings, overcharging or charges for investigations that are simply not done. So, auditing the system and holding fraudsters accountable is crucial. However, I am not sure the government would be able to find so many auditors or be able to prosecute most fraudsters. Besides, there is an acute lack of basic infrastructure.

Sen: What exactly is this lack of infrastructure you are referring to?

Singh: As I mentioned earlier, there is an acute shortage of medical facilities in the rural areas. Having said that, we must remember that health-care infrastructure doesn’t mean medical facilities such as a hospital or a primary health center alone. It also includes good training institutions, laboratories and research facilities.

There are hardly any such facilities in this country except for the Central Drug Research Institute in Lucknow, the Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology in Hyderabad, the All India Institute of Medical Sciences and a handful of other places. Even existing facilities lack funds for research, which is dominated by foreign pharmaceutical firms who have the money to invest in research. They market, advertise and sell their drugs, equipment and medical devices at astronomical prices to make large profits. Sometimes, these drugs are hyped up and private hospitals become willing partners in prescribing them because they get a share of the profit.

One drug called Xigris was used for septicemia. A single dose of Xigris cost more than $8,000, and I know of no patient who survived after being given this drug. Later, Eli Lilly this drug from the market. Big pharmaceutical companies often sell such drugs in developing countries like India to make a killing.

Sen: Are you saying big pharmaceutical companies are taking advantage of patients?

Singh:  Yes, big pharmaceutical companies spend huge sums on advertisements and rope in doctors through various inducements. Take the case of knee and hip implants in India. Many implants, which were stopped in developed countries a good two or three decades ago, were being used in India until very recently. If this is not taking advantage of patients in poor countries, I don’t know what else is.

Sen: If there are so many malpractices by big pharmaceutical companies, what can the government do to control them?

Singh: It is very difficult to exercise control over these companies because most of them are multinational. They do not lie under India’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, India depends on other countries for active pharmaceutical ingredients. In fact, 66.69% come from alone.

Foreign players are not prepared to negotiate with the government on price. The drug controller of India has tried to prices of some drugs such as antibiotics, anti-tuberculosis medicines and antimalarial tablets, but this has led companies to stop production of many life-saving drugs when their profit margins have gone down.

Sen: Is that not sheer blackmail and profiteering?

Singh: Yes, it is. Once the companies stop production, there are shortages and panic often grips the market. People start to hoard essential medicines and sell them in the black market. Once the trade goes underground, prices become very difficult to control, further aggravating the original problem. So, companies know that they have bargaining power over the government.

Sen: What are the other issues facing Indian health care?

Singh: Medical education has declined precipitously. When I studied at King George’s Medical College, my professors were extraordinary. Today, medical colleges are run by politicians, bureaucrats and property dealers along with corporate houses. It is bizarre that people who ran sweet shops or dairy farms have suddenly started medical colleges. Many students who graduate from such institutions are doctors only in name and are really little better than quacks.

The Medical Council of India is deeply compromised. Ketan Desai, one of its past presidents, was found guilty of . He was convicted of taking bribes to approve shady institutions as recognized medical colleges. With the fox guarding the henhouse, it is no surprise that regulation is utterly ineffective in safeguarding the interests of citizens.

There is another major issue. During British rule, the (IMS) and state medical services provided the backbone of health care to a limited population. After independence, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and the Indian Police Service continued, but the IMS was discontinued. Health care was now the responsibility of the states, but they were not given taxation powers to fund it.

India never planned its health-care system properly. Politicians and IAS officers had no domain expertise. Doctors, nurses and medical professionals were cut out of policymaking. Unsurprisingly, India’s health-care system is in shambles.


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Modi has shown a penchant for personal engagement with the leaders of major world powers. While critics have warned against the dangers of personalizing diplomatic encounters, many view Modi’s proactive interactions as beneficial for India. Even as the country has substantively moved away from being a mere , there are glaring regional and global realities that will require its attention. Its immediate neighborhood will continue to be a priority for India even as it strives to increase its global footprint.

In this guest edition of The Interview, Nilanjana Sen and Joy Mitra talk to Harsh V. Pant, the head of the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi and professor of international relations at King’s College London, about the foreign policy priorities of the Modi government, the changing international and regional challenges, and the future of India’s global engagements.

The transcript has been edited for clarity. The interview took place before recent developments in Jammu and Kashmir.

Nilanjana Sen: Your , “Indian Foreign Policy: The Modi Era,” in which you call Narendra Modi the “foreign policy prime minister,” was released earlier this year. What do you find most remarkable about Modi’s performance in his first term, especially on the foreign and security policy front?

Harsh V. Pant: As someone who was a former chief minister of a state, a lot of people were concerned about the impact Modi’s arrival as the prime minister may have on the trajectory of Indian foreign policy — and it was, in fact, dramatic. State chief ministers in India usually focus on foreign policy with a view to secure foreign direct investment for their own states, so the focus is largely on economic diplomacy rather than viewing foreign policy as something that would serve a broader strategic purpose. So the concerns were valid, but Modi began his term with an invitation to regional heads for his swearing-in ceremony in 2014, signaling that foreign policy will be a priority area for him.

Second, he has publicly linked India’s domestic transformation to Indian foreign policy priorities, taking foreign policy discourse beyond the confines of a small elite.

Third, Modi has made foreign policy a whole of government enterprise, rather than it being solely the domain of the Ministry of External Affairs [MEA]. He has been instrumental in moving toward integrating military force more clearly and substantively into diplomacy, whereas in the past the two operated in silos. This is ironic because, in the realm of foreign policy, the shadow of military force always looms in the backdrop, and how one calculates moves and countermoves depends on the military balance of power.

Modi has recalibrated this a bit. His government has probed how far India could climb the escalation ladder — whether it was during the surgical strikes in 2016 [against suspected militant bases in Pakistan-administered Kashmir], or the Balakot airstrikes in 2019, or even in the case of Doklam in 2017. So, there has been a calculated move to do this and, more importantly, defense forces today are becoming more integral in India’s outreach and defense diplomacy.

In the past, with respect to our outreach to the US, there were ideological constraints that prevented signing of agreements like the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement [LEMOA], the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement [COMCASA], etc., but today those constraints are gone, and we are comfortable with a military engagement. And this brings me to the last point here, which is recognizing that issue-based alignments are a necessity for India in this day and age.

Joy Mitra: In the aftermath of the Pulwama attack in February 2019 and the retaliatory airstrikes conducted in Balakot, do you think India has developed a sustained policy toward Pakistan to deal with the security threats that emanate from across the border? 

Pant: When Modi started his first term, everyone asked what is different about his engagement with Pakistan. But by the end of the first term, everyone seemed to suggest that it was dramatically different, perhaps even problematic. However, any rational assessment of his approach toward Pakistan has to be balanced. Given the mandate he received, he began his term first with outreach efforts toward Pakistan. But after the Pathankot and Uri attacks, Modi realized that this approach was not paying dividends. 

In fact, Modi’s predecessors have also grappled with the question of how to deal with Pakistan under a nuclear overhang. Pakistan is a geographical constraint, so everyone has tried to deal with it. During his term as prime minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh felt escalation wasn’t a good choice for India, and there was a time that strategy was useful since it gave India the strategic space to convince the world that India is not the loony one. 

Modi realized that this traditional framework was not working, so when terror struck again, the idea that he had to try another option, which was the military option, settled in. He probed how far India could climb the escalation ladder, and I think the first attempt was the surgical strike in 2016. India saw the impact it had and assessed what was right and what went wrong with the approach, and by the time it reached Pulwama-Balakot crisis, there was an assessment that India can climb the escalation ladder. Unlike cross-border land operations where there is the choice of plausible deniability, the use of airpower is certainly riskier because one really doesn’t know how it will end. Modi decided to use airpower not in the Kashmir theater but in mainland Pakistan, so in that sense, he changed the dynamic, especially in terms of how the international community reacted to the use of force. 

Perhaps, India now feels that the use of force will not be met with a negative reaction by the international community, which does empathize with India’s efforts at grappling with terror. For almost four years, every international platform was used by India to make a case for isolating Pakistan, and it yielded dividends when Balakot airstrikes happened, and I think there was method in what was being done by India. Even after the Balakot episode when Masood Azhar’s case for his designation as a global terrorist came up, all major powers rallied toward India. There was a sense within the international community that if this is not done then India will be forced to escalate. So the onus of de-escalation is now on Pakistan and not on India. It seems then that Modi has managed to change the calculus. 

Whether or not this is a permanent situation remains to be seen, but my sense is that the message has been delivered. Modi is unwilling to yield. He could have invited [Pakistani Prime Minister] Imran Khan for his swearing-in ceremony, but he chose not to. He is also consciously engaging with BIMSTEC and other platforms to not be held hostage to Pakistan’s ways. However, with a skewed civil-military balance, the nature of problems within Pakistan is structural. Whether the current policy of airstrikes will remain the way it is also depends on Pakistan’s choices. 

Sen: India’s immediate periphery in South Asia is characterized by a variety of security, economic and developmental challenges. How has India responded to these challenges under Modi’s leadership, and what foreign policy trajectory should India follow?  

Pant: South Asia’s regional politics can be located in two geographies. One is toward the west, where India can link itself to the West Asian landscape, and the other is toward the east, wherein it draws on the economic viability and economic systems of East and Southeast Asia.

Largely, it is the problem of state capacity in South Asia that hinders economic development, social harmony, even regional integration. The periphery remains problematic partly because of the inherent weaknesses in the state capacities of these countries. This will continue to be a problem, and it will have externalities for India which we will have to deal with. The best that India can do is provide indirect capacity building support to the countries. The challenge for India is that the moment it tries to do too much, it is blamed for interfering in the internal affairs of neighboring countries.

The other issue is that regional states now see China as an alternative and a great benefactor. China is looked at as a country that can deliver. As far as India is concerned, it is still very poor in terms of delivery on projects. There are time delays that lead to an escalation of costs, and sometimes projects never get completed. One of the good things Modi did when he came to office was his decision to not sign new MoUs [memoranda of understanding] with the neighbors. His focus was the completion of existing projects that were in the pipeline. If India can’t deliver in its neighborhood, then there will be doubts about it establishing a global footprint. The recognition that unless India delivers, it is all pointless is now there.

Hopefully, this will also continue at the level of foreign policy during Modi’s second term. The aspirations in regional states are rising, and they often look to China because of the belief that it will deliver. I feel constantly using the China card and the more overt positioning vis-à-vis China might be counterproductive for India. What India can do is to alert the neighbors about certain developments such as what happened in Hambantota, under the rubric of the Belt and Road Initiative [BRI] in Sri Lanka. India, with its limited resources, can actually focus on the building capacity of these countries in terms of, say, improved project assessments. Say if China puts forth a project proposal to a particular state, India could help with feasibility and cost assessments. It is better at such work because of a more participatory approach. Our approach to aid is more bottom-up.

In terms of articulation, what Modi has done is sensible. The traditional idea of what constitutes South Asia is increasingly redundant. India’s periphery is not simply the countries that are part of SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation]. South Asia as a geographical region is evolving. Until a few decades back, Afghanistan was not considered part of South Asia, but now it is; similarly Myanmar and Thailand, which are now part of BIMSTEC [Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation]. It doesn’t make sense for India to not consider these countries as part of India’s immediate neighborhood.

Such a consideration shifts the focus away from the West, which is complicated because of the relationship with Pakistan, and it also links India to the Southeast Asian growth story. It situates the Bay of Bengal in the larger Indo-Pacific paradigm. So, you have that sense that if the world is looking at Indo-Pacific as one geography, then the Bay of Bengal is important. India can now reimagine its geography and its strategic periphery by breaking away from the constraints of the past. This is something India has been trying to do, and it is helpful domestically because it allows the northeast of India to develop. If the northeast is connected to Myanmar, Thailand, Southeast Asia, then it is helpful.

But the larger issue of transitions within the countries on the periphery will continue. In the last few years, very explicit pro-China and pro-India constituencies have developed in the neighboring countries, and this will continue. Going forward, it is important for India to acknowledge that it has not done enough as a provider of economic security, in terms of economic integration, infrastructure development and connectivity.

Sen: In the Indo-Pacific region, India is trying to leverage its relationship with other powers to counter China’s strategic assertiveness. To that effect, India is part of the so-called Quad that includes the United States, Japan and Australia. India, however, is often viewed as the “weakest link” in the group. How would you explain India’s approach toward the Quad: hesitant or pragmatic?

Pant: India’s approach was hesitant when the Quad first came into existence in 2007. A lot has changed since then, and India’s approach is more pragmatic now. My sense is that if there was any other administration in Washington, India would have been comfortable taking a more overt position. After all, Modi did go ahead and sign LEMOA, COMCASA, etc. He made America such a big part of his global outreach.

But [US President Donald] Trump, as a leader, is very complicated. Trump’s approach to global economic order is very problematic for India and this means that India will have to find ways of working with other countries, including China. When you see India and China together, you see them talking about the economic order. This is because these two countries have a lot at stake in what Trump is doing. While strategically India still pivots toward America, there are issues on which the Trump administration has made it very difficult for India to not engage with Chinese.

This does impact India’s ability to participate in the Quad. Yes, New Delhi wants certain things to go forward, but it also doesn’t want to raise red flags in Beijing — although I feel that Beijing works on the assumption that India is in the other camp. They recognize that they can work with India on certain issues, but if you look at their narrative, you will see that for them India has become part of this larger containment game that the US is playing.

India officially still wants to hedge. If you see Quad 2.0, it is about connectivity, infrastructure and whether the Quad members can have an alternative plan to China’s BRI.  If you look at the military exercises, for example, there are no Quad military exercises happening. The Quad evokes a slight unease for India, and I feel even Australia shares that concern about making it a strategic pillar for everything that is happening in the region.

There is also this question of differing definitions of the Indo-Pacific, whether the term is geographic or political. Australia and the US have a definition of Indo-Pacific that ends at the Indian subcontinent, while India’s definition extends all the way to the coast of Africa. Unless there is some agreement on the geographical and political parameters of the engagement, it is very difficult to concur on the remit of this security engagement. The Australians, for example, want to be part of the Malabar exercises, but India continues to be ambivalent. Perhaps India does not want to give China the message that all is over.

If we consider the Wuhan summit, which happened post-Doklam crisis, it was an effort at this recalibration. This recalibration was driven partly because India wanted to bring down tensions after the Doklam crisis, but also in part because of economic tensions with the US. It also happened because China is concerned about what the US is doing, the trade war and so forth. No nation seems willing to make hard choices.

If tomorrow there is a deal between the US and China, both of them might come to a modus vivendi, and then the US could decide that it would not go with the Quad or the idea of Indo-Pacific. India needs to be aware of that probability. This is also something that one observes in Australia’s engagement with China or Japan’s engagement with China. This effort to recalibrate is in large part due to the inability to gauge what the Trump administration wants, and it is this uncertainty which is pushing countries like India toward a hedging position rather than a more categorical assertion on approach to China.

Mitra: As far as the Indo-US relationship is concerned, what can we expect in Modi’s second term? Is there a common strategic purpose between the two countries or is there an increasing incoherence in terms of their strategic priorities, and how much of this coherence or incoherence is driven at the level of individual leadership?

Pant: While there is nothing wrong with politicians taking decisions driven by domestic compulsions, it is not clear what exactly is driving the decisions taken by President Donald Trump. This lack of clarity is extremely difficult to manage. With every other president of the US, you could identify a few broad parameters around which their foreign policy revolved. I don’t imply that during the tenure of former presidents like Barack Obama that India did not have issues with the US, but with Trump it is particularly difficult to formulate a policy response to issues. Modi tried and he did succeed when he visited Trump in Washington, DC, in June 2017.

One of the key strands of India’s policy has been to convince the US to consider the rise of India in its long-term interest and, therefore, the strategic picture should not be lost sight of. The two countries may continue having differences over their respective stand on individual issues like Iran or Russia and they may have problems on trade issues, but India would not want to lose sight of the big picture and would have the same expectation from the US.

If we look at it rationally, Trump has not been bad for India. His Pakistan and China policies have been tough, and this suits India. However, the problem we have is two-fold. Consider the South Asia strategy the US came up with during Trump’s first term. It was very positive about India’s role in Afghanistan, but then suddenly the route to negotiation was taken to India’s exclusion. On trade, there is a constituency in America that believes that the trade imbalance is a consequence of what China and India are doing.

In such a situation, what should India do? The question is whether you can convince the US that there is a long-term future of India’s relationship with the US and that this has been India’s strategy throughout. But this is a difficult proposition with Trump because he is a transactionalist. He is not looking at the long-term strategic picture and is only interested in the immediate benefits at the cost of long-term deliverables.

Sen: Key powers like the US, China and Russia have become very assertive toward shaping the global order. In your assessment, how does Modi manage bilateral relationships between these three competing powers?

Pant: I think one of Modi’s successes in his last term was how India managed major powers. But I believe some of this balance is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. In particular, it is hard to tell how the US-China relationship would evolve. The trade and technology conflict that is happening will impinge on countries like India because India has assumed that these major powers, especially on the economic side of the equation, are more or less on the same page, but it does not look that way now. Even the issue of technology has become contentious. There was a time when trade and technology were seen as public goods — not discounting the fact that the US would be the dominant factor, but, by and large, the US was benign enough to let everyone use it and take its advantage.

But it does not look that way now. India today has to shape its own policy priorities because it has articulated that it wants to be a leading power. It is not simply about balancing, it is also about the desire to shape the global order. And if India wants to shape global order, it is inevitable that India eventually would have to make some difficult choices.

How India manages its relations with Russia is also becoming challenging because Russia’s traditional role is being questioned today. Many in India question whether it is the same Russia of the past, given the changing priorities of the country. Considering Russia’s close engagement with China, how far can India actually go with the Russians?

The challenges are manifold in terms of India’s engagement with major powers, but the question is whether India can be transactional enough to get some advantages from the bilateral engagements. One of the ways in which India solved the Russia challenge was by rewarding them with big defense orders. Such actions are not sustainable because it can happen maybe only once in three or four years. But that does seem to be becoming the norm, even if only for a declaratory purpose where every year we have these bilateral summits with the Russians and we at least announce a deal.

Part of the problem is also that there is so little else to show in this relationship — economically, there is nothing much happening, and politically and diplomatically we are increasingly thinking differently. Russians, for example, question the whole idea of the Indo-Pacific, whereas for India it is central to the way of looking at the world now. Russia’s engagement with Pakistan is deepening and Russia’s engagement in Afghanistan is very different from what it was in the past. Russia’s interest in the Middle East is also problematic because it is more or less in confrontation with the US. The diverging interests between India and Russia will be something to watch out for.

I feel what Modi did effectively in his first term is that he understood that diplomacy with major powers sometimes has to be done at the leadership level because we have very strong personalities running these powers. I feel this trend will continue and it makes sense to do this. But whether it will yield dividends in terms of resolving the larger policy problems that India faces is hard to tell. Perhaps India will simply have to manage such trends till another equilibrium is reached.

Mitra: What do you make of Modi’s outreach to China at the Wuhan Summit? Do you think summits of this nature where dialogue is initiated at the highest level of the leadership could offer a template to manage or de-escalate Doklam-style crises going forward?

Pant: If it happens again, not only would there be a question mark over the informal summitry, but it would also mean that Modi will have to face some challenges at the personal level. If he has staked his reputation on stabilizing the relationship with China, then a repeated mishap would mean he would have to respond. The onus will be on him. If diplomacy is so personalized, that is the risk you face.

The border issue is a big-ticket issue in some ways for India, and in this term, China is going to be a priority for Modi. One of the ways in which he has tried to anchor this problem is by going back to something India harped on back in the 1990s. So, the narrative now is that China and India will have to work together on global issues. Since the global economic order is currently under stress, they will explore the possibility of working together to stabilize the order and become the guarantors of globalization. This effort at working together will have an impact on the relationship, but whether it will resolve long-standing bilateral problems is hard to tell.

Sen: What impedes India’s defense modernization? Are we only limited by financial resources, and will this be a high priority for Modi in his second term?

Pant: The problem is largely institutional. I feel defense modernization should be a priority for India. The country is bringing the military more sensibly into diplomacy as part of its strategy to attain foreign policy objectives. Whether it is for projecting power or humanitarian aid — consider the use of naval forces — or for deterrence and compellence purposes that we do with China and Pakistan.

The question is also whether India is effectively utilizing its military instrument. India’s institutional structures are not capable of meeting the kind of threats that it faces today. India found it difficult to add just 36 Rafale fighter air crafts to its inventory. Think about the scale of what we are talking about. India is short by at least seven or eight squadrons in terms of what it needs to manage its main challenges. There has to be some way of thinking in a manner that enables India to handle this situation smartly and swiftly. But, clearly, that has not happened given the financial, political and process-related constraints. The lack of transparency in India’s defense procurement system means that almost every procurement is marred in corruption allegations.

India needs to start thinking more strategically about national security and force posture. Every serious country does that. It needs to make better projections about the future and, unfortunately, that kind of work has not happened in India yet. India is always found firefighting and is mostly making ad-hoc decisions. As India looks to modernize its forces looking at the changing balance of power with China, it is also trying to focus on “Make in India.”

This compounds the problem because “Make in India” is not going to happen in five years. If you want to develop manufacturing capacity in India, it will take at least another decade in terms of getting the infrastructure in place and then operationalizing the policy. Immediate threat landscape does not allow that kind of time. The government is right that India needs domestic manufacturing capacity, but there are immediate threats that have to be dealt with. Unless India brings its ends, ways and means into balance, it will be found wanting in managing national security.

Mitra: Would you agree that Modi is rewiring India’s engagement with the world and this will continue as a consequence of his re-election in 2019?

Pant: It has been debated whether Modi’s foreign policy is more style than substance, whether the change is more superficial in terms of his own personal engagements, rather than any fundamental level shift in foreign policy.

My assessment is that there has been a shift in both the style of how we conduct our foreign policy under Modi as well as the substance of India’s engagement with the world. It’s more outgoing and proactive, it’s focused on outcomes and, more importantly, it is aimed at mobilizing global public opinion to achieve concrete outcomes for India. Five years, however, is a short time period to assess any substantive shift in terms of foreign policy. But my sense is that at the end of Modi’s 10 years in office, we will see a very different kind of Indian engagement with the international system.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In 2014, the world’s largest democracy elected the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power, with Narendra Modi as the prime minister. Modi came to victory on the promise of creation of jobs and development across India. This of 10 million jobs hasn’t been met, and in 2018 in India was at a 45-year high. An independent suggests that the informal sector, where around 11 million jobs were lost, was most severely hit by government policies such as demonetization.

But as Modi seeks reelection five years on, India ranks 77th among 190 nations in the World Bank’s . This is a marked improvement from 142nd place in 2014. Policies such as the financial inclusion initiative have successfully integrated 310 million marginalized Indians into the banking system. The BJP government has also initiated notable technology interventions. The new captures real time information from farmers on harvest losses. In order to improve connectivity, the government has prioritized the availability and usage of broadband services across the country.

On May 19, the six-weeks-long exercise to elect 543 members to India’s next Parliament will come to an end. This time around, not only is Modi’s promise of acche din — Hindi for “good days” — being questioned, there is also growing concern of the challenge posed by the ruling party to the secular fabric of the country. As issues like construction of a Hindu temple in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh — which saw the mosque in 1992 that led to intercommunal rioting, resulting over 2,000 fatalities — repeatedly find their way in the election manifesto of the BJP, it stirs fears among the public of a very specific kind of majoritarian politics.

The in states like Uttar Pradesh have come together in an attempt to and challenge the divisive politics of the ruling party. In a similar move, the chief ministers of West Bengal, , and of Andhra Pradesh, have maintained their willingness to unite with other opposition parties at the national level to “” from the BJP. The BJP continues to maintain its commitment to fight against dynastic politics, corruption and terrorism. It has pitched the election to the Indian voters as a choice they will make between a .

In this guest edition of The Interview, Nilanjana Sen and Varuna Shunglu talk to Maheish Girri, MP, the national secretary of the Bharatiya Janata Party, about the significance of the 2019 election, the government’s economic policies, the growing importance of the issue of national security, as well as how India should respond when its core interests are challenged in the international arena.

The text has been lightly edited for clarity.

Varuna Shunglu: What makes India’s 2019 general election special? On what issues is the Bharatiya Janata Party fighting this election?

Maheish Girri: The 2019 general election will play a pivotal role in shaping India’s image as an emerging nation. If you look at it from a political standpoint, 2019 Lok Sabha [lower house of India’s Parliament] election has managed to unify a variety of opposition parties into a so-called . This arrangement comprising of opposition parties does not aim to promote development and is only aimed at unseating Narendra Modi and the BJP, thus pushing the voter to between mazboot (strong) and mazboor (helpless) sarkar (government).

In the words of our prime minister, the “2014 Election was [fought] to fulfil hopes and expectations, but the 2019 general election is going to fulfil the dreams of Indians.”

In the last five years, India has seen considerable progress on various fronts under the visionary leadership of Narendra Modi, and if he is not elected back to power, India will again fall prey to dynastic politics that led India into a state of hopelessness, with policy paralysis, rampant corruption and sluggish development. The 2019 Lok Sabha election will be a big game changer.

Nilanjana Sen: In the recent past, national security issues have prominently figured in the BJP’s election campaigns. What explains the new-found focus while communicating with the voters?

Girri: National security is not a new-found focus of the BJP or the prime minister. Ever since he assumed power, Narendra Modi has emphasized the need to strengthen the army and the national security system. For years, India has lacked a concrete national security doctrine, and our security policy was subsumed by foreign policy. It is only after the Modi government came to power that our defense policy has been given due importance. Therefore, it is definitely a big election agenda for the BJP.

Going forward, as suggested in the for 2019, the focus is going to be on national security and zero tolerance against terrorism. The manner in which India has retaliated against terrorist activities, such as the in Kashmir and its robust response to Pakistan’s shenanigans, has brought to light the courage that Narendra Modi has displayed in countering terrorism. This is unlike the previous government that failed to act against terrorism.

Shunglu: The BJP has been criticized by the opposition parties for not being policy-oriented, and some major policies like demonetization have hit small entrepreneurs and farmers. In the coming years, if brought back to power, what measures can we expect from the government to strengthen the economy?

Girri: Narendra Modi had assumed power at a time when the economy was growing at the slowest pace in a decade, and high hopes were pinned on his administration considering the remarkable electoral victory in 2014. Under Modi’s leadership, India emerged as the fastest growing economy in the world. Demonetization and the Goods and Service Tax (GST) are two major economic reforms that have taken place under Narendra Modi’s leadership. While demonetization aimed to wipe out the black money, the GST was a landmark legislation that streamlined India’s indirect tax regime.

With Modi’s government rolling out a series of major reforms that made it easier for firms to get construction permits, pay taxes and carry out trade across borders, the ease of doing business in India has also improved significantly over the past few years. The development work of the next government of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) would be multi-layered, with a focus on work for the development of villages, those belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, women and the youth.

The BJP aspires to make India the third largest economy of the world by 2030. For rural development, the BJP has promised to spend 25 lakh crores ($356 billion) in the next five years, including 6,000 rupees ($85) yearly income support to farmers and pension to small and marginal farmers above 60 years of age.

Shunglu: Post the Pulwama attacks, analysts and many in the opposition are debating the BJP’s stand on Kashmir. At a time when militancy is a major concern, what exactly is the BJP’s policy on the region? Do we need a more robust political solution for Kashmir?

Girri: Kashmir’s problem is a very old one, and this issue must be treated with sensitivity and understanding. As far as the challenge being faced in Kashmir is concerned, the BJP in its 2019 election manifesto has reiterated its resolve to abrogate , which gives autonomous status to Jammu and Kashmir, and annul of the constitution, which the party finds discriminatory against non-permanent residents and women of the valley state.

The party also aims to make all efforts to ensure the safe return of Kashmiri Pandits and provide financial assistance for the resettlement of refugees from West Pakistan, Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, and Chhamb.

Sen: As far as India’s foreign policy is concerned, if re-elected, what will be the priorities of the Modi government while engaging with its immediate neighbors in South Asia?

Girri: Ever since Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power in 2014, the face of Indian foreign policy changed. The situation in South Asia does not seem to paint a perfect picture, I may agree. India’s relations with some of its neighboring countries have been problematic.

India views China and Pakistan as its biggest security challenge in the South Asian region. But unlike his predecessors, Modi has chosen to be more assertive when it comes to national security. Pakistan today has been isolated in the world arena due to the prime minister’s diplomacy. He has built successful relations with the leaders of the world. Modi has also transformed India’s “Look East” policy into a more aggressive “Act East” policy that seeks to connect India to East Asia through better trade, infrastructure and regional institutions.

Sen: There have been talks about the growing challenges to India’s autonomy, especially in light of the sanctions imposed by the Trump administration on Iran, which happens to be a major oil supplier to India. How will India respond to such postures when its core interests are challenged by countries like the United States?

Girri: For India, Iranian sanctions present both political and financial problems, due to its strong relationship with both Iran and the United State of America. India and Iran have traditionally maintained cordial relations. India continues to be Iran’s second-largest buyer of crude oil, next only to China. At the same time, India is also keen to preserve its close partnership with the United States of America. Therefore, India will have to work on a two-fold strategy: negotiate with the Trump administration to get special exemptions in the case of Chabahar Port, for example, and at the same time maintain its current economic and security ties with Iran.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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At a time when censorship is growing across the globe, Shahidul Alam —��a Bangladeshi photographer and social activist —��has pledged his life to represent the downtrodden and insists that he “will remain a thorn for the oppressor.” Over the years, Alam’s work has concerned itself with the representation of political violence and social change.

Having first obtained a PhD in chemistry from the University of London, Alam returned to Dhaka to focus on photography, setting up the award-winning Drik Picture Library in 1989. His work depicts everyday life in Bangladesh, following the lives of sex workers and women who joined the to fight against oppression, telling the story of the Rohingya refugees and showing the resilience of marginalized indigenous people and survivors of natural disasters. What becomes immediately obvious from his work is a deep concern for the lives of working people. Alam’s powerful depictions of lives of migrant laborers and those engaged in the informal sector explain his belief in recognizing the role they need to play in improving governance in Bangladesh.

In August 2018, Alam was detained following an interview with Al Jazeera in which he criticized the government’s use of violence against students protesting road safety in Bangladesh. Held under the controversial Information and Communication Technology Act for more than 100 days, Alam’s imprisonment garnered a wave of support from around the world, putting pressure on Sheikh Hasina’s government. Now out on bail, Alam continues to face charges that can mean up to 14 years in prison.

In this edition of The Interview, 51�Թ� talks to Shahidul Alam about the current political climate in Bangladesh, his work as a photographer in a censored environment as well as his sense of duty toward his homeland.

Anna Pivovarchuk: First of all, from all of us at 51�Թ�, we want to express our relief at your release from jail. We are very glad to see you well and free. Your arrest in August 2018 has garnered enormous support from around the world. Were you aware of the numerous campaign efforts fighting for your freedom?

Shahidul Alam: I am not free. The case against me still stands. I am merely out on bail. If sentenced, I potentially face up to 14 years in jail. So the pressure to drop the case needs to continue. On the other hand, if one cannot freely express one’s opinion, if dissent is quashed, if it is impossible to question authority, then no one in Bangladesh is free.

There were several stages to my detention. In the first phase, immediately after I was abducted and tortured, I had no idea of how much others knew. I had tried screaming out to people, but didn’t know if others knew either where I was, or if I was alive. I managed to see the TV when I was being taken to the police headquarters the following morning, and saw that information of my arrest was on the newsfeed. I didn’t know what was happening outside, but was confident my friends and the global community would be supporting me.

While in jail, other inmates told me of the by Nobel laureates. In the first jail visit, Rahnuma [Ahmed, Alam’s partner] and Saydia [Gulrukh, journalist and director at Drik agency] told me about the by Raghu Rai, and later I also learnt of the statement by Arundhati Roy, Noam Chomsky and others. I didn’t have detailed information, but knew by then it was a massive campaign.

Pivovarchuk: What was the hardest part of your detention?

Alam: Accepting the fact that I could not play an active part in the resistance. I knew the country was in trouble, and I had a role to play. There was much more work to be done, and I felt I wasn’t doing my share. At the jail visits, I tried to tell my friends to concentrate less on me and more on the movement. The second hardest was hearing the stories of my fellow prisoners. Many inmates came to tell me their stories — stories of injustice and pain which tormented me, especially as there was little I could do besides being a sounding board.

Pivovarchuk: Indeed, Bangladesh’s social and political milieu has been growing increasingly violent and intolerant of dissent, with brutal and often deadly attacks against free thinkers. You have strong connections to the UK, where you hold residency, yet you chose to live and work in your homeland. What prompted this return to Bangladesh, given the difficult conditions when it comes to freedom of speech and expression?

Alam: I was studying and teaching in the UK. Even as a student, I worked and earned money. I was given residency in the UK by virtue of having been a taxpayer for many years. I never applied for it. I am a Bangladeshi citizen and my allegiance is to my people. I also consider myself to be a global citizen, and global issues do concern me, but Bangladesh has given me far more than I’ll ever be able to give back. Yes, there are difficulties, but as a privileged Bangladeshi, the onus is upon me and others like me to do what we can to right these wrongs. I can hardly expect someone else to fix my country.

Nilanjana Sen: Do you see similar trends with regard to censorship of critical voices occurring worldwide? Or does something set the South Asian context apart, and Bangladesh in particular?

Alam: Levels differ widely, but I do not know of a single nation that does not champion freedom and democracy in its rhetoric but actively opposes it in its practice. Bangladesh and South Asia are at the wrong end of this spectrum, Scandinavian countries being at the other end. But as long as the military-industrial complex plays such an important role in the world economy, critical voices will be suppressed. Besides, powerful nations find it much more expedient to work with pliant dictators than with messy democracies. As long as our autocracies satisfy major corporate interests, as long as they do the dirty work of powerful nations, they will be supported. It is the same across the globe. Morality has little to do with global politics.

Sen: As a photographer, given the constraints under which you often work, what are the kind of compromises you have to make? What are the challenges when you work in a censored environment? And are there any surprising advantages?

Alam: There are times when one takes advantage of people’s vanity or allows the powerful to fall into their own traps. I am aware that I have not always made full disclosure when avoidance has been an option. I have also been deceptive when my survival has depended on it. In an ideal world one would not have to resort to such tactics, but when one considers the greater public good, some compromises need to be made. That people are so susceptible to their own conceit is surprising. When people surround themselves with sycophants, they leave big chinks in their armor. Arrogance leads to vulnerabilities, which can be exploited.

Sen: Your work is concerned with representation of political violence and social change. You probe the roots of censorship, capture images of marginalization, giving your subjects a voice —��all of which has given you an activist label. As you capture the spirit of the time and the historic moments in Bangladesh, do you think you can do this objectively? And what does objectivity even mean when it comes to human suffering, like we see with the Rohingya refugees, for example?

Alam: In an unequal world, staying on the fence means supporting the status quo. I do take sides and am clearly on the side of the oppressed. But I wear my allegiance on my sleeve. I take pains to ensure I am not being unfair, or am not distorting facts or misrepresenting the story, but yes, I take positions, whether it be Rohingya refugees or downtrodden peasants. I will remain a thorn for the oppressor.

Sen: Do you think photography is a better tool than other art forms to question authority? Is it a medium that can overcome barriers – national, regional, cultural —��more easily, perhaps?

Alam: It is precisely because I recognize the power of photography that it is the weapon of my choice, but it is not always the best weapon. There are times when words or dance, or even silence might work better. Often it is a combination that works best. I am not married to photography. I will use it when it works, to maximum effect, and abandon it when it fails. I use the most powerful weapon in my arsenal, and often it is photography.

Pivovarchuk: The recent election, where the ruling Awami League won a disputed, yet a landslide victory, suggests little scope for change at the moment. What are your hopes for Bangladesh in the near future? What needs to happen for change to take root?

Alam: The Awami League knows it rigged the elections. They know their “victory” is hollow. It is a weakness they will constantly need to defend. There is a suppressed anger that is very difficult to contain. Even people who are sympathetic to the Awami League resent that the nation has been robbed. There is a climate of fear, but fear does not buy allegiance. The youth who took to the streets continue to be angry.

What gives me hope is that they still believe. That they have not sold out. There are very committed people working at grassroots levels. They lack resources and are not plugged into networks. With the right guidance and support, they can become drivers of change. The real heroes of Bangladesh are the migrant workers, the garment workers and the millions who work in the informal sector. They are the ones who generate the bulk of Bangladesh’s wealth. If they can gain skills and move up the value chain, and are not exploited in the process, and if they can have a say in the process of governance, Bangladesh can surge ahead.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In India, the Police Act is of 1861 vintage, drafted barely four years after the “natives” revolted against the rapacious British East India Company in what is known as India’s First War of Independence, or the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. This act, which was meant to subjugate the native population, is the one in use today.

However, after independence, various states in India curated their own police acts, but these haven’t always been fundamentally different from the 1861 version. The police is a state subject in India, and the reforms proposed to the services are aimed at reflecting the aspirations of an evolving society. In 1981, the National Police Commission of India submitted its first Police Bill, with reforms continuing to remain an important issue since.

Prakash Singh, the former director general of police of Uttar Pradesh, picked up the issue of police reform and filed a public interest litigation in 1995 to fast track the initiation of reforms. With hardly any progress on the issue , the Supreme Court of India made it mandatory in 2006 for individual states to initiate the process of reform. By 2006, the Police Act Drafting Committee formed by the Ministry of Home Affairs had submitted the draft Model Police Bill. While the bill was circulated among all state governments, it did not necessarily lead to new legislation.

In this guest edition of The Interview, Nilanjana Sen talks to Somesh Goyal, director general of police for Himachal Pradesh, about the need for new police legislation, the role of technology in improving police operations, and the modernization of the state police force.

Nilanjana Sen: The Indian Police Act of 1861 enacted by the British forms the bedrock of Indian police operations. Why has it been so difficult to repeal and replace it with legislation that reflects the aspirations of a vibrant and progressive society?

Somesh Goyal: The Indian Police Act of 1861 has been replaced by state police acts in a number of states. In Himachal Pradesh, for example, we had new legislation called the Himachal Pradesh Police Act of 2007, which is in sync with the times. Instead of being a colonizer’s brutal force, the act seeks to transform the police into a service-oriented unit. So there is change. But at the same time, I would say, this legislation has not been passed in a number of states. The Supreme Court of India in Prakash Singh vs Union of India passed a few orders regarding assured tenures, selection processes, internal autonomy, etc., which have not been fully incorporated in the so-called modern acts. So there is still a lot of ground to cover, but we are all moving in that direction.

Sen: What has been the role of technology in improving police operations in India?

Goyal: There are no two opinions about the fact that technology has played a key role in improving police operations. Take the case of how the police has addressed the problem of narcotics in Himachal Pradesh. Using technology and digital maps of the area, particularly of isolated and remote locations where the majority of cultivation stays under the radar, we identify where cultivation of cannabis and opium is taking place. My immediate source of intelligence in Himachal Pradesh, however, has been “humint,” which comes from the people. Technology has helped us in collation, updation, validation, storage and sifting of actionable intelligence on a real-time basis.

Earlier, we depended on registers to track down criminals. This technique is now obsolete. It has been getting replaced with CCTNS — a national Crime and Criminal Tracking System. Our roll-out has been one of the fastest and most effective in the entire country.

However, even as the system becomes more efficient, there are various new challenges we face by way of cybercrime that dot the landscape. There is a lot of fraud taking place via the World Wide Web. In a number of cases, the servers of the social media sites are located outside the country, which makes investigation a difficult task. Also, there is a problem with a lack of training in the use of technology to crack such cases. Thus, the police force is set with the task of changing with the times and has to continuously upgrade its strategy, task force and technology.

Himachal Pradesh, however, is very different in the sense that we are one of the most educated states in India. The awareness levels are high even in the lowest ranks of the police. The education standard is very high and we have seen that people catch up with technology fast. Most of our investigative officers are put through an intensive training program at our Police Training College at Daroh, in the Kangra district. During training, they are evaluated according to their performance at the college and then assigned the roles of investigators, armed police, etc.

Sen: What action has been taken in Himachal Pradesh to modernize the police force and make it more effective?

Goyal: Even though we are a very small state, we are very conscious of the quality of work that we do. We may be getting minuscule funds under the modernization plan from the center and a matching grant from the state, but every penny that we have received has been well utilized in improving and strengthening our investigative capabilities, forensics science labs, mobility and other infrastructure as a result of which our response time has improved, conviction rates are much better. Our scientific investigation standards are much higher compared to other states, and our cyber cell is doing a wonderful job.

In Himachal Pradesh, we also have something known as the Minimum Service Delivery Guarantee Act, and we adhere to that. As far as lodging of complaints is concerned, here one can do so through SMS [text message] or online. Responses are sent to the complainants on an immediate basis. As soon as a complaint is received, it is forwarded to the police office concerned. Timelines to address the grievances have been fixed. The complainant is regularly updated about the progress. For various verifications like passports, we do take around 10 days to complete the process. We are in the process of supplying tablets to our police officers set up specifically for this type of verification to bring down the time to less than one week.

Sen: Do you think that there is a need to reassess the role of constables in the Indian police force? What is your view on them having responsibilities to fulfill but no real authority?

Goyal: I agree that there is a need to empower the civil police. The role of a constable who is doing routine policing has to be reassessed under several acts. Presently, constables are not empowered to do things like investigative work despite of the fact that they constitute over 90% of the work force, and that their educational levels at the time of enrolment have also shown an upward trend. A large number of them are graduates and, in some cases, even post-grads. These roles and powers are fulfilled by the head constables and other senior officers instead. So, until the constable does not become a head constable, he does not exercise a lot of responsibility, which to my mind should be available to him as a police officer. We will be making recommendations to the government regarding what can be done at the moment.

In the armed police the game is totally different. It is a game of numbers, but on the street your role becomes totally different. So one must have a different sort of sensitivity, responsibility and accountability. We do have something in mind, and we want to take it forward once we have definite recommendations.

Sen: What is your view on integrating community policing with regular policing to making policing more effective?

Goyal: A policeman is a citizen in uniform. And a policeman should be perceived as a friend of the people. These are lofty ideals and to achieve this we need community participation. A response mechanism has to be evolved from the police leadership that incorporates the aspirations of the people. And our policing practices should be devised based on that. But we need a very strong mechanism which is adequately funded, well-structured and has the mandate of the government.

Sen: What are the two most important police reforms in your view?

Goyal: One, post independence, we have seen disproportionate growth of armed police at the center and states vis-à-vis civil police that provides cops on the streets. A nation-wide assessment of civil police needs to be done to provide services expected. The scale must now tilt in favor of the civil police.

Two, constables of the civil police need to be empowered to carry out investigative and other core police functions. Adding mere numbers to the police stations may not result in better service delivery.

Sen: What do you think are the big internal security challenges India faces?

Goyal: Lack of quality education and unemployment among the youth in India poses the biggest security challenge. India has the largest young population in the world which may not have the requisite education and skills to get employment. This sizeable population, which is unemployed and has nothing to do, is an easy target for criminals and anti-national elements.

Naxalism continues to hurt us. It is a much bigger issue than militancy in various theaters. Radicalization of youth in the absence of jobs and quality education is another challenge. Perceptions of alienation and persecution in certain areas of our country call for us to go the drawing board.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit:����/

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emerged as an influential player in the Hindi religious publishing world in the 20th century. The founder, Jaydayal Goyandka, and promoters of the press were Marwaris, a mercantile class in India. Gita Press came into existence in 1926, and its publications were reaching the ordinary Hindu households in no time. As a religious publishing house, it had embedded itself in the political developments of colonial India. It sought to save the Hindu religion and counter the influence of Christians and Muslims, who were considered to be foreigners. Even though the Hindus were divided because of the caste system, Gita Press sought to make religious texts such as the Ramayana, Gita and Mahabharata accessible to all the Hindus, including Harijans (former untouchables), in an attempt to unite them against foreigners.

Gita Press produced a monthly journal, Kalyan, reaching a circulation of 100,000 within five years of its inception. In no time, Kalyan became the medium through which cultural organizations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) expanded its reach in Hindu households.

In this guest edition of The Interview, Nilanjana Sen talks to Akshaya Mukul, the author of , about the publishing house’s role in shaping the Hindu nationalist project, the moral universe it designed for Hindu women, and how its social agenda got closely intertwined with its political activism in the years leading up to the Partition of India.

Nilanjana Sen: What explains the choice of Gita Press over other Hindi publishing houses to explain the ideological underpinnings of the Hindu nationalist project?

Akshaya Mukul: If you are growing up in places such as Bihar or Uttar Pradesh, Gita Press is very much part of your everyday life. As children, a very attractive aspect of the books published by Gita Press was the detailed and high quality illustrations of mythic stories. Hindu homes would invariably have journals such as Kalyan, published by Gita. While growing up, I noticed that everyone had a story about the publishing house but no one knew about the trust that started it, why it was started and its life more generally as a serious player in the Hindi publishing world.

Some important work had been done on Gita Press recently, but it was very hagiographical in nature written mostly by insiders. The versions produced by them were often heavily sanitized and hid uncomfortable facts.

During the early days of my research I was still tentative about the way a book on the Gita Press will shape up, until I saw the private papers of Hanuman Prasad Poddar, the founding editor of Gita Press and its monthly journal Kalyan, in Gorakhpur. He was a distant relative of Jaydayal Goyandka, the man who set up the Gita Press. Poddar shared close ties with the , an organization formed in April 1915 to represent the Hindu community. As my research gained momentum, I realized that Gita Press was a massive enterprise, and its work coincided with the larger Hindu nationalist project because both were working in tandem with each other. Gita Press at times acted as a foot soldier and on other occasions provided intellectual sustenance to the Hindu nationalist project. For organizations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Gita Press publications were of big help since they were reaching ordinary Hindu homes. It helped the RSS expand its reach. Though the RSS, which was founded in 1926, claims to be a cultural organization, it has always had close political links. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh, an Indian nationalist party that existed from 1951 to 1977, and later the Bharatiya Janata Party, were born out of the RSS.

Sen: A running theme in your book is the moral universe pertaining to social conduct, which was defined by publishing companies such as Gita Press. Can you shed some light on this?

Mukul: One of the bases of Gita Press was the revival of the glorious days of Hinduism. This meant that they had to re-create the golden age, which they believed was interrupted by Muslim rule and subsequently by the influence of Christianity following colonization. One of the key ingredients of the golden age was the maintenance of a code of conduct, defined for women. By early 1930s, Poddar was already writing that the inner world was for women, and the outer world was for men. Men will procure, and women will procreate. Gita Press introduced its readers to new developments such as women’s exposure to modern education, the fear of unwanted pregnancies and the potential danger of women marrying outside their caste and religion.

They feared that women with modern education will deviate from the roles assigned to them in the shashtras, which are rules or treatise and refer to the Vedic scriptures. They originated with an oral tradition and were eventually transcribed into texts. Gita Press propagated the view that the role of a woman is to take care of the house and produce a good male child for the nation. This was similar to Adolf Hitler’s rhetoric in Germany, and Gita Press carried a passage on what he said in the annual issue of Kalyan titled Nari Ank (On Women).

It also came up with concocted stories about what education did to women in the United States and England. There is elaborate mention in Kalyan of incidence of pregnancies in hostels and the spread of diseases. The key to understanding the template it followed for almost 90 years now and its philosophy is the editorial Poddar wrote in the first issue of Kalyan in August 1926. He talks of various things that were bothering him, and the new influences on Hindu women was one of them. He prescribed a code of conduct wherein they must not intermingle with men outside their families, and this includes men other than their brother, father, uncles and cousins. In a veiled way, he expressed that interactions with Muslim men should be avoided. There was a long list of prescriptions such as don’t intermingle with Muslim bangle sellers, Muslim tongawallas (horse cart drivers), don’t go to fairs. This was the moral universe the Gita Press created.

Gita Press realized early on that unlike Muslims and Christians the Hindus were divided. The idea was to become the sole spokesperson for the Hindus. They never directly questioned the reformism of social organizations such as Arya Samaj or even the Hindu Mahasabha, which was in favor of temple entry for Dalits [members of lower castes — FO]. Gita Press never took on institutions and organizations directly; rather it presented a more general critique. Through Kalyan it attacked specific changes in society that hinted the influence of outsiders. The moral universe became extremely important for Gita because the crux of , the eternal Hindu religion that is believed to have existed since time immemorial, revolved around it.

Sen: How do you explain the understanding Gita Press had of the caste system and why the tendency to unite Hindus did not result in granting rights such as temple entry to former untouchables?

Mukul: They believed in the varnashrama dharma (Hindu caste system), the . If you are born outside the caste system, it had to do with sins you had committed in your past life. They came up with bizarre theories about Harijans (former untouchables) that they used to justify the restrictions on temple entry. Poddar wrote that those who worked with animals have worms in their body.

Societal relations had to be looked at from the standpoint of the fourfold varna system. But there was an ambiguity too. For example, when it came to spreading the gospel of Gita or the Ramayana, they brought out pocket-sized books that were not very expensive and were distributed across all castes. So, while there was a tendency to Hinduize everyone, when it came to letting the same people enter temples, they refused.��

Sen: In the book, you refer to the “Marwarization” of Hinduism and this, you argue, was shaped by the crisis of identity among business communities such as the Marwaris. What you are referring to?��

Mukul: By beginning of 20th century, Marwaris — the Vaishya, or trading class community — had made their mark as big businessmen. But, at the same time, they had a very bad reputation. Jaydayal Goyandka, the man behind Gita Press, at one point wrote that people do not look at Marwaris with respect because of their business practices. This idea of having been looked down upon despite having money did initiate some soul-searching in the community. By the early part of the 20th century, money began to be used by the Marwaris for philanthropic purposes. It was used to build temples, schools, colleges, inns, hospitals.

And with this also started a new system where the names of the donors began to be placed outside temples, schools, hospitals and inns. Also, Brahmanical rituals got introduced among Marwaris. They began wearing the sacred thread. So, the Marwaris were trying to break away from the reputation they had and this was done using the enormous wealth the community had. At one level, you had philanthropy and on another the Brahmanization of Marwaris to deal with this identity crisis. But one very interesting thing they did during this time was that they began to bankroll gaurakshini sabhas (cow-protection societies).

Financially, the Marwaris had made it big by the first quarter of the 20th��century, but at the same time there were popular views about their lack of desire to study. So, you find another very important new development: Some of the earliest publishing houses were run by them. Gita Press was also a Marwari enterprise. It came from a line of thinking within the community that the new generation of Marwaris is going haywire. It was felt that a journal like Kalyan or a publishing house like Gita Press would help them get back on track. Before Kalyan they had started some other journals where the focus was on the community.

There were two streaks of reform within the community. One was the , -variety that focused on modern education, cutting down on ostentatious display of wealth in marriage and other rituals. The other streak was represented by Gita Press that said salvation for Hindus in general, and Marwaris in particular, lay in going back to sanatana dharma and its attendant rituals.

Gita Press was slowly becoming the representative of the entire Marwari community and visibly displayed the desire to unite all Hindus as well. Even today it is run by Marwaris. Gobind Bhawan Karyalaya, the trust behind Gita Press, specifies that the trust will never have a lower caste person as a trustee. In a way, what began to happen was that there was a Brahmanization of Marwaris and Marwarization of Hinduism. Central to this was the control Marwaris had over money, and this allowed them to have a say in education or cow protection, to name but a few issues. The Bania (trading-class) model of bhakti was based on the desire for easy and quick gratification. What I mean by this model is that just like the Banias’ want instant or assured profit, Gita Press propagated that if people followed certain rules, they would immediately benefit. Gita Press had an annual issue called Bhagwan Mahima Ank, which is full of examples of how taking the name of a god helped many ordinary Hindus.

Sen: You mention that the assertion of identity was becoming linked to nationalism after the 1920s. How and why did this shift take place?

Mukul: The 1920s were also a period of intense competitive communalism with both Hindus and Muslims trying to outdo each other in the name of religious identity. It was a period that witnessed maximum number of riots on the issues of cow and music before mosques. There was a consolidation of identity taking place. Poddar was always stressing that the Muslims spoke in one voice, and the Hindus were divided. In his very first editorial in Kalyan, in August 1926, Poddar wrote that there is a need for sangh bal — unity of strength. Against the backdrop of the religious schism, Poddar felt that the only way to deal with it was if Hindus papered over their own differences.

The Hindu right-wing had always been suspicious of Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi was constantly evolving as a thinker. He had the honesty to say, in 1932, that at some point he opposed inter-dining between upper caste Hindus and lower caste Hindus, but eventually he stopped believing in it. Poddar and Gandhi exchanged long letters. Poddar was against inter-dining and temple entry for Harijans. The relationship between Gandhi and Gita Press began to rupture at this point.

By the 1940s, Kalyan had started to directly attack Gandhi for his views. A year before Partition, the magazine was attacking Gandhi for his role in the break-up of India. The situation was such that when Gandhi was assassinated in 1948, Poddar was also one of those rounded up by police. When the noted industrialist Sir Badridas Goenka wrote to G.D. Birla asking him to get Poddar and Goyankda out of prison, Birla refused and expressed that they were not doing sanatan dharma they were doing shaitan dharma (devil’s religion).

Sen: What explains the intersection of the social agenda and the political activism of Gita Press closer to the years of the Partition of India and independence?

Mukul: The Marwari network helped to popularize Gita Press and spread its social message. If you look at the early days of Kalyan, you will see that within a year it had hit a circulation of 20,000-25,000. Marwaris were buying it in huge numbers and the entire Marwari network was at play. Within five years Kalyan hit a circulation of 100,000. Every time before the special issue would come in the beginning of the year, Poddar would reach out to contributors four months in advance so they had enough time to write. The entire process was meticulously planned. What surprises me is the people who were writing for Kalyan: poets, mendicants, rabid communalists and politicians.

Poddar was fascinating also for the way he reached out to people. People as far as Berkeley were approached, and his persuasion would continue until they agreed to write. Everyone was writing for Kalyan, except some notable exceptions, such as Jawaharlal Nehru. A very large and powerful section of the Congress [Indian National Congress party — FO] was part of the project Gita Press was designing: people like Rajendra Prasad, Madan Mohan Malviya, Seth Govindas, G.B. Pant, to name a few. Despite being part of the Congress that talked about secularism as its ideal, these leaders were closer to those involved in the Hindutva project aimed at establishing a majoritarian Hindu rule.

During the entire , Gita Press had played a significant role, but it hasn’t been chronicled very well. When I went through the records, I realized that Gita Press was the key player in turning public opinion against the bill. Kalyan was not only writing against it but also encouraging and requesting readers to write protest letters that Kalyan would forward to the president of India. The arguments against Hindu Code Bill are the same as the ones we hear against “” — that the bill will result in our daughters marrying outside their own religion, our daughters will be violated, outsiders will enter our homes, they will cook beef in our kitchens and they will dump our daughters and walk away with our wealth all because the bill would give women the right to property.

The Hindu right-wing consisting of RSS, Hindu Mahasabha and Ram Rajya Parishad was upset with Nehru, and during the 1951-1952 elections they openly supported Prabhudatt Brahmachari against Nehru in the Phulpur constituency. They campaigned through Kalyan against Nehru. During the 1952 elections, concerted efforts were made to tarnish Nehru’s image wherein publicly it was being stated that Nehru consumes beef.

The specter of creation of Pakistan angered and scared Gita Press, Hindu Mahasabha, RSS and many other Hindu outfits. When the Hindu Mahasabha meeting took place at Gorakhpur in 1946, a resolution as to what the new India should be like was passed and Gita Press almost reproduced it. The broad outline was Hindu-centric, propounding that India should be a Hindu nation called Hindustan or Aryavartha, and have a saffron flag. The cow was an important issue and they wanted cow slaughter to be banned. There were other issues too that sought to give a pre-eminent position to Hindus vis-à-vis Muslims like appointments in civil posts and recruitment in the armed forces. In government jobs they wanted Muslims to be appointed based on their percentage in population and this they believed should be done only if Hindus in Pakistan get government jobs proportionate to their population.

So, you see, we are having a replay of sorts of what was desired by the Hindu ring-wing at the time of independence.

*[This article was updated on September 25, 2017.]

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In India, companies such as are using the culture of feeding people to design a unique model to empower housewives. Using the culture of hospitality as a business idea, however, is often connected with a class structure and gendered outlook.

Pankaj Sharma is the founder and CEO of Zeemlo, a mobile app that provides homemade food primarily for middle-class, working professionals. His exposure to the work of social organizations encouraged him to start a company that helps tackle the lack of financial independence among women in India.

In this guest edition of��, Nilanjana Sen talks to Sharma about the culture of hospitality in India, the role of housewives in middle-class families in Jaipur, and Zeemlo’s model for the empowerment of women.

Nilanjana Sen: What inspired you to start the company Zeemlo? Can you give us a glimpse of the idea behind it?

Pankaj Sharma:��I completed an MCA in 2004 and, until 2010, I worked in the field of computer applications. I used to make websites and mobile applications and, in 2010, I decided to start my own company called Netleon Technologies Private Limited. Our clients were located mostly in the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom. While this company is still functional, in the past two years my involvement with the social activities of [different groups] encouraged me to start something of my own to tackle social problems, especially concerning women. I had noticed during my work with [social organizations] that people appreciated social work, but they were often hesitant to participate in it. I wanted to address the reasons behind their reluctance to participate in activities of social organizations.

While women contributed to the welfare of their families, their role in public life was constrained. This is not to say that women have not contributed to society. I wanted to address bigger concerns such as the identification of factors that limit their participation in the public sphere. I noticed that, in [different social groups], women were often encouraged to form their own organizations, but active participation of women always remained a major hurdle. Sometimes I felt that maybe our approach toward the problem was wrong, and on other occasions I put the blame on women who seemed unwilling to work for society.

Ultimately, however, I realized that empowerment of women had to be connected to money. So, I decided to devise a way to help women earn by serving others home-cooked meals.��The aim is to instill confidence in them [so] they can be earning members of the family.

Apart from my association with [social organizations], the inspiration behind the idea also involved the example of Preeti Sharma, who is one of the directors of Zeemlo — along with Aditya Jain,��a young businessman who loved the idea. Preeti��is a multi-tasker. She manages the children, performs other household chores and she loves to cook for everyone. I noticed this about women in other middle-class households as well. Some women may not enjoy cooking as a daily chore, but others always appreciated a home-cooked meal made with love. I also observed that there is a huge demand for home-cooked food in the market. Young, working professionals have complained to me about being compelled to eat out because they can’t cook or don’t find time to cook.

Sen: How do you distinguish the model Zeemlo has adopted for the empowerment of women from other existing models in the market?

Sharma:��People have already experimented with the idea of using the ability to cook to empower women. For instance, some have started tiffin centers to meet the growing demand of cooked food for working professionals and students. But tiffin centers come with their own set of challenges for women who cook. The reason why women hesitate to join the tiffin center services is the fear of being bound. The compulsion to cook every day and to cook a set meal which has to be delivered to specific people deters women from engaging with such work. Cooking for others then becomes a burden, and there isn’t much incentive to do additional work apart from their daily household chores.

For me, the task was to ensure that a woman does not feel bound to cook for people who are merely craving homemade food. I wanted to nurture a tradition of popularizing serving of home-cooked food without making women feel compelled to do so as a routine activity. I felt that the existing efforts made in this direction often failed. No one succeeded in providing people homemade food as a commercial enterprise while keeping the tradition of feeding as an art alive. The system of dabbawalla [tiffin carriers], as is prevalent in Mumbai, may be considered an exception as far as its popularity is concerned. The reasons for its success are varied: the organized nature of delivering the food; people’s familiarity with the system; and, most importantly, the assured demand for such a service in the city. In other parts of India, a similar model has not [been replicated] and, even if it has, the scale cannot be matched.

Deepika was awarded Best Chef. © Zeemlo

Recently, a company was set up in Ahmedabad which was providing home-cooked meals made by women across the city. The company failed because it did not have the logistics in place to ensure timely delivery of food. The designated time of two hours to supply the meals did not appeal to customers looking for quick, fresh and hygienic food. Also, its spread throughout Ahmedabad threw up additional challenges to ensure timely delivery and added cost.

In the past two years, I conducted a detailed study of the market and arrived at the following question and conclusion: Can we make a system wherein the lady cooks whenever she wants to and the food is delivered by an external actor depending on the time she finds convenient? We can have time slots for pick-up and delivery of food, but she decides her way around it. Can she serve the same food to the customers that she makes for her family? So, the conclusion I came to was that the supply of food in the market need not be based on demand alone. At Zeemlo, we have shifted the focus away from cooking in bulk for many people.

By December 2016, Zeemlo was fully functional, and we made an Android application in which there is an option to upload the dish that women have cooked. Our approach is that the woman should focus on cooking for [her] family and, if she wants to upload dishes on our application, then she should keep one or two extra plates. She is then expected to click a picture of the meal she has cooked, upload it and write a small description for potential buyers. The next option prompts her to decide the price for the dish. We have kept a basic minimum price for breakfast, lunch and dinner. After this step, she chooses the timing between which her food will be sold. We have put a restriction on the maximum number of plates which can be uploaded in one go and have limited it to three. The benefits of this [mean] there are less chances of food getting spoilt in case it is not sold and the risk of compromising on its quality is drastically reduced.

Once the image of the dish and its description are submitted, we approve it. Prior to joining the Zeemlo fraternity, we visit the kitchens in [people’s] houses to ensure that an acceptable level of hygiene is maintained. When we involve new women, we order the first dish to gauge the quality and taste of the food. We have also decided that as far as delivery and packaging of the food is concerned, this is entirely the responsibility of Zeemlo. As soon as we get the order, we send the delivery boy with the plates, which he gives to the woman who has cooked the meal. We do not give plates to the women in advance because we fear that early packaging can compromise the quality of the food. Once the food has been picked up, money is transferred to the person’s e-wallet every Monday.

Sen: What is the geographical reach of Zeemlo, and what are the factors that have shaped it?

Sharma:��I had mentioned before that the model adopted by a company in Ahmedabad failed because it delivered the food in two hours. We have developed an alternative to delivering across Jaipur and instead have a local delivery system in place. By local delivery system I am referring to an area — for example, we have a place named Vaishalinagar in Jaipur which has around a lakh and half [150,000] people where there is demand for home-cooked meals. [And] we ensure that the buyer and the seller are from the same area. So, those who are in Vaishalinagar will only be able to see the option of food cooked by women of Vaishalinagar on the menu. We do this mainly to ensure that quality food is delivered in the least possible time. We have also chosen colonies where the buyer and seller meet regularly. In Vaishalinagar, there are companies where there is demand for home-cooked meals, and there are colonies nearby where middle-class and lower-middle-class families live. The women of the families are mostly housewives who are willing to use their expertise at cooking to accrue monetary benefits.

An important aspect of the model for Zeemlo was the analysis of the social profile of women who could be integrated within its framework. We have tried to target the lower-middle-class population of Indian women. I noticed that these women have a lot of free time at home to cook [and] there is a desire to earn money, and the hope that someone would provide them with the easiest solution to do so. These women are looking for external help to discover ways of earning.

In Jaipur, the lower-middle-class constitutes a major chunk of the population. Those who demand home-cooked food are, more often than not, from this class and so are those who sell the food.

We had done a survey by taking a sample of 1,000 [people] to find out how it could be done. The survey helped us find out how much people can spend on food, and whether women are willing to be part of an enterprise that will use their expertise for monetary purposes.

Another important feature of our model is that as soon as the three plates put up by a single person are sold, there is an option to upload new dishes which have to be different from the ones which were put up before. We do not allow the same food to be put up again. We cut 25 rupees (39 cents) on every dish offered. With this money we manage packaging, delivery and payment of taxes. Our expenses turn out to be much more but, by ensuring bulk sales, we manage with the available money.

Our pilot project for Zeemlo was started in Vaishalinagar. We first brought together women we knew and slowly expanded to users beyond our known circle of people. Today, we have more than 12,000 registered users and over 275 active chefs. We sell around 300 meals per day.

Sen: What is the mobilization strategy that has helped women participate willingly as members of the workforce through your start-up? Is your target audience primarily married women?

Sharma:��Our survey helped us gauge the market accurately, but our decision to expand is also based on a demand expressed by women themselves who are well networked in the city. They want the application to be useful for their friends and other family members located in different parts of Jaipur. The initial mobilization happened primarily through word of mouth.

Latika is inspiring others to join. © Zeemlo

Sen: How have women reacted to Zeemlo, and what has been the involvement of their immediate family in their decision to participate as earning members of the household?

Sharma:��There are women who are earning Rs5-6,000 ($77-93) per week. They end up earning around Rs20,000 per month and some earn more than this. As far as the feedback from women is concerned, some of them tell us that earlier they would go to three [kitty parties], but now they prefer working on something they enjoy and earning through it. There are husbands who have told us that their wives were [going through] depression and they feel much better today by becoming part of the workforce with such ease.

It is important to remember that these women might be from lower-middle-class families, but they are by no means financially deficient. There is no compulsion to work to contribute to the family’s income.

What we often forget is that women cannot be reduced to roles of being mothers and wives alone, and even if they are, they need to be appreciated for the contribution they make to their families. At Zeemlo, we make sure that we organize regular events aimed specifically at appreciating their efforts. They are constantly reminded that their work is not merely a transactional exercise tied to monetary benefits. We stress that they are keeping the culture of hospitality alive.

There are some cases where the husband has an income of Rs12,000 rupees, but his wife is earning anywhere between Rs14-18,000 sitting at home because of Zeemlo. When we organize events, there have been times when women have walked up to me and said that after marriage this is the first time someone has rewarded them on stage. Such moments are overwhelming for us because they make us realize that empowerment of women is a very complex concept, and it acquires a unique meaning for women depending on their location in the class hierarchy. There is a need to consider factors that deter women from participating in the workforce and identify factors that encourage them to participate willingly. Sometimes an initial hand-holding is appreciated by women as they make inroads into a new world of work outside of their homes. Our aim is to focus on a skill-set which women believe is their strength. At Zeemlo, we anchor on it to initiate their participation in the workforce rather than expecting them to learn new skills.

*[This interview was conducted in Hindi and translated to English by Nilanjana Sen. The article was updated on July 11, 2017.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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In his short treatise published in 1912, Alexander Hubbard laid out suggestions to “brighten up [the] little world” of the Indian native which was drowned in “filth and squalor.” The treatise, while best described as patronising in its suggestions, partially succeeded in articulating a socio-cultural reasoning behind the poor sanitary conditions in India. It recognized that for sanitary reforms to succeed one needs to be aware of the “prejudices and superstitions” that afflict large parts of the native population. The British by the beginning of the 20^th century had begun to view the problem of sanitation largely as a social issue. They were no longer concerned with the alone, and the general good health of the public was seen as essential for the smooth functioning of the empire.

Despite having recognized the root of the problem, the government of India was unsure of the progress it had made through much of the 19th century to improve sanitation conditions of the Indian natives. It recognized that the failed because it blindly applied Western sanitation measures to a starkly different civilizational set-up and did not adequately assess the conditions of life in tropical climates. The mind of the general public had to be endowed with what the government believed was a “higher level of thought.”

, who was the president of the , referred to an angel that would have to descend on India and ennoble the humble native. The angel for him was science, which in his words was another name for “well informed common-sense.” This new scientific approach to sanitation, the British believed, could contribute significantly to improved sanitary conditions in rural and urban India. At this point the British had begun to vocally distinguish between the educated and the illiterate Indian, both of whom were responding in starkly different ways to the newly-developed scientific approach to sanitation. The government of India felt that in the “” sufficient attention had to be paid to the fact that the uneducated native was unprepared for drastic change, seen simply as a form of “interference” by them.

Traditional Social Structures

Evidently, the problem of poor sanitation conditions in India could not be attributed to the lack of infrastructure alone. Indian society has a unique composition where the scavenger is a . B.R. Ambedkar, who belonged to the Untouchable Mahar caste, condemned this fixity that was imposed on an individual’s social identity. He recognized that in the cast-ridden Hindu society, birth qualifications preceded the actual work performed as a marker of the individual’s social identity.

Patna slums, Bihar © Shutterstock

The sanitation framework in India sustains itself on the traditional structure of Hindu society. It is heavily reliant on particular caste groupings who occupy the lowest position in the caste hierarchy for its unhindered existence. Any successful sanitation reform measure would have to take into account the intricate ways in which concerns for purity and pollution would determine the acceptance of reforms, as well as decide who has access to them. For Ambedkar, the problem of poor sanitation in India was a socio-cultural issue since the scavenger was who was a permanent victim of his hereditary occupation.

Recently, the government of Narendra Modi has announced that it aims to in the country by 2019. of the world’s open defecators live in India and has the highest percentage of people defecating in the open. people who have no access to toilets, nearly 600 million reside in India. The current political dispensation plans to invest in 5.2 million toilets, or in its five year term. If lack of adequate infrastructure alone accounts for these figures, the government’s effort to end open defecation is laudable.

Mehrotra and Patnaik in their study show that programs such as the , initiated by the United Progressive Alliance I (UPA I) government, have failed in certain places such as Bastar primarily because of the lack of adequate infrastructure and water scarcity. But in other instances culture is often seen as the root cause of the problem of poor sanitation in India. In there have been cases when Rajputs, who consider themselves to be part of an upper caste, have refused to clean their toilets as they find the task to be degrading and ritually polluting.

It is not surprising then that technological solutions that are economically feasible are not always finding much success in India. Simple pit latrines, despite being economically conducive, have not always found takers in rural India and only .

A case of a slightly different nature was reported in Punjab where a dangerous mix of politics and caste impacted access to toilets for those belonging to the lower castes. The landlords in a village in , who were upper caste Jat Sikhs, on the declaration of election results denied access to those belonging to the Schedule Caste to the fields, since the election results did not favor their interests. The are used by many as bathrooms, and this move meant that the lower-caste people were effectively left without access to the only sanitation facility available to them.

For the successful implementation of sanitation reforms in India, the scavenger can no longer remain a scavenger by birth. At the root of the problem is socio-cultural attitudes that continue to shape and are sustained by the traditional Hindu social order, upon which the entire framework of sanitation is placed.

The system of sanitation in India does not exist as an independent structure and it is not self-sustaining. Socio-cultural factors such as the dominance of caste determines the acceptance of reforms in the sanitation system, shapes social attitudes toward certain occupations and ultimately decides who gets access to sanitation facilities. Any successful sanitation reform program would have to deal with an awareness that change, for example, in the form of development of new technologies and infrastructure, cannot be neutral, since its acceptance is contingent upon social attitudes that often prioritize the maintenance of the traditional social structure.

The whole concept of latrines has assumed a unique socio-cultural meaning in India. The suggests that it is not the scarcity of water or simply a lack of access to toilets that pushes people to use alternatives such as agricultural fields as toilets. Some claim that the to many, as ownership of toilets in north India has not had a bearing on the reduction of open defecation. While some choose to use the fields because toilets close to the vicinity of the house are considered to be polluting, others do not use it because the eventual cleaning of the latrines is perceived to be ritually degrading.

Chance for Change

For the successful implementation of sanitation reforms in India, the scavenger can no longer remain a scavenger by birth. At the root of the problem are��socio-cultural attitudes that continue to shape and are sustained by the traditional Hindu social order, upon which the entire framework of sanitation is based.

ORCHHA, INDIA © Shutterstock

In such a situation there are two options that can ensure the success of sanitary reforms in India: Either the entire sanitation framework is built as such that it is self-sustaining without necessarily tackling the caste question directly and focussing instead on providing alternatives to the existing system. This would involve the development of technological solutions that eliminate the reliance on former Untouchables—the term is no longer legal in India—on an unequal footing to maintain the sanitation structure.

The focus has to be not only on the building of toilets—rather it is the design of the toilets that should assume more significance. This could involve the construction of , since the latter rely heavily on the former Untouchable community for maintenance. But because of water scarcity, technological solutions will have to focus on designing toilets that can be sustained without access to water. has developed the dry hygienic rural toilet that is cost-efficient and eco-friendly, which sustains itself as a waterless system.

Alternatively, the second option could focus on a radical restructuring of the Hindu society to break the occupational fixity imposed by caste. This would involve sustained efforts to mainstream the former Untouchables by empowering them. This can certainly work, as is evident from the s today. Many claim this is because of a sense of revulsion in the minds of the former Untouchables toward what is seen by society as their traditional occupation, as much as it is because of the availability of alternative occupations they have��finally begun to consider for themselves.

While poverty and the lack of infrastructure maybe partly responsible for the poor sanitation conditions in India, it must be adequately stressed that the in itself will not solve the problem. An awareness that the physical infrastructure and the people who sustain it are operating within a social framework that is not receptive to drastic change is essential to planing the nature of reforms—something the British had recognized early on as they set out to establish their rule in India.

A recent noted that open defecation has been reduced in India by 31%. While the government focuses on building the appropriate infrastructure that is numerically significant and economically efficient, it must simultaneously address the question of caste as a major factor shaping social attitudes and policies. Is India ready for the “,” or is gradual change based on the development of a self-sustenance model the way ahead?

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Background

With over ’s population living in cities, the 21^st century has been described as the urban century. It is estimated that will be living in cities by 2050.

The first urban settlements appeared as early as 3,000 BC in ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt and the Indus Valley. Historically, cities have fulfilled various functions ranging from sites of pilgrimage, centers of trade and providing protection against enemies.

During the Industrial Revolution, cities developed a more prominent commercial function, attracting people from rural areas who moved to the metropolis��in hope of benefiting monetarily from this shift. The share in England increased from 25.9% in 1776 to 65.2% in 1871. In the early 19^th century, this was due to immigration that was largely , but at the turn of the century natural increase was a major factor in shaping population growth.

The birth of the industrial city, however, came with its own set of limitations: declining infrastructure, congestion, squalor and disruption of social order. A growing concern throughout the late 18^th and 19^th centuries was the development of sustainable cities capable of accommodating a rising��population, since the flow of people to urban areas could not be slowed down.

The beginning of the 20^th century witnessed an in other parts of Europe as well. By , Paris had a population of 2.5 million people, and one-fifth of Germans and French resided in towns. London, with 1 million people in 1800, was unrivaled not only as the largest city in Europe, but also in the world. With a population of 8.6 million in 2015, London��continues to be , but has been outnumbered by with 38 million in the global ranking.

Concerns of unprecedented population expansion find their way well into the 21^st century. Measuring urban success, the City Prosperity Index developed by the United Nations Habitat defines a prosperous city not merely in material terms, but instead inclusivity and equity are important considerations. The cities that do this best often make their proud way onto the “” surveys.

Why are Sustainable Cities��Relevant?

The on climate change notes that cities are not investing adequately in tackling climate change, and unplanned urbanization has led to environmental degradation. Today, even as cities cover less than 2% of the Earth’s surface, they consume 78% of the world’s energy.

City planning often cannot cope with the pace at which population is expanding. It is estimated that today,�� people live in slums, and much of this growth is witnessed in the developing world. According to a����study on urban poverty, over 90% of the urban growth is taking place in the developing world, and the population in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa will double in the coming two decades.

But various new models of urban planning have been developed to deal with the environmental costs of an expanding population and the consequent social risks of the city’s inability to accommodate them.

Concepts such as are developing to reduce urban traffic, the increasing popularity of biking as a mode of transport aims to reduce motorized vehicles on the roads, and smart cities have added technology as an important component while designing inclusive cities aimed specifically at engaging effectively with citizens.

The in India focuses on the use of technology to create safe cities. Women’s safety is central to the that aims to incorporate increased surveillance of public spaces through security devices such as and the development of an efficient emergency response system as key features of a smart city.

To ensure inclusive growth, it is imperative that relevant policies are devised to accommodate the informal settlements and equip them to deal with everyday challenges such as access to employment opportunities, health care and sanitation.

This is particularly relevant for the people who build the cities we live in. The creates employment for over 110 million people worldwide, and it is estimated that of them are in the developing world, most of whom work in the informal sector. In the recent past, large-scale to the Middle East for employment opportunities��has taken place. Migrant construction workers make a significant contribution to their home economies in the form of remittances, but they often face the , irrespective of whether they are legal or illegal.

According to the , a total of 432 Indian and Nepali construction workers have died between 2011 and 2013. , however, notes that in 2014 alone, one Nepali migrant died every two days, so the real figures are most likely much higher.

As urban populations grow and cityscapes expand, take their place on the United Nations agenda, as building�� frameworks becomes essential to ensuring a better future for the global population.

The ideal city would find space for human existence defined in terms of comfort, accessibility, environmental awareness and inclusive social policies, since it is ultimately the human face of the city that breathes life into it.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The relationship between the Indian public and the government has often been fraught with tension. During such times, foreign broadcasters like the BBC have found it easier to make inroads in a new cultural setting and communicated effectively with the Indian audience.

However, in the history of independent India, the relationship between the government and foreign media has not always been stable. On June 25, 1975, then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency—known as the “Emergency”—during which the BBC office in India was shut down. More recently, the Indian government made an attempt at stopping the British broadcaster from airing , a documentary on sexual violence in the country.

Sir Mark Tully, an author and the former bureau chief of BBC New Delhi, started his career in India with the transistor radio in the 1960s. He has witnessed the evolving relationship between the Indian government and the media, both domestic and foreign. From the time of the Emergency to present-day claims that the media are gagged under the current government, Tully argues that Indian media have never been afraid to take on the powerful.

In this edition of The Interview, 51�Թ� traveled to New Delhi to speak with Sir Mark Tully on his love for India, the evolution of Indian media and the future of the country.

Nilanjana Sen: What is it about India that makes you stay? What do you find so alluring about the country?

Sir Mark Tully: Well, it’s a difficult story to explain. People often say that I love India—of course I like India, otherwise I would not be here—but it is not as simple as that. As a matter of fact, I am a great believer in fate.

My family has connections with India going back to 1857. But even before 1857, the first War of Independence, we have a diary written by my great-great-grandmother about what happened during that time. Her father was established in India during the time of the mutiny. He was an opium agent actually, in eastern Uttar Pradesh.

My mother was born in [present-day] Bangladesh, and I was born in Calcutta. When I left India, we were six of us children and we were all very sad. We all went to English boarding schools but none of us liked it, and we were all naughty children at school. We all had happy memories of Darjeeling, which was a lovely free place.

Then, 20 years later when I joined the BBC, I had a very boring job and I did not like working in London. Out of the blue I got a chance of working in India, and I thought it must be my fate that made me come back here. And ever since then whenever I left India, something has happened to bring me back here.

I left India after four years when I came here in 1965 as part of the BBC. The man who succeeded me got into a mess and was expelled from the country—not his fault though. Then, the BBC back in London thought that we must send someone who is experienced and can deal with this Indian government, which can be tricky. I held up my hand and said I was experienced. But during the Emergency, I was also expelled. And when the Emergency was over, I told the BBC to send me back, otherwise it would look as though I had done something very bad. After that, the BBC gave up trying to get me out of India.

And when I left the BBC, I thought to myself for few moments that shall I go back to England now? But then I thought that India has made me and it would be very ungracious of me to just leave India because I was no longer part of the BBC. And that was 20 years ago and I am still here. And I have no plans of going. But I would have to say that it is ultimately in the hands of God and we will have to go one day anyway. Whether I leave a little of myself here or not is still very much in the hands of God.

Sen: In your book,��The Heart of India,��you mention that you started your career with the transistor radio, which was replaced by television. What impact did this have on the Indian audience, especially those in rural India? Do you continue to believe that the radio enables a more intimate relationship with the audience than television?

Tully: Yes, absolutely. The radio does help connect better with the audience. My career has basically been in radio. It is still my favorite medium. If someone said to me that you can either do radio or television, I would not for a moment think. [I would] go for radio.

During the 60s, 70s and 80s, the transistor radio had come in by then. The transistor radio was very cheap. It operated on batteries, so you did not need electrification and it did not require a lot of money. This dramatically increased the spread of radio because it was easily accessible by people in villages, and the Indian government was giving away transistors for family planning. So there was a big radio audience. And during those roughly 30 years, the only radio that people could hear in villages was All India Radio and that was what they would call sarkari radio. But they knew that the sarkar was not to be trusted, so they turned to foreign broadcasts.

Luckily, the BBC was the first choice and, to be absolutely honest, the only choice then. We were broadcasting in English, Hindi, Bengali, Tamil, Urdu and Nepali. So, we had a huge audience and this made us have a huge impact. But very often, this also made us the target of anger of the government. We were sometimes accused of being a foreign hand, sometimes accused of trying to destabilize India—we were accused of all sorts of things. But my argument always was that if we were distorting the news or we were doing something which was blatantly untrue or wrong, then people would not listen to us. So the government and [the BBC] had a difficult relationship, but except during the Emergency, we had to live with each other.

Since the 1990s, television has come along. It has been free and it is allowed to broadcast news and current affairs. And the written press has expanded spectacularly, especially the vernacular press. So, the BBC is no longer as important as it was, but I had the good fortune to be broadcasting during the times when the BBC was quite important. That is why I became well-known, not because I was a genius or anything like that.

Sen: Some people used to call you “Munshi Tully”? What’s the story behind that?

Tully: Actually, what happened was that when I was writing Heart of India, I was in Varanasi near Premchand’s village, and I said to someone that not many people write stories about rural India—it’s only about the Indian middle-class. So, I said I am trying to do a Munshi Premchand. But I said I can never be anywhere as good as he was. So, some people began to call me “Munshi Tully.” But they also called me all sorts of other things—some not very polite, others polite.

Sen: As you have reported extensively on rural India, what are your views on mainstream media’s depiction of what Mahatma Gandhi referred to as “real” India? Do you think mainstream media gives enough importance to rural India?

Tully: No, I don’t think they do. Certainly, there are notable exceptions like P. Sainath, Shekhar Trivedi [and] Srinivas Jain, but basically they don’t give enough attention to rural India. But rural India is still very important because obviously the majority of the population lives in rural India.

Sen: You have often stated that Indian media is disconnected from common citizens and is elitist in its orientation. Why is this?

Tully: I think the Indian media is basically an urban media. I think all of us in the media have a problem that we are, on the whole, looking for bad news and, therefore, that does misrepresent things, because if you are giving only bad news—I mean if the bias is towards bad news—then the bad news becomes in people’s mind what is happening all the time.

You get some very obvious examples in this. I am the last person to deny that rape is highly objectionable and that women should be protected. Nevertheless, because of the coverage of rape now in the Indian media, everybody has the impression that no woman can walk out of the door in India without being afraid of [getting] raped. Nobody knows how many young women are in journalism, in IT and in all sorts of things—who are going in the streets of Delhi doing their jobs and living normal lives.

So this is one of the problems [and] corruption is another. Much is said about corruption and there is a lot of corruption, but there are a lot of honest people in the police. And even as journalists because of paid news—there are lot of people who think that every journalist is taking money. So that is one reason for the disconnect.

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Sen: How do you compare Indian media to British media—or, for that matter, American media? What are the strengths and weaknesses of Indian media?

Tully: I would say that I don’t know why the division. I think, to an extent, the Indian media are less divided on political lines than the media tends to be in Britain. I do not know much about the American media because I have hardly ever been to America and I do not read much of the American media. But as far as the British media are concerned, there is a fairly strong ideological and political divide. You know which side The Daily Mail is going to be—on the right—and The Guardian, for instance, is going to be left of center. You don’t have it to the same extent in India, but you do have individual journalists who are identified with one ideology or another. I think that’s one difference.

I think Indian journals, on the whole, publish more academic type of articles and perhaps less journalistic, though not all of them. I think they are less sensational. Indian newspapers are much more investigative than they were, but they are less investigative than British ones are.

As for television: When I was in Britain, I [didn’t] see all these discussion programs which go on endlessly and in which people shout at each other. I think these programs are very uninstructive. I don’t think you have that sort of thing very much in Britain. You have hard-hitting interviews, but they are usually one on one. You don’t have four people speaking all at once. So that would be another difference.

There is one more very important difference. In Britain, radio is a very powerful current affairs and news medium. And the one program that today the politicians like to get onto is not a television program, but it is breakfast show on Radio 4 called Today Program. In India, by contrast, radio for news and current affairs is virtually dead because no one is allowed to broadcast, except All India Radio.

Another thing which we have not talked about is social media. I don’t really know very much about social media, and that is a very big gap in my knowledge.

Sen: Corruption in Indian media has been a hot button topic. You have commented before that much of India’s governing apparatus is really the relic of the British Raj. Do you think some of this colonial, top-down mentality permeates Indian media today? Do you think Indian media enjoys independence, or are they timid when it comes to holding the powerful to account? If so, why?

Tully: I don’t think the media are that scared to take on the powerful. I think the one time during the Emergency they were, but we have known some journalists who took on the government. Take for instance Kuldeep Nayar, who was arrested during the Emergency. I do not think journalists are unduly afraid of the government, and if you watch the television every night, you will see that people come and say rude things, aggressive things, and they criticize the government.

But people are suggesting that because [Narendra] Modi is a strong prime minister, the media are feeling gagged, [but] I don’t think so. I find a lot of criticism of Modi and of the government. Remember all that rumpus about his suit?

Sen: What is your view on the controversy regarding the film, India’s Daughter?��Do you think the media covered the issue satisfactorily?��

Tully: I think it was the government in this case. It is always, or rather usually, an unwise thing to make a fuss about something you don’t like, because you just draw attention to it and more and more people end up watching it.

There was no way the Indian government was going to stop the BBC from broadcasting it around the world. I know the BBC’s attitude: We do not allow foreign governments to tell us what to broadcast. So when Rajnath Singh said he was going to stop this from being broadcast anywhere, he was not going to be able to do that. All he did was attract international attention to it. So I think it was unwise of the government to make a fuss about it. But I do understand they felt political pressure on them. They must have thought if they did not make a fuss about it, people would think they were not taking the problem seriously.

About the film itself: I didn’t see it. To be honest, I did not very much want to see it; perhaps I should have. But I have read various views on it, and obviously there are different views.

Sen: Please shed some light on the role the BBC played in the restricted political environment of the Emergency in the mid-1970s.

Tully: During the Emergency, I was thrown out [of India] and the BBC office was closed down. It was a very difficult time, but what we tried to do was use other sources and information in order to provide a reasonably reliable service for people. And certainly, we were very widely listened to, but Mrs. [Indira] Gandhi hated us and the government [did] too, since we were defying them. They thought that by closing the office and throwing me out, they would close the BBC down, but they didn’t—the BBC continued. There were lots and lots of people who were very grateful to the BBC, and we had not damaged our credibility.

Sen: What motivated you to write your first book on India,��Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle?��

Tully: What motivated me to write this book was that I felt the Punjab crisis was an example of something which was very dangerous anywhere and particularly in India, which was doing religious politics. I believe the Congress had created Bhindrawale and he had gotten out of control. We were happily working on this book when, suddenly, Indira Gandhi’s assassination took place, and that gave the book a new slant.

Although there have been lots of other books on Blue Star and the assassination of Indira Gandhi, ours was the first and, if I can say so, without being arrogant, [it] has reasonably stood the test of time. But as I said, there are lots of other books, and there is more information available than in our book because ours was the first.

Sen: In��India’s Unending Journey,��you mentioned that Christianity can learn from the Hindu tradition of acknowledging that there are many different ways to God. You mentioned that it might help people question their belief that denies the validity of other faiths. Do you think the semitization of Hinduism is currently taking place?

Tully: I don’t believe the majority of Hindu people are intolerant. There is a streak of intolerance, but even those in the Hindutva wing will always say that we are not intolerant and that we do accept that there are many different ways to God. They do say it, but quite often their actions and the things they say thereafter seem to suggest otherwise. But we Christians believe that Jesus is the only way to God. In that sense, we can learn from Hindu tradition.

Sen: Where do think India is headed, given its potential?

Tully: I have always said that India has enormous potential, and that is why she is recognized around the world. But India will not realize her potential until the administrative system is reformed, [and] the judiciary and the police. In order to realize her potential, India needs a government that functions more efficiently. You cannot function with a judiciary that does not deliver justice on time; you can’t go on with having as many as 70% of people in prisons under trial and trials that can go on for years.

So, yes there is potential, and yes the potential is shown. Even with this old British Raj-style government, which I think is fundamentally flawed. Take for instance the police, which still [operates] on an act that was introduced by the British in 1861. Well, how can that be right?

I think it is [fine] to have plans like the Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, the Make in India Campaign, but these campaigns won’t really be successful until we have an administration which functions efficiently.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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The general elections have come and gone, and India has a new prime minister: Narendra Modi. He led the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to a decisive victory at the polls. However, the future of other parties has come into question. In particular, some are writing off the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). Yet the AAP is likely to survive this setback and continue to shape the political discourse in innovative ways. It has played a major role in encouraging Indian voters to become active participants in the political process and to make clearer choices.

End of the Dynasty

Today, politics has a new language in India. Indians are no longer subjects ruled by a dynasty. Both Arvind Kejriwal, the AAP’s combative leader, and Modi have risen from the grassroots. They made a conscious effort to transcend identity-based politics. While the BJP is seen as a Hindu nationalist party, Modi as a prime ministerial candidate focused on livelihood concerns and economic betterment instead of religious and caste-based identities. The elections reinstated the importance of leadership in shaping the language of politics in India. The way political parties are perceived by voters is shaped to a great extent by the role of leadership. The language of politics spoken by Modi shaped the electorate’s perception about him and the BJP.

The political landscape of India is going through a major transformation. Dynastic politics is being replaced by a more decentralized and bottom-up model of governance. The AAP has been more successful on this count, while the BJP still harbors some dynasties. The success of the AAP lies in reviving the democratization process that existed during India’s freedom movement. Even if the AAP does not survive, its ideas of a bottom-up democracy are here to stay.

A New Language of Politics����������������

For the last few decades, Indian democracy has suffered political decay. Today, it is characterized by rampant corruption, increasing criminalization, weak institutional structures, complete subversion of the system from the top, a sycophantic political culture, increasing populism and a disconnect between power and responsibility. While Manmohan Singh was nominally the prime minister, the decisions were made by the party leader, Sonia Gandhi.

The AAP emerged as a reaction to this decay. It was an offshoot of the anticorruption movement, which started in January 2011. It focused on the development of democracy by making the government accountable to the people. It broadened public deliberation and sought to make the government respond to public concerns. Its ideas, such as anonymous reporting of officers demanding bribes, regular assessment of teachers’ performance and establishment of primaries to choose candidates, are needed steps in a top-down system.

Today, the AAP faces an existential crisis. While many are writing off the party, its chances of bouncing back will be determined by its ability to give a moral basis to politics.��

The AAP has attempted to make citizens more vigilant and to ensure that civil society plays a greater role in the democratic process. The AAP has performed a useful function of empowering the common man. Its very name means the common man’s party and its focus is straightforward: The common man needs to be empowered irrespective of caste, class, religious or regional affiliations. The AAP has proposed a form of direct democracy on certain issues that is a radical new idea in the Indian system that has so far only used the representative democracy model. It has changed Indian politics forever by drilling into voters’ minds that democracy is not just about voting. This is particularly important in a country where democracy has long been limited to voting and where citizens ceased to play any role once a government acquired power.

Support Base of the AAP

The AAP emerged as an urban phenomenon. The urban middle-class and the poor are its main support base. In the future, the party might be able to appeal to rural voters as well, but as yet its organizational reach is limited to Delhi and a few other cities.

An Identity Problem

India has long had reverence for those in authority. Therefore, it has treated politicians as demigods. B.R. Ambedkar, the architect of India’s constitution, had warned against hero worship and expressed his disdain for India’s proclivity for reverence. The AAP has been chipping away at this hierarchical mindset by challenging India’s faltering institutions with a brazenness that can at times be breathtaking.

The AAP has roots in a social movement that wanted to rid corruption from Indian society. Some members of this movement joined the political arena to be active members in transforming government, instead of mere pressure groups agitating for an alternative model. However, politics brings its own compulsions and the AAP is struggling with its activist mindset and, often, seems trapped in its social movement mode. It also has to deal with the feasibility of direct democracy in a deeply divided country of 1.2 billion.

India Needs Ideals

Corruption has gnawed away at India’s soul. In the recent past, those in power have become rapacious and voters have become cynical. The AAP emerged because voters desired a new kind of politics. They wanted representatives to behave with integrity and act in public interest. The AAP promised to make politics respectable, credible and accessible. This touched a chord with Delhi’s voters who elected them as the second largest party in the Delhi Assembly election. The AAP formed the government with outside support of the Indian National Congress.

Today, the AAP faces an existential crisis. While many are writing off the party, its chances of bouncing back will be determined by its ability to give a moral basis to politics. This is a radically new development in a political system that suffered not only from political decay, but also spiritual decadence.

“Alternative Politics”

The AAP, unlike most other parties, particularly the Congress, has accepted that it made mistakes. It has acknowledged that the party’s��impatience to achieve quick results disconnected it from the voters. Yogendra Yadav, a prominent AAP leader, rightly points out that the current aim of the party is to ensure “there is room for alternative politics.”

The AAP never intended to form the government in the 2014 elections. However, it aims to provide an effective opposition because the Congress will fail to do so. The AAP has succeeded in attracting members from sections of society that were politically inactive. More importantly, it has also drawn people to its fold who were anti-political. This is a remarkable achievement in a country where citizens were lulled into passivity during six decades of de facto monarchy. This election marks the end of dynastic politics. It will be remembered for the deepening of democracy that has only just begun and will inevitably grow in the years to come.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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According to Will Durant, the success of religion lies in the “persistent power over the human soul.” Religion helps us connect with reality in a different way; it focuses on experience and enables us to comprehend its transcendental nature.

Much inquiry in the world today suffers from judgments based on narrowly construed interpretations of the experiential reality. Meerten Ter Borg distinguishes between “power of religion” and “religious power.” The former refers to the institutional nature of power, whereas the latter is concerned with the source of power. This source of power may be transcendental, and hence, need not be materialistic in nature.

In the case of Tibet, a combination of the two has taken place to set it apart from other Buddhist societies.

Heart Over Mind

Emotions transcend space and time. In the case of Tibetan Buddhism, the centrality of emotions shapes the ethical character of not only individuals in Tibetan society, but also of Tibet’s national interest. The linguistic expression and practice of the emotions associated with Tibetan Buddhism have earned it international support. The notions of “love” and “compassion” have become metaphors in their struggle for ensuring the survival of their distinct culture. The dominance of structural interpretations blinds us to the degree of which our everyday life is embedded in emotions. Religion performs a role of bridging the gap between these emotions, the individual, and society.

The enlightened mind is integral to the Tibetan culture. The focus on ethical practices is not confined to monks alone and involves the active engagement of lay persons. In , Keneth Liberman notes that the “enlightened mind” is located in the heart in Tibetan thought, in contrast to its location in the head in European philosophy. Ethical transformation, which forms the centerpiece of the Tibetan culture, focuses on the development of the heart over the mind.

Authority and Religion

Tibet faces the challenge of being unable to meet the prerequisites set by the West for recognition. The idea of Tibet as a particular territorial unit was historically enmeshed with  religious fervor, and the most important distinction between people was along the lines of faith. There never existed a distinction between the sacred and the secular, a feature that characterizes the modern state. The idea of a democratic state, which the Dalai Lama has adopted for the Tibetans in exile in India, holds little significance for those who “ is and has always been the only democratic leader of the Tibetan people.” 

A centralized authority had never been established in Tibet except during the 7^th century, when fear of external threat initiated military alliances by the clan-based polities, and during the Mongol entry in the 13^th century. The instability, which ensued due to lack of centralized authority, created a void filled by monasteries. The role the lama played was both spiritual and political in nature. The distinguishing feature of Tibetan Buddhism has been the role of the spiritual teacher that was missing in other variants of Buddhism, with the notable exception of Burma, writes . Power has been historically diffused between the nomadic organizations, the aristocracy, and the monasteries. However, the greatest degree of integration in Tibet has taken place through the monastic tradition.

The Dalai Lama’s government, in line with the West, is working towards establishing a state for a society that, effectively speaking, was always stateless. Even when centralized authority of the monastic system existed, local political structures retained a high degree of autonomy. Hierarchy characterized the society, but religion always proved to be a binding factor. The Chinese invasion in 1950, according to Ashild Kolas, was accompanied by an application of religious persecution as a way of dismantling the Tibetan political system. The situation only worsened with the Cultural Revolution and the systemic attempts at destruction of the Tibetan way of life. Any attack on religion has a direct bearing on the political landscape of a “country” where the distinction between sacred and the secular have been blurred.

Where is Tibet?

If we were to ask – “where is Tibet?” writes , “the future Buddha will locate Tibet in the hearts rather than on a page in an atlas — thus bringing Tibet’s mysteries full circle to a time, before 1950, when it was just a blank space on a classroom globe.” 

Much of the firmness that was expressed with respect to Tibet’s strict territorial boundaries in the Dalai Lama’s book, , dissipated afterwards. “The pull towards independence is mainly moral and emotional in character,” . 

In the case of Tibet, the importance of the value of territorial boundaries was not realized until its cultural identity was attacked. Tibetans always distinguished themselves from others based on beliefs, and in that sense we can identify the cause for the shift in the Dalai Lama’s position with regard to the “question of Tibet” from a demand for independence to an acceptance of autonomy, to his desire to shun violence and preserve its traditions.

For a community faced with a threat to its way of life, infusing its world view with strengthened vigor made it “marketable” in a world plagued by spiritual decay. The experience of the Tibetans also proved to be a blessing in disguise because their struggle was now comprehensible to the world. The Dalai Lama writes: “Tibetans never took any active steps to prove their individuality to the outside world, because it never seemed necessary.” Eventually retaining the Tibetan world view became essential to score an ideological victory over China, and hence, persistent efforts were made to break free from the core area of administration imposed by the Chinese.

Independence of Mind

It can be argued that in the case of Tibet, the demand for independence moved beyond the narrow framework of territorial independence to include independence of the mind. The dangers of the slow death of its culture through change in the education system were a bigger threat than territorial occupation. 

In the hegemonic struggle between the Chinese and Tibetans that ensued after the Dalai Lama’s move to India in 1959, the latter focused on the illegitimacy of the Chinese authority and power over Tibet. This claim was rooted in the major difference that existed between their opposing world views. Where one had adopted the communist path with no role of religion in the affairs of the state, the other intertwined religion and politics.

However, despite the barbarity of the Chinese, the Dalai Lama magnanimously expressed admiration for the party leadership because they held to their communist faith. The Chinese had repeatedly asserted that it was problematic to rest one’s life on religion. 

In his book, , the Dalai Lama spoke favorably of many aspects of Marxism. As a system based on justice and equality, it appealed to him. However, he argued that the theoretical basis of Marxism with its emphasis on a materialist view of human kind was problematic. Despite these differences, he expressed his belief in the two doctrines of Buddhism and communism meeting on a common ground, which would improve the way the two countries conducted politics.

The Dalai Lama’s desire to see Tibet “modernize” along the lines of People’s Republic of China when it came to heavy industries was misconstrued by Mao Zedong, who failed to recognize that the Dalai Lama’s view on scientific matter and material progress was very much in line with the Buddhist teachings. Mao’s belief that “religion is poison” – because it neglected material progress – did not go down well with the Dalai Lama, who did not see the two as antithetical to each other. Mao seemed to ignore the Buddha’s instructions that, as the Dalai Lama writes, stressed the need for “anyone who practices the dharma should test for themselves its validity.” The Tibetan Buddhist way of life was never overpowered by religion and there remained an appreciation for modern science, so long as its usefulness could be tested.

Reaction to Repression

In the case of Tibetans, the reaction to repression by the Chinese in the form of strengthening the potency of the symbols that represent their culture is more viable than engaging in violence. The maintenance of the sanctity of territorial boundaries is desirable, as often these boundaries signify distinctions between “us” and “them.” 

However, notes, the most important distinctions in Tibet were always made according to beliefs. Many tribes did not fit the “gentle Tibetan stereotype” but, Dunham writes: “Although Khampas had no love for Lhasa’s central government, their allegiance to the Dalai Lama was without parallel.” A student belonging to the Khampa tribe argued in an interview that: “My faith in the Dalai Lama is indelible and I would do anything to protect him, even if that means indulging in violence.”

Much of the resilience shown by Tibetan Buddhists is rooted in their belief that nothing is permanent in the world, not even their suffering. The tragedy of Tibet initiated interdependence with the world, which made them more conscious of the Buddhist teaching that their suffering does not exist independent of the suffering of others. 

Thus the Tibetans, with the Dalai Lama as their spiritual and political leader, embarked on a journey to connect with the world on a deeper spiritual plane. The inter-subjective meanings assigned to human experience made the world converge on the centrality of certain emotions that the Tibetans believed had universal value.

A move beyond the materialist conception of relations between countries to formation of ties based on a sharing of universal responsibility to ensure peace, guided the foreign policy of Tibet. The material aspects of life, such as the nature of the state or that of foreign policy, were shaped by the meaning the community gave to them and, in the case of Tibet, it was always colored with religious insights. 

In the words of Albert Camus: “The only way to deal with an unfree world is to become so absolutely free that your very existence becomes an act of rebellion.” The assertion of the Tibetan cultural identity is acquiring a powerful dimension through organized non-violent movements like the , which emerged in Tibet but has spread worldwide among the Tibetan community, and is based on the Gandhian principle of taking pride in everything that resonates of their cultural identity.

For the Tibetans who are deeply-rooted in their history, the potency of their culture has become a “weapon” in their fight for their homeland and, more importantly, in their struggle to retain their unique Tibetan Buddhist identity. 

The Chinese may depart with a thumping victory. Mountains might be riddled by roads. There might be rail lines the Tibetans would have never dreamt of. The Chinese might change the demographics of the region. All this is happening amidst the smoldering ruins of their culture; however, the Tibetans still live in hope. The Chinese will never succeed in destroying the indomitable spirit of their compassion. The politics of the good heart which enables them to remain rooted in history and to gain a moral high ground has connected the Tibetans with the world at a spiritual level, where basic human emotions of love and empathy are invoked to bridge the gap between the individual, his spirit, and the world at large.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect 51�Թ�’s editorial policy.

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Religion helps inculcate social virtues but it also prescribes social customs, which prove to be stifling. To prescribe different norms of social conduct owing to birth qualifications is a discriminatory practice that has its roots in religion. Chistopher A. Bayly, in his book , writes that the treatment which was meted out to the lower castes was slavery compounded by perverted religiosity and a sense of physical revulsion against the poor and oppressed, who are consequently driven to suicide or madness by their exclusion.

This oft quoted statement explains the connection between religion and subjugation most aptly. The  (Hindu caste system) has its basis in religion, and in a country like India, where much is determined by religious beliefs. This has been particularly debilitating, having a direct bearing on the political culture, which is determined by caste and religious identities. The system represents a rigid stratification where notions of purity and pollution are integral. The caste hierarchy sees the Brahmin priests in the uppermost echelons, followed by the Kshatriyas as the warrior and ruling class, the Vaishyas as merchants and farmers, and, at the bottom, the Shudras, serving the other three varna, were often seen as impure and, depending on their trade (such as shoemakers or washers), were once .

Fear and Terror

Desperate attempts are made by many to break away from the shackles of religion. Yet there are those who are drawn deeper into the system by attempting to fit in rather than changing it. This involves the Sanskritization process, by which members of the lower caste adopt the practices of the upper caste. This process has further reinforced the caste identities, as it does not involve questioning of social hierarchies and indicates an acceptance of subservient positions. Fear has subjugated an entire set of people, who are placed in the lower rungs of society and function as per the dictates of the upper caste. In the words of , fear and terror has robbed countless men and women of dignity and peace. When religion instills fear and becomes an instrument of the powerful to coerce those who are in the lower rungs of an entrenched social system, a need to question its credentials arises.

The Caste System and the Free Market

The individual in Indian society struggles to cope with the challenges of globalization and the constant need to adhere to principles that, for a long time, were his only defining characteristics. Migratory flows to the cities in search of better opportunities greatly affect individual identities, as city life is characterized by a certain degree of anonymity. , unlike Gandhi, did not hold the village in high regard, and instead believed that the village was a “den of ignorance.” He argued for breaking hegemonic control by the village heads over lower castes and propagated the need for the exaltation of parliamentary democracy. Basic human necessities include freedom from oppression, a life of dignity, and a sense of justice.

The forces of globalization are altering social relationships and identities. Power equations are defined differently in urban and rural India. Much of urban India has experienced capitalism in its full form, and its core characteristic of engaging in profit-seeking activities gives rise to a heightened class consciousness. The liberalization process, initiated in India through market reforms under ’s government in the early 1990s, was a driving factor behind a heightened class consciousness. As the market was now open to the entry of new players, without the prerequisites pertaining to caste affiliations, class consciousness began to set foot.

Much of the debate after the 1992 market reforms in India, was centered around whether an identity defined by class should be preferred over an identity defined by caste. We cannot ignore the fact that in a society which is divided along caste lines, capitalism, with its emphasis on profit-seeking, completely alienates an entire section that has no share of the pie. The abyss of poverty is as much a reality as vulgar wealth. To rise up the ladder is difficult for many as the resources are controlled by the upper castes. More often than not, these take recourse to religion to validate their privileged position.

Having said this, the growth of cities and increasing urbanization have enabled many people to escape this exploitative system and assume new identities. With all its shortcomings, capitalism has enabled economic, rather than social indicators, to take precedence. The caste code, as it exists in India, prevents those at the bottom of the hierarchy from accumulating wealth. Capitalist societies are characterized by the existence of mobile “classes,” and this is a better alternative than divisions based on caste where the possibility of upward mobility is virtually nonexistent.

Then again, globalizing forces have shaped caste identities in newer ways. As markets have opened up, competition has caused an increase in the number of individuals who have access to the free market. P.N. Panini argues there is enough evidence of caste clustering taking place in industrial units. The economic structure was affected by the liberalization process of 1992, but he argues that caste continued to remain an important aspect of an individual’s identity. The need for trusted workers in a newly liberalized economy made the employers favor the people who belonged to the same community, and hence making the assertion of one’s caste identity was important.

A Division of Laborers

Ambedkar had acknowledged that the caste system was originally intentioned as ensuring a division of labor, but it resulted in what he calls “a division of labourers.” Education, which should have been an instrument of enfranchisement, came to be seen as the domain of the few. It was used as a tool of ideological hegemony. It is exactly this which prevented Voltaire’s famous words — “once a nation starts to think there is no looking back” — from being translated into actions. Domination through ideological means stunted the process of thinking. The literature which the Indian education system produced was, for a long time, Brahminical in nature. The celebrated story from the Mahabharata of low caste Eklavya, who cut off his thumb and presented it to Guru Dronacharya when asked to do so, though projected as a shining example of the Guru-Sishya (teacher-student) relationship, is a firm reminder that a person from the lower castes should not try to grow out of their caste identities.

As the system clearly specifies the domain of each caste, it is not surprising that it was the Brahmins who benefitted from the educational opportunities initiated by the British. The lower castes were not allowed access to educational opportunities. Much of the writings by the Dalit Panthers — a community which emerged in Bombay in 1972 — expressed anger in the most explicit form. The Dalits represent a category of people who fall outside the caste system. The Constitution of independent India forbids discrimination based on caste and has put in place a mechanism of reservations in education and jobs to ensure the upward mobility of the “lower” castes. (Independent India has seen Dalit chief ministers of states and also a Dalit president in K.R. Narayan.) They represented a community that was vying for total annihilation of ideological hegemony through impactful writing and militant activities. The aim was to destroy established cultural hierarchies, disable the Brahminical control over knowledge, and bring about a social revolution.

To envision a state which is caste-neutral is rather difficult. The problem is further compounded by the political culture that has come to characterize India. Ambedkar attempted to establish a political democracy, which would guarantee every individual certain basic rights and establish a balance between the principles of justice and equality. His  of a social system that deprived people of something as basic as dignity and peace, explains the barriers certain sections of society face.

The interplay of caste and religion in India requires well-thought out ways of dealing with this complex relationship. Instead of mindlessly vying for political power by playing on caste identities, the political class needs to ensure that the discourse on annihilation of caste focuses on growth and progress. The market forces post-1990 have contributed to both the weakening and, in some sense, strengthening of caste identities. Even though urban life in India is today characterized by a heightened class consciousness, caste affiliations for many is a form of social security, especially in a country characterized by a subject political culture where citizens recognize their limited ability to influence government decisions. The growing Dalit assertion, be it in the form of theoretical or symbolic victory (the dip by Dalit women in the holy waters of Ganga during the Kumbh Mela of 2013 in gross violation of caste codes), is contributing to a blurring of caste lines. But to visualize a casteless society in the near future, considering the political culture and the strong hold of religion on the lives of most Indians, would seem premature.

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